There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. . . .

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. Carpio v. Valmonte (2004) Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. Villanueva v. Rosqueta (2010) whether or not petitioner Villanueva is liable for damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case, thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer. Abuse of Right; Ignoring Preliminary Injunction Order. Petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. . . That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning (Art. 19, NCC). . . That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action.

People v. Bayotas (2000) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability unless the latter is predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) b) c) d) e) Law Contracts Quasi-contracts ... Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Heirs of Teodoro Guaring v. CA (1997) The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case (acquitting the bus driver) extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus in Tayag v. Alcantara (1980): . . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c),

Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . . Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta et al. (2006) As for petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. As reflected below (infra), Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: Maccay v. Sps Nobela (2005) A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability arising out of the crime. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any. Thus, the counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. Banal v. Tadeo Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . [In other words], criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another (Art. 100, RPC in relation to Article 20, NCC)

Violation of BP 22 may give rise to civil liability. In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public." Thus, civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.