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Page i

The Principle of Hope

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Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (partial list) Thomas McCarthy, General Editor Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bon, and John McCole, editors, On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project Jrgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences Jrgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate Jrgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Jrgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles Jrgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays Jrgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society Axel Honneth, The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory Max Horkheimer, Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings Pierre Missac, Walter Benjamin's Passages Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences William E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law Dennis Schmidt, The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements of Philosophy Georgia Warnke, Justice and Interpretation Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought

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Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion

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Page iii

The Principle of Hope


Volume One Ernst Bloch Translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight

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Third printing, 1996 First MIT Press paperback edition, 1995 Written in the USA 19381947 revised 1953 and 1959; first American edition published by The MIT Press, 1986 English translation 1986 by Basil Blackwell, Ltd. Originally published as Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 1959 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduccd in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bloch, Ernst, 18851977 The principle of hope. (Studies in contemporary German social thought) Translation of Das Prinzip Hoffnung. Includes index. 1. Hope. 2. Imagination. 3. Utopias. 4. Creation (Literary, artistic, etc.) I. Title. II. Series. B3209.B753P7513 1986 193 85-23081 ISBN 0-262-52199-7 (volume 1) 0-262-52200-4 (volume 2) 0-262-52201-2 (volume 3) 0-262-52204-7 (3-volume set) Printed and bound in the United States of America

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CONTENTS
Translators' Preface Translators' Introduction Introduction Volume One Part One (Report) Little Daydreams 1. We Start Out Empty 2. Much Tastes of More 3. Daily into the Blue 4. Hiding-Place and Beautiful Foreign Lands By Ourselves At Home Already on Our Way 5. Escape and the Return of the Victor Putting to Sea The Glittering Bowl 6. More Mature Wishes and their Images The Lame Nags Night of the Long Knives Shortly before the Closing of the Gate Invention of a New Pleasure Opportunity to be Friendly 21 21 21 22 22 23 24 24 26 29 29 30 31 33 35 xvii xix 3

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7. What is Left to Wish for in Old Age Wine and Purse Evocations of Youth; Counter-Wish: Harvest Evening and House 8. The Sign that Changes

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Part Two (Foundation) Anticipatory Consciousness 9. What Goes Ahead as Urging 10. Naked Striving and Wishing, Unsatisfied 11. Man as a Quite Extensive Complex of Drives The Individual Body No Drive Without Body Behind It The Changing Passion 12. Various Interpretations of the Basic Human Drive The Sexual Drive Ego-Drive and Repression Repression, Complex, Unconscious Material and Sublimation Power-Drive, Frenzy-Drive, Collective Unconscious 'Eros' and the Archetypes 13. The Historical Limitation of All Basic Drives; Various Locations of Self-Interest; Filled and Expectant Emotions The Urgent Need Most Reliable Basic Drive: Self-Preservation Historical Change of the Drives, Even of the Self-Preservation Drive Mental Feelings and State of Self, Appetite of the Expectant Emotions, Especially of Hope Self-Extension Drive Forwards, Active Expectation 14. Fundamental Distinction of Daydreams from Night-Dreams. Concealed and Old Wish-Fulfilment in Night-Dreams, Fabulously Inventive and Anticipatory Wish-Fulfilment in Daylight Fantasies 45 45 47 47 48 49 51 51 52 54 57 61 65

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Inclination to Dream Dreams as Wish-Fulfilment Anxiety Dreams and Wish-Fulfilment A Crucial Point: The Daydream is not a Stepping-Stone to the Nocturnal Dream First and Second Characteristics of the Daydream: Clear Road, Preserved Ego Third Characteristic of the Daydream: World-Improving Fourth Characteristic of the Daydream: Journey to the End Merging of Nocturnal and Daytime Dream-Games, Its Dissolution More on Inclination to Dream: The 'Mood' as Medium of Daydreams More on the Expectant Emotions (Anxiety, Fear, Terror, Despair, Hope, Confidence) and the Waking Dream

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15. Discovery of the Not-Yet-Conscious or of Forward Dawning. NotYet-Conscious as a New Class of Consciousness and as the Class of Consciousness of the New: Youth, Time of Change, Productivity. Concept of the Utopian Function, Its Encounter with Interest, Ideology, Archetypes, Ideals, Allegory-Symbols The Two Edges Double Meaning of the Preconscious Not-Yet-Conscious in Youth, Time of Change, Productivity Further Thoughts on Productivity: Its Three Stages Different Kinds of Resistance Which the Forgotten and the Not-YetConscious Offer to Illumination Epilogue on the Block which has Prevented the Concept of the NotYet-Conscious for so Long Conscious and Known Activity in the Not-Yet-Conscious, Utopian Function More on the Utopian Function: The Subject in it and the CounterMove to the Badly Existing Contact of the Utopian Function with Interest Encounter of the Utopian Function with Ideology Encounter of the Utopian Function with Archetypes Encounter of the Utopian Function with Ideals Encounter of the Utopian Function with Allegory-Symbols 16. Utopian Image-Trace in Realization; Egyptian and Trojan Helen Dreams Want to Drift Non-Satisfaction and What Can Lie Within It First Reason for Disappointment: Happiness is There Where You are Not; Second Reason: Dream Rendered Independent and the Legend of the Double Helen

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Objection to the First and Second Reason: Odyssey of Aquiescence Third Reason for Utopian Trace-Images: The Aporias of Realization 17. The World in Which Utopian Imagination has a Correlate; Real Possibility, the Categories Front, Novum, Ultimum and the Horizon Man is not Solid Much in the World is Still Unclosed Militant Optimism, the Categories Front, Novum, Ultimum 'What-Is According to Possibility' and 'What-Is in Possibility', Cold and Warm Stream in Marxism Artistic Appearance as Visible Pre-Appearance False Autarky; Pre-Appearance as Real Fragment It is a Question of Realism, Everything Real has a Horizon 18. The Layers of the Category Possibility The Formally Possible The Factually-Objectively Possible

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The Fact-Based Object-Suited Possible The Objectively-Real Possible Memory: Logical-Static Struggle Against the Possible Realizing Possibility 19. Changing the World or Marx's Eleven Theses on Feuerbach Time of Drafting Question of Grouping Epistemological Group: Perception and Activity (Theses 5, 1, 3) Anthropological-Historical Group: Self-Alienation and True Materialism (Theses 4, 6, 7, 9, 10) Theory-Practice-Group: Proof and Probation (Theses 2, 8) The Password and its Meaning (Thesis 11) The Archimedean Point; Knowledge Related not Only to What is Past, But Essentially to What is Coming Up 20. Summary/Anticipatory Composition and Its Poles: Dark Moment Open Adequacy Pulse and Lived Darkness Room for Possible Advance Source and Outflow: Astonishment as Absolute Question Once More: Darkness of the Lived Moment; Carpe Diem Darkness of the Lived Moment, Continuation: Foreground, Dead Space, Melancholy of Fulfilment, Self-Mediation More on Astonishment as Absolute Question, in the Shape of Anxiety and of Happiness; the Directly Utopian Archetype: Highest Good

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The Not in Origin, the Not-Yet in History, the Nothing or Conversely the All at the End Utopia no Lasting State; Therefore After All: Carpe Diem, But a Genuine One in Genuine Present 21. Daydream in Delightful form: Pamina or the Picture as Erotic Promise The Tender Morning Effect Through the Portrait Nimbus Around Encounter, Betrothal Too much Image, Rescue from It, Nimbus Around Marriage High Pair, Corpus Christi or Previous Cosmic and Christ-Like Utopia of Marriage After-Image of Love 22. Daydream in Symbolic form: Pandora's Box; the Good Thing that Remains Part Three (Transition) Wishful Images in the Mirror (Display, Fairytale, Travel, Film, Theatre) 23. Making Ourselves More Beautiful than We are

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24. What the Mirror Tells Us Today Being Slim Good at Cringing 25. New Clothes, the Illuminated Display Well Laid Out Light of Advertising 26. Beautiful Mask, Ku Klux Klan, the Glossy Magazines The Crooked Paths Success Through Terror Bestsellers, Syrupy Stories 27. Better Castles in the Air in Fair and Circus, in Fairytale and Colportage Courage of the Clever Magic Table, Genie of the Lamp 'On Wings of Song, My Darling, I will Carry You Away' 'Let Us Go to the Meadows of the Ganges, There I Know the Loveliest Place' South Seas in Fair and Circus The Wild Fairytale: As Colportage 28. Lure of Travel, Antiquity, Happiness of the Gothic Novel Beautiful Foreign Lands Distance-Wish and Historicizing Room in the Nineteenth Century Aura of Antique Furniture, Magic of Ruins, Museum

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Castle Garden and the Buildings of Arcadia Wild Weather, Apollo By Night 29. Wishful Image in the Dance; Pantomime and Filmland New Dance and Old New Dance as Formerly Expressionist Dance, Exoticism Ritual Dance, Dervishes, Blessed Circles The Deaf and Dumb and the Significant Pantomime New Mime Through the Camera Dream-Factory in the Rotten and in the Transparent Sense 30. The Theatre, Regarded as Paradigmatic Institution, and the Decision in It The Curtain Rises Rehearsal on the Model More on the Rehearsal on the Model to be Sought Reading, Spoken Mime and Scene Illusion, Sincere Appearance, Moral Institution False and Genuine Topicalization Further Genuine Topicalization: Not Fear and Pity, But Defiance and Hope 31. Mocked and Hated Wishful Images, Voluntarily Humorous Ones The Little Word If 'None of These New-Fangled Things Are Any

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Good' Le Nant; Another World The 'Birds' of Aristophanes and Cloud-Cuckoo-Land Merry Outdoing: Lucian's 'Vera Historia' Voluntary-Humorous Wishful Images 32. Happy End, Seen Through and Yet Still Defended Volume Two Part Four (Construction) Outlines of a Better World (Medicine, Social Systems, Technology, Architecture, Geography, Perspective in Art and Wisdom) 33. A Dreamer Always Wants Even More 34. Physical Exercise, Tout Va Bien 35. Struggle for Health, Medical Utopias A Warm Bed Lunatics and Fairytales Medicines and Planning Hesitation and Goal in Actual Bodily Rebuilding Malthus, Birth-Rate, Nourishment The Doctor's Care 36. Freedom and Order, Survey of Social Utopias I. Introduction/A Frugal Meal The Roast Pigeons Lunacy and Colportage Even Here

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New Moral Worlds on the Horizon Utopias Have Their Timetable II. Social Wishful Images of the Past/Solon and the Contented Medium Diogenes and the Exemplary Beggars Aristippus and the Exemplary Scroungers Plato's Dream of the Doric State Hellenistic Fairytales of an Ideal State, Iamboulos' Island of the Sun The Stoics and the International World-State The Bible and the Kingdom of Neighbourly Love Augustine's City of God from Rebirth Joachim of Fiore, the Third Gospel and Its Kingdom Thomas More or the Utopia of Social Freedom Counterpart to More: Campanella's City of the Sun or the Utopia of Social Order Socratic Inquiry into Freedom and Order, with Regard to 'Utopia' and 'Civitas Solis' Continuation: Social Utopias and Classic Natural Right Enlightened Natural Right in Place of Social Utopias Fichte's Closed Commercial State or Production and Exchange in Accordance with Rational Law Federative Utopias in the Nineteenth Century: Owen, Fourier Centralist Utopias in the Nineteenth Century: Cabet, Saint-Simon Individual Utopians and Anarchy, Stirner, Proudhon, Bakunin Proletarian Castle in the

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the Air from the Vormrz: Weitling A Conclusion: Weakness and Status of the Rational Utopias III. Projects and Progress Towards Science/Topical Remnants: Bourgeois Group Utopias Beginning, Programme of the Youth Movement Struggle for the New Woman, Programme of the Women's Movement Old New Land, Programme of Zionism Novels Set in the Future and Full-Scale Utopias After Marx: Bellamy, William Morris, Carlyle, Henry George Marxism and Concrete Anticipation 37. Will and Nature, the Technological Utopias I. Magic Past/Plunged into Misery Fire and New Armament Lunacy and Aladdin's Fairytale 'Professor Mystos' and Invention Andreae's 'Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz Anno 1459' Alchemy Again: Mutatio Specierum (Transmutation of Inorganic Species) and its Incubator Unregulated Inventions and 'Propositiones' in the Baroque Period Bacon's Ars Inveniendi; Survival of the Lullian Art New Atlantis, the Utopian Laboratory II. Non-Euclidean Present and Future, the Problem of Technological Contact/Plans Must also be Spurred on Late Bourgeois Curbing of Technology, Apart from the Military

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Kind De-Organization of the Machine; Atomic Energy, Non-Euclidean Technology Subject, Raw Materials, Laws and Contact in De-Organization Electron of the Human Subject, of Technology of the will Co-Productivity of a Possible Natural Subject or Concrete Technology of Alliance Technology Without Violation; Economic Crisis and Technological Accident Chained Giant, Veiled Sphinx, Technological Freedom 38. Buildings Which Depict a Better World, Architectural Utopias I. Figures of Ancient Architecture/Glance through the Window Dreams on the Pompeian Wall Festive Decorations and Baroque Stage Sets Wishful Architecture in the Fairytale Wishful Architecture in Painting The Church Masons' Guilds or Architectural Utopia in Actual Construction Egypt or the Crystal of Death Utopia, Gothic or the Tree of Life Utopia Further and Individual Examples of Guiding Space in Ancient Architecture II. Building on Hollow Space/New Houses and Real Clarity Town Plans, Ideal Towns and Real Clarity Again: Permeation of Crystal with Profusion 661

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39. Eldorado and Eden, the Geographical Utopias The First Lights Inventing and Discovering; Characteristic of Geographical Hope Fairytales Again, the Golden Fleece and the Grail Island of the Phaeacians, the Bad Atlantic, Location of the Earthly Paradise Voyage of St Brendan, the Kingdom of Prester John; American, Asiatic Paradise Columbus at the Orinoco Delta; Dome of the Earth South Land and the Utopia of Thule Better Abodes on Other Stars; Hic Rhodus The Copernican Connection, Baader's 'Central Earth' Geographical Line of Extension in Sobriety; the Fund of the Earth, Mediated with Work 40. Wishful Landscape Portrayed in Painting, Opera, Literature The Moved Hand Flower and Carpet Still Life Composed of Human Beings Embarkation for Cythera Perspective and Large Horizon in Van Eyck, Leonardo, Rembrandt Still Life, Cythera and Broad Perspective in Literature: Heinse, Roman de la Rose, Jean Paul The Wishful Landscape of Perspective in Aesthetics; Status of the Matter of Art According to its Dimension of Depth and Hope Painters of the Residual Sunday, Seurat, Czanne, Gauguin; Giotto's

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Land of Legend Land of Legend in Literature: As Celestial Rose in Dante's 'Paradiso', as Transcendental High Mountains in the Faustian Heaven Splendour, Elysium in Opera and Oratorio Contact of the Interior and the Boundless in the Spirit of Music: Kleist's Ideal Landscape; Sistine Madonna 41. Wishful Landscape and Wisdom Sub Specie Aeternitatis and of Process The Search for Proportion The 'Authentic' in Primary Matter and Law Kant and the Intelligible Kingdom; Plato, Eros and the Pyramid of Value Bruno and the Infinite Work of Art; Spinoza and the World as Crystal Augustine and Goal-History; Leibniz and the World as Process of Illumination The Watchful Concept or the 'Authentic' as a Task Two Wishful Propositions: Teachable Virtue, the Categorical Imperative The Proposition of Anaximander or World which Turns into Likeness Lightness in the Depths, Joyfulness of the Phenomenon of Light 42. Eight-Hour Day, World in Peace, Free Time and Leisure The Whip of Hunger From the Casemates of the Bourgeoisie All Kinds of Alleviation Through Benefaction Bourgeois 820

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Pacifism and Peace Technological Maturity, State Capitalism and State Socialism; October Revolution Delusions of Free Time: Toughening up for Business Residual Older Forms of Free Time, Spoiled, But not Hopeless: Hobby, Public Festival, Amphi-Theatre The Surroundings of Free Time: Utopian Buen Retiro and Pastoral Leisure as Imperative, Only Half Explored Goal Volume Three Part Five (Identity) Wishful Images of the Fulfilled Moment (Morality, Music, Images of Death, Religion, Morning-Land of Nature, Highest Good) 43. Not Straight with Oneself 44. Home and School Guide the Way 45. Guiding Images Themselves, to Become Like Proper Human Beings 46. Guiding Panels of Dangerous and Happy Life Much Still Open Too Warmly Dressed Wild, Bold Hunt French Happiness and Joy Adventures of Happiness 47. Guiding Panels of will Tempi and of Contemplation, of Solitude and Friendship, of Individual and Community A Decent Person Fabius or the Hesitant Man of Action

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Sorel, Machiavelli or Energy and the Wheel of Fortune Problem of Breaking, Hercules at the Crossroads, Dionysus-Apollo Vita Activa, Vita Contemplativa or the World of the Chosen Good Part Double Light of Solitude and Friendship Double Light of Individual and Collective Salvation of the Individual Through Community 48. Young Goethe, Non-renunciation, Ariel The Wish to Smash Things Wertherian Happiness and Suffering The Demand, Prometheus, Ur-Tasso Intention of Sublimity, Faust Gothic and Metamorphosis Ariel and Poetic Imagination The Demonic, and the Allegorical-Symbolic

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Sealedness which Expresses Itself Just Those Who Know Such Longing: Mignon Wishes as Presentiments of Our Capacities 49. Guiding Figures of Venturing Beyond the Limits; Faust and the Wager of the Fulfilled Moment No Wet Straw Play the Lute and Drain the Glasses Don Giovanni, All Women and the Wedding Faust, Macrocosm, Stay a While You are So Fair Faust, Hegel's Phenomenology and the Event Odysseus did not Die in Ithaca, He Journeyed to the Unpeopled World Hamlet, Sealed will; Prospero, Groundless Joy 50. Guiding Panels of Abstract and Mediated Venturing Beyond the Limits, Illustrated by the Cases of Don Quixote and Faust The Fermenting will Don Quixote's Rueful Countenance and Golden Illusion A Related Question: The Wrongs and Rights of Tasso Versus Antonio The Luciferian-Promethean and the Layer of Sound 51. Venturing Beyond and Most Intense World of Man in Music Happiness of the Blind The Nymph Syrinx Bizarre Hero and Nymph: Symphonie Fantastique

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Human Expression as Inseparable from Music Music as Canon and World of Laws; Harmony of the Spheres, More Humane Lode-Stars Tone-Painting, Work of Nature Once Again, the Intensity and Morality of Music The Hollow Space; Subject of the Sonata and Fugue Funeral March, Requiem, Cortge Behind Death Marseillaise and the Moment in Fidelio 52. Self and Grave-Lamp or Images of Hope Against the Power of the Strongest Non-Utopia: Death I. Introduction/No Talk of Dying Utopias of the Night With No Morning Any More in this World II. Religious Counterpoints from Death and Victory/Only Good of the Dead Shades and Greek Twilight Affirmation of Recurrence; Orphic Wheel Elixirs of the Soul and the Gnostic Journey to Heaven Egyptian Heaven in the Tomb Biblical Resurrection and Apocalypse Mohammedan Heaven, Strength of the Flesh, Magic Garden Sheer Repose Seeks Deliverance Even from Heaven, the Wishful Image of Nirvana

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III. Enlightened and Romantic Euthanasias/The Freethinker as Strong Thinker Youth with the Reversed Torch and with the Newly Lighted Torch Dissolution in the Universe, Lethal Return to Nature Glacier, Earth-Mother and World-Spirit IV. Further Secularized Counter-Moves, Nihilism, House of Humanity/Still the Dyeing of Nothingness Four Signs of a Borrowed Faith Metaphorical Immortality: in the Work Death as the Chisel in Tragedy Disappearance of Lethal Nothingness in Socialist Consciousness V. Joy of Life and Fragment in All Things/Journey of Discovery into Death The Moment as Not-Being-Here; Extra-Territoriality to Death 53. Growing Human Commitment to Religious Mystery, to Astral Myth, Exodus, Kingdom; Atheism and the Utopia of the Kingdom I. Introduction/In Good Hands Lunatics Again, Occult Path Chiefs and Magicians; Every Religion has Founders A Numinous Element, Even in the Religious Humanum II. Founders, Glad Tidings and Cur Deus Homo/The Stranger as Teacher: Cadmus Singer of ecstatic salvation: Orpheus Poets of Apollonian Gods and Their Attendance: Homer and Hesiod; Roman State Gods

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The Unblossomed Belief in Prometheus and the Tragic Liturgy: Aeschylus Fish-Man and Moon-Scribe of Astral Myth: Oannes, Hermes Trismegistus-Thoth Glad Tidings of Earthly-Heavenly Balance and of the Inconspicuous World-Rhythm (Tao): Confucius, Lao Tzu A Founder Who is Himself Part of the Glad Tidings: Moses, His God of Exodus Moses or Consciousness of Utopia in Religion, of Religion in Utopia Warlike Self-Commitment, Mingled with Astral Light: Zoroaster, Mani Redemptive Self-Commitment, Limited to Acosmos, Related to Nirvana: Buddha Founder from the Spirit of Moses and the Exodus, Completely Identical with his Glad Tidings: Jesus, Apocalypse, Kingdom Jesus and the Father; The Serpent of Paradise as Saviour; the Three Wishful Mysteries: Resurrection, Ascension, Return Fanaticism and Submission to Allah's will: Mohammed III. The Core of the Earth as Real Extra-Territoriality/The Road of the Non-Existent What For Inavertible and Avertible Fate, or Cassandra and Isaiah God as Utopian Hypostatized Ideal of

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the Unknown Man; Feuerbach, Cur Deus Homo Again Recourse to Atheism; Problem of the Space into Which God Was Imagined and Utopianized Stay Awhile in the Religious Layer: The Unity of the Instant in Mysticism Miracles and the Miraculous; Moment as the Foot of Nike 54. The Last Wishful Content and the Highest Good Drive and food Three Wishes and the Best Value-Images as Variations of the Highest Good; Cicero and the Philosophers Stay Awhile and Highest Good; Problem of a Guiding Image in the World Process Drive and Food Once Again or Subjectivity, Objectivity of Goods, of Values and of the Highest Good Hovering and Severity with Reference to the Highest Good (Evening Wind, Statue of Buddha, Figure of the Kingdom) Number and Cipher of Qualities; Meaning of the Highest Good in Nature 55. Karl Marx and Humanity; Stuff of Hope The True Architect 'To Overturn All Circumstances in Which Man is a Degraded, a Subjugated, a Forsaken, a Contemptible Being' Secularization and the Power of Setting Things on Their Feet Forward Dream, Sobriety, Enthusiasm and Their Unity Certainty, Unfinished World, Homeland

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Glossary of Foreign Terms Name and Title Index

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Page xvii

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE
The English text of the Principle of Hope is based on Bloch's revised version of the work, first published by Suhrkamp in 1959. As far as possible the format of this edition conforms to the German text which Bloch himself authorized. There are no footnotes in the original German but we have included explanations and references where we felt these would be helpful or especially interesting for the English reader. Wherever possible, we have also annotated the numerous implicit and explicit allusions to the Bible and to Goethe's Faust, the central spiritual and poetic legacies inherited by The Principle of Hope. All translations are our own, with the exception of biblical quotations for which we have used the Authorized Version. Bloch's own references are included in the body of the text. Where a specific page reference is given to a German work, we have left the original title and supplied a translation in the bilingual index. Otherwise book titles have been translated in the text and retained in the bilingual index, with the exception of Latin titles, which have been left in the original throughout. To preserve the structure and fabric of Bloch's text, it has been necessary to override certain English publishing conventions. Except for epigraphs, quoted extracts have not been displayed, but are run on in text within quotation marks. To avoid confusion with Bloch's own emphatic italics, classical and foreign expressions have not been italicized. These expressions have been left in the original, as they are also very much a feature of Bloch's style. We have included a glossary of foreign terms not directly explained in the text. It precedes the index at the end of the third volume. The project of translating The Principle of Hope was first suggested to Paul Knight by Basil Blackwell Ltd to whom the book had been recommended by Bryan Magee. The translators would like to thank the following people for their assistance and encouragement. At Basil Blackwell: Ren Olivieri, Ray Addicott, Julia Mosse and Sue Banfield, all of whom demonstrated the principle of hope in setting up and realizing this project. Our thanks to George Steiner for his advice at important stages of its development. Margot Levy undertook the task of copy-editing the work. She also supplied us with some valuable references. Isabel Raphael interpreted Bloch's Latin devices

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and allusions cum ira et studio, and likewise helped us to reference them. Our special thanks to them both. Thanks also to Kevin Mulligan and to Martin Shovel. The translators would like to acknowledge the financial assistance of Inter Nationes and of South East Arts.

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TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

Bloch's Early Life


Ernst Bloch was born in Ludwigshafen on 8th July 1885, the son of a Jewish railway official. A stark contrast was presented to him as a child between the new industrial, proletarian city where he grew up and the fading nineteenth-century opulence of Mannheim, the other city just across the Rhine, with its Grnderzeit architecture and its old Residenz, one of the most elaborate palaces in Germany. Though Bloch by no means dismisses the achievements of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie and describes them with a certain affection, this early landscape of class contradiction must have been decisive in his formation as a socialist. The local aniline and soda factory, Bloch points out in his early impressionistic and autobiographical work 'Spuren' (Traces), was moved to Ludwigshafen 'so that the smoke and proletariat did not drift over Mannheim'. But though he lived on the wrong side of the bridge, his childhood was an imaginative and rewarding one which he looked back on fondly in his later books. The visions and longings of the child are for Bloch the emotional inklings of the spirit of 'venturing beyond' which he esteemed so highly in thinkers and innovators, and without which the New is inconceivable. The games he played with his childhood friends transformed the dismal, flat industrial hinterland of Ludwigshafen into an almost numinous, hallucinatory landscape, populated with characters out of the adventure stories of Karl May. As a boy Bloch immersed himself in these stories, a love of which he retained for the whole of his life. Even in the core work of his mature system 'The Principle of Hope', a section is devoted to fairytale and to colportage, the term he employed to describe the genre of the adventure story. 'There is only Karl May and Hegel', he once said, 'everything in between is an impure mixture'. Bloch was an indifferent pupil, but a precocious intellect. As a schoolboy he was composing speculative tracts with ambitious titles like 'The Universe in the Light of Atheism', 'Renaissance of Sensuality'. By the age of seventeen he was already corresponding with prominent German philosophers

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of the day. Even as an old man he was to reach back into these early writings for a motto to suit a volume of his complete works: ' . . .but the essence of the world is cheerful spirit and the urge to creative shaping; the Thing In Itself is objective imagination'. This pre-appearance and its re-appearance across seven decades demonstrates the homogeneous development of Bloch's work and thought. It is also entirely consistent with his idea that only at the end of a process does its beginning reveal itself and finally begin. Yet his school report for 1904/5, two years after the above was written, informs us that 'his achievements are so minimal that, considering the profound gaps in his knowledge, he will only be able to pass his final exams by the most strenuous application'. After studying philosophy in Munich and in Wrzburg, in both cases pursuing the idea of bohemia and a particular girl-student rather than seeking out a particular professor, Bloch moved to Berlin, where he was befriended and encouraged by Georg Simmel, a fashionable professor whose interests ranged, as Bloch's were later to do, over the whole spectrum of philosophy, sociology and metaphysics. Simmel was also one of the 'Georgekreis', the intimate circle around the lyric poet Stefan George. But Bloch was dismissive of the aesthetic posturing of the 'Georgekreis' and soon disillusioned by Simmel's inability to commit himself to any of the positions he was so adept at expounding. During these years in Berlin Bloch also forged an important friendship with the philosopher and critic Georg Lukcs. Bloch travelled widely at this time, both with Lukcs and with Simmel, particularly in Italy. His work reflects an interest not only in travel and travellers, but in the psychological attraction of distance and foreignness in the daydreams and wishful images of the little man confined to the everyday. It is with these dreams that 'The Principle of Hope' opens. In 1911 Bloch went to Garmisch and began work on his own philosophy in earnest, developing the key-concept of the Not-Yet-Conscious which he had formulated as early as 1907. For the next few years, Bloch moved between Garmisch and Heidelberg where Lukcs was living. Later he wrote of this time and of his friendship with Lukcs: 'We had become so close that we functioned like speaking-tubes. I was always away from Heidelberg, actually had my writing-desk in Garmisch, I alternated between Garmisch and Heidelberg; the beginnings of my philosophy were written in Garmisch a Bavarian birth then, with the will to be worthy of the Alps which I had outside my window. If we were separated, I in Garmisch and Lukcs in Heidelberg or somewhere else, and then we saw each other again after a month or two then it might happen that I or he began to speak

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or to think where the other had just left off.' In Heidelberg Bloch became part of the circle around the sociologist Max Weber. Marianne Weber gives us a picture of him at that time: 'A new Jewish philosopher has recently arrived a boy with an enormous quiff and just as enormous self-importance, he obviously regards himself as the forerunner of a new Messiah and wants people to regard him as such.' Weber shared his wife's opinion and distanced himself from Bloch, suspicious of his mystical ideas. In 1913 Bloch married Elsa von Stritzky, a sculptress from Riga. Unfit for military service, he lived in Grnewald in the Isar valley for most of the First World War before moving to Berne in 1917. He was emphatic in his opposition to the war, which he saw as a fundamentally imperialist conflict. When Simmel lent his support to the wave of patriotism sweeping Germany, Bloch finally severed their friendship. In Zurich Bloch became acquainted with Walter Benjamin, seven years his junior, the essayist and critic. Benjamin described him in a letter as 'the only person of significance I have met in Switzerland so far', and later as the writer who alongside Kafka and Brecht had perfected the German essay, a compliment he might justifiably have paid himself.

The Spirit of Utopia


During this central decade of Expressionism, Bloch continued to develop the concept of the Not-Yet-Conscious, and in 1918 published 'Geist der Utopie' (The Spirit of Utopia), a mystical and prophetic work written in a highly Expressionist style. The book, his first major work, is dedicated to his wife. Bloch's interest in religion which first becomes manifest in 'The Spirit of Utopia', unusual in a Marxist, may to some extent be attributed to the influence of Elsa's almost gnostic Christian mysticism. This essayistic work is a blend of messianism, socialism and ideas of unrevealed spiritual truth, but the book also reflects Bloch's early interest in what was to become the principal field of his future study utopia. Bloch's great friend Margarete Susman seems to have anticipated the importance of the ideas contained in the book, seeing in it elements of a new German metaphysics. Bloch's first wife, to whom he was devoted, died in 1921 after several years of illness. Her death had a devastating effect on him, and continued to affect him throughout his life, as we may see from the end of the very moving section on marriage in 'The Principle of Hope', begun almost twenty years later: 'Just as the pain of love is a thousand times better than

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unhappy marriage, in which there only remains pain, fruitless pain, so too the landlocked adventures of love are diffuse compared with the great sea voyage which marriage can be, which does not end with old age, not even with the death of one partner.' Here still, as elsewhere in the section, there is a sense of his relationship with Elsa, and perhaps too of his second abortive marriage to a painter from Frankfurt which lasted less than a year, an attempt perhaps to replace the intimacy of the first. In 1928 a former girlfriend of Bloch's from the days when he was living in Positano gave birth to a daughter, Mirjam, after their relationship had ended. Frida Abeles did not inform Bloch of the pregnancy or of the birth; the news reached him through the poet Else Lasker-Schler. The relationship was obviously an embarrassment to Bloch who was by this time involved with Karola Piotrkowska, a young student of architecture from Lodz in Poland whom he subsequently married in 1934. A portrait of their felicitous life together may be read in Frau Karola Bloch's book 'Aus meinem Leben' (From My Life). Bloch continued to travel throughout the twenties after the death of his first wife. His visit to Tunisia in 1926 brought him into contact with the world of Islam for the first time, a religion which significantly contributes to the 'wishful images of the fulfilled moment' in volume three of 'The Principle of Hope' alongside the Christian and Jewish traditions. When in Germany, he was mainly based in Berlin. Another major friendship began here in the twenties, with one of the philosophers who was later to be a major figure in the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno. Adorno later speaks of 'the great Blochian music', and retained a great admiration for Bloch, but as with Lukcs, the friendship was strained by the alleged unorthodoxy of Bloch's subjectivist approach to socialism, even though by the twenties Bloch was politically a hard-line communist. There seems to be some evidence that he attempted to align himself in a more orthodox way with the mainstream of Marxist thinking. In 1923 he issued a second re-written edition of 'The Spirit of Utopia' giving a more systematic introduction to his utopian philosophy and attempting to fuse it with Marxism. Bloch seems to have had a closer affinity with Walter Benjamin, with whom he was in close contact in Berlin. Benjamin shared Bloch's interest in mystical traditions, particularly the Cabbala, and they experimented with hashish together, another productive source of the creative daydream for Bloch, as 'The Principle of Hope' elaborates. Elements of Benjamin's theory of tragedy may be detected in Bloch's analysis of the

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social function of theatre at the end of the first volume of this work. By this tame Bloch's literary reputation was established and he was writing regularly for the major newspapers in Berlin. He had met Bertolt Brecht as early as 1921 and their friendship endured until the latter's death. He was drawn to Brecht by his undogmatic approach to Marxism, and Brecht's work forms the backbone of Bloch's view of the theatre as a socially instructive 'paradigmatic institution'. Towards the end of the decade there were also friendships with Kurt Weill, Hanns Eisler and Otto Klemperer. In 1930 Bloch's major literary work was published, 'Spuren' (Traces), a collection of prose pieces which set the tone for the cryptic passages that introduce each section of 'The Principle of Hope'. During these Berlin years Bloch began work on 'Erbschaft dieser Zeit' (Legacy of this Time), a critical analysis of the twenties and the rise of fascism, but this work was interrupted by Hitler's accession to power. Bloch emigrated to Zurich at the beginning of March 1933. During this period his friendship with Lukcs gradually developed into public disagreement. This culminated in the notorious debate concerning Expressionism which by 1935 Lukcs, now a leading communist critic, saw as a direct cultural antecedent of National Socialist ideology. Bloch published his first reply in an essay written as a result of the Nazis' exhibition of 'degenerate art' in which many Expressionist works were included. But as 'The Principle of Hope' illustrates at several points, Bloch remained loyal throughout his life to his concept of Expressionism as a progressive artistic movement. Lukcs distanced himself more and more from Bloch's mystical approach to the revelation of socialism. Lukcs pointed to the decisive difference in position between his own 'Geschichte und Klassenbewutsein' (History and Class Consciousness) and the utopian philosophy of 'The Spirit of Utopia' or Bloch's book on the millenarian Christian Thomas Mnzer, 'Thomas Mnzer als Theologe der Revolution' (Thomas Mnzer as Theologian of the Revolution). Even though as young men they had both developed a socialist perspective, Lukcs did not consider Bloch to be a 'genuine Marxist'. Bloch also looked back on their early dialogue together with affection, and in 1972, still with obvious respect for Lukcs, he dedicated 'Das Materialismusproblem' (The Problem of Materialism) to the friend of his youth.

Exile in America
After Zurich, Bloch moved on to Vienna, then Paris and Prague where

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his son Jan was born in 1937. Keeping one step ahead of the Nazis, he emigrated to the United States in 1938 and remained there for over a decade, living on the East Coast. It was during this period that 'The Principle of Hope' was largely written (it was revised in the 1950s). Originally Bloch hoped to publish it in America under the title 'Dreams of a Better Life'. The book shows a clear antipathy to a culture which he saw as the inevitable heir of the fascism he had left Europe to escape. 'The Principle of Hope' bristles with anti-American sentiments, and a good deal of its ideological analysis of the psychology of the Babbitt (a term he borrowed from the American author Sinclair Lewis), the archetype of the little man, has an American frame of reference. Bloch never fully mastered English, as may be seen from some of his rather bizarre uses of American colloquialisms, and in fact he lived rather remote from the other exiled German intellectuals in the United States, grouped around Thomas Mann. The comprehensive 'Triptych of the German Emigration' painted by Arthur Kaufmann during those years shows Bloch withdrawn, in the very back row. Like Benjamin, who died during exile, Bloch was not given employment in Horkheimer's Institute for Social Research when it moved from France to the USA, though Adorno's influence must have carried great weight there. This perhaps shows the extent to which their friendship had atrophied in the thirties. In 1942 Adorno did make a public appeal on behalf of Bloch in a New York journal, outlining the deprivation in which Bloch was living at the time and requesting donations. But this must have been very double-edged loyalty for Bloch, since Adorno incorrectly stated that Bloch had been earning his living by washing dishes and that he had been dismissed for his slowness. In fact, Karola Bloch supported Ernst and Jan by working first as a waitress and then in an architect's office. Neither were the Blochs entirely free of the anti-Semitism which had forced them to leave Germany. Many places of recreation, Karola reports in her biography, were 'restricted' and inaccessible for Jews. In 1938, more than a decade before McCarthyism, a committee against 'un-American activities' had been founded to counteract communism. Bloch was repeatedly forced to appear in the Immigration Office in Boston to establish whether he was fit for American citizenship. Though he had never been a member of the KPD, the Communist Party in Germany, he was considered 'a premature anti-fascist', that is, someone who had been opposed to the fascists before Pearl Harbour. Finally he was forced to undergo an oral examination on the American Constitution. Karola Bloch relates that the astonished examiner called in his colleagues to listen to Bloch's riveting analysis of the American War of Independence.

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In this way he finally secured citizenship, two years later than his wife.

East and West


Bloch returned to Germany in 1949 to take up the chair of philosophy at the university of Leipzig at the age of sixty-four. As 'The Principle of Hope' tells us, he did not consider that the war was over, merely that the seat of fascist power had removed itself from Berlin to Washington. To begin with, he seems to have firmly believed in the possibility of creating a new anti-fascist society in the German Democratic Republic which would restore German culture to greatness. In 1954/5 the first two volumes of 'The Principle of Hope' appeared, and Bloch was awarded the National Prize of the GDR, and recognized as its leading philosopher. But gradually his philosophical and political position became irreconcilable with that of the leadership of the Stalinist SED (the ruling state party in the GDR). A number of his students were arrested in 1957, among them Wolfgang Harich, a supporter of Tito's non-Stalinist regime in Yugoslavia. Though Bloch rejected Harich's democratic humanist ideas of reform for the GDR, he was implicated in counter-revolutionary activity and was fortunate to escape arrest. Harich was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, accused of conspiracy with the West. Bloch was forced to retire, forbidden to teach, and was obliged to give up the editorship of the politically influential 'Deutsche Zeitschrift fr Philosophie'. His and Harich's contributions were expunged from its index. Walter Ulbricht, leader of the SED, suggested that Bloch's teaching adopted non-Marxist principles, laid too much emphasis on the subjective, and that his utopian philosophy was ignoring the concrete class-struggle and idealistically pursuing a 'distant goal'. These sentiments seem to echo those of Bloch's old friend Lukcs, who had become the Minister of Culture in Hungary in the Nagy regime, but it is worth considering that in 1956 Soviet troops were already suppressing 'counterrevolutionary' tendencies in Hungary, and Lukcs himself was forced into temporary exile in Rumania, because of his closeness to the 'Yugoslavian' line. In 1957, with official sanction, a pamphlet criticizing Bloch appeared in Berlin entitled 'Ernst Bloch's Revision of Marxism'. Branded as a revisionist, even as a mystic pantheist, Bloch was no longer able to participate in academic life in the East. He lived in isolation, having contact only with personal friends. His books continued to appear fitfully

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in the East, however. In 1959 the third volume of 'The Principle of Hope' was published. Bloch began to travel more frequently to the West to deliver lectures and attend congresses. In 1961 he was coincidentally in West Berlin when the Berlin Wall was first erected and spontaneously took the decision to remain in the West, accepting a guest professorship at Tbingen university where he continued to be an active advocate of socialism and, most untypically for a German professor, devoted much of his time to his students. He spoke publicly against the voting of emergency powers in October 1966. Later in the sixties he befriended Rudi Dutschke and lent his support to the student movement, though with characteristic anticipatory consciousness, expressing surprise that the radical movement against capitalism in the West should emerge from the children of the middle class. Bloch never visited the Soviet Union. His attitude to it in 'The Principle of Hope' is still positive, but already we may detect a good deal of implicit criticism, of the ideology of the comrade for example, of the nonintervention pact, and of State Socialism in general. But he considered the artistic developments in dance and film in the Soviet Union to be extremely progressive tendencies, and praised the elements of folk-culture which the revolution had preserved, though he was well aware that the USSR had not reached political maturity, was still in a transitional stage, contained elements of State Socialism and fell far short of the 'final state' which corresponded to his own utopian vision of international socialism. His own reappraisal of Stalinism came late, after Khrushchev's in 1956, after Hungary, and only after his own experiences in East Berlin. In later life he was opposed both to Soviet domination and to American imperialism, supporting the Prague Spring and vehemently denouncing America's part in the Vietnam War, advocating a diversification of socialism away from the Soviet model. Bloch saw Marxism as a necessary synthesis of 'cold' and 'warm' streams, the one representing its undeceived critical rigour, the other its idealistic and imaginative receptivity. As early as the 1930s, Bloch warned against the separation of 'bread' and 'violin' in the communist world. Ultimately he was condemned for not subordinating the latter to the former in a decade of ideological entrenchment in the East. Bloch was not exposed to the international acclaim accorded to the Frankfurt School in the English-speaking world in the sixties and seventies, perhaps indeed because his works were not available to readers of English. He shared Marcuse's suspicion of the ideologies into the service of which the new technologies were being pressed in East and West. His voice was

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not heard outside Germany. But at Tbingen he became the pipe-smoking father figure of philosophy in his own country, ultimately preferring, like his great literary guiding-image Goethe, the climate of Southern Germany where his philosophy had begun. Bloch's conception of old age, and the counselling role of the elder, was certainly one which he realized in his own life. Though he became blind in later years, he lived to supervise and to revise the seventeen volumes of his collected works, an astonishing achievement for a philosopher in his own life-time and consistent with his wishful image and archetype of harvest. He died in the summer of 1977 at the age of ninety-two.

Bloch and Tradition


Consistent with his view that the past contains a cultural inheritance and utopian content still to be extracted, Bloch's philosophy, though firmly rooted in the German tradition, contains an eclectic mixture of progressive elements drawn from classical, oriental and Western philosophies. The inheritance that is to be claimed from the past, however, is not a legacy of fixed tradition, but of undischarged hope-content and utopian content in the works of the past. Thus Bloch takes the utopian aspirations and energy of the subjective factor in German Idealism first systematized by Kant and combines it with the objective factor in the materialist philosophy of Marx and Engels. He takes the concept of process from Hegel and develops it into his own concept of open process at work in dialectical materialism. He takes Aristotle's concept of 'entelechy' and builds it into his own theory of possibility. He takes Bacon's 'New Atlantis' and includes it in the historical programme for socialism. But claiming this inheritance in no way makes Bloch a secondary thinker. It is entirely consistent with his wholly original concept of the Not-Yet-Conscious, the preconscious dimension in both past and future. New meaning and fresh synthetic combinations can be extracted from the thinking of the past, precisely because this thinking is not yet finished, and is to be discovered and inherited by each succeeding age. The works of the past contain the premonitory and pre-figurative images of the next stage of society. In open process, succeeding ages 're-function' the material of the past to suit their ideological requirements, whether reactionary or progressive. But from all progressive thinking a utopian surplus is carried over into the future. It may lie dormant for centuries before new social conditions recall it and extract its new

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meaning. 'The Principle of Hope' is an encyclopaedia of hope that attempts to catalogue the surplus of utopian thought from the early Greek philosophers to the present day. Bloch understands utopia not as an impossible ideal, but as a real and concrete final state which can be achieved politically. He sees the development of socialism as the modern expression of the utopian function which effects this change, the goal towards which the process of history is impelled by utopian thinking. But history is by no means mechanical or fully determined for Bloch. It is not an inevitable march towards socialism. Its dynamic is not a Hegelian world-spirit. It advances at all stages through possibility. The possibility of Nothing, of the In-Vain remains. Possibility is itself an open process, and not merely in the subject. Bloch considers that the object itself contains layers of possibility, culminating in the objectively real Possible, the ultimate synthesis of subjective and objective realization of the world. Bloch has often been placed squarely in the Romantic tradition because of this attempted synthesis, as if he were continuing the utopian search for the 'blue flower' of German Romanticism where imagination and world finally meet. But the subjective idealism of Schelling and Fichte, the philosophical inspiration behind German Romanticism, sought this synthesis without considering possible development in the object, in objective process in the world. Whereas Bloch insists on the bilateral development of both the subjective and the objective factor and on their dialectical interaction. Bloch takes as his model for this final state of subjective and objective cognition the idea mentioned in a letter from Marx to Ruge in 1843 of the world possessing 'a dream of the matter', of a real state of the world that has not yet become manifest and will only become so through socialism. Yet Bloch understands that this ultimately real perception of the world implies the political task of humanizing the world. Hegel's 'Thing in Itself' must also become Engels' 'Thing For Us'. By theoretically and practically realizing the real possibility of the world, it may be transformed into 'Heimat' homeland, where, in the words of Bloch's literary guiding-image, Faust, we may say 'Here I am human, here I am entitled to be!' At all points in Bloch there is the sense of this human freedom. The problematic dialectic of freedom and order is a central question in his work. His discussion of this relationship (which forms part of volume two of 'The Principle of Hope') was the first of his writings to appear after the war, but the political implications did not endear him to his post-war sponsors in the stabilizing regimes of the Eastern Bloc. The Not-Yet-Conscious can be contained in past, present and future.

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Unrealized meaning can be trapped in the works of the past. The 'darkness of the just lived moment' which prevents us from experiencing and enjoying the world in a Carpe diem sense indicates the presence of the Not-Yet-Conscious in the present. The future aspect of the NotYet-Conscious is principally revealed in what Bloch calls 'forward dawning' and 'preappearance' ('Vor-Schein', which also has the connotation of 'shining ahead'). Every age contains its horizon, its Front over which this Not-Yet-Conscious flows when the block of static and regressive thinking is lifted. It may actually be observed in social and political events, as in the storming of the Bastille, for example, but art is the major repository of the images, archetypes and symbols of the Not-Yet-Conscious, supplying us with the guidingimages that 'venture beyond' the statics of the known world. In his historical survey of the Not-Yet-Conscious, Bloch concentrates on the thinkers and project-makers who have extended this Front by venturing beyond, by inventing, visualizing the possibilities of the world that is coming over the threshold. 'The Principle of Hope' is thus an encyclopaedia of these figures and their appearance in reality and in art. The Not-Yet-Conscious contains an individual psychological dimension as well as social and political expression. In characteristically polemical style, Bloch attacks Freud and particularly Jung (whom he regarded as a thinker complicit with fascism) for confining the unconscious to the past, in Jung's case to an ahistorical dimension of primal experience. Bloch illustrates how this theory was appropriated to serve the bogus notions of Aryan purity and native soil by German Nazism. His criticism of Freud largely centred on the latter's understanding of repression. Freud's analysis solely attempted to lead his patients back into the past to confront the origins of their neurosis, the repressed material that was inhibiting them. There was no concern with future, not yet conscious development. Analogously, in Bloch's view, Freud avoided analysis of the social causes of repression and entertained no idea of the future development of the society which might improve the psychological conditions of his patients. He only addressed himself to the symptoms and not the fundamental causes of their neuroses. Furthermore, he ignored the most basic human drive, the closest drive to the unrevealed 'That' which drives on within us, namely hunger. It is significant that Freud never uses the German term 'Instinkt' for his theory of the drives, but rather the word 'Trieb'. It may well be that Strachey's English translation of Freud has committed a major error in referring to the drives as 'instincts'. Bloch's analysis of Freud makes this distinction unequivocal. He extends the theory of the drives by demonstrating

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that they are socialized rather than innate, and thus wholly distinct from instincts. It is perhaps no coincidence that Bloch's philosophy was ultimately considered heretical in the East. Bloch's attention always seems to wander in the direction of heretical rather than orthodox figures. His earlier book on Thomas Mnzer is a pre-appearance of his preoccupation with thinkers who are challenging orthodox beliefs. Mnzer and millenarians like Joachim of Fiore feature largely in 'The Principle of Hope', whereas Luther, the father of the orthodox Reformation in Germany, only merits a handful of references. Bloch's commitment to the Hermetic tradition and to heretical figures in general reflects his preference for those thinkers who regard the world as an unrevealed mystery rather than a body of received laws and commandments. In 'The Principle of Hope' he chooses to investigate the Cabbala rather than the Torah, prospective alchemy rather than determined astrology, systems of thought that are processive and open rather than already manifest and absolute. Bloch's 'Principle of Hope' is of course such a system itself, and owes almost as much to the Hermetic tradition as it does to the tradition of dialectical materialism. Sections of the work have a mystical quality as they approach the That-riddle of consciousness that appears behind the drives, but Bloch would not see this as metaphysical speculation incompatible with a materialist approach to the world. He seeks to relocate man's metaphysical aspirations and apotheoses in worldly experience itself, and to reveal the world precisely as the mystery towards which Hermetic thinking has been groping. This mystical aspect of Bloch's work, often lifting his thought out of culturally specific historical and philosophical argument on to a different level of elliptical conceptual and linguistic connection, may well have contributed to the notion that Bloch is a difficult thinker. But these passages, cryptically opening each section of 'The Principle of Hope', transcendentally and climactically closing each section with a sweeping gesture of optimism or hope, perhaps hold the key to Bloch's literary style. The notion of 'intensification' (Steigerung), already present in Goethe, permeates Bloch's work. Bloch's cadences do not fall, they are always going up. It is therefore no coincidence that many sections of the work end on the 'heights', on the metaphor of the high mountains, as indeed does 'Faust', a fact of which Bloch was well aware. The book is full of explicit and implicit references to 'Faust', and the structure of Goethe's major work is unmistakably present behind Bloch's own, as it moves towards 'identity'. The symphonic structure of the work is also clearly evident. Bloch considered music to

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be the most important of the arts, in which the Not-Yet and the utopian could be most perfectly realized. Reprises, refrains, codas, the musical gestures are unmistakable. Bloch was not only anxious to include the ontological and utopian gestures of music in his catalogue of hope (a section is devoted to it in volume three), but also to incorporate these gestures in the structure of his major work itself.

The Style of 'The Principle of Hope'


'The Principle of Hope' is thus certainly a literary work in its own right, and this may also account for the suspicion with which it has been received in Marxist circles. Alongside the metaphor of the high mountains is that of the ship venturing beyond the Pillars of Hercules, an image inherited from Francis Bacon, whom Bloch greatly admired. These images become sunken metaphors, often just below the text, apparently lost, then surfacing again with new significance, perfectly mirroring in metaphorical terms Bloch's theory of the continuing legacy of utopian content. Forward dawning is also an aspect of Bloch's style. An image will be filtered into the argument before it emerges in its full metaphorical plumage, as real cipher. But Bloch's philosophy, of course, acknowledges the residual traces of past consciousness in advancing process, and this is also reflected in the fabric of the text, which reveals a great deal of after-ripening of ideas and images, reintroductions of motifs and metaphors, charged with renewed significance. A repeated idea, as Bloch states in his own introduction, may have learnt something in the meantime. Bloch's eclectic choice of register is in itself a further reflection of his theory of the mutual presence of the past and future in each other. He blends archaisms, Latin and Greek terms, obsolescent usages, 'Volksweisheiten' (popular sayings and proverbs) with the language of Marxism, science and dialectical materialism to produce a kind of cultural lexicon of the German language. As a poet, Bloch is perhaps a poet of light. The quality of light, morning red, distant blue, the blue hour of twilight, are metaphorical expressions of states of consciousness, both individual and social, and of states of hope and realization. New and unexpired ideas appear as premonitory glimmerings and extended after-glowings, shining ahead or continuing to bathe history in their unextinguished light. Bloch holds up a light-meter to history to test its utopian content. Light, and all its nuances, becomes the most fundamental 'real cipher' in the book. The theory of the 'real cipher' is

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crucial to an understanding of Bloch's literary style and of his use of metaphor. He develops Goethe's conclusion in 'Faust' that 'Everything transitory is only a metaphor', and sees the very objects of the phenomenal world as 'real ciphers' of the world-riddle, that is, he believes the world contains in metaphorical form the secret signatures of the world mystery that is to be revealed. Bloch had conceived this idea of traces which the world-secret leaves behind it in the physical details of the world much earlier in 'Traces', begun in 1917 though completed in 1930, but it is in 'The Principle of Hope' that this aspect of his theory is developed into a fully fledged aesthetics, synthesized with the concept of the possible utopian All that, if progressive forces prevail, may finally be attained. Art is thus fundamentally concerned not with the imitation but with the revelation of the world, the process by which the images of the Not-Yet-Conscious are brought into consciousness. But for Bloch the successful achievement of this utopian final state is by no means an inevitability. He is equally aware of the opposite cipher circulating in the world, the Nothing which expressed itself and may express itself again in the darkness of fascism.

Venturing Beyond
This is the first full translation of any of Bloch's works in English. It is ironic to think that 'The Principle of Hope' might first have been published in England before it had even appeared in Germany. Paul Tillich, among others, was instrumental in trying to get the book published in Oxford in the 1940s. But no contract was ultimately signed. The work seems to have been hovering on English consciousness for many years, its arrival inhibited by the resistance to heterodox socialist thought in British academic philosophy. This delay is itself a true example of the Blochian Not-Yet-Conscious. But there is no sense in which the book now appears, forty years later, as an anachronism. Always when reading Bloch there is the impression of a mind not confined to a specific decade but spanning the century, forwards and backwards. This year, 1985, is his centenary. There could be no more fitting time to present 'The Principle of Hope' in an English translation. In a time of cultural reentrenchment and social pessimism, it presents a radical reappraisal of utopian socialist thinking. But it is not merely an academic catalogue of socialist and utopian thinkers. In fact, though Bloch was himself suspicious of the idea of 'Lebensphilosophie', programmatic philosophies of life, he provides in this book a moral and

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intellectual agenda for socialism, a philosophical and historical counter-argument to the popular ideology that radical change in itself presents a danger and a threat to humanity and to 'order'. By providing a panoramic view of history, Bloch demonstrates that it is precisely radical thinkers 'venturing beyond' available existence who have extended and humanized the world through intellectual, scientific and artistic innovation. He may now certainly take his place amongst the great innovators and utopians who have espoused the principle of hope. Fittingly, his own epitaph, taken from this book, reads: 'Thinking means venturing beyond'. Bloch was no utopist, he considered his philosophy to be concretely utopian, mediated with real possibility, and his philosophy advocates engagement with, rather than contemplation of, the world. There is certainly no sense of detachment, in his life or in his work, from political reality and practice. From the beginning, he was a tireless opponent of imperialism, fascism and war. From very early on, he was aware of the potential of nuclear weapons, of the negative Ultimum, of the destruction to which man's scientific innovations could be turned. And he never wavered in the belief that socialism was ultimately the only alternative to the annihilation capitalism would inevitably bring if man did not venture beyond it politically and embrace radical change. 'The Principle of Hope', Bloch's central work, is a historical and collective statement of hope against this annihilation, but also a practical guide to living in late capitalist society, in cultural decline, where the possibility of a truly human society seems remote and the dominant emotion is fear. As an alternative, it offers a socialist theory of the emotions based instead on the strongest of the expectant emotions hope. It envisages a new society where men and women can at last become like proper human beings, living and working and above all enjoying themselves in a world which has become Thing For Us, or in Bloch's own phrase, where man is walking upright. NEVILLE PLAICE STEPHEN PLAICE PAUL KNIGHT BRIGHTON, 1985

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To my son Jan Robert Bloch

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INTRODUCTION
Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? What are we waiting for? What awaits us? Many only feel confused. The ground shakes, they do not know why and with what. Theirs is a state of anxiety; if it becomes more definite, then it is fear. Once a man travelled far and wide to learn fear. In the time that has just passed, it came easier and closer, the art was mastered in a terrible fashion. But now that the creators of fear have been dealt with, a feeling that suits us better is overdue. It is a question of learning hope. Its work does not renounce, it is in love with success rather than failure. Hope, superior to fear, is neither passive like the latter, nor locked into nothingness. The emotion of hope goes out of itself, makes people broad instead of confining them, cannot know nearly enough of what it is that makes them inwardly aimed, of what may be allied to them outwardly. The work of this emotion requires people who throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they themselves belong. It will not tolerate a dog's life which feels itself only passively thrown into What Is, which is not seen through, even wretchedly recognized. The work against anxiety about life and the machinations of fear is that against its creators, who are for the most part easy to identify, and it looks in the world itself for what can help the world; this can be found. How richly people have always dreamed of this, dreamed of the better life that might be possible. Everybody's life is pervaded by daydreams: one part of this is just stale, even enervating escapism, even booty for swindlers, but another part is provocative, is not content just to accept the bad which exists, does not accept renunciation. This other part has hoping at its core, and is teachable. It can be extricated from the unregulated daydream and from its sly misuse, can be activated undimmed. Nobody has ever lived without daydreams, but it is a question of knowing them deeper and deeper and in this way keeping them trained unerringly, usefully, on what is right. Let the daydreams grow even fuller, since this means they are enriching themselves around the sober glance; not in the

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sense of clogging, but of becoming clear. Not in the sense of merely contemplative reason which takes things as they are and as they stand, but of participating reason which takes them as they go, and therefore also as they could go better. Then let the daydreams grow really fuller, that is, clearer, less random, more familiar, more clearly understood and more mediated with the course of things. So that the wheat which is trying to ripen can be encouraged to grow and be harvested. Thinking means venturing beyond. But in such a way that what already exists is not kept under or skated over. Not in its deprivation, let alone in moving out of it. Not in the causes of deprivation, let alone in the first signs of the change which is ripening within it. That is why real venturing beyond never goes into the mere vacuum of an In-Front-of-Us, merely fanatically, merely visualizing abstractions. Instead, it grasps the New as something that is mediated in what exists and is in motion, although to be revealed the New demands the most extreme effort of will. Real venturing beyond knows and activates the tendency which is inherent in history and which proceeds dialectically. Primarily, everybody lives in the future, because they strive, past things only come later, and as yet genuine present is almost never there at all. The future dimension contains what is feared or what is hoped for; as regards human intention, that is, when it is not thwarted, it contains only what is hoped for. Function and content of hope are experienced continuously, and in times of rising societies they have been continuously activated and extended. Only in times of a declining old society, like modern Western society, does a certain partial and transitory intention run exclusively downwards. Then those who cannot find their way out of the decline are confronted with fear of hope and against it. Then fear presents itself as the subjectivist, nihilism as the objectivist mask of the crisis phenomenon: which is tolerated but not seen through, which is lamented but not changed. On bourgeois ground, especially in the abyss which has opened and into which the bourgeoisie has moved, change is impossible anyway even if it were desired, which is by no means the case. In fact, bourgeois interest would like to draw every other interest opposed to it into its own failure; so, in order to drain the new life, it makes its own agony apparently fundamental, apparently ontological. The futility of bourgeois existence is extended to be that of the human situation in general, of existence per se. Without success in the long run, of course: the bourgeois emptiness that has developed is as ephemeral as the class which alone still expresses itself within it, and as spineless as the illusory existence of its own bad immediacy with which it is in league. Hopelessness

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is itself, in a temporal and factual sense, the most insupportable thing, downright intolerable to human needs. Which is why even deception, if it is to be effective, must work with flatteringly and corruptly aroused hope. Which is also why hope is preached from every pulpit, but is confined to mere inwardness or to empty promises of the other world. Which is why even the latest miseries of Western philosophy are no longer able to present their philosophy of misery without loaning the idea of transcendence, venturing beyond, from the bank. All this means is that man is essentially determined by the future, but with the cynically self-interested inference, hypostasized from its own class position, that the future is the sign outside the No Future night club, and the destiny of man nothingness. Well: let the dead bury their dead; even in the hesitation which the outstaying night draws over it, the beginning day is listening to something other than the putridly stifling, hollowly nihilistic death-knell. As long as man is in a bad way, both private and public existence are pervaded by daydreams; dreams of a better life than that which has so far been given him. In what is false, and all the more so in what is genuine, every human intention is applied on to this ground. And even where the ground, as so often before, may deceive us, full of sandbanks one moment, full of chimeras the next, it can only be condemned and possibly cleared up through combined research into objective tendency and subjective intention. Corruptio optimi pessima: fraudulent hope is one of the greatest malefactors, even enervators, of the human race, concretely genuine hope its most dedicated benefactor. Thus, knowing-concrete hope subjectively breaks most powerfully into fear, objectively leads most efficiently towards the radical termination of the contents of fear. Together with informed discontent which belongs to hope, because they both arise out of the No to deprivation. Thinking means venturing beyond. Admittedly, venturing beyond has not been all that adept at finding its thinking until now. Or even if it was found, there were too many bad eyes around which did not see the matter clearly. Lazy substitution, current copying representation, the pig's bladder of a reactionary, but also schematizing Zeitgeist, these repressed what had been discovered. Marx's work marks the turning-point in the process of concrete venturing beyond becoming conscious. But around this point deeply ingrained habits of thinking cling to a world without Front. Not only man is in a bad way here, but so is the insight into his hope. Intending is not heard in its characteristic anticipating tone, objective tendency is not recognized in its characteristic anticipatory powerfulness. The desiderium, the only honest attribute of all men, is unexplored. The

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Not-Yet-Conscious, Not-Yet-Become, although it fulfils the meaning of all men and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept. This blossoming field of questions lies almost speechless in previous philosophy. Forward dreaming, as Lenin says, was not reflected on, was only touched on sporadically, did not attain the concept appropriate to it. Until Marx, expectation and what is expected, the former in the subject, the latter in the object, the oncoming as a whole did not take on a global dimension, in which it could find a place, let alone a central one. The huge occurrence of utopia in the world is almost unilluminated explicitly. Of all the strange features of ignorance, this is one of the most conspicuous. In his first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro is said to have forgotten the future tense; philosophically, it has still not been adequately considered to this day. This means: an overwhelmingly static thinking did not name or even understand this condition, and it repeatedly closes off as something finished what has become its lot. As contemplative knowledge it is by definition solely knowledge of what can be contemplated, namely of the past, and it bends an arch of closed form-contents out of Becomeness over the Unbecome. Consequently, even where it is grasped historically, this world is a world of repetition or of the great Time-and-Again; it is a palace of fateful events, as Leibniz called it without breaking out of it. Occurrence becomes history, knowledge re-remembering, celebration the observance of something that has been. This is how all previous philosophers went about it, with their form, idea or substance posited as being finished, even postulating Kant, even dialectical Hegel. In this way physical and metaphysical need spoiled its appetite, in particular its paths to outstanding satisfaction, certainly not just that achieved in books, were blocked. Hope, with its positive correlate: the still unclosed determinateness of existence, superior to any res finita, does not therefore occur in the history of the sciences, either as psychological or as cosmic entity and least of all as functionary of what has never been, of the possible New. Therefore: a particularly extensive attempt is made in this book to bring philosophy to hope, as to a place in the world which is as inhabited as the best civilized land and as unexplored as the Antarctic. In critical and further elaborated connection with the contents of the author's previous books, 'Traces', especially 'The Spirit of Utopia', 'Thomas Mnzer', 'Legacy of this Time', 'Subject-Object'. Longing, expectation, hope therefore need their hermeneutics, the dawning of the In-Frontof-Us demands its specific concept, the Novum demands its concept of the Front. And all this so that ultimately the royal road through the mediated

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realm of possibility to the necessarily Intended can be critically laid, and can remain orientated, without being broken off. Docta spes, comprehended hope, thus illuminates the concept of a principle in the world, a concept which will no longer leave it. For the very reason that this principle has always been in the process of the world, but philosophically excluded for so long. Since there is absolutely no conscious production of history along whose path of informed tendency the goal would not likewise be all, the concept of the utopian (in the positive sense of the word) principle, that of hope and its contents worthy of human beings, is an absolutely central one here. Indeed, what is designated by this concept lies in the horizon of the consciousness that is becoming adequate of any given thing, in the risen horizon that is rising even higher. Expectation, hope, intention towards possibility that has still not become: this is not only a basic feature of human consciousness, but, concretely corrected and grasped, a basic determination within objective reality as a whole. Since Marx, no research into truth and no realistic judgement is possible at all which will be able to avoid the subjective and objective hope-contents of the world without paying the penalty of triviality or reaching a dead-end. Philosophy will have conscience of tomorrow, commitment to the future, knowledge of hope, or it will have no more knowledge. And the new philosophy, as it was initiated by Marx, is the same thing as the philosophy of the New, this entity which expects, destroys or fulfils us all. Its consciousness is the openness of danger and of the victory which is to be brought about in those conditions. Its space is the objectively real possibility within process, along the path of the Object* itself, in which what is radically intended by man is not delivered anywhere but not thwarted anywhere either. Its concern, to which all its energies must be devoted, remains what is truly hoping in the subject, truly hoped for in the object: our task is to research the function and content of this central Thing For Us. The good New is never that completely new. It acts far beyond the daydreams by which life is pervaded and of which the figurative arts are full. All freedom movements are guided by utopian aspirations, and all Christians know them after their own fashion too, with sleeping conscience or with consternation, from the exodus and messianic parts of the Bible. In addition, the merging of have and have-not constituted by longing and hope, and by the drive to reach home again, has in any case been burrowing in great philosophy. Not only in Plato's Eros, but also in the far-reaching Aristotelian concept of matter as that of possibility towards essence, and
*

For a distinction between 'Objekt' (object) and 'Gegenstand' (Object) see footnote on p. 166.

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in Leibniz's concept of tendency. Hope acts unmediatedly in the Kantian postulates of moral consciousness, it acts in a world-based, mediated way in Hegel's historical dialectic. However, despite all these Enlightenment patrols and even expeditions into terram utopicam, there is something broken off about them all, broken off by contemplation. Most obviously perhaps in Hegel, who ventured out furthest: What Has Been overwhelms what is approaching, the collection of things that have become totally obstructs the categories Future, Front, Novum. Thus the utopian principle could not achieve a breakthrough, either in the archaic-mythical world, despite exodus from this, or in the urbane-rationalistic one, despite explosive dialectics. The reason for this is invariably that both the archaic-mythical and the urbane-rationalistic cast of mind are contemplative-idealistic, consequently, being merely passive-contemplative, they presuppose a closed world that has already become, including the projected over-world in which What Has Become is reflected. The gods of perfection in the former, the ideas or ideals in the latter are in their illusory being just as much res finitae as the so-called facts of this world in their empirical being. Future of the genuine, processively open kind is therefore sealed off from and alien to any mere contemplation. Only thinking directed towards changing the world and informing the desire to change it does not confront the future (the unclosed space for new development in front of us) as embarrassment and the past as spell. Hence the crucial point is: only knowledge as conscious theory-practice confronts Becoming and what can be decided within it, conversely, contemplative knowledge can only refer by definition to What Has Become. In myth, the direct expression of this pull towards What Has Been, this relation to What Has Become is self-absorption, is the urge towards the immemorial, also the continual predominance of what is truly pagan, namely astral-mythic, the fixed dome arching over all occurrence. The methodical expression of the same connection to the past, estrangement from the future in rationalism is Plato's anamnesis, or the doctrine that all knowledge is simply re-remembering. Re-remembering of the ideas perceived before birth, of totally primal past or what is ahistorically eternal. Whereby Beingness simply coincides with Been-ness, and the owl of Minerva always begins its flight only after dusk has fallen, when a form of life has already become old. Even Hegel's dialectic, in its ultimate 'circle of circles', is similarly inhibited by the phantom of anamnesis and banished into the antiquarium. Marx was the first to posit the pathos of change instead of this, as the beginning of a theory which does not resign itself to contemplation and interpretation. The rigid divisions between future

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and past thus themselves collapse, unbecome future becomes visible in the past, avenged and inherited, mediated and fulfilled past in the future. Past that is grasped in isolation and clung to in this way is a mere commodity category, that is, a reified Factum without consciousness of its Fieri and of its continuing process. But true action in the present itself occurs solely in the totality of this process which is unclosed both backwards and forwards, materialistic dialectics becomes the instrument to control this process, the instrument of the mediated, controlled Novum. The Ratio of the bourgeois epoch which remained progressive is the next inheritance for this (minus ideology which is tied to its location and the increasing emptying of contents). But this Ratio is not the sole inheritance, on the contrary, preceding societies and even many myths in them (again minus mere ideology and particularly minus prescientifically preserved superstition) may also provide a philosophy which has surmounted the bourgeois barrier of knowledge with possibly progressive inherited material, even though, as is obvious, this material particularly requires elucidation, critical acquisition, functional change. Consider for example the role of purpose (Where To, What For) in precapitalist world-pictures or even the meaning of quality in their non-.mechanical concept of nature. Consider the myth of Prometheus, whom Marx calls the most distinguished saint in the philosophical calendar. Consider the myth of the Golden Age and its transposition into the future in the messianic consciousness of so many oppressed classes and peoples. Marxist philosophy, as that which at last adequately addresses what is becoming and what is approaching, also knows the whole of the past in creative breadth, because it knows no past other than the still living, not yet discharged past. Marxist philosophy is that of the future, therefore also of the future in the past; thus, in this collected consciousness of Front, it is living theory-practice of comprehended tendency, familiar with occurrence, in league with the Novum. And the crucial point remains: the light, in whose appearance the processiveunclosed Totum is depicted and promoted, is called docta spes, dialectical-materialistically comprehended hope. The basic theme of philosophy which remains and is, in that it becomes, is the still unbecome, still unachieved homeland, as it develops outwards and upwards in the dialectical-materialistic struggle of the New with the old. Furthermore a signal is set for this. A forward signal which enables us to overtake, not to trot behind. Its meaning is Not-Yet, and the task is to grasp it thoroughly. In line with what Lenin meant in a passage which has come to be very much praised over the years, but not so eagerly taken to heart:

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' ''What must we dream of?" I have written these words down and am shocked. I imagine I am sitting in a 'coordination conference' and opposite me are sitting the editors and staff of the 'Rabocheye Dyelo'. And then Comrade Martinov stands up and turns to me menacingly: "May I be permitted to ask if an autonomous editorial staff still has the right to dream without previously consulting the Party committee?" And after him Comrade Kritschevski stands up and (philosophically expanding the ideas of Comrade Martinov who has long been expanding those of Comrade Plekhanov) continues even more menacingly: "I'll go further than that. I'm asking whether a Marxist has the right to dream at all, unless he forgets that according to Marx humanity only sets itself tasks that it can solve, and that tactics are a process of growth of these tasks, which grow together with the Party?" I shudder at the mere thought of these menacing questions, and I wonder where I can hide. I will try and hide behind Pissarev. "One gulf is different to another", wrote Pissarev concerning the gulf between dream and reality. "My dreams can overtake the natural course of events, or they can go off at complete tangents, down paths that the natural course of events can never tread. In the first case dreaming is totally harmless; it can even encourage and strengthen the working man's power to act . . . There is nothing about such dreams which impairs or cripples creativity. In fact, quite the contrary. If a person were completely devoid of all capability of dreaming in this way, if he were not able to hasten ahead now and again to view in his imagination as a unified and completed picture the work which is only now beginning to take shape in his hands, then I find it absolutely impossible to imagine what would motivate the person to tackle and to complete extensive and strenuous pieces of work in the fields of art, science, and practical life . . . The gulf between dream and reality is not harmful if only the dreamer seriously believes in his dream, if he observes life attentively, compares his observations with his castles in the air and generally works towards the realization of his dream-construct conscientiously. There only has to be some point of contact between dream and life for everything to be in the best order." In our movement there are unfortunately precious few dreams of this kind. And those people are chiefly responsible for this who boast how sober they are and how "close" they stand to the "concrete", and those are the representatives of legitimate criticism and the illegitimate politics of trotting behind' (Lenin, What is to be Done?). So let a further signal be set for forward dreaming. This book deals with nothing other than hoping beyond the day which has become. The

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theme of the five parts of this work (written between 1938 and 1947, revised in 1953 and 1959) is the dreams of a better life. Their unmediated, but principally their mediatable features and contents are broadly taken up, explored and tested. And the path leads via the little waking dreams to the strong ones, via the wavering dreams that can be abused to the rigorous ones, via the shifting castles in the air to the One Thing that is outstanding and needful. * So the book begins with daydreams of an average kind, lightly and freely selected from youth to old age. They fill the first part: report, concerning the man in the street and unregulated wishes. This is immediately followed, founding and supporting everything else, by the second and fundamental part: the examination of anticipatory consciousness. For reasons founded in the subject itself, the foundation makes many sections of this part no easy reading, but of gradually increasing difficulty. But, to the reader who is being informed by it and being led deeper into it, it equally becomes of decreasing difficulty. The interesting nature of the subject also relieves the effort of assimilating it, just as the light above is part of climbing a mountain, and climbing a mountain is part of the inspiring view at the top. Hunger, the main drive, must be worked out here, and the way it proceeds to the rejection of deprivation, that is, to the most important expectant emotion: hope. A central task in this part is the discovery and unmistakable notation of the 'Not-Yet-Conscious'. That is: a relatively still Unconscious disposed towards its other side, forwards rather than backwards. Towards the side of something new that is dawning up, that has never been conscious before, not, for example, something forgotten, something rememberable that has been, something that has sunk into the subconscious in repressed or archaic fashion. From Leibniz's discovery of the subconscious via the Romantic psychology of night and primeval past to the psychoanalysis of Freud, essentially only 'backward dawning' has previously been described and investigated. People thought they had discovered that everything present is loaded with memory, with past in the cellar of the No-Longer-Conscious. What they had not discovered was that there is in present material, indeed in what is remembered itself, an impetus and a sense of being broken off, a brooding quality and an anticipation of Not-Yet-Become; and this broken-off and broached material does not take place in the cellar of consciousness, but on its Front. So it is a question here of the psychological processes of approaching, which are so characteristic above all for youth, for times of change, for the adventures
*

Cf. Luke 10, 42.

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of productivity, for all phenomena therefore in which Unbecome is located and seeks to articulate itself. The anticipatory thus operates in the field of hope; so this hope is not taken only as emotion, as the opposite of fear (because fear too can of course anticipate), but more essentially as a directing act of a cognitive kind (and here the opposite is then not fear, but memory). The imagination and the thoughts of future intention described in this way are utopian, this again not in a narrow sense of the word which only defines what is bad (emotively reckless picturing, playful form of an abstract kind), but rather in fact in the newly tenable sense of the forward dream, of anticipation in general. And so the category of the Utopian, beside the usual, justifiably pejorative sense, possesses the other, in no way necessarily abstract or unworldly sense, much more centrally turned towards the world: of overtaking the natural course of events. Thus understood, the theme of the second part is the utopian function and its contents. The exposition examines the relationship of this function to ideology, to archetypes, to ideals, to symbols, to the categories Front and Novum, Nothing and Homeland, to the fundamental problem of the Here and Now. Here, against all stale and static nihilism, it must be borne in mind: even the Nothing is a utopian category, though an extremely anti-utopian one. Far from forming a nullifying basis or being a background of this kind (so that the day of being lies between two absolute nights), the Nothing is exactly like the positive Utopicum: Homeland or the All simply 'existing' as objective possibility. It circulates in the process of the world, but does not ride on it; both: Nothing and All are still in no way decided as utopian characters, as threatening or fulfilling result-definitions in the world. And likewise the Here and Now, what is repeatedly beginning in nearness, is a utopian category, in fact the most central one; even though, in contrast to the annihilating circulation of a Nothing, to the illuminating circulation of an All, it has not yet even entered time and space. Instead, the contents of this most immediate nearness still ferment entirely in the darkness of the lived moment as the real world-knot, world-riddle. Utopian consciousness wants to look far into the distance, but ultimately only in order to penetrate the darkness so near it of the just lived moment, in which everything that is both drives and is hidden from itself. In other words: we need the most powerful telescope, that of polished utopian consciousness, in order to penetrate precisely the nearest nearness. Namely, the most immediate immediacy, in which the core of self-location and being-here still lies, in which at the same time the whole knot of the world-secret is to be found. This is no secret which exists only for

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insufficient intellect, for example, while the matter* itself is content which is totally clear or reposing in itself, but it is that real secret which the world-matter is to itself and towards the solution of which it is in fact in process and on the way. Thus the Not-Yet-Conscious in man belongs completely to the Not-Yet-Become, Not-Yet-Brought-Out, Manifested-Out in the world. Not-Yet-Conscious interacts and reciprocates with Not-Yet-Become, more specifically with what is approaching in history and in the world. And the examination of anticipatory consciousness must fundamentally serve to make comprehensible the actual reflections which now follow, in fact depictions of the wished-for, the anticipated better life, in psychological and material terms. From the anticipatory, therefore, knowledge is to be gained on the basis of an ontology of the Not-Yet. So much for the second part here, and for the subject-based and object-based function analysis of hope begun within it. Going back now to individual wishes, the first to surface again are the dubious ones. Instead of the unregulated little wishful images of the report, those harnessed and manipulated by the bourgeoisie now become visible. Thus manipulated, these images can be held down and misused, coloured pink and with blood. The third part: transition shows wishful images in the mirror, in a beautifying mirror which often only reflects how the ruling class wishes the wishes of the weak to be. But the picture clears completely as soon as the mirror comes from the people, as occurs quite visibly and wonderfully in fairytales. The mirrored, so often standardized wishes comprise this part of the book; common to all of them is a drive towards the colourful, representing what is supposedly or genuinely better. The appeal of dressing-up, illuminated display belong here, but then the world of fairytale, brightened distance in travel, the dance, the dream-factory of film, the example of theatre. Such things either present a better life, as in the entertainment industry, or sketch out in real terms a life shown to be essential. However, if this sketching out turns into a free and considered blueprint, then we find ourselves for the first time among the actual, that is, planned or outlined utopias. They comprise the fourth part: construction, with historically rich content which does not merely remain historical. It develops in the medical and social, the technological, architectural and geographical utopias, in the wishful landscapes of painting and literature. Thus the wishful images of health emerge, the fundamental ones
*

Bloch uses the term 'Sache' here and elsewhere to mean the true state of affairs which has not yet been revealed. We have translated this as 'the matter'.

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of society without deprivation, the marvels of technology and the castles in the air in so many of the existing wishful images of architecture. Eldorado-Eden appears in the geographical voyages of discovery, the landscapes of an environment formed more adequately for us in painting and poetry, the perspectives of an Absolute in wisdom. All this is full of overhauling, builds implicitly or explicitly on to the road and the goal-image of a more perfect world, on to more thoroughly formed and more essential appearances than have empirically already become. There is also a lot of random and abstract escapism here, but great works of art essentially show a realistically related pre-appearance of their completely developed subject-matter. The glance towards prefigured, aesthetically and religiously experimental being is variable within them, but every attempt of this kind is experimenting with something that overhauls, something perfect which the world has not yet seen. The glance towards this is concrete in various ways depending on the respective class barrier, but the basic utopian goals of the respective so-called artistic aspiration in so-called styles, these 'excesses' over and above ideology, do not always perish with their society. Egyptian architecture is the aspiration to become like stone, with the crystal of death as intended perfection; Gothic architecture is the aspiration to become like the vine of Christ, with the tree of life as intended perfection. And in this way the whole of art shows itself to be full of appearances which are driven to become symbols of perfection, to a utopianly essential end. Of course, until now it has only been self-evident in the case of the social utopias that they are utopian: firstly, because that is what they are called, and secondly, because the word cloud-cuckoo-land has mostly been used in association with them, and not only with the abstract ones among them. Because of which, as noted, the concept utopia has been both unduly restricted, namely confined to novels of an ideal state, and also above all, through the predominant abstractness of these novels of an ideal state, it has preserved that abstract playful form which only the progress of socialism from these utopias towards science has moved out of the way and removed. Nevertheless, despite all these dubious aspects, the word utopia emerged here coined by Thomas More, though not the philosophically far more comprehensive concept of utopia. On the other hand, little utopian material worthy of consideration was noticed in other, for example, technological wishful images and plans. Despite Francis Bacon's 'New Atlantis ' no frontier-land with its own pioneer status and its own hope-contents introduced into nature was distinguished in technology. This was seen even less in architecture, in buildings which form, re-form or pre-form

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a more beautiful space. And similarly, utopian material astonishingly remained undiscovered in the situations and landscapes of painting and poetry, in their extravagances and especially in their deeply inward and outward-looking realisms of possibility. And yet, in all these spheres, utopian function is at work, with modified content, fanatical in the lesser creations, precise and realistic sui generis in the great ones. The very profusion of human imagination, together with its correlate in the world (once imagination becomes informed and concrete), cannot possibly be explored and inventoried other than through utopian function; any more than it can be tested without dialectical materialism. The specific pre-appearance which art shows is like a laboratory where events, figures and characters are driven to their typical, characteristic end, to an abysmal or a blissful end; this essential vision of characters and situations, inscribed in every work of art, which in its most striking form we may call Shakespearean, in its most terminalized form Dantean, presupposes possibility beyond already existing reality. At all points here prospective acts and imaginations aim, subjective, but possibly even objective dream-roads run out of the Become towards the Achieved, towards symbolically encircled achievement. Thus the concept of the Not-Yet and of the intention towards it that is thoroughly forming itself out no longer has its only, indeed exhaustive example in the social utopias; important though the social utopias, leaving all others aside, have become for the critical awareness of elaborated anticipating. But to limit the utopian to the Thomas More variety, or simply to orientate it in that direction, would be like trying to reduce electricity to the amber from which it gets its Greek name and in which it was first noticed. Indeed, the utopian coincides so little with the novel of an ideal state that the whole totality of philosophy becomes necessary (a sometimes almost forgotten totality) to do justice to the content of that designated by utopia. Hence the breadth of the anticipations, wishful images, hope-contents collected in the part called: construction. Hence in front of as well as behind the fairytales of an ideal state the aforementioned notation and interpretation of medical, technological, architectural, geographical utopias, also of the actual wishful landscapes in painting, opera, literature. Hence, finally, this is the place for the portrayal of the multifarious hope-landscape and the specific perspectives on it in the collective thinking of philosophical wisdom. Despite the predominant pathos of What Has Been in previous philosophies; the almost continually intended direction: appearance essence nevertheless clearly shows a utopian pole. The sequence of all these formations, socially, aesthetically,

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philosophically relevant to culture of 'true being', accordingly ends, coming down to always decisive earth, in questions of a life of fulfilling work free of exploitation, but also of a life beyond work, i.e. in the wishful problem of leisure. The final will is that to be truly present. So that the lived moment belongs to us and we to it and 'Stay awhile'* could be said to it. Man wants at last to enter into the Here and Now as himself, wants to enter his full life without postponement and distance. The genuine utopian will is definitely not endless striving, rather: it wants to see the merely immediate and thus so unpossessed nature of self-location and being-here finally mediated, illuminated and fulfilled, fulfilled happily and adequately. This is the utopian frontier-content which is implied in the 'Stay awhile, you are so fair' of the Faust scheme. The objective hope-images of the construction thus press inevitably towards those of fulfilled human beings themselves and their environment fully mediated with these images, that is, towards homeland. The fifth and final part: identity attempts to take up these intentions. As attempts to become like proper human beings, the various moral guiding images appear, and the so often antithetical guiding panels of the right life. The fictional figures of human venturing beyond the limits then appear: Don Giovanni, Odysseus, Faust, the last precisely on the way to the perfect moment, in utopia which thoroughly experiences the world; Don Quixote warns and demands, in dream-monomania, dream-depth. As call and pull of very immediate, very far-striking lines of expression, music emerges, the art of strongest intensity distilled into song and sound, of the utopian Humanum in the world. And then: the images of hope against death are gathered, against this hardest counterblow to utopia; death is therefore its unforgettable awakener. It is especially a circulation of that Nothing which is devoured into being by the utopian pull; there is no becoming and no victory into which the annihilation of what is bad is not actively devoured. All the glad tidings which constitute the imagination of religion culminate mythically, against death and fate, both the completely illusory tidings and those with a humane core, ultimately related to deliverance from evil, to freedom towards the 'kingdom'. There follows, precisely concerning this-worldly intention towards this becoming homeland, the future problem in the bearing, encompassing space of homeland: of nature. The problem of what is worth wishing for in general, or of the highest good, always remains the central point here. Its utopia
*

Cf. Goethe's 'Faust', Part 1, 1700. The moment for which Faust will gladly sell his soul.

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of the One Thing Necessary, although it in fact still stands completely in premonition, like the being-in-the-present of men themselves, governs all the rest. If only the less high goods were attained and accessible of course, on the road to the abolition of base deprivation. On the road which first leads to the treasures where moth and rust doth corrupt,* and only then to those which stay awhile. This road is and remains that of socialism, it is the practice of concrete utopia. Everything that is non-illusory, real-possible about the hope-images leads to Marx, works as always, in different ways, rationed according to the situation as part of socialist changing of the world. The architecture of hope thus really becomes one on to man, who had previously only seen it as dream and as high, all too high preappearance, and one on to the new earth. Becoming happy was always what was sought after in the dreams of a better life, and only Marxism can initiate it. This provides fresh access to creative Marxism, even pedagogically and in terms of content, and from new premises, of a subjective and objective kind. What is thus intended needs to be broadly delineated here. On a small and large scale, tested if possible, with the will to set free what is real within it. So that by the yardstick of real possibility, What Is in real possibility, what is really still outstanding (everything else is chaff of mere opinionizing and fools' paradise) achieves positive being. This is ultimately a great simplicity or the One Thing Needful. An encyclopaedia of hopes often contains repetitions, but never overlappings, and so far as the former is concerned, Voltaire's statement is valid here that he would repeat himself as often as was necessary until he was understood. The statement is even more valid since the repetitions of the book ideally always occur on a new level, have therefore both learnt something in the meantime and may allow the identical thing they are aiming at to be learned anew. The direction towards the One Thing Needful was also alive in previous philosophies; how else could they have been a love of wisdom? And how else could there have been great philosophy, that is, ceaselessly and totally related to the Authentic, the Essential? Let alone materialistically great philosophy with the capability for the real depiction of what is coherently essential? With the basic pull towards explaining the world in terms of itself (and with the certain confidence of being able to explain it in these terms), towards this-worldly happiness (and with the certain confidence of finding it)? But, until Marx, the previous lovers of wisdom, even the materialist
*

Matthew 6, 19.

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ones, posited the Authentic as already ontically* existing, in fact statically closed: from the water of the simple Thales** to the In-and-For-Itself of the absolute Hegel. Time and again, it was ultimately the ceiling of Plato's anamnesis above dialectically open Eros which kept out and, in a contemplative antiquarian fashion, closed off previous philosophy, including Hegel, from the seriousness of the Front and the Novum. Thus the perspective was broken off, thus remembering defused hope. Thus hope did not in fact arise in remembering either (in the future in the past). Thus remembering did not arise in hope either (in concrete utopia which is historically mediated, but which pours forth history). Thus we appeared to have already got behind the tendency of being, that is, to have arrived behind it. Thus the real process of the world appeared to have got behind itself, to have arrived and to have been brought to a standstill. But the forming-depicting aspect of the true, of the real, is never so easily broken off, as if the process pending in the world were already decided. Only with the farewell to the closed, static concept of being does the real dimension of hope open. Instead, the world is full of propensity towards something, tendency towards something, latency of something, and this intended something means fulfilment of the intending. It means a world which is more adequate for us, without degrading suffering, anxiety, self-alienation, nothingness. However, this tendency is in flux, as one that has precisely the Novum in front of it. The Where To of the real only shows in the Novum its most basic Objective determinateness, and it appeals to man who is the arms of the Novum. Marxist knowledge means: the difficult processes of what is approaching enter into concept and practice. In the problem area of the Novum inherently lies the profusion of even whiter fields of knowledge where worldly wisdom becomes young and original again. If being is understood out of its Where From, then it is so only as an equally tendential, still unclosed Where To. The being that conditions consciousness, and the consciousness that processes being, is understood ultimately only out of that and in that from which and towards which it tends. Essential being is not Been-ness; on the contrary: the essential being of the world lies itself on the Front.
*

Bloch makes a distinction between ontological and ontical. The former broadly refers to 'being', the latter to 'entities' and facts concerning them.
**

Thales of Miletus (c. 624565 B.C.), the earliest of the Greek scientists, saw water as the basic material of all being.

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PART ONE (REPORT): LITTLE DAYDREAMS

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1 We Start Out Empty


I move. From early on we are searching. All we do is crave, cry out. Do not have what we want.

2 Much Tastes of More


But we also learn to wait. Because what a child wishes seldom comes in time. We even wait for wishing itself, until it becomes clearer. A child grasps at everything to find out what it means. Tosses everything aside again, is restlessly curious and does not know what about. But already here the freshness, the otherness lives, of which we dream. Boys destroy what they are given, they search for more, unpack the box. Nobody could name it or has ever received it. So what is ours slips away, is not yet here.

3 Daily into the Blue


Later we reach out more confidently. Wish ourselves where things are named more clearly. The child wants to be a bus-conductor or a confectioner. Seeks long journeys, far away, cake every day. That seems like real living. With animals too we dream we are big. With small ones especially, they are less frightening, they run into our hands. Or can be caught in nets; distant wishing becomes active in this way. The confectioner turns into a hunter, in a strangely filled outdoors. Green and blue runs the lizard, something elusively colourful flies as a butterfly. Even the stones are alive, but do not run away, we can play with them, they join in, 'I want

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everything to be like that' said a child, meaning the marble which rolled away but then waited for the child. Play is transformation, though within what is safe and returns. As he wishes, play changes the child himself, his friends, all his things into strangely familiar stock, the floor of the playroom itself becomes a forest full of wild animals or a lake on which every chair is a boat. But fear breaks out if what we are used to runs too far away or if it does not smoothly slip back into its former aspect. 'Look, the button is a witch', screamed a child in play and then would not touch the button even later on. It had become no more than this child had wished it to be, but it had stayed that way too long. The homely den must never venture too far into the dream. It must remain a place the lizard has not yet violated, the butterfly not yet threatened. From here what we like doing best is playing and collecting window-views, deep and brief glimpses into otherness. The colourful animal is itself a colourful window, behind which the wished-for distance lies. Soon it is no different than a stamp, which tells of foreign countries. It is like the shell in which the sea roars when we hold it close enough to our ears. The boy sallies forth, collects from everywhere what is sent his way. This may also bear witness to the things the boy must go to bed too early to see. When he is gazing at a coloured stone many of those things germinate which he later wishes for himself.

4 Hiding-Place and Beautiful Foreign Lands


By Ourselves Here too the fun of being invisible ourselves. We seek out a corner, it protects and conceals. It feels good in a narrow space, but we know we can do what we want there. A woman relates, 'I wished I could be under the cupboard, I wanted to live there and play with the dog.' A man relates, 'As boys we built ourselves a platform between the branches which could not be seen from below. When we were sitting up there, when we pulled up the ladder and cut ourselves off completely from the ground, then we felt perfectly happy.' Our own room is prefigured here, the free life that is coming.

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At Home Already on Our Way The hidden boy is also breaking out, in a shy way. He is searching for what is far away, even though he shuts himself in, it is just that in breaking free he has girded himself round and round with walls. All the better if the hiding-place is mobile, that is, if it consists of living material. In other words, of outlawed or strange people with whom we go along, amongst whom we are not suspected. Schoolboys do not always drop everything in an effort to please their parents and teachers, but parents and teachers can be relied upon to put a damper on things. Suffering at school can be nastier than any other later form of suffering, except that of the prisoner. Hence the wish to break out, shared by the prisoner; because outside is still indistinct, it becomes a place of wonder. A woman relates, 'As a girl I always wished that burglars would come. I wanted to show them everything, silver, cash, linen, they could take anything they wanted, even me, for their trouble.' A man relates, 'When I heard the bagpipes for the first time, I ran after them as I did after everything peculiar. But I did not turn back after a little while, as I usually did when other curiosities came along the street, the knifegrinder, the Salvation Army and so on, instead I followed out of the city, along the country road into the villages that I knew, into the villages that I did not know. It wasn't only the fantastic man who drew me away, the whistling spirit enticed me which I believed lived in the bagpipes, and in the end I became this myself.' Thus at seven or eight the narrow space expands, the strangest things take place inside it (when the ladder is pulled up). But it is really only the hiding-place which seeks to be transposed here, the boy inside it only breaks free invisibly with his friends. Carries himself off on his snorting steed, with a fluttering feather into the security of the adventure. The night is full of taverns and castles, in each one there are furs, weapons, roaring fires, men like trees, no clocks. Drawings on blotting-paper in exercise books also seem characteristic of the sprinkled pleasure in hiding-places at this time. A spiky security is committed to paper, a house, a town, a coastal fortress bristling with cannon. There are islands offshore, they deter the enemy from sea attack; inland there are three rings of forts. They guard the road, the only one which leads to the dream fortress, and it is mined. Thus the coastal town lies, out of sight of school and home, inaccessible, with eyes that seem to slumber. And yet: the fortress was not simply drawn as being impregnable, but also as being powerful, radiant;

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its effect carries beyond the edge of the paper, into the unknown. Our own life was protected and rimmed by battlements high above, but these could be climbed at any time to look out. Even later on this combination of narrowness and beautiful foreign lands does not disappear. In other words: from this time the wishful land is an island.

5 Escape and the Return of the Victor


When someone dreams, they never remain rooted to the spot. They move almost at will away from the place or the state in which they find themselves. Around the thirteenth year, the fellow-travelling ego is discovered. That is the reason why dreams of a better life grow so luxuriantly around this time. They stir the fermenting day, fly beyond school and home, take with them what is good for and dear to us. Are outriders of our escape and establish the first quarters for our clarifying wishes. We practise the art of talking about what we have not yet experienced. Even an average mind tells itself stories at this time, simple fables in which things go better. It spins out the stories on the way home from school or when walking with friends, and the narrator is always in the middle as in a posed picture. Almost everyone is filled with a hatred for the average at this time, even if they have not strayed too far from the nest themselves. The silly young goose wants to improve herself, the young lout sneers at his stuffy home. Girls play around with their first name, just like they do with their hairstyles, they make it more piquant than it is, and in doing so they reach the beginning of a dreamed existence that is different. Young boys aspire to a nobler life than their father might lead, to tremendous deeds. They try their luck, it tastes forbidden and makes everything new. Putting to Sea Sexual attraction is not always part of this process, at least not in an obvious way. Girls retain an acquired shyness for a long time, boys pride themselves on a certain dry coolness. Often arrogance and self-love prevent them from giving love a special place in their dreams. The right boy or the right girl do not seem to be around or only among their own sex, often they

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are not even present in wishing. Thus the castle in the air seldom becomes a castle of pleasure at this stage, the harem and the dream-woman only come later. Infantile structures are also preserved for quite a long time in this dry fantasy; the theme of escape fulfils their loneliness. A woman relates of this time, 'I wanted to become a painter, I dreamed myself into an oriental castle on a mountain, living alone there with my illegitimate child which I had had by a very distinguished man.' A man, asked about his fantasies at fifteen, related the following: 'I wanted to go to sea and imagined a unique battleship. It was called the Argo, did so many knots per hour that it was present on all the coasts of the earth almost simultaneously. I was master of the Argo, with the title and rank of Prince Admiral, ruled over all emperors and kings, re-drew the map of the world with the help of my electric cannons, re-established my beloved Turkey once more within her old borders. Once a year came the night of flight, the ship left the water, landed on the highest mountain on earth. There I entertained my friends, let them see into the future through a specially placed window, worked the mysterious green ray. This ray shines shortly after sunset on the Pacific Ocean; and I knew how to operate it so that we could see all the lost empires of the past.'* These are still excessive bourgeois notions of a juvenile kind; in proletarian adolescents of this age they are much more muted, more grown-up even, and more realistic. But even if here the contents have ceased to be so fantastic, their attraction still remains like that of a fairytale, sharply transcending the given world. Clearly, such fantasies do not only emanate from the depths of the mind, but just as often from newspapers, from adventure books with their wonderfully glossy pictures. From booths at the fair where chains rattle and are broken, where the song to the evening star is sung and the half-moon shines. Argo, Turkey and the like come from there, even the raw or rough colour of adventure with which these figments glow. The elemental ship image characterizes the will to depart, the dream of itinerant revenge and exotic victory. Argo (and the equivalent images that almost every individual can replace this with from their own experience) is a kind of Ark for the principal wishes of this time: for the trumping wishes. The will destroys the house in which it is bored and in which the best things are forbidden. So in timeless history it builds its mountain stronghold in the clouds or the knight's castle in the form of a ship.
*

This dream is not completely original. Jason had a ship made for him called the Argo in which Athene fitted an oracular beam.

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The Glittering Bowl Only then do pleasures which have grown sweet announce themselves, foam immediately. Love lets no one alone into the dreamed castle or out on the sea. Loneliness is no longer sought after and spun out in fantasies, but is intolerable, it is the most intolerable aspect of the life that begins at seventeen. So if the right girl eludes us for too long, the girl whom we think up, think out, appears anywhere. The torment of having missed out then becomes monstrous: every party which we did not go to leaves space for us to picture wishful images, and the young adolescent believes that one of these descended to earth on the very evening he missed. Now it is too late to meet her; because the girl, even if she were to be found, would be no match for the brilliance of the image he has painted. But erotic enchantment plays a part even in felicitous encounters. It clothes the girl in its dream. The street or the town in which the loved one lives turns to gold, turns into a party. The name of the loved one shines upon the stones, slates and railings, her house always lies beneath invisible palm-trees. We are unsure of our own powers because there are too many of them and they disturb each other. So the young man is mostly pulled to and fro between extreme dejection (to the point of asking himself if he even deserves to be in the world at all) and compensating arrogance. Embarrassment and impudence are bound up together here; the adolescent who is not part of the average world or who hates it, feels he is a little God, and since the others do not take the trouble to prove his existence, he does it himself. He wants to be the first to reach the goal, wants to outdo the others; the goal can be a completely external one, it stands for an unknown goal. What smooth skin, or the good fortune to have long legs or hard muscles meant to children becomes in young girls pride in so-called gentlemen friends, in young boys the vanity of being seen with the prettiest girl in town or in the area. Feelings of uncertainty, of being unsure of oneself go deeper, while being spurned is never felt so bitterly, being chosen (room at the top) never so rapturously as in puberty. Youth itself becomes a scourge or a laurel here, there is no middle ground; beyond loneliness, which is so strenuously avoided, there is only defeat which refutes claims to validity, claims to the future, or victory, which proves them. Immaturity per se is an invitation to go one better, this is not empty as in later years, but rather vexatious, taunting to itself. Thus everything wavers and wishes to be placed, to be fixed, especially the life-light, the

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future image of the life which youth expects. All we know for certain is that it should not contain any trivialities and that no other season except spring should count in it. The young person torments himself with the enjoyable prospect of this future, he wants to induce it all at once, even with storms, suffering, thunder and lightning, as long as it is just life, real life that has so far not yet become. And the world begins with our own youth: nothing is stranger for an adolescent than to imagine the courtship of his parents, and nothing more awkward than imagining himself in age, with children now themselves having his own courtship and his own apparently unsurpassable spring. During this period of youth it also becomes apparent that the only thing that actually binds us and establishes friendship is the common expectation of a common future; this unites us as matter-of-factly as working together does in later years. If the common future falls away, then the living spirit of the youthful friendship (if that is all it was) disappears; this explains why nothing is flatter and more forced than seeing old schoolfriends again after many years. They have become like the teachers, like the grown-ups of the past, like everything against which we had conspired. Such reunions make it seem as if the youthful faces and dreams have not only disappeared, as is obvious, but as if they have been betrayed. But this enormous shock does make us realize how much headiness and Rtli oath,* how much mountain air swirled and still swirls above real seventeen-yearolds. But this mountain air too is full of squalls, it is swept up in the changing winds racing here and there in the most uncertain of all ages of life. Uncertain even intellectually, since only very few young people enjoy one of those inescapable talents which make a job into a vocation and so spare us the choice. So many young girls, of course, wish to go into films, almost every young man has great ideas which cannot be sold in the normal job-market. However, these are more general wishes and directions, fortunately they are not pursued for long, they lack the detail of talent. In fact even where there is the urge more common these days towards productive expression, towards painting, music or writing, it comes as a surprise that everything shrinks in the execution. Adolescents of this kind know the feeling of a fire burning inside them, of art being so close, but when they try to grasp its being, it becomes dry, it shrinks so much that they cannot even fill a page. Talking at this time is common and easy, writing hard, and
*

The legendary oath of allegiance of the first three Swiss confederates on the Rtli at the Vierwaldstttesee in 1291.

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if it is produced, the fruit appears precisely to the overflowing writer himself 'like a shrivelled plum, black and wizened'. Bettina von Arnim, who says this, and who all her life could not get beyond this adolescent feeling, thus mostly chose letters to express herself. Another form is the diary which, not without reason, is called secret or is imparted secretly. Many an adult uses jottings like these, if he has made them, and if he has kept them with faithful vanity, as a gauge to measure how low his waterlevel has sunk. Love, melancholy, embryonic images and thought-masks, everything is fished for here and remains in its initial stages. But the lifelight, containing nothing stale, shines vexatiously, tauntingly to itself. So this time seems to be unhappy and blissful at the same time: the feeling of spring later contains both. But the desire for courage, for colour, breadth, height is general; the real adolescent develops from a will which in these years is always still a chivalric will. Hence the dream of adventures which are to be undergone, of beauty begging to be discovered, of greatness begging to be won. Because our own life still lies a long way ahead, all distance is made more beautiful. The wish not only impels us towards this distance, but now it propels itself into it without a hiding-place, all the more strongly the narrower our situation. Even the distance which the evening express train brings into the smallest town can suffice as a symbol, the distance of the capital, seen from the provinces. In this way a dissolutely daring, carelessly beautiful wishful image develops, without relatives, miles away from them. Inside is the expanded soul in which longing is at work, outside the dreamed image of a city which could fulfil it. One of the strongest wishes in human nature, and one which is most frequently violated, is the wish to be important, and this is further combined especially strongly with the wish for a significant environment. Gifted girls wish to run away there; Munich had this attraction around 1900, Paris for much longer. Thrilled, the student enters the big city, besides the bright lights, it is populated with sheer impatient hopes. Here he believes he has at last found the ground and background for an existence which finally suits him; the houses, the squares, the stages seem bathed in a utopian light. In the caf, at a proud little table, the chosen few are gathered who write verses, heavenly strings await the boy who plays the double bass, fame taps at the window. It is not surprising that with the wishful image of triumph, that of trumping also returns or is included in the erotic sheen. If the parents' home was not only narrow but also bad, then the pictured homecoming of the victor is a particularly popular and widespread dream,

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a form of satisfaction so overwhelming that it welcomes the previous misery almost as a foil. The famous actress goes back, her parents and neighbours stand timidly aside, graciously she forgives what they did to her. The downtrodden boy of days gone by comes back in a coachand-four, by his side the beautiful rich girl whom he has captured as his wife; he is now no longer misunderstood, returning as a general or as a great artist, returning at least with a magnificence that puts them to shame. His is the princess, graceful, proud and gentle, with the perfume of high above, and around her swirls the silver travel-veil, all this is the splendour their darling has won, all this is like Nice brought home. These are particularly immature wishful dreams, but they are still to be found today in the western glossy image of these years. Desirous, aware, mindful, possessed, in control, full, these words govern the genitive and the wishes of bourgeois youth. The often invoked streak of blue in the bourgeois sky became of course a streak of blood; the stupid or stupefied had their very own strong man called Hitler. But the greyness of a young mediocrity has never shone without capricious figures; the wish itself puts them on his arm. At this time, between the March and June of life, there is no break, either love fills it up, or the prospect of a kind of stormy dignity.

6 More Mature Wishes and Their Images


These do not have to be any less turbulent. Since wishing does not decrease later on, only what is wished for diminishes. The drive that has grown older aims closer, it knows its way around, it sets itself up in this world. But not as if it were thereby accepting the life that had simply come to it; precisely what has already become petit bourgeois is half-baked and flat. Something important is missing now just as it was then, so the dream does not stop inserting itself into the gaps. An element of defeat probably also settles in, the flight often dips. An element of vulgarity emerges which no longer has healthy red cheeks, but is hard-boiled. But the dreamer believes he has at last found out what life ought to be offering him. The Lame Nags First his wish goes backwards, it makes something good again. The dream

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pictures what would have happened if a silly move had been avoided, if a clever move had not been missed. Lame nags and good ideas come last; this is wit on the stairs. It torments because it has missed the opportunity, and what has been missed is thus retrospectively activated and articulated in the imagination. This imagination contains both regret and longing together, the regret makes it into a wishful dream which improves on the past. In the wishful dream of wit on the stairs, blows are landed which the dreamer did not have the courage to land at the time they were due. The wishful dream of wit on the stairs makes losses good by going back to that point in time where it was still possible to avoid them. With bitter enjoyment it savours profits which would certainly have been made if we had gone into the business at the right time. We drank the wrong brand how wisely we choose the right one in the dream or in the subsequent account, with which we not only fool other people. Or the source of the fiver down which all our hopes were dashed is imagined as a tap; we turn it off retrospectively, as if everything were as good as could be. Regret is a feeling that persists in the bourgeois world, but now almost exclusively in business life, so regretful dreams mostly revolve around money that has been lost. But amidst these dreams there is still room among the petit bourgeois for the heroic pose, the one they did not strike at the right time, and the thundering phrase that just did not flash out at the time. The dream plays out what is wished for as it could have been, what is right as it should have been. All boasting is part of this, all stupid pride follows this course, and the memory that the reality was different gives way to suit the vanity of our wishes. Night of the Long Knives Not so far from here are the various dreams that are fond of getting their own back. They are particularly delicious, revenge is sweet when merely imagined, but also shabby. Most men are too cowardly to do evil, too weak to do good; the evil that they cannot, or cannot yet do, they enjoy in advance in the dream of revenge. The petit bourgeoisie in particular has traditionally been fond of the fist clenched in the pocket; this fist characteristically thumps the wrong man, since it prefers to lash out in the direction of least resistance. Hitler rose out of the Night of the Long Knives, he was called by the masters out of the dream of this night when he became useful to them. The Nazi dream of revenge is also subjectively

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bottled up, not rebellious; it is blind, not revolutionary rage. As for the so-called iron broom, the hatred of the immoral life of the hooknoses and those at the top, middle-class virtue, as always in such cases, was here merely betraying its dearest dream. Just as, with its revenge, it does not hate exploitation but only the fact that it is not itself an exploiter, so virtue does not hate the slothful bed of the rich, but only the fact that it has not become its own and its alone. This is what the headlines have always aimed at in those papers which love to see red, the gutter-press. 'The truth, latest news: Broilers at Wertheim's store The harem in the Tiergarten villa, * sensational revelations.' But they are only revelations concerning the outrage of the bourgeois conformist himself, both regarding Wertheim raking in the shekels and regarding Jewish lechery. Hence the immediate impulse to set oneself up in place of the eliminated Wertheim, after an act of retribution which, in the supposedly detested fraud, merely replaces the subject which is practising it. The malicious and brutal aspect of this, the repulsiveness of this kind of wish, as pervasive as the smell of urine, has always characterized the mob. This mob can be bought, is absurdly dangerous, and consequently it can be blinded and used by those who have the means and who have a real vested interest in the fascist pogroms. The instigator, the essence of the Nights of the Knives was, of course, big business, but the raving petit bourgeois was the astonishing, the horribly seducible manifestation of this essence. From it emerged the terror, which is the poison in the 'average man on the street', as the petit bourgeois is now called in American, a poison which has nowhere near been fully excreted. His wishes for revenge are rotten and blind; God help us, when they are stirred up. Fortunately though, the mob is equally faithless; it is also quite happy to put its clenched fist back into its pocket when crime is no longer allowed a free night on the town by those at the top. Shortly Before the Closing of the Gate But how is the most ordinary kind of life, the quiet everyday kind, transformed through dreams? Let us leave the vengeful wishes, there are besides them also warm, harmlessly foolish and colourful dreams. In general, the little man who is not class-conscious is content just to rearrange his
*

A residential district of Berlin.

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lot slightly. He does not change anything, but he temporarily pours out the dishwater of his previous existence which has seemed so unsatisfactory. His waking dreams remain private; sexual dreams are particular favourites, followed by business dreams, both are effervescent. Solitary walks give these images room, novels of his own composition begin to be woven, involving his ego. They are no longer young, no longer full of superman, dream-ship, Prince Admiral. But they are sufficiently adventurous to garnish his usual fried egg and chips beyond all recognition. The reticent man or the man in a mediocre marriage enjoys the pleasures of an accomplished lover, kindled imagination serves up double or treble portions, inexhaustible powers are at his command. There are so-called joke-cards on which a naked woman appears as a balloon: weightless, totally flexible, to be used for any purpose; thus the Calypso of the deprived Babbitt* is hallucinated as unresisting in a higher sense. Usually there are several images, a mixture of free love and harem, full of trained women. In interchangeable positions and groups, some of them being defiled, others looking on: a dream forest of randy eyes and spread legs. Normally the imagined harem is stocked with those women whom the well-behaved, often also impotent lecher has failed to secure in life. But of course excess alone does not satisfy him, even that of the so luxuriantly matured wishes. Because a man is not made for love alone, so the waking dream of the bourgeois conformist also becomes practical. Younger powers must be given their head, and so in his wishes he is himself these powers, and experienced as well. There is still room for improvement in blossoming communities, so the dreaming walker plucks up speculative courage. Long ago in his dream he bought the thriving shop on the corner, expanded it, brought it up to date; long ago he became a town councillor, a man to whom many who now scarcely give him the time of day doff their hats. Long ago the shop was sold again, the great world takes him on board, as it is shown in the films, the hunting lodge in the forest, the castle by the sea, his own yacht. Everything almost as it was in puberty, only now furnished with money instead of ideals; to his ever alert but now sedate longing a group of purchasable comforts present themselves, imagined in detail, but unpossessed. In this forest there is a different ending for him than in the forest of youth; beyond the tropical sea through which the yacht is ploughing stands the beach casino where people are gambling. But the private dreams of a more mature kind evidently
*

The typical little man, the central character in the Sinclair Lewis novel 'Babbitt', 1922.

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do not cease to be foolish one moment, exotic the next. Although they develop more past material than future, more that is familiar and which simply has not been allotted to the dreamer than defiant premonition. The imminent closing of the gate, both sexually and in terms of business achievements, plays its part; especially as: 'Make way for efficiency'* is at an end anyway, at least in the world which coined this slogan, the capitalist world. The little man, the petit bourgeois, proletarianized, but without proletarian consciousness, thus dreams considerably more castles in Spain than the bourgeois man of property who knows what he has. The latter in his thoughts tends to swim along with the current of what has already been achieved, the little man, on the other hand, finds only traces around him and kicks over them. Even if only in the silence of his imagination, as long as there is no Pied Piper on hand, or as long as he does not see through the conditions of his disgruntlement. He exercises this imagination through images which shimmer towards him out of the solarium of life which he has never entered. Invention of a New Pleasure Most people in the street look as if they are thinking about something else entirely. The something else is predominantly money, but also what it could be changed into. Otherwise it would not be so easy to lure with jewellery, to attract with a beautiful figure. The flneur would not exist, nor everyone's persistent inclination to turn themselves into one. In this way the shopping street is also steeped in dreams, not just the more rural walk or the hustle and bustle of the suburbs. A woman stands in front of the shop-window, looking at lizard-skin shoes trimmed with chamois leather, a man goes past, looks at the woman, and so both of them have a share of the wishful land. There is enough happiness in the world, only not for me: the wish tells itself this, wherever it goes. And it thus also demonstrates, of course, that it merely wishes to break out of the world somewhat, not that it wants to change it. The employee, the petit bourgeois, of whom we are talking here, this in no way regular, but increasingly regularized social stratum, contents itself with the needs which are awoken by the window-displays dressed for it. This unites all bourgeois
*

'Freie Bahn dem Tchtigen'. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg used a similar slogan to the Reichstag, 28th September 1916.

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dreams and yet it still rations them, even in more distant excursions to the over-blue coast of the travel agent's and beyond: so that they do not explode the given world. People with wishes of this kind live beyond their own means, but never beyond the generally existing means. If this is true of the employee, in middle age and with the until now so cloudy consciousness of the middle class, then the upper middle-class citizen whose means are sufficient certainly does not have any reason even in his wildest dreams to explode the existing world. He finds it easiest to give up youthful ideals, to apply his will solely to what is attainable. To pull his weight efficiently, standing right in the middle of gainful employment, which really is that, full of plans promising profit, but on the whole without that element which, usually with contempt, he calls utopian. Since the rich man, in contrast to the salary earner, can indulge his every wish, he has, so to speak, no definite, that is, longcherished and thus fully developed wishes at all. And yet, although it is only the left-hand side which is studied here on menus of every kind, and not, as in the case of the employee, the right-hand side where the price is given, precisely this affluence causes a quite specific producer of more mature, now sedate wishes to appear: instead of deprivation boredom. No speed, no luxury, no coast however blue, helps to escape it; even the excitements of gambling go stale eventually. This fog of boredom swirls in the abyss of possession, and the peak, because it is not one, does not rise above it. The wishes, which nevertheless do rise above it, are solely those of the urgently longed-for thrill, of the snobbish butterfly, of fashion and its changes, provided they are not too gaudy. Of course, fresh styles are also continually produced for the masses, so that there is a turnover (which is not yet ensured by shoddy production alone); but the incentive came first from those at the top and is older than the pleasure in turnover. The rich man, who otherwise is nothing and can do nothing, the rich man, in the rarer and rarer guise of a gentleman of leisure, sees to it that boredom is at least made interesting. Xerxes was already offering a prize for the invention of a new pleasure; in its more modern form this escape attempt turns away from mere fat capital towards snobbery. Or even towards eccentricity: a rich Englishman travelled through all the countries where pointed arches occur to photograph them. This is how bourgeois wishes end, at least those of private life, for ordinary people so that they also want to cut their slice of the available cake, without changing baker's, as Brecht puts it in his 'Threepenny Opera'; in the case of the rich these wishes necessarily end bizarrely, that is, increasingly boosted into increasing triviality.

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Opportunity to be Friendly Even the non-bourgeois dreamer likes many things that the others have. But essentially he imagines a life without exploitation, this must be attained. He is not the limpet stuck fast, having to wait for what chance brings to it, he overhauls the given world, both in actions and in dreams. The happy existence which he anticipates lies behind smoke, behind the smoke of a powerful change. The world which then appears is likewise changed, no Babbitt has any place in it or stretches himself out comfortably into the rotten laziness, the lazy rottenness that he is. It is not that comfort itself is dubious or limited to its bourgeois form. To each his chicken in the pot and two cars in the garage, that is also a revolutionary dream, not just a French or American or 'general human' dream. But the values of comfortable happiness shift in the prospects of the revolutionary wishful dream, if only because happiness no longer arises out of the unhappiness of others and measures itself against it. Because our fellow man is no longer the barrier to our own freedom, but rather the means by which this freedom is truly achieved. Instead of freedom of acquisition, there shines freedom from acquisition, instead of imagined pleasures of cheating in the economic struggle, there shines the imagined victory in the proletarian class struggle. And even higher above this shines the distant peace, the distant opportunity of being in solidarity and being friendly with all men, an opportunity for the sake of which the struggle moves in the distant goal. The turmoil in which all this still lies admittedly makes the individual non-bourgeois dreams considerably less distinct than those which need only reach into the existing window-display. No department store sends a list out to them, there is no patron who realizes these dreams from above. Instead they are characterized not only by an incomparably higher status, but also by an expectation of the unknown, a blueprint of the unrealized which the bourgeois wishful image of more mature years no longer possesses at all.

7 What Is Left to Wish for in Old Age


In old age we learn to forget. Exciting wishes recede, although their images remain. They picture escape, as they once did in March: the young girl

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and dangerous old age, the flashy teenager and the old fop can share a turbulent desire for new life. Nevertheless, we no longer yield so willingly to temptation. Even if the wish does not wane, the strength which thinks itself capable of fulfilling the wish does. Even if the strength does not wane, then the disappointed gift of picturing ahead does. To this extent, and often only to this extent, unrest decreases. Wine and Purse Instead the realistic fears increase, they want to be avoided. The body does not recover so quickly as it did, everything is twice the effort. Work does not go so smoothly, economic uncertainty weighs heavier than before. Needs in the form of addictions, those whose satisfaction does not bring pleasure, but whose absence causes pain, do in fact decrease. Yet instead the demand for comfort increases and to a grumpy old man everything can become uncomfortable, even what he is used to, but even more so what is new. The adolescent is at odds with his ordinary environment and declares war on it, the grown man applies his strength to it, often resulting in the loss of his dreams, of his previously better consciousness, but the elderly man, the old man, when he gets annoyed with the world, does not fight against it like the adolescent, but stands in danger of becoming peevish towards it, moaning and cantankerous. At least in those areas where the old personality turns sour, where it simply shrinks back into miserliness and selfishness. In bourgeois old age money seems more desirable than ever, both on account of the neurotic drive to cling on to things with wizened hands, for which a means has entirely become an end, and of course also on account of the mortal fear of an infirm being. Wine and purse remain for petty old age what remains to be wished for, and not always only for petty old age. Wine, women and song, this association dissolves, the bottle lasts longer. Cheers, old boy; that is why an old drinker seems nicer than an old lover. Evocations of Youth; Counter-Wish: Harvest Even young people, indeed especially young people, wish to live for a long time. But this seldom includes the wish to be an old man. This is rarely indulged. An adolescent can imagine himself as a man, but hardly as an

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old man; the morning points to midday, not to evening. It is remarkable in itself that getting old, in so far as it relates to the loss of an earlier state which, whether rightly or wrongly, is felt to be better, is not really felt until around fifty. Does the adolescent feel no loss at leaving his childhood behind? Does the man feel none when he quits the bloom of youth, when the green shoot turns to wood? Does the child not already die in the sexually mature girl and boy, in the ego and its responsibility which now emerges? The mother feels this when the shadow of her son's first beard tickles and pricks, the adolescent himself feels it when life ceases to be a game, when small things and hiding-places become inaccessible to his growing body. And melancholy is in fact customary during the transition into the first stage of manhood, where the good old student days vanish, embourgeoisement begins. But the caesura of old age is clearer than any earlier caesura and more brutally negative; loss itself seems to become concentrated. Virility decreases, fertility ceases entirely, the lustre disappears, the summer ends. And if the ageing man does not notice himself that he is growing old, then the others notice it, he sees the cause by the effect, no matter how young he is urged to feel. It is very instructive for most old men when a girl stands up to make room for them for the first time; this politeness certainly does not act as a plus which age has brought, it has a fatal effect. And even the old fop who usually tries to deceive himself by being superficial, the easiest gift of youth, is surprised by the realization of how short life is. Something long since past can seem as close in old age as distant mountains shortly before the rain. The realization is received almost with disbelief even by the dignified old man; it seems only yesterday that he was the same age as the young people around him. Doubtless therefore, the specific feeling of age which sets in around fifty, sometimes even earlier, is little prepared for by the previously experienced and yet never so sharply experienced changing stages of life, is seen with some justification as something unfamiliar. The reason lies in the unclear nature or in the unclarified nature of the benefits which old age brings, for all the brutal negative aspects which can be associated with it and ultimately are associated with it. Thus the handshake of old age is predominantly only felt to be one of farewell, that is with death at the sharp end. The latter, possible at any stage of life, but inevitable in greater age, no longer gives the ebb any prospect of experiencing a flow; and that makes the change called old age so decisive. It makes it so unmistakable in contrast to the earlier stages concealed beneath new foliage; just as if the pain of farewell which the adolescent, the man may

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have felt, or equally may not have felt, on leaving childhood and youth, were retrieved here and added to one's own autumn. Thus an old age which is not petty also manifests wishes to return to a youth which there and then, years ago, may well have been felt as something that was still deficient, namely as intangible blossom and not yet as tangible, clearly defined fruit ripe for weighing. Precisely an old man who works, who is therefore not sucking at the paws of memory in his winter cave, will at least wish back all the time he had before him at the age of twenty. He will wish back the magic of the long backgrounds which life possessed for him then and which, as the future decreases (as the years are 'numbered'), certainly decreases too. Thus resignation, which is only half-genuine and temporary in youth, exists as genuine and collected in normal old age. No mere farewell to a phase of life is marked here, with dispersing dreams, thwarted fulfilments, but farewell to long life itself. It nevertheless remains strange that an oppressive sense of ageing can emerge so strongly. And characteristically, it does not emerge with equal force, nor so uninhibitedly in all men, nor in all periods of history. Instead, a psychological vacuum must also accompany the organic ebb, or at least, as noted above, the unclear or unclarified nature of the benefits which old age brings. Thus to sum up we may say: to make old age pure suffering, provided it is relatively healthy and based on an efficient life, all that is necessary is a simpleton to experience it and a late bourgeois society which desperately dolls itself up to look young. There is a proverb When the candle's out, you can tell whether it was wax or tallow: so old age is not itself at fault if the figure which it raises out of illusion and appearance is still just an ugly one. And societies which unlike today's declining bourgeois society did not shy away from every glimpse of the end, possessed and saw in old age a blossoming fruit, a very desirable and welcome one. So it was in the Spartan Council of Elders, in the Senate in still Republican Rome, even in the new dimension of socialist experience. A different destiny to that of declining is still always to be heard here, has remained considerably more than 'honour and the hoary head'*; for a thriving society does not fear like a declining one its reflected image in old age, but greets there its watchmen. On the whole, old age shows, like every earlier stage of life, completely possible, specific benefits which also compensate for the farewell to the previous stage of life. Thus growing old not only describes a desirable stretch of time in which as much as possible has been experienced and in which as much as
*

Cf. Leviticus 19, 32.

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possible can be learnt on the way out. Growing old can also describe a wishful image according to the situation: the wishful image of commanding view, or possibly of harvest. Voltaire says in the same vein, for the ignorant old age is like the winter, for the educated it is gathering and pressing the grapes. This does not exclude youth, but includes it in the afterripening; the wish to return to youth loses precisely its element of suffering thanks to this matured empathy with what is coming, it compensates, fulfils itself with the footing it has gained, with simplicity and meaning. In general, a person's later years will thus contain all the more youth, in the unimitated sense, the more collection there already was to start with in his youth; the phases of life, and therefore also old age, then lose their isolated sharpness. The healthy wishful image of old age and in old age is that of thoroughly formed maturity; it feels more at home giving than taking. Evening and House To be able to be so collected means there must be no noise. A final wish permeates all the wishes of old age, an often not unquestionable one, for rest. It can be just as tormenting, even as hungry as the earlier pursuit of diversion. The sexual flaring up, which especially in women is often reminiscent of early puberty, is also dampened by it. Even the possibly productive nature, related so closely to youth, so familiar with it, needs freedom from disturbance more than before (or even more freedom from disturbance). And every old man wishes to be allowed to be exhausted by life; even if he is caught up in the hurly-burly of the world, a part of him behaves as if he were not caught up in it. Vanity is the last garment that man removes, but only a very strange old man will give this garment a lot of hard wear at the expense of silence. The image of this silence is wonderfully embellished precisely in the nonembourgeoisement of old age, the image of the country instead of the city, the elapsion where the wet clothes are drying, where things are not very busy. In more important cases, the wish for rest subdues even the regret over previous omissions and mistakes; in his old age failures in his life seemed to Goethe almost unimportant in the long run, where they had not turned out well. Happiness refused, and particularly work unfinished, still rankle, but in memory the latter at least, rightly or wrongly, almost takes shape. Jacob Grimm's speech about old age, which he himself gave in his seventy-fifth year, throws light on all these friendly late wishes and late feelings. This speech, definitely more 'nolens' than 'volens', is sustained by the grateful

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awareness that growing old is a blessing. Physical debilities of the senses are mitigated here in the general wish for rest, they even supplement its content. Even possible deafness, according to Grimm, has the advantage that superfluous talk, useless chatter can no longer interrupt us. Failing eye-sight causes many disturbing details to disappear; Grimm recalls the blind seer. And he describes the enjoyment which the solitary walk affords the old man, how feeling for nature is heightened in general. Man is alone with himself in nature, the chattering conversation of nutrient plants dies down, the world grows dark in the evening, but the water grows bright, the last drop of life is dedicated to contemplation. Past deprivation is no longer felt, past happiness is becalmed, renewed through memory, the chisel-blows of life have worked an essential shape, and what is essential can be seen by it better than ever before. Nevertheless, of course, even this kind of separation from other stages of life, emphasized by the wish for rest and a kind of strolling standstill, is different in different periods. The Biedermeier period* is long past where the old soul, even in much less pure forms than that of Jacob Grimm, repaired to its own breast and was served at the long table d'hte of memories. The late capitalist world is certainly not a Bank of Good Hope for old people. Even the winter rest of the middle class is seriously disturbed by the dwindling or the precariousness of the savings account. Only socialist society can fulfil the wishes of old age for leisure, yet even here this leisure, in a positive sense of course, is different to before, since the difference between the generations is no longer so sharply divisive. Life at the moment is much more sharply delineated politically, and it can no longer be said that old age, despite its reflectiveness, is simply reactionary, youth, despite its freshness, simply progressive. Often it is the other way round, and the wish of old age for rest, in a time where, to isolate one symptom, there are still fascist youth leagues with their heads thrown back, does not always coincide with the wish of old age to remain forever in the inertia of yesterday. It has become easier than ever for old age to burn at both ends, namely with courage and experience together, with new consciousness and with that of the known inheritance. The man who has grown old and who, sitting in the cool of evening on the bench outside his front door, turns over the pages of his spent life and nothing more this feature of Grimm's wishful image has gone out of circulation economically and in terms of
*

Period of bourgeois culture in nineteenth-century Germany from 1815 to 1848. Also an elaborate style of domestic art in this period.

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content. Still in circulation, however, is the vigorous wish, so commensurate with the wish for silence, that the empty whirl of life round about should stop. Precisely love of silence can be more remote from the capitalist scramble than a youth which mistakes the scramble for life. Here old age (for which the bourgeois world no longer has any use) has the right to be old-fashioned. To be genteel, giving a lead, using words and casting commanding glances which are not of that day nor for that day. Embodying times in which as yet not everything was the bustle of commerce, and above all in which this bustle will cease again. This makes a striking and yet understandable connection possible for many an old man today, provided he has grown wise, with a new age, the age without the cocky, sharp, heel-clicking wolves, i.e. the socialist age. Wish and ability to be without vulgar haste, to see what is important, to forget what is unimportant: all this is authentic life in old age.

8 The Sign That Changes


It is a flat feeling to be disturbed. But we let ourselves be interrupted by new things remarkably easily, by unexpected things. As if no part of life were so good that it could not be abandoned at any time. Pleasure in being different abducts us, it often deceives us. But it always drives us out of what we are used to. Something new must come to take us with it. Most are attracted merely by the empty difference from what has previously been, by freshness, regardless for the moment what its contents are. Here it already brings enjoyment that something is happening, only it must not contain any misfortune for ourselves. In the lowest instance, gossip seduces us, news of other people's quarrels. But even the newspaper lives largely from the need for the unusual, the latest news is its appeal. Nothing is therefore more uninteresting, and so undeservedly so, than a paper that is one or even several days old. Today's paper is overrated, yesterday's underrated, the sting of surprise has been pulled out. All these vulgar or mediocre needs presuppose boredom which is to be driven out, but at the same time set something higher in motion; this something ultimately moves towards a wished-for, liberating piece of news. Its contents are definitely not uninteresting, but they make what is new into what is expected, finally

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attained, achieved. The New is greeted as a brother who has travelled from the region where the sun rises. The sensational wish is in malleable, dull souls itself dull and gullible, in strong souls capable of vision it is thorough. It wants to make sure that man is not lying crooked, that he is in tune with his place and his work. That this work does not fob him off with alms, but rather that the same old story of doing without finally comes to an end. We listen in that direction, strain to see. The will which is at work here stems from deprivation and does not disappear until the deprivation is eradicated. Thus as children we jumped up, not always in fear, when the bell rang outside. Its ringing cuts through the silent, gloomy room, especially towards evening. Perhaps now something darkly intended is coming, that which we are looking for, that which is looking for us again. Its gift transforms and improves everything; it brings a new age. The ringing of this bell remains in every ear, it is associated with every good cry from outside. With the great awakening that is there and is coming; of course expectation alone does not bring it. But if it is well attuned to the sound and what it means, the expectation does not let us ignore the sound. It will not be deceived in the long run, because the lie does not last. Any more than the more refined, that is, the almost more cunning lie which whines and slanders pharisaically can deceive us in the long run, because the socialist New is brought about by power and not by gossip, by the hard work of proving ourselves and not through back-sliding excuses. The obsession with what is better remains, even when what is better has been prevented for so long. When what is wished for arrives, it surprises us anyway.

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PART TWO (FOUNDATION): ANTICIPATORY CONSCIOUSNESS

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9 What Goes Ahead As Urging


Who drives on within us? We move, are warm and keen. Everything living is aroused, and first of all by itself. It breathes, as long as it exists, and stimulates us. To keep on bringing us to the boil, from below. That we are alive cannot be felt. The That which posits us as living does not itself emerge. It lies deep down, where we begin to be corporeal. This push within us is what we mean when we say, man does not live in order to live, but 'because' he lives. Nobody has sought out this state of urging, it has been with us ever since we have existed and in that we exist. The nature of our immediate being is empty and hence greedy, striving and hence restless. But all of this does not feel itself, in order to do so it must first go out of itself. Then it senses itself as 'urge', as a quite vague and indefinite urge. No living thing can ever escape from the That of urging, no matter how tired it may have become of this. This thirst constantly announces itself but does not give its name.

10 Naked Striving and Wishing, Unsatisfied


From the bare inside something reaches forth. The urging expresses itself first as 'striving', craving to go anywhere. When the striving is felt, it becomes 'longing', the only honest state in all men. The longing itself is no less vague and general than the urge, but at least it is clearly directed outwards. It does not burrow like urging does, but roves around, though quite as utterly restless, addicted. And if it becomes obsessed with itself, the longing remains mere general addiction. Roving around blind and empty, the latter can never go to the place where it would be stilled. To achieve this the longing must first clearly drive towards something. As something definite, it ceases to strike out in all directions at once. It becomes a 'searching', that has and does not have what it is searching for, it becomes goal-directed driving. Its driving-towards is divided up

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according to the something at which it is directed, thus becomes the or that individually nameable 'drive'. This concept, undoubtedly often dulled and reified in a reactionary way, should be understood as meaning the same as 'need'. But since the word 'need' does not also have the resonance of goal-directed driving, the word 'drive' and the concept, understood in an undull way, may be allowed to stand. The drive is always searching to fill a hollow space, a missing space in the striving and longing, to fill something lacking with an external something. This various something, above all as bread or as woman or as power and so on, in fact divides up the driving towards a goal into its several respective drives. Thus also, when the striving we feel is only general longing, then the felt drive is the particular element of the respective individual 'passions', 'emotions'. This something enables the drive to decrease when it is satisfied, even to stop temporarily, in contrast to the insatiably continuing addiction. So the goal towards which the drive moves is at the same time that by which (as long as and in so far as it is to hand) it is stilled. The relation of animals to this goal is that of their respective desires, man also pictures the goal to himself. Thus man is not only capable of craving, but also of wishing. The latter is more extensive, adds more colour than craving. For 'wishing' eagerly looks forward to an imagined idea in which the desire causes what is its own to be pictured. Craving is certainly much older than the imagining of the something which is craved. But precisely because this craving passes over into wishing, it acquires the more or less definite idea of its something, in fact as a better something. The demand of the wish rises precisely with the idea of the better, even perfect aspect of its fulfilling something. So that it may be said, not of course of craving, but of the demand of the wish: wishing arises, if not actually out of imagined ideas, then only together with them. At the same time it is further stimulated by them to the same degree that what is pictured, pictured ahead, promises fulfilment. Thus where there is the imagined idea of something better, ultimately perhaps perfect, wishing takes place, possibly impatient, demanding wishing. The mere imagined idea thus becomes a wishful image, stamped with the cachet: this is how it should be. But here wishing, no matter how strong it is, is distinguished from actual 'wanting' by its passive nature which is still related to longing. In wishing there is not yet any element of work or activity, whereas all wanting is wanting to do. We can wish for the weather to be fine tomorrow, although there is not the slightest thing we can do about it. Wishes can even be entirely irrational, we can wish that X or Y were still alive; it is possibly meaningful to wish this,

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but meaningless to want it. Therefore the wish remains even where the will can no longer change anything. The remorseful man wishes that he had not carried out a certain action, but he cannot actually want this. Even despondent, dithering, often disappointed, weak-willed men have wishes, even especially strong wishes, without these wishes making them want to do something. Furthermore, different things can be wished, one is spoilt for choice here, but only one of them can be wanted; whereas the man who wants has already shown preference, he knows what he would rather do, the choice lies behind him. Wishing can be undecided, despite the definite imagined goal to which it eagerly looks forward; conversely, wanting is necessarily active progress towards this goal, it goes outwards, has to measure itself exclusively against things given as real. And the path the wishing takes, wishing augmented and hardened by wanting, can itself be unwished for, that is, rough or bitter. And yet ultimately nothing else can be wanted except what is wished: the interested wish is the 'driving method', 'drive-method', which releases wanting, demonstrates to it what is to be wanted. Hence though there may be wishing without wanting, namely feeble, inactive wishing which exhausts itself in the imagination or is impossible, there can be no wanting that is not preceded by wishing. And wanting will be all the stronger, the more vividly the imagined goal which it has in common with wishing has been shaped into a wishful image. Wishes do nothing, but they depict and retain with particular fidelity what must be done. The girl who would like to feel radiant and sought after, the man who dreams of future deeds, wear poverty or ordinariness as a temporary skin. This does not cause the skin to be shed, but it does make people grow into it less easily. Bare desire and its drive principally hold on to what they have, but the wishing in them that pictures intends more. It remains unsatisfiable, that is, nothing that exists gives it proper satisfaction. In all of this, drive as definite striving, as a desire for something, remains alive.

11 Man As a Quite Extensive Complex of Drives


The Individual Body The drive must have someone behind it. But who is the the searcher open to stimuli? Who moves in the living movement, who drives in the animal,

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who wishes in man? Everything certainly does not revolve around the ego here; because a drive 'overcomes' us. This does not mean, however, that no individual self-enclosed being is present at all, which carries and feels the drives and takes away unpleasant feelings by satisfying them. But this being is first and foremost the living individual body; moved by stimuli, overcrowded with stimuli, it contains the drives, they are not floating generally. And when the animal eats, its own body is satisfied, nothing else. No Drive without Body Behind It Certainly, that which feels itself to be body is itself very general. It merely 'finds' itself, in a good or bad state of health; but these are not very clear findings. Whereas every drive certainly seems to appear as a Who and as if it were pulling the body behind it. As if the body did not contain the drive, but the drive contained the body and determined it, dyed it respectively, black with rage, green with envy, red with anger, like a piece of cloth. In addition there is also the long duration and apparently subjectless appearance which the drives possess in so-called instinct. The chicks which have just crawled out of the egg peck immediately for grains of corn, on a pre-determined path, in which they attain what is their own in the most effective manner. The path is steered by the cerebellum, though subsequently of course, according to Pavlov's discoveries, it can be steered in changing directions by the cerebral cortex and the environment which is experienced through the latter as changed; particularly among the higher animals. But so-called instinct works falsely as if it were a self-guiding drive, and people experience it too, particularly women, if not in love, then as caring mothers. Here it really does appear as if drives existed independently and controlled the body, not to mention the soul. But even less efficient drives occasionally pretend to be independent, make people into their prey. This is so in the case of neurotics, where an isolated drive-direction, which appears almost self-sufficient, overwhelms not only the body but also the conscious ego and confronts it as something alien. This is also true in healthy people at the moment when they are 'overpowered' by a drive-feeling, as if the emotion were a master in itself. Then we may say: it was not the love-sick girl who went into the water out of grief, but the grief which went into the water with the love-sick girl. But nevertheless, despite this in many ways subjectless appearance: nothing in the body allows drives to become their own vehicles. When the bird builds

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its nest, when the swallow finds the previous year's nest, there is still of course no ego at work in such mysterious processes, but also no independent drive which could, as it were, get by without a body. Even the drive-instinct belongs to the economy of the individual body and is only employed in so far as it belongs to it, in so far as the body does its own business, fleeing from what damages it, searching for what preserves it. This is why there are also several motivating forces, according to the circumstances, not only a single one that drives everything along. Present throughout is only the body which wants to preserve itself and therefore eats, drinks, makes love, overwhelms and thus drives alone in its drives, however varied they may be and however transformed by the appearing ego and its relationships. The Changing Passion Man, in particular, always carries several drives with him. For he retains not only most of the animal ones, he also produces new ones; that is, not only his body, but also his ego is emotional. Conscious man is the most difficult of all animals to satisfy; he is in the gratification of his wishes the animal which makes detours. If he lacks what is necessary for life, he feels the lack like no other creature: hunger-visions surface. If he has what is necessary, then with its enjoyment new desires surface which torment him differently, but no less intensely than the previous naked privation. The rich and the sated (but not only them) possibly suffer from the strange itch of the I-Don't-Know-What-It-Is; luxury above all (which does appear to fulfil everything) is an insatiable driver. Xerxes offered a prize for the invention of a new pleasure; not only boredom was behind this, but an unknown drive, at least the clamour for it which also wanted to be stilled. In fact, in the course of history with its changing forms, the increasing extent to which needs are satisfied, hardly one kind of drive has remained the same, and not one presents itself as finished. With the new objects, differently orientated addictions and passions awake, of which nobody had the slightest inkling yesterday. The acquisitive drive, for example, which is itself only acquired anyway, has grown to an extent which was quite alien to pre-capitalist times; even the sexual libido is in many ways thwarted by it. Rather new also is the record-drive in late capitalist society, especially the empty technological addiction to ever greater speed; this latter addiction was first created by motorized

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vehicles. Above all, however, monopoly capitalism needs to intensify an abstract recorddrive for the purpose of whipping people on, for otherwise the maximum profit could not be so quickly squeezed from the workers. And furthermore, the fascist death-drive has a novelty which is almost furious, compared to, say, the sentimental death-drive of the Wertherzeit,* or even the Romantic nocturnal kind; it is fired and orientated by a very different social mandate. It receives a bonus partly for the slaughter in imperialist war, partly for the pointlessness of late bourgeois existence as a whole. On the other hand, the religious drive, if one can call this phenomenon such, heavily laden as it is with superstructure, the drive upward, the erotic urge towards the changeless, receded. And where it was stimulated in a depraved or deceived way, as in various fascist seductions, the previous upward drive hardly remained one, it sank into the soil, into Blood and Soil. ** In short, we realize that man is an equally changeable and extensive complex of drives, a heap of changing, and mostly badly ordered wishes. And a permanent motivating force, a single basic drive, in so far as it does not become independent and thus hang in the air, is hardly conceivable. The principal motivating force does not even become visible in men of the same time and class, by psychoanalytically dismantling their apparently purely inner clockwork, for example. There are certainly several basic drives; now one, now another emerges more strongly, now they work together, like opposing winds around a ship, and they do not even remain similar to themselves. Man wants to make his fortune, this saying certainly does sound really old and it is also undoubtedly reliable in quite a different way from the calumny about the eternal predatory drive, but when we ask: which fortune and for what, then immediately the questions and refinements always begin. It would also be too remarkable if in class history, where new imagined goals of striving repeatedly surfaced, the goal-directed striving of the drives in fact proceeded in one direction, firmly, already complete.
*

Goethe's novel 'Die Leiden des jungen Werthers', published in 1774, caused a spate of suicides in imitation of its hero.
**

'Blood and Soil' a Nazi propaganda slogan calling for racial purity and re-occupation of allegedly German territory.

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12 Various Interpretations of the Basic Human Drive


The Sexual Drive But the body must first and foremost strive towards something. After all, what is the principal motivating force of our mind and energies, as they stand in the present? As we know, Freud posits the sexual drive as the first and most powerful. Accordingly, libido governs life, it is fundamental both in terms of time and content. Already the sucking of the suckling is supposedly connected with sexual pleasure and takes place largely for the sake of this pleasure. Even hunger is supposedly subject to the sex-drive, its satisfaction becomes sexual relaxation. The relationship to our own body and thereafter to external objects, and all the more so to people around us, thus appears to be always primarily sexual. But libido did not remain the sole impulse in Freud, at least not libido in the sense of positive pleasure. The later Freud stressed alongside it a tendency towards negative pleasure, namely the deathdrive. The animal will is then also assigned to the death in store for it, not only to mating. Just as multicellular creatures drive towards death from the outset, and mortal decomposition already sets in in youth, in vascular contraction for example, there is also a separate drive towards the process of dying, of growing cold. It is the destructive and aggressive drive; Freud sought to identify it as a separate, though always libidinally coloured drive in sadistic desires. The din of life which emanates from love is supposed to be silenced or destroyed by this same libido. The wish for destruction expresses itself with respect to our own body in the pleasure taken in bare discipline, in the various ascetic tendencies. With respect to other bodies and objects the death-drive expresses itself as cruelty, as the undeniable frenzy of destruction now raining down on others. That the death-drive is also libidinal, however, is supposedly indicated by the universal connection between cruelty and sexual pleasure, above all also by the emotion of Liebestod.* In any case the core is and remains sexual here, this is what motivates Freud's man.
*

'Love-death'. The desire to preserve the perfection of Romantic love through death, as in Wagner's interpretation of the story of Tristan and Isolde, for example.

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Ego-Drive and Repression Only later is this joined by another, narrower power. Of course, this narrowness, even sharpness in man is important; since it is his ego. Freud indicates time and again, not without retreating occasionally, that, apart from the sex-drive and the death-drive related to it, he has distinguished a purely human drive. For if there were only libido and nothing else, then neither conflicts nor neuroses could arise in us. Next to the 'dark id' of the body and its drives, however, stands the ego, according to Freud. The ego-drives stand opposite the sexual powers; indeed, the whole of psychoanalysis, says Freud, 'has been built up upon the sharp division of the sexual drives from the ego-drives'. The ego affirms, denies and censors the drives, consciousness depends on it, it is the power which makes our mental life coherent. It is the power 'which goes to sleep at night and then still operates dream censorship'. The egodrive represses what does not fall into line with it in the sexual drives and their contents (of which more later). Thus our mental life is dualistic, in spite of the libido, which began everything here; it moves 'between the coherent ego and the repressed material that is split off from it'. Precisely this tension leads, if it leads to contradiction, to pathogenic conflict, one between the ego-drives and the sexual drives. From the ego emanate 'the repressions through which certain mental tendencies are excluded not only from consciousness but also from the other kinds of validity and application. This material removed by repression confronts the ego in analysis, and the analysis is given the task of eliminating the resistances to dealing with the repressed material expressed by the ego.' The ego sees to the removal of unpleasant feelings through the fulfilment of drives, but it sees to this fulfilment in its own way, in a censoring, moralizing way and above all with respect to what can be achieved, to 'reality'. This moralizing element, i.e. what has adapted to the practices of Freud's bourgeois environment, is according to Freud the acquired line of the ego-drive. Thus there even occurs a penetration of the libido, hence of the pleasure principle which otherwise determines all drive-processes; the adult, or better: the bourgeois individual seen by Freud in a bourgeois way, wears down his Dionysian horns on 'reality', as Freud calls his bourgeois environment (the commodity world and its ideology).'The thus educated ego has become ''reasonable", it no longer allows itself to be controlled by the pleasure principle but follows the reality principle, which basically also wants to achieve pleasure, but pleasure

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ensured by consideration of reality, even if this is postponed and diminished pleasure.' And yet the ego, the 'reality' itself or the bourgeois outside world would not yet be sufficient to censor and also to sublimate the libidinal drives, if there was not also, next to and above them, the 'super-ego' or the 'ego-ideal'. The super-ego is the other content of the ego; according to Freud it represents our relations to our parents; it creates all the surrogate formations of piety. The ego represents the rights of the outside world, the super-ego is however 'the advocate of the inner world', the 'origin of conscience and of guilt feelings' (understood as the tensions between the claims of conscience and the achievements of the ego); it is the 'seed from which all religions have developed'. By representing father and mother, the super-ego observes, threatens and controls the ego as the parents had previously observed, threatened and controlled the child; thus it gives the ego a guiding image and is the source of the formation of ideals. But precisely because of the continuing effect of parental authority, a threatening element can easily exist in the super-ego; the conscience is strict, the sense of duty sombre, and also the super-ego very often retains, from its parental side, the traditions and ideals of the past. Nevertheless it skirts round the wakeful ego to get to the libido, to the common dark, to the id of the inner world united in the dark. All this is added to the original libido, at least in the later Freud; thus an extraordinary superstructure of drives exists. Admittedly one which is supposed to be largely dismantled again through analysis and which, as far as the contents of the super-ego are concerned (to which not only religion but, for example, also the postulates of changing the world belong), supposedly consists exclusively of 'illusions' with regard to the outside world. The inner world itself, however, which finds its advocate in the super-ego, in the final analysis always remains that of the libido or the repressed drives, of the 'unconscious id' in man. The id of this libido is and remains according to Freud the unconscious realm of drives that fills the body and surrounds us, seen from its animal side as well as from that of the super-ego. With the result 'that we are "lived" by unknown, uncontrollable forces' (in other words: by the alien domination of the capitalist mode of production which Freud has made into the libido-id). Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is 'a tool which should make the progressive conquest of the id by the ego possible'. This merely has the effect of freeing the basic libidinal drive again, that is, it is neither diminished in acts of repression nor eclipsed in ties of the ego-ideal. Freud does indeed want to bring the repressed and unconscious material in it rationally to light, that is, to reduce the hypocritical and neurosis-creating

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mustiness. But what should follow is solely daylight within the private libido and within the 'discontent' of a civilization* where apparently nothing more than a breath of psychoanalytical air is lacking. Repression, Complex, Unconscious Material and Sublimation Thus the sexual drive, if not the be all and end all, still remains fundamental here. The decent girl simply refuses to admit it, the demure ego represses sexuality. But consequently the latter now begins to ferment and to urge all the more, it cannot work itself off in the existing or permitted life. Sexuality and its wishes are wrapped up by bourgeois people, as Freud found them, in a thick web of secrecy, of hypocrisy and lies. For in fact: the libido in the individual himself, not just in the cant of society, is subject to a moralizing censorship which does not allow our true being to step over the threshold of consciousness. This censorship debars, it represses the sexual impulse, it slanders it, as soon as the repression is not totally successful, it blocks itself off against knowledge of it. The libido here remains for Freud both the single basic drive and the essential content of human existence; for the ego is, as noted, only a checking authority. It inspects the baggage brought in by the libido, it forces the libido to disguise itself, if necessary to 'sublimate' itself into intellectual material, but the ego itself is unproductive. Of course, when it represses, the moralizing censorship only removes the repressed material on the surface. The unfulfilled, even hushed-up wishes simply sink down in the process of repression into the more or less unconscious. There they fester, form neurotic tensions and complexes without the sufferer becoming aware of the cause. The merely forgotten, not vanished sexual affective processing continues to work in all manner of disguises. Freud was already looking to demonstrate the prompting of the libido in the psychopathology of everyday life, in slips of the tongue, bungled actions, in slips** of the seemingly most coincidental, most insignificant kind. Drives which have not been worked off, incomplete experiences, forgotten wounds and disappointments continue to smart; they have disappeared from the consciousness of the ego, but not from the psyche. From them derive seemingly unfounded oversensitivity, over-reaction,
*

Bloch is alluding to Freud's 'Civilization and its Discontents', 1930.

**

'Fehlleistungen'. Strachey's English translation gives the elaborate 'parapraxes' for this simple German compound.

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compulsively neurotic activity, and finally the group of emotions which has become senselessly independent and devoid of content: the complex. All ghosts or perhaps merely Freudian ghosts appear here: penis envy, the castration and Oedipus complexes and more besides. According to Freud, a sexual irritation is at the bottom of all complexes, they are fixated on an infantile, forgotten trauma. From the experiences of childhood derives the castration complex, the so-called Oedipus complex of father hatred (although Oedipus himself, as Chesterton says, was the only man who certainly had no Oedipus complex, since he did not know until the end that Laertes, whom he killed, was his father, and Jocasta, whom he married, was his mother). Supposedly, all these strangely named phenomena, even more strange because they are thundered up from below, have entirely 'resulted from interrupted, somehow disturbed processes which had to remain unconscious'. If it were then possible to go down with consciousness into the cellar of the repressed, to make the unconscious preconditions of the neurotic symptoms conscious, then the neurotic would be cured, that is, his ego would have his id under its thumb. The person who knows the cause of his complexes cures himself; though only psychoanalysis can help him to this knowledge. Laborious probing into the depths, paying attention to seemingly incidental authorities, particularly to authorities made to seem incidental, but also to mistrust of ideologies which sound much too nice (like 'sanctity' of motherhood and the like) all this detective skill is necessary to recognize the content of the neurotic symptom and to call it into the patient's consciousness. The main road there, via regia, is supposed to be the interpretation of dreams, as is well-known, in fact the interpretation of nocturnal dreams as such, being those where the censoring ego is asleep, and the harsh external world can no longer be perceived. For Freud, every dream is the fulfilment of an unconscious wish-fantasy; the task is to decipher analytically the wishfully announced material from the symbolism in which it cloaks itself in the dream. At all stages the neurotic puts up a characteristic resistance to this deciphering: the forgotten wants to remain forgotten and its symptoms to remain disguised. But it is nevertheless important to note here: the resistance to them becoming conscious lies according to Freud solely in the will of the patient, not, for example, in the material of the unconscious itself, i.e. that unconscious which Freud himself establishes and which apart from the grotesque quality of its essentially merely libidinal contents is essentially a product or at least a refuge of repression. Repression itself is in this sense a process 'through which an act capable of consciousness, i.e. one which belongs

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to the system of pre-consciousness, is made unconscious, i.e. pushed back into the system of unconsciousness. And likewise we call it repression, when the unconscious mental act is not permitted to enter the next pre-conscious system at all, but is turned away on the threshold by censorship.' The libido which has been made conscious thus reveals no other door than that through which we re-enter the reeled-up Long Ago. Psychoanalysis seeks to be ab ovo subcortical memory, solitary, encapsulated, and, as it itself states, subterranean, Acherontic.* The unconscious in Freud is therefore one into which something can only be pushed back. Or which at best, as id, surrounds consciousness as if this were a closed ring: a phylogenetic inheritance all around conscious man. 'With the help of the super-ego, the ego draws, in a way that is still obscure to us, on the experiences of prehistory stored up in the id.' The unconscious of psychoanalysis is therefore, as we can see, never a Not-Yet-Conscious, an element of progressions; it consists rather of regressions. Accordingly, even the process of making this unconscious conscious only clarifies What Has Been; i.e. there is nothing new in the Freudian unconscious. This became even clearer when C. G. Jung, the psychoanalytic fascist, reduced the libido and its unconscious contents entirely to the primeval. According to him, exclusively phylogenetic primeval memories or primeval fantasies exist in the unconscious, falsely designated 'archetypes'; and all wishful images also go back into this night, only suggest prehistory. Jung even considers the night to be so colourful that consciousness pales beside it; as a spurner of the light, he devalues consciousness. In contrast, Freud does of course uphold illuminating consciousness, but one which is itself surrounded by the ring of the id, by the fixed unconsciousness of a fixed libido. Even highly productive artistic creations do not lead out of this Fixum; they are simply sublimations of the self-enclosed libido: imagination is a substitute for the fulfilment of drives. 'The problem to be solved then', says Freud, 'is to displace the drive-goals, in such a way that they cannot be affected by the failure of the external world.' The sex-drive can be refined into caritas, into devotion to the well-being of one's neighbour, ultimately of humanity. More highly sublimated libido constitutes the pleasure the artist derives from his creation, but also the enjoyment and the (vicarious) satisfaction the non-artist derives from a work of art. The latter does after all provide pure wish-fulfilment of a shaped yet uninhibited kind: women, wedding, heroes and even the beautiful tragic corpse. It provides the man
*

Acheron, the river of woe in Hades.

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in the stalls with what he lacks in life, provides cloth of gold like a beautiful dream in the night does. The viewer or the spectator works off his wishes in this way so that they no longer cause him pain. But every 'catharsis' of this kind remains temporary, in fact illusory: art, according to Freud, works exclusively with the illusions with which the unsatisfied libido allows itself to be fooled. How mechanistically far away Freud is here from Pavlov's realization that precisely the higher psychological processes work, with the constant influence of the changes in the environment which they have grasped, on the emotional and organic processes; that they are in no way merely dependent, nor inherently hollow modes of substitution. In Freud, however, there remain only sexual libido, its conflict with the egodrives, and the cellar of consciousness as a whole, from which the illusions then rise. Power-Drive, Frenzy-Drive, Collective Unconscious No matter how dully grasped the body is, the sexual drive does not live in it all the time, nor alone. After he had taken this road, Freud, as we know, was therefore contradicted by several of his pupils. These pupils were quick either to distinguish a quite different driving force or to bronze the libido. Alfred Adler, the originator of so-called individual psychology, attempted to do the first, C. G. Jung the second (with a mythical patina). Thus 'the problem of sexuality which weighs upon us all' was 'eliminated at a stroke', for which Freud criticizes them both. At any rate, it seemed it could be eliminated. In systems based on different motivating forces, it is not the complete be all and end all. On a bi-sexual foundation, Adler posits, in supreme capitalist fashion, the will to power as the basic human drive: primarily man wants to rule and overpower. He wants to get from the bottom to the top, wants to lie on top, to pass from the female line in him to the male, feel himself individually confirmed as the victor. Vanity, ambition, 'male protest' are accordingly the emotions in which this basic drive appears most visibly. Wounded vanity, failed ambition are the source of most neuroses. Sexuality is itself only a means to the final goal, the attainment of power: 'Libido, sex-drive and tendency to perversion, wherever they may have derived from, also line up behind this guiding principle' (Adler, Der nervse Charakter, 1922, p. 5). The feeling of insecurity and inferiority stands threateningly at the beginning of the development of neurosis; unfulfilled power-drive produces the inferiority complex. But as skin hardens over a wound, as a protective measure, as it

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were, against future damage, and as the failure of one kidney strengthens the functioning of the other, mental inferiorities are likewise overcompensated by the ego. Partly through masks and fictions: will to power then becomes will to appearance; partly also, however, through higher achievements: will to power then recoups its losses, possibly in a beautiful fantasy world. Though we do not see where it takes its material from here; for the will to power, in itself necessarily bare, cannot of course be sublimated as regards content. Nevertheless, goalsetting remains essential in this will, precisely in accordance with the desire to be out in front; it takes the place of mere innate drivenness from below, i.e. from the Freudian sexual libido. The individual person builds himself up by means of a guiding image or even just by means of play-acting and fiction: 'The insecurity which is felt to be embarrassing is reduced to its smallest proportions and then reversed into its extreme opposite, into its contradiction which as a fictional goal is made into the guiding point of all wishes, fantasies and endeavours.' In this way the person forms nothing other than the individual person appears in this individual psychology his character: 'So as not to miss the path to the summit, to make it perfectly safe, he draws constantly effective guidelines in the form of character traits in the broad chaotic fields of his soul.' Fundamentally, everything personal is thus made and cultivated from the outset in Adler through a largely unconscious but no longer in any way naive purposive will. Thus, fundamentally, the causa finalis rules, the biological factor is subjugated to the capitalistically interested goal which is geared to the safeguarding of the personality, to raising the feeling of personality. Because Adler therefore drives sex out of the libido and inserts individual power, his definition of drives takes the ever steeper capitalist path from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and reflects this path ideologically and psychoanalytically. Freud's concept of libido bordered on the 'will to life' in Schopenhauer's philosophy; Schopenhauer in fact described the sexual organs as 'the focal points of the will'. Adler's 'will to power' conversely coincides verbally, and partly also in terms of content with Nietzsche's definition of the basic drive from his last period; in this respect Nietzsche has triumphed over Schopenhauer here, that is to say, the imperialist elbow has triumphed over the gentlemanly pleasure-displeasure body in psychoanalysis. The competitive struggle which hardly leaves any time for sexual worries stresses industriousness rather than randiness; the hectic day of the businessman thus eclipses the hectic night of the rake and his libido. But even that did not last, for fewer and fewer people were attracted by the day which had become inhospitable. The petit bourgeois' wish grew

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ever stronger to allow himself to lapse back into irresponsible, but also more or less wild obscurity. Above all the path to the so-called heights lost some of its interest and prospects, in exact proportion to the decline of free enterprise, as a result of monopoly capitalism. The path became more attractive which led into the so-called depths, in which the eyes roll instead of aiming at a goal. C. G. Jung, the fascistically frothing psychoanalyst, consequently posited the frenzy-drive in place of the power-drive. Just as sexuality is only part of this Dionysian general libido, so also is the will to power, in fact the latter is completely transformed into battle-frenzy, into a stupor which in no way strives towards individual goals. In Jung, libido thus becomes an archaically undivided primeval unity of all drives, or 'Eros' per se: consequently it extends from eating to the Last Supper, from coitus to unio mystica, from the frothing mouth of the shaman, even the berserker, to the rapture of Fra Angelico. Even here, therefore, Nietzsche triumphs over Schopenhauer, but he triumphs as the affirmation of a mescalin Dionysus over the negation of the will to life. As a result, the unconscious aspect of this mystified libido is also not contested and there is no attempt to resolve it into current consciousness, as in Freud. Rather the neurosis, particularly that of modem, all too civilized and conscious man, derives according to Jung precisely from the fact that men have emerged too far out of what is unconsciously growing, outside the world of 'elemental feel-thinking'. Here Jung borders not only on the fascist version of Dionysus, but also partly on the vitalistic philosophy of Bergson. Bergson had already, though still in a secessionist-liberal* way, played off intuition against reason, creative unrest against closed order and rigid geometry. But far more so than with Bergson's 'lan vital', the fascist Jung borders on the Romantic reactionary distortions which Bergson's vitalism underwent; as in sentimental penis-poets like D. H. Lawrence, in complete Tarzan philosophers like Ludwig Klages. Bergson's lan vital was still directed forwards; it corresponded to the 'Art Nouveau' or 'Secessionism' of the Nineties, it contained watchwords of freedom, none of regressive enslavement. D. H. Lawrence, on the other hand, and Jung along with him, sings the wildernesses of the elemental age of love, which to his misfortune man has emerged from; he seeks the nocturnal moon in the flesh, the unconscious sun in the blood. And Klages blows in a more abstract way on the same bull-horn; he does not only hark back
*

Bloch has in mind here the artistic secessions in the last decade of the nineteenth century in Munich (1892), Vienna (1897) and Berlin (1899).

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like the earlier Romantics to the Middle Ages, but to the diluvium, to precisely where Jung's impersonal, pandemonic libido lives. There are of course egos and individuals, Jung teaches, but they do not go deep in the soul; the personality itself is only a mask or a socially played role. What works in the personality and as such is instead supposed to be vital pressure, from much deeper, much older layers, from the magical collective layers of the race, for example. The individual person is collective on this ground, and leads back to it again: 'Since the individual is not only a single being, but also assumes collective relationships to his existence, the process of individuation therefore also leads not into isolation, but into a more intensive and more general collective context' (Jung, Psychologische Typen, 1921, p. 637). Contest and free competition, which in Adler still spurred people on to outstrip each other and to keener and keener individual psychology, are submerged here into the 'folk community' and into 'psychosynthesis', this means in fact: into archaic collective regression. Impersonally, in fact inhumanly unconscious material opens up, a long way behind every individual experience, if not behind the archaic traces of the mere memory of humanity. Accordingly, primal memories are supposed to be active from the time of our animal forefathers, i.e. a long way behind the diluvium; Jung appropriates the concept of the 'engram' for this, which Semon introduced into biology, the concept of a memory of the whole of organic matter and its memory traces. They are incorporated in libido as a primal animal plan, but they also keep the unconscious per se in the archaic primal dimension of What Has Been. Thus psychosynthesis does not disperse into day and into external pieces, but 'reflects' and takes the neurotically or otherwise given symbol back into its ancestral night: 'Just as analysis (the causal reductive process) divides the symbol into its components, the synthetic process condenses the symbol into a general and comprehensible expression.' Freud's unconscious, despite phylogenetic archaic elements which he no doubt believed he saw and which in his school have been 'excavated' down to the primal memories of the first land animals Freud's unconscious was therefore largely individual, that is, filled with individually acquired repressions and with repressions from the recent past of a modem individual. Jung's unconscious on the other hand is entirely general, primeval and collective, it purports to be 'the five-hundred-thousand-year-old shaft beneath the few thousand years of civilization', particularly beneath the few years of individual life. In this basic ground there is not only nothing new, but what it contains is decidedly primeval; everything new is ipso facto without value, in fact hostile to value; according to Jung and Klages,

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the only thing that is new today is the destruction of instinct, the undermining of the ancient basic ground of the imagination by the intellect. Even neurotic conflict is the suffering caused by intellect to this basic ground of the drives and of the imagination; or as Lawrence said: men have lost the moon in their flesh, the sun in their blood. Thus the neurotic must not be completely removed from the unconscious material which he still has, rather what is necessary is guidance back to the collective unconscious, to the 'age-old forces of life'. Psychosynthesis fleeing the present, hating the future, searching for primeval time thus becomes the same as 'religion' in the etymological sense of the word: namely re-ligio, connecting back. And in fact there appears to be no difference between the frothing mouth of the shaman and Meister Eckhart, in true night-tolerance; indeed, the shaman is better. Then the most rampant superstition ranks more than ever above enlightenment; since, of course, Jung's collective unconscious flows thicker in witch-crazes than in pure reason. 'Eros' and the Archetypes It comes to this, among other things, when the conscious ego is taken away from the body. When the libido is driven completely into the dark, into the unconscious as a goal. In Freud the sick person was only reminded of the unconscious so that he could free himself from it. In C. G. Jung, however, he is reminded of it so that he plunges headlong into the unconscious, into layers lying deeper and deeper, lying deeper and deeper in the past. Libido becomes archaic; blood and soil, Neanderthal man and Tertiary period leap out simultaneously to confront us. Gottfried Benn, the disciple of Jung and Klages, gave this an equally psychosynthetic and lyrical expression: 'We carry the early peoples in our souls, and when the late Ratio loses its hold, in dream and intoxication, they rise up with their rites, their pre-logical way of thinking, and dispense an hour of mystical participation. When the logical superstructure dissolves and the cortex, tired of the onslaught of the pre-lunar stock, opens the eternally contested border of consciousness, it is then that the old, the unconscious appears in the magic ego-transformation and identification, in the earlier experience of being everywhere and eternal.' Jung drove the libido harder and harder towards these archaic connections, at the same time he grasped these beginnings so nebulously and generally that the whole Irratio of those times, quite regardless of what it says, can be accommodated interchangeably.

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This really is the night in which all cows are grey, the night of that immeasurably extended libido, collectivized in the idea of the bosom of nature, which is now also called world soul. Eros, Plato, Indian theosophy, alchemical and astrological imagery, Plotinus or what C. G. Jung imagines by this, swirl around each other, all united in the 'pre-lunar' libido: 'As far as the psychological aspect of this concept is concerned, I remind the reader here of the cosmogonic significance of Eros in Plato and in Hesiod, as well as the orphic figure of Phanes, the ''revealer", the first to come into being, the father of Eros . . . The orphic significance of Phanes matches that of the Indian Karma, the love-god who is also a cosmogonic principle' (Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, 1925, p. 127). Jung adds, across huge gulfs, as if, because it sounds so cosmic, it were the same thing: 'In the neoplatonist Plotinus the world soul is the energy of the intellect.' In this way the libido in Jung opens up like a sack of undigested, atavistic secrets, or rather abracadabras, in fact this sack, in Jung's own words, drags 'an invisible dinosaur tail behind it; carefully separated, it becomes the saviour serpent of the mystery' (ber die Archetypen des kollektiven Bewutseins, 1935, p. 227). For accordingly, diluvium remains the closest thing to Eros, who began everything, and Eros strives to get back to it, along pre-logical lines, away from consciousness. The anatomical location of this libido is the ancient sympathetic nerve, not the cerebro-spinal system; its organon, already itself semi-insufficient, all too enlightened, remains mythology. The mother bond, for example, is according to Jung not to the individual mother, but to an ancient general mother image. It is the bond with Gaia or Cybele, with that archaic beingness (Been-ness), which is also supposed to be behind Astarte, Isis, and Mary. The occupation* of libido thus subsequently becomes 'prototypal' per se here, the 'archetypes of the Earth Mother' shine and triumph through every individual mother. Archetype in general, Lvy-Bruhl's 'reprsentation collective', is the cue with which Jung's libido brings on its collective unconscious. Thereafter, the unconscious, and only this, is universally populated by archetypes: snake, kitchen, fire, pot on the fire, deep waters, Mother Earth, the old wise man, are a few examples of it. This prototypical material is supposed to be highly inflammable, especially for a man of today, that is, one who is a mixture of myths: he who speaks in archetypes, speaks
*

'Besetzung'. In Strachey's English translation of Freud this has been translated by the overcomplicated 'cathexis'. For a discussion of the misrepresentation of Freud in English translation, see Bruno Bettelheim's 'Freud and Man's Soul', 1983.

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with a thousand tongues, and this, according to Jung, simply because the creature of intellect is mediated with the drive-image life of the primeval man-animal, with the enormous resonance of blood and soil. Collective unconscious is, however, not only the location of this kind of health, according to Jung it also contains all the basic forms of human imagination: all better or more beautiful worlds that have ever been dreamt of are racial soul, archetypal time. Thus the mandate to strive from the light into the darkness was followed here in such stupefying fashion. It is only possible to run capitalist business if the consciousness of its victims is stupefied in their free time. Consequently, Jung generalized and archaized Freud's unconscious right down the line; it is not supposed to be resolved rationally. No sublimation takes place here either (which, according to Freud, does at least lead to culture); Freud's pupil Jung dissociated himself also on this point from 'Jewish psychology' when the stars were propitious. The 'sacred dark primeval night', complete with bloody visions and a veritable orgy of images, replaces sublimation; this force is already in good order, it is in fact the only thing that lives in good order. Jung did stumble upon a not unimportant (as we shall see) imaginative stock here, upon that of archetypes. But just as he took his concept of them from Romanticism, he also failed to extricate it from unstructured Romantic dilettantism. Prototyping is only suitable for so-called psychosynthesis lock, stock and barrel, and magical wishy-washyness (commanded by monopoly capitalism) is useful for its purposes. The rapport of this Panic libido with German fascism is obvious; the consciousness of the C. G. Jung somnambulist is in no way suspended here. To fascism also, hatred of intelligence is, as Jung actually says 'the only means of compensating for the damages of today's society'. Fascism too needs the death-cult of a dolled-up primeval age to obstruct the future, to establish barbarism and to block revolution. Given all this, the basic drive becomes a drive towards that basic ground where Dionysus only wants to be called Moloch. A basic ground of regressio is praised as medicine and morality, a ground from which everything human has again become estranged. Thus Freud, as we said, who did at least want to bring liberal enlightenment, and the fascistic mystifier Jung, present extensive contradictions in their common 'depth psychology' (as it modestly calls itself): the liberal wants to make repressed material conscious, the reactionary wants to connect conscious material back with the repressed, to push it back ever deeper into the unconscious. In Freud the unconscious is combated and, as far as it is individually acquired, kept in the orbit of the individual.

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In Jung the unconscious is welcomed and completely settled in the archaic-collective, and is also contemplated with limitless tolerance towards everything that swirls around in it as fog, numen or taboo. But neither must we forget: Freud the teacher is on the same plane as his perverted pupil on the crucial point: both understand the unconscious solely as something past in historical development, as something that has sunk down into the cellar and only exists there. They both recognize, even if the regression has an extremely different nature and extension, only an unconscious that moves backwards or underneath the already existing consciousness; they in fact recognize no pre-consciousness of a New. And, so far as the drive-theory under discussion here is concerned, the whole psychoanalytical school is connected in that it emphasizes solely spicy drives, and moreover lifts them in a conceptually mythical way out of the living body. In this way an idolized libido arises, or will to power or primeval Dionysus, and more significantly these idols are made absolute. Just as that which has been made absolute is lifted out of the living body, which after all only wants to preserve itself and that is all, so too in Freud and Adler, and especially in Jung, it is never discussed as a variable of socioeconomic conditions. But if basic drives are to be distinguished at all, they will vary widely in material terms in men according to individual classes and epochs, and consequently in terms of intention or as drive-direction. And most importantly: the respective psychoanalytical basic drives that are emphasized are not basic drives at all in the strict sense, they are too partial. They do not break through so unequivocally as say hunger, the drive that is always left out of psychoanalytical theory; they are not such final authorities as the simple drive to keep oneself alive. This drive is the self-preservation drive, it alone might be so fundamental no matter what changes occur as to set all the other drives in motion in the first place.

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13 The Historical Limitation of all Basic Drives Various Locations of SelfInterest Filled and Expectant Emotions
The Urgent Need Very little, all too little has been said so far about hunger. Although this goad also looks very primal or primeval. Because a man dies without nourishment, whereas we can live a little while longer without the pleasures of love-making. It is all the more possible to live without satisfying our power-drive, all the more possible without returning into the unconscious of our five-hundred-thousand-year-old forefathers. But the unemployed person on the verge of collapse, who has not eaten for days, has really been led to the oldest needy place of our existence and makes it visible. In any case, sympathy with the starving is the only widespread sympathy there is, in fact the only one that is widely possible. The girl, or especially the man, who is longing for love, these do not arouse sympathy, whereas the cry of hunger is probably the strongest single cry that can be directly presented. We believe the particular misfortune of the starving man; even the freezing, even the sick, not to mention the love-sick, seem to be in luxury by comparison. Even the most hard-hearted housewife will possibly forget her vexed stinginess when the beggar eats the soup she offers. Already in this ordinary sympathy, deprivation and its wishes are undoubtedly clear here. The stomach is the first lamp into which oil must be poured. Its longing is precise, its drive is so unavoidable that it cannot even be repressed for long. Most Reliable Basic Drive: Self-Preservation But no matter how loud hunger bellows, it is seldom mentioned by the doctors here. This omission shows that it is always only the better class of sufferers who have been and are treated psychoanalytically. The problem of finding nourishment was the most groundless of worries for Freud and his visitors. The psychoanalytical doctor and above all his patient come from a middle class which until recently had to worry little about its

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stomach. When Freud's Vienna became less carefree though, there was a psychoanalytical advice bureau for attempted suicides, where there was also the opportunity to get to know the drives beneath the libido. Because over ninety per cent of all suicides occur out of economic deprivation and only the rest out of love-sickness (which is incidentally unrepressed). However, even in bourgeois dclass Vienna, the notice hung on the wall of the psychological advice bureau: 'Economic and social questions cannot be treated here.' Understandably, little could be thus discovered about the inner life of the attempted suicide, and just as little was done to remove the commonest complex of all, the one which Franziska Reventlov so unmedically called the money complex. The goad of hunger is just as excluded from psychoanalysis as the libido was from the cant of the salons. This is the class-based limitation of psychoanalytical research into basic drives; there is also a national limitation. Perhaps not as regards libido, but certainly concerning moral ego-censorship and consequently repression. A characteristic difference exists here between the middle classes of different countries, especially between France and Germany. If a bachelor in Paris does not take a girl to his hotel room at least once a week, or if he does not stop out one night, the manager begins to get worried about the bill: the tenant does not seem to be normal sexually, and so it may be assumed that he may not pay the rent either. The French bourgeois thus has a smaller reserve of cant than the average German, let alone the average Englishman; consequently he shows less sexual stuffiness, fewer libidinal repression complexes. And in the proletariat neither cant, nor above all the libido take up so much room as Viennese psychoanalysis assumed ab origine. Hunger and troubles constrict libido in the lower class; there are fewer noble sufferings here, and they have a more tangible cause with a less sophisticated name. The neurotic conflicts of the proletariat do not unfortunately consist of such well-heeled material as Freud's 'fixation of the libido on particular erogenous zones' or Adler's 'badly fitting character mask' or Jung's 'imperfect regression to primeval times'; and the fear of losing one's job is hardly a castration complex. Of course, psychoanalysis cannot help but take notice of hunger and thirst occasionally, likewise of the interest in selfpreservation; but, strangely, the self-preservation drive is not assigned by Freud to the stomach and the body-system in general, in which it is deeply anchored, but to the group of late ego-drives, the same group also responsible for moral censorship. Thus it looks like a late arrival, of which nothing is said in the advice bureau, like an acte accessoire compared to all-driving Eros. Obviously, however, there is

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no erotic conception of history to replace the economic one, no explanation of the world in terms of libido and its distortions, rather than in terms of the economy and its superstructure. Here too then we should ultimately stick with the real expression of the matter: with economic interest, not the only, but the fundamental interest. The self-preservation which manifests itself within this interest is the soundest among the many basic drives and, despite all temporal, class-based modifications which it is also subject to, surely the most universal. Therefore it can be said, despite all reservations and the stated aversion to making things absolute: self-preservation with hunger as its most obvious expression is the only basic drive among the several which consistently deserves this name, it is the last instance of the drive and the one most concretely related to the bearer. Even the idealist Schiller had to teach that the world maintained its push and shove 'through hunger and through love'; and furthermore he puts hunger in first place and love in second. Such a precedence was still possible at that time, though without any real consequences, in the rising bourgeoisie; in the late bourgeoisie, to which Freud's psychoanalysis also belongs, hunger was deleted. Or it became a subspecies of the libido, its 'oral phase', as it were; subsequently, self-preservation does not occur as an original drive at all. 'Suum esse conservare', to preserve one's being, that is and remains however, according to Spinoza's unerring definition, the 'appetitus' of all beings. Even if capitalist competitive economy has made it individual beyond all measure, it still runs, however modified, remorselessly through all societies. Historical Change of the Drives, Even of the Self-Preservation Drive Just as no drive remains rigid, neither does what bears it. Nothing at all is fixed once and for all here, at the beginning for instance, but rather precisely our self is not given to us in advance. Since the passions are subject to historical change, and new ones arise with newly set goals, the subjective hearth on which they are all cooking also changes. Nor is there an 'original' drive, nor a 'primal man' or even an 'old Adam' either. The supposed 'nature of man', in the sense rigid research into basic drives understands it, has been cross-bred and broken up hundreds of times in

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the course of history. Among cultivated plants and breeding animals an original variety may have been preserved because they are brought together in an external and artificial way in the breeding process, but this does not happen among men. Certainly, among cultivated plants and breeding animals there is still the simple dog-rose which was ennobled into the luxury roses, and the wood-pigeon from which all our tame pigeons stem, to which they could possibly revert. Whereas historical man, even if he becomes wild, never again becomes primal man from whom the various historical domesticated varieties emanated. He becomes a decadent barbarian with a well-known, historically ordered psychopathology of drives; he becomes a bit of Bluebeard or Nero or Caligula or Hitler, but not a Neanderthal man from the 'healthy diluvium'. Even a great number of so-called primitives today are, as we know, nothing of the sort, they are not the oldest human creatures. Rather, they represent the waste products of great cultures; they are not old physis, but have long since become new physis, by virtue of inheriting historically acquired qualities. The 'heathen' whom a missionary baptizes, the 'old Adam' whom the Christian casts off, is himself again the 'Christ' of an earlier practice and religion, that is, of an earlier radical change of the human creature. Therefore, the so-called man of primal drives is not to be discovered beneath historical and modern man, and, scientifically speaking, does not exist. What we call by this name is either (in Freud) the bourgeois man of drives, distorted and buried under the cant of the Victorian century, or he is even (in Jung) a fascist phantasmagoria, corked up in mythological bottles. Research into basic drives more than any other kind reflects the characteristic drive of its times, which is why its findings have always turned out to be so different. Rousseau's 'natural man' was Arcadian and rational, Nietzsche's 'natural man', on the other hand, was Dionysian and irrational; i.e. the one fulfilled the wishes of the Enlightenment, the other the wishes of Imperialism (and simultaneously of the 'anti-capitalist longing' smouldering amongst the bourgeois). Correspondingly, the historical location of 'the human creature', as characterized by Freud, can also be precisely determined: this libidoman lives together with his dreamed wish-fulfilments in the bourgeois world a few decades before and a few decades after 1900 (the key year of the secessionist 'liberation of the flesh from the spirit'). The way of perceiving sex, and consequently the excitability of the libido is always variant in every society and in every layer of that society. Even for hunger there is no 'natural' drive structure, for the simple reason that the kind

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of perception assigned to it, and consequently the stimulus-world, is also historically variable. Even this is no longer a biologically maintained basic direction in man, no longer one which remains rooted in the fixed instinct of searching for nourishment down firmly established paths. Rather, it interacts as socially developed and guided need with the other social, and therefore historically varying needs which it underlies and with which, for this very reason, it is transformed and causes transformation the more, and the more sophisticatedly, further and further layers are added to the appetite. In short, all definitions of basic drives only flourish in the soil of their own time and are limited to that time. For this simple reason they cannot be made absolute, even less separated from the economic being of mankind in each age. Libido (which is confined in animals to the mating season), powerdrive (which sets in at the earliest with the division into classes) appear secondary in contrast, but incidentally all have hunger, appetite within them. The latter's need to be satisfied is the oil in the lamp of history, but even this primary need looks different according to the changing ways in which needs are satisfied. Economic interest forms the final instance in the historically existing framework of drives, but even this, precisely this once again, as we know, has its changing historical forms, the changes in the mode of production and exchange. Indeed, even man's self, which wants to preserve itself, which reproduces itself through the intake of nourishment, which is co-produced by the respective form of economy and relation to nature, is itself the historically most variable entity. Namely one that despite its most reliable basic drive: hunger, which relatively remains the most general must continually run throughout history, so that through work it is and becomes. History is, as possible gaining of man, the metamorphosis of man precisely also in view of our core, of the self which is only developing. Not confined to the selfish system, not to this capitalist phase of egotism, but existing before it, and all the more so after it, self-preservation, human preservation in no way seeks the conservation of that which has already been drawn and allotted to the self. Thus self-preservation ultimately means the appetite to hold ready more appropriate and more authentic states for our unfolding self, unfolding only in and as solidarity. If these states approach, then self-encountering prepares itself in them; and selfencountering begins, highly disconcerted, in all phenomena and works broaching a final state. But our self always remains, with its hunger and the variable extensions of this hunger, still open, moved, extending itself.

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Mental Feelings and State of Self, Appetite of the Expectant Emotions, Especially of Hope Taking hunger as our starting point again, not merely the immediate drives come from here. Rather they also originate from it as 'felt' drives, as the drive-feelings in which craving or loathing become intensely aware of themselves. These drives which drive not only directly but also as feeling are the mental feelings or emotions; if the whole man throws himself into a single emotion, then this becomes a passion. However, a quite special juice flows through all mental feelings, it comes from the heart, a blood which is also psychological. * And just as in every emotion, in contrast to sensation and imagination, there is an inner temperature, this temperature also senses itself. Thus emotions are distinguished from sensations and imaginations, not least because they proceed, in that they become closely aware of their process as a still semi-immediate feeling of self. They can in fact proceed in vaguely objective terms in this 'state-based' self-awareness, before a distinct external object even appears to which the feeling mind relates. This happens not only in the diffuse and undecided state called 'state-of-being', and moreover, less immediately, 'mood', (of which more later), but also in the more decided state, in those mental feelings at least which belong from early on to organic 'dispositions'. Thus there is in young people and in erotic personalities throughout their lives a kind of intransitive mental feeling of being-in-love, which its objects only enter retrospectively; they were not given narcissistically in advance to this being-inlove either, that is, in their own body. Thus there is not as a mental feeling, but rather as a state of mind a light-heartedness of character, even hope; it certainly does not only appear when it knows clearly what it is hoping for. Thus we speak or used to speak of a sanguine (or conversely, of a melancholic) 'temperament', raising the whole organic 'disposition' to a state of mind. This temperament can extend far beyond the mere state of mind into intransitive mental feelings, with absolutely no, or very weakly 'founding', imaginative contents. Of course, the more sensation contents and imaginative contents are added to this, the more clearly these intransitive processes will also become related to objects and transitive: just as vague craving passes over into wishes with wishful contents by imagining its something, so the emotional world is now all the more governed by love of something,
*

Cf. Mephistopheles in Goethe's 'Faust', Part I, 1740: 'Blood is a very special juice'.

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hope for something, pleasure in something. In any case there would be no loathings or cravings at all without the external something that evokes them; only in fact: this external something must not be clear from the very beginning. But the emotions do not remain confined to the mere experiencing of their experience, even with the idealistic interpretation that their content concretely emerges only as 'substance' and not also as a clearly stimulative external object. But the difference to imaginative ideas and thoughts is nevertheless also indelible within the process of the emotions becoming transitive. The difference is characterized by the nature of the emotional intending, which is still occurring especially within itself and is still semi-immediately bent back upon itself. Even in imagining and thinking, there is an act of intending, it was separated by Franz Brentano, though here in an impossibly exaggerated idealistic way, then by Husserl from the 'intended object'. But this act is not in fact imagined or thought to itself in imagining and thinking, rather it must first be laboriously made accessible to 'inner perception'. Whereas with the emotions, a retrospective analysis in Brentano's sense, a liberation of the 'act psychology' from the 'content psychology', is not necessary first at all: the emotions are given to themselves as intentional acts in the form of states. And they are given to themselves in the form of states, intensively, because they are chiefly moved by the striving, the drive, the intending, which underlies all intentional acts, even the imagining and thinking-judging kind. 'Interest' ultimately underlies them and is the thing which really touches man most closely. Like the basic emotion of hunger, which primarily burrows into itself, all emotions are therefore primarily states of self; and precisely as these states of self, they are the most active intentions. But, because they are concerned with themselves, the life of the emotions is not only a most closely intensive, eminently intending into itself, it is also the mode of being of what Kierkegaard once called existential. In other words: only the 'feeling mind', as the essence of the mental feelings, has become an 'existential' concept, one of 'affectedness', not the theoreticalobjective 'intellect'. Thus, not without reason, so-called existential thinking, which has putrefied into nothingness today, began in Augustine with his highly emotional 'Confessions'; even the becoming conscious of consciousness emerged here in the self-reflection of a man of intensive will-power. And, not without reason, Kierkegaard played off his 'UnderstandingOneself-In-Existence' as an experiential phenomenon of moral and religious emotions against Hegel's objective 'abstractions'. And finally, not without reason, a kind of existere, which has become blood-curdling and also hesitant,

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descends from here as far as Heidegger's animal, petit-bourgeois experiential phenomenology, as far as his 'basic state of mind': anxiety, and the care that is attached to it; and these 'existential modi' are even supposed to provide especially 'fundamental' revelations, concerning existing itself in fact. All this is ultimately putrefied subjectivism, but even petitbourgeois, reactionary existentialism at least casts an affinitive disreputable glance at the emotions of dying out. However, the only thing that is relevant here, instead of this conscious obscurantism, is the original, the nevertheless basically honest Kierkegaard with his playing off of emotionalized subject-thinking against the merely object-based kind. And the reverse check might be that the whole of object-based thinking necessarily turns away from the emotions as an organ of knowledge. 'The whole nature of the intellect', says Descartes in the 'Meditations', 'consists in the fact that it thinks'; thus in Descartes, no theory emerges, even from his theory of the emotions, which does not have the merely thinking intellect as its author. And Spinoza, who was so inclined towards the extensively object-based, when he introduced a definition of the emotions into his marble hall (Ethics, Book 3), defined them not in the form of states, but essentially with regard to their imagined goals or 'ideas'. Spinoza does of course emphasize that only emotions determine human wanting, but they themselves are only determined according to the form of their objects. Descartes and Spinoza therefore, as rational objective thinkers, also had to eliminate the emotions methodically; as Dilthey notes, this time not wholly inaccurately, they both necessarily include 'observations from outside, with relationships which are not given in any inner perception' in their theory of the emotions. So unswervingly is every 'Understanding-Oneself-In-Existence' connected with emotional closeness, and every pure observation of objects with turning away from the emotions. Therefore we may say: where philosophy merely clings to the emotions, everything that comes out of this is only to be regarded as 'world of idle chatter', in Kierkegaard's sense; but where philosophizing clings purely to cogitatio, everything that aims in the emotional sphere cum ira et studio,* is to be regarded as 'perturbatio animi' even methodically, therefore as 'asylum of ignorance', in Spinoza's sense. But intellectual contact (although nothing further) with the emotions is necessary for every piece of self-knowledge, and wherever self-knowledge was comprehensively attempted, this contact presented itself. Even in Hegel,
*

'With passion and partiality'. Tacitus in Annals I, Chap. 1 declares he will write history impartially, 'sine ira et studio'. Bloch is reversing the idea.

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despite Kierkegaard; there is no book which is more pervaded in its conceptual procedure by both emotional machinations and emotional insights than 'The Phenomenology of Mind'. This precisely because it disposes of the worldless pectoral dimension, a disposal which wanted to grasp the 'pulse of vitality' first and foremost in the external, in the world. And just as, according to Hegel, nothing great has been achieved without passion, so too undoubtedly nothing great concerning the self can be comprehended without emotional insight. Seen from outside, the drive-feelings were always only insufficiently ordered and divided up. The abrupt ones were differentiated from the slowly maturing ones, the quickly disappearing ones from the self-entrenching ones: as for example anger from hatred. They were differentiated according to the strength which the individual drive-feelings could take on, then according to the expression of the mental feelings in men and animals. Externally the division is also according to asthenic and sthenic emotions, i.e. those which paralyse or strengthen heart innervation and also the tonus of the external muscles. According to this, emotions that suddenly break in, like fear, terror, but also excessive joy, are always asthenic, as are unpleasurable emotions of lesser degree, like sorrow and worry. Weak and moderately strong pleasurable emotions are however always sthenic, but anger, rising gradually, can also be sthenic, whereas in fact joy, when it breaks out suddenly, accompanied by surprise, appears asthenically, despite its pleasurable character. This division is thus still so external that emotions with different, even opposite feeling-content fall into the same sthenic or asthenic class. Nearer to the real state of things, already somewhat more from psychological experience, comes the division of the emotions into those of rejection or inclination, consequently into the two basic groups of hatred and love. Hunger, which must be able to accompany all emotions, breaks out most obviously in the grouping of libido and aggression. And nearly all the emotions can be assigned to the poles of will: negation or affirmation, the dissatisfaction or satisfaction with themselves and with their object. And the emotions of rejection : fear, envy, anger, contempt, hate on the one hand, the emotions of inclination : contentment, generosity, trust, admiration, love on the other hand, largely coincide with the old displeasure-pleasure duality. However, the rejecting-unpleasurable, inclining-pleasurable equation does not work out perfectly either. There are also emotions here with contradictory feeling-content which are sometimes pleasurably united: revenge, in which hatred discharges itself, tastes sweet, almost like the moment of ecstasy in which, love discharges itself. Likewise

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there are emotions, like greed, which, even though they lie on the side of inclination, do not have the least in common with pleasure. Or there are mixed emotions, like resentment, in which the rejecting intention of envy and the inclining intention of admiration get along in a complex way, in so far as envy in fact transforms the admiration which is present into slander, so that it does not give rise to the unpleasant feeling of envy. It follows that even rejection and inclination, the poles of hate and love do not fully cover the curious area, so rich in elisions, of the emotional modes of self. In retaining love and hate as basic groups, the attempt has therefore been made to transform the mere pole relation of both into a value relation. The emotions of rejection are thus consigned to a lower region which is itself to be negated (and this, incidentally, since the class struggle also belongs here, appealed to reactionary pyschology, in Scheler); the emotions of inclination on the other hand (with truce, cosmopolitanism, pax capitalistica) stand in the light. But condemning one lot to hell or praising one lot to the skies does least justice to the amount of truth, or at least psychological experience, that may lie in the rejection-inclination series despite its confusion. Thus, to sum up: what has been imported from outside into the theory of the emotions must be completely removed; only then does the correct order of the drive-feelings emerge. This order must be discovered from the experienced appetite itself; and the result is then the only satisfying one, the division of the emotions into the following two series: into filled and expectant emotions. Whereby justice is also done to the relatively legitimate aspects of the rejection-inclination series: this series extends at least as far as the group of expectant emotions, namely as unwish or as wish. The series in the real table of the emotions are now definable as follows: filled emotions (like envy, greed, admiration) are those whose driveintention is short-term, whose drive-object lies ready, if not in respective individual attainability, then in the already available world. Expectant emotions (like anxiety, fear, hope, belief), on the other hand, are those whose drive-intention is long-term, whose driveobject does not yet lie ready, not just in respective individual attainability, but also in the already available world, and therefore still occurs in the doubt about exit or entrance. Thus the expectant emotions are distinguished, both in their unwish and in their wish, from the filled emotions by the incomparably greater anticipatory character in their intention, their substance, and their object. All emotions refer to the horizon of time, because they are highly intentioned emotions, but the expectant emotions open out entirely into this horizon. All emotions refer to the actually temporal aspect in

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time, i.e. to the mode of the future, but whereas the filled emotions only have an unreal future, i.e. one in which objectively nothing new happens, the expectant emotions essentially imply a real future; in fact that of the Not-Yet, of what has objectively not yet been there. When they are banal, fear and hope also intend unreal future, but secretly or deep down even then a more total fulfilment has entered the banal fulfilment, one which, quite unlike the case of the filled emotions, lies beyond the available given world. Thus the urge, the appetite and its wish usually break out frontally in the expectant emotions. As urge, as wish, it even breaks out in the purely negative expectant emotions, those of anxiety and fear; for where there was no urge, there would be no unwish, which is only the reverse side of a wish. Moreover, there is always a countersense of the negative and positive emotions at work here, so that, as will be seen, even in anxiety dreams wish-fulfilment still takes place. In the images of fear and hope in the daydream, the faces may often change all the more between fear and hope, between the negative and positive expectant emotion, the still utopian undecided faces. But the most important expectant emotion, the most authentic emotion of longing and thus of self, always remains in all of this hope. For the negative expectant emotions of anxiety and fear are still completely suffering, oppressed, unfree, no matter how strongly they reject. Indeed, something of the extinction of self announces itself in them, and something of the nothingness into which ultimately the merely passive passion streams. Hope, this expectant counter-emotion against anxiety and fear, is therefore the most human of all mental feelings and only accessible to men, and it also refers to the furthest and brightest horizon. It suits that appetite in the mind which the subject not only has, but of which, as unfulfilled subject, it still essentially consists. Self-Extension Drive Forwards, Active Expectation Hunger cannot help continually renewing itself. But if it increases uninterrupted, satisfied by no certain bread, then it suddenly changes. The body-ego then becomes rebellious, does not go out in search of food merely within the old framework. It seeks to change the situation which has caused its empty stomach, its hanging head. The No to the bad situation which exists, the Yes to the better life that hovers ahead, is incorporated by the deprived into revolutionary interest. This interest always begins with hunger, hunger transforms itself, having been taught, into an explosive force against the prison of deprivation. Thus the self seeks not only to preserve itself, it

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becomes explosive; self-preservation becomes self-extension. And this overthrows what stands in the way of the rising class, ultimately of the classless man. Out of economically enlightened hunger comes today the decision to abolish all conditions in which man is an oppressed and long-lost being. Long before this decision, and for a long time during it, the drive towards satisfaction becomes a drive which survives the available world in the imagination. And in human work, undertaken for the purpose of satisfying needs, transforming raw materials into richer and richer utility values, consciousness runs as a consciousness which overhauls the available world in the imagination. Marx has the following to say about this, which has received nowhere near enough attention: 'We are assuming work in a form in which it belongs exclusively to man. A spider carries out operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts many human builders to shame with the building of its wax cells. But what distinguishes the worst builder from the best bee from the outset, is that he has built the cell in his head before he builds it in wax, at the end of the work process there is a result which already existed in the imagination of the worker at the beginning of that process, i.e. already existed ideally. Not that he only effects a formal change in the real; he also realizes his purpose in the natural world, a purpose he knows, which determines as a law his way of doing things, to which he must subordinate his will' (Das Kapital I, Dietz, 1947, p. 186). Therefore it follows: before a builder in all areas of life knows his plan, he must have planned the plan himself, and must have anticipated its realization as a brilliant, even decisively spurring forward dream. In ideal terms, all the more necessarily, the bolder, above all the more arduous the plan, towards which a man, in contrast to the spider or the bee, is looking, looking ahead, might be at that moment. And precisely at this point there is formed that which stimulates the wishful element in the expectant emotions always arising from hunger, that which possibly diverts and fatigues us, or which possibly also activates and galvanizes us towards the goal of a better life: daydreams are formed. They always come from a feeling of something lacking and they want to stop it, they are all dreams of a better life. No doubt there are among them base, dubious, dismal, merely enervating escapist dreams full of substitution, as is well-known. This kind of escape from reality has often been combined with approval and support of the status quo; as is revealed most strongly in the empty promises of a better hereafter. But how many other wishful daydreams have sustained men with courage and hope, not by looking away from the real, but, on the contrary, by looking into its progress, into its horizon. How many have reaffirmed

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their refusal to renounce, in the course of anticipation, of venturing beyond and its images. The amount of venturing beyond that takes place in daydreams thus indicates nothing repressed, even psychologically, nothing that has simply sunk down out of consciousness that already existed, nor any atavistic state which was simply left over from or breaks out of primeval man. The venturer beyond does not occupy a shaft in the ground beneath existing consciousness, with a single exit either into the familiar daylight world of today, as in Freud, or into a romanticized diluvium, as in C. G. Jung and Klages. What hovers ahead of the selfextension drive forwards is rather, as will have to be shown, a Not-Yet-Conscious, one that has never been conscious and has never existed in the past, therefore itself a forward dawning, into the New. It is the dawning that can surround even the simplest daydreams; from there it extends into further areas of negated deprivation, and hence of hope.

14 Fundamental Distinction of Daydreams from Night-Dreams: Concealed and Old Wish-Fulfilment in Night-Dreams, Fabulously Inventive and Anticipatory Wish-Fulfilment in Daylight Fantasies
Inclination to Dream We never tire of wanting things to improve. We are never free of wishes, or only in moments of delusion. It would be more comfortable to forget this longing rather than to fulfil it, but what would this lead to today? These wishes certainly would not stop, or they would disguise themselves as new ones, or worse still: without wishes we would be the dead bodies over which the wicked would stride on to victory. This is not a time to be without wishes, and the deprived certainly do not intend to be. They dream that their wishes will be fulfilled one day. They dream about it night and day, as the saying goes, not only at night then. That would indeed be strange, since deprivation and wishing are still very much with us during the day. There are daydreams enough, we just have not taken sufficient notice of them. Even with our eyes open, things can be colourful

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enough or dreamy inside our heads. If the inclination to improve our lot does not sleep even in our sleep how should it do so when we are awake? Few wishes are not burdened with dreams of some sort, especially when their senses start to clear a bit. And then: the dreamy person during the day is clearly a different person from the one who dreams at night. The daydreamer often follows will-o'-the-wisps, gets led astray. But he is not asleep and does not sink back down with the mist. Dreams as Wish-Fulfilment As of course the nocturnal dreamer does and must do. The latter may as well be treated first, since after all the colourful performance does begin in sleep. The word dream has nocturnal origins, the dreamer presupposes the sleeper. The external senses are blinded, the muscles relax, the cerebrum is at rest. So important is this general black-out here, that in fact the sleeper often only dreams in order not to wake up. In order that he is not raised above the threshold of consciousness by external or internal stimuli. If the stimulus is an external one (say knocking or light or a shift of position in bed), then we wish it was not there. If it is an internal one (thirst, hunger, micturition, sexual excitement), then it is itself a wish, we want its stimulus to disappear. For all stimulation is unpleasant: pleasure, says Freud, is 'linked with the diminution, reduction or extinction of the set of stimuli present in the psychic system, but displeasure with an increase of the same'. If the sleeper did not dream, then he would be woken by the clamour of these stimuli; so dreams protect sleep by assimilating knocks, intrusive light, and physical unrest. Not by this means alone, however; since Freud, it is generally agreed (and this will be his lasting contribution) that dreams are not merely a means of protecting sleep, or a world of poppies, but as regards both their motor and their content wish-fulfilment too. Dreams can only assimilate these disturbances at all by breaking off their insistent prodding. Or as Freud says: 'Dreams are the elimination of (psychic) stimuli which disturb our sleep on the road to hallucinated gratification.' As everyone knows, Freud's real discovery is this: that dreams are not just foam,* and naturally not prophetic oracles either, but that they lie half-way between the two as it were: precisely as hallucinated wish-fulfilments, as fictitious fulfilments of an unconscious wishful fantasy. And the general theme of dreams of a better life also partly includes,
*

A German saying: 'Trume sind Schume': 'Dreams are just foam'.

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with all due caution and relevance, nocturnal dreams as wishful dreams; they too are a component (though a dislocated and not entirely homogeneous one) in the vast field of utopian consciousness. They are namely the component in which very early wishes circulate. In which the light of very old, long-vanished images beneath the ego and the cerebrum is still reflected. The nightdream has three characteristic qualities which enable it to hallucinate wishful ideas. Firstly, the adult ego is weakened in sleep, it cannot censor that which seems indecent any more. Secondly, from the waking state and its contents only the so-called dregs of the day remain, that is to say ideas with greatly loosened associations, to which the dream fantasy adapts itself. Thirdly, in connection with the weakened ego, the outside world with its realities and practical functional content is blocked off. The ego reverts to the ego of childhood, thus there first appears the complete uncensored drive-world straight out of our childhood, or more accurately: as in our childhood. Freud thus stresses: 'Every dream-wish is of infantile origin, all dreams work with infantile material, with childish psychic impulses and mechanisms.' Moreover, in so far as the opposing tendency of material reality is cancelled by this blockade of the outside world, the wishful ideas receive sufficient psychic energy and psychic space to intensify into hallucinations. But the ego which censors morally, aesthetically and also in accordance with reality is only weakened in dreams, not completely switched off. It goes on censoring in a drunken way as it were, and forces the hallucinated wish-fulfilments to disguise themselves from its gaze. Thus almost no night-dream is wish-fulfilment pure and simple, but almost every one is distorted and masked, appears in 'symbolic' disguise. And the person who is dreaming does not understand the symbolic element at all, in which his wishfulfilment disguises itself; it suffices here that the restlessness of the libido activates and satiates itself in a symbolically distorting dream-image. Only the dreams of children lack this dream-distortion, since the child knows no censoring ego whatsoever. Even very voluptuous night-dreams of a physiologically normal and as it were permissible kind, in the wake of involuntary seminal emissions for example, take a direct course, with no appreciable dreamdistortion; the manifest and actual dream-contents also more or less coincide here. But all the other 'improper wishes': the incest-wishes, the death-wishes directed towards people we love and other elements of infantile evil inside us resort to disguise in order to gratify themselves, in order to conceal themselves from the even though weakened censorship of the dreamego. The conversion of latent (deeply subconscious) into manifest

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(symbolized) dream-content, Freud calls the dream-work; the analytical interpretation of dreams takes the opposite route, the route back to desymbolized wish-fulfilment. There is a resistance, in the person who has woken up, to the analytical interpretation of dreams, which is analogous in an intensified form to the neurotic's resistance to the interpretation of the symptoms of his neurosis; it is the resistance of the reinforced daytime ego to the revelation of its other side. This other side usually tends to be very oppressive in the morally upright and correct man; he has sensed in it all along much which would embarrass him when awake. In this way the daytime ego can even feel responsible for the so very much weakened nocturnal one, the moment a single sensual echo remains behind from the jumble of symbols. Jean Paul remarks on this: 'Dreams shine terribly deep into the Epicurean and Augean Stables we have constructed for ourselves; and we see in the night all the wild beasts of the grave and wolves of the evening roaming around alive, which reason held in chains during the day.' In fact, the strange question was even asked, from the standpoint of intact bourgeois propriety and its daytime ego, whether a person should be held morally responsible for the good and evil which he thinks and does in his dreams. A moralist and psychologist from the final period of the Enlightenment answered in the affirmative and concluded, most comically, but instructively as far as this resistance is concerned: 'We can therefore assert that it is a man's moral duty to preserve the purity of his imagination even in his dreams, as far as this is possible by his own free will, and that the good and evil which he says or does in his dreams can also be attributed to him, namely in so far as his dream is created or modified by his desires and these desires are dependent on his own free will' (Maa, Versuch ber die Leidenschaften I, 1805, p. 175). So if the relatively harmless aberrations in the dreams of an ordinary human being are disagreeable to a morally correct ego how much more so the wild infantile variety, in symbolic disguise. Hence the resistance to the psychoanalytical interpretation of dreams, hence the reluctance to allow these dream-images to be turned into crime stories of one's private self. (A reluctance which significantly did not apply to the old, so-called prophetic interpretation of dreams: Pharaoh was delighted by Joseph, because Joseph did not see through him, the prophetic interpretation of dreams left the internal affairs of the subject untouched.) From this moralizing reluctance chiefly springs the nocturnal egodrive towards masquerade, towards concealment and disguise of the dream-content; the main part for the Freud of the libido is of course merely sexual symbolization. According to this,

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there are hundreds of symbols for the male and female genitals (dagger and casket are the primary models), for sexual intercourse (the primary model is climbing stairs). The casket can turn into a compartment, the dagger into the moon standing unnaturally close to the window, into the ceiling-lamp in the compartment, into the light of this lamp, with a mild yellow like smashed egg-yolk. The whole variety of sexual allusions and metaphors, as displayed in Rabelais or Balzac's 'Amusing tales', is attained if not surpassed by dreams; and this, as far as consciousness is concerned, in allegorical innocence. Balzac speaks of the joiner who thought of keeping the front door of his house permanently locked in future, of the page who had already planted his standard in the royal domain, and so on; all these metaphors are also dreamlike. They are joined by images which are not even to be found in the vast literature of pornography, namely those that have been lost; like the symbols of wood, table, and water for woman. They seem to reach back into the depths of racial history, depths which, as we have noted, are also familiar to Freud and his more immediate school, not to mention C. G. Jung. The table clearly stands for a room or house, the symbol of wood leads back to the family tree, a very old mother-image; it also suggests living wood, the tree of life. The water symbol is traced back to the mother's amniotic fluid by Ferenczi, one of Freud's oldest colleagues, and then, in a thoroughly phylogenetic 'excavation', to the primitive geological oceans in which life first arose. In the history of mythology a very differently preserved legend has grown up concerning this, that of the stork which brings babies from a pond; but the waters of the deep appear too, above which the spirit of God broods, just like a mother-hen. The well is an old mother-image, the reedy pond an even older, archaic hetairan one; it was unearthed by Bachofen. Be that as it may, hardly a dream is dreamed by adults that is not involved and enveloped. Freud comments on this with a striking paradox: the dreamer does not know what he knows. For Freud the manifest dreamcontent is simply just disguised or in fancy dress; the interpretation becomes Ash Wednesday, the day after the carnival. The censorship of the ego only let the truth, which is libido and its wish-fulfilment, pass through the night in the mask of a jester or a thin veil of sanctity; nevertheless, the Freudian interpretation of dreams is intent on revealing the naked text again. It proceeds via the symbols, without losing itself in them, to the more or less conscious wish-fulfilment, which expresses itself in such colourfully convoluted clauses. This embodies a true perception, even if it only emerges contorted by the narrow and false notion of bare libido.

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In any case, something recouped is at work in the nocturnal dream, a compensating element satiated with a wealth of images; whether this satiation occurs simply by means of these images or within them. Anxiety Dreams and Wish-Fulfilment But is someone who dreams at night really having wishes fulfilled all the time? These are mixed with enough insignificant dross after all, which evaporates and does not seem to fill any kind of gap. Even among our vivid dreams the happy ones, that is the wish-fulfilling ones, are by no means in the majority. Alongside them there are the anxiety dreams, from the usual examination dreams to downright horrible ones; the sleeper wakes from these with a yell. He was on the run from grimacing bogies which only emerge at night, but his car changes into a snail-shell, he jumps down and runs for his life, but his feet stick in the ground, soon they are firmly rooted to the spot. Freud naturally finds it hard to interpret even this nocturnal Fury as a fairy godmother, yet he still incorporates anxiety dreams into his theory of wish-fulfilment in three different ways. Firstly, a dream can suddenly break off, then the distressing stimulus which has caused it persists, the wish-fulfilment has failed. Secondly, a dream can turn into an anxiety dream precisely because the wish-fulfilment has occurred within it; this absurdity appears chiefly in undistorted, uncensored dreams. In this sort of anxiety dream, a particularly depraved wish unacceptable to the dream-ego is gratified in a particularly blatant way; the anxiety is then not that of the physical creature itself but that of the dream-ego, and the development of anxiety takes the place of censorship. Neuroses of this sort, for example the perpetual fear of losing one's parents, can also be accompanied by the wish for such a thing. The phobia is then merely the so-called moral thick end of the wedge or the attention-seeking hangover. Thirdly, however, Freud overcomes the problem almost involuntarily in dialectical terms, namely by not simply grasping anxieties and wishes as strict opposites. The ultimate source of anxiety is here seen as the act of birth; it brought 'that constellation of feelings of aversion, angry rejection and physical excitement, which have become the standard reaction to any mortal danger and have been repeated by us ever since as an anxiety state'. The very term anxiety (angustia = narrowness) emphasizes the constriction in breathing which occurred at that time in consequence of the interruption in our internal breathing. But the most important thing of all is that

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this first anxiety state stemmed from separation from our mother, and hence signals loneliness, defencelessness, abandonment. This first anxiety state is linked in Freud's view with the so-called fear of castration, and this has moral consequences which pervade the whole of one's life: 'From the higher being, which became the ego-ideal, there was once the threat of castration, and the fear of castration is probably the nucleus for later anxiety of conscience, it is this which continues as anxiety of conscience.' More plausible though is the explanation of anxiety from the very first act of desertion, which psychologically prefigures all the later ones, from the act of being torn from our mother by our birth; hence too the real anxiety of the child, the pavor nocturnus without a so-called castration complex, the fear of strange faces, darkness and the like. The longing and love of the child for its mother is frustrated by strange faces, it is unable to channel its 'libido', which cannot find its object. So it turns inward and is discharged as anxiety even in adulthood; the consequence is as follows: all repressed wishful emotions turn into phobias in this realm of the unconscious. A similar reversal of unoccupied libidinal urges which have lost their object occurs, as Freud conjectures, in the fear of death (countering the death-drive), especially in the neurotic, melancholic variety: 'The melancholic fear of death admits of only one explanation, that the ego surrenders, because it feels hated and persecuted instead of loved by the super-ego . . . The super-ego performs the same protective and rescuing function as the father at an earlier stage, and later providence or fate.' And even in a state of health, the fear of an immense concrete danger is increased by the fear of death which arises from desertion; the ego surrenders because it does not think it is able to overcome the danger by itself. 'It is moreover', adds Freud as a reminder, 'still the same situation which lay at the heart of the first great anxiety-state of birth and the infant's anxious longing, namely that of separation from the protective mother' (Das Ich und das Es, 1923, p. 76). And it is the same reversal of the libido into its dialectical opposite which was already evident in the anxiety of the child when the libidinal emotion had to be repressed because its object, the mother it loved, was missing. Only, where the fear of death is concerned, the libidinal object has become one's own ego, or more precisely: the ego loved by the superego; it is this very (narcissistic) occupation which has now ceased. 'The mechanism of the fear of death could only be that the ego relinquishes its narcissistic occupation of the libido to a large extent, and thus surrenders itself, instead of another object as in other cases of anxiety'; but in the act of reversal it merely releases a feeling of immense horror. Libido again

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of course, nothing but libido the whole time (and this is the part of Freud that will not endure, in fact we can say even now: that did not endure); and together with the libido, a pure psychologism once again, without regard to the social environment. Is sexual libido sufficient to produce this anxiety, is it necessary to it at all? Does this negative wish-fulfilment or anxiety stem exclusively from the subject, exclusively from the 'libidinal emotion which has lost its object'? And are there not also Objects, circumstances, which are menacing enough in an object-based way, unoccupied by libido, but sufficiently occupied by other things instead? The later Freud expressed this himself when he stated that it was not repression which caused anxiety, but anxiety which caused repression; it therefore precedes the blocked libido and forms the blockage. Towards the end of his life, moving far beyond the internal and initial biological experience of the act of birth, Freud even declares 'that a feared drive-situation basically originates in a situation of external danger' (Neue Folge der Vorlesungen, 1933, p. 123). The feeling of abandonment would not have any content at all if the strange faces, the darkness and so on were solely non-mother and otherwise neutral. Instead of which, here too we find hunger, subsistence worries, economic despair, and existential anxiety, which are positive and objective enough. Bourgeois society was actually founded on free competition until recently, and is inclined towards it even today, hence it is founded on an antagonistic relationship, even within the same class and stratum of society. The hostile tension thus posited and even demanded between individuals produces incessant anxiety; and this does not need the pretexts of libido and the act of birth in order to deposit itself on it. It is sufficiently posited with the outside world as it is, especially one with two world wars to its credit. And with the anxiety caused by fascism as well, which hardly needed the pretext of infantile trauma in order to be delivered into the world. Thus many a tranquil night-dream may indeed be backward-looking, perhaps also many attacks of pavor nocturnus among sheltered children. They may consist of repressed libido, of amorous wishes unoccupied in object-based terms, and hence of anxiety. But even in dreams, the daytime and the objective apprehension of what is coming furnishes causes and sources enough as far as anxiety is concerned. Sources which relate to naked self-preservation and its shattered, not merely unoccupied wishes. In particular, however, waking anxiety culminating in the fear of death does not go right back to the beginning to find its explanation in the vanishing libidinal object of its own ego, that is, of the transposed mother. It is precisely this anxiety which cannot be explained chiefly in narcissistic regressive

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terms, but rather in terms of the axe which will cut life short in the future, in terms of the pain and horror of an objectively expected night. If the ego merely relinquished itself in the fear of death and merely relinquished its narcissistic occupation of the libido, then neither animals without an ego nor very matter-of-fact people who are not infatuated with their ego would know the fear of death. If therefore the Freudian libido-subjectivisms of anxiety are untenable, the correlation he established between phobias and repressed wishful emotions still remains important and true; nor is it orientated around narcissistic fantasies, but around the objective content of the wishful emotions. Anxiety and its dreams may have their initial origin in parturition, just as they have their final biological content at the moment of death. But where anxiety arises not merely in a biological sense, but in a way which is only to be found in human beings, especially in the form of an anxiety dream: then it is essentially founded on social blockages of the self-preservation drive. In fact, it is simply the annihilated content of the wish, a content actually transformed into its very opposite, which causes anxiety and ultimate despair. And how does the waking dreamer fare in all this, if his wishes are variously sprinkled? If he needs salt and pepper on his wishes, even a dash of shock, and not just honey all the time? Freud himself refers to a merging of opposite drive-feelings, not merely a transition from one to the other. He refers to a simultaneous 'countersense of primal words', so that 'anxiety and wish coincide in the unconscious'. But they also undoubtedly coincide in consciousness to a large extent, as in the case of the hypochondriac and the general pessimist, who are both hoping to see their non-hope fulfilled. And did not the same eighteenth century in which the hypochondriac flourished apply a thick coat of sentimentality on to this mixed feeling, with its weeping willows and pitchers of tears, with its painful delight in mortality? The Gothic novel in particular, which emerged at the same time, discovered the strangely homely aspect of the uncanny; it thrived on a wishful home among shadows, on feeling at home at the crossroads, in the horrors of the night. Things of this sort already exhibit the wish-fulfilment fantasies of anxiety, an exchange of faces between the wish and that quality of anxiety which has itself become spine-chilling by virtue of the hope that has been fixed on it, and as the perverse, even positive content of that hope. It is this devious, rather eerie wish-fulfilment which even in higher realms prevents, or at least impedes, a mere rosy red. An element of blackness is introduced, it heightens the colours, creates dissonance in far too predictable and hence insipid happiness, and reveals

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the peak of our wishes to be equally an abyss. Many emotional statements driven to the extreme have caught very well this merging full of consternation, even the so-called sweet horror in Wagner's 'Ring of the Nibelungen', in the exhibition of this neurasthenic-colossal work of art. And so the same is true even of the nightmare as of the meadow at the bottom of the well* and its symbols: every dream is wish-fulfilment. A Crucial Point: The Daydream Is Not a Stepping-Stone to the Nocturnal Dream But clearly, people do not dream only at night, not at all. The day too has twilight edges, where wishes are also gratified. In contrast to the nocturnal dream, that of the daytime sketches freely chosen and repeatable figures in the air, it can rant and rave, but also brood and plan. It gives free play to its thoughts in an indolent fashion (which can, however, be closely related to the Muse and to Minerva), political, artistic, scientific thoughts. The daydream can furnish inspirations which do not require interpreting, but working out, it builds castles in the air as blueprints too, and not always just fictitious ones. Even in caricature, the daydreamer is presented in a different light than the dreamer: he is then Johnnie Head-in-the-air, and thus by no means the sleeper at night with his eyes closed. Lonely walks or enthusiastic youthful discussion with a friend or the socalled blue hour between daylight and darkness are particularly conducive to waking dreams. The account of little daydreams with which this book began gave a brief survey of slighter, barely inward images of this kind; it is now necessary to investigate the structure of the whole, as well as its consequences, specifically in order to gain an understanding of these, as we shall see, very powerful consequences: those of hope in general in the subjective factor. Yet astonishingly, the daylight fantasy has hardly been acknowledged as an original state by psychology up till now, not even as a special kind of wish-fulfilment, with a lot of sheer wishful thinking,** but which does not exclude acuteness and even responsibility precisely of 'thinking'. Psychoanalysis, however, puts daydreams completely on a par with night-dreams, and merely sees them as incipient night-dreams. Freud remarks on this: 'We know such daydreams are the essential models
*

This meadow appears in Grimm's fairytale 'Frau Holle'. Bloch is using the English term here in the original and continues to do so throughout the text.

**

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for nocturnal dreams. The night-dream is basically nothing other than a daydream which has become serviceable through the nocturnal freedom of the impulses, and distorted by the nocturnal form of mental activity' (Vorlesungen, 1935, p. 417). And earlier on, in the same place: 'The most well-known products of the imagination are the so-called daydreams, imagined gratifications of ambitious, megalomaniac, and erotic wishes, which thrive all the more profusely the more reality calls for resignation or for patience. The essence of imaginary happiness, the restoration of the independence of pleasure-gaining from the consent of reality, is unmistakably revealed in them.' Psychoanalysis of course, which judges all dreams only as roads to what has been repressed, and only knows reality as that of bourgeois society and its existing world, consistently prefers to label daydreams as a mere stepping-stone to nocturnal ones. In any case, the poet equipped with daydreams is for the bourgeois only the hare who sleeps with his eyes open, and this in bourgeois everyday life which sees and employs itself as the touchstone of all reality. But if this touchstone is challenged even for the world of consciousness, if even the nocturnal wishful dream is only seen as a dislocated and not entirely homogeneous component in the vast field of a still open world and its consciousness, then the daydream is not a stepping-stone to the night-dream and is not disposed of by the latter. Not even with respect to its clinical content, let alone its artistic, pre-appearing, frontlike anticipatory content. For night-dreams mostly cannibalize the former life of the drives, they feed on past if not archaic image-material, and nothing new happens under their bare moon. So it would be absurd to take daydreams: as those presentiments of the imagination which from time immemorial have of course been called dreams but also forerunners and anticipations, and to subsume them under or even subordinate them to the night-dreams. The castle in the air is not a stepping-stone to the nocturnal labyrinth, if anything, the nocturnal labyrinths lie like cellars beneath the daytime castle in the air. And what of the equality of imaginary happiness which both are said to share, as a 'restoration of the independence of pleasure-gaining from the consent of reality'? More than one daydream before now has, with sufficient vigour and experience, remodelled reality to make it give this consent; whereas Morpheus only has the arms in which we rest. Thus the daydream requires specific evaluation of its own, since it enters and unlocks a very different region altogether. It ranges from the waking dream of a comfortable, silly, crude, escapist, devious and paralysing kind, to the responsible kind, the kind actively and acutely deployed in the matter-in-hand, and the shaped kind

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in art. Above all, it is clear that 'reverie', unlike the usual nocturnal 'dream', can possibly contain marrow and, instead of the idleness or even the self-enervation which certainly are to be found here, a tireless incentive towards the actual attainment of what it visualizes. First and Second Characteristics of the Daydream: Clear Road, Preserved Ego The first property of the waking dream is that it is not oppressive. It remains within our power, the ego starts out on a journey into the blue, but ends it whenever it wants. However relaxed the dreamer might be, he is not abducted or overpowered by his images, they are not independent enough for this. Real things do appear muted, they are often distorted, but they never completely vanish in the face of the wished-for images, however subjective. And daydream images are not normally hallucinated, so they return from the most remote flight of fancy at a moment's notice. There is no spell in this condition, at least none which the daydreamer has not voluntarily imposed on himself, and which he could not revoke. The waking dream-house is also furnished exclusively with ideas chosen by the daydreamer himself, whereas the sleeper never knows what is awaiting him beyond the threshold of the subconscious. Secondly, the ego in the daydream is nowhere near so weakened as it is in the night-dream, despite the relaxation that also takes place in the former. Even in its most passive form, where the ego merely looks on or allows itself to be carried along by its reveries, it looks on completely intact, remains in the context of its life and its waking world. In contrast the night-dream ego is divisible, often like mush; it feels no pain, it does not die when it suffers death. Indeed the difference between the being of the ego in night-and daydreams is so great that the very relaxation in which the daydream ego also participates can subjectively burgeon into a feeling of elevation, however dubious. Because the ego itself then becomes a wishful idea for itself, one freed of censorship, it experiences the green light of release which appears to have come on for all other wishful ideas. The relaxation of the ego in night-dreams is merely a sinking, whereas in the daydream it is a rising with the general rising swarm. Thus there is even a difference between the drugs which artificially induce the two types of dream; even pharmacologically, within the artificially stimulating phantastica, the imagination of the sleeping cerebrum, with its benighted ego, is distinct

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from daytime imagination. Namely: opium appears to belong to the night-dream, hashish to the freewheeling, rapturous daydream. Even under the influence of hashish, the ego alters very little, neither the individual temperament nor its reasoning are withdrawn. Admittedly, the external world is rather blocked off, not completely as it is in sleep, especially opium sleep, but only to the extent that it is not compatible with the images that appear, and its babbling interference merely appears stupid, pitifully stupid. Whereas in contrast, an external world which reaches into the realms of the imagination and appears to be on a plane with Parnassus or even with a fool's paradise, such as gardens, castles, beautiful old streets, is particularly suited to the stimulation of the hashish dream. The Shiite sect of the hassasins or Assassins, the religious murder-sect of the Arabian Middle Ages, with the Sheik of the Mountain at their head, led the young boys who had been chosen to commit murder into the dazzling gardens of the Sheik, into a world of unlimited sensual pleasure with their eyes wide open even though they were under the influence of hashish. And the hashish images fitted in perfectly with this external world comparable to a waking dream, in fact they exaggerated it beyond all earthly measure, so that the boys with the utopian poison in their veins believed they were enjoying a foretaste of paradise; so that they were prepared to risk their lives for the Sheik in order to gain the real paradise. The hashish dreams of the subjects in more recent experiments are reported to be of an enchanting levity, they have a kind of elfin spirit about them, the asphalt of the street is transformed into yards of blue silk, random passers-by turn into Dante and Petrarch anachronistically deep in conversation, in short, to the talented hashish dreamer the world becomes a request concert of wishes. Another kind of levity is available under the influence of hashish: 'The individual imagines he can see tangled plans, the clarification of which previously seemed impossible, disentangled before him and well on the way to being accomplished' (Lewin, Phantastica, 1927, p. 159ff.). Even delusions of grandeur set in temporarily, anticipated achievements, almost as in paranoia. The opiumtrance is quite different, the total sleep of ego and external world; here there is nothing but night-dream, right to the very bottom. Instead of imagined elevation of the ego, and utopistically conducted alleviation of the environment, everything in the opium-trance is sunken. And a sole dimension opens up of veiled, particularly undisentangled subconsciousness: woman, ecstasy, cave, torch, midnight, crowd in upon one another, usually in heavy, padded air. Oblivion, not light, is primarily at work in opium; it is Night who proffers the opium poppies to Morpheus

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in ancient cameos. The chthonic priestesses carried poppy seeds in their hands to deaden pain, Lethe was poured in the mysteries of Ceres as the opium water of oblivion, Isis-Ceres herself is portrayed in late antiquity with poppy-heads in her hand. Even though Baudelaire calls both the realms of intoxication of opium and hashish equally 'paradis artificiels', among these disreputable delights, those induced by hashish are and remain in fact the only ones which are pathologically assigned to the waking dream. So much for the illustration of a difference even between the enervations of Morpheus on the one hand, of Phantasus on the other. Consequently, the ego in the waking-dream is found to be very animated, even striving. It is particularly narrow and fundamentally wrong of Freud to observe on the subject of daydreams that they are all the dreams of children, that they are only equipped with an unadult ego. No doubt in some cases memories of a mistreated childhood ego are also at work within them, as are infantile inferiority complexes, but these do not constitute the core. The bearer of daydreams is filled with the conscious, enduringly conscious, even if variable will for the better life, and the hero of daydreams is always our own adult personality. When Caesar stood in Gades in front of the statue of Alexander deep in a daydream and shouted: 'Forty years and nothing yet done for immortality!', the ego which reacted in this way was not that of the childish, but rather of the future Caesar he was to become. Far from the ego regressing on this occasion, it is possible to say that it was not until this dream of immortality that the Caesar we know first came into being. The ego is always preserved here with its adult power, as unified adult experience of conscious mental processes; furthermore: the guiding image is present of what a man would like to be and become in utopian terms. It differs precisely on this point from the night-dream ego, all the more so from the completely altered, deposed ego of the opium dream. As we remember, in Freud the night-dream ego only remains sufficiently present to compel the hallucinated wish-fulfilments to disguise themselves from its gaze; thus it practises moral censorship, even if it is patchy. Whereas the ego of the waking dream is neither deposed, nor does it practise censorship against the often unconventional content of its wishes. On the contrary: the censorship here is not merely weakened and patchy as in the night-dream, rather it completely ceases despite the entirely undiminished strength of the daydream ego, indeed because of it. It ceases precisely because of the wishful idea which seizes the daydream ego and in fact strengthens or at least dresses it up. In contrast to night-dreams therefore, in daydreams there is no censorship whatsoever by a

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moral ego; rather, their utopistically intensified ego builds itself and what belongs to it into a castle in the air in an often amazingly carefree blue. This is especially evident in crude private reveries. In any case it is much more obvious here than in those of a considered plan or a definite future-path. The little man who satisfies his wishes for revenge or who wishes his otherwise more or less beloved wife dead to the extent that in his wishful dream he is openly honeymooning with a younger woman, feels no pangs of conscience. He does not atone for any pleasure, and, in the imaginary fulfilment of such depraved wishes, he experiences no anxiety as a substitute for the censorship. And an ambitious dreamer really does allow his wishes free rein, he flies with outspread wings up to the Temple of Posterity, whether he is a Caesar or, as in most cases, a Spiegelberg.* He too feels no censorship, apart from the hindrance of external circumstances, not even the censorship of the comic, let alone that of the anxiety of an Icarus or a Prometheus. In waking dreams, however average, Circe who turns men into swine, King Midas who turns the world into gold, live unrestrained always with remarkable exemption from the rules of behaviour, all the more remarkable since the relationship to the outside world is in no way screened as it is in the night-dream. All this overhauling, however, is only possible because of the unaltered ego of the waking dream and more precisely because of the already mentioned utopianizing strengthening with which the daydream ego supplements itself and what is commensurate with it. In fact it must supplement this whenever the daydream is not expended on chimeras like Circe and Midas, or even on private excesses, but attains the commonly binding progression: to painting a better world. Particularly when a daydream of this kind takes on its proper seriousness and becomes a cleverly informed plan. What is needed for this is least of all the altered ego as in the night-trance, but rather an ego with taut muscles and a concrete head. A head with the will to extend itself, held up high, which knows how to be circumspect. Third Characteristic of the Daydream: World-Improving The ego of the waking dream may become so extensive that it represents others along with it. Thus we reach the third point where daydreams and night-dreams differ: human breadth makes them different. The sleeper is alone
*

The villainous blackguard in Schiller's play 'The Robbers', 1781.

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with his treasures, the ego of the enthuser can refer to others. If the ego is no longer introverted in such a way or does not only refer to its immediate environment, then its daydream wants to improve publicly. Even still privately rooted dreams of this kind apply themselves to what is inside only because they want to improve it in collaboration with other egos; because they take the material for this above all from an outside which has been dreamed to perfection. Thus it is instructive to read in Rousseau, in the fourth book of his confessions: 'I filled nature with being after my own heart; I created a golden age for myself to my own taste, by recalling the experiences of earlier days with which sweet memories were associated, and by picturing in vivid colours the images of happiness for which I could then long. I imagined love and friendship, the two ideals of my heart, in the most delightful forms and decorated them with all the charms of woman.' Thus, even out of the swirling fog of the phantasm, shapes emerge which draw the ego into their orbit, into a better, external orbit in which millions are embraced.* World-improving dreams in general seek the outwardness of their inwardness, they emerge like the extrovert rainbow, like a vault across the sky. At this point the separate classification of night- and daydream which appeared above with opium and hashish recurs; and this time it recurs in psychoses. The poppy-like aspect of the night-dream manifests itself correspondingly in schizophrenia, as a regression, the hashish-like aspect in paranoia, as projective delusion. Of course the two illnesses to which these names are given are not to be strictly separated, their characteristics sometimes flow into each other. Both are examples of extreme turning away from the current or available reality, schizophrenia is of course literal splitting off from it, with a submerged road back. The schizophrenic lets the world go, goes back to the autistic-archaic state of childhood; but the paranoiac takes from this state many of his delusions, which certainly are not turned away from the world, but in fact world-improving. Often, of course, paranoia ends in schizophrenia; even so, there is an unmistakable difference in direction between the two illnesses, which the utopian aspect now enables us to denote. If psychosis in general is an involuntary giving way of consciousness to an invasion by the unconscious, then the paranoiac unconscious, unlike the schizophrenic unconscious, at least manifests utopistic edges. The schizophrenic succumbs defencelessly to traditional powers, is thoroughly spellbound, stands with the regressions of his madness in archaic primeval time and paints, rhymes, stutters
*

Cf. Schiller's 'An die Freude': 'Be embraced, you millions.'

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out of its long-lost dream; the paranoiac, on the other hand, reacts to the traditional powers with querulousness and persecution mania, but breaks them at the same time with adventurous inventions, social recipes, heavenly roads and more besides. Related differences of upwards or downwards, of darkening or over-brightness also seem to be at work where the downwards or upwards of neurotic consciousness pass over into raving. Where, that is, regression boils up to the being-beside-oneself of ecstasy, projection to the being-aboveoneself of rapture. Iamblichus, the Syrian neo-Platonist, who knew his way around in the false consciousness of the possessed, reports the following about this kind of upwards and downwards in his account of the mysteries: 'It has quite wrongly been assumed that even rapture can be attained by the influence of the demons. The latter only bring about ecstasies, but rapture (enthusiasm) is the work of the gods. So rapture is definitely not ecstasy, rather rapture is a turning to the good, whereas ecstasy is a falling towards evil' (De mysteriis II, 3). These are chaotic and mythological interpretations, but what underlies them repeats precisely in the religious-parapsychological field the different directions of significance of schizophrenia and paranoia. In short, if schizophrenia denotes the illness (screened exaggeration) of archaically regressing acts, paranoia does the same thing for the utopian progressive acts, especially, however, for the tendency of the waking dream towards worldimprovement. Which explains why there have been so many of these madmen among project-makers, and at least some among the great utopians. Almost every utopia in fact, whether medical, social or technological, has paranoiac caricatures; for every real innovator there are hundreds of fantastic, unreal, mad ones. If one could fish out the mad ideas which are swimming around in the aura of lunatic asylums, alongside the archaic theory of schizophrenia made all too famous by C. G. Jung, we would find the most astonishing prefigurations created by paranoia. And no brooding night-symbols will be found among them, of the heart in the pond variety, a crucifixion fountain or any other painted or fictional antiquities derived from schizophrenia, but instead new combinations, changes to the world, project-making forwards, in short, fiery owls of a crazy Minerva who nevertheless wants to glimmer with red dawn. Even in such great illness the waking dream shows what it is capable of in terms of specific world-improvement. As madness it makes fiery owls, as fairytale it paints Arabian fairy palaces into the world, of gold and jasper. It is further important for the waking dream, as an extensive dream, to communicate itself outwards. It is capable of doing this, whereas the

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night-dream, like every all too private experience, can only be related with difficulty, related in such a way that the particular feeling of the subject-matter is communicated to the listener too. Conversely, daydreams are comprehensible on account of their openness, communicable on account of their generally interesting wishful images. The wishful images immediately posit external form here, in a better planned world or even in an aesthetically heightened world, one without disappointment. On this point Freud himself gives daydreams their own slant, they now become after all, against the grain, alongside the stepping-stone of the nightdream, a stepping-stone to art: 'They are the raw material of poetic production; since the writer makes out of his daydreams, by certain reshapings, disguises and omissions, the situations which he inserts into his short stories, novels, plays' (Vorlesungen, 1922, p. 102). Freud has touched on the truth of utopian creativity at this point, of consciousness directed into the good New; but the merely diluting concept of 'sublimation' which follows immediately in Freud made the psychology of the New once more unrecognizable. Yet the daydream, because it is common property, extends both into the broad and into the deep expanse, into the non-sublimated, but in fact concentrated expanse, into that of the utopian dimensions. And this automatically posits the better world also as the more beautiful, in the sense of completed images, the like of which have not yet been seen on earth. Through planning or forming, windows are hewn in deprivation, hardness, rawness, banality, with distant prospects, full of light. The daydream as a stepping-stone to art so very obviously intends world-improvement, has this as its robustly real character: 'Ahead, with lowered gaze, the earthly pain/Entwined with joy, a figure in a dream': thus, in 'Death of the Poet' Gottfried Keller characterizes the companions of the poet, together with imagination and its wit. Art contains this utopianizing character by virtue of the daydream, not as a frivolously gilding character, but as one which also contains renunciation and which, though the latter is certainly not conquered by art alone, is not forgotten within it either, but embraced by joy as the figure that is approaching. The daydream goes into music and echoes in its house which is invisible but nevertheless as much a part of world-extension, now it is dynamic and expressive in music. It posits all the figures of venturing beyond, from the noble robber to Faust, all the wishful situations and wishful landscapes, from the aurora in oil to the symbolic circles of the Paradiso. People and situations are themselves driven to their end by virtue of the daydream riding to its end in great art: the consistent, the objectively possible becomes visible. In realistic writers such objective

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possibilities in the world they portray become quite distinct. This however, not by making nature fantastic for example, but rather by making known through fantasy, a fantasy which is concretely related and hurries on ahead, that dream of a matter in nature and history which the matter has of itself and which belongs both to its tendency and to the settlement of its Totum and essence. Where extrovert imagination is completely lacking, as in Naturalists and in those people Engels called 'induction asses', then of course only matters of fact and superficial connections are apparent. Consequently, waking dream with world-extension is always presupposed for the accomplished work of art, as the most exact imaginative experiment of perfection possible; in fact not only for the work of art. Ultimately, even science only gets beyond the superficial connection through an act of anticipation, through one, it goes without saying, of a specific kind. This may simply consist in the so-called heuristic 'assumptions', which present a picture of the whole matter, still not in detail, but purely in outline. However, a perfect waking dream of harmonious connection with nature may also come first: Kepler intended such world-perfection, and he discovered the laws of planetary motion. The reality of these laws certainly did not correspond to the dream of perfection of the harmony of the spheres; nevertheless: the dream went on ahead, was the estimate of a totally harmoniously ordered world. This sort of thing is as remote as can be from the regression of the night-dream: for the latter shows, in its sinking back and archaism, only prelogical images, as categories of a society which has long since passed, not those of a rational cosmos. Anticipations and intensifications which refer to men, social utopian ones and those of beauty, even of transfiguration, are really only at home in the daydream. Above all revolutionary interest, with knowledge of how bad the world is, with acknowledgement of how good it could be if it were otherwise, needs the waking dream of world-improvement, keeps hold of it in a wholly unheuristic, wholly realistic way in both its theory and practice. Fourth Characteristic of the Daydream: Journey to the End Fourthly, the waking, that is, open dream knows how not to forgo. It refuses to be fictitiously full or even simply to spiritualize wishes. The day-fantasy begins like the night-dream with wishes, but carries them radically to their conclusion, wants to get to the place of their fulfilment.

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Two typical daydreams of writers are relevant here; for, despite all weakness and escapism, they posit this place in a really prototypical way. The two daydreams, both incidentally of quiet writers, are all the more relevant here because they intend an arrival, not merely a world-improving roaming. One comes from the childhood of Clemens Brentano, the other comes from the youth of Mrike and already contains all the seeds of a poetic ideal landscape. After Brentano, with his sister Bettina and other children, had established a kingdom called Vaduz in a Frankfurt attic, it was, as Brentano says, like being driven out of paradise when he later learnt that there was a real Vaduz and that it was the capital of the principality of Liechtenstein. But Goethe's old mother consoled him: 'Don't let it upset you, believe me, your Vaduz is yours and is not marked on any map, and all the soldiers of Frankfurt, even the household cavalry with the Antichrist at their head, can't take it away from you . . . Your kingdom is in the clouds and not of this earth, and every time it touches the earth it will rain tears, I wish you a blessed rainbow.' Mrike's account concerning the direct transition from day-fantasy into poetry is to be found in his novel 'Maler Nolten', and it records the following, as transposed autobiography: 'When I was still at school I had a friend whose way of thinking and aesthetic endeavour went hand in hand with mine; we spent our free time together and soon created our own sphere of poetry . . . All the shapes of our imagination still stand before me, vivid, earnest, true, and anyone into whose soul I could play just one ray of the poetic sun which warmed us then, truly golden as it was, would not at least begrudge me a serene pleasure, he would even forgive the mature man for taking another idle walk in the redolent landscape of this poetry and even for bringing back a piece of old stone from the beloved ruin. We invented for our poetry a territory which lay outside the known world, a secluded island on which a powerful heroic people was supposed to live. This island was called Orplid, and we imagined it was situated in the Pacific Ocean between New Zealand and South America.' So much for Brentano's Vaduz founded in the children's attic, and Mrike's Orplid transported so far away. The mere assignment of the daydream to the chimeras of the night or even to art seen as a kind of game does least justice to such or similar imaginative landings. For this sees only sublimations in them or even archaic return, instead of attempted articulation of a utopian hope-content. In a thinker like Freud, nothing at all corresponds to these contents in the outside world either (which must in fact appear to the late bourgeoisie as leaden sobriety and nothingness); art as a whole is false appearance, religion as

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a whole, illusion. What is essential for the daydream, particularly in the journey to the end, is: the seriousness of a pre-appearance of the possibly Real, this is almost more definitely blocked off for it here than for the night-dream which is in any case symptom-like. The usual simple bourgeois illusion-theory of the daydream leaves within it and around it only the playing space for the pretty games of infantilisms and archaisms: 'In the exercise of his imagination, man thus continues to enjoy the freedom from external compulsion which he has long since renounced in reality. . . . The creation of the spiritual realm of the imagination finds its complete counterpart in the laying-out of conservation areas, nature reserves in those places where the demands of agriculture, of traffic and of industry threaten to change quickly the original face of the earth beyond recognition. The nature reserve preserves this old state which we have elsewhere regretfully sacrificed to necessity. Everything may thrive and grow as it wants, even what is useless or harmful. The spiritual realm of imagination is also such a conservation area, withdrawn from the reality principle' (Freud, Vorlesungen, 1922, p. 416). If art was everywhere and always the same as mere formal or non-committal armchair observation, i.e. like enjoyment of art that merely conserves, then the nature reserve theory would perhaps be all right; and a kind of jester's licence for the purpose of producing pleasure would follow, for anywhere from the night-club to the National Gallery. But even the bourgeoisie was not always committed solely to the stalls of contemplation, it did once dream of the aesthetic education of man,* and consequently of art which grasps, in fact attacks, and of a morning gate of the beautiful. How little Socialist Realism has in common with philistine enjoyment of art, let alone with 'a conservation area withdrawn from the reality principle'. In Freud, reality always appears as immutable, and it appears as mechanical reality consistent with the world-picture of the last century. Precisely by this process, utopian daydream, particularly as journey to the end, is made reflexive, or, psychologically speaking, purely introverted, as is the night-dream. In C. G. Jung this introverted material only had to be excavated vertically in order to transfer Orplid into the archaic realm; from the nature reserve into the Tertiary period. By this process, imaginative landing was only possible as an archetype, that is, in Jung, only in the long since sunken land of myth. This is decisively contradicted by the fact that Vaduz and Orplid, and what is intended by these radical conceptions, have never sought their place of fulfilment
*

A reference to Schiller's essay 'On the Aesthetic Education of Man', 1795.

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anywhere but in the future. Even the transferral of such fairytale images into Once-upon-atime always allows the One Day as something coming to shimmer through the One Day as something past. Even the transferral to secluded valleys or South Sea islands, as was the case in older novels of an ideal state,* involves future in its remoteness, utopian destination in its distance. Even the really archaic basic ground of memory to which so many images of hope refer back: the archetype Golden Age, Paradise stands likewise, as something expected in the Some Day of time. The Orplidic thus hangs with hundreds of small and great pearls on the little-explored red thread** of dream-utopia and is continually held together by it. It is held together by the intention towards something perfect, no matter how variably the contents of this perfect something have been pictured in accordance with previous classes and societies. The will to journey to the end where everything turns out well thus always pervades utopian consciousness, plays throughout this consciousness with a never to be forgotten spirit of fairytale, works in the dreams of a better life, but also, and this must finally be understood, suo modo in works of art. The world-improving imagination lands in them not just so that all men and things are driven to the limits of their possibility and all their situations are used up and their forms fully fashioned. Rather, every great work of art, besides its manifest essence, is also carried towards a latency of its coming side, that is: towards the contents of a future which had not yet appeared in its time, in fact ultimately towards the contents of an as yet unknown final state. For this reason alone, great works of every age have something to say, and indeed something new that the previous age had not yet noticed in them; for this reason alone, the fairytale Magic Flute, but also the historically rigidly fixed Divine Comedy have their 'eternal youth'. What is important is, as Goethe says, the 'far radiating' quality of these great imaginative creations, through which they at least hold open the exit in given reality, possibly a window on to something Absolute. And the great, i.e. realistic works of art do not become less realistic through the notation of latency, through the space however blank of the Absolute, but more realistic; since everything real mingles with the Not-Yet within that space. Significant daydream imaginative creations do not blow soap-bubbles, they open windows, and outside them is the daydream world of a possibility which can at any rate be given form. There are enough differences
*

Novels in which life in an imaginary state is described, as in Thomas More's 'Utopia'. 'The red thread' also means 'the central theme' in German.

**

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between the two kinds of dream even at this end; the mode as well as the content of wishfulfilment diverge in them insuppressibly. This always means: the night-dream lives in regression, it is indiscriminately drawn into its images, the daydream projects its images into the future, by no means indiscriminately, but controllable even given the most impetuous imagination and mediatable with the objectively Possible. The content of the night-dream is concealed and disguised, the content of the day-fantasy is open, fabulously inventive, anticipating, and its latency lies ahead. It comes itself out of self- and world-extension forwards, it is wanting to have better, often simply wanting to know better. Longing is common to both kinds of dream, for it is, as noted, the only honest quality of all men; but the desiderium of the day, in contrast to that of the night, can also be the subject not only the object of its science. The daytime wishful dream requires no excavation and interpretation, but rectification and, in so far as it is capable of it, concretion. In short, it does not have a measure from the outset any more than the night-dream but, unlike the spooks of the night, it has a goal and makes progress towards it. Merging of Nocturnal and Daytime Dream-Games, its Dissolution Being different from one another does not of course mean being unrelated. Between the level of the dreamer and that of the daydreamer there is sometimes an exchange. There is a play of colours in the night which can also exist during the day, which looks like something exceptional and doubtless can be portrayed as such. Remarkable collections of this kind exist. Friedrich Huch published a hundred accounts of 'Dreams', thus a particularly tangled strangeness, the novel 'The Other Side' (by the illustrator Alfred Kubin) stems mainly from moon and sleep. Day writings, however, also certainly incorporate dreams, most strikingly and most beautifully even in the realist Keller. They are reported like other events, but they also blend effortlessly with the solid yet fairytale-like lavishness in which all Keller's observations are steeped. Der grne Heinrich,* shortly before his sad return home, succumbs to a real orgy of dreams. They are all reproachful wish-fulfilments. Among them belongs the vision of his home town, transfigured, changed, a crazy aerial picture on the ground, into which there is no entry. Valleys
*

The hero of Keller's most famous novel of the same name, 18545.

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and streams appear with unheard-of, yet well-known names, rose-gardens float away into the distance, spreading out a reddish hue on the horizon: 'the alpine glow streams out and surrounds the fatherland'. It is a different red to that of reddening dawn, the waking dawn of former times when der grne Heinrich left his home town and turned back to the mountains: 'now the morning star glimmered only over the last ice-altar'; the light now comes from Hades, pretends to be the last remaining hope. His mother's house appears, actually the parlour at dusk turned inside out, unforgettable, only the night-dream provides the raw material and image for this: 'On the ledges and in the recesses stood rows of antique silver pots and beakers, porcelain jars and little marble images. Window-panes of glass-crystal sparkled with mysterious brilliance in front of a dark background between the grainy doors of rooms and cupboards with shining steel keys in them. Above this strange faade the sky arched dark-blue, and a half-nocturnal sun was reflected in the dark splendour of the walnut, in the silver of the jugs and in the window-panes.' This sort of thing does of course show the traffic between the antipodes of night and daylight, they seem completely immersed in each other, uncannily and peculiarly full of foreboding. With what elective affinity Romanticism in particular was able to use this mixed light, as a dream-game and not only as a game. Every dream was for Novalis 'a significant tear in the mysterious curtain which falls in a thousand folds in our inner being'. It was predominantly also the metamorphosis of dream-images which recommended itself to Romantic antistatics and to its waking dream, in an almost scholarly fashion. Night-dream as novel grown wild was discovered by Romantic nature philosophy: 'These creations then are not without voice and speech; sounds and words, coming as if from all different directions, comprehensible and incomprehensible, meet and mutually suppress each other, and thus nothing seems to be lost from that inner nature, in contrast to the outer, except the steadiness and quiet which the latter has. For such inner figments, as if made of fleeting clouds, come and disappear; here neither the high mountains are protected by their greatness, nor the tree by the power of its roots from passing quickly away, and where one moment there was cliff and forest, there suddenly now appears a plain or a room enclosed by walls' (G. H. Schubert, Die Geschichte der Seele, 1830, p. 549). Thus the appearance arose as if night-dreams and daydreams underwent, beside their exchange, even a merging of their images, on the same ground, romantically-objectively united. The pure Romantic simply no longer wants to know whether subconscious chaos or consciously shaping, re-shaping

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imagination predominates in his poetry. For him the night-dream is in any case removed from all concepts of time and space of current sobriety, from all causal and identity-forms of the grey cortex of civilization; the night-dream is constructed pre-logically and is thus an archaic element against the expanse, the morning, the future of the day. This is a legacy which Romanticism brought from the night into the day layer, though there was continually an element of new connection at work between the two layers. Accordingly the overlap of the black and the blue hours happened again every time both were proud not to be day in the sense of superficial clarity, mere superficial connection. The crack in the previous surface then tore open cave and distant blue together; ultimately in Expressionism, particularly in Surrealism. Though now with the important difference from Romanticism that the utopian did not so much want to turn towards the past, as the past towards something utopian. No matter how lunar the atmosphere in the Expressionist poem: 'pale evening trees, willows which steal the light from the moonfond pond, moon flakes silvering through the window', and many more Dubler phrases besides:* night-lines were incorporated into utopian ones in this strained way. Even stammering nonsense of the night in the attempt to travel, on the basis of such dissolutions of the former day connections, to a new land, to better shores, even to rationally ordered shores. An object-lesson in these transitions was given by James Joyce in 'Ulysses'; highly post-Romantic, highly un-Romantic. The cellar of the unconscious discharges itself in Joyce into a transitory Now, provides a mixture of prehistoric stammering, smut and church music; the author does not interrupt with a single comma the decoction that surges over the levelled threshold of consciousness for eighty pages. But in the midst of the monkey-chatter (from one day and a thousand subconscious human reactions strictly mixed up) there appears something clearly viewed, applied montage shows quite rational cross-connections or analogiae entis; Lot's wife and The Old Ireland Tavern near the salt water down by the docks, cutting straight through time and space, celebrate their meeting, their everyday beyond space and time. 'So that', says Stephen Dedalus, 'so that gesture, not music, not odours, would be a universal language, the gift of tongues rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm' (Ulysses, Part II (Circe)). Primeval caves, with babbling and speaking in tongues inside them, are thus conjured up in day-fantasies and these are then lowered down again; a continual merging
*

Theodor Dubler, Expressionist poet, 18761934.

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of grotesque night-faces and outlines develops. And in Surrealism, i.e. corresponding to the very time of collapse to which Surrealism belongs, as always in the sudden combination of incompatibles, there is no lack of humour; a contemptible humour sometimes, one which then unmasks the design merely to pater le bourgeois, or even a humour of pettily contrived jokes, and after that things become quite cosy in the dream-house at the sign of the Double Strangeness. But more essential in Surrealism remains the fundamental coupling of Hecate and Minerva, remains the visionary face, a montage of mere shreds and collapses. This is in fact a difference from Romanticism understood as the age of Restoration;* at that time the daydream was fundamentally incorporated into night-lines without becoming phosphorescent. At any rate, it is a protracted mixed world of subconsciousness and red dawn, a contact-world in which the regressio makes use of the journey to the end, or the journey to the end makes use of the regressio. The labyrinth of the night-dream even aesthetically is not a stepping-stone to the castle in the air, and yet: in so far as it forms its dungeons, archaic material can communicate with waking imagination. And above all: from the example of Gottfried Keller's dream-house, which flashes like the Styx, a night-piece of the house of the mother and of youth, it also becomes apparent why conversely the waking dream is no less able to communicate with archaic material. It can do so because, not only psychologically, but also objectively, future still exists in the past, because many night-pieces are also undischarged or unfinished and therefore demand daydream, forward-intention. This night still has something to say, not as something brooding that has primally been, but as something that has not become, that has never really become known anywhere, which is encapsulated in parts within it. But it can only say something in so far as it is exposed by waking imagination, by an imagination that is directed towards what is becoming; in itself the archaic is dumb. Only as something brooding in an undischarged, undeveloped, in short, utopian way does it have the power to open up in the daydream, does it attain the power not to hold itself sealed against the latter; but as such, even though only as such, it can circulate in the notions of clear road, preserved-retained ego, world-improvement, journey to the end. The insight therefore that archaic brooding can be utopian in reality finally explains the possibility of a merging of night-dreams and daydreams, gives the explanation and dissolution of a partially possible merging of the dream-games. And even
*

Bloch is referring to the reactionary period of the restoration of the French monarchy after 1814.

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with the continuing primacy of the waking imagination: it is not the utopian that capitulates here to archaism, but archaism which capitulates, on account of its undischarged components, possibly to the utopian; every other merging and every other explanation of it is illusion. The elaboration of it is in any case the business of the day; the suspect god who gives to his beloved in sleep* needs Apollo to speak for him, that Apollo who may well be familiar with vapours and oracles, but has conquered them and has them serving in his temple. Otherwise, imagination in Jung and Klages' sense would revert completely to prehistory, moreover a romanticized, counterfeit prehistory. Therefore, only the daylight opens up the wonderfully relevant material of night-dreams, of the archaic in general, and it is this material only because and in so far as it is still itself utopian, transposed in a utopian way. Regression therefore occurs artistically only with profit when something that has not become, a future possible, is also still encapsulated in the archetype. Otherwise the treasures which can be seen on the floor of night become chaff and withered pine-cones, like Rbezahl's** gifts when day comes. But the daydream, and what it grasps, contains human concerns instead of Medusas in the labyrinth. Daydreams have chosen the better part; so they all advance together, though with so much variation of capability and quality, into the field of anticipatory consciousness. More on Inclination to Dream: the 'Mood' as Medium of Daydreams Asleep, the body is in the dark, only awake do we sense it. It senses itself first in the feeling of its state-of-being; therein only physical states become aware of themselves. And even they then only become aware in a blurred and diffuse way, not yet referring to a particular part of the body or to a particular kind of physical pain or enjoyment. There are middling, sick and healthy states-of-being, feeling well and feeling ill, but they are all merely quite general; a clear stomach-ache, a specific sensation of pleasure, on the tongue or localized in erogenous zones, is immediately excluded from the above. And: the state-of-being is not, for example, being in good or bad 'spirits', like the mood; since it is not a mixture, like the latter, of actual drive-feelings or emotions. In fact, it only contains the cooking
* **

Psalm 127, 2. Rbezahl a legendary Silesian mountain spirit.

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of the bodily processes, particularly the gut-sensations and more or less subconscious sensations of the circulation of the blood, but as yet no emotional feelings, with an ego behind them. This distinguishes the more organic feeling of condition in the 'state-of-being' from the far more ego-based feeling of 'mood'; thus there is the diffuse sense which announces the feelings of organs on the one hand, and the diffuse sense that conveys emotional feelings on the other, which a person always first gets into, when in unsettled spirits. The state-of-being is like a roaring which, like every other noise, arises out of a confusion of many naturally given sounds in an irregular sequence. The mood is like the confusion of sounds from an orchestra which plays bits of individual passages simultaneously before the beginning of a piece of music, not natural sounds, but sounds which have a musical, composing ego behind them. The mood does not have such a muffled, subterranean 'ground tone' either, as the state-of-being does, but its own 'ground tone' is undulating, like weather, atmospheric, it can move between extremes (like 'exulting to the heavens, gloomy as death'),* which the state-of-being does not know so close together. And furthermore, every mood shows a peculiar expanse, which is reminiscent of the spreading of perfumes. Th. Lipps emphasized precisely this expanse which is foreign to the state-of-being of the body; he notes in the case of 'cheerfulness', for example, 'the perceptible spreading of the pleasure of an experience into a more or less expansive mood embracing the whole of psychological experience' (Leitfaden der Psychologie, 1903, p. 271). Or in a more recent description (which at any rate is not crawling with the fashionable existentialist moodobsession la Bollnov):** 'The spiritual mood is the relatively persistent atmospheric basis of our feeling of life, from which the changing perceptions are raised with particular colouring, by which, however, our ideas and our behaviour are also permeated' (Lersch, Der Aufbau des Charakters, 1948, p. 41). On account of this atmospherically wide, and at the same time diffuse collective phenomenon, the feeling of mood spreads out even beyond the ego, to which it is primarily attached. A room, a landscape appear to have a 'mood', and even here the more distinctly, the more indistinct, i.e. more diffuse the transmitted emotional state looks. So bright midday is little suited for this, the early morning is better, it is most at home in the evening; the stormy mood is wellknown (which the first bolt of lightning disperses). Simple, great objects like the sea are worse suited for it, those which cannot be surveyed are
*

Klrchen in Goethe's play 'Egmont' 3, 2 (1788). Otto Friedrich Bollnov, b. 1903, German philosopher and education theorist.

**

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better, like the forest. Here, however, we must never forget that the breadth of mood, which itself moves outwards so strongly, even as an extroverted feeling for nature never appears divided up, but remains in an undulating generality. It is an essential feature of the mood that it appears total only when it is diffuse; it never consists of a dominant, overwhelming emotion, but of an itself wide mixture of many emotional feelings which have not yet been settled. This in fact makes it into a phenomenon which so easily becomes iridescent, this at the same time causes it still on the other side of the confusion of sounds before the beginning of a piece of music, and also completely without intensive density to spin out and deform so easily as merely impressionistic experience-reality (Debussy, Jacobsen). Heidegger also hails from this impressionistic thereabouts, in so far as he describes it and at the same time succumbs to it. But here, within this dull dimension, Heidegger has the so to speak tautological advantage of having noticed 'that existence always already has a mood', in the sense of an original explanation of how one is and one feels. The original aspect is according to this idea not a perceiving Finding-Oneself-in-a-State but rather a mood-laden Being-in-a-State: 'What we indicate ontologically by the term state-of-mind is ontically the most familiar and everyday thing: mood, mood-ladenness' (Sein und Zeit, 1927, p. 134). But Heidegger has not got beyond the dull, depressingly stagnant, even shallow dimension that he has uncovered. State-of-being and mood remain unseparated here; thus, in this undifferentiated animal surge, shallowness prevents any intimation of the darkness of the real immediate existere which in no way brings its being before it as There (darkness of the lived moment, of which more later) even in the mood. Thus the interested depressing element obstructs all brightening tendencies of the mood, to reproduce instead only the dejection: 'The often enduring, evenly proportioned and pale moodlessness, which should not be confused with a bad mood, is so far from being nothing that precisely within it existence becomes wearisome to itself. Being has become manifest as a burden. . . . And there again an elevated mood can relieve the manifest burden of existence; the possibility of mood also reveals, even though relieving it, the burdensome character of existence' (l.c., p. 134). Not the misery of all mankind, but solely that of the unilluminated hopeless petit bourgeoisie strikes us when we come to this sentence in Heidegger, concerning the 'abysses' of this kind of stateof-mind: 'The deep boredom, swirling to and fro in the abysses of existence like a silent fog, draws all things, people and oneself together in a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals That-Which-Is in the whole' (Was

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ist Metaphysik? 1929, p. 16). Here then from the mood, because it announces itself solely as a mood of expiring life, i.e. here: of a declining class, the wishful character is completely missing, without which even this diffuseness of emotions, as one of emotions, cannot exist; unless, as Heidegger must himself say, it is 'moodlessness'. What is missing is precisely the colour for waking dreams, with which the mood can picture its blue hour, without it of course becoming uninteresting in existential-ontical terms and sinking down in existentialistontological terms into nihilism. Not every possible everyday, not even every one which has already appeared historically, is endowed with 'pale moodlessness', let alone with the boredom which the 'That-Which-Is in the whole' supposedly reveals; rather, this everyday mood essentially, if not solely, belongs to the mechanized capitalist enterprise. And even within this enterprise there exists, apart from the moodlessness, even alongside the undoubted burden of such an existence, that confusion of sounds of living drive-feelings which actually first pictures 'mood' and in which the inclination to dream, one to waking dreams, only now finds its medium. Because the sleeper's body is in the dark, its state-of-being is also missing. And this is even more true of the mood, which presupposes the ego, it belongs to the blue hour, not to the black one. It also demands relaxation, certainly, though of a kind which is not seeking slumber, but rather an excursion. This state of mood, particularly inclined to the blue, has previously been disregarded in relation to the daydream; we must now make up for this. The pale moodlessness itself may not yet be dreamy, even the dejected mood, the confusion of unpleasurable emotions, is not light enough as a medium to allow daydreams to develop straight away. However, the continual propensity towards the better in the ground tone of all expectant emotions is all the more inclined to relieve this dejected mood and to escape into an elevated one. And precisely at this point of transition, between gloom and cheerfulness, the medium exists in which waking dream images develop most comfortably. Escape and inclination, emotions of rejection and devotion are simultaneously mixed in this bright-dark mood, and in this way form the aura in which each embarkation for Cythera takes place. Whether it is minor or grand, a nervous or a considered departure, whether Cythera consists in a mere improvement of situation or in something unheard-of till now, whether it is for next to nothing or not for all the world: this of course depends not on the mood, but on the strength and the content of the emotions of inclination which arise out of it, on the status and concreteness of the imagination

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which visualizes the fulfilment of their intention for these emotions. But bright-dark mood remains in every blue light, distant light of this kind clings for a long time to the waking dream, and thus also extends a long way into the actually shaped waking dreams, negatively as well as positively. Otherwise there would not be in them that weather-like quality which is not just confined to Impressionism, to this phenomenon of mood which is relatively of the most comfortable kind, that is, of a weakly shaped and weakly committing kind. Otherwise there would not be the lyricism which also accompanies rigidly shaped daydream images, wherever they are still situational. In daydream-works, bright-dark mood is therefore not only confined to softness la Debussy or Jacobsen. It also fills such sustained and martellato emotional picture music as that of Brahms (fourth symphony, particularly the last movement), rather than softness it causes the rough and sharp quality here. Mood only recedes in a decisive situation and in a representation which can accordingly make itself appear free of atmosphere. Not merely the impressionistic and the older sentimental mood then recedes, the kind whose iridescence never goes beyond a mixture of broken-off emotions and blurred outlines, but also the atmosphere of sharpness, together with the whole romanticism of this medium clears, opens a view on to what is decisive and no longer so situational. This always happens where a situation driven to its conclusion in the artistic waking dream, or at least a situation which has been brought to a standstill by taking a stance, refuses the situational itself. This is also the case, in a strikingly weatherless way, in all art that has been striven for and which is without unrest, without the pathos of movement and time, that is, in that art which seeks to be hard and crystalline. Around a Cythera like Egyptian relief, Byzantine mosaic or even merely Alfieri's classicism, there is no longer so much mood as around Gothic, Baroque or even merely around Byron's stormy world. Nevertheless, mood as pathos still underlies these too; even Egyptian art contains unrest, in that it pacifies it, in fact, qua its wishful dream, by seeking to be a single stone requiem. So mood still lies at the feet even of the intended anti-mood of a work of art, because of the atmospheric quality of the imagination. This daydream water belongs to every daydream, imaginative dream, even if, in its ultimately achieved dryness, it leaves this water. Thus it is confirmed: the bright-dark mood provides the medium in which all daydreams begin, even those with hardness, and especially those with arousing blue (azure).

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More on the Expectant Emotions (Anxiety, Fear, Terror, Despair, Hope, Confidence) and the Waking Dream The drive-feelings themselves are of course no longer so mood-based, do not remain so. They soon clearly raise themselves from this general way of feeling in the shape of 'sheer' envy, 'open' hatred, 'complete' trust. Cheerfulness, for example, this general carefree feeling of life, is a mood; but keenly flashing pleasure is an emotion. And the emotions do not only emerge out of the diffuse, but also out of the relatively unrelated. Therefore, even when the mood-based medium disperses, the waking dream continues to resound; but now as one which has predominantly been driving in the medium of expectant emotions. These, a quite special type of emotions, have been promoting the waking dream in the mood-medium anyway; so they appear here again, as those which are differentiated from the filled emotions by their strongly anticipating intentional direction (cf. Vol. I, p. 74). The intention in all expectant emotions is one that points ahead, the temporal environment of its content is future. The more imminent this future is, the stronger, 'more burning' the expectant intention as such; the more extensively the content of an expectant intention affects the intending self, the more totally the person throws himself into it, and the 'deeper' it becomes a passion. Even expectant intentions with a negative content as regards self-preservation, like anxiety and fear, can likewise become passions, no less so than hope. They then seem 'exaggerated' to the unengaged observer, and are so in pathological cases; occasionally, of course, simply lack of awareness of the real situation causes them to appear 'exaggerated', 'enlarging' their object. But even then the expectant emotion extends beyond its 'founding' idea-content; the expectant content shows a greater 'depth' than the given idea-content in each case. Every fear implies, as a fulfilment correlate, total destruction such as there has not yet been before, hell let loose; every hope implies the highest good, bliss let loose such as there has not yet been before. This ultimately distinguishes expectant emotions from the filled ones (like envy, greed, admiration), which are always only 'founded' by known material and at most intend an 'unreal' future of their Object, that is, one that can be imagined exactly, objectively containing nothing new. The intentional contents of the filled emotions lie, as Husserl wrongly says of all emotions, in a 'set horizon', the horizon of memory idea, as opposed to that of hope idea, the forward-reaching, i.e. real imagination, and the possible 'real' future of its Object. At the

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same time there is always of course, even in the remembering idea, qua intention, an expectation at work, and Husserl himself states, quite unexpectedly: 'Every originally constituting process is animated by protentions which emptily constitute and collect what is coming as such' (Zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewutseins, 1928, p. 410). However, these 'protentions' have in memory and in the emotions 'founded' by it already received what is theirs, they only have a 'horizon directed towards the future of what is re-remembered', which, with its unreal future, is in fact 'set horizon'. Whereas the expectant emotions, and the real imaginative idea which shows them their Object in space, at the same time possess this space as decided temporal space, that is, with the unweakened temporal material in time that is called real future. Accordingly, every expectant emotion, even if it should only intend unreal future in the foreground, becomes capable of a rapport with the objectively New. This is the life which the expectant emotion implicitly communicates to the thus anticipatory waking dreams. Every drive-feeling that is not merely mood-based refers to a something that is external to it. But the inner surge is of course abandoned in this process with varying speed or force. The first and fundamental negative expectant emotion, anxiety, begins as the most mood-based and undefined. An anxious person never sees defined in front of him or around him the something from which the feeling drifts towards him; this feeling is tremulous, not only in its physical expression, but also in its Object. Freud primarily traced anxiety, as we have seen, back to the act of birth, to the first constriction (angustia) in breathing, and to the first separation from the mother. Every later feeling of anxiety accordingly brings this primal experience of trepidation and abandonment alive; reacting to all situations of danger, even fear of death, is thus supposed to be merely subjective and therein regressive. But with the existing social conditions which may by themselves copiously stimulate fear of life and death, or even produce them, the negative content in this relation is completely omitted here, i.e. that which objectively arouses anxiety, without which anxiety could not constitute itself at all. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not make his anxiety regressive, but neither does he process beyond it to equally original positive expectant emotions without which anxiety as such could not exist, just as a valley could not exist without a mountain. Instead, Heidegger makes anxiety into the simple, undifferentiated 'Thusness' in everything, the existential 'basic state-of-mind', and in a way which really does subjectively individuate each man, leading him back to himself as

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solus ipse. Anxiety thus accordingly reveals to man 'his most characteristic Being-in-theworld'; but the About Which, 'about which anxiety is anxious, is Being-in-the-world itself' (Sein und Zeit, 1927, p. 187). And this About Which is basically the same thing into which anxiety dissolves itself, namely nothingness, the 'It was nothing'; being itself 'hangs over into nothingness'. Thus anxiety here confronts us most immediately and par excellence with nothingness as the basic fund of the Being-Uncanny, of the Being-Subject-to-Death of all Being-in-the-World. The 'basic state-of-mind' of anxiety reveals precisely this abyss, according to Heidegger; hence also 'the constant, although mostly concealed trembling of everything existing' per se. Heidegger, with much intentional immediacy of experience (mere experiencing), but also with, it can be said: much cheap emotion-seeking, together with an inordinate amount of mere interpretation of the meaning of words, with which philosophy feels ashamed in front of philology and gains nothing in the process beyond metaphysical dilettantism Heidegger thus reflects and, with his ontology of anxiety, clearly only makes absolute the 'basic state-of-mind' of a declining society. From the standpoint of the petit bourgeoisie, he reflects the society of monopoly capitalism, with permanent crisis as its normal condition; the only alternatives to permanent crisis are war and war production. What was for primitive man still the 'Not-at-home' in impenetrable nature, has become for the unsuspecting victims of monopoly capitalism their society, the gigantic alienated enterprise into which they are placed. Heidegger however with a sociological ignorance which matches his metaphysical dilettantism makes this anxiety into the basic state-of-mind of man in general, including the nothingness into which he is supposedly always, everywhere and irrevocably thrown. All that remains of Heidegger's anxiety-'hermeneutics' is at best a kind of familiarity, acute in the petit bourgeoisie, with anxiety as unsuspectingness. 'The fact that the threatening is nowhere, characterizes the About Which of anxiety' (l.c., p. 186); in fact it is from the outset expectation of something negatively undefined. Because what causes and establishes anxiety can come from all sides, its most revealing manifestations were fear of ghosts and nocturnal horror. And both have been replaced by those monsters and nightmares walking in the flesh today, but working in the darkness. So naturally anxiety does not yet clearly refer to its external something, in contrast to the second negative expectant emotion, fear: with its sudden concentrated mode, fright, and its intensified concentrated mode, terror. The threat here at least comes out of a weather-corner which is known from previous experience; or even:

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that which stimulates fear is spatially so visible that we can be prepared for the way it strikes, if not actually for its arrival. If the About Which of fear emerges completely and moreover suddenly, and terror arises, with the weaker degrees of fright, then the suddenness of these emotions must not blind us to the fact that they too are also those of expectation, although possibly (by no means always) of an expectation that is itself first born in statu nascendi of its Object. Without expectation, nothing could instil terror, nothing make us numb with fright; like a sniper's bullet, an event which is completely disparate to the expectant intentions arouses no emotion at all. It does cause numbness, blindness (as long as the event is survived), that is, bodily sensations which are also appropriate to fright, as to a shock, but it does not cause the actual mental feeling of terror or fright which always presupposes expectant intention of what has happened. After all, this expectation itself so little excludes the surprising feature of its Object that the emotional character of the surprising feature, both of the negatively and positively surprising ('miraculous') feature, does not appear at all without being prepared for by an expectation. The activated expectation of the terrible is of course brief; if it is prolonged, like fear, but with the complete certainty (temporal inevitability, familiarity of content) of its Object, then the most extreme, hardest borderline mode of fear appears, the absolutely negative expectant emotion: despair. And only this, not anxiety, really refers to nothingness; anxiety is still questioning, hovering, still determined by mood and by the undetermined, unresolved element of its Object, whereas despair itself has a definitive quality in its frame of mind, and besides this definitive element, has something absolutely defined about it in its Object. It is expectation as eliminated expectation, that is, expectation of something negative about which there is no longer any doubt; with despair, the series of negative expectant emotions ends. All their waking dreams (only terror has no time to form one) ultimately revolve around something negatively unconditional: the infernal. In complete contrast there now appear in and behind all this the positive expectant emotions. Of course their number is much smaller, up till now there has not been so much cause for them. There are only two of them: hope, which wrecks fear, and confidence, which corresponds to despair. Hope, as a gathering emotion, still has a mood-based element in common with anxiety: not as the homeless element of the nocturnal, but rather as the dawning-decanted element of the auroral. This is described with particular accuracy in the echo or reflection of the landscape in Thomas Mann's 'Death in Venice', as the ineffably sweet blooming of the reddening dawn with

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all its arpeggio ante lucem shining from afar. But hope stands also as one of the most exact emotions above every mood; because it is not very changeable, but very characteristic in its intention, and above all something which befits neither the mood nor even the negative expectant emotions capable of logical and concrete correction and sharpening. Consequently, hope is not only the opposite concept to anxiety, but also, regardless of its emotional character, to memory; that is, a relation to a purely cognitive process and system of ideas which befits no other emotion. And its relation to anxiety, even to the nothingness of despair, is of such determined power that it can be said: hope drowns anxiety. No 'existential analysis' of hope will ever be able to reveal the latter as a 'forerunning determination to die', provided that the analysis really is one of existere and not corrumpere. Instead, hope has projected itself precisely at the place of death, as one towards light and life, as one which does not allow failure the last word; thus it definitely has the intentional content: there is still rescue in the horizon. 'Where there is danger, rescue also grows', this line of Hlderlin's* indicates simply the positive dialectical turning point for which fear of the place of death disappears. In such a way that the uncertainty of the outcome remains, just as with fear, but an uncertainty that, unlike fear, does not border on passive care, on bearing a burden of care, on the night where nothingness is, but on the day which is the friend of man. Danger and faith are the truth of hope, in such a way that both are gathered in it, and danger contains no fear, faith no lazy quietism. Hope is thus ultimately a practical, a militant emotion, it unfurls banners. If confidence emerges from hope as well, then the expectant emotion which has become absolutely positive is present or as good as present, the opposite pole to despair. Like the latter, confidence is still expectation, that is, eliminated expectation of an outcome about which there is no longer any doubt. But whereas the expectant intention in the emotion of despair only appears as a corpse, in confidence it gives and yields itself up like a wise virgin, who, in going into the chamber of the bridegroom, offers up as well as gives up her intention. Despair touches almost completely that Nothing which all the negative expectant emotions are approaching; confidence, on the other hand, has in its horizon almost that All to which the weakest hope, even that transposed by unreal future, essentially refers. Despair transcends, in that its Nothing defeats the intention in the certainty of extinction, confidence, in that its All allows the intention to enter into the certainty
*

From Hlderlin's 'Patmos', 1802.

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of salvation. Whereas therefore the negative expectant emotions and their utopian images ultimately intend the infernal as their unconditional element, the positive expectant emotions likewise inevitably have the paradisial in the unconditional element of their ultimate intentional object. Thus: if the mood is the general medium of daydreaming, then the expectant emotions (including the extension which they can build on the filled emotions, on envy or respect for example) give the direction of daydreaming. They give the line along which the imagination of anticipatory ideas moves, and along which this imagination then builds its wishful road, or even (in the case of negative expectant emotions) its unwishful road. The wishful road with the landscape it aims for is no richer as a road of hope, but noticeably more lovely and more lively than the unwishful road, or road of fear; at least among peoples who are striving from the darkness into the light. Both future-orientated intentions, that of expectant emotions and that of expectant ideas, accordingly extend into a Not-Yet-Conscious, that is, into a class of consciousness which is itself to be designated not as filled, but as anticipatory. The waking dreams advance, provided they contain real future, collectively into this Not-Yet-Conscious, into the unbecome-unfilled or utopian field. Its composition, which is in the first instance psychological, must now be investigated; certainly cum ira et studio, with partiality for the already understood forward imagination, for the object-based Possible in psychological approaches to it. For only in the discovery of the NotYet-Conscious does expectation, above all positive expectation, attain its proper status: the status of a utopian function, in emotions as well as in ideas and in thoughts.

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15 Discovery of the Not-Yet-Conscious or of Forward Dawning. Not-YetConscious as a New Class of Consciousness and as the Class of Consciousness of the New: Youth, Time of Change, Productivity. Concept of the Utopian Function, its Encounter with Interest, Ideology, Archetypes, Ideals, Allegory-Symbols
The cistern contains, the fountain overflows. William Blake
7KH O L QNHG L DJ H FDQQRW GL D\ HG 7KH ILH P D\ KDYH EHHQ P RYHG U P EH VSO O HQDP HG RU GHO HG 9HUI\ W W O SRL V W W FRU HFW HW L KDW KH L QN QW R KH U ILH DQG O L O RFDW RQ

Peculiar to the soul is the common spirit that grows. Heraclitus

The Two Edges The inward glance never sheds equal light. It is sparing, only ever illuminating a few parts of us. We are not conscious of what is not struck at all by the ray of attention. We are partly conscious of what is only struck obliquely, to a decreasing or increasing extent, according to the degree of attention. The conscious field is so narrow, and on all sides it shades off into darker edges and dissolves. Even before a mental event is forgotten, in fact even without it being forgotten, much in it is not conscious. A pain may remain unfelt, an external impression unexperienced, although they are definitely present psychologically. They lie below the threshold, either because the stimulus is too weak to be perceived, or because our attention is occupied with other things, and hence distracted, or because repetition deadens even powerful stimuli. So even in the conscious field, quite apart from forgetting, there are already various darker patches which are not conscious or only weakly so. The actual edges of consciousness do not of course lie in present experiencing, which is merely weakened. They are rather to be found where the conscious fades, in forgetting and

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in the forgotten, where what has been experienced sinks below the edge, below the threshold. And what is more, they are also to be found in a different form on the opposite side to forgetting, where something not previously conscious dawns. Here too there is an edge, a threshold in consciousness, in this case an upper one, pushed forward a greater or lesser distance, beyond which what is happening psychologically is not very lucid. Beneath the threshold of fading, yet also above the threshold of dawning, there is relatively unconscious material, the attentive glance must first make an effort, often a painful effort to focus on it. It is certainly capable of being preconscious, both in the depths of the no longer perceptible and especially where new material rises which has never occurred to anyone. Both can be fetched from beyond their edges, and to a greater or lesser extent elucidated. Double Meaning of the Preconscious Mental life is always framed both by evening and morning. The night-dream moves in the forgotten and repressed, the daydream in what has never been experienced at all as present. For roughly two hundred years, what lies outside the conscious field has generally been called the unconscious. It was a great discovery that mental life does not coincide with consciousness. Unconscious, of course, wherever thought of as capable of consciousness, does not mean completely unconscious of itself, like a stone for example, but rather preconscious. But this is how the psychologically unconscious has been understood and is still understood today, merely as something that lies beneath consciousness and has dropped out of it. The unconscious lies according to this interpretation in the sediment; it begins backwards from an increasingly diminished consciousness. The unconscious here is therefore exclusively No-Longer-Conscious; as such it populates solely the moonshine landscape of cerebral loss. Accordingly, even when psychoanalysis calls it preconscious, it is not a newly dawning consciousness with new content but an old one with old content that has merely sunk below the threshold and may cross it again by a more or less straightforward process of being remembered. Thus the unconscious for Freud is solely the forgotten (for him the preconscious proper, which is normally capable of easily returning to consciousness) or the repressed (for him the unconscious proper, the 'not merely descriptively but also dynamically unconscious', which is not capable of easily

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returning to consciousness). Admittedly the later Freud does stress that apart from the forgotten and repressed unconscious there is a third kind, namely an unconscious 'in the ego itself'. 'Even a part of the ego, God knows how important a part of the ego, can be unconscious, certainly is unconscious'; however, Freud immediately continues: 'If we find ourselves thus compelled to posit a third non-repressed unconscious, then we must concede that the character of unconsciousness loses some of its meaning for us' (Das Ich und das Es, 1923, p. 17). It loses some of its meaning because this third unconscious (Freud surprisingly cites even significant intellectual production as a manifestation of this) does not fit into his scheme of repression. But this touches on that preconscious which does not suit Freud's system at all, the preconscious in its other meaning, over on the other side, in which no repressed material, but rather something coming up, is to be clarified. The night-dream may refer to the No-Longer-Conscious, it regresses towards it. But the daydream is carried on to something which is new at least for the dreamer, and probably even on to something in itself new, in its objective content. Thus in the daydream the crucial definition of a Not-YetConscious reveals itself, as the class to which this daydream belongs. A final psychological definite feature of the daydream arises here, and it is a question of clarifying it. Up till now it has remained completely beyond conceptual reach, there is as yet no psychology of the unconscious of the other side, of forward dawning. This unconscious has remained unnoticed, although it represents the actual space of receptivity of the New and production of the New. The Not-Yet-Conscious is admittedly just as much a preconscious as is the unconscious of repressedness and forgottenness. In its way it is even an unconscious which is just as difficult and resistant as that of repressedness. Yet it is by no means subordinated to the manifest consciousness of today, but rather to a future consciousness which is only just beginning to come up. The Not-Yet-Conscious is thus solely the preconscious of what is to come, the psychological birthplace of the New. And it keeps itself preconscious above all because in fact there is within it a content of consciousness which has not yet become wholly manifest, and is still dawning from the future. Possibly even content that is only just objectively emerging in the world; as in all productive states which are giving birth to what has never been there. The forward dream is disposed towards this, and Not-Yet-Conscious, as the mode of consciousness of something coming closer, is charged with it; here the subject scents no musty cellar, but morning air.

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Not-Yet-Conscious in Youth, Time of Change, Productivity All fresh strength necessarily contains this New, and moves towards it. Its best places are: youth, times which are on the point of changing, creative expression. Any young person who feels some hidden power within him knows what this means, the dawning, the expected, the voice of tomorrow. He feels called to something that is going on inside him, that is moving in his own freshness and overhauling what has previously become, the adult world. Bold youth imagines it has wings and that all that is right awaits its swooping arrival, in fact can only be established, or at least set free by youth. With puberty begins the mystery of women, the mystery of life, the mystery of knowledge; how many unexplored shelves the young reader sees shining in front of him. The green years are filled with forward dawning, they consist chiefly of not yet conscious states. These are certainly threatened in young people, between the ages of twenty-five and thirty. But what has survived of youth till then will always survive in people who are not infected by and in league with the putrefaction of yesterday as something warm, bright and at least comforting kept in view. The voice which calls for things to be different, to be better, to be more beautiful, is as loud in these years as it is unspoilt, life means 'tomorrow', the world 'room for us'. Bold youth always pursues the melodies from its dreams and books, hopes to find them, knows the hot dark roaming through field and town, waits for the freedom which lies before it. It is a longing out of and a looking out of the prison of external compulsion which has become stifling or appears stifling, but also out of the prison of its own immaturity. Longing for life as an adult drives us on, but this life is to be completely transformed. If youth occurs in revolutionary times, that is, during a time of change, and if it is not duped into screwing its head back, as so often happens today in the West, then it really does know what the forward dream is all about. The dream then passes from vague, mainly private premonition to a more or less socially sharpened, socially mandated premonition. The broadest example of this was once provided by the Russian Narodniki, who went among the Russian people to fight with them for the overthrow of Tsarism, with sentimental or angry red dawn. Here the conversations of young unmatriculated women and of male students utopianized on the dusty boulevards of Russian provincial towns. And later in the big cities, with increasing socialist clarity, united with the workers, the red dawn which lay in consciousness and above

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the time made solid headway. For more than half a century before the October Revolution, even the Russian popular novel was continually portraying youth which had time of change in mind. Germany had its revolutionary students in the Sturm und Drang,* in the Vormrz,** and it has them today, with the goal in their sights, in the new Republic;*** in all these, youth and movement forwards are synonymous. During these times and whenever they are topical, there is not merely a physiological feeling of spring in the air, but more than this: changing times are sultry, a thundercloud seems to be pent up within them. Hence categories of weather or birth have always been applied to them: calm before the storm or March in history or, in its strongest and most concrete form: a society pregnant with a new one. Times like ours understand the state of change well; even its enemies, the fascists in Italy and Germany, were only able to continue to deceive by masquerading as revolutionaries, marasmus in the guise of spring sunshine. The times of change are themselves the youthful times in history, i.e. objectively they stand at the gates of a new society which is coming up, just as youth feels subjectively that it stands on the threshold of a hitherto unopened day in life. So far the Renaissance has been the most easily surveyable example of such a change, especially on the ideological and cultural side. Here more clearly than almost anywhere else there is, in the first shift of feudal society towards the modern bourgeois one, departure and expectation, Not-Yet-Consciousness as conscious premonition. Incipit vita nova, at the time this also designated psychologically the aurora quality of the age: the still progressive entrepreneur emerged, and with him the feeling of individuality; the consciousness of the nation appeared over the horizon; individuation and perspective entered into the feeling for nature and the picture of the landscape; the distant earth itself opened up and revealed new continents; the ceiling of the heavens cracked, leaving a clear view of infinity. All the testimonies from the period of change in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proclaim a very powerful preconscious here, one which created space and went beyond the previously posited Pillars of Hercules. A total renewal of art, life and science began, or seemed to begin; this threequarters-of-an-hour-before-day still appears, rather late, but eloquently enough, in Bacon's 'Novum Organum':
*

A period of revolutionary literary activity, principally in drama, during the second half of the eighteenth century.
**

A period of political ferment in Germany leading up to the revolutions of March 1848. Bloch means the German Democratic Republic here of course, not the Federal Republic.

***

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'Then let others consider what may be hoped for from men who enjoy abundant leisure, from united labours, and the succession of ages, after these suggestions on our part . . . Lastly, though a much more faint and uncertain breeze of Hope were to spring up from our new Continent, yet we consider it necessary to make the experiment, if we should not show a dastard spirit.'* The air of such historical springs is buzzing with plans which are seeking to be realized, and with thoughts in the stage of incubation. Prospective acts are never more frequent or more common than they are here, the anticipatory element in them is never more contentladen, the feeling for what is coming closer never more irresistible. All times of change are thus filled with Not-Yet-Conscious, even overfilled; a Not-Yet-Conscious which is carried by a rising class. The expression of this state which recaptures the experience of the Renaissance is the monologue in Goethe's Faust, here too satiety, waking dream, dawn-red are the ingredients of the onward. And likewise such periods are working on problems which have barely emerged in embryonic form in existing reality. Thus the Renaissance, just as later the genius period** in Germany, excavates the developing tendencies of the epoch, places them in early morning light, new daylight. In such periods man distinctly feels that he is not an established being, but one which, together with his environment, constitutes a task and an enormous receptacle full of future. How much more so creative work itself is preceded by dawning, and how peculiarly it stands within it. Intellectual productivity, creation proves to be particularly full of Not-YetConscious material, that is, of youth that potentiates itself in creative work; here too, youth is presupposed and constantly active. Gifted youth has a beginning which easily gets lost, as in the whispering reeds in Lenau:
At the water's edge I think I can hear your soft voice call me From across the pool, and sink With your lovely melody.
*

Bacon, Novum Organum, Aphorisms 113 and 114. The cult of genius in the Sturm und Drang period.

**

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As it progresses, youth acquires the gratitude of becoming, and the birthgiving wondrous image of this which is to be formed, as in Goethe's 'Prologue in the Theatre':*
Then give me once again the time, When I was still becoming strong, When welling springs of bubbling rhyme Supplied a constant stream of song, When mist concealed my world from view, The bud still promised wondrous hours And I could pluck the thousand flowers That richly in each valley grew.

Youth remains in the same place during production, even after this production has finished, and even after the work is complete it feels unguaranteed boldness or bold anticipation; as in Klopstock's ode 'To Friend and Foe', thirty three years after he had begun the 'Messias':**
The hot soul of the youth was thirsting After immortality! I woke, and I dreamed Of the bold voyage on the ocean of the future! Thank you once again, my early mentor, for showing me How terrible it is there, my guiding spirit. Your golden rod pointed the way! Tall-masted, full-rigged works of poetry And yet sunken wrecks frightened me! ... I became serious, fell into melancholy, absorbed myself In the purpose, in the hero's dignity, in the basic tone, The restraint, the stride, strove, led by my knowledge of the soul, To fathom: what might the poem's beauty be? I flew and hovered among the monuments of the fatherland, Searched for the hero, did not find him; until at last
* **

In Goethe's 'Faust', 18491.

The 'Messias' was probably begun sometime between 17458, though Klopstock in his dotage, in a letter to Herder in 1799, claimed it went back sixty years.

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And the light of youth, productive light, which can even find affinities in ancient events, as if they were not ancient at all, but new proclamations, keeps the morning in the world awake even in times of darkness in Hlderlin's great hymn to Ex oriente lux,* to the new and vocal day:
Then, as if from the superbly tuned organ In the sacred hall, Pouring in from the inexhaustible pipes, The prelude, waking, of the morning begins, And all around, from chamber to chamber, The refreshing, melodic stream runs, Filling the house with excitement Right into the cold shadows. But now awakened, now ascending, The choir of the parish answers The sabbath sun, so the word Came to us out of the East. And on the cliffs of Parnassus and on Cythera I hear, O Asia, the echo from you, and it breaks On the Capitol, and hurtling down from the Alps She comes to us, A stranger, awakening, The voice that shapes humanity.

Productivity thus does not cease to awake as it is awoken by the spur of the compulsion to speak. This compulsion really takes hold when the vision hovering ahead, that would have to be formed, conceals itself, when it even seems to be flirting with the idea of retreat. When work perhaps flees from its doer before the breakthrough of a new assault, because it so urgently craves for him; when the theme of work is reified into a wavering, whispering, itself hesitant entity and seems to reproach the compulsion to speak for its dilatoriness. But anyone whose destiny is bound to a star, says Leonardo, does not turn back, and the moral of productivity proves itself by completing everything that has been kindled, by bringing to light in pure and concise form the contours of the content hovering ahead. All the more so when youth, time of change, productivity simultaneously
*

Hlderlin's 'Am Quell der Donau', 1801.

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coincide in talents which get off to a felicitous start. As was the case in the young Goethe, in his Prometheus fragment, in the vast intention-dimension in 'Faust' and even in the 'Urfaust',* but also still from the same source in the most confident of all statements (from 'Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship'): 'Wishes are presentiments of the abilities which lie within us, precursors of what we will be capable of achieving.' Then the prospective acts work and succeed through the powerful expectation which has gained power over itself; through the affinity to the star which still lies below the horizon; through the strength to explore the untrodden, which prompts Dante to say: 'L'acqua che io prendo giammai non si corse'** (the water that I hold has never been crossed before). This last motto is ultimately the one which best unites youth, time of change and productivity at a single stroke, not with arrogance, but with a description of what occurs in the process of creation, what has to occur. Further Thoughts on Productivity: Its Three Stages So much for the great unrest when it covers itself with forward dreaming. An active unrest, with its new origin opposed to rigidity, developing full of premonition. Even in the unusual form in which it appears, this premonition is the feeling for what is on its way. When it becomes creative, it combines with imagination, particularly with that of the objectively Possible. This premonition with its potential for work is intellectual productivity, understood here as work-forming. More specifically, productivity extends threefold into the unarrived, growing in three directions: as incubation, as so-called inspiration, as explication. All three belong to the ability to travel forward beyond the previous edges of consciousness. In incubation there is a powerful intending, it aims at what is sought, what is dawning, on the advance. Mists are the best times for sowing, even psychologically, only things must not just rest there; there is even a stage of darkness, but with an intensive propensity to clear. This state of propensity is in itself already a contradiction which seeks to resolve itself; it is the untenable state, as fearful as it is happy, of not being what our nature most genuinely strives to be, and of being precisely what it not yet is. Also caught in this contradiction is the more developed propensity
*

The early draft of Goethe's 'Faust', 17725. Paradiso ii, 7.

**

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or fermentation in which the already more contoured expression and form is prepared and concocted. At any rate, expectation is always present here, no matter with how large or small a charge the three-quarters-of-an-hour before-day appears. This incubation is usually further followed by abrupt clarification in a flash; it comes as if from outside or, falsely interpreted, as if from above. That is why the expression inspiration came to be used to describe this; it indicates the abruptness, the illuminating and inspiring stroke, the sudden insight. The incubation which had a speechless quality about it, and which can sometimes produce from sheer profusion a kind of emptiness of consciousness, this sealed character now dissolves. In simpler cases the solution can come about through an invasion of ideas which merely surround or proclaim the central thought; sometimes they also follow after the central thought has appeared. Its very appearance comes in an overpowering way and seems to be so clearly the solution of the problem, as if no problem had existed at all during the incubation and the process of brooding. Even the most intense concentration dissolves which had marked the sealed character of the last stage, and which in the print of Drer's 'Melencolia' is a stone sphere lying in the room, i.e. the condensed intellectual symbol of the brooding mind. The solution springs up in a process seemingly so unmediated, that is, without consciousness of the long-fermenting incubation period, that the inspiration, along with the elation of release, easily brings with it, or rather has brought with it, the marvellous feeling of a magical gift. But the vision which comes with it is in every case combined with euphoria, with the greatest buoyancy, although both the magic-archaic and the transcendental interpretations have to be discarded, as just so much musty consecration. The productive creator is no shaman, nor is he a psychological relic from primeval times; he is neither a sooty flame from this abyss, but nor is he, no matter what Nietzsche may coquettishly have wished to remind us, a mouthpiece of higher powers. This transcendental mythicization of inspiration, as if it descended from above, really is without substance; it is superior to the magic-archaic version only in so far as it does at least attempt to do justice to the transcendere, that is: the surpassing expanding element in intellectual creation, and does not distort this creation into a sinking down, into a language of the night. The fact that no archaic regression takes place here in the act of productivity precisely demonstrates the constant experience of light that is associated with inspiration. This experience is wholly lucid in most cases and discernible at the peak of consciousness, most notably in the case of Descartes when he discovered the principle of cogito ergo

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sum: 'On the loth of November 1619 when the light of a wonderful discovery broke in on me.' But where does the kindling of this light take place, when neither shamanistic notions from below, nor enthusiastic notions from above, have provided anything more than superstitious explanations? The kindling place of inspiration lies in the meeting of a specific genius, i.e. creative propensity with the propensity of a time to provide the specific content which has become ripe for expression, forming and execution. Not only the subjective, but also the objective conditions for the expression of a Novum must therefore be ready, must be ripe, so that this Novum can break through out of mere incubation and suddenly gain insight into itself. And these conditions are always socio-economic and of a progressive kind: without the capitalist mandate, the subjective mandate towards cogito ergo sum would never have found its inspiration; without an incipient proletarian mandate, the discovery of the materialist dialectic would have been impossible or would have remained merely a brewing aperu, and neither would it have struck like lightning into the no longer naive popular soil. Likewise, the breakthrough, the sudden powerful burst of light that often occurs in the individual of genius, obtains both the material which sparks it off and the material which it throws light on solely from the Novum of the time content itself which is forcing its way into thought. This is the case, of course, even when, as so often, the receptivity of a time does not itself stand at the peak of that time, let alone of its further ramifications, its continuing tendencies and latencies. Even then the inspiration comes from the mandate of the time which perceives itself in the individual of genius and reveals itself in harmony with his propensity, potentiates itself with his potential. The mystery of the world which advances as our task in time and is advanced in front of great talent is powerful enough to keep those called upon to articulate it charged with incubation, but not yet powerful enough to trigger off the shot of each possible, socially imminent mode of illumination. When this world mystery is merely seen in isolation, without a concrete relationship to time, even in the greatest talents only that narrow pass of incubation is formed which Hegel, looking back at a slack period in his early days, describes at one point as follows: 'I know from my own experience this mood of the mind or rather of reason, once it has plunged with interest and with its premonitions into a chaos of appearances and . . . inwardly certain of its goal has not yet reached the clarity and detail of the whole . . . Every man probably has one such turningpoint in his life, the nocturnal point of the concentration of his being' (Briefe von und an Hegel I, 1887, p. 264). And as

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for the necessary concurrence with the historical kairos* as a constitutive property of genius as a whole, the Hegelian Rosenkranz remarked most pertinently with his master in mind: 'Unlike talent, genius is not great through formal versatility, although it can possess this, but through the fact that it accomplishes what is objectively necessary in a particular sphere as its individual destiny. That is precisely why it has its true measure only in historical development, because it must be directly above and beyond everything given and must elaborate for its own private satisfaction those elements for which, according to the objective course of things, the time has come. Within the confines of this task it rules with demonic power, beyond them it is powerless, and while it can develop in various ways, it cannot create the new' (Psychologie, 1843, p. 54f.). And how splendidly this definition would have applied to Marx, at that time in 1843, a young genius who, as few others could, began to accomplish the objectively necessary in a particular sphere as his individual destiny, and who experienced the inspirational breakthrough of his work as no other could in fully grasped concurrence with the socio-historical tendency of his time. Thus inspiration as a whole, whenever it is work-forming, emerges from the meeting of subject and object, from the meeting of its tendency with the objective tendency of the time, and is the flash with which this concordance begins. Then the kindling which is thoroughly immanent occurs; inspiration is thus the explosion of light in each tendency-latency being itself, in each case produced by its strongest consciousness. The clear idea of the work now surfaces in the author, and as before in incubation, in the present state of inspiration it is by no means complacent, but instead drives on ahead, and, from the flash which revealed the new landscape, has to enter into the topography of that landscape. That which was revealed by the initial unrest and its premonition is finally carried out here. This happens in the final act of productivity, in the agonizing, blissful work of explication. Genius is hard work, but of a kind which never wants to allow the elaboration to grow stale or to be anything less than a constant obsession. There must be no break here, either between vision and work or between work and vision: 'The first light', says Van Gogh, 'in which the kindling impression lay, must itself have begun to share in the act of painting.' Genius is thus the specific hard work of leading the visionary moment of light towards its expression, so that the mastered material adds not only strength but also depth to
*

Kairos transliterated from the Greek: occasion, opportunity, the right time.

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what was planned. In accordance with the true observation in Schopenhauer's statement: 'Talent resembles a marksman who hits a target which the others cannot reach; genius resembles one who hits a target so far away they are not even able to see it.' It is this very truth that also cancels out the fundamentally false definition that Schopenhauer expressed elsewhere, according to which genius is a purely static world-eye, and hence can by no means be hastening ahead. But precisely because genius looks beyond each existing horizon, hits a distant target, it is not a contemplative-static world-eye, but a pioneer on the borders of an advancing world, and even a most important part of the world which is only now being formed. Psychologically, genius is the appearance of a particularly high degree of Not-YetConscious and of consciousness capability, ultimately then the power of explication of this Not-Yet-Conscious in the subject, in the world. The degree of gifted genius is determined by the wealth of its Not-Yet-Conscious material, i.e. of its mediated being-beyond what has previously been consciously given, what has previously been explicated and finally formed in the world. It is not yet necessary at this point to distinguish between artistic and scientific genius; since the motto in Dante 'L'acqua che io prendo giammai non si corse' is psychologically true both of artistic and scientific works of note. Forming of the previously not yet formed, this criterion for works of genius, is the same in art (the figurative depiction of a real preappearance) and in science (the conceptual depiction of the tendency-latencystructure of the real). The explications in art and science, of course, even at these contrasting levels of objectivity, still have the fact in common that they each find themselves in the process of objectivity itself and, in so far as they contain sufficient genius, they stand at its Front. Genius, as the most advanced consciousness and tutor of this consciousness, for this very reason is also the highest sensitivity to the crucial moments of change in time and its material process. It is the power and ability to stand at the peak of this time and to inform it knowingly about the landscape and the horizon of this process-epoch. Therefore it is not completely unjust of Carlyle to celebrate the word of the genius as nothing less than the password to the premonition of the age: 'It is ever the way with the Thinker, the spiritual Hero. What he says, all men were not far from saying, were longing to say. The Thoughts of all start up, as from painful enchanted sleep, round his Thought; answering to it, Yes, even so!'* Even if this yes often only comes in the next generation or even later, the powder
*

Carlyle, 'Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History'.

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for the shot still lay ready prepared, and the publicity of the time simply did not hear the shot, precisely because it went off on the horizon of that time. And what is most clearly demonstrated in the explication of a previously Not-Yet-Conscious is: the Not-Yet-Conscious as a whole is the psychological representation of the Not-Yet-Become in an age and its world, on the Front of the world. The making conscious of the Not-Yet-Conscious, the forming of the Not-Yet-Become, exists only in this space, a space of concrete anticipation, only here is the volcano of productivity to be found pouring out its fire. Mastery in the work of genius, a mastery which is foreign to what has normally become, is also comprehensible only as a phenomenon of the Novum. Every great work of art thus still remains, except for its manifest character, impelled towards the latency of the other side, i.e. towards the contents of a future which had not yet appeared in its own time, if not towards the contents of an as yet unknown final state. For this reason alone great works have something to say to all ages, a Novum pointing onward in fact, which the previous age had not yet noticed; only for this reason does a fairytale opera like 'The Magic Flute', but also a historically localized epic like the 'Iliad', possess so-called eternal youth. Therefore: explications which have become works of genius have not only completely expressed their own day, but the permanent implication of the plus ultra also circulates in them. Its place, the place of the Not-Yet-Conscious, is here least of all to be found in the territory of the subconscious, the region into which what has already been conscious, already experienced and appeared material has simply submerged. Its place is on the Front, where genesis continues, and where, being the proper genesis, it is still only now in the process of beginning with the beginning. The waters of oblivion flow in the underworld, but the Castalian spring* of productivity rises on Parnassus, a mountain. Thus productivity, although it comes from the depths, is working for the very first time in the light and is continually positing a new source, namely one at the peak of consciousness. It is fitting that there is blue above this peak, the opposite colour to Orcus, the dark and yet transparent nimbus around all real explication This blue, as a colour of distance, likewise designates in a graphically symbolic way the future-laden aspect, the Not-Yet-Become in reality, to which significant expressions, precisely because they are advancing, ultimately refer. The darkness forwards, because it is clearing, is in its expression also assigned to that brightest consciousness in which the day has not given up the reddening dawn but is precisely growing dawn.
*

In Greek mythology, a spring sacred to the Muses.

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Different Kinds of Resistance Which the Forgotten and the Not-Yet-Conscious Offer to Illumination The problems of penetrating the backward or forward disposed darkness are always of a different order. Certainly, in remembering, as in premonition which has a potential for work, the threshold of consciousness is moved. But in the one case it is a matter of lowering it so that forgotten or repressed material can cross it, in the other case a border is shifted upwards. Certainly too, in both cases, something blocks itself off against becoming conscious, a resistance asserts itself against the displacement of the threshold. But this resistance is still different in character, according to whether repressed material is to be remembered or intuitive material to be formed. Psychoanalysis has long been trying to identify such resistance in its subconscious region: as one of reluctance to unpack repressed material again. The repressed material itself is here supposed to have resulted from the fact that a struggle had arisen against the underlying mental process or event becoming conscious. Thus the process remained or became unconscious, merely sending a neurotic symptom of itself into consciousness; but this symptom is always regarded as a sign that a process has not been lived through to the end, that it has been broken off, that the patient has not come to terms with something in himself. And the same struggle which has made a person ill again opposes the effort to raise repressed-subconscious material into consciousness during analytical treatment; this is precisely the resistance of the No-Longer-Conscious to its becoming conscious. In short, a clearly manifest will founds the resistance here; if this will is broken, then the forgotten material supposedly emerges without further ado. And this will is regarded as a purely negating will, which is why Freud also says: 'Repression is the early infantile stage of condemnation.' The same motives which allowed the old trauma to become embedded place themselves in the way of the attempt to make it conscious. And above all: if the repressed material comes to light all the same, then it is redundant dbris which is only now properly forgotten, that is to say, overcome. The unwillingness is of a completely different kind, however, where the journey is forwards into the darkness. The resistance to material becoming conscious in the area of the Not-YetConscious rarely or never displays neurotic features. It displays them only when a discrepancy between power and will arises in the willingness to produce; though, as is

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well-known, this discrepancy does create one of the acutest forms of suffering. Even then, however, a self-blocking is definitely lacking in the will towards illumination itself, of the kind, that is, which appears in the subject during the mere recovery of something repressed, that is, on the march into the No-Longer-Conscious. A resistance in the subject of the production-will to this will and its contents, or even to the success of the journey into the Not-Yet-Conscious and to its treasures: unwillingness of this kind does not occur at all in the producer. He leaves that instead to the receivers of his work, to the so often blocking receptivity, i.e. to that which used to be called the resistance of the uncomprehending world. But the psychology of producing itself reveals no sign of inner resistance to the acts of illumination under discussion here; instead, the resistance which belongs to production and is endemic to it is not present in the human subject at all. It is to be found instead in the matter treated by the subject and is only mirrored by the specific difficulties of explication. It is to be found in the hazardous straits of the Novum, in the still inchoate, utterly habit-free character of the new material. In fact, even the mere receptivity-resistance, when it forms a block against works of genius, completely fails to understand them or is simply irritated by them, ultimately derives, in spite of the added resentment which belongs to the realm of psychoanalysis, from a disinclination towards the difficulty of the factually New; yet even here the resistance inherent in the illumination of the Not-Yet-Conscious is finally identified as that of the still unchannelled material. All beginnings are difficult* in an area like this, all the more difficult in fact because the newness into which the productive pioneering effort goes is essentially also a newness of the matter in and for itself which is coming up. It is therefore for this reason alone that the new truths, those of the objectively New, emerge so hesitantly in their articulation and always only as astra per aspera. Thoughts only happily coexist as long as they are plans or sketches, but one step further and the concrete difficulty of the work begins. Even where sufficient ability is present and precisely when it is, the difficulty is after all responsible for the many repulsed expeditions in the studio, in the laboratory, in the study, the countless battlefields without victory or where victory is postponed. Thus, not repressed material at all, but rather the difficulty of the path is the thing in the Not-Yet-Conscious, Not-Yet-Become which causes productivity trouble. The reasons for this lie exclusively in the terrain of the matter, itself a terrain which
*

A German proverb.

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is not yet enclosed, let alone rounded off; in short, the upper threshold has its own guardians, and they lie in the material. The block that operates in this way first and always appears as a historical one. More precisely as a social one; even when that which is to be expressed or to be known is actually by no means new itself. When therefore only a new piece of knowledge is to be acquired and not also knowledge of the factually New, i.e. of what is only now factually coming up. There is thus in history a socio-economic barrier to vision, it cannot be scaled by even the most daring mind. Many anticipations, previsions entered existing consciousness and were emphasized, illuminated by that consciousness itself in the Not-Yet-Conscious; however, the social barrier prevented their being carried out. Thus, first-rate researchers, because of their social and historical standpoint, often did not appropriate even half the wisdom of Minerva (as the ancients themselves called this resistant material). No Greek mathematician would have understood differential calculus, not even Zeno, close though he came to it. The infinitesimal, the variable quantity, lay totally beneath the horizon of Greek society; only capitalism caused what was previously fixed and finite to enter such a state of flux that rest could be conceived as infinitesimal movement, and non-static notions of quantity conceived at all. It is also relevant here that the notion of work was alien to Greek slave-owning society, even in epistemological terms and especially in those terms. It constantly stressed knowing merely as a receptive looking, never as an activity; easily though it could have suggested itself to the Stoics, for example, with their 'subjective factor'. Not all insights and works are possible at all times, history has its timetable, the works that transcend their time often cannot even be intended, let alone carried out. Marx stressed this with the statement that humanity always only sets itself tasks which it can solve. The tasks which transcend their time are concretely insoluble even where, by way of exception, they may be set in abstract terms. But even this barrier is ultimately founded solely in the historical state of the material, above all in its own processive, unfinished state, itself existing in difficulty, Front and fragments. This is true even where only new knowledge but not yet knowledge of anything factually new is fragmenting; and all the more true where, as in the case of the concept of work, the whole matter bourgeois society still lies under the horizon. Here too, the thing which ultimately determines the productivity-resistance remains the hazardous straits of the matter itself, remains the sealedness, clearing only sparingly, of the Novum in the overall process, which proceeds as world. The by no means fundamental, but rather historically temporary

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resistance in this is still noted even where it is claimed that it has been overcome, namely through courage. As in the marvellously anti-agnostic vision of Hegel's: 'The sealed nature of the universe contains no power which could offer resistance to the courage of knowing, it must open up before the latter and reveal to it its riches and its depths and allow them to be enjoyed' (Werke VI, 1840, p. xl). It is noticeable that the word resistance is also present here, although it is very far from dealing with Objects of a subconscious. Instead the sealedness of an entire universe is cited, and this precisely in proportion to the unrestrained courage of knowing. The resistance of object-basedness to the subject-object relationship of knowledge is all the greater where there is no universe which is panlogical and thereby at the same time closed, as there is in Hegel. Where an unfinished process is pending, which is furthermore not signed with such a familiar name as Spirit, associated with every idealistic professor. In complete contrast, the vehicle of the process is matter, and is an entity that in no way actually compounds the subject with the object, like the so-called World Idea, except in the wake of hard work sharpened by the very difficulty of the resistance. The still sealed nature of the universe which, precisely as matter, still lies in an unfinished process of its objectifications, can least of all be mirrored or declared as something already complete, let alone extravagantly clear as daylight. That which has still not become, still not been achieved, is a wilderness of its own, comparable in danger to the untrodden wilderness, but superior to it in its unarrived possibilities. This Not-Yet-Become, Not-Yet-Achieved in the object thus founds the last resistance, it is clearly of a completely different type to that of repressedness or of concealed availability. The world-mystery itself does not lie in a kind of cosmo-analytic rubbish pit, but in the horizon of the future to be attained, and the resistance which it offers to its being opened is not that of a sealed chest, as in demonic treasure-myths, guarded by dogs with malicious eyes, but the resistance here is that of fullness which is still itself actually in process, and not yet manifest. Significantly, this means that objective idealism, even spiritualism, generally undertook to define its essence behind appearance by virtue of the false equation: Thinking = Being, as if it were only geographically in a different place, whereas Marx, who certainly could not be suspected of 'agnosticism', already speaks of the 'realm of freedom' almost only privatively in a negative sense, namely as the mere nonexistence of the characteristics of the class society, or at most in the deeply remote, still completely hovering meaning of a 'naturalization of man, humanization of nature'. The socalled character of the

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universe is therefore still inherently sealed in the sense of: Not-Yet-Appearance of itself; the fact that this is its own task-nature makes it difficult. In order to remove what is difficult, not only knowledge is necessary in the sense of an excavation of what was, but knowledge in the sense of a planning of what is becoming; knowledge is therefore necessary which itself decisively contributes to this becoming, becoming which changes for the good. Revolution and genius inspire confidence in the fact that this difficult heliotropic business was not in vain or will not have been in vain; despite the resistance in itself or in the sour dough which the world is. Epilogue on the Block which has Prevented the Concept of the Not-Yet-Conscious for So Long With particular difficulty the inward glance sheds light on itself. There is a separate resistance in the general factual resistance here; mental life seems fleeting, shadowy. How long it took for people even to begin to notice that this life takes notice of itself, i.e. is a conscious life. And subconscious mental processes have only been named as such for little more than two hundred years. There may possibly be some excuse for this in the fact that the subconscious processes are not automatically submitted to our notice, that they are only deduced from symbols, that they contain forgotten content. But it seems more difficult to understand, after the conscious and the subconscious have finally been noted, that the NotYet-Conscious has been disregarded for so long. Because it is not first excavated by the act of memory, but is a separate act which is immediately given to itself, i.e. intuitively, apart from the content that occurs within it. Nevertheless, the floating, open, visualizing aspect of these events was portrayed, as we have seen, as if it too was merely subconscious; and in fact: it has remained hidden in this darkness until the present day. As is well-known, unconscious processes in general were first identified in psychological terms by Leibniz, by a very roundabout route. Not just observation, but also theory effected the discovery; observed material to some extent served as an example later to illustrate the theory. One of Leibniz's basic principles was that of the unbroken coherence of the world; this lex continui tolerates no interruption, no empty space, anywhere. If there does seem to be one, however, then in reality it is occupied by the imperceptibly smallest something, something beginning and growing; differential calculus

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expresses this infinitesimal something mathematically as a moment of motion. But just as there are the smallest impulses of motion, so too there are those of the intensity of conception in consciousness graded according to its clarity and lucidity: these are the 'petites perceptions insensibles'. And as examples of these, Leibniz cites the smallest perceptions, which because of their weakness remain imperceptible or unconscious, but in adequate numbers, such as in the sound of waves or the buzz of voices, definitely become conscious. So they must also have been present beforehand in the mind, hence they must be forgotten ideas which enter into consciousness when sufficiently amplified. The petites perceptions are immediately singled out by Leibniz as a great discovery in the preface to the 'New Essays': 'In a word, these imperceptible perceptions are of just as great importance in the theory of the intellect as the imperceptible bodies are in physics; and it is equally unreasonable to reject either one of them on the pretext that they fall outside the realm of our senses.' Thus the notion of the unconscious is born out of the lex continui, indeed it can be said cum grano salis: out of differential calculus, as its counterpart in the mind. At the same time, however, the notion of the unconscious which has thus been acquired is totally subordinated to that of existing consciousness. As soon as it is noted, unconscious material is branded subconscious. The petites perceptions are always outbidden, even dispersed, by the consciousness that has already been achieved in man; consequently, after attaining clarification, they occur as elements of creation, not giving birth again, as it were, to anything beyond themselves. Nevertheless, something other than existing consciousness had been demonstrated in the mind by the hero of the Enlightenment himself, even if only as moonlight in the ancestral hall of consciousness.* Sheer consciousness was now no longer regarded as the essential feature of the human intellect; the previously so paradoxical notion of unconscious mental activity began. And, more importantly, the peculiar hiding-place of the Not-Yet-Conscious in this darkness began, the subordination of the Not-Yet-Conscious to a past, brooding moonshine-world: this mask of the Not-Yet-Conscious now emerged. Undergoing curious pseudo-morphoses, only now discernible as such, first in the Sturm und Drang, then in Romanticism. Fifty years after the death of Leibniz, with the posthumous appearance of his 'New Essays', this key notion of the petites perceptions echoed in the early throes
*

Bloch is punning here on the double meaning of 'Ahnen', which means both 'premonition' and 'ancestors'.

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of that bourgeois revolution which then never came in Germany. While for the Sturm und Drang the unconscious remained something completely submerged, lay at the mere beginning of the history of the mind, it still appeared welling and bubbling up within it. Thus the unconscious no longer remained infinitesimal like the smallest impulses, nor meagre like the petites perceptions, but all the mists of the north and of prehistory swirled around in it, both Fingal's cave and Macbeth's heath, both The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry and Strasbourg cathedral seemed to find a place in it. For all its dull fugginess, the unconscious had the primal voice, fervour, youth, the wild, impetuous spirit of creative genius. Dawning therefore also appeared in the Sturm und Drang, which of course largely belongs to the Enlightenment, to be endowed with future for the first time, and also to be aware of the fact in the night-wind of prehistory: 'Who can expect', exclaims Hamann, magus of this whispering Enlightenment, 'who can expect to take proper ideas from the present, without knowing the future? The future determines the present and the latter the past, just as the intention determines the nature and use of the means.' And Hamann goes on to say, with reference to Ezekiel 37, 16: 'The field of history has thus always appeared to me like that wide field full of bones, and 10! they were very dry. Nobody except a prophet can prophesy upon these bones that sinews and flesh will grow on them and skin will cover them.' And also, when it came to the rule, this pride of rationalistic consciousness, it was above all the extinguished element, that which has become and is dead, that was rejected, as opposed to bursting forth or nature always forcing its way to the surface like a spring. Nevertheless, even this still remained mixed to numbing effect with regressio, with the moonshine of Ossian,* with moss-covered monuments and heroes' graves. Germany's unreadiness for a bourgeois revolution and the resulting opaque thwartings of progressive revolutionary reason thus ultimately made original genius more into a messenger from primeval times than from the future. This sort of thing intensified in the really strange complexities of Romanticism. The welling of the spring was certainly lively here, and extraordinary things seemed to be under way, but the feeling of a lost yesterday opposed it with a force which the Sturm und Drang would not and could not recognize. This force was supplied by the reactionary mandate, directed against the bourgeois revolution, which increasingly determined German
*

The verses of Ossian, a legendary warrior, were composed by James Macpherson (173696). Herder and Goethe believed the verses to be authentic and translated from them.

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Romanticism and thwarted the undeniably progressive tendencies which were nevertheless present. In a way which can hardly be recaptured any more, the Romantic was enslaved by the past, and was so with a lex continui which true to the reactionary mandate preferred to raise nothing but knights' castles in the magic moonlit night. The historical was increasingly associated with the archaic, and this in turn with the chthonic, so that the core of history soon came to look like the core of the earth itself. This enshrined feeling, this incestuous phenomenon of the desire to return to the womb of night and the past, culminates late, in Bachofen, the teacher of matriliny, but with grave-love for chthonic Demeter herself. Even psychologically, in keeping with this nocturnal vision, everything good and premonitory is drawn to the nocturnal pole of consciousness: creation has a native affinity with drive and instinct, with atavistic clairvoyance and the whispering of the abyss; for the Romantic, nothing half as familiar dwelt on the day side, or even on the form and fulfilment side. All productivity, especially the expectation which paradoxically characterizes so much of Romanticism, lost itself here in antiquarian images, in the past, in the immemorial, in myth, as a stance against the future, which increasingly comes to be regarded merely as chaff, emptiness, wind. It is therefore not surprising if youth and productivity here reversed all consciousness of their Not-Yet-Conscious even to the point of ancestor worship: the other explosive force, apart from productivity: the grasped time of change, was missing. Nor is it surprising if the nevertheless powerfully vague mood of expectation in the Restoration world of Romanticism was never elevated beyond the level of an Advent in which Vineta bells* ring out, the bells of a sunken city. Grres, the renegade with the Phrygian cap, expressed this pathos of the past most passionately: 'That past world was so rich, it is sunk, the waters have passed over it, here and there the ruins still tower, and whenever the murky depths of time clear, we see its treasures on the sea-bed. We look down from a great distance into the wondrous abyss, where all the secrets of the world and life lie hidden, but have we succeeded in fathoming the root of things which lies hidden in God? Our gaze penetrates the depths, mysteries beckon us from afar, but the current surges upwards and throws the diver out into the present' (Mythengeschichte, 1810, p. 599f.). Significantly, this upward surge leads only with regret into the present, and the future is nowhere to be seen at all. There are of course mysteries of
*

Vineta: a tenth-century Viking city, possibly located on the Baltic Sea island of Wollin, supposedly engulfed by a flood or an earthquake, often referred to in sagas and legend.

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distance, they are the most compelling for the Romantic, but they lie almost exclusively in the abyss, the distance is and remains primal Beenness. Undoubtedly, German Romanticism this cannot be stressed often enough in view of the antiquated, abstract way it has been underestimated also had a progressive character; precisely its instinct for what is bubbling up, becoming, growing, is relevant here, the famous 'historical sense' which first created whole disciplines like legal history and German studies; especially the patriotic element must not be forgotten, and corresponding to it the feeling for all great national achievement in world literature. As the Wartburgfest of 1817 alone shows,* there is definitely also a revolutionary Romantic component in German Romanticism: while even the most passionately utopianized red dawn is shot through here time and again with the abovementioned night-thoughts of an antiquarium, with the projection of an overprized past even into the newness of the future. And it is almost solely outside Germany, in English and Russian Romanticism, neither of which stood beneath such a reactionary star, but beneath the wildly remembered star of the French Revolution, in Byron, in Shelley, in Pushkin, that the true feeling of homeland commensurate with man becomes explosive and future-laden, and is not sought by sinking back into the past. But this was anomalous in Germany; a revolutionary Romanticism was not yet distinctive enough to be a match for Romantic reaction. Even Jean Paul, who cannot really be classed as a Romantic anyway, the most exuberant and uninhibited creator of waking dreams, whose liberalism was beyond question, and whose dawn-red language, if it is steeped in night, then in Midsummer night, even he subordinated hope, which is constantly present in his work, to memory, or ultimately settled it there. So even Jean Paul, the creator of the most beautiful wishful landscapes shimmering ahead, finally sought the light, as soon as he was not creating it but rather reflecting on it, only in the past, not in the future. 'For this very reason every remembered life gleams in the distance like an earth in the heavens, that is, the imagination condenses the parts into a closed serene whole. Of course, it could equally well form a gloomy whole; but it places Spanish castles in the air full of torture chambers only in the future, and only Belvederes in the past. Unlike Orpheus, we gain our Eurydice by looking back, and lose her by looking forwards' (Vorschule der sthetik, 7). Thus Romanticism, with its promise of a land beneath the well** in the petites perceptions, seduced the Not-Yet*

Wartburgfest: a student festival on the Wartburg on the 18th October 1817 in memory of the Reformation and of Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Leipzig, 1814.
**

Cf. Grimm's fairytale 'Frau Holle'.

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Conscious time and again. The vision of the utopian condition, the yield of its content, thus encountered the most powerful block, for all the expectation which pervaded Romantic feeling, in anamnesis, a re-remembering which is virtually an invocation. And this did not remain the only block, as Freud later demonstrated with his exclusively subconscious dream. Probably few ages have felt so inescapably the transition to a becoming different, to something coming up, as the present one has. But the bourgeoisie reacts all the more sheepishly and blindly to this, shows no interest at all or only a hostile interest in the reflection of tomorrow. For this bourgeoisie, coming events merely cast their shadow, nothing but shadow; capitalist society senses itself negated by the future. More than ever the bourgeoisie lacks the material incentive to separate the Not-Yet-Conscious from the NoLonger-Conscious. All psychoanalysis, with repression as its central notion, sublimation as a mere subsidiary notion (for substitution, for hopeful illusions), is therefore necessarily retrospective. Admittedly, it developed in an earlier age than the present one, around the turn of the century it took part in a so-called struggle against the conventional lies of a civilized mankind. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis developed in a class which was superannuated even then, in a society without future. So Freud exaggerated the dimensions of the libido of these parasites and recognized no other onward, let alone upward drive. Nor any other dreams than those which the Lord, now called Eros, gives his beloved in sleep. And the longer time went on, the more readily the thoroughly self-interested mistrust of the future was intensified by the bourgeoisie's new supply of anxiety and old supply of resignation. And it is precisely this which characterizes the barrier which, as we have seen, even in Freud's case, obstructs the notion of a Not-Yet-Conscious, and obstructs forward dawning. Hence the totally inevitable, totally regressive proposition: 'The repressed is for us the model of the unconscious' (Das Ich und das Es, 1923, p. 12). The barrier finally became absolute in so-called depth psychology; where in other words psychoanalytical regression became ideologically useful for the Blood and Soil humbug. C. G. Jung's notion of the unconscious consigned itself all the more completely to the cellar of consciousness, since it is only there that the opium with which Fascism stupefies utopia can be smoked. Jung also interprets what is beginning to dawn in an utterly archaic and occult fashion, analogous to the prophetic sleep in the temple. Even the 'inconscient suprieur', even the so turgidly expressed 'prospective tendency of subliminal combinations' is thus, in the manner understood above, wholly subordinated to regression. The passage in Jung in which 'an idea prefiguring

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the future is and remains archaized thus, is revealing enough for the history of obstructed Novum-psychology to warrant quoting at length: 'Psychoanalysis works backwards like the study of history. Just as a large part of the past is so remote that our knowledge of history no longer reaches it, so a large part of unconscious determination is also inaccessible. But there are two kinds of things history does not know, namely what is hidden in the past and what is hidden in the future. Both could perhaps be reached with a certain probability, the former as a postulate, the latter as a historical prognosis. In so far as tomorrow is already contained in today, and all the threads of the future are already in place, a more profound knowledge of the present could make possible a more or less far-reaching and certain prognosis of the future. If we apply this line of reasoning . . . to the psychological sphere, the same thing must necessarily follow; just as memory traces which have long since sunk below the threshold are still demonstrably accessible to the unconscious, so are also very fine subliminal forward combinations, which are of the very greatest significance for future events in so far as these are determined by our psychology. But just as the study of history scarcely concerns itself with future combinations, which are rather the object of politics, so psychological future combinations are also scarcely material for analysis. They would have to be objects of an infinitely sophisticated psychological synthesis, capable of following the natural currents of the libido. We cannot do this, but the unconscious can because that is where it occurs, and it seems as if from time to time in certain cases significant fragments of this work are revealed, at least in dreams, which would explain the prophetic significance of dreams long claimed by superstition. The aversion of exact scientists today to these trains of thought, which can hardly be termed fantastic, is merely an overcompensation for man's millennial, all too great inclination to believe in soothsaying.' (Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, 1925, p. 54f.). This is all that Jung can find to say on the subject of the mental representation of what is coming up. Utopian consciousness is presented as an Egyptian book of dreams. Only the archaic unconscious, in deepest darkness, carries out here the so-called future combinations; but if the slightest area of this darkness comes to light, then it is to the light which ultimately displays regressio. Precisely in the historical context of the petites perceptions, the archaizing of the unconscious recalled again here sounds another warning. The barrier in front of the Novum in the great progressive work of Leibniz becomes a guillotine for the Novum in the final bourgeois psychology of the unconscious. As now becomes completely clear, even in the times

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when bourgeois psychology flourished, they did not note, or at least not unmistakably, the New as a class of consciousness. Leibniz placed the accent on the advance of consciousness, but the petites perceptions in which the seeds lay were exclusively underneath already acquired consciousness, show therefore the precise historical topology to which the preconscious was confined until Freud. Even the construction of wishful dreams which the modern age has developed: the social utopias and those of a technologically controlled world, even these anticipations were unable to develop, in the philosophical consideration they were given from More, Campanella, Bacon to Fichte and beyond, either a psychology of their expanding daydreams, or an epistemology of their possible-real place in the world. The reason in this case certainly does not lie in a self-interested mistrust of the future, but, as it were, in a uninterested mistrust, under the continuing spell of static living and thinking. In addition, the consciousness of the rising bourgeoisie had not yet sufficiently escaped from the concept of a pre-ordained, ultimately finished world (ordo sempiternus rerum); continuing feudal statics inhibited the concept of newness. It inhibited it in the work of Leibniz, it inhibited and perverted it even in the most decisive of all previous expositions of becoming and philosophies of process such as Hegel's. Even the famous passage on process from the 'Phenomenology of Mind' must be seen as similarly constricted: 'But just as a baby's first breath, after a long period of silent nutrition, breaks the gradualness of merely continuing growth a qualitative leap and the baby is now born, so the developing mind matures slowly and silently towards a new form, dissolves one particle after another of the construction of its previous world, its shakiness is only suggested by isolated symptoms; the frivolity and the boredom which make inroads into the existing mentality, together with the vague premonition of something unknown, herald the fact that something else is in the offing. This gradual crumbling, which did not change the physiognomy of the whole, is interrupted by the opening up, a flash which all at once erects the structure of the new world' (Werke II, 1832, p. 10). The reflex of the French Revolution is unmistakable here, as in the leaping character of the Hegelian dialectic in general; yet the whole thing is equally conceived as finished simultaneity, as memory. The flash of the new beginning is here also merely opening up, where the closedness of what is opening up has long since been decided. It is therefore trapped in a circle without an opening out on to the as yet unarrived. The enormous enterprise has already entered perpetual retirement, the rest of finished achievement: 'The phenomenon is the arising and passing away which does not itself arise

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and pass away but is in itself and constitutes the reality and movement of the life of truth . . . Stored up in this movement as a whole, conceived as rest, is that which distinguishes itself within it and gives particular existence, one which remembers, and this existence is the knowledge of itself' (Werke II, p. 36f.). The utopian hiddenness which certainly exists in embryo or In-itself, and which bursts through again at every stage of the Hegelian process, is accordingly revealed by the totality of comprehended manifestations to date. Plato's theory, according to which all knowing is merely anamnesis, a re-remembering of something seen before, this knowledge, solely geared to Been-ness, was thus reproduced over and over again; this ideologized once and for all the block against the being sui generis of a Not-Yet-Being. Precisely the continuing statics of what is reactionary and in need of rest, this finally settled, enclosed anamnesis-world here accomplished what in periods of decline is accomplished by the horror of the unknown that is in the offing. No new tone-composer of the old kind, however new he appears, is free of this block. Not even where, as in Bergson, there is an attempt to single out exclusively, all too exclusively, this very newness. Bergson says at one point, in his 'Introduction to Metaphysics', that the great insights had previously been regarded as if they illuminated point for point a logic which had long been preformed in things, 'just as at an evening celebration one gradually lights the circle of gas-lamps which already outline the contours of a ornament'. But what then claims to be Novum in Bergson: anti-repetition, anti-geometry, lan vital and intuition flowing with the stream of life all this vitality is impressionistic, and liberal-anarchistic, not anticipatory. Bergson's lan vital is a 'continually modifying change of direction, as in a curve for example'; the so-called intuition enters into this continuously surprising mode, but without ever meeting the actual Novum for sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was. Therefore everything is in fact pre-arranged even in Bergson's stream of surprise, and is frozen into a formula, into that equally dead antithesis to repetition which reduces the New to a merely endless, contentless zigzag, to that coincidence made absolute, in which neither birth nor explosion, nor a venturing beyond, fruitful in terms of content, the previously Become occur. Bergson opposes the process-idea directed towards a goal, but he does not oppose it because the goal has already been agreed, so that the said process at the highest level almost looks as if it has been rigged, instead he eliminates any and every trace of the onward, the

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Where To and any openly pursuable goal whatsoever. So that the alleged Novum does not look any different than it does in anamnesis, that is, having always been, always phoenix, always spellbound return to the unchangeable which is here called changeability. Overall, therefore, the astonishing fact remains almost everywhere that the dawning sticks fast in the Fixum, ultimately unnoted or clogged with What Has Been. A vast mental realm of the NotYet-Conscious, one that is constantly travelled, has so far remained undiscovered, or its discoveries have remained unnoticed. Similarly, a vast physical realm of the Not-YetBecome, which forms the correlate of the Not-Yet-Conscious, remained stationary, and the closely related real categories: Front, Novum, Objective Possibility, which are inaccessible to anamnesis, remained without a theory of categories in the world before Marx. The epigone is always only found on the passable roads which productivity has built and embellished before him, but in the notation of the New, previous productivity also behaved as if it only recognized epigonism. The decline of the bourgeois class sealed this aversion to the concept of aurora far beyond Romanticism, which had itself been so reactionary. And as we are now in a position to say only experience of the modern age, as a positive age, that is to say: as the affirmation of its oncoming content, allows us to describe a state of consciousness which, just as it was always hidden, fulfils the potential of youth, of times of change, of cultural production. Only our present age possesses the socioeconomic prerequisites for a theory of the Not-Yet-Conscious and whatever is related to it in the Not-Yet-Become of the world. Marxism, above all, was first to bring a concept of knowledge into the world which no longer essentially refers to Becomeness, but to the tendency of what is coming up; thus for the first time it brings future within our theoretical and practical grasp. Such recognition of tendency is necessary to remember, to interpret and to open up even the No-LongerConscious and the Become according to its possible continuing significance, i.e. its undischargedness. Marxism thus rescued the rational core of utopia and made it concrete as well as the core of the still idealistic tendency-dialectics. Romanticism does not understand utopia, not even its own, but utopia that has become concrete understands Romanticism and makes inroads into it, in so far as archaic and historical material, in its archetypes and works, contains a not yet voiced, undischarged element. The most advanced consciousness thus operates even in memory and oblivion not as in a sunken and hence closed space, but in an open space, that of process and its Front. But this space is exclusively filled up with forward dawning, even in its examples from

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continuingly significant past; it is filled with the vitality, capable of being both conscious and known, of a Not-Yet-Being. Where Romanticism, in its archaic, historical aspect, was drawn down into solely antiquarian welling, into false depths, utopian consciousness lays bare even what is coming up in the old, and all the more so in the imminent itself. It discovers the real depths on the heights, that is on those of its brightest consciousness, where something still brighter is dawning. Conscious and Known Activity in the Not-Yet-Conscious, Utopian Function The forward glance in question here is discriminating, not gloomy. It requires from the outset that premonition is sound, and not dim like something kept in the cellar. Something which is not at all disposed to make itself conscious in its half-light, even though it may be directed towards morning. As there was no science, hysterical and superstitious elements also accumulated here. Nervous states like clairvoyance, second sight and so forth, were described as premonition, in fact, as dim premonition. But these are aberrations, into which genuine premonition, as goes without saying, neither can nor will descend. Even assuming that so-called second sight does occur, a poky atmosphere clings to it, even a proximity to convulsions and other not exactly hopeful gifts. Such things belong to that morbid sensitivity (the sensitivity of a wound) which in legitimate cases only senses in advance a sudden change in the weather, but here supposedly senses major fires or deaths. And it is in keeping with the very subconscious, sunken, atavistic, exhausted nature of this kind of premonition that it always only refers to something that has already happened a thousand times before, and that will happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, again and again. Somnambulary presentiment in general may at best be a decayed remnant of animal instinct, but the instinct is utterly stereotyped; its actions, though appropriate down to the finest detail, immediately become absurd as soon as the animal, confronted with a new situation, has to sniff out in advance what has never been there before. Egg-laying, nest-building, migration are performed by instinct, as if precise 'knowledge' of the future existed, but this very future is one in which only the million-year-old destinies of the species occur. It is an automatic future with old contents, and consequently, since nothing new occurs in it, the false one mentioned above. Many aspects of bodily instinct still seem obscure, research

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into signal systems is not yet complete, the life of the driving images in instinct, if there is one, is undeciphered, together with the sense of bearings which it provides for the drives. But however far the threshold of human premonition is lowered, it will scarcely be able to recapture the activity which in the animal instinct of pre-caution seems to possess past, present and future still completely ravelled up together, and which relatively controls them according to the business of the species. Nevertheless, it is absolutely certain here, as also in the prophesying found in folklore, that the future is a totally false one, a repetition, a preordered piece in a circle that is always the same. Instinct-future and the related future of atavistic premonition always starts and picks up the same thing on the same level, over and over again, whenever it begins. Productive premonition, even in the form of so-called intuition, is thus something completely different from instinct that has become conscious of itself. It does not remain dim and poky, not in the least fuggy, it exists from the beginning in strength and health. It is openly conscious of itself, precisely as a Not-Yet-Conscious, demonstrates in its alertness the desire to learn, shows the capacity to be circumspect in its foreseeing, to have circumspection, even foresight in its fore-sight. Since genuine premonition begins with youth, time of change and production, it is automatically at home in human dealings of the most upright kind, not in animal, let alone parapsychological ones. The German peasants of 1525, the masses of the French and Russian Revolutions, certainly also had, alongside their slogans, driving images, as it were, of revolution; there was a sense of bearings in 'a ira'.* But these driving images were attracted and illuminated by a real future place: by the realm of freedom. The so-called power to foresee deaths or even winning lottery-numbers is obviously of a less productive order. One of the greatest somnambulists, the seer of Prvost, says in the account Justinus Kerner published of her at the time (Reclam, p. 274): 'For me the world is a circle, I was able to move back and forth around this circle and see what had been and what was coming.' The Romantics, and even Hegel, knew and valued premonition solely in this atavistic, superstitious sense, which has become totally trivial today. The only sense they have is for an old world in which the only novelty is the cockcrow which summons back to the graveyard and itself belongs to the realm of ghosts. There is understandably not a single
*

'a ira!': a song of the French Revolution. 'Ah! a ira, a ira, a ira, Les aristocrates la lanterne!'

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word in any of these wheezing diaphragm-prophets from the sibyl to Nostradamus, when they proclaim 'the future', which transcends available knowledge and which does not merely rearrange it. Whereas Bacon, for example, no prophet, but a discerning utopian, saw in his 'New Atlantis' amazingly genuine future. And this solely by virtue of his sense, which makes itself thoroughly conscious, for the objective tendency, objectively real possibility of his age. After all, the forward glance becomes all the stronger, the more lucidly it makes itself conscious. The dream in this glance seeks to be absolutely clear, and the premonition, the correct one, seeks to be quite plain. Only when reason starts to speak, does hope, in which there is no guile, begin to blossom again. The Not-Yet-Conscious itself must become conscious in its act, known in its content, as the process of dawning on the one hand, as what is dawning on the other. And so the point is reached where hope itself, this authentic expectant emotion in the forward dream, no longer just appears as a merely self-based mental feeling, as described in chapter 13, but in a conscious-known way as utopian function. Its contents are first represented in ideas, and essentially in those of the imagination. In imaginative ideas, as opposed to those remembered ones which merely reproduce past perceptions and thereby shade off more and more into the past. And even these imaginative ideas are not ones which are merely composed of existing material, in arbitrary fashion (stony sea, golden mountain and so on), but extend, in an anticipating way, existing material into the future possibilities of being different and better. So that the thus determined imagination of the utopian function is distinguished from mere fantasizing precisely by the fact that only the former has in its favour a Not-Yet-Being of an expectable kind, i.e. does not play around and get lost in an Empty-Possible, but psychologically anticipates a RealPossible. At the same time, this lends a new clarity to the so often stressed distinction of the waking dream as really possible anticipation: utopian function is not present at all in mere wishful thinking or only flickers up. In the figure of Ulrich Brendel in 'Rosmersholm', Ibsen has movingly portrayed a mere and hence fruitless planner. On a very much lower level, not at all movingly, Spiegelberg in 'The Robbers'* belongs to the utopian-swaggering brigade to which Marquis Posa also belongs on an incomparably higher level, by virtue of an all too great, solely abstract-postulative purity.**
* **

Schiller's play 'Die Ruber', 1781. In Schiller's play 'Don Carlos', 1787.

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Pure wishful thinking has discredited utopias for centuries, both in pragmatic political terms and in all other expressions of what is desirable; just as if every utopia were an abstract one. And undoubtedly the utopian function is only immaturely present in abstract utopianizing, i.e. still predominantly without solid subject behind it and without relation to the RealPossible. Consequently, it is easily led astray, without contact with the real forward tendency into what is better. But at least as suspicious as the immaturity (fanaticism) of the undeveloped utopian function is the widespread and ripe old platitude of the way-of-theworld philistine, of the blinkered empiricist whose world is far from being a stage, in short, the confederacy in which the fat bourgeois and the shallow practicist have always not only rejected outright the anticipatory, but despised it. Indeed this confederacy from an aversion to all modes of what is desirable, primarily to those which drive forward finally, as was only logical, even added nihilism to its repertoire. So that this very nihilism was able to come up with anti-utopian statements like the following: 'In wishes existence projects its being into possibilities which not only remain unseized when provided, but whose fulfilment is not even considered or expected(!). On the contrary: the predominance of being-inadvance-of-oneself in the mode of mere wishing entails a failure to understand factual possibilities . . . Wishing is an existential modification of comprehending self-projection which, addicted to thrownness, merely continues to indulge in possibilities' (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1927, p. 195). This sort of thing, purely applied to immature anticipating, unquestionably sounds like a eunuch accusing the infant Hercules of impotence. We do not need to emphasize that the genuine struggle against immaturity and abstraction, in so far as they adhered to the utopian function or potentially still adhere to it, has nothing in common with bourgeois 'realism', and is also on its guard against practicism. But what is important is the fact that the hope-charged imaginative glance of the utopian function is not corrected from a worm's-eye view, but solely by the real elements in the anticipation itself. That is, from the perspective of that solely real realism which only is so because it is fully attuned to the tendency of what is actually real, to the objectively real possibility to which this tendency is assigned, and consequently to the properties of reality which are themselves utopian, i.e. contain future. And the thus denoted maturity of the utopian function never led astray denotes not least the sense for tendency in philosophical socialism, in contrast to the bad 'sense for fact' in empirically side-tracked socialism. The point of contact between dreams and life, without which dreams only

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yield abstract utopia, life only triviality, is given in the utopian capacity which is set on its feet and connected to the Real-Possible. And which in fact tendentially transcends what exists in each respective case, not only in our nature, but in that of the entire external world of process. Thus the only seemingly paradoxical concept of a concrete utopia would be appropriate here, that is, of an anticipatory kind which by no means coincides with abstract utopian dreaminess, nor is directed by the immaturity of merely abstract utopian socialism. The very power and truth of Marxism consists in the fact that it has driven the cloud in our dreams further forward, but has not extinguished the pillar of fire in those dreams, rather strengthened it with concreteness. In similar fashion, therefore, the consciousness-knownness of the expectant intention must prove itself as the intelligence of hope in the midst of the immanently ascending, materially-dialectically transcending light. Thus the utopian function is also the only transcendent one which has remained, and the only one which deserves to remain: one which is transcendent without transcendence. Its support and correlate is process, which has not yet surrendered its most immanent What-content, but which is still under way. Which consequently is itself in a state of hope and of object-based premonition of the NotYet-Become, in the shape of a Not-Yet-Become-Good. Consciousness of the Front provides the best light for this, utopian function as the comprehended activity of the expectant emotion, of the hope-premonition, maintains the alliance with all that is still morning-like in the world. Utopian function thus understands what is exploding, because it is this itself in a very condensed way: its Ratio is the unweakened Ratio of a militant optimism. Therefore: the act-content of hope is, as a consciously illuminated, knowingly elucidated content, the positive utopian function; the historical content of hope, first represented in ideas, encyclopaedically explored in real judgements, is human culture referred to its concreteutopian horizon. The docta spes combine* operates on this knowledge as expectant emotion in the Ratio, as Ratio in the expectant emotion. And predominant in this combine is no longer contemplation, which for centuries has only been related to What Has Become, but the participating, co-operative process-attitude, to which consequently, since Marx, the open becoming is no longer sealed methodically and the Novum no longer alien in material terms. Subsequently, the theme of philosophy has stood solely in the topos of an unfinished lawgoverned field of becoming in depicting-intervening consciousness and in the world
*

Bloch is using the word 'combine' in the economic sense here.

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of knownness. This topos has only been discovered by Marxism through science precisely with the development of socialism from utopia to science. More On the Utopian Function: The Subject in It and the Counter-Move to the Badly Existing But without the strength of an I and we behind it, even hoping becomes insipid. There is never anything soft about conscious-known hope, but a will within it insists: it should be so, it must become so. The wishful and volitional streak vigorously bursts out within it, the intensive element in venturing beyond, in acts of overhauling. Walking upright is presupposed, a will which refuses to be outvoted by anything that has already become; it has its preserve in this upright posture. This characteristic point on which the subject can stand and from where it reacts is abstractly described by stoic self-confidence as follows: if the world caves in, I will stand firm amidst the falling rubble. The point is abstractly described in a different way in the transcendental ego of German Idealism, from the perspective of assumptions no longer proud of virtue, but proud of intellect. Here self-confidence has changed into an act of cognitive production; and even as early as Descartes, cognition appears in places as manufacture, namely of its Object. The assumptions proud of intellect were of course incurably inflated, with the illusion of their absolute power of making; intellect definitely does not dictate the laws of nature. Nor is the world of this epistemological idealism by any means a utopian one; on the contrary: the ambition of the transcendental ego was predominantly to produce the existing world of laws itself, the world of mathematical-scientific experience. Nevertheless, the transcendental ego of Kant and Fichte knew how to postulate morally beyond a bad existent, even if only, corresponding to the German misery,* in an abstract way, lacking content. Kant, who on almost every point is not to be confused with neo-Kantianism, constructed, as a postulate at least, a more beautiful world, in Goethe's phrase, one of spontaneity of the will, which was neither satisfied by mechanistic experience based on the existent, nor destroyed by it. Thus though thoroughly impaired by abstractness there is in stoic self-confidence, and much more immediately in German Idealism itself, the indication of the
*

Bloch uses Heine's expression to describe the political and historical experience of Germany, often contrasted with the progressive, revolutionary history of France. There are also echoes of 'The Poverty of Philosophy' (1847), Marx's reply to Proudhon's 'The Philosophy of Poverty'.

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characteristic point from which the subject reserves for itself the freedom of a counter-move contradicting the badly existing. In spite of the still abstractly formal indication of such a subjective factor, the latter was nevertheless clearly identified; at that time it stood philosophically for the citoyen. Thus every bourgeois-revolutionary call in Germany, from the Sturm und Drang to the so-called People's Spring of 1848, is still connected with the ego of idealism. Whereas in real terms, not merely in the mind, and also totally free of incurably idealistic inflatedness, a subjective factor was only grasped through socialism, namely as proletarian class-consciousness. The proletariat grasped itself as the actively contradictory contradiction in capitalism, and therefore as the one which causes the most trouble for what has become bad. In equally real terms, the subjective factor against all abstractness and the corresponding boundless spontaneity of consciousness has mediated itself with the objective factor of the social tendency, of the Real-Possible. Thus the activity of knowingbest turned into that something more which consciously continues, guides and humanizes the path on which the world has set out, its 'dream of the matter', as Marx puts it. The objective factor alone is not sufficient for this; instead, the objective contradictions are constantly provoking interaction with subjective contradiction. Otherwise the ultimately defeatist heresy of an objectivist automatism develops, according to which the objective contradictions are alone sufficient to revolutionize the world permeated by them. Both factors, the subjective and the objective, must rather be understood in their constant dialectical interaction, one which cannot be divided or isolated. While the element of human action must certainly also be preserved from isolation, from the evil of putschistic activism as such, which just charges out, and whose excessively subjective factor thinks it can skip over the objective economic laws. But no less harmful is social-democratic automatism as such, superstitious belief in a world which becomes good of its own accord. It is therefore impossible to get by without the subjective factor, and it is just as impossible to suppress the deep dimension of this factor, precisely that of the counter-move to the badly existing, the mobilization of contradictions which occur in the badly existing, for the purpose of undermining it completely, bringing about its collapse. But that is precisely why the deep dimension of the subjective factor is in its counter-move, because the latter is not only negative but equally contains within it the forward surge of an achievement which can be anticipated and represents this forward surge in the utopian function. The question is now, whether and to what extent the anticipating counter-move coincides with a merely embellishing one. Especially when

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the merely embellishing element, although it definitely does highlight things, has for the most part no counter-move in it at all, but merely dubious polishing of what exists. And with a by no means revolutionary mandate behind it, but with an apologetic one, one which is supposed to reconcile the subject with what exists. This purpose is fulfilled above all by ideology in periods of a class society which are no longer revolutionary, although still rising, because they still further the development of the forces of production. The highlighting of what exists then occurs as an illusory, at best premature harmonization, and it is surrounded by nothing but smoke or incense of false consciousness. (The rotten ideology in the declining periods of a class society, especially that of the late bourgeoisie of today, does not of course belong here at all; since it is already known false consciousness, and therefore deception.) Furthermore, however, there are in ideology certain figures which condense, perfect and give significance to what exists which are known as archetypes when mainly referring to condensing, as ideals when mainly referring to perfection, as allegories and symbols when mainly referring to significance. The embellishment of what exists, which is intended in so many different ways in all this, is nevertheless not an embellishment of the badly existing, and it is not consciously, i.e. deceitfully, trying to divert attention from the latter. Rather, what exists is completed here, though in a largely idealistic-abstract way and never in a dialectically explosive and real way, yet so that a characteristic, an inauthentic anticipation of a better world is not lacking: an anticipation in space so to speak, not or only inauthentically in future and time. And now the question has become more concrete: whether and to what extent the anticipatory counter-move coincides with a merely embellishing one. Since in ideology, in a different way in archetypes, different again in ideals, and again in allegories and symbols, there is of course no counter-move, but rather a transcending of what exists through its embellishing, condensing, perfecting or signifying exaggeration. And this again is not possible without a distorted or displaced utopian function, just as it is not possible without an irregularly perceived 'dream of a matter' on the leading edge of what exists. But then the original and sustained concrete utopian function must also be discoverable in these inauthentic improvements, at least in places, and it must be possible to confront the not wholly irredeemable distortions and abstractnesses. The respective conditions of production explain how the respective ideologies and other inauthentic improvements came about, but the respective confusions in the Humanum of the respective conditions of production made a borrowing from the

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utopian function necessary in order to be able at all to make the completions mentioned above together with their cultural surplus. Ideologies as the ruling ideas of an age are, in Marx's striking phrase, the ideas of the ruling class; but since even the latter is self-alienated, ideologies also incorporated, apart from the interest in presenting the well-being of one's own class as that of humanity as a whole, that yearning and overhauling image of a world without alienation, that above all passes for culture in the bourgeoisie, and that showed the utopian function at work partly also in that class which otherwise felt happy in its alienation. It is obvious that this function truly, indeed almost entirely, animated the still revolutionary ideologies of such classes. Without the utopian function, no spiritual surplus at all is explicable over and above what has been attained and thus exists, however full this surplus may be of appearance instead of pre-appearance. Therefore, every act of anticipating identifies itself to the utopian function, and the latter seizes on all possible substance in the surplus of the former. Even, as will be shown, on that contained in previously progressive interest, in ideologies which have not completely passed away with their society, in archetypes which are still encapsulated, in ideals which are still abstract, in allegories and symbols which are still static. Contact of the Utopian Function with Interest A cool glance does not prove its worth by understating. Rather it wants to correct things and can do so, does not want to lose its own sense of proportion. It dispels the deceptive feelings and words, wants to see ego, striving, impulse naked, but not of course cut up and divided. Certainly, the economic impulse in the totally crooked business-life of today has descended to a purely despicable level, and all that remains intact is ruthless nastiness. The greed for profit here overshadows all other human inclinations, and unlike the desire to kill, does not even pause occasionally. And likewise it is true that even in earlier, comparatively more honest ages of capital, profit interest was not exactly composed of the noblest human impulses. On pain of being ruined, a powerful selfishness was always at work in the economic struggle. If this stimulus had let up, if altruistic motives had taken its place, then, as Mandeville's Fable of the Bees so cynically and truthfully demonstrated, the whole capitalist machinery would have ground to a halt. And yet, would it not often at least have been slowed down, among a considerable majority of employers at that time, if the egotistical impulse had presented itself so nakedly? If it had not

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pretended even to itself, on a purely inward level, that is, distinct from conscious brutality, something more noble, more communal, and dreamed it up in a subjective way that was not entirely false? These fictional bees must therefore not blind us to the nature of the real egoists, a nature which even had to make altruistic excuses and protestations to itself in order to make so-called honest profit in an honourable, ostensibly philanthropic way. Thus Adam Smith's selfish system distinctly incorporated features of an even inwardly false consciousness; and these were not, as they so often are in Calvinism, crafty and twisted, but subjectively honest and polished. They were features of conviction, of clear conscience, of the respectable businessman and employer, showing how he actually believed in honest profit, how he above all felt himself to be a kind of benefactor to consumers, in the game of supply and demand. That is, of course, to those wealthy consumers through whom the surplus value extorted from the workers can be made into money by selling the product of their labour. But their clear conscience bolstered itself up with the fact that capitalist interest was continually supposed to address itself to the interest of the customer, to its satisfaction. The clear conscience of mutual advantage was further enhanced by the fact that all human beings were regarded as free traders with increasing powers of exchange, whose evident selfinterest balanced itself out in the overall benefit thus produced. With all this, the capitalist economy appeared the only natural one, discovered at last, of which Smith expressed his total approval, in a manner as ponderous as it was utopian. The interest itself was therefore influenced in a utopian way, or rather the false consciousness of it, which was in fact extremely active. Without this embellishment the exploitation among the great sharks, totally unencumbered by bourgeois morals, would undoubtedly have continued as before, the gentlemen of the East India Company had no place for a utopian function in their business, it would only have damaged it. But the average businessman in manufacturing industry, even in the incipient industrial revolution, still needed and cultivated a belief in the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number, he needed it as a link between his egotistical impulses and those pretended, dreamed-up impulses specifically noted by Smith as being benevolent. All the more so as cynical selfishness was ascribed to nobility, chiefly to the lechers in its ranks (cf. the contemporary novels of Richardson). Whereas the rising bourgeois citizen needed 'virtue' in order to earn money all the more zealously from others, as if he were earning it for those others. And when it came to the last fight of all against feudal restraints, the bourgeoisie, not a very heroic class,

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had to boost itself in a particularly strong utopian fashion. Otherwise they would not have done any fighting themselves, which was actually partly the case, but would have let the men from the suburbs do all their fighting for them. Otherwise they would not have felt a credulous affinity with the Gracchi* and with Brutus, which was actually again partly the case, during the courtship leading up to the bourgeois freedom of 1789. Therefore the rising class, which was economically due, needed even inwardly a far-reaching passion in the confused feelings of that time, in order, as Marx says, 'to hide from themselves the content of their struggles with its bourgeois limitations'. This was blatant self-deception, the private businessman who supported human rights, the abstract idea of the citoyen as a moral person, were not seen through, could not yet be seen through at that time. Yet this kind of selfdeception also contained an anticipatory element, it even showed particularly humanitarian features, although they were abstractly expressed, employed in an abstract and utopian way. And in fact not everything about its interest was deception; otherwise one could not refer in socialist terms to the businessman who supported human rights and was not only orientated towards the private sector, let alone to the citoyen. What the citoyen promised is a promise which can certainly only be kept in socialism. All the same, it can be kept, so there was at that time a surplus, contributed in a utopian fashion, in bourgeois striving itself. The social mentality which is morally abstracted in the citoyen, i.e. which had become divorced from real individual people, must first be united with their own energies, which are no longer bourgeois individualistic ones. All the same, this mentality, called 'virtue' in those days, did still exist, it existed in this case as one which not only acted as a boost, but also as a surplus; how else could someone like Jefferson be revered, let alone the genuine Jacobins? So another, sustainable trend, one going beyond the progress which was to be directly encouraged, could operate even in the impulse, if it was a progressive one for its time. It can be morally inherited, in the same way as the shaped surplus in actual ideological consciousness, a surplus which has been turned into works, can be culturally inherited. Good things, indeed the best, have been desired repeatedly in the past, and mostly it remained at that. But precisely because this desire was one which never reached its goal, on those points where it does not coincide with the attainable that is now due, in this case therefore with capitalist society, it carries on along the path of liberation. Utopian function
*

Tiberius Gracchus (d. 133 B.C.) and his younger brother Gaius (d. 121 B.C.) made use of the concilium plebis to oppose the power of the Senate in Republican Rome.

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tears this part away from deception; it thus enables everything philanthropic to feel a growing mutual affinity. Encounter of the Utopian Function with Ideology A keen glance does not simply prove its worth by seeing through things. But also in the way it does not see everything as if it were as clear as crystal. Since not everything is as perfectly clear as that, in fact there is sometimes a process of fermenting, of self-forming at work, to which precisely the keen glance does justice. This unclosed aspect appears in its broadest and most hybrid form in ideology, in so far as this ideology is not exhausted merely by the connection to its time. Nor by the mere false consciousness about its time which has accompanied all previous cultures. Certainly, ideology itself stems from the division of labour, from the separation of physical and mental work which occurred after primitive communes. Only after that could a group which had the leisure to develop ideas deceive themselves and especially others by means of these ideas. So, since ideologies are always originally those of the ruling class, they justify existing social conditions by denying their economic roots and disguising exploitation. This is the picture in all class societies, most clearly in that of the bourgeoisie. Here there are admittedly three phases in the ideological formation of these societies with very different status, with a different mandate to the mental, all too mental superstructure: the preparatory, the victorious, the declining. The preparatory phase of an ideology helps its own, not yet secured substructure by opposing its fresh progressive superstructure to the rotten superstructure of the previous ruling class. The class which then itself comes to power instigates the second ideological phase, by securing (through the omission, partly also through the more or less classical 'equilibration', of previous revolutionary impulses) its own substructure which has meanwhile come into existence, fixing it politically and legally, and dressing it up politically, legally and culturally. Securing and embellishment are supported by an achieved, although only temporary harmony between forces and conditions of production. The declining class then instigates the third ideological phase by sweetening the rotten stench of the substructure while the credulity of the false consciousness almost totally disappears, and the deception is almost completely conscious and even by phosphorescently renaming night as day, day as night. Thus the economic substructure in class society is certainly shrouded in the mist of an interested false consciousness, no matter whether its illusion subdivides in terms of content into fiery, classical or decadent, into ascent, blossoming,

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or cosmetic application. In short, since no exploitation can afford to be seen naked, ideology seen from this side is thus the sum of the ideas in which a society has justified and transfigured itself with the help of false consciousness. But then again: whenever we think of culture, does not another side of ideology appear which is already recognizable in the composition, so different morally and as regards content, of the three phases? This is precisely the side which does not fully coincide with merely false consciousness and with the apologetics of a mere, historically discarded class society. Seen from the critical side, Marx says strikingly in 'The Holy Family': 'The ''idea" always blundered whenever it differed from "interest"', and with this remark he takes up the self-examination of bourgeois society that had begun in French materialism, which first demonstrated, in the work of La Bruyre, La Rochefoucauld, and particularly of Helvtius, that evident personal interest was the basis of all this morality. But Marx goes on to say in the same passage: 'On the other hand, it is easy to understand that every massive, historically successful "interest", when it first enters on the world stage, goes far beyond its real thoughts in its "idea" or "conception" and becomes confused with human interest per se.' This results in illusion or 'what Fourier calls the tone of every historical epoch'. Yet, because this illusion possibly also contains, apart from the enthusiastic flowers with which a society garlanded its cradle, those artistic creations which, as Marx reminds us, citing the Greeks, in the 'Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy', 'are regarded in certain respects as norms and unattainable models', the problem of ideology is broached from the side of the problem of cultural inheritance, of the problem as to how works of the superstructure progressively reproduce themselves in cultural consciousness even after the disappearance of their social bases. The very difference in content of the three phases cannot be suppressed here, not even when the continuing tua res agitur* is by no means confined to the rising revolutionary epoch of one of the previous class societies. In fact, it is precisely then that the actual phenomenon: cultural surplus under discussion here, dwelling on the other side, becomes all the more apparent. For this phenomenon, that of developed and also future-orientated art, science and philosophy, confronts us much more abundantly in the classical epoch of a society than in its revolutionary epoch, where of course the directly utopian impetus against what exists, beyond what exists, is stronger. And the
*

'Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet'. Horace, Epistles, I. 18, 84. 'It is your concern when your neighbour's house is on fire.'

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blossoms of art, science, philosophy, always denote something more than the false consciousness which each society, bound to its position, had of itself and used for its own embellishment. Rather, these blossoms definitely can be removed from their first sociohistorical soil, since they themselves, in essence, are not bound to it. The Acropolis of course belongs to slave-owning society, Strasbourg cathedral to feudal society, yet, as we know, they did not disappear with their social base, and they carry with them nothing deplorable, in contrast to the base, in contrast to the conditions of production at the time, however progressive they may have been. The great works of philosophy do of course contain more time-bound, and thus transitory material, due to the respective social barriers to cognition. However, because of the height of consciousness which distinguishes them and which permits a glance far into future, essential material, these works too, especially these, demonstrate that genuine classicism which does not consist in rounding off, but in eternal youth, with constantly new perspectives in it. In the case of the 'Symposium', the 'Ethics' and even 'The Phenomenology of Mind', only the illusory problems and the ideology of particular place and time have sunk away and been discarded, whereas the Eros, the substance, the substance as subject stand in the midst of all changes as variations of the one goal. In short, these great works are not deficient as on their first day, nor glorious as on the first day: but instead they shed their deficiency and their first glory while being capable of a later glory, in fact a final one to which they can intend. The classical element in every classicism equally stands before each age as revolutionary Romanticism, i.e. as a task that points the way forward and as a solution that approaches from the future, not from the past, and, itself still full of future, speaks, addresses, calls us on. But this, together with more modest things, is only the case because ideologies seen from this side are not exhausted with the false consciousness of their base, nor with the active work for their respective bases. No search for the surplus is possible in false consciousness itself, as carried by the ideology of class societies, none is necessary in the ideology of socialist revolution, in which no false consciousness at all participates. Socialism, as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat, is only true consciousness at all with reference to the comprehended movement and the apprehended tendency of reality. But rather, the following statement by Marx (to Ruge, 1843) holds good for the relation of this true ideology to the anticipatory element in the false, though here not merely false consciousness of the earlier ideology: 'Our motto must therefore be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but through analysis of mystical

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consciousness which is still unclear to itself. It will then become apparent that the world has long possessed the dream of a matter, of which it must only possess the consciousness in order to possess it in reality. It will become apparent that it is not a question of a great thought-dash between past and future, but of the carrying through of the thoughts of the past.' Even the class ideologies, within which the great works of the past lie, lead precisely to that surplus over and above the false consciousness bound to its position, the surplus which is called continuing culture, and is therefore a substratum of the claimable cultural inheritance. And now it becomes clear that this very surplus is produced by nothing other than the effect of the utopian function in the ideological creations of the cultural side. Indeed, false consciousness alone would not even be sufficient to gild the ideological wrapping, which is what in fact happened. Alone it would be incapable of creating one of the most important characteristics of ideology, namely premature harmonization of social contradictions. And ideology is even less conceivable as the medium of continuing cultural substratum without its encounter with the utopian function. All this obviously ventures beyond both false consciousness and the strengthening, even mere apologetics of the respective social substructures. Therefore, without the utopian function, class ideologies would only have managed to create transitory deception, not the models in art, science and philosophy. And it is this very surplus which forms and preserves the substratum of the cultural inheritance, as that morning which is not only contained in the early day, but on a higher level also in the midday of a society and partly even in the twilight of its decline. All previous great culture is pre-appearance of something achieved, in so far as it could still be built up in images and thoughts on the panoramic heights of time, and thus not only in and for its time. Without doubt, the dream of a better life is very broadly perceived through all of this. Or, which comes to the same thing, utopian, apart from the usual purely pejorative sense, is used not only in the above anticipatory sense, but as function also in a comprehensive sense. It thus emerges that the breadth and depth to which the utopian extends is at first, even in a historical respect, not confined to its most popular manifestation the utopia of an ideal state. Correspondingly, the dream of a better life stretched far beyond its social-utopian parent company, namely into every kind of cultural anticipation. Every plan and every creation that was pushed to the limits of its perfection had touched on utopia and gave, as mentioned above, precisely the great cultural works, which had a more and more progressive influence, a surplus over and above their mere ideology

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there and then, and consequently nothing less than the substratum of cultural inheritance. The broadening of a previously so narrowly conceived power of anticipation was begun in Ernst Bloch's 'The Spirit of Utopia', in 1918, and, moreover, with witnesses, ornaments and figures which had previously been dealt with totally outside a Not-Yet-Arrived in reality, although they belong to this and are occupied with its articulation. The parasitic enjoyment of culture reaches an end through insight into the more and more adequate trend towards our becoming identical and through commitment to this; cultural works open up strategically. The question now remains, of course, whether and how far the expression utopia and its attack can or should also be applied, without superfluous misunderstanding, to intentions and interest which are by no means those of the past. But which lie completely current and new within the development which has occurred, of socialism from utopia to science. Of course, the history of terminology contained several such examples of the broadening of a previous meaning of a word, with the partial removal of the negative meanings which adhered to it; the word romantic is a relevant example here. A still greater differentiation was undertaken between the meanings of the concept of ideology itself; on the basis of this differentiation, Lenin was able to call socialism the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat. And yet in general, the power of anticipation, which we called concrete utopia above (as distinct from the utopistic and from merely abstract utopianizing), with its open space and its object which is to be realized and which realizes itself forwards, has still remained completely untouched by the terminological correction and broadening which the romantic, for example, underwent in 'revolutionary Romanticism', and the ideological underwent in 'socialist ideology'. Although, of course, above all in the areas of technological, architectural or geographical utopias, but also of all those which ultimately revolved and are revolving around the 'Absolute', the 'authentic' core of our wanting, the category: utopian function is dominant factually and therefore in a conceptually apposite way. Naturally, with knowledge and removal of the finished utopistic element, with knowledge and removal of abstract utopia. But what then remains: the unfinished forward dream, the docta spes which can only be discredited by the bourgeoisie, this seriously deserves the name utopia in carefully considered and carefully applied contrast to utopianism; in its brevity and new clarity, this expression then means the same as: a methodical organ for the New, an objective aggregate state of what is coming up. Thus all great cultural works also have implicitly, though not always (as in Goethe's 'Faust') explicitly, a utopian

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background understood in this way. They are now, from the point of view of the philosophical concept of utopia, not an ideological prank of a higher kind, but the attempted path and content of known hope. Only thus does utopia fetch what is its own from the ideologies and explain the progressive element which continues to be historically effective in the great works of ideology itself. There is a spirit of utopia in the final predicate of every great statement, in Strasbourg cathedral and in the Divine Comedy, in the expectant music of Beethoven and in the latencies of the Mass in B minor. It is in the despair which still contains an unum necessarium even as something lost, and in the Hymn to Joy. Kyrie and Credo rise in the concept of utopia as that of comprehended hope in a completely different way, even when the reflection of mere time-bound ideology has been shed, precisely then. The exact imagination of the Not-Yet-Conscious thus completes the critical enlightenment itself, by revealing the gold that was not affected by aqua fortis,* and the good content which remains most valid, indeed rises when class illusion, class ideology have been destroyed. Thus beyond the end of class ideologies, for which it could only be mere decoration up till then, culture has no other loss than the business of decoration itself, of falsely concluding harmonization. Utopian function tears the concerns of human culture away from such an idle bed of mere contemplation: it thus opens up, on truly attained summits, the ideologically unobstructed view of the content of human hope. Encounter of the Utopian Function with Archetypes A deep glance proves its worth by becoming doubly profound. Not only downwards, which is the easier, more literal way of getting to the bottom of things. But rather there is also a depth upwards and forwards which takes up into itself profound material from below. Backwards and forwards are then as in the movement of a wheel, which simultaneously dips and scoops. Real depth always occurs in double-edged movement: 'Sink then! I could also say rise! It's all the same', Mephisto shouts to Faust.** He even shouts it where a delight in something that has long since ceased to exist, in Helen of Troy, is to begin. And not only Mephisto shouts
*

Nitric acid. Used to separate gold and silver in gold-silver alloy, since silver dissolves in it, but gold does not. Hence pure gold.
**

'Faust', Part II, 6275.

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this, the intriguer, the dangerous master of double-edged meanings, a double meaning itself shouts through Mephisto: that of the equally archaic and utopian relations between images. Thus utopian function very often has a double profundity, that of submersion in the midst of that of hope. Which can only mean that the groundwork for hope is partly done in the archaic frame here. More precisely, in those archetypes which still arouse consternation and which have possibly been left over from the age of a mythical consciousness as categories of the imagination, consequently with a nonmythical surplus that has not been worked up. Hope consequently has to make utopian provision not only for ideologies which continue to have significance, but also for those archetypes which contain material which has still not been worked out. It therefore has to forge them into utopia, just as, mutatis mutandis, significantly progressive ideology is forged into it. It is clear here that this can be achieved not only from below, by sinking, but essentially from above, from the overall perspective of climbing. Because we find repeatedly: that which is exclusively repressed downwards and to be found in the subconscious is in reality only the soil from which night-dreams emerge and occasionally the poison which causes neurotic symptoms: this below can largely be resolved into the known, is not ascending forward dawning, therefore has at bottom only a tedious latency. Whereas that which is hoped for and imagined contains the possible treasure from which the great daylight fantasies are derived, those which do not become obsolete for a long time; this forwards and above can never be resolved into the already Known and Become, and therefore has at bottom an inexhaustible latency. When Faust, with the magic potion of youth, sees Helen in every woman,* Helen the archetype of beauty is moving wholly out of the archaic here; this archetype is moving upwards even in the archaic. But: it can only be invoked from the utopian standpoint; and only from the overall perspective of climbing, not in pure submersion, can affinitive utopian material possibly become visible in archetypes. That which is still Eurydice, not yet lived out herself, in the Orcus of What Has Been, is found by Orpheus alone, and it is Eurydice for him alone. Only this utopian aspect of some archetypes makes their fruitful quotation possible, glancing forwards not backwards; as has already been seen in the apparent merging of dream-games and in the dissolution of this appearance. All such rationalisms
*

Mephisto in Goethe's 'Faust', in the witches' kitchen, Part I, 26034: 'When you have drunk this magic potion Soon you'll see Helen in every woman.'

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based on the Mothers,* seen as still giving birth, show a light falling in from utopia, even in Romanticism with its nostalgic grave- and underworld-lamp. The peculiarly brooding element in archetypes, particularly this element, shows their unfinished nature; but the warmth produced by the maturing process is not located in regressio. The archetypes themselves have already been mentioned above, in connection with C. G. Jung, but this archreactionary, in whose work, moreover, the archaic appeared like Timbuktu in Zurich, merely invoked the whole phenomenon falsely, purely as gloom. The expression archetypos itself is first found in the work of Augustine, still as an explanatory paraphrase of Plato's Eidos, that is, of every generic form, but in fact it was only Romanticism that applied the classical expression to a categorial stock of a pictorially objective kind, breaking through and illuminating by means of certain, as it were, compressed events. Thus in the work of Novalis, Romeo and Juliet become the archetype of young love, Anthony and Cleopatra that of more mature, more interesting love; Philemon and Baucis, together with their hut, are visualized as the tableau of age-old, elapsed marriage. What is decisive, according to Novalis, is the extraordinary harmonization of all elements in these archetypes, in the case of Philemon and Baucis it extends 'to the ham which hangs well-smoked in the chimney'. But far more decisive was the peculiar nimbus that was added to the agreement of these elements, a nimbus like that around landscapes with successful architecture of the situation and its significance. The attention that was beginning to be paid to similarities in the material of fairytales, in conflict-types, in rescue-types, in recurring 'motifs', did much to point to the existence of archetypes; comparative literary history revealed a wealth of such elements. Thus it is the extremely impressive motif of recognition (anagnorisis), for example, which archetypally unites such diverse material as Joseph and his Brothers in the Bible and the meeting of Electra and Orestes in Sophoclean tragedy. Above all, mythology seemed to contain all basic situations and their possible combinations; this is, of course, a wild exaggeration wholly in accordance with a reactionary element in Romantic archaism, but the studies of the history of myths by Karl Philipp Moritz, and especially Friedrich Creuzer, do indeed contain a wealth of archetypes through their attempt to categorize 'motifs'. These archetypes appear here as symbols; Creuzer in particular already unmistakably separates their archetypicality into four aspects: into 'the momentary, the total, the unfathomable aspect of their origin, and
*

The archetypes of creation in Goethe's 'Faust', Part II.

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the necessary'. And he explains the momentary and also pictorially laconic aspect beforehand, by means of an archetype: 'That arousing and at the same time startling element is connected with another quality, with brevity. It is like a suddenly appearing ghost or like a flash of lightning which abruptly illuminates the dark night, a moment which claims our whole being' (Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Vlker I, 1819, p. 118, 59). Creuzer called such laconicisms symbols in the Romantic sense, since they were manifestations of an idea; it would have taken only a little less hypostasis of an already eternally translucent idea to see the archetypes also in the form of an allegory, not just in that of a symbol. After all, allegories, in their true form, that is, before the classicism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are by no means concepts dressed up in sensory form, and therefore what we so readily call frosty and abstract. Rather, they also contain in the Baroque period, and in a different way in the Middle Ages archetypes, in fact the majority of archetypes, namely those of transitoriness and its multiple guises. It is precisely in the allegory that the wealth of poetically working archetypes first opens up, of those which still lie in the Alteritas of worldly life, whereas the symbol is consistently assigned to the Unitas of a meaning, and therefore also essentially forms the religious archetypes, or rather, religiously forms the archetypes. Thus Bachofen, a greater Creuzer and accomplished mythologist, both discovered and first attempted to arrange the system of archetypes among ancient peoples completely inside the sphere of religion. It appeared in hetairan, matrilinear, patrilinear series: in the hetairan ornaments of reeds and swamp, in the matrilinear ones of ear of corn and earth cave, in the patrilinear ones of laurel and the circle of the sun; an equally socio-historical and natural mythical order was thus supposed to emerge in the archetypes as a whole. Though this does not mean that apart from the hypothetical division of the three series they were catalogued in a more comprehensive way, either in their allegorical form and relation, or in their religious-symbolic one. Nevertheless, precisely from the work of Romanticism, the following became clear, crucial in terms of utopia: despite their original Augustinian consonance with prototypes in the sense of Platonic Ideas, archetypes have little or nothing in common with these and their pure, ultimately even transcendental idealism. They are, as already emerges from the above examples, essentially situational condensing categories, especially in the realm of poetically depictive imagination, and not, like Platonic Ideas, generically hypostasized. The archetypes of Romanticism or rather: as interpreted by Romanticism, were connected with the Platonic Ideas only

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through so-called re-remembering, even though in a way which also indicates their differences from unchangeable ideas. Re-remembering, anamnesis, was in Plato that of the pre-worldly state where the soul found itself in a prototypal heaven; re-remembering in Romanticism, however, moves historically, goes back into primal periods within time itself, becomes archaic regression. Though the fact that this was possible, even if it shows no proximity whatsoever to the Platonism of heavenly ideas, does show a misunderstandability particularly exploited by Romanticism of archetypes in their relation to the utopian function. Those archetypes merely held back in regression transform utopia into a backwardlooking, reactionary, ultimately even diluvial one. They are then more dangerous than the usual smoke-screen of ideology; for while the latter merely diverts attention from recognition of the present and its real driving force, the archetype, spell-binding backwards and held in a backward spell, additionally prevents openness to the future. By no means all archetypes are capable of utopian treatment anyway, even if this is genuine, and not reactionary utopianism as it often is in Romanticism. Through the pathos of the merely archaic the whole sphere is missed which is often so actively, and, on a grand scale, luminously powerful, in poetry and also philosophy. As noted above, only those archetypes in which something not worked out, relatively unexpired and undischarged still circulates are capable of utopian treatment. Significantly, it was precisely expired feudal archetypes that were most popular in the regression which corresponded to political reaction, just as if the archetype, the token, by which, as Romanticism said, all things poetical always recognize themselves in life that has grown older, was solely surrender to the past and not also (like the storming of the Bastille) an emblem of the future, in genuine utopian function. Therefore another separation begins here so that true friends recognize each other and stay together. Only the utopian glance can find this material which has an elective affinity with it, it has an important office to perform here, instead of the bare capitalist murder of ornaments even in thought. The rotten archetypes must first be separated from those which are really undischarged in utopian terms, namely by assigning the former to totally obsolete What Has Been. But clearly, existing archetypes of the situation of freedom or of luminous happiness are not bound to this sort of past material, they have escaped it and are at least extraterritorial to it. This is not the place to survey the archetypes, they belong, as we will later have to demonstrate, to a new part of logic, to the categorial table of the imagination. They are to be found, as we have seen, in all great literary works,

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myths, religions, and in fact: they belong by virtue of their undischarged part alone to a truth, to a cloaking depiction of utopian tendency-contents in the real. An archetype with undischarged tendency-latency beneath the cloak of fantasy is the Land of Cockaigne, is the fight with the dragon (St George, Apollo, Siegfried, St Michael), is the winter demon who tries to kill the young sun (Fenriswolf, Pharaoh, Herod, Gessler). A related archetype is the liberation of the virgin (innocence in general) whom the dragon holds captive (Perseus and Andromeda), is the time of dragons, the dragon-land itself, when it appears as the necessary space which precedes the final triumph (Egypt, Canaan, the kingdom of Antichrist before the beginning of the New Jerusalem). An archetype of the highest utopian order is the trumpet signal in the last act of 'Fidelio', concentrated in the Leonora overture, which heralds the rescue: the arrival of the Minister (he stands for the Messiah) embodies the archetype of the vengeful, redeeming apocalypse, the old thunderstorm and rainbow archetype. Indeed, there is an archetype of an age-old, but here quite concretely related kind even in Marx's statement: 'When all internal conditions have been fulfilled, the day of German resurrection will be heralded by the crowing of the Gallic cockerel.' We notice, purely immanent in these examples, that the utopian dimension of archetypes ultimately cannot be fixed at all in terms of the archaic, but rather it wanders highly suitable through history. And, above all, these are not all archetypes of archaic origin, many of them appeared aborigine only in the course of history, such as the dance on the ruins of the Bastille a new arresting prototype, separated from the archaic circles of the Blessed by entirely new contents. Its music is Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, and therefore not one which would have been in tune with fields of asphodel, nor with orgiastic festivals of spring and Dionysus. Even archetypes of clearly archaic origin have repeatedly derived refreshment and variation from historical transformations: even the trumpet signal in 'Fidelio' would hardly have its piercingly genuine effect without the storming of the Bastille, which forms the model and the continual background for the music of 'Fidelio'. Through it the thunderstorm and rainbow archetype, to which the signal and the rescue refer, first acquired a completely new origin: it stepped out of astral myth into revolutionary history; although an archetype, it now seems to lack any trace of the archaic. Thus, in the end, not all archetypes are merely condensed images of archaic experience; time and again a shoot has sprouted from them that augments the existing contents of the archetypes. All the more so when the utopian incursion occurs into both the age-old and the

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historically fresh archetypes, the refunctioning which is expert at liberating archetypally encapsulated hope. If archetypal material was totally regressive, if there were no archetypes which themselves reach for utopia, while utopia reaches back to them, then there would be no pioneering literature, committed to light, with ancient symbols; imagination would be exclusively regressio. Progressively determined it would have to guard against all images, even allegories and symbols, which stem from the old mythical ground of imagination, in each case it would only have technical school intellect in its favour, and therefore, as the latter is dreamless, against it. But the Magic Flute to take a fantasy-piece that is unquestionably humanizing uses almost nothing but archaic allegories and symbols: the guide and priest-king, the kingdom of night, the kingdom of light, the ordeal by water and fire, the magic of the flute, the transformation into a sun. Nevertheless, all these allegories and symbols, among them some in whose sacred halls no philanthropy had ever previously been sung, have shown they can be used in the service of enlightenment, in fact, they found their true home in Mozart's fairytale music, in an undemonic temple. Thus productive utopian function also draws images from the What Has Been which is not obsolete, in so far as they are capable of future, in a double-edged sense, despite all the spell in them, and it makes them suitable for the expression of What Has Still Not Yet Been, of sunrise. Thus the utopian function discovers not only the cultural surplus belonging to it, it also fetches back from the double-edged archetypal depths an element of itself, an archaically stored anticipation of still Not-Yet-Conscious, Not-Yet-Achieved material. To use a dialectical archetype itself: the anchor which sinks down to the bottom here is simultaneously the anchor of hope; what is sinking down contains what is rising up, can contain it. And the same double nature designated by all this, that which is capable of utopia, ultimately shows itself and proves its worth whenever archetypes clearly turn into object-based ciphers, which they have in any case copied from nature. This is so in numerous condensed sayings (still waters run deep, it's lonely at the top), in the thunderstorm-rainbow archetype, and also in the light and sun imagery of the Magic Flute. Archetypes of this type are not at all formed merely out of human material, neither out of the archaic, nor out of later history; but rather they demonstrate a bit of the double inscription of nature itself, a kind of real cipher or real symbol. A real symbol is one where the thing signified is still disguised from itself, in the real object, and not just for the human apprehension of that thing, for example. It is therefore an expression for that which has not yet become

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manifest in the object itself, but rather is signified in the object and through the object; the human picture of the symbol is only a representative depiction of this. Lines of movement (fire, lightning, sound-figure and so on), forms of well-defined objects (palm shape, cat shape, human face, Egyptian crystal style, Gothic forest style and so on), indicate these real ciphers. A sharply delineated part of the world thus appears as a symbol group of an objectbased kind whose mathematics and philosophy are still both equally undeveloped. So-called morphology is only an abstract caricature of this; because real ciphers are not static, they are figures of tension, they are tendentious process forms and, above all in fact, on this path, symbolic ones. Things like this border on the problem of an object-based utopian theory of figures, and therefore ultimately on the forgotten (Pythagorean) problem of a qualitative mathematics, of a renewed qualitative philosophy of nature. Here, however, it is already clear that even object-based archetypes, turned into real ciphers which are to be found in the enormous antiquarium of nature, and nearer at hand in the formed works of man, are only elucidated by utopian function. Archetypes, of course, always have their nearest existence in human history; namely in so far as archetypes are what they can be: concise ornaments of a utopian substance. Utopian function tears away this part from the past, from reaction, and also from myth; every refunctioning occurring in this way demonstrates the undischarged aspect of archetypes changed to the point of recognition. Encounter of the Utopian Function with Ideals An open glance proves its worth by turning towards itself. A goal hovers before it which has rarely been lost sight of since youth. Since it is not to hand, but demands or shines, it acts as a task or as a target. If the goal seems to contain not just something desirable or worth striving for, but something absolutely perfect, then it is called an ideal. Every goal, whether attainable or unattainable, whether crackpot or objectively meaningful, must first be imagined in the mind. But the ideal as imagined goal is distinguished from an ordinary imagined goal precisely by its emphasis on perfection; it cannot be made to settle for anything less. Active striving and desiring are otherwise abandoned, or they are empirically and shrewdly diverted, if the imagining of empirically compelling counter-reasons penetrates the imagined goal. On the other hand, the ideal as imagined goal acts as such unremittingly, a decision of the will directed towards

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it is irrevocable. It is so even when it is not implemented; because the non-implementation, precisely because of its factual irrevocability, is accompanied by guilty conscience, at least by the feeling of renunciation. The Object* of the imagined ideal, the ideal Object, thus acts as a demanding one, seemingly as if it had its own desire, which is decreed to man as obligation. The ordinary imagined goal and that of the ideal display the character of a value, and mere illusion of value is to be found in both cases. But whereas this illusion can be empirically corrected in ordinary imagined goals, this is considerably more difficult in the case of ideals, precisely because of their reified demands. If an Object appears as one which is ideal, then the only way of breaking its demanding, sometimes enchantingly demanding spell is through catastrophe; and even then this is not always a cure. There is the misfortune of an idolatry of love which continues to cast its spell even on the object which has been seen through; illusionary political ideals occasionally continue to have an effect even after an empirical catastrophe, as if they were genuine. A peculiar power thus emanates from the formation of ideals, one which intersperses the, as it were, bright and fully-fledged conviction of the ideal as perfection with very much darker impulses. So that formation of ideals, seen from its unfree and illusionary side, is able to contain a tremendous amount of false consciousness, archaic subconsciousness. This sort of thing has already appeared in connection with repression in the Freudian sense, and differently in connection with Adler's psychology of power, concerning the over-compensatory formation of the guiding ideal. In Freud, the super-ego is the source of the formation of ideals, and the super-ego itself, with all the threat, the obligation that radiates from it, is supposed to be the father continuing to exert an influence. The ego stands in the same relation to the super-ego as that of a child to its parents; their commands have remained effective in the ideal ego, in every ideal command in general, and now, as conscience, exercise moral censorship. This theory of ideals therefore led exclusively backwards to the father, and, with sufficient excavation, back into the patriarchal-despotic age as a whole. Accordingly, all non-threatening, all shining features of the ideal are left out in Freud, and this ideal is wholly confined to the moral sphere. Adler's theory of over-compensation seeks to explain these truly shining features, at the same time it is directed towards the past,
*

Bloch begins to use the more concrete 'Gegenstand' here, alongside the more philosophical 'Objekt'. Both can only be translated by the English 'object', but we have indicated the difference by capitalizing the former.

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towards the previous 'Tom Thumb situation', only with regard to what the guiding-ideal may overcome. The guiding or personal character-ideal is not supposed to be a remembered, enforced goal here, but one which is chosen relatively freely: people finalize themselves by changing from the character-mask to the ideal-mask, in order to achieve the feeling of superiority. Once again, of course, according to this theory, all ideal images are confined to moral and ultimately to personally vain ones; more objective ideals, artistic ones for example, are totally missing. Even alternative ideals of the correct life-style which extend from pre-capitalist times, such as loneliness or friendship, such as vita activa or vita contemplativa, have no place in this pure psychology of competition. Likewise, ideal situations and ideal landscapes, when limited to purely personal guiding images, remain uncomprehended and homeless. Thus Freud and Adler identified only the oppressive spell which can underlie the formation of ideals: the father-spell in Freud, and at least the spell of inferiority in Adler. Neither is the march-route open which leads from here both to the surplus qualities and to the surplus images. Everything remains in the sphere of obligation, the goal-image imagined by wanting-to-become is mostly endured rather than hoped for. But the will which gazes up at towers, and also climbs them, is never exhausted by this. The formation of ideals is by no means restricted to obligation and spells, it has its freer, brighter side as well. Even if this brighter side also displays strong negative aspects: those of substitution, overblownness, abstractness, which were joined in the nineteenth century by the mendacity of the ideal, these are certainly not connected with the dark or sinister elements of the formation of ideals. Not with obligation from above, with spells, pressure of the superego, turning against the human creature as such; what is seductive here is rather perfection itself, floating high above our heads. The free characters of the daydream reveal themselves on this brighter side, particularly the journey to the end, where things really do go on forever. Even if a real journey to the ideal is not undertaken at all or only remains in its picture, as embarkation for Cythera, a moreover purely erotic ideal, an end is always intended, and always as Perfectum. Perfection then is not merely easier to feel, it is also more inviting to think about than middling cultural categories. Thus the ideal was much more clearly conceptualized than ideologies (which goes without saying because of the interested cloaking character of ideology), but also more clearly than archetypes. Up to now there has been no classification and table of archetypes, but there have been several of the ideal; and they go right down to terms like: ideal housewife, ideal Bach baritone and the

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like, they go right up to the ideal of the highest good. There are guiding ideals of the right life, sharply contrasting ones, there is a value estimation theory, richly nuanced from the Sophists and Socrates right down to Epicurus and the Stoics, a theory of criteria for the ideal. In Kant, who calls the philosopher himself a teacher of the ideal, and philosophy a course of instruction in the ideal, the ideal appears from all sides in fact, those of pressure and of final directing unity and of hope. This ideal appears again as pressure, even attack, in the categorical imperative of moral law: the dignity of man, which demands respect in this law, conflicts with all natural impulses. But then the ideal appears in Kant as the final directing force in such a way that the latter does not itself demand, but on the contrary is itself demanded, and in the postulating trinity of the Unconditional: freedom, immortality, God. The ideal equally appears as hope, namely as the truly highest good of practical reason; this is then supposed to be the combining of virtue and bliss, the (admittedly always only approximative) realization of a kingdom of God on earth. Then the ideal appears again in Kantian aesthetics: as that of a natural perfection, therefore without the highest good, but with the most instructive contrast to the moral pressure-ideal. Kant turns away from this in art, just as in art moral Being Obliged in general always becomes silly: there is a thundering ethics, but corresponding to it only a schoolmasterish aesthetics. Kant does not want this, the artistic genius for him is not at odds with his natural motivating force, as the moral man is. On the contrary, genius 'gives the rule' precisely 'as nature', genius is an 'intelligence which acts just like nature'. And all embellishments in accordance with the aesthetic ideal are defined as 'the perfect embodiment of an idea in an individual phenomenon'. Thus precisely in Kant, the formal, but thereby particularly abstract-radical teacher of the ideal, perfection bursts out in so many different forms, corresponding to its various faces, those of spell and those of starlight above all, as a hope for the future. His aesthetic version, the 'perfect embodiment of an idea in an individual phenomenon', passes, moreover, from a formal idealism straight into an objective one. Thus this concept of the ideal ultimately comes close to the Idea, which was taken by Aristotle from Plato's generic form above the phenomenon into goal-form or entelechy within the phenomenon. This entelechy, which does not perfectly reveal itself because of impeding secondary causes in individual things, is made visible for Aristotle by sculpture, and also by literature. Aesthetic ideal representation thus becomes one which both captures imitatively and embellishes in accordance with entelechy, i.e. which shows what ought

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to happen according to the nature of the matter; hence the famous Aristotelian statement that drama is more philosophical than the recording of history. It is ultimately this character of perfection, driving to an end, of the aesthetically ideal which in Schopenhauer and Hegel can be linked with Kant's 'perfect embodiment of an idea in an individual phenomenon'. With a large Aristotelian component in Schopenhauer: 'Now according to whether the organism more or less succeeds in overcoming those deeper levels of natural forces expressing objectivity of the will, it becomes the more perfect or more imperfect expression of its idea, that is, stands closer to or further from the ideal to which in its particular genre beauty is appropriate.' And further, clearly touching on the idea of a utopian function (in the static limited character of the genre): 'Only thus could the Greek genius find the prototype of the human form and set it up as a canon of the school, as sculpture; and also, only by means of an anticipation of this sort is it possible for us all to portray the beautiful where nature has really succeeded in individual instances. This anticipation is the ideal; it is the idea in so far as at least half of it is known a priori and becomes of practical use to art, in that this idea approaches in a complementary way what is given a posteriori by nature' (Werke, Grisebach, I, p. 207, 297). For Hegel, ideals in general can only occur in art and not in the rest of reality, least of all in political and social reality; here they are for Hegel, in so far as he is a Restoration philosopher,* solely chimeras of an imaginary perfection. Whereas art as a contemplative structure has absolutely nothing but ideals as its substratum, oriental-symbolic, classical Greek, western-romantic (honour, love, loyalty, adventure, faith). And their aesthetic manifestation is most definitely reminiscent of Aristotle, of entelechy: 'The truth of art must therefore be no mere correctness to which the mere imitation of nature confines itself, but the exterior must harmonize with an interior that harmonizes with itself and, precisely by means of this, can reveal itself as itself in the exterior. By now leading back what has been stained by contingency and externality in the rest of existence to this harmony with its true concept, art casts everything aside which does not correspond to that concept in the phenomenon, and brings forth the ideal only through this purification' (Werke XI, p. 199f.). Clearly, the ideal is definitely not regarded here as indifferent towards reality in general, nor as cheap gloss (which asserted the fraudulent contrast between poetry and prose, ultimately between culture and civilization). But a stronger
*

Restoration: again Bloch means the period of the restoration of the French monarchy after 1814.

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degree of reality itself is meant, of the respective perfection which is in real terms intended in phenomenal process, even if this layering in Hegel is never permitted to be that of a Not-YetBecome in real terms. Nevertheless, wherever no super-ego, wherever no backward fatherspell or even fixed images of a merely imitative over-compensation are about their business, the ideal manifests much more genuine anticipation than most archetypes. And the utopian function in the ideal thus becomes not so much the blasting open as the correction of this ideal: by means of a mediation with concrete movements towards perfection in the world, with material ideal tendency. Beyond this, of course, only grand words remain, inwardly and all the more so outwardly, known by heart. Obligation, demand, pressure are part of the ideal as spell, but as noted above: overblownness, non-binding abstractness, unhistorical statics threaten it in its freedom and intended perfection. And on top of this came the sheer lie added by the nineteenth century the true, the good, the beautiful as bourgeois clichs. In the commercial councillor's wife Jenny Treibel, ne Brstenbinder,* Fontane portrayed a bourgeois woman with ideals who is a cut above all her own kind. Even above her whole environment: 'They liberalize and sentimentalize constantly, but that is all farce; when they have to lay their cards on the table, then the call is: gold is trumps and that's that.' In most of his dramas, Ibsen is passionately keen to show how professed bourgeois ideals and bourgeois practice no longer have anything in common with one another at all. 'The Doll's House', 'Ghosts', 'The Wild Duck', are nothing but variations on the theme of clich ideals; and it would not have taken much to work up these deeply serious, almost tragic plays into comedies. Gregers Werle in 'The Wild Duck' is precisely the Don Quixote of bourgeois ideals, in the midst of a degenerate bourgeois world, and the cynicism of Relling when he calls these ideals not merely lies, but life-lies necessary to the average person, is by no means merely cynical, he is simply calling the Sunday swindle of the late-bourgeois ideal by its proper name. With the limitation that Ibsen himself still believes and wants to believe in bourgeois ideals, and tries to portray them in his dramas after 'The Wild Duck' in such a way that they are immune to Relling's criticism. There was no new world either in Fontane or in Ibsen, instead the old one was immanently
*

Commercial councillor was an honorary title formerly conferred on German financiers and industrialists. In his novel 'Frau Jenny Treibel', Theodor Fontane (181998) implies the class aspirations of his central character in her names. Her maiden name means 'brushmaker', her married name 'Treibel' suggests 'treiben', as in 'Handel treiben', 'to do business'. 'Frau Jenny Treibel' appeared in 1892.

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denounced, with its discrepancy between theory and practice, with its deeply ingrained hypocrisy. A critical realism is sufficient to see through this, no research into ideology, let alone utopian function is necessary. But the latter is necessary, with apprehended material tendency, so that the ideal is not seen to be at one with its overblown bourgeois existence; so that it really may be rescued from its whole previous mode of existence, from abstractness, from statics. First from abstractness, the detached, poorly general, feebly hovering kind. It is essentially formal, the content has stolen out of real life, or stands directly opposed to it in the empty, grand words. Since the ideals were thus not mediated with any tendency, abstractness was joined by undialectical statics. Both increase the illusion of value; it is now supported by an attitude which places the ideals in the silver cupboard for our eternally unchanging edification. Abstractness and statics together then constitute the so-called ideal principles, as targets for words, not for actions. This kind of formality flourishes chiefly in England and, deteriorating into a religion of dead slogans, in North America. The American Declaration of Independence and then the American Constitution contained their rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, their principles of liberty, justice, morality and law, still seen from the standpoint of the citoyen (not of course forgetting the less Bengal-lit principle of property, as the basic principle). But now all this is trapped in inert air, and the only real basic principle, the economic one, because of the formal abstract-statics of the other principles, permits any opportunism of content, above all in the case of liberty. Such an ideal neither can nor wants to stand out theoretically against this opportunism of its content, which can go as far as total inversion; it cannot do so because of its misleading formal generality, it does not want to do so because of its languid inertia. And how great this powerlessness was in Germany especially, in Luther's Germany of double-entry book-keeping or the dualism of works and faith. In Calvinistic countries the ideal at least remained a verbal and formaldemocratic target for modes of action which were soon abandoned; hypocrisy develops as a tribute of vice to virtue. In Germany, however, what is ideal stood so high above the world that it did not come into any contact with it at all, apart from that of eternal distance. This target became stars which were too far away to be reached, that is, stars of velleity, not of action. Out of this arose the phantom of mere endless approach to the ideal or, which comes to the same thing, of its transposition into eternal striving towards the ideal. The world thus remained in a bad way, moral ideals hung in the heavenly distance, aesthetic ideals were not even sought

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after, but were merely enjoyed for their splendour. So easy is the leap from endless desire to mere contemplation: for even the eternally approximative is contemplation, only disturbed by the constant illusion of action, by acting for the sake of acting, ut aliquid fieri videatur. Even if a concrete sense of the ideal did emerge in Germany, as far as its realization was concerned it was certainly only the reverse side of endless non-realization, namely total peace in the world; as in Hegel. Here the endless aspect of the approach to the ideal does admittedly disappear, but so does every approach through the works of man to the ideal in general. The world-process as such becomes the self-realization of the ideal aims posited within it, and man is a mere accessory, ultimately even, as a philosopher, a mere spectator of ideals which are supposedly realized in any case. All this therefore keeps the ideal impotent, no matter whether in endless approach or in far too much overlapping with the world as a supposed ideal world. In both, statics of the ideal predominates with an in itself already finished perfection; and it is precisely against this finished aspect that utopian function has to prove its worth here. But this probation is different from that through archetypes, it is much more related to the material, though it also contains much more fraternal strife. It is precisely this intended perfection, its wholly admitted anticipation, which makes the ideal accessible to utopian treatment. Archetypes have encapsulated the anticipating element, and it has to be blasted out; whereas ideals reveal it abstractly or statically, and it only has to be corrected. Archetypes very often reveal hope in the profound depths and these depths in the archaic, they are then like the sunken treasures in myth itself which rise up and sun themselves on a midsummer's day; whereas ideals reveal their hope from the beginning in the daylight, on its upwardly curving dome. The renewal of most archetypes is supported by Mrike's quiet line about Orplid: 'Ancient waters rise rejuvenated around your waist, child!'; whereas the appearance of an ideal is supported by the distinct daylight cry from Browning's 'Pippa Passes': 'Thy long blue solemn hours serenely flowing,/Whence earth, we feel, gets steady help and good / . . . All shall be mine!' There are certainly also archetypes which do not dwell in the profound depths, dancing on the ruins of the Bastille provided the strongest example of this, and conversely an archetype like the mother-image in Isis-Mary is at the same time a deeply rooted ideal. But on the whole, the ideal lives purely on the Front, so much so that its image of fulfilment appeared too distant, rather than too sunken. It is no accident that the abstract utopias, as abstract, but equally as utopias, are essentially filled with ideals and considerably less with archetypes, even

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with those which have straightforward revolutionary meaning. The lonely island where Utopia supposedly lies may be an archetype, but more strongly at work within it are the ideal forms of perfection which is striven for, as either free or ordered development of the content of life. Utopian function therefore has to prove itself through the ideal basically along the same lines as through utopias themselves: along the lines of concrete mediation with material ideal-tendency in the world, as noted above. That which is ideal can by no means be instructed and corrected by mere facts; on the contrary, it is part of its nature to exist in a state of tension with mere factual Becomeness. And yet that which is ideal, if it is worth anything, has contact with the process of the world, of which so-called facts are reified-fixed abstractions. It has in its anticipations, if they are concrete, a correlate in the objective hopecontents of the tendency-latency; this correlate makes possible ethical ideals as models, aesthetic ones as pre-appearances which point to something that is possibly becoming real. Such ideals, corrected and aligned by utopian function, are then collectively those of a selfand world-content developed in terms adequate to man; thus they are which may finally summarize and simplify the whole nature of ideals here all variations of the basic content: highest good. Ideals relate to this supreme hope-content, possible world-content, as means to an end; there is therefore a hierarchy of ideals, and a lower one can be sacrificed to a higher one, because it is resurrected anyway in the realization of the higher one. For example, the supreme variation of the highest good in the socio-political sphere is the classless society; consequently, ideals like freedom and also equality act as means to this end, and derive their value-content (one which in the case of freedom has been particularly ambiguous) from the highest good in socio-political terms. In such a way that it does not merely determine the content of the ideals as means, but also varies them according to the requirements of the supreme end-content, and where necessary temporarily justifies the deviations. Equally, the supreme variation of the highest good in the aesthetic sphere is immanent pre-appearance of a humanely perfect world: consequently, all aesthetic categories bear relation to this goal and are its variations as l'art pour l'espoir. And more audibly than in the case of archetypes, there resounds in the ideal the answer of the subject to bad Becomeness, the tendential answer against what is insufficient, for what is humanely appropriate. Thus when Marx says the working-class has no ideals to realize, this anathema certainly does not apply to the realization of tendentially concrete goals, but only to that of abstractly introduced goals, of ideals which have no contact with history

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and process. Through Marx and Lenin, socialism has itself become a concrete ideal in each further stage to be pursued, an ideal which, through its systematically mediated solidity, spurs us on not less but more than the ideal which was abstract. And precisely the highest political ideal: the realm of freedom, as political summum bonum, is so little alien to consciously manufactured history that, as a concrete realm, it constitutes the finality of that history, or the last chapter of the history of the world. Because an anti-summum-bonum or In-Vain, the equally possible alternative, would not be the last chapter of this history, but rather its deletion, and not finality, but exit to chaos. In process, there is either death without hinterland despite human work, or there is, by virtue of human work, realism of the ideal in its operation tertium non datur. But the activity and the separate ideal of the freedom of the utopian function consists in objectively signifying and setting free the not yet become 'Being as Ideal' (highest good) which develops with real possibility in dawnings, on the Front of the process-world. Encounter of the Utopian Function with Allegory-Symbols There still remains the engaged glance which clearly proves its worth even through what is not yet clear. The latter is here that not yet clear element which not only signifies its own matter, but also at the same time another matter within it. When this element appears in literary language, the words can certainly be sensuous and immediate, but they echo as in a great hall. Even the proverb offers itself as multi-layered and significant, in so far as it is capable of becoming metaphorical, in fact prefers to be so. 'Still waters run deep', this is thus already an allegorical statement, and it is heightened in great literary metaphors. 'Poems are painted windowpanes', this great metaphorical phrase of Goethe's splendidly conveys the dark-brightness of signifying its own matter and at the same time another within it. Such a phrase is a perfect allegory, though as such itself again tainted with the not yet clear element of itself, which again is why no allegory can be perfect. For it is equivocal by definition, i.e. the Object from which it takes its illuminating metaphor (here: the painted windowpanes) is itself by no means unequivocal. It contains several meanings within it, even those which do not relate to poems as comparisons, and above all it points further beyond itself, even in the poem-relation, in the transparency-relation, between darkness and light. So no allegory is perfect;

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if it was, if its extended relation was not one which repeatedly sends us shooting off in all directions, but also along the same lines, to other things, then this kind of statement would not be allegorical but symbolic. It would be so even though the then attained perfection still remains one of what is factually not yet clear, namely one of the cloaked in the apparent, of the apparent as something still cloaked. In this sense, compared with the symbolic, allegory possesses a kind of wealth of vagueness; thus, in fact, its type of metaphor is inferior to the unwavering, yet at the same time still hovering type of the symbol and of its unified point of reference. Of course, this must not be confused with the other value-distinction between the allegorical and the symbolic, which has been drawn in a fundamentally false way for little more than a hundred years. According to this, the allegorical merely consisted of concepts which are dressed up or decorated in sensory form, whereas the symbolic in fact, was simply always based on so-called immediacy. Or as Gundolf subsequently put it so foolishly, on the subject of Goethe whom he had Georgianized:* the young Goethe had expressed his 'original experiences' symbolically, whereas the older Goethe had only been able to convey his so-called mere 'formative experiences' allegorically. This value distinction is not only pointless in Goethe's case, it also follows the whole conventional fallacy concerning allegories which has been committed since Romanticism. By virtue of the semi-allegories defused by reason, indeed mere abstract illustrations, which in the Rococo and Louis Seize period (as figures of virtue, of truth, of friendship and so on) were the only aspect of the phenomenon of allegory that remained in consciousness. The Romantic devaluation of allegories which related to this lacked the experienced knowledge of real allegory: that of the Baroque, with its orgy of emblems, that of the Middle Ages, that of early Christian patristics. Allegory in its heyday was by no means a dressing up of concepts in sensory form, a decoration of abstractions, but in fact the attempt to convey a thing-meaning through other thing-meanings, and furthermore on the basis of the opposite of abstractions: namely on the basis of archetypes, which unite the respective metaphorical components in their meaningcontent. And likewise it is archetypes which found the resonance of meaning, though the binding and central one, in the symbol-metaphor: not as archetypes of On The Way and transitoriness, but of a strict Absolute or final sense. Clearly therefore, this last-mentioned value-distinction between allegory and symbol, the only legitimate one,
*

After the manner of the poet Stefan George.

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cannot be confused with that between decorated abstractions, even of the most fixed kind, and incarnate theophanies; their difference of status is rather one within the same field of archetypes itself. The distinction has already been made above (cf. p. 161) that allegory contains the archetypes of transitoriness, which is why its meaning is always directed towards Alteritas, whereas the symbol remains consistently assigned to the Unitas of one sense. And in the problem that now arises of an encounter of utopian function with allegory and symbol, the category of the cipher must be stressed in both, as the formed meaning, occurring even in real terms in objects, of the allegorical or symbolic dimensions combined in the archetype. Accordingly, allegory through respective detail provides a cipher on to a sense which is likewise still spread out in detail (multiplicity, Alteritas) and is to be found in transitoriness and fragmentation. Whereas the symbol through respective detail provides a cipher on to a unity of sense transparently appearing in detail (multiplicity, Alteritas); it is thus focused on the unum necessarium of an arrival (landing, gathering), no longer on temporariness, equivocalness sent hither and thither. This intention towards an arrival thus makes the symbol binding, in contrast to allegories, which shift as they flourish and are at the mercy of the continuing uncertainty of the path. Which ultimately means that allegory is essentially at home in art which is rich in figures and in polytheistic religions, whereas the symbol essentially belongs to great simplicity in art and to heno- and monotheistic religions. Anticipation has something to announce in both, because in both it announces itself. This is simultaneously something sealed that reveals itself and something revealing, opening, that still seals itself up, because especially in the symbol the time is not yet ripe, the process has not yet been won, the matter pending within it (the sense) has not yet been produced and decided. Thus there is an encounter, founded in the substance itself, of utopian functions with allegory and symbol; it is the objective signification itself in which the utopian function here encounters itself. To repeat: every metaphor that remains in multiplicity, Alteritas, represents an allegory, as it does in the following: 'The oak stood in its misty shroud/a giant towering to the skies/where darkness from the bushes glowered/with hundred black and gloomy eyes.'* If however the metaphor expresses unity, central things in general, if it converges towards these with an unquestionable certainty which is beginning to appear, even though it is still
*

From Goethe's poem 'Willkommen und Abschied' a later version of 'Es schlug mein Herz . . . ', 1771.

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cloaked, then symbolism is achieved unequivocally, as it is in the following: 'Above all summits there is peace.'* And the form of both is that dialectical form which Goethe called, in a phrase which itself has a dialectical tension, 'a public mystery', precisely as a still continuing merging of what is opened and what is cloaked, what has not yet been removed from the cloak. But in such a way that in all genuine, i.e. also objectively accurate allegories, especially symbols the 'public mystery' is not only one for human interpretation, owing to inadequate powers of comprehension for example, but equally constitutes real qualities of meaning in the outside world independent of human beings; hence the tendencyforms of the characteristically typical which signifies itself in its respective appearances, hence the whole dialectical experiment of the world with forms of existence (with figures) on its still latent central figure. It is also instructive to compare this really public element of a mystery with Goethe's so realistic world-opening: the entelechies developing in the shape of life in the world are all so many living, object-based existing allegories and symbols. Thus this cipher also exists in reality; not merely in allegorical and symbolic designations of this reality: and such real-ciphers exist precisely because the world-process itself is a utopian function, with the matter of the objectively Possible as its substance. The utopian function of humanly conscious planning and change here represents only the most advanced, most active outpost of the aurora-function circulating in the world: of the nocturnal day in which all realciphers, i.e. process-forms still occur and are located. The allegorical formation of figures, the symbolic formation of goals, thus in fact show everything transitory as a metaphor,** but as one which is a separate real path of meaning. Every apt metaphor is therefore at the same time one depicting reality, to the same extent as it is full of objective utopian function in the direction of its meaning, and is full of real-cipher in the form of its meaning. And the symbol, in final contrast to the allegory, proves its worth from this standpoint as an attempted transition from metaphor to equation, i.e. to the attempted identity of inwardness and outwardness. And it is in fact part of the honesty of the statement itself that the unum necessarium (highest good) of such an identity-content has always first appeared in the voice of a Chorus Mysticus, and not yet with that adequate predication, object-based successfulness, which is the frontier-goal and the final task of world enlightenment. Longing, anticipation,
*

From Goethe's poem, 'Wanderers Nachtlied', 1780. Cf. Lines from the Chorus Mysticus at the end of Goethe's 'Faust', Part II, 121045.

**

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distance, still continuing cloakedness, these are determinations in the subject and the object of the allegorical-symbolic. They are determinations of a by no means permanent kind, but tasks directed towards the growing illumination of what is still indeterminate within it, in short, towards the growing resolution of the symbolic. But it is precisely realistic tendencyknowledge, with the conscience of latency within it, which has to do justice to what is termed a public mystery.

16 Utopian Image-Trace in Realization Egyptian and Trojan Helen


But does the deed come, as the sun comes from the clouds, From the thought perhaps, spiritual and ripe? Does the fruit follow, as from the grove's Dark leaf, the silent script? Hlderlin

Dreams Want to Drift How long does it keep on pointing only forwards in us? Wishing does want something, is not just anyhow, only rarely torments empty. If it hurries to land however, does the drive which is working within it arrive? The drive perhaps can surprisingly be gratified for a time, as any craving can to begin with. Nothing is of more indifference to the sated man than a piece of bread, nothing is more out-of-date to the curious man than the newspaper he has just read. Behind this, however, everything rises again, there are, beginning with hunger, wishes that are never cooled. And the images which even a self-gratifying wish has visualized occasionally hang in the air, as if they could not condense and fall. The wish and will towards them lives on, they themselves live on. Not even everything in fulfillable dreams always arrives when they land on level ground; often a trace remains. It is airy, windy even, but is stronger than flesh, is nevertheless noticeable. A man awaits a girl, the room is full of tender unrest; the last light of evening is in it, heightens the tension. If, however, the girl he is hoping for crosses the threshold and everything is all right, everything is there, then hoping itself is no longer there, it has vanished. It no longer has

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anything to say and yet it still carried something with it which does not make itself known in the existing pleasure. Complete congruence has rarely, probably never, entered. In the dream of something, before the heart refreshes itself, things were better or appeared to be so. Non-Satisfaction and What Can Lie within It It is not always possible even to pluck a Now that has come. The flesh can be weak, but there is often a more sophisticated reason. All the more dubiously in fact, even in a good situation, if too many dreams are added beforehand, too many overhauling dreams. Then the imagination has used up the material of the imminent experience for itself, in love as in every kind of debut. Stendhal's essay 'On Love' achieves its famous diagnosis of the fiasco from this premise. According to Stendhal, immediate happiness occurs only where a man possesses a woman without delay, that is: in the moment of desiring her. Certain happiness in love is then only guaranteed 'if a lover has not yet had time to long for the woman and to work on her in his imagination'. In fact, Stendhal does not even need the full play of the imagination to explain a remaining behind reality; he ventures the proposition: 'As soon as a single grain of passion comes into the heart, there is also a grain, a possibility of fiasco.' And further, with dangerous, unnerving creation of stage-fright: 'The higher a man's love is, the more he must force himself before he dares to touch his loved one intimately. He imagines he will anger a being which appears to him as something divine, which inspires in him both boundless love and boundless respect . . . Thus the soul is filled with shame and preoccupied with overcoming this shame; the road to bliss is blocked.' We may compare with this the reluctance of Romantic poets to allow their heavenly images of femininity to fall into experience, to see them fall, especially in E. T. A. Hoffmann. The Romantic hatred of marriage derives not least from a stock of dreams which becomes inexhaustible and reified: 'The magic is destroyed', exclaims an artist in Hoffmann's 'Fermate' with over-sexual fiasco in mind, 'and the inner melody, which otherwise announces marvellous things, becomes a row over a smashed soup-dish'. The same tragi-comedy is suggested in a conversation of the conductor Kreisler with the princess in Hoffmann's 'Kater Murr'; Kreisler praises the 'real musicians' who do not want to make love like the good people who desecrate dreams in their marriage-bed. However, in order that the artists do not appear

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either as eccentric or even as incapable of love, Kreisler compares them to minnesingers, courtliness, the cult of the Virgin and continues on the subject of the 'real musicians': 'They bear their chosen lady in their hearts and want nothing more than to sing, to write, to paint in her honour, in short, in their most exquisite Courtoisie, they are comparable to the gallant knights. In fact, several husbands have experienced the end that comes with realization, even if they were no Kreislers; this happened to a real composer, and moreover one of the most Romantic, Hector Berlioz, in exactly the way Kreisler envisaged. There was even a stage available here on which the idol shone with double radiance: Berlioz fell in love with a young English actress who portrayed Shakespeare's maidens and noble women. This Juliet, Ophelia, Desdemona enhanced her brilliance by rebuffing all approaches and consequently became all the more destructively radiant for Berlioz. Fearing that the desperate lover might take his life, his friends Chopin and Liszt spent a whole night searching the plain of St Quentin in the direction of which Berlioz, quite out of his mind, had been seen rushing off. However, some years later, when the now famous composer succeeded in winning his beloved, when his idol became his wife, the previously so violent love collapsed with its realization (which may have brought more than just 'smashed soup-dishes' with it). Madame was no match for the dream-image which she had infused into a young man from the stage. Experience was not forbearing with hope, but this hope was not forbearing with experience either; and the latter became exaggeratedly disappointing. First Reason for Disappointment: Happiness is There Where You Are Not;* Second Reason: Dream Rendered Independent and the Legend of the Double Helen The first underlying factor here is that the Here and Now stands too close to us. Raw experience transposes us from the drifting dream into another state: into that of immediate nearness. The moment just lived dims as such, it has too dark a warmth, and its nearness makes things formless. The Here and Now lacks the distance which does indeed alienate us, but makes things distinct and surveyable. Thus, from the outset, the immediate
*

G. P. Schmidt von Lmbeck, 'Des Fremdlings Abendlied', and in Schubert's 'Wanderer'.

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dimension within which realization occurs seems darker than the dream-image, and occasionally barren and empty. Even if boundless imagination has not washed away the soil on which the realization stands, if the meeting with reality also takes place, even then the paradox can occur that the dream appeared firmer or at any rate brighter than its realization. The shining cloud settles around us as a grey mist when it comes nearer; the distant blue of the mountains vanishes completely when we reach them. Tamino in the 'Magic Flute', a fairytale opera, supposedly sees Pamina in the courtyard of Sarastro's castle exactly as she looks in her picture. Yet, despite his happy cry: 'It's her!', the question arises whether it really is her, whether the feeling expressed in Tamino's nostalgic song 'This likeness is enchanting', whether this utopian imagination, with its imago, has found and could find its fulfilment in such a perfect original. We may compare with this image-blue two tests which, as in the case of Berlioz, have taken place, have happened in life, and in fact to such diverse personalities as the distraught lyric poet Lenau on the one hand, the vain and strict Christologian Kierkegaard on the other; but it was the same catastrophe with the mirage. Lenau travelled to America, desiring not least to have the image of his bride more intensely present through separation than if he had her beside him; he returned home dissatisfied with the mere image, his desire for the original reinforced, but then he wrote the following poem entitled 'Change of Longing':
Yet how long that journey seemed to me, how I longed to return so fearfully from the wide and foreign wastes of foam to the dear and distant coast of home. Welcomed by the land I longed to reach, jubilant I sprang at last upon the beach, like the evergreen dreams of younger days home's familiar trees greeted my gaze. Purer than ever rang the bird-song here, sweet and intimate upon my ear; gladly, after the pains of being apart, I'd have taken every stone there to my heart. You instead I found, and on a dying beat all my joy sank down there at your feet,

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So much for Lenau and his incapacity for real reunion: Pamina crumbled immediately here at close quarters. This kind of love has the solemn vanity of being in love with itself; it is a feast that can never experience a Monday. For exactly the same reason, Kierkegaard, the all too absolute lover, also remained on the high seas with the image alone for company. Kierkegaard broke off his engagement with his fiance Regine Olsen, Regine took one of her previous admirers as a husband, and Kierkegaard wrote in his diary: 'Today I saw a pretty girl and was not interested. No husband can be more faithful to his wife than I am to her.' And he continued, in the adopted mask of the lecher and equally that of the ascetic: 'She has grasped the point well that she has to marry.' There is the craziest criss-crossing of Platonisms here: there is the love-ideal of the troubadour and the ascetic love of the Virgin, but there is also the removal of Pamina to an image-horizon as her idea-based home. The Platonist, even the homo religiosus Kierkegaard does not always deny himself the present, but he confines himself to the absolute, just as the absolute reserves the present for itself: 'For with regard to the absolute, there is only one time: the present; the absolute does not even exist at all for anyone who is not contemporary with it.' Consequently, according to Kierkegaard, not only is the unconditional present of love very difficult to attain, but also, wholly in keeping, that of Christian imitation, Christian love: 'There have been no Christians since the days of the Apostles.' The fact that here, both in the relationship to the so-called absolute and especially to our neighbour, nothing more than horizonless inwardness appeared: this deep loss does not dispel the power of Kierkegaard's aporia concerning realization. Present means probation here, and, in Kierkegaard, it suits the reactionary mandate in Romanticism to represent the probation precisely before high ideals, i.e. those that are sometimes uncomfortable for existing society, as being as difficult as possible. In relation to the society of his time, Kierkegaard's ideals were certainly only paradoxical and anything but revolutionary: nevertheless, this probation scruple made absolute does suit very well not

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even in a paradoxical way the reactionary defeatism concerning the (abandoned) ideals of the formerly revolutionary bourgeoisie itself. Thus the bourgeois 'resigned' himself to paying lip-service to liberty, equality, fraternity; but in this way social democracy, by 'idealizing' its supposed socialism to the extreme, also avoided the realization of a society in which people again with absolute idealization would supposedly have to become angels and, more significantly, would already have had to act like angels previously. And yet there is also real seriousness concealed in the continuing brilliance of the great image confronted with the Here and Now of its content; otherwise this seriousness could not be misused. That which is realized immediately, perfectly, with skin and hair, with flesh and bones, that which leaves no trace in the midst of our prehistory, of our sphere of being which has still developed so little towards complete Being-Here, is also hardly likely to appear as the right thing immediately to the scheming realist, whom no absolute demand makes bankrupt. This is in fact the unromantic trace and core in Kierkegaard, even in Lenau's so eccentric, in fact defeatist and impotent scrupulousness, a trace which elsewhere precisely caution notices in hope. Hence hope makes us mistrustful justly and with precision, in fact with the highest kind of conscience: that of the goal of every realization that offers itself all too plumply; apotheoses are also always flat and decorative to a consciousness that does not esteem Kierkegaard's abstract radicalisms. Even such a perfect music of fulfilment as that which resounds in Beethoven's 'Fidelio' when Leonora takes the chains off Florestan, even this unearthly happy music does not mediatize the previous music of hope. 'A brilliant rainbow shines before me which brightly rests upon dark clouds above' this earlier song of Leonora's has a special kind of happiness about it, even though it comes out of the middle of the night. 'Come, o hope, do not let the last star of the weary pale, illuminate my goal, no matter how far, love will not fail' the music of this pure prayer to hope does not completely pale before the fulfilled jubilation with which the opera 'Fidelio' closes and releases us. Of course, Leonora's aria of hope has none of the depth which subsequently appears at the moment of realized hope, at the moment when the chains are taken off, in the almost stationary mysticism of this moment, but it does nevertheless retain an unsunken rainbow, with a space which seems open. Thus nearness makes things difficult; hope, at least the presentiment of the imminent entrance of what has been hoped for, often still appears easier, even more filling than this nearness. Secondly, the all too distantly drifting and resonating flight makes things

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difficult here. It is the life in the dream that has become independent, a life that longingly augments itself. This life will not die of fulfilment, does not want to quit its long-familiar stage without leaving a trace. Not even when dream-content and fulfilment appear to be as congruent as is humanly possible; even then something which has become an idol does not withdraw as a matter of course. In fact, the anomaly is possible that the idol posits itself as solely real, and then the fulfilment itself acts as a phantom. The motif of this rendered independence, which is not normal and yet threatens every wishful-image, is conceived in the legend of the Egyptian Helen. A drama by Euripides deals with this peculiar, in fact essentially fragmentary material; the material subsequently deserved a Shakespeare, but did not even find a Hebbel.* Eventually, Hofmannsthal did base an opera libretto on it, which is of little significance without Strauss's music,** and an essay as well. The myth itself is one of the most true-to-life, even most important, which is to be found on the utopia-reality road. Hofmannsthal tells us the following about it: 'We are in Egypt or on the island of Pharos which belongs to Egypt, before a king's castle. Menelaus appears, alone on the return journey from Troy. His ship has been drifting for months, blown from shore to shore, continually driven away from home. He has left behind Helen, the wife he has won back, in a concealed bay with his warriors; he is looking for advice, for help, an oracle which will instruct him how to find the way home. Then from the colonnade of the castle Helen approaches him, not the beautiful, all too notorious one whom he has left behind on the ship, but a different one, and yet the same. And she claims to be his wife the other one left behind on the ship is nobody, means nothing, a phantom, a delusion, put into Paris' arms at the time by Hera (the protectress of marriage) to fool the Greeks. Ten years of war have been waged for the sake of this phantom, tens of thousands of the best men have fallen, the most flourishing city in Asia has been reduced to ashes. But meanwhile she, Helen, the only real one, carried across the sea by Hermes, has been living here in this royal castle.' So she has lived purely, secluded, faithfully, the most beautiful woman, but one who knows nothing of Paris, the Helen without Trojan war, not the monstrous cocotte, not the idol who was present during all the fighting, not the prize of victory. The change is too abrupt, the withdrawal of the idol too extensive for Menelaus to be able to believe
*

Freidrich Hebbel, 181363, German dramatist. Richard Strauss' opera 'Die gyptische Helena'.

**

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it immediately, in fact to want to believe it. Ten years' fixation on the Trojan Helen stand in the way of the Egyptian one; even Euripides has Menelaus say in similar vein: 'I trust the weight of sufferings endured more than I trust you!' Menelaus turns to go, but then a messenger comes from the ship and reports that the being that had been taken for Helen had dissolved into fiery air on the ship. After which as little doubt about the mere phantomexistence of the Trojan cocotte remains as about the reality of the Egyptian woman of virtue: the former a streak of fiery air (but still glowing as it vanishes, perishes), the latter a corporeal entity, solely real. In fact, in Euripides, Menelaus has to accept this explanation and takes the Egyptian and not the Trojan Helen home with him, to the royal court at Sparta where she is also depicted by Homer in the fourth canto of the Odyssey. Not greatly admired or admonished, but as an aristocratic lady of the manor reigning in peace, whose mind is hardly troubled by any memory of Troy. Except by a brief and smiling memory, by a memory which is not so much expressed with flippancy as with detachment (Od. IV. l. 145): Menelaus' wife mentions that the Acheans had to besiege Troy because of her enticing doggaze ( ) (the bitch is an old allegory for the hetairan). Elsewhere she pretends to have wept over the misery that she has caused and lays all the blame on Aphrodite who abducted her (ll. 25164) quite distantly, just as if she had been the Egyptian Helen all along. Thus far everything appears to be all right, not only on the ship but also in Sparta; Menelaus is envied his great goddess of love, he is congratulated on having a wife who has remained virtuous. While at the real heart of the matter the following has taken place: the Trojan or dream-Helen has the advantage over the Egyptian one that she has been inhabiting a dream for ten years, in fact has fulfilled the dream as a dream figure. In fact, the later real fulfilment can match this only with difficulty, or at least not completely: the luminous trace of the dream remains, a streak of fiery air remains, the mirage becomes independent. Because the object of the real fulfilment was itself not present during the adventures, in contrast to the dream-object; the realized represents a very late acquaintance. Only the Trojan, not the Egyptian Helen followed the colours, has absorbed the longing of ten utopian years, the bitterness and the love-hatred of the cuckold, the many nights far from home, the rough field-camp and the sweet foretaste of victory. Precisely because of this the balance easily shifts: the airy siren in Troy, with whom a world of guilt, suffering, but above all hope is associated, remains almost the real object in this curious aporia, reality almost becomes a phantom.

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Quite apart from the cocottish glamour of the Trojan Helen, the Egyptian one does not have the utopian glamour of the Trojan one in her favour, she did not go along with the longing of the voyage, the adventures of the campaign, the wishful image of conquest; consequently the Egyptian reality as such appears to be of lesser dimensions. At least the destruction of the imagination by realization (even if by its own realization which fulfils it) creates deficiency symptoms in the latter case which reduce consciousness of the realization itself, where they do not in fact make this relative itself. The Egyptian Helen can have many names her Euripides problem, which does not only appear in literary and antiquarian contexts, is consequently representative. It is to a great extent threatening, as reification of the goaldream, or at least as the continuation of this goal-dream which has become like reality. In each fulfilment, in so far and in as much as this is even possible totaliter, there remains a peculiar element of hope whose mode of being is not that of the existing or currently existing reality, and which is consequently left over together with its content. However, of course: it is, if it is not abstract but runs along the concrete line of extension of what it has overhauled, never quite outside the objectively possible in reality; instead this Trojan Helen-like element is also provisionally dotted in outline in Helen. Otherwise it would not have found any space in her at all, and no credibility for the universally desired object, the goal of the struggle. And furthermore: the imago which can be kindled on an object, as one which continues to hover towards attainment, is also not in the air, but possibly in the real-utopian possibility of the object itself which points even further. Only there can the full congruence of intentioncontent and content of attainedness be latent, that is, the identity of the identical and of the non-identical (the latter understood here as intention-distance, as hope-distance). Rest, however, is the day when the Egyptian Helen also contains the glamour around the Trojan one. Objection to the First and Second Reason: Odyssey of Quiescence But dreaming in no way wants to point forwards continually. The drive behind it is definitely not sated by purely pictured material. Even dreaming itself does not aim at dream in such a way that it only takes pleasure in images. In waking dreams people enjoy instead the imagination of how it would be if there were something like what is dreamed, that is, if it

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were to become real. Thus even subjectively there is a counterweight to the reification of the dream and to the hoping which does not arrive itself in arrival, but rather, in the double sense of the word, remains behind. The counterweight is posited in the That of the intending, in the wish and will to become real itself. The dream as such does not realize itself, that is a minus, but flesh and bones are added to it, that is a compensating plus. There are also well-known cases where what is wished for, when it appears, may not only surprise us by the force of its landing, its quiescence, its realization, but even by a certain surplus of content which was not dreamed. The blossom as such may no longer be in the fruit, but then the fruitful as such was not in the blossom either; and the previous dream-road can appear shorter than the real road which is now being trodden. Thus the darkness of the Here and, Now, even the loss of the dream-colour itself, are sometimes overemphasized, as if neither were present. As if there were already fulfilment toto coelo, experienced as present, in the existing aggregate state of being real. Hope then apparently no longer needs to be disappointed by privation, any more than experience needs to lack forbearance with hope. The feeling of first love is relevant here, when all buds burst, the feeling of thrilling encounter, enthusiastically experienced time of change, time of greatness. In this context the testimony of Gottfried yon Strassburg concerning Isolde is still noteworthy, i.e. present, in fact reminding us of Helen, the most beautiful of women:
This madness I have now forsaken, by Isolde it was taken, so henceforth I might not fancy that I saw the sun rise from Mycenae. Such splendour never dawned in Greece so clear, it first dawns here!

We may take the liberty of applying this consciousness of Gottfried's also to his other Greece, to a work-based super-Greece of his time, for example to Strasbourg cathedrah: its inscription in the mind of the contemporary onlooker. Pride in works in general is capable of great presence, in the spirit of the producer, on the day of completion, when the sun for which a vigil is so often kept rises like a crown. This moment appears most clearly, endlessly anticipated and yet succeeding in the end, in Klopstock, after the completion of the Messias:
I have reached the goal, the goal! and feel where I am My whole soul is alive! It will be thus (I speak humanly Of divine things) for us one day, you brothers of the Man Who died and rose again, on our arrival in Heaven!

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All this seems like historical presence of mind per se, like quiescence, which nevertheless seems to contain the whole of the previous odyssey. Klopstock's comparison itself points to that strongest example of landing which was mythically described in the unio mystica: no expectation remains behind in the face of it, no intention persists, not even that of the sursum corda, and definitely no distance. And yet even here a trace emerges again in the long run, one that has never disappeared. Since all these contacts are not yet such, even the glance at them is still merely preview, even the feeling that they arouse, merely presentiment. Little more repose is achieved through this than the darkness of the Here and Now together with the loss of the dream-colour being briefly over-emphasized in what is reached. Even in such culminations, however Klopstockian, all that remains objectively justified is after all only Faust's presentiment of a supreme moment. It remains the journeying odyssey, and thus an odyssey of quiescence cannot yet succeed, with identity of its arrival and its journey-content. The presentiment itself, which is thoroughly related to attainability and arrival, is of course extremely important; since corresponding to it is the That-tendency, aimed at realization and positing realization, of the waking dream and its anticipatory perfection. In no way does the so-called endless approach to the ideal smuggle itself in again here, that kind of scruple which is not really serious about realization. However, the opposite to the endless approach is not in fact sheer presence, not the claimed total successfulness of the arrival in the goal, but rather the opposite is the finiteness of the process and of the consequently at least surveyable anticipation distance to the goal. This genuine presentiment, that is, one which implies an attainable final state, undoubtedly fills most broadly, most democratically, and most humanely the immense moments of the happily begun, then victoriously celebrating revolution. But again only, and here precisely only in such a way that it does not rest on the laurels of the present, but that instead, in the still so pressing achievement of victory, this victory is properly grasped as task and thus the happy present is simultaneously grasped as pledge for the future. Revolutions realize the oldest hopes of mankind: for this very reason they imply, demand the ever more precise concretion of what is intended as the realm of freedom and of the unfinished journey towards it. Only if a being like utopia itself (consequently the still completely outstanding kind of reality: successfulness) were to seize the driving-content of the Here and Now, would be the basic state of mind of this driving: hope, also be totally included in the successfulness of reality. Until this possible fulfilment

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the intention waking-dream-world is in progress; no part payment allows it to be forgotten. No making absolute of a mere presentiment may allow us to forget the mindfulness in this intention. For it is the mindfulness of the basic content in our driving, a content which has not yet entered into our consciousness at all, let alone into successfulness, which, for precisely this reason, still lies in utopia. The highest conscientiousness of this mindfulness is set down in the words of the psalm: 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.'* Even without religious accents, even without contrasting accents towards a socalled exile of existence, a realization has never yet been made absolute without a final part of its waking dream being left over, and therefore moved on further beyond the attained to its possible Being-even-better. A new peak appears behind the previously attained one: this plus ultra consequently does not let the realization weaken, but makes it sharper towards its purpose. Anyway the duration, the non-renunciation of the image of hope, have their origin in the enduring problem: realization and in the reasons for this problem itself. Third Reason for Utopian Trace-Images: The Aporias of Realization Even in the entrance of something there is still a something which remains behind itself. The doer and the doing of the work of realization are not completely carried out, they live on to themselves. They remain absent from the deed which frees itself from them, as the tool remains absent from the finished machine or the poet from his poem. And in every fulfilment, even in the one which seems, so to speak, similar to the point of confusion to the goal-image, there lies an unfinished piece of work of the active element which becomes a burden on the weakness of the realization, the quantitative as well as the qualitative weakness. From the quantitative weakness derives the compulsive will to continue work endlessly; against this will the Roman counsel is issued: manum de tabula. ** From the qualitative weakness derives the decision to begin even a finished work from the very beginning again, in accordance with an image of perfection which has grown up alongside the growing work itself and thus seems to be doubly unrealized. Therein lies the cause of a fiasco and of an Egyptian Helen problem in this sphere too. Hoffmann's fantasy-piece 'Ritter Gluck' allows the composer of the 'Armida' (or the madman who wants to embody him) to go around even after his death
* **

Psalms 137, 5. 'Hands from the writing tablet'.

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'somewhat diminished' so that he can play 'Armida' again, 'to a higher degree, as it were', can play it as if it came 'out of the kingdom of dreams'. The quantitative and most definitely the qualitative deficit in the act of realization itself has hardly been thought through philosophically until now: and this in spite of the overwhelming internal, external experience of it. One reason for this lies in the fact that human activity as such only became conscious of itself at a late stage. Work was the business of slaves and manual workers, thought took only brief notice of its completion, realization. Creating and knowing were considered in antiquity as pure depicting of something given, passive looking is dominant, the work merely traces over it. Even in the ethical sphere: according to Socrates no-one can do wrong voluntarily, knowledge of the good inevitably posits the doing of it. Thus there is here neither a defiance of what has been morally demonstrated nor a will towards it; the realizing is so passive and therein so apparently self-evident that it is not even named, let alone thought. This minimal regard for the separate, active act of realization did not change fundamentally either when in more recent times the homo faber, the maker, the entrepreneur, producer were thoroughly reconsidered philosophically. In fact, since the act of generation was exclusively rationalized, i.e. was understood as a purely logical action, the rationalistic, if not panlogical ideology supplied a further motive as regards the non-reflection of the realization. At that time, in rationalism, after many re-qualifications of this 'construction', world-formation itself ultimately developed out of the idea of generation, understood initially purely in mathematical terms, which only posits and defines formal objects. It is still a predominantly formal world-formation, i.e. orientated towards mathematics, as in Kant, where reason makes the world of experience. Then generation became experimental in terms of content, orientated towards artistic production; as in Schelling, in that spontaneity here not only dictates nature's laws, but as nature productive with consciousness creates nature, i.e. animates it to become free and sends it into its separate development. And generation finally became completely experimental in terms of content in Hegel, orientated towards history and its genesis, in that here all the form-contents of the world were supposed to arise dialectically out of 'sound, continually governing reason'. This is therefore in nuce the classical-idealistic notion of generation, of origin, of reality-formation, and evidently it does not do much more justice to the problem of realization, although this was seen, than antiquity did. Because even here realization does not appear as a separate act, it simply appears as an automatically unfolding logos. The cognition-ground remains the same as the real-ground; because the realground is itself only a logical-

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panlogical one, one inside the world-thought of which the whole world ultimately consists in Hegel. And above all: the ancient passivity of realizing is not abandoned despite the homo faber and his philosophy: the pan-logos repeatedly ties generating into a mere process of revelation. This means: to contemplative thinking as a whole (and all idealistic thinking is contemplative) realization remains mere 'embodiment' of a goal-idea, an automatically existing and a finished one, so to speak, which is simply clothed with flesh by the doer or creator. The realization comes out of the logical consistency of the matter itself here; it comes out of this even in the only thinker who, although he lived in antiquity, did at least make realization into a category, even if not into a problem: in Aristotle. He saw the various disruptions of Realization,* and yet despite this he entrusted it, in fact in a particularly wholehearted way, to the idea which had become 'entelechy', as its most characteristic concern. According to Aristotle, realization is solely self-realization of the form-idea or entelechy which is inherent in things; the entelechy is thus itself the energy (or the actus) towards its Realization. However, a not so logical element manifests itself in the first thinker of realization as well: in fact a not so logical element which attempts to do justice from afar to the disruptions, perhaps even aporias of realization. Aristotle lays the existing unfinished piece of work of realization which remains behind the entelechy to the charge of mechanical matter, in so far as this despatches 'disrupting subsidiary causes' into the entelechetic purpose-causes. In this way what is not defined, what is contingent in nature arises, together with capricious fate in the sphere of intentional occurrence, of history. An idea which does at least confront the problem, even though it is an idealistic idea, and how close Goethe's notion in Faust is to it: 'The finest things the spirit could receive,/By strange and stranger matter are besieged;' ** How close to it even Hegel's notion is, despite all its confinement of non-panlogicality to nature: 'This contingency is greatest in the realm of concrete structures which, however, are only directly concrete as natural things . . . Nature is powerless to keep conceptual definitions merely abstract and to expose the elaboration of the particular to external definability' (Enzyklopdie, 230). And yet even here the problem of realization proves not to be posed in terms of and within itself, rather it is shifted on to a scapegoat: on to mechanical matter or, in Hegel, on to the Being-besideitself of the whole of nature itself, as the 'unresolved contradiction'.
*

Bloch uses two terms for 'to realize' here, 'verwirklichen' and 'realisieren'. We have indicated the latter and its compounds by capitalizing it.
**

'Faust', Part 1, 6345.

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But do not the doer and the doing besiege each other in a strange and stranger way? This is a thought which would like to get to the still dark heart of the process of realization as such. That is why, finally, we cannot leave memories from the history of philosophy concerning Realization and its weakness without a gesture in the direction of the later Schelling, who was the only philosopher who did in fact wish to tear the problem of Realization away from total rationalism, though instead he consigned it to incurable mythology: the mythology of the Fall of Man and of the fall of Lucifer. According to the later Schelling, its quod or its That-existence and entry-origin do not at all follow from the quid or the rationally graspable essence of a matter. Instead: the becoming real of the idea is, in its immemorial origin, particular will, a 'falling away from the idea', and indeed a will which already occurs in God himself, in the fathomless ground or non-ground of the divine ground. Schelling's work 'Philosophy and Religion' thus combines the logos as creator and places a kind of original crime, the dark-evil particular will, at the source of being: 'In a word, there is no constant transition from the absolute to the real, the origin of the world of the senses is only conceivable as complete breaking-away from absoluteness, by means of a leap' (Werke VI, p. 38). Thus Schelling in fact transferred realization on to a separate sheet from that written on by the idea; it ceases to be a mere manifestation-function of the objectively logical. The price that was paid for this reference of the logical to something volitional and That-intensive was of course that the realization was both housed in mythology and literally sent to the devil inside this mythology. To which must be added: not only the irrational first impetus given to the world, but also every individual realization in the world generates, according to Schelling, nothing but discord and irregularity, abortion, illness and death, since it runs on from that irrational impetus. So this is how far Schelling tore the realizing element and the idea apart, and how senselessly and totally he made the aporias of realization itself absolute to the point of insolubility. And neither did Schelling dissolve the traditional connection of Realizing with a finished, merely to be manifested idea. The connection was only expressed as a negative one: the evil particular will realizes what is opposed to the good universal will. Open horizon is not granted here either to the Realization factor or to its goal-image, any more than it is in the optimists of the incarnation. These then are the reasons why the quantitative and qualitative weakness of realization is still really uninvestigated. Obviously, its aporias from the unfinished piece of work to the still present non-congruence

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of even the best realization with the goal-image cannot be investigated at all outside the context of the utopia problem. All the less so since such varied utopian elements are left over in realized material and re-emerge afterwards, pursuing new goals. We said that even in the entrance of something there was still something that remains behind itself. Something about it darkens and cannot completely free itself from this Not, this Notthere in the midst of the immediate nearness of occurrence. We have already identified above the dimming of the just lived moment, and precisely this dimness makes it difficult, in the most immediate way, to experience something that has entered wholly as such. At the same time, however, this most immediate thing in itself is nothing other than the driving force, the That-factor, consequently the intensive aspect of the realizing element itself. And this realizing element still stands squarely in the Not-Having of its act and content; the darkness of the just lived moment illustrates precisely this Not-Having-Itself of the realizing element. And it is in fact this still unattained aspect in the realizing element which primarily also overshadows the Here and Now of something realized. Therein therefore lies the ultimate, the principal solution of the Not-, Not-Yet-Carpe diem, definitely without romanticisms: what is realized is brilliant and slightly in shadow at the same time, because in the realizing element itself there is something that has not yet realized itself. The unrealized Realizing element brings its own most peculiar minus into the plus of the Realization as soon as the latter occurs. This is the primary reason why, as Goethe says, nearness makes things difficult; also why a fulfilment which appears to be sufficiently perfect rebus sic stantibus still equally brings a melancholy of fulfilment along with it. And why the preceding goal-image, with its utopianly anticipated substance, may not enter completely into the fulfilment, and thus, driving on further, often even driving on into senselessness, is left over. After all, the wishor goal-content itself did not lie in the nearness which belongs to the attainment of the goal; precisely the far goal-content was still outside the darkness of the just lived moment on account of its distance, on account of its being kept away from the Here and Now. When, however, what has been utopianly anticipated moves into what is realized, it also simultaneously moves up into the shadow of that most central immediacy which, being that of the realizing element, is itself not yet cleared. From this primary reason, at the same time in a wider context, the whole twilight follows in which the process of realization also still lies and must lie, which is the process of history. Since it is still an undecided process, on account

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of its not yet realized driving- and origin-content, its outflow can just as easily be Nothing as All, just as easily total In-Vain as total success. And just as, cheeringly, there is a sudden flash of the possible All in this so dark-bright dappled world, so too, threateningly, darkenings of the possible Nothing loom. Though far from being the case that Being is centred in death, there is still a hint of negation circulating in the air, without any joking, even without automatic negation of negation. Every mortal danger belongs to it and every individual death, the millions of young people who fell in the World Wars belong to it and the pervasive imbecility which has learnt nothing from them. These are the delays or frustrations which interrupt the conditions of positive realization; also, since the Not in the Not-Having-Itself of the realizing element can equally lead to the non-realization of the essential tendency-content, and ultimately Realization-content, this threatening circulation of In-Vain and Nothing already generates the disruption, otherwise expressed as the resistance in the material, otherwise expressed as the gigantic sleep of stupidity or disparateness in the so hazardous straits of our process-world. This circulation of Nothing is what Aristotle wrongly laid to the charge of mechanical matter. What Schelling even wished to displace as old Satan from reason and to place in the primal ground of the world. Both were looking for a scapegoat for imperfection in their completed world, that is, a world already statically defined to an end. Conversely, insight into process as something undecided with Nothing or All in its real end-possibility needs no scapegoat, either with regard to the existing unfinished piece of work or to the not wholly redeemed goal-image in its best conceivable fulfilment. Instead: not yet emerged realizedness of the realizing element and closely associated with it not yet discovered, positively manifested, realized Absolute and Essence, these are the elements in the aporias of realization. Only if a Being were like utopia, if consequently the still completely outstanding kind of reality of successfulness had made the driving-content of the Here and Now itself radically present, would the basic stock of this driving: hope be wholly included as such in the realized reality. The content of what has been realized would then be the content of the realizing element itself, the What-Essence (quidditas) of the solution would be precisely the opened That-ground (quodditas) of the world. The Essence most highly qualified matter has not yet appeared, therefore missing represents its not yet manifested Absolute in every, previously successful appearance. But the world makes space even for this missing, on the Front of its process the goal-content itself is in fermentation and real possibility. Concretely anticipatory consciousness is directed

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towards this state of the goal-content, it has its openness and positiveness within it.

17 The World in Which Utopian Imagination Has a Correlate Real Possibility, the Categories Front, Novum, Ultimum and the Horizon
The critic can therefore latch on to any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop true reality out of the separate forms of existing reality as their obligation and their final purpose . . . It will then become apparent that the world has long possessed the dream of a matter, of which it must only possess the consciousness in order to possess it in reality. Marx, letter to Ruge, 1843 I am convinced that the world-spirit gave the age the command to advance; such a command is obeyed; this entity moves irresistibly forward like an armoured, tightly-closed phalanx with the same undiscernible movement with which the sun moves, through thick and thin; countless light troops are flanked around it, for and against, most of them have no idea what it is about and are run through the head, as if by an unseen hand. The best bet, however, is to keep a close eye on the advancing giant. Hegel, letter to Niethammer, 1816

Man Is Not Solid To think oneself into what is better, this proceeds at first only inwardly. It indicates how much youth there is in man, how much lies in him that is waiting. This waiting will not go to sleep, however many times it has been buried, even in a desperate man it does not stare into complete nothingness. Even the suicide still flees into negation as into a womb; he expects rest. Even disappointed hope wanders around agonizing, a ghost that has lost its way back to the cemetery and clings to refuted images. It does not perish through itself, but only through a new form of itself. The fact that we can thus sail into dreams, that daydreams, often of a completely uncovered kind, are possible, indicates the great space of the still open, still uncertain life in man. Man spins out wishes, is in a position to do so, finds a wealth of material for them, even if it is not always of

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the best, most durable quality, in himself. This fermenting and effervescing above the consciousness that has become is the first correlate of the imagination, a correlate which to begin with is merely inward, in fact only located within itself. Even the silliest dreams nevertheless exist as foam;* daydreams even contain a foam from which a Venus has sometimes risen. The animal knows nothing of this kind; only man, although he is much more awake, wells up utopianly. His existence is less solid as it were, although, compared with plants and animals, he is much more intensely present. Human existence has nevertheless more fermenting Being, more dawning material on its upper edge and hem. Something has as it were remained hollow here, in fact a new hollow space has only just developed. Dreams drift in it, and possible things circulate inwardly which can perhaps never become outward. Much in the World Is Still Unclosed Of course, nothing would circulate inwardly either if the outward were completely solid. Outside, however, life is just as little finished as in the ego which is working on this outside. No thing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed, full of fixed, even perfected facts. Instead of these there are simply processes, i.e. dynamic relationships in which the Become has not completely triumphed. The Real is process; the latter is the widely ramified mediation between present, unfinished past, and above all: possible future. Indeed, everything real passes over into the Possible at its processual Front, and possible is everything that is only partially conditioned, that has not yet been fully or conclusively determined. Here we must of course distinguish between the merely cognitively or objectively Possible and the Real-Possible, the only one that matters in the given context. Objectively possible is everything whose entry, on the basis of a mere partial-cognition of its existing conditions, is scientifically to be expected, or at least cannot be discounted. Whereas really possible is everything whose conditions in the sphere of the object itself are not yet fully assembled; whether because they are still maturing, or above all because new conditions though mediated with the existing ones arise for the entry of a new Real. Mobile, changing, changeable Being, presenting itself as dialectical-material, has this unclosed capability of becoming, this Not-Yet-Closedness both in its ground and in its horizon
*

Bloch is alluding to the German saying 'Trume sind Schume' (Dreams are just foam).

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So that we may deduce from this: the really Possible of sufficiently mediated, i.e. dialectically, materialistically mediated newness gives utopian imagination its second, its concrete correlate: one outside a mere fermenting, effervescing in the inner circle of consciousness. And as long as the reality has not become a completely determined one, as long as it possesses still unclosed possibilities, in the shape of new shoots and new spaces for development, then no absolute objection to utopia can be raised by merely factual reality. Objections to bad utopias can be raised, i.e. to abstractly extravagant, badly mediated ones, but precisely concrete utopia has in process-reality a corresponding element: that of the mediated Novum. Only this process-reality, and not a fact-basedness torn out of it which is reified and made absolute, can therefore pass judgement on utopian dreams or relegate them to mere illusions. If we give every mere factuality in the external world this critical right, then we make what is fixedly existing and what has fixedly become into absolute reality per se. It becomes clear, however, even merely within the vastly altered reality of today, that the restriction to the Factum was hardly a realistic one; that reality itself is not worked up, that it has something advancing and breaking out at its edge. Man today is thoroughly acquainted with the frontier-existence outside the previous expectation-context of Becomeness. He no longer sees himself surrounded by ostensibly completed facts, and no longer considers these as the only Real; devastatingly, possible fascist Nothing has opened up in this Real, and above all, finally feasible and overdue, socialism. A different concept of reality to the narrow and ossified one of the second half of the nineteenth century is thus overdue, a different one to that of the positivism to which the idea of process is alien, and of its counterpart: the noncommittal ideal world of pure appearance. Sometimes the ossified concept of reality even penetrated Marxism and consequently made it schematic. It is not sufficient to speak of dialectical process and then to treat history as a series of sequential Fixa or even closed 'totalities'. A narrowing and diminishing of reality threatens here, a turning away from 'efficacity and seed'* in reality; and that is not Marxism. Rather: the concrete imagination and the imagery of its mediated anticipations are fermenting in the process of the real itself and are depicted in the concrete forward dream; anticipating elements are a component of reality itself. Thus the will towards utopia is entirely
*

From Goethe's 'Faust', Part I, 384: 'All efficacity and seed explore and rummage round in words no more.'

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compatible with object-based tendency, in fact is confirmed and at home within it. Militant Optimism, the Categories Front, Novum, Ultimum Precisely the defeated man must try the outside world again. That which is coming up is not yet decided, that which is swamp can be dried out through work. Through a combination of courage and knowledge, the future does not come over man as fate, but man overcomes the future and enters it with what is his. However, the knowledge needed by courage and above all decision cannot have the most common mode of previous knowledge: namely a contemplative mode. Because merely contemplative knowledge necessarily refers to what is closed and thus to what is past, it is helpless against what is present and blind to the future. In fact, it appears to itself all the more as knowledge, the further back its objects lie in what is past and closed, the less therefore it contributes to the process of something being learnt for the present and future from history, a history that occurs in tendency. The knowledge necessary for decision accordingly has a different mode: one which is not merely contemplative, but rather one which goes with process, which is actively and partisanly in league with the good which is working its way through, i.e. what is humanly worthy in process. It goes without saying that this mode of knowledge is also the only objective one, the only one which reflects the Real in history: namely the events produced by working people together with the abundant interweaving process-connections between past, present and future. And knowledge of this kind, precisely because it is not merely contemplative, thoroughly mobilizes the subjects of conscious production itself. Since it is not quietism, even in relation to discovered tendency, it does not revere that banal, automatic progressoptimism per se which is only a reprise of contemplative quietism. The optimism is this reprise because it also disguises the future as past, because it regards the future as something which has long since been decided and thus concluded. Confronted with the future-state which stands like an agreed consequence in the so-called iron logic of history, the subject can just as easily lay his hands in his lap as he once folded them when confronted with God's will. In similar fashion, for example, by leaving capitalism to function to its conclusion, it was appointed as its own grave-digger, and even its dialectic appeared to be self-sufficient, to be autarkical. All this is fundamentally false, however,

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in fact so patently just new opium for the people that, cum grano salis, even a dash of pessimism would be preferable to the banal, automatic belief in progress as such. Because at least pessimism with a realistic perspective is not so helplessly surprised by mistakes and catastrophes, by the horrifying possibilities which have been concealed and will continue to be concealed precisely in capitalist progress. Thinking ad pessimum, for every analysis which does not make it absolute again, is a better travelling companion than cheap credulity; it thus constitutes the critical coldness precisely in Marxism. For every changing decision, automatic optimism is not much less of a poison than pessimism made absolute; since, if the latter quite openly serves shameless reaction, which calls itself by its own name, with the aim of discouraging, then the former helps shamefaced reaction with the aim of fostering winking connivance and passivity. Thus, rather than false optimism, the only thing that is assigned in order to foster true optimism to the knowledge of decision, to the decision of attained knowledge, is once again the concretely and utopianly comprehended correlate in real possibility: comprehended as one in which of course it is by no means already the night to end all days, but just as little in the sense of non-utopian optimism already the day to end all nights.* The attitude towards this undecided material, which can however be decided through work and concretely mediated action, is called militant optimism. Through this, as Marx says, no abstract ideals are realized, but rather the repressed elements of the new, humanized society, that is, of the concrete ideal, are set free. It is the revolutionary decision of the proletariat which today commits itself to the final struggle of liberation, a decision of the subjective factor in alliance with the objective factors of economic-material tendency. And it is not as if this subjective factor, that of realization and of changing the world, were any other than a material activity; it is such, even if, as Marx stresses in the first thesis on Feuerbach, as the active side (generation, productivity, spontaneity of consciousness), it has certainly been developed primarily from idealism and not from (mechanical) materialism. And once again it is not as if even for one moment the activity which is part of changing the world, i.e. of militant optimism, could really intervene or bring about lasting change without being allied with real, present tendencies; because if the subjective factor remains isolated, then it simply becomes a factor
*

Bloch is playing on a German saying 'It is not yet the night to end all days', an English equivalent of which would be 'We are not yet out of the wood'.

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of putschism, not of revolution, of Spiegelbergian forays,* not of the work. If, however, there is insight into the consequences of the decision and it is precisely the knowledge in the decision which guarantees this insight then the power of the subjective factor cannot be estimated highly or even deeply enough, precisely as the militant function in militant optimism. Concrete decision in favour of the victory of light in real possibility is the same as countermove against failure in process. Is the same as the countermove of freedom against so-called destiny which has been removed from process and which counteracts it through stagnation and reification. Is the same as the countermove against all these deadly manifestations from the family of Nothing and against the circulation of Nothing, the other alternative to real possibility itself. Is thus ultimately the countermove against the pervasive ruin of pure negation (war, advent of barbarism), so that, by redirecting this destruction on to itself, the negation of the negation may also find space here and the dialectic actively triumph. Concrete decision is always in conflict with statics here, yet precisely because it is not putschism, but rather, being militant, is equally founded optimism, it lives in peace with process which brushes death-statics itself the wrong way. Man and process, or rather: subject and object in dialectically materialist process, consequently both stand equally on the Front. And there is no other place for militant optimism than the place which the category of Front opens up. The philosophy of this optimism, that is, of materially comprehended hope, is itself, as the trenchant knowledge of non-contemplation, concerned with the foremost segment of history, and is so even when it concerns itself with the past, namely with the still undischarged future in the past. Philosophy of comprehended hope thus stands per definitionem on the Front of the world process, i.e. on the so little thought-out, foremost segment of Being of animated, utopianly open matter. Not everything that is well-known is also known, least of all when freshness is present. Thus along with the concept of the Front the so closely related concept of newness is also in a parlous state. The New: it circulates in the mind in first love, also in the feeling of spring; the latter has nevertheless hardly found a single philosopher. It permeates, though it is forgotten time and again, the eve of great events, together with a highly characteristic mixed reaction of fear, being armed, confidence; it founds, in the promised Novum of happiness, advent consciousness. It runs through the expectations of almost all religions, in so far as primitive, even ancient oriental future
*

Spiegelberg: the unscrupulous marauder in Schiller's 'The Robbers'.

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consciousness can be properly understood at all; it pervades the whole of the Bible, from Jacob's blessing to the Son of Man who makes everything new, and to the new heaven, the new earth. Nevertheless, the category Novum has not been described anything like adequately enough, and found no place in any pre-Marxist world-picture. Or if it did seem to find it, as in Boutroux* or above all in the Art Nouveau or secession philosophy of Bergson, then the New was simply considered from the point of view of senselessly changing fashions and celebrated as such; all that resulted from this was the different rigidity of a surprise that is always the same. This kind of thing has already been made clear in the case of the block which has obstructed the concept of the Not-Yet-Conscious for so long; in such a way that the dawning, the Incipit vita nova, also repeatedly remains a Fixum in the so-called Philosophy of Life. Thus the concept of the New in Bergson simply appears as abstract contrast to repetition, in fact often as merely the reverse side of mechanical uniformity; at the same time it was attributed to every moment of life without exception, and was consequently devalued. Even the duration of a thing, the dure which is imagined as being fluid, is based by Bergson on continual difference; supposedly because in truly unchanged persistence the beginning and end of this state would be indistinguishable, would objectively coincide, and consequently the thing would not have duration at all. And the Novum as a whole in Bergson is not elucidated by its path, its explosions, its dialectic, its images of hope and genuine products, but in fact repeatedly by the contrast to mechanism, by the contentless declaration of an lan vital in and for itself. Great love for the Novum is active, great inclination towards openness leaps to the eye, but the process remains empty and repeatedly produces nothing but process. In fact, the eternal metaphysical vitality theory ultimately achieves a mere frenzy instead of the Novum, precisely because of the constantly required change of direction, required for its own sake; so it is not the curve praised by Bergson that develops with this change, but rather a zig-zag in which from sheer opposition to uniformity there is only the figure of chaos. Consequently, the abstractly understood Futurum also ends in a l'art pour l'art of vitality which Bergson himself compares to the rocket or 'to an immense firework which continually shoots out new bursts of fire' (L'Evolution cratrice, 1907, p. 270). Here too we must emphasize: there is absolutely no genuine Novum in Bergson; he has in fact only developed his concept from sheer excess into capitalistic fashion-novelty and thus stabilized it; lan vital and
*

mile Boutroux, 18451921, French philosopher of science.

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nothing more is and remains itself a Fixum of contemplation. The social reason for Bergson's pseudo-Novum lies in the late bourgeoisie, which has within it absolutely nothing new in terms of content. The corresponding ideological reason ultimately lies in the old, laboriously reproduced elimination of two of the most essential qualities of the Novum in general: possibility and finality. In both, Bergson sees the same schematics of deadening reason hostile to change which he sees at work elsewhere as spatialization, causality, mechanism. The mighty realm of possibility thus becomes for him an illusion of retrospection: there is no Possible in Bergson whatsoever, for him it is a projection which is sketched back into the past by what is newly developing. In the Possible, according to Bergson, the just arising Novum is only to be conceived as 'having been possible': 'The possible is nothing other than the real plus a mental act which reflects the image of this real into the past, as soon as the real has developed . . . The real welling-up of unforeseeable newness, not predesignated in any possible, is however a real which makes itself possible, not a possible that becomes real (La Pense et le Mouvant, p. 133). Bergson thus characteristically almost reproduces the antipossibility proof of the Megarian philosopher Diodoros Kronos, who was in fact himself close to the Eleatic philosophers, the teachers of an absolute rest. And similarly, Bergson closes his mind to the concept of the Novum by regarding finality simply as the establishing of a rigid final goal, rather than as the goal-determination of the human will, which first seeks precisely its Where To and What For, in the open possibilities of the future. Or rather: as the goal-determination of a work, above all of a planning, which has stressed its Where To and What For and goes about achieving it. Bergson, however, in equating all foreseeability with static prediction, has not only ignored creative anticipation, this reddening dawn in the human will, but the genuine Novum as a whole, the horizon of utopia. And the continually stressed changeableness, boundlessness, hardly made Bergson's newness-universe into what, with nevertheless unmistakable finality, he fantasized it to be: into 'the machine to produce gods'. To sum up: appropriate to the Novum, so that it really is one, is not only abstract opposition to mechanical repetition, but actually also a kind of specific repetition: namely of the still unbecome total goal-content itself, which is suggested and tended, tested and processed out in the progressive newnesses of history. Thus moreover: the dialectical emergence of this total content is no longer described by the category Novum, but rather by the category Ultimum, and with this of course the repetition ends. But it only ends by virtue

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of the fact that, to the same extent that the Ultimum represents the last, i.e. the highest newness, the repetition (the unremitting representedness of the tendency-goal in all progressively New) intensifies to the last, highest, most fundamental repetition: of identity. And the newness in the Ultimum really triumphs by means of its total leap out of everything that previously existed, but it is a leap towards the newness that is ending or identity. The category Ultimum has not been left as unconsidered as that of the Novum; the idea of the Last Thing has always been a subject of those religions which also set a time-limit to time, and thus above all of Judaeo-Christian philosophy of religion. However, this categorial treatment precisely indicated that the one which properly ought to precede it, that of the Novum, was as good as absent. Because in the whole of Judaeo-Christian philosophy, from Philo and Augustine to Hegel, the Ultimum relates exclusively to a Primum and not to a Novum; consequently the Last Thing appears simply as the attained return of an already completed First Thing which has been lost or relinquished. The form of this return incorporates the pre-Christian form of the self-combusting and self-renewing Phoenix, it incorporates the Heraclitean and Stoic doctrine of world-conflagration, according to which the Zeus-fire takes the world back into itself and similarly, in periodic cycles, releases it again. And in fact we may say: the cycle is the figure which the Ultimum attaches so firmly to the Primum that it misfires logically and metaphysically within it. Of course, Hegel saw in the Being-for-itself of the idea, which is its Ultimum and in which process dies away as in an amen, the Primum of the Being-in-itself of the idea not only reproduced but fulfilled: the 'mediated immediacy' is attained in the Being-for-itself, rather than the unmediated immediacy in the beginning of the mere Being-in-itself. But, as in every individual formepoch of the world process, and consequently also in its totality, this result nevertheless remained a cyclical one here; it is the cycle, completely free of the Novum, of the restitutio in integrum: 'Every part of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle which closes in upon itself, . . . the whole thus presents itself as a circle of circles' (Enzyklopidie, 15). Likewise, despite having been thought out more thoroughly, the Ultimum was also invariably defused here, in that its Omega coils back into the Alpha again without the power of the Novum. In the final analysis, this is also true where mechanically and materialistically the Alpha-Omega has been secularized into a ball of vapour out of which the world emerges and into which it disperses again. The original and the archetype of all this remains the Alpha-Omega in the embracing ring of a primal being to which process

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returns almost as a prodigal son and undoes the substance of its Novum. These are all in fact prison-formations against real possibility or a disavowal of it which seeks to visualize even the most progressive historical product solely as the re-remembering or restoration of something once possessed, primally lost. Consequently, as is evident precisely in the Ultimum, in the case of this Novum, but also in that of all previous Novum, only antireremembering, anti-Augustine, anti-Hegel is philosophically appropriate, anti-circle and denial of the ring-principle, that intended from Hegel and Eduard von Hartmann, in fact as far as Nietzsche. Yet hope, which does not want to be just as far at any end as it was at the beginning, does away with the sharp cycle. The dialectic which has its motor in unrest and its goal-content, which in no way exists ante rem, in unappeared essence does away with the dogged cycle. The tension-figures and tendency-forms, the real-ciphers in the world, even these rehearsals on an as yet unsuccessful model, do away with the fundamentally sterile cycle through their especially high percentage of utopia. The humanization of nature has no parental home at the beginning from which it runs away, to which, with a kind of ancestor cult in philosophy, it returns. In fact in process itself, still without the problem of the Ultimum, a horde of real possibilities emerge which were not predicted of the beginning at birth. And the end is not the bringing back, rather it is precisely as the impact of the Whatessence on the That-ground the blasting open of the primum agens materiale. In other words: the Omega of the Where To explains itself not with reference to a primally been Alpha, supposedly most real of all, of the Where From, of the origin, but on the contrary: this origin explains itself first with reference to the Novum of the end, indeed, as an origin still essentially unrealized in itself, it first enters reality with this Ultimum. The origin is certainly the realizing element itself; and yet: just as there is still something immature and not yet realized in the realizing, so the realization of the realizing, of the realizing element itself is always only just starting to begin. In history it is the self-apprehension of the historical doer, working man: in nature it is the realization of that which has been hypothetically called natura naturans or subject of material motion, a problem which has hardly been touched on, even though it is clearly connected with the self-apprehension of working man and lies along the line of extension of Marx's 'humanization of nature'. The site for both kinds of selfapprehension and their Novum, their Ultimum, is however located solely on the Front of the process of history and is predominantly confronted with only mediated-real possibility. This remains that which

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corresponds to exact anticipation, concrete utopia as objective-real correlate. In the same sense that the concretely utopian is an objective-real degree of reality on the Front of the occurring world, as Not-Yet-Being of the 'naturalization of man, humanization of nature'. Correspondingly, the thus designated realm of freedom develops not as return, but as exodus though into the always intended promised land, promised by process. 'What-Is According to Possibility' and 'What-Is in Possibility', Cold and Warm Stream in Marxism On the path to the New we must usually, though not always, proceed step by step. Not everything is possible or can be implemented at any time, absent conditions not only hinder, they also block. More rapid progress is of course allowed, even demanded, where the stretch ahead shows no other dangers than over-anxiously or pedantically imagined ones. Thus Russia did not first need to become fully capitalist before it could pursue the socialist goal successfully. Even the complete technological conditions for the construction of socialism could be made good in the Soviet Union, in so far as they had already been developed in other countries and could be taken over from there. On the other hand, obviously, a path which has never been travelled before can only be skipped or jumped over with some failures. Because of course everything is possible for which the conditions exist in a sufficiently partial form, but this is precisely why everything is still factually impossible for which the conditions do not yet exist at all. The goal-image then proves to be subjectively and objectively an illusion; the movement towards it then collapses; at best, if it makes headway, as a consequence of the prevailing and determining socio-economic conditions, a totally different goal is achieved from the one intended in this skipping over, abstract sense. Of course, in the bourgeois ideal dream of human rights, from the outset the tendencies were already active which subsequently ushered in the purest capitalism. But even here a city of brotherly love hovered ahead anyway, a Philadelphia, particularly far removed from the real Philadelphia which was on the agenda of economic history and consequently saw the light of day. And nothing much more than a Philadelphia of that kind would have been the fruit of the pure, the simply chiliastic utopias, if they had not collapsed but had reached the goal according to the measure of the Possible at that time. The economic conditions which the radical will towards the millennium from Joachim

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of Fiore to the English millenarians skipped over, and in fact had to skip over, would have announced themselves anyway, even in what was attained itself: and, again by virtue of the still imminent capitalist agenda, they would certainly not have been those which predestine for the kingdom of love. All this has become completely comprehensible through the Marxist discovery which shows that concrete theory-practice is most closely connected to the explored mode of objective-real possibility. Both the critical caution which determines the speed of the path, and the founded expectation which guarantees a militant optimism as regards the goal, are determined through insight into the correlate of possibility. And in such a way that this correlate, as it is now becoming possible to say, itself again has two sides, a reverse side as it were, on which the measures of the respectively Possible are written, and a front side on which the Totum of the finally Possible indicates that it is still open. In fact, the first side, that of the existing decisively conditions, teaches conduct on the path to the goal, whereas the second side, that of the utopian Totum, fundamentally prevents partial attainments on this path from being taken for the whole goal and from obscuring it. Despite all this it must be stressed: even this double-sided correlate: real possibility is nothing other than dialectical matter. Real possibility is only the logical expression for material conditionality of a sufficient kind on the one hand, for material openness (unexhaustedness of the womb of matter) on the other. Already above, in the previous chapter (cf. p. 191), on the subject of the 'disrupting subsidiary causes' during realization, a part of the Aristotelian definitions of matter was enlisted. We mentioned that according to Aristotle mechanical matter ( ) represents a resistance, and consequently the entelechetic tendencyform cannot reveal itself purely. This is how Aristotle seeks to explain the many inhibitions, chance thwartings, even the innumerable progress-torsos of which the world is full. In the quoted passage, this definition of matter was designated as that of a scapegoat, and so it is, in so far as it is made absolute and in so far as it supposedly serves to send matter to the devil for the purpose of unburdening entelechy in general. But of course there is no mention in Aristotle of any such In General, any such Making Absolute, rather for him matter is in no way limited to the mechanical, and even this, from which stems, is in fact assigned for the first time to the extremely extensive concept of or objective-real possibility in Aristotle. This assignment now also opens up a new, not thwarting, but rather determining meaning for the concept of inhibiting matter: is supplemented and extended through ,

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i.e.: through What-Is according to possibility, according to the measures of possibility. Seen from this side, matter is the site of the conditions according to whose stipulations entelechies reveal themselves; thus does not only mean mechanics, but much more extensively: continuous conditional connection. And only from this What-Is-according-topossibility does the inhibition ultimately originate which the entelechetic tendency-form experiences on its path. The consequence also originates from here that the sculptor, working under 'more favourable conditions', can create more beautiful bodies than the physical ones that are born, and that a poet removes contingency and narrowness from the path of his creations, transposes them, as Aristotle says in his 'Poetics', from the or each individual thing into the or the richer possibilities of a whole. But all this would not have been possible if Aristotle and this is of central importance had not already also distinguished the other side, the front side of possibility-matter, in fact recognized it as the side completely free of inhibitions; matter is not only , according to possibility, and therefore the respectively conditioning element according to the given measure of the Possible, but it is , What-Is-in-possibility, therefore the in Aristotle admittedly still passive womb of fertility from which all world-forms inexhaustibly emerge. With this last definition precisely the friendly, if not the hope-side of objective-real possibility opened up, however long it took for it to be comprehended; the utopian Totum is implied in the . To repeat and sum up, What-Is-according-to-possibility in matter precedes the critical consideration of what is respectively to be attained, What-Is-inpossibility in matter precedes the founded expectation of attainability itself. And since the passive was deleted from the latter definition in the pantheistic school of the Aristotelians, since the no longer appeared as undefined wax on which the form-entelechies imprint themselves, the potential of matter ultimately became birth and grave and new place of hope for the world-forms in general. This development of the Aristotelian concept of matter runs through the peripatetic physicist Strato, the first great Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, the oriental Aristotelians Avicenna, Averros and his natura naturans, the neo-Platonizing Aristotelian Avicebron, through the Christian heretical philosophers of the thirteenth century Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinant, right down to the world-creating matter of Giordano Bruno (cf. here Ernst Bloch, Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke, 1952, p. 30ff.). In fact even the substratum, giving birth to itself, of the Hegelian world-idea, this idea which moves away

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so soon from matter, nevertheless contains a large part of matter-potentiality, which has become potent. On this point Lenin, in his 'Philosophical Notebooks', particularly notes the statement from Hegel's Logic: 'That which appears as the activity of form is furthermore also the separate motion of matter itself.' There are several such statements in Hegel, also in his History of Philosophy (Werke XIII, p. 33), concerning the Aristotelian concept of development, where he at least equates his idea of Being-in-itself with the Aristotelian . And the supposition is justified that without this legacy of Aristotle and Bruno, Marx would not have been able to set much of the Hegelian world-idea on its feet in such a natural way. Nor would the dialectic of process have been rescuable from the so-called world-spirit in materialistic terms and become ascertainable in matter as a law of motion. Thus, however, a very different matter from the mechanical clod appeared, the matter of dialectical materialism, one in which dialectic, process, expropriation of expropriation, humanization of nature are in no way just external epithets, let alone tacked on. So much here for the correlates to critical consideration of the attainable, to founded expectation of attainability itself within the overall correlate: real possibility or matter. Coldness and warmth of concrete anticipation are pre-figured in this, are related to these two sides of the real Possible. Its unexhausted fullness of expectation shines upon revolutionary theorypractice as enthusiasm, its strict determinations which cannot be skipped over demand cool analysis, cautiously precise strategy; the latter indicates cold, the former warm red. These two ways of being red always go together of course, yet they are distinct from each other. They are related to one another like that which cannot be deceived and that which cannot be disappointed, like acerbity and belief, each in its place and each employed towards the same goal. In Marxism, the act of analysing the situation is entwined with the enthusiastically prospective act. Both acts are united in the dialectical method, in the pathos of the goal, in the totality of the subject-matter treated, yet the difference of view and situation is plain to see. It has been recognized as one between the respective conditionexploration according to the stipulations of the Possible, and the prospect-exploration of What-Is-in-possibility. Research which analyses conditions does equally show prospect, but with its horizon as a limiting one, that of the limited Possible. Without such a cooling down Jacobinism or even totally extravagant, most abstractly utopian fanaticism would emerge. Thus lead is here poured into the shoes of overhauling, skipping over, flying over, because experience shows that the real itself has a heavy gait and seldom consists of wings.

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But the prospect-exploration of What-Is-in-possibility goes towards the horizon, in the sense of unobstructed, unmeasured expanse, in the sense of the Possible which is still unexhausted and unrealized. Only then of course does prospect in the authentic sense result, that is, prospect of the authentic, of the Totum of what is occurring and what is to be pursued, of a not only respectively prevailing, but overall historical, utopian Totum. Without such a warming up of the historical and especially of the currently practical conditional analysis, the latter is subject to the danger of economism and of goal-forgetting opportunism; the latter avoids the mists of fanaticism only in as far as it gets bogged down in the swamp of philistinism, of compromise, and finally of betrayal. Only coldness and warmth of concrete anticipation together therefore ensure that neither the path in itself nor the goal in itself are held apart from one another undialectically and so become reified and isolated. And the conditional analysis on the whole historical-situational stretch emerges both as an unmasking of ideologies and as a disenchantment of metaphysical illusion; precisely this belongs to the most useful cold stream of Marxism. Through it Marxist materialism becomes not only the science of conditions, but at the same time the science of struggle and opposition against all ideological inhibitions and concealments of the ultimately decisive conditions, which are always economic. To the warm stream of Marxism, however, belong liberating intention and materialistically humane, humanely materialistic real tendency, towards whose goal all these disenchantments are undertaken. From here the strong appeal to the debased, enslaved, abandoned, belittled human being, from here the appeal to the proletariat as the turntable towards emancipation. The goal remains the naturalization of man, humanization of nature which is inherent in developing matter. This final matter or the content of the realm of freedom first approaches in the construction of communism, its only space, has never before been present; that is beyond doubt. But it is also beyond doubt that this content lies within the historical process, and that Marxism represents its strongest consciousness, its highest practical mindfulness. Marxism as a doctrine of warmth is thus solely related to that positive Being-in-possibility, not subject to any disenchantment, which embraces the growing realization of the realizing element, primarily in the human sphere. And which, inside this sphere, signifies the utopian Totum, in fact that freedom, that homeland of identity, in which neither man behaves towards the world, nor the world behaves towards man, as if towards a stranger. This is the doctrine of warmth in the sense of the front side, the Front of matter, hence of forward matter. The path then opens up

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within it as function of the goal, and the goal opens up as substance in the path, in the path explored towards its conditions, visualized towards its opennesses. Matter is latent in these opennesses according to the direction of their objective-real hope-contents: as the end of selfalienation and objectivity encumbered with alien material, as matter of Things For Us. On the path towards this, the objective surpassing of what currently exists in history and world occurs: this transcending without transcendence, which is called process and is accelerated on earth so forcefully by human work. Forward materialism or the warmth-doctrine of Marxism is thus theory-practice of reaching home or of departure from inappropriate objectification; through it the world is developed towards the No-Longer-Alienation of its subjects-objects, hence towards freedom. Undoubtedly only from the vantage point of a classless society does the goal of freedom itself come clearly into our sights as definite Being-in-possibility. Nevertheless it is no great distance from that self-encounter which has been sought in images under the name of culture; with so many ideologies, but also with so many kinds of pre-appearance, anticipations in the horizon. The means by which man first became human was work, the basis of the second stage is the classless society, its framework is a culture whose horizon is surrounded purely by the contents of founded hope, the most important, the positive Being-in-possibility. Artistic Appearance As Visible Pre-Appearance We say of the beautiful that it gives pleasure, that it is even enjoyed. But its reward does not end there, art is not food. For it remains even after it has been enjoyed, even in the sweetest cases it hangs over into a land which is 'pictured ahead'. The wishful dream goes out here into what is indisputably better, in doing so, in contrast to most political wishful dreams, it has already become work-like, a shaped beauty. Only: is there anything more in what has been shaped in this way than a game of appearance? Which may be extremely ingenious but, in contrast to the childlike, does not prepare for anything serious, nor signifies it. In aesthetic ringing or even jingling* is there any hard cash, any statement which can be signed? Paintings prompt us less often to this question, since paint only stands in sensory certainty and is otherwise more weakly burdened with the claim to truth than the word. Since the word not only serves literature,
*

Here Bloch is playing on the old German expression 'in klingender Mnze': 'in coin of the realm'.

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but also truthful communication; language makes us more sensitive to the latter than paint, even than drawing. All good art, of course, finishes its materials in shaped beauty, renders things, people, conflicts in beautiful appearance. But what is the honest status of this finish, of a ripeness in which only invented material ripens? How do things stand with a richness which communicates itself in a merely illusionary fashion, as mere appearance to the eye or to the ear? Conversely, how do things stand with Schiller's nevertheless prophetic statement that what we experience here as beauty will one day approach us as truth? How do things stand with Plotinus' statement, and then Hegel's, that beauty is the sensory manifestation of the idea? Nietzsche, in his positivist period, sets against this assertion the much more massive one that all poets lie. Or: art makes the aspect of life tolerable by throwing the veil of impure thought over it. Francis Bacon sees the golden apples in silver bowls as really not that far from being an illusion, they belong to the idola theatri that have been handed down to us. He compares the truth to the naked bright daylight in which the masks, mummeries and resplendent features of the world do not appear half so beautiful and magnificent as in the candlelight of art. According to this, all artists are from beginning to end in league with appearance, they have no inclination towards truth, but just the opposite inclination. In the whole of the Enlightenment there are premises for this antithesis between art and truth, and they have made artistic imagination an object of suspicion from the factual standpoint. These are the empirical objections to the insidious gloom, to the golden mist of art, and they are not the only ones which derive from the Enlightenment. For alongside them stand the rational objections which of course originally belong to the Platonic conceptual logos and to its especially celebrated, especially radical hostility to art, but which made themselves fashionable again as objections to art in the trend towards calculating reason in the new bourgeois age. Even where the specific hostility to art, described by Marx, of capitalism in the nineteenth century (with l'art pour l'art as the counterblow and with the Goncourts' declaration of war on 'the public') could not yet make its presence felt. Even the droll inquiry of that French mathematician is relevant here who asked after listening to Racine's 'Iphignie': 'Qu'est-ce que cela prouve?'* Droll and fetishistically pedantic though this question looks, it still stands as a purely rational question in a separate and great school of alienation from art, equal to that of the empirical school. The aesthetic dimension is conspicuously absent in all the great systems of reason of
*

'What does that prove?'

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the new rationalist age; the ideas which inhabit it are not considered worthy of the least scientific discussion. Predominantly only technical aesthetic theories, albeit of a significant kind, chiefly concerning poetics, blossomed in French classical rationalism, and only the mathematical side of music was of interest to Descartes. Otherwise we do not know either in Descartes or even in Spinoza that there is an art in the ordered connection of ideas and things. Even the universal philosopher Leibniz at best only cited a few examples from art, such as those concerning the harmony-enhancing effect of shadows and dissonances, because such examples were serviceable for something much more important: for the proof of the best of all possible worlds. In Leibniz the harmoniously beautiful is in fact a kind of hint of a scientifically recognizable world-harmony, but it is only a confused hint, and the truth can thus dispense with it. Consequently the aesthetics of rationalism began in a very strange way when it was finally made into a philosophical discipline very late by Baumgarten,* the follower of Wolff;** in fact it began with a decidedly low opinion of its Object, indeed with apologies for its existence. The aesthetic Object was solely the so-called lower cognitive faculty at work in sensory perception and its ideas. And though beauty also represented perfection in this area, it was not comparable in terms of value with the complete clarity of conceptual cognition. The rationalist debasement of art thus lines up with the empirical positivist kind after all; but the list of enemies is still not complete. Indeed, hatred of art only becomes totally glaring when it derives not from reason but, often conversely, from belief, at least from the positing of something spiritually true. Then a storm of iconoclasm breaks out in this case not against the golden mist of art, as was usual in the empirical and ultimately also in the rationalist approach, but against the mainland of art, i.e. against the over-accentuated appearance within it. Beauty, the verdict reads here, seduces us to the superficial, falls for the hollow exterior and thus diverts from the essential nature of things. 'What good is there in imitating the shadows of shadows?' asks Plato, already making his conceptual logos almost clerically curt. On the other hand: 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth',*** commands the fourth commandment in the Bible and gives the cue for the iconoclasm of the invisibility of Yahweh, of the banning of all idolatry.
*

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 171462. Christian Wolff, 16791754, philosopher of the German Enlightenment. Exodus 20, 4.

**

***

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Art in general thus becomes gleaming, ultimately luciferian fulfilment which stands in the way of the true undissembling kind, indeed which denies it. This is hostility to art in its religious and spiritual form; what corresponds to it in morality is, not without reason, the turning away from the all too great visibility of 'works', the turning towards the invisible, genuine dimension of 'convictions'. Puritanism in this extensive sense (reaching back as far as Bernard of Clairvaux) finally culminated in Tolstoy's monstrous hatred of Shakespeare, of the lascivious work of beauty in general. Even in Catholicism a horror pulchri led, under Pope Marcellus, to the planning of a ban on elaborate church music, and this horror, applied to what is visible, gave to Protestantism the bare God who wishes to be worshipped in moral belief, in the word that is the truth. Thus the claim to truth comes out against beauty in so many different forms, empirical and rationalist, spiritual and religious. And however much these different claims to truth (for subjectively the spiritual was one as well) were at variance with themselves and in extreme conflict with one another, they are nevertheless united in the will towards a seriousness opposed to the game of appearance. This has always affected artists too, precisely because they themselves were serious. They themselves felt committed to the question of truth, because they did not want to be gameplayers, either immured or decadent ones. How amply the beautiful seeks also to be pictorially true in the descriptions and stories of great realistic writers. Not only in terms of sensory certainty, but also in terms of broadly revealed social contexts and natural processes. How legitimate Homer's realism is, a realism of such exact fullness that almost the whole of Mycenean culture can be visualized from it. And admittedly not a French mathematician, but Alexander von Humboldt, the naturalist, tells us of the Book of Job, Chapter 37: 'The meteorological processes which take place in the cloud cover, the formation and dispersal of the vapours during various wind changes, their kaleidoscope of colours, the generation of hail and of rolling thunder are described with individual graphicness; many questions are also raised which our modern physics is able to formulate in more scientific terms, but not to solve satisfactorily' (Kosmos II, Cotta, p. 35). Such precision and reality is undoubtedly peculiar and essential to all great literature, often also in decidedly spiritualreligious literature, as in the imagery of the Psalms. And the demand of significant realism to which all surface, but also all extravagance is alien, this glory in Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe, Keller, Tolstoy, is so greatly recognized in art (at least in the novel in recent times), if not actually

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fulfilled at high points, as if there had never been a mistrust born of the love of truth towards the Magister Ludi and his box of tricks. And yet artists, however concrete they are, have not settled the aesthetic question of truth; at best they have extended it in a desirable and significant way and made it more precise. For precisely in the realistic work of art we see that as a work of art it is still nevertheless something other than a source of historical and natural historical knowledge, or even insights. It is characterized by exquisite words which do after all also exaggerate what is so tellingly described by them beyond its given station, it is characterized above all by fantasizing, which bustles around between characters and events with a degree of licence highly alien to science. Fantasizing and in addition, in both senses of the word, art-fullness, by means of which invented material fills up the gaps in what has been concretely observed and rounds the plot into well-curved arches. An appearance of rounding, over-rounding, is in any case unmistakable even in the most realistic artistic creations, particularly in artistic novels. And great appearance has a quite 'surpassing' effect in those works of art which do not offer themselves primarily as realistic, either because they consciously romanticize alongside or beyond available existence, or because, far beyond a mere 'subject', they fructify myth, which is the oldest sustenance of art anyway. Giotto's 'Raising of Lazarus', Dante's 'Paradiso', Heaven in the final part of Faust: how do these stand beyond all detailed realism in relation to the philosophers' inquiry after truth? They are undoubtedly not true in the sense that the knowledge we have acquired of the world is true, but then what does the enormous wonderment at the after all inseparable form-content of these works mean, in a legitimate, world-related manner? Thus, astonishingly, although on a completely different level, the 'Qu'est-ce que cela prouve?' of that French mathematician becomes irrefutable, even without mathematics and completely without drollery. In other words: the question as to the truth of art becomes philosophically the question as to the possibly available depictability of beautiful appearance, as to its degree of reality in the by no means single-layered reality of the world, as to the location of its object-correlate. Utopia as object-determination, with the degree of existence of the Real Possible, thus encounters in the shimmering phenomenon of art a particularly fruitful problem of probation. And the answer to the aesthetic question of truth is: artistic appearance is not only mere appearance, but a meaning, cloaked in images and which can only be described in images, of material that has been driven further, wherever the exaggeration and fantasizing represent a significant pre-appearance, circulating

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in turbulent existence itself, of what is real, a pre-appearance which can specifically be represented in aesthetically immanent terms. What habitual or unblunted sense can hardly still see is illuminated here, in individual processes as well as social and natural ones. This pre-appearance becomes attainable precisely because art drives its material to an end, in characters, situations, plots, landscapes, and brings them to a stated resolution in suffering, happiness and meaning. Pre-appearance is this attainable thing itself because the mtier of driving-to-the-end occurs in dialectically open space, in which any Object can be aesthetically represented. Aesthetically represented, this means: immanently more achieved, more thoroughly formed, more essential than in the immediate-sensory or immediatehistorical occurrence of this Object. This thorough formation remains appearance even as pre-appearance, but it does not remain illusion; instead, everything that appears in the artistic image is sharpened or condensed to a decisiveness which the reality of experience in fact only seldom shows, but which is most definitely inherent in the subjects. Art clearly indicates this with founded appearance, in the theatre regarded as paradigmatic institution. It remains virtual, but in the same sense as a reflection is virtual, i.e. reproduces an Object outside itself with all its dimensions of depth on the reflecting surface. And the preappearance, in contrast to religious pre-appearance, remains immanent despite all transcendence: it expands, as Schiller in fact defined aesthetic realism using Goethe as an example, it expands 'nature, without, going beyond it'. Beauty, even sublimity are thus representative of an existence for Objects which has not yet become, of thoroughly formed world without external chance, without unessentiality, unrenderedness. The motto of aesthetically attempted pre-appearance runs along these lines: how could the world be perfected without this world being exploded and apocalyptically vanishing, as in Christian-religious pre-appearance (cf. also: Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie, 1923, p. 141). Art, with its formations which are always individual and concrete, seeks this perfection only in these formations, with the Total as penetratingly viewed Particular; whereas religion, of course, seeks utopian perfection in totality and places the salvation of the individual matter completely in the Totum, in the: 'I make all things new'.* Man is supposed to be born again here, society transformed into Civitas Dei, nature transfigured into the celestial. Whereas art remains rounded, when 'classical' it loves the coastal trip around the given, even when it is Gothic, despite all venturing beyond, it has something balanced, homogenized in
*

Rev. 21. 5: 'Behold, I make all things new'.

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it. Only music works explosively, occurring in open space, for which reason this art always carries something eccentric in it compared with the other arts, just as if it were only transposed on to the level of the beautiful or the sublime. All other arts pursue the representation of the pure carat in individual figures, situations, plots from the world, without exploding this world; hence the perfect visibility of this pre-appearance. Thus art is nonillusion, since it works along a line of extension from the Become, in its formed, more commensurate expression. This goes so far that a writer from antiquity, Juvenal, in order to express all the possible horrors of a storm, calls the storm 'poetica tempestas'. This goes so deep that Goethe, in his commentary on Diderot's 'Essay on Painting', posits concentration as realism, against merely reproductive naturalism: 'And thus the artist, grateful to nature, which also produced him, gives her a second nature in return, but one that is felt and thought and humanly perfected.' This humanized nature is however at the same time one that is more perfected in itself; not of course in the manner of sensory appearance of an idea which is finished anyway, as Hegel teaches, but rather in the direction of increasingly entelechetic expression, as Aristotle states. In fact, precisely this entelechetically or, as Aristotle also says, typically resolving force is powerfully remembered afresh in Engels' statement that realistic art is representation of typical characters in typical situations. Whereby the typical in Engels' definition obviously does not mean the average, but the significantly characteristic, in short, the essential image of the matter, decisively developed through exemplary instances. Along this line, therefore, lies the solution of the aesthetic question of truth: Art is a laboratory and also a feast of implemented possibilities, together with the thoroughly experienced alternatives therein, whereby the implementation and the result occur in the manner of founded appearance, namely of worldly perfected pre-appearance. In great art, exaggeration and fantasizing are most visibly applied to tendential consistency and concrete utopia. Though whether the call for perfection we can call it the godless prayer of poetry becomes practical even only to a small extent and does not merely remain in aesthetic preappearance is something which is not decided in poetry, but in society. Only controlled history, with an incisive counter-move against inhibitions, with active promotion of tendency, can help essential material in the distance of art to become increasingly also appearance in the dealings of life. This is then of course the same as iconoclasm that has become correct, not as destruction of artistic images, but as a breaking into them for the purpose of fructifying what is possibly contained in them, not only typically,

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but paradigmatically, i.e. in exemplary fashion. And wherever art does not play itself out into illusion, beauty and even sublimity is that which mediates a premonition of future freedom. Often rounded, never closed: this life-maxim of Goethe's is also that of art with the accent of conscience and substance ultimately on the unclosed. False Autarky; Pre-Appearance As Real Fragment Often rounded: it does not suit a beautiful image to present itself as incomplete. What is unfinished is external to it, does not belong to it, and the artist who has not finished what he had to do is unhappy about it. This is quite correct and obvious, in so far as and as long as it is merely a matter of sufficient strength of form. The source of artfulness is the ability which understands and thus totally wants to acquire its subject-matter. But of course, precisely for the sake of non-isolated acquisition, the threat of that artfulness must also repeatedly be noted which arises not out of ability but out of the share of mere appearance which even preappearance has. The appeal of pleasing perception and its representation, however imaginary what is represented may possibly be, is enough to satisfy mere appearance. Indeed, the imaginary or what has become imaginary can lend mere appearance a particularly decorative roundedness, one in which the seriousness of the subject-matter hardly disturbs, let alone interrupts, the beautifully coherent game. Precisely because mere appearance lets images live alongside each other so easily, so unreally, it guarantees that pleasing superficial coherence which shows no interest and presence whatever of a subject-matter beyond sheer illusion. The lack of belief in the represented subject-matter can even be a help to the smooth illusion, even more so than scepticism. This showed itself in Renaissance painting with regard to the gods of antiquity, in depicting whom the painter did not need to fear he had not behaved sufficiently discreetly towards the sacred; the same thing showed itself a little later in mythologically rounded poetry. Cames in the 'Lusiads' has his goddess Themis say quite ironically and yet in the most luxuriant verse that she herself and Saturn, Jupiter and all the other gods that appear are 'vain creatures of fantasy born to mortals out of blind madness, only serving to lend charm to the song'. Through the use of beautiful appearance mythological substance was indeed held in memory here, in fact introduced into the possible allegories of a pre-appearance, but by means of that finished fullness especially invited

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by appearance which is never interrupted. And finally, a further invitation to this comes from the side of immanence without an exploding crack, which surrounds all art, not just the art of classical antiquity or that imitating classical antiquity. Precisely the art of the Middle Ages provides many examples of a rounded-off satisfaction of an aesthetic kind, despite its religious-transcendental conscience. Gothic art contains this conscience, but there was equally a curious harmony in it which derived from classical Greek balance. The early Lukcs observed quite acutely, if somewhat exaggeratedly: 'So a new polis arose from the church . . . , the ladder of the earthly and heavenly hierarchies from the crack. And in Giotto and Dante, in Wolfram* and Pisano, in Thomas Aquinas and St Francis the world became round again, surveyable, the abyss lost the danger of its actual depth: but without losing any of its blackly shining strength, all its darkness became pure surface and thus fitted smoothly into a closed unity of colours; the cry for redemption became dissonance in the perfect rhythmical system of the world and made a new balance possible, but no less colourful and perfect than that of the Greeks: that of inadequate, heterogeneous intensities' (Die Theorie des Romans, 1920, p. 20f.). German secessions of Gothic art like that of Grnewald are of course unaffected by this kind of perfection. However, this hypostasis of the aesthetic confronts us in an even more closed fashion, though by no means in classical strength, from the Middle Ages, which remained determined by the Mediterranean. And there is within it an equilibrium and a finished coherence which is not only idealistic, but ultimately derives from great Pan, this primal image of all rounding. Pan is the one and all of the world which had also been revered as that whole which lacks nothing. Hence the ultimate seduction to nothing but rounding, but hence also Greek balance as secularized form of the totally pagan, i.e. crackless world-picture: the astral myth. In this myth the cosmos really was 'decoration', i.e. evenly beautiful; it was something ceaselessly circling within itself and hen kai pan a circle itself and not an open parabola, a sphere and not a process-fragment. Thus it is not without reason that art is very often pantheistically disposed in this all too rounding form, and not without reason that, conversely, a system formulated in a finished way appears pleasantly beautiful even in extra-artistic occurrence. The pleasure in sensory appearance, in the living mantle of divinity, certainly contributes to this pantheistic trait, but the seductive pull towards it is
*

Wolfram von Eschenbach, fl.c. 120020, wrote 'Parzival', the greatest German romance of the Middle Ages.

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even stronger from the harmoniously undisturbed coherence, the 'cosmos' even without 'universe'. All these are therefore the various reasons why a veritable art-fullness, an autarky of apparent enclosedness can also exist in a work of art, which, because it is excessive and immanent, at first masks the pre-appearance. But equally, and this is precisely the crucial difference and the crucial truth, all great art shows the pleasant and homogeneous aspects of its work-based coherence broken, broken up, leafed open by its own iconoclasm, wherever immanence is not driven to closedness of form and content, wherever it still poses as fragment-like. Here completely incomparable with the mere contingency of the fragmentary in the avoidable sense another hollow space of a factual, highly factual kind opens up, with unrounded immanence. And it is precisely in this space that the aestheticutopian meanings of the beautiful, even the sublime make their presence felt. Only what is broken into pieces in the all too stilled work of art, mixed with the atmosphere of the gallery, one which has become a mere objet d'art or, to put it a much better way: the itself already shaped openness in great artistic creations gives the material and the form for a cipher of the authentic. Never closed: thus precisely the all too beautiful breaks into life when the varnish cracks. When the surface pales or darkens, as in the evening when the light falls obliquely and the mountains emerge. The shattering of the surface and furthermore of the merely culturalideological context in which the works have stood exposes depth wherever it exists. What is meant here is not the sentimental ruin nor that kind of torso which, as so often with Greek statues, holds the figure together more tightly and produces greater block unity and plastic rigour. This sort of thing can of course be improvement of form, but not necessarily the intensification of the cipher which is what matters here. This only occurs through the fissures of disintegration, in the quite specific sense which disintegration possesses concerning the objet d'art and as transformation of the objet d'art. In this way, instead of ruin or torso, a belated fragment arises, one which can do better justice to the depth contents of art than the completedness which the work sought to manifest there and then. Every great art, even one as inherently so completely closed as that of Egypt, thus becomes a belated fragment, by disintegrating into essentiation; because the utopian ground opens up in which the work of art had been registered. Although the acquisition of the cultural heritage always has to be critical, this acquisition contains, as a particularly important factor, the self-dispersal of what has been made into the museum-bound objet d'art, but also of the false enclosedness which the work of art sought to have there and then and which further intensifies

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in museum-bound contemplation. The insular quality cracks, a series of figures full of open, experimental symbolic formations opens up. All the more so when the phenomenon of the belated fragment combines with that created in the work of art itself: not in fact in the usual, flat sense of the fragmentary as that which could not be done or that which remained by chance unfinished, but in the concrete sense of that which, at the highest level of mastery, is unclosed, of that which is transformed through utopian pressure. This is the case in great Gothic art, sometimes also in the Baroque, which despite all the power of the work, indeed because of it, had a hollow space and behind it a fertile darkness. Thus precisely fullyexecuted Gothic, despite Pan's presence here too, executes a fragment composed of central un-finish-ability. Peculiar, if then fragments arise even in the usual sense of brokenness, and yet in the unusual, though solely legitimate sense of an appearing Ultimum only hinted at. This is so in the work of Michelangelo, who left more fragments behind than any other great master, and in fact remarkably in his most characteristic concern, in his sculpture and not in his painting. Since in the latter he finished everything he began, whereas with statues and also in architecture he set a disproportionately large amount of half-completed work on one side, never turned to it again and left it behind. Vasari gave art history the signal to wonder at the meagre amount of totally finished material in Michelangelo's work and to wonder all the more since the enormity in the intended goal nevertheless corresponded so completely to the power and nature of this genius. But what offered resistance to artistic rounding, artistic completion here was precisely the corresponding element to enormity in Michelangelo himself, was the agreement between an overpowerful nature and the overpowering character of a task in such a way that no work executed could satisfy this adequation, so that in fact completion itself, driven so deeply into the Absolute, becomes a fragment. This kind of fragment is then nothing less than an ingredient of the un-temple-like, of the unharmonized cathedralic, is the conscience: Gothic even post festum. The depth of aesthetic completion brings the very dimension of the uncompleted into play: to this extent even the nonfragmentary, in the usual sense, in Michelangelo, the figures on the Medici tomb as much as the dome of St Peter's Basilica, stretches into that excessive measure which is the measure of the Ultimum in art. Hence finally the legitimately, namely materially fragmentary quality, in all works of this ultimative kind, in the West-stlicher Divan,* in Beethoven's last quartets,
*

A cycle of later Goethe poems inspired by intensive reading of Persian poetry in 1814 when the poet was already sixty-five.

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in Faust, in short, wherever unfinishability lends greatness in finishing. And if we look for the reason, which in ideological terms most definitely continues to operate, for such internal iconoclasm in greatly completed art and precisely in this, then it lies in the pathos of path and process, in the eschatological conscience that came into the world through the Bible. Totality in the religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom is solely of a totally transforming and exploding kind, is utopian; and, confronted with this totality, not only our knowledge, but also the whole of what has previously become, to which our conscience refers, then appears as unfinished work. As unfinished work or objective fragment precisely also in the most productive sense, not only in that of creatural limitation, let alone resignation. The 'Behold, I make all things new', in the sense of apocalyptic explosion, is written above this and influences all great art with the spirit after which Drer named his Gothic creation Apocalypsis Cum Figuris. Man is still not solid, the course of the world is still undecided, unclosed, and so also is the depth in all aesthetic information: this utopian factor is the paradox in aesthetic immanence, the most fundamentally immanent paradox in this immanence itself. Without such potency for the fragment, aesthetic imagination would of course have sufficient perception in the world, more than any other human apperception, but it would ultimately have no correlate. For the world itself, just as it is in a mess, is also in a state of unfinishedness and in experimental process out of that mess. The shapes which this process throws up, the ciphers, allegories and symbols in which it is so rich, are all themselves still fragments, real fragments, through which process streams unclosed and advances dialectically to further fragmentary forms. The fragmentary holds good for the symbol too, although the symbol does not refer to process, but to the unum necessarium within it; but precisely because of this reference and because of the fact that it is only a reference and not an arrival, the symbol also contains fragment. The real symbol itself is in fact only one because, instead of being disguised merely to the observer and inherently clear, it is precisely not yet inherently manifest. This therefore constitutes the meaning of the fragment, seen from the perspective of art, and not only from that of art; the fragment lies in the subject-matter itself, it still belongs, rebus sic imperfectis et fluentibus, to the subjectmatter of the world. Concrete utopia as object-determination presupposes concrete fragment as object-determination and involves it, even though certainly as an ultimately revocable fragment. And therefore every artistic, and especially every religious pre-appearance is only concrete on the basis and to the extent that the fragmentary in

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the world ultimately presents the layer and the material for it to constitute itself as preappearance. It Is a Question of Realism, Everything Real Has a Horizon To stick to things, to sail over them, both are wrong. Both remain external, superficial, abstract, and being immediate, cannot get away from the surface. Sticking keeps to it anyway, sailing over has it in its own unruly inner dimension as well as in the other, merely evaporated dimension of immediacy to which it escapes. Nevertheless, of course, sailing over belongs to a higher human type than taking things as they are. And above all: sticking to these things remains flat even when it is considered, that is, empiricist, whereas enthusiasm, when it is considered, can most definitely stop being bottomless. The flat empiricist and the effusive enthusiast are constantly surprised by the flow of the real, which neither of them grasp, but the former, as a fetishist of so-called facts, remains obstinate, whereas the fantast is possibly teachable. In the world only reification, which keeps a firm hold on individual moments of process and anchors them as facts, suits the empiricist, and he stands and falls by it. Whereas sailing over is itself at least in motion, i.e. in an attitude which need not fundamentally remain unmediable with real motion. In creation, sailing over has art on its side, albeit with much appearance, much dubious escape to a downright intentionally untrue dream-appearance. But the concrete correction of sailing over opens up in art, and not only in art, images, insights, tendencies which occur simultaneously in man and in the object assigned to him. Precisely this concrete dimension does not rise from the perspective of grovelling empiricism and the naturalism that corresponds to it in aesthetic terms, which never advances from the establishment of what is factual to the exploration of what is essentially happening. Whereas imagination, as soon as it appears concretely, knows how to visualize not only sensory abundance, but also the mediation-relations in and behind the immediacy of real experience. Instead of the isolated fact and the superfcial context of abstract immediacy which is likewise isolated from the whole, the relation of appearances to the whole of their epoch and to the utopian Totum located in process now emerges. Art becomes knowledge with the help of imagination of this kind, namely through telling individual images and overall pictures of a characteristically typical kind; it pursues the 'significant aspect' of appearances and executes it. Science, with the help of imagination of

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this kind, grasps the 'significant aspect' of appearances through concepts, which never remain abstract, never allow the phenomenon to fade, let alone be lost. And the 'significant aspect' is in art and science the particular aspect of the general, the respective instance for the dialectically open context, the respective characteristically typical figure of the Totum. And the actual Toturn, this dimension in which even the epochally grasped whole of all epochal moments is itself again a moment, shows itself precisely in broadly mediated great works only on the horizon, not in an already thoroughly formed reality. Everything living, says Goethe, has an atmosphere around it; everything real in general, because it is life, process, and can be a correlate of objective imagination, has a horizon. An inner horizon, extending vertically as it were, in the self-dark, an external one of great breadth, in the world-light; and the regions behind both horizons are filled with the same utopia, are consequently identical in the Ultimum. Where the prospective horizon is omitted, reality only appears as become, as dead, and it is the dead, namely naturalists and empiricists, who are burying their dead here. Where the prospective horizon is continuously included in the reckoning, the real appears as what it is in concreto: as the path-network of dialectical processes which occur in an unfinished world, in a world which would not be in the least changeable without the enormous future: real possibility in that world. Together with that Toturn which does not represent the isolated whole of a respective section of process, but the whole of the subjectmatter pending in process overall, hence still tendential and latent. This alone is realism, it is of course inaccessible to that schematism which knows everything in advance, which considers its uniform, in fact even formalistic, stencil to be reality. Reality without real possibility is not complete, the world without future-laden properties does not deserve a glance, an art, a science any more than that of the bourgeois conformist. Concrete utopia stands on the horizon of every reality; real possibility surrounds the open dialectical tendencies and latencies to the very last. By these the unconcluded motion of unconcluded matter and motion is, in that profound phrase of Aristotle, 'uncompleted entelechy' is arch-realistically pervaded.

18 The Layers of the Category Possibility


How often something presents itself in such a way that it can be. Or even in such a way that it can be different than it was before, which is

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why something can be done about it. But this itself would not be possible without Possible within and in front of it. There is a wide field here and it must be investigated more than ever before. Already the fact that a Can-Be can be said and thought is by no means self-evident. There is still something open here, it can be meant differently than it was before, can be rearranged, connected differently, changed in moderation. Where nothing more can be done or is possible, life stands still. 'Now everything, everything must change',* how else would this decidedly youthful exclamation itself be possible? Certainly, there is much that is vague in the merely Possible, much that is slippery too, not only what is fluid or that which keeps things fluid. But just as man is mainly a creature who enters into the Possible and has it in front of him, he also knows that this does not coincide with vagueness, that precisely his open character is definitely nothing arbitrary. Can-Be also has laws, even in the mere play of words and especially in the seriousness that soon enters. And the available substance which has so much airiness in it is at the same time one of the heaviest and demands to be treated strictly. Otherwise above all the different layers of the Can-Be do not become visible. The Formally Possible First, of course, much too much can just be said without thinking. Everything can be spoken in theory, words can be senselessly strung together. Constructions are possible such as: 'something round or'; 'a person and is'. Apart from the fact that they are sayable, there is nothing possible in them at all; they are meaningless nonsense. The case is different however with statements which are not nonsensical, but run counter to sense, where the listener at least shakes his head in disbelief. Namely when the statement directly contradicts itself, as in the concept 'round square' or in the judgement: 'He is boarding a ship that had sailed.' A meaning like this which directly contradicts itself in its characteristics or its predicate is absurd, but definitely not nonsense, rather in fact countersense. The latter is, in contrast to merely sayable nonsense, definitely something conceptually possible, a formal Can-Be; because everything is conceptually possible which can in any way be conceived as standing in relation. In fact even
*

Cf. Uhland's 'Frhlingsglauben', 1812: 'The gentle breezes have woken, Now everything, everything must change.'

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relations whose parts are related not only absurdly, but totally disparately to one another still represent, even though they are disparate, a formally describable relation, namely in fact a disparate one, and belong to what is conceptually possible. Such as the statements 'irascible triangle' or 'well-read chain-bridge' or 'the horse that is thunder' and other incompatible things besides. Such exaggeration shows at the same time how boundless the merely conceptually possible can be. For even the relation in the statement that there is no relation whatsoever between things had an unfruitful place in what is conceptually possible. Just as there can be fullness in thinking due to imprecision, bad fullness in other words, there is also bad openness in what is conceptually possible. And this alongside the good kind, which reveals itself above all in the formal Can-Be of the Self-Contradicting. The Factually-Objectively Possible* Much too much can therefore still not only be said, but also thought. That is why the Can-Be, which can be encountered not only in thinking but also in cognition, looks much more definite. This Possible is not boundless, but a respectively nameable one and one that can be indicated by degrees in proportion to the known conditions. But since such namings and degrees initially only express degrees of knowing and cognition, not degrees of the inner conditional maturity of the fact-based Object* itself, the Possible is still not a strictly factbased one here, but a factual one, i.e. a cognitive, fact-suited one. Thus it presents itself as statement of caution, then as one of grounded opinion, of grounded assumption of its capability-of-being, in short as factually-objectively grounded possibility. It is the grounding which stands here for the condition or the real ground, in such a way however that the grounding, that is, the condition existing according to cognition for an affirmative, factually valid statement itself does not exist in a complete form. Everything is conceptually possible where
*

In this section Bloch uses the concepts 'sachlich', 'sachhaft' and 'sachgem' for possible attitudes to 'die Sache', i.e. the real matter, the real state of affairs. We have translated these as 'factual', 'factbased', 'fact-suited'. Uniform with these are the concepts for possible attitudes to 'das Objekt', the object 'objektiv', 'objekthaft', 'objektgem', which we have translated consistently as 'objective', 'objectbased' and 'object-suited'.
**

Bloch once again distinguishes between the more philosophical 'Objekt' and the more concrete 'Gegenstand' here. We have indicated 'Gegenstand' and its compounds with a capital.

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anything at all can be conceived as standing in relation, but over and above this it is true of all further kinds of the Can-Be: the Possible is partially conditioned material, and it is possible only as such. We must keep to the thus given definition from here on, as it contains the criterion for the Possible in all its variations. In other words: every Possible beyond the merely conceptually possible signifies an openness in consequence of a not yet completely sufficient, and hence more or less insufficiently existing conditional ground. Because only a few but not all conditional grounds exist, the Real cannot yet be indicated from the thus Possible, so the old scholastic principle holds: a posse ad esse non valet consequentia.* But now back to the factually Possible itself which is in question here. It is likewise partial conditionality, but, in more precise terms, solely factually-partial knowledge-cognition of conditionality. This conditionality is partial and must be so because a total mustering of the conditions would make the occurrence of an event no longer merely supposable, more or less probable, i.e. factually possible, but unconditionally certain. Thus it is unfair, in full knowledge of the fully available conditions, still to bet on the occurrence of an event; thus with such knowledge in one's pocket it is cowardly or stupid still to play Fabius Cunctator.** The factually-objective Possible (and incidentally also the fact-based object-based Possible and the really Possible, of which more later) is stated in a hypothetical judgement or, in cases of even less certainty, in a problematic judgement. The hypothetical judgement is distinguished in this relation from the problematic one in that it presupposes not yet confirmed initial propositions, whereas the problematic judgement, which in its form conceals the initial propositions: 'it could rain today', 'Leukippos did perhaps exist', 'cosmic rays possibly emanate from a star-cluster in the Milky Way' presupposes other unknown initial propositions apart from the not yet confirmed ones. The problematic judgement is therefore the authentically developed judgement of possibility as a factually modal determination: P is assigned to S in the mode of the Can-Be. A special case that is relevant here is further represented by the inauthentic, in fact false judgements of possibility; they are those of knowledge which is insufficient not in terms of research but only of reception. Previously, this false factual Can-Be has hardly been separated from the genuine kind, and
*

There is no necessary development from potential to being.

**

Fabius Maximus (Cunctator) (d. 203 B.C.), the Roman Consul and Dictator who saved Rome from being conquered by Hannibal by evasive tactics, avoiding direct confrontation in battle. Hence the term 'Fabian Policy' which Bloch is referring to here.

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yet the difference, which is so important for the status of the possible, leaps to the eye. A false modal judgement is this for example: 'Water can be broken down by electric current.' In reality, however, water is always broken down by electric current (as long as no new, possibly disturbing conditions exist). Likewise the knowledge of this process is completely grounded, all conditions for it exist; consequently the above-mentioned content of the judgement is unquestionable. The only thing that is not so unquestionable is the state of knowledge of the consciousness which receives the proposition, and only in this psychological-pedagogical respect, external to logic, is the cited judgement modally formed, modally disguised. Factually, it is a categorical or assertive judgement through and through, not a hypothetical or problematic one. Which is why therefore only non-pedagogical statements, only research-statements in which a non liquet of the knowledge-conditions for the categorical or assertive form exists are genuine factually-modal statements. Factuallyobjective possibility thus always designates the degree of scientific-objective groundedness according to the incomplete scientific knownness of the factually existing conditions. Thus the judgement is left in the balance here, is only more or less distanced from the question. Or rather the affirmation and denial of the judgement remains in the balance, i.e. the bare judging or the qualitative judgement of a judgement. And only in this judgement of a judgement does the factually Possible exist, and most decidedly in this of course; it begins to exist in it before it goes on to become depictive. Factual possibility is thus already in the assumption or the suppositions which lead to the formulation of questions concerning scientific or socio-historical given facts. The supposition anticipates in a problematic judgement the principal condition or a group context of conditions on the basis of which the Object of examination can be clarified in its real ground and accordingly understood in the course it takes. This methodological supposition guides the formulation of questions and the variations of the conditions of scientific experiments, but it also provides the peculiar estimate, i.e. what has been called the temporary, the working hypothetical image of a particular matter. The expression working hypothesis of course contains a dubious element within it, in that it was flogged to death by the late-bourgeois relativists; so let us use the older and more solid expression: heuristic principle. Such a principle is at work for example in hypothetical simplification or in a hypothetical analogy to what is already better known, with which the exploration of confused or complicated phenomena of a socio-historical

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kind may first be approached. The formulation of the question of this factually Possible in methodological use is confirmed or not confirmed by inductions which are made in the direction of the supposed conditional context. Though, of course, however comprehensive it is, an induction can never express its result other than in a judgement of factually-objective possibility once again. For even the most complete induction cannot be a total one, i.e. a knowledge of all conditional elements as the same in all regions of space, or even remaining the same in time. Thus in inductive confirmation of a methodological supposition there is also still that trace of a factually Possible, of a not totally Certain, which in graduated stages up to 'astronomic certainty' is called comparative probability. And what of deduction, the supposedly always settled large form of an exhaustively sufficient, essentialgeneral conditional ground? It is true that it not only reveals the particulars of inductive empirical knowledge as moments of a total context, from this generality of the particular, it also seeks, in a traditionally extreme claim, to derive the cognition of these particulars with necessity, consequently not with partial but total conditionality. This quite clearly in the first mode of the first conclusion figure: Caius is necessarily mortal by virtue of his being a man. The middle term of being a man produces here the completely sufficient 'essential ground' of being mortal; thus there arises what Aristotle calls a perfect conclusion, that is in fact: a conclusion of necessity. 'Perfect I call a conclusion which, in order for its necessity to be clear, needs no further definition beyond the premises' (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Chapter 1): factual capability-of-being thus gives way to factual inevitability-of-being. However, the thus asserted impossibility of the capability-of-being-other, let alone of the capability-ofbeing-opposite, is only to be found in areas of the highest abstraction which have been made artificially pure, and even there only when limited to what can be derived from axioms or to that which is dominantly contained in theorems. The axioms (mathematical, logical, in copied form even the earlier ones of Natural Right) are of course not posited arbitrarily, and hence mere game-rules, as with incurable randomness much airily idealistic, supposedly fact-free 'pure research' into mathematics asserts. Instead, the axioms definitely contain a depiction of factual relations external to thought, although in the most abstractly abbreviated and general form. However, they are limited to particular areas of their purely constructive dominance, and these limits are above all fluid (we only need to think of the mere 'limited case' of our Euclidean space and its axioms or of the changes in the proposition of contradiction in

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elementary, as it were Euclidean logic, and then in dialectically developed logic). But then, all these axioms still far from coincide with the 'essential ground' designated by Aristotle (the active Totum of the matter, the 'entelechy'); they are kept much too abstract for that. And the 'essential ground' itself, for example the cited fact of Caius being a man as the middle term in the first mode of the first conclusion figure: even the middle term of this being a man, in which Aristotle wanted to perceive both the perfect logical cognitive ground and also the inevitable real ground of being mortal, produces no necessity settled once and for all, in the sense of strict deductive proof. Since even being human (like every other 'essential ground') stands in process, and cannot therefore, in the strict sense, lend logical necessity even to such an exceptionless phenomenon as mortality. Consequently, even in deduction, factually Necessary only proves to be factually Possible, even though this is possibly of the smallest degree. In general: the conditional initial propositions of concluding cognition, without falling into a closed schematism estranged from the world, cannot be more complete than the unenclosed Fact-based itself, which the Factual has to depict after its fashion, in concept, judgement, conclusion. Even in the Factually-objective the area of the possible is, sui generis, very large; it can belong here, opposed to bed of ease and fixed derivation, to the life of research. The Fact-Based Object-Suited Possible So much for what remains open, that is so because it is not or not rigidly settled. This kind of Can-Be thus reflects factual caution in judgements, mostly in the manner of a question still resonating along with it, of a factual reservation. Differently constituted, however, to this factually Possible is the fact-based Possible which now emerges; namely in so far as it does not concern our knowledge of something, but this something itself, as something that could become this or that. The fact-based Possible does not live on the insufficiently known, but on the insufficiently emerged conditional grounds. It therefore does not designate a more or less sufficient knowledge of conditions, but it designates what is more or less sufficiently conditioning in Objects themselves and in their factual relations. Factual relation, that is the 'relating of matters-of-fact' as Objects of cognition; to the factual relation belong first the kinds of having of Objective qualities and relationships, then of standing in Objective relationships. Modal factual relations, as the Objects of cognition, therefore never coincide with modal statements,

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as the mere procedures of cognition, of the kind represented by assumptions, suppositions, the anticipating estimate, and inductively probable or even deductive conclusions. But in fact: a still openly Possible arises even when there is otherwise sufficiently enclosed knowledge of the existing conditions; consequently, the Possible appears here as Objectivestructural thus-relating itself. Here we enter upon the depictive layer of fact-basedness, of object-suitedness, as distinct from mere factuality, objectivity. This also makes a distinction necessary in the discipline in which the fact-based Possible is to be treated. Whereas factuality only concerns cognition and therefore the concern of its objectivity is an epistemological one, fact-basedness concerns the Object of cognition, which is not, according to the neo-Kantians, cognition itself; the real concern of this object-suitedness is consequently a categorically Object-theoretical one. The concept of Object theory first appeared clearly in Meinong, but it was here purely related a priori to the supposedly existence-free quality of an essence which was supposed to ghost around independently of the existence or non-existence of Objects. Mathematics was regarded as a model of this 'existence-free knowledge' here, and especially in the later phenomenology of Husserl, even if it was of course: a mathematics artificially removed from all its depictive real reference, and incurably reified in its abstractness. And logic was well and truly reified here, in the sense of a purely a priori 'description' of its acts, a purely a priori 'semantic analysis' of its categories with 'bracketed existence'. Whereas Object theory that applies to reality is one in which the a priori represents even less of a temptation than in epistemology. For although the Objects and their factual relations must still be distinguished not only from the factual aspect of the process of cognition, but also from the actual objects and their real relations, they function precisely as the most faithful possible forms of realistic depiction. And the precedence noted here of an Object theory over object theory thus contains no idealism, because the researching-materialistic depiction itself belongs to the Object theory, is at work only in the face of the object-based Real and not in it, and does not coincide with it. Further: the depiction of the structural factual relations no longer belongs to the methodological cognition-process, because it is a result of cognition, and it is such a result in that and in so far as it is related, being object-suited, precisely to the real object. The form of the result of cognition is the real definition, as the statement not merely of linguistic features, conceptual characteristics, but of Objective-constitutive properties; and precisely this real definition, being characteristically 'concise' and not spread out,

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represents the object considered from its structural Object-side. To give an example: the socialist real definition of the nation depicts, without all the far-fetched foreign nationalistic moustaches or even cosmopolitan great Chicagos, hotel sauces, levellings of today, precisely the concise Object-side of the real, this means in fact: it makes the constitutive-real structure in the object clear. The theory of Objects is thus the site of categories as the most general and then characteristically typical modes and forms of existence. (If it were not this specific site and on it, the theory of categories would coincide with the whole philosophy of the real and the latter likewise with the theory of categories.) So now, within the thus constituted layer of fact-basedness, of structural object-suitedness, the possibility in this layer must also be distinguished separately and as separately determined. Important for this is the abovementioned distinction between Object and real object: the purely structural possibility of the propensity to something is not yet the same as this real propensity itself, as the disposition in all the richly interwoven, even richly disturbed, inhibited, and again victorious metamorphoses of reality. The fact-based object-suited Possible, grasped and defined in terms of Object theory, therefore definitely constitutes a separate differentiation in the category of possibility and is not, for instance, a superfluous doubling of the object-based real Possible. The fact-based Possible is the fact-based partially Conditional according to the structural genus, type, social context and legislative context of the matter. Partially Conditional appears here therefore as an openness strictly founded in the Object and thus only communicated to hypothetical or problematic cognition, an openness of a more or less structurally determined kind. Two kinds of conditions appear here in all cases, internal and external ones. They interweave in interaction, in such a way however that the individual character of both is thoroughly preserved. But the fact-based merely Possible remains even if one of the two conditions, the internal or the external, should almost be fulfilled. Thus a blossom can of course let the fruit ripen within it with complete internal conditionality, but if the complete external condition of good weather is missing, then the fruit is still merely possible. Conversely, an even more reductive effect than the missing external condition is produced by the weakness of internal conditions when there is a simultaneous abundance of external ones. Of course, humanity always sets itself tasks it can solve, but if the great moment for solution is met by a fainthearted generation,*
*

'The great moment is met by a faint-hearted generation', from Goethe and Schiller's 'Xenien', epigrams written mainly in 1796.

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then more than ever this solution is merely possible, i.e. only remains weakly possible. The lack of revolutionary consequences that followed from the 9th November 1918 in Germany provides an example of this, or, in another sphere, the unripened fruit of great German painting after Drer, even though the external conditions still existed for it, however much the circle of ideology and patronage was that of a small state.* The partial conditionality must not therefore sink below a certain fraction in either of the two kinds of condition, otherwise over-compensation by the other kind of condition is itself impossible. But the interweaving remains of course, as becomes especially clear when the structure of the internal as well as the external condition is more firmly grasped, i.e. with the removal of that equivocation which has persisted for ages precisely in the Object-category of possibility. Possibility here in fact means both internal, active capability and external, passive capability-of-being-done; therefore, capability-of-being- other falls into capability-of-doing-other and capability-ofbecoming-other. As soon as these two meanings have been concretely distinguished, the internal partial condition emerges as active possibility, i.e. as capacity, potency, and the external partial condition as possibility in the passive sense, as potentiality. Both are in fact interwoven: there is no working capability of capacity and its active 'propensity' without potentiality in a time, environment, society, without the usable ripeness of these external conditions. The political form of active possibility is the ability of the subjective factor; and the latter least of all can act without interweaving, without interaction with the objective factors of possibility, i.e. with the potentialities of that which can really happen or can at least be arranged, according to the ripeness of the external conditions. But not as if the external conditions themselves here fell out of possibility in its most significant sense, namely out of openness here in a fatalizing way. On the contrary: if possibility as capacity is the capabilityof-doing-other, that which does not cancel but rather redetermines in all determinations, then possibility as objective potentiality is the capability-of-becoming-other, that which cannot be cancelled, but rather can be directed and re-determined in all determinations. And the latter always with such interweaving that, without potentiality of the capability-of-becoming-other, neither the capability-of-doing-other of potency would
*

Bloch is referring to 'Kleinstaaterei', the political division of Germany into small states which pertained until the nineteenth century. This was the outcome of the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. After 1848, with great foresight, Marx wrote: 'Unless radical elements unite Germany by revolutionary means, Bismarck will unite it by reactionary Junker ones'. By 1871 Bismarck had done so.

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have space, nor, without the capability-of-doing-other of potency, would the capability-ofbecoming-other of the world have a sense which could be mediated with human beings. Consequently even the Object category of possibility predominantly reveals itself as that which it is not by virtue of itself, but rather by virtue of the supporting intervention of human beings in what is still changeable: as a possible concept of salvation. It also revealed itself partly, of course, as a possible concept of disaster,* precisely on account of the capability-ofdoing-other, but also on account of the capability-of-becoming-other within it, that no less provides room for a change for the worse, commensurate with the precarious material which can lie precisely in the changeability, and here therefore uncertainty of a situation. This precarious material, as negative stock of fact-based possibility, extends from the accident that can happen to us to the eruption of fascist hell, a possibility that was and still is concealed in the final stage of capitalism. The disaster character of the Possible thus militates against the above-mentioned salvation character, hope character of the Possible, which lies no less powerfully in the changeability of a situation, here however not in its uncertainty, but in its redeemability, positive revocability. This non-precarious, but beneficial element, as the so highly positive other stock of fact-based possibility, extends from the stroke of luck which can happen to people to the realm of freedom which develops as socialist possibility in history and finally begins to become real. Everything which is thus capable of change (fortuna vertit) admittedly always contains an element of chance, but again in a different way. There is the merely singular and immediate aspect of an accident or a stroke of luck. But there is also a capability-of-being-other which does not occur on the surface in this way. Along these lines, Hegel distinguished with great vividness external contingency from dialectically mediated change of process; he did this by limiting external contingency to merely external necessity, in fact by declaring that they are identical. Consequently contingency is seen by Hegel solely in the immediately concrete and not in the mediatedly concrete, or in fact only on the edge of process: 'The immediately concrete is namely a host of properties which are outside each other and more or less indifferent towards each other, and towards which for this very reason simple subjectivity that exists for itself' (the incipient centring aspect of process) 'is equally indifferent and leaves them to external and therefore contingent determination' (Enzyklopdie, 250). This is contingency in the not at all
*

Bloch is punning on the German 'Heil' salvation, and 'Unheil' disaster.

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trustworthy sense, that which externally disperses and disturbs normal and typical development more in previous history than in nature. But dialectically-mediated unenclosedness, as the possibility structure of lasting process, has nothing at all in common with poorly-mediated randomness. Though once again not as if that which is circulating in the capability-of- being-other of the process is now the strict opposite of every kind of chance and contingency. The enormous experiment of mediated capability-of-being- other in process does not yet possess this opposite and still has neither the calm nor even a legal title to possess it. Instead, there is at work in this capability-of-being-other of possibility once again precisely that which we may call contingency at its highest level, with the character of permanent, but in fact partial mediation. This kind of contingency, in the finally trustworthy sense of the matter, means creative wealth of variability which is open to formations and creations. This is a variability which is not external but mediated in a law-governed and factbased way, yet precisely one of unthwarted change of direction, above all of unexhausted new formation. Here even a so-called contingency no longer coincides with merely external necessity, but it forms, as a contingency which is dialectically mediated with the material of law-based necessity, precisely the blooming, characteristic aspect, the ordered fullness of development of the open world. Contingency of this kind is of course equally still situationbased, but not in the sense of the precarious, it fulfils rather the mundus situalis of the process which is giving birth to the New. The strict opposite of every contingency would only be enclosed necessity no longer capable of variability, but not in need of it either. Only this structurally enclosed necessity would be the fully Conditional per se, in which the internal and above all the external conditions are not merely completely ripe, but coincide. Though as yet no Objectivity has got to the bottom of the matter in this necessity to such an extent that the Objectivity itself coincides with its total foundation; so that it would in fact be structurally necessary. This coincidence was considered by Spinoza in his definition of Godnature as the causa sui and with much greater hypostasis of logical identity by Anselm of Canterbury in the self-foundation, the 'aseitas' (a se esse) of God. According to which the most perfect being necessarily exists because it exists out of its own intrinsicality, and consequently its essence also necessarily includes its existence, as its existence does its essence. It is not necessary to affirm that such object-based notions do not exist beyond their definition, unless in mere, more or less concretely anticipatable value-ideals of the perfect coincidence of reason and manifestation. The framework

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of such a value-ideal is even outside and opposed to all theology the 'one thing which is necessary', and therefore that which has traditionally been designated as the 'highest good'. However, since rebus sic imperfectis even what is designated thus is still by no means real, but at best in process, even this type of structural necessity exists once again only in structural possibility. Though the latter now proves, with the horizon of the causa sui or achieved identity of existence and essence, to be the most decisive category of salvation. Since the ideal point where essential being and appearance coincide is always simultaneously the absolute target point for the structural line of the humanely positively Possible. The Objectively-Real Possible The Can-Be would mean almost nothing if it remained without consequences. The Possible only has consequences, however, in that it does not occur merely as formally permissible or even as objectively supposable or even as open in an object-suited way, but in that it is a future-laden definiteness in the real itself. There is thus real-partial conditionality of the object which represents in the latter itself its real possibility. Thus man is the real possibility of everything which has become of him in his history and, above all, which can still become of him if his progress is not blocked. He is a possibility therefore which is not merely exhausted like an acorn in the enclosed realization of the oak-tree, but which has not yet ripened the whole of its internal and external conditions, condition-determinants. And in the unexhausted whole of the world itself: matter is the real possibility for all the forms which are latent in its womb and are delivered of it through process. In this most comprehensive concept of real possibility, the dynamei on (Being-In-Possibility) is located, which Aristotle himself defined as matter. For just as Heraclitus was the first to see the contradiction in things themselves, Aristotle was the first to recognize possibility in real terms, in the worldstock itself. From this point Real Possible becomes conceivable as substratum: 'Everything that becomes in nature and art has matter, since everything that is becoming is capable (dynaton) of being and not being, but this (what can and cannot be) is in every case matter' (Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 7). And it is instructive that that which reveals itself actively in this potentiality: the self-realizing form (entelechy) which is still dualistically separated from matter in Aristotle, recedes and itself becomes matter to the same extent that the

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concept of active potency accedes to that of passive potentiality. The ex contrario proof of this is the struggle of strict Arab theists, the so-called Motakhalim (that is, teachers of the word, of revealed faith) against the equation: real possibility = matter. To keep the omnipotence of the highest form (of the divine actus purus) absolute, instead of the dynamei on, they had to spread the wholly null void into a Primum before the world: God created the world out of the void, did not evoke it from matter, from real possibility. Conversely, in pantheistic-materialistic philosophers of the Middle Ages, for example in Avicenna, Averros, Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinant, real possibility becomes matter for the whole ground of the world, and the divine creative will is always a moment of matter; in fact, God and matter become identical. Development in Averros is 'eductio formarum ex materia', with the 'dator formarum' in the universe itself. Thus creation appears with the omission of all dualism solely as self-movement, self-fertilization of the matter of God; this matter contains the potentiality and simultaneously that potency immanent in it which makes an extra-worldly mover superfluous. And this semi-materialism of real possibility increases in line with the Renaissance in Giordano Bruno. In his work the world becomes totally the realization of the possibilities which are contained in uniform matter and as this. Natura naturans and natura naturata now coincide above and below 'in permanent, eternal, generating, maternal matter'. The substratum real possibility thus becomes, in bold extrapolation from Aristotle, at the same time the source, not only the vessel of forms: 'Hence matter, which . . . always remains fertile, must have the significant prerogative of being recognized as the sole substantial principle and as that which is and remains . . . That is also why some of them, because they had perhaps considered the relationship of forms in nature, as far as it could be discerned from Aristotle and others of a similar school of thought, finally concluded that the forms were only accidents and determinations in matter and that therefore the prerogative of being considered as actus and entelechy must also belong to matter' (Bruno, 'Cause, Principle and Unity'). These are therefore the first consequences when real possibility is taken as being so real that it simultaneously embraces the womb and generation, life and spirit, united in matter. And the womb also continues to remain fertile, the tendencylatency of that which can become in real terms is not enclosed in the material substratum. This definition of the dynamei on is of course one which perished in merely mechanical, mechanistic materialism. Matter as fullness first rightly had to shrink here, because quantitative science showed no

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trace of it and because total mechanics was the best crowbar against otherworldliness. But this shrinking was no less possible because Christian scholasticism had itself removed the Aristotelian concept of matter and even the variously pre-Socratic one (to which Bruno likewise refers) from the fecund region of the natura naturans. Which is also why the words of the English naturalist John Tyndall may also apply to the mechanical = all too mechanical concept of matter, above all to its deadening aftereffect in the previous century: 'If matter comes into the world as a beggar, it is because the Jacobs of theology have robbed it of its birthright.'* In any case, matter which is only understood mechanically subsequently became a clod estranged from history, for which all of its real possibility has already become static reality, in the sense of a beginning frozen to death from birth as it were. However, Aristotle's definition which continues to have an effect, that of the dynamei on, a definition which has become capable of mutation, enters itself mutatis mutandis into historical-dialectical materialism. Subjective factor, ripeness of conditions, shift of quantity into quality, even changeability: all these dialectically-materialist moments of development are without substratum in a clod-matter. The dialectical element falls away from it, as a quantum which is of course moved mechanically but also immediately mechanized, or remains an epitheton ornans attached to it; transition from the realm of necessity into that of freedom only finds land in unenclosed process-matter. Precisely the extremes which have previously been held as far apart as possible: future and nature, anticipation and matter chime together in the overdue groundedness of historical-dialectical materialism. Without matter no basis of (real) anticipation, without (real) anticipation no horizon of matter is ascertainable. Real possibility thus does not reside in any ready-made ontology of the being of That-Which-Is up to now, but in the ontology, which must constantly be grounded anew, of the being of ThatWhich-Is-Not-Yet, which discovers future even in the past and in the whole of nature. Its new space thus emphasizes itself in the old space in the most momentous manner: real possibility is the categorical In-Front-of-Itself of material movement considered as a process; it is the specific regional character of reality itself, on the Front of its occurrence. How else could we explain the future-laden properties of matter? there is no true realism without the true dimension of this openness. The Real Possible begins with the seed in which what is coming
*

The physicist John Tyndall (182093) was actually Irish.

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is inherent. What is prefigured in it drives on to unfold itself, but not of course as if it already existed beforehand, boxed into the narrowest space. The 'seed' itself still awaits many leaps, the 'inherent propensity' unfolds itself in the unfolding itself to ever new and more precise beginnings of its potentia-possibilitas. The real Possible in seed and inherent propensity is consequently never an encapsulated finished entity which, first existing in miniature, simply has to grow out. Instead it proves its openness as really developing unfolding, not as mere spilling out or folding out. Potentia-possibilitas repeatedly makes the initial root and Origo of processively continuing appearance original on a new level, with newly latent content. Thus the worker, this root of becoming human, is transformed throughout the whole of his further history and develops more and more precisely within it. In fact we can say that even man walking upright, this alpha of ours in which lies the propensity towards being completely unbowed and hence towards the realm of freedom, itself moves repeatedly transformed and more precisely qualified throughout the history of ever more concrete revolutions. Right up to classless man, who in general represents the ultimately intended propensity-possibility of history up to now. Hence the real Possible not only keeps the latter driving onwards, as propensity towards its Real, but also, as the ever further developing ultimate Totum of this propensity, has an essential relation to the reality which has already become. Thus the previously Real is both pervaded by the constant plus-ultra of essential possibility and illuminated by it at its leading edge. This illumination, a pre-appearing light on the horizon, which has also been reflected in almost all social utopias in a more or less abstract way, presents itself psychologically as wishful image forwards, morally as human ideal, and aesthetically as natural object-based symbol. The wishful images forwards have as their content the more or less grasped Possible of a better life in general; they are therefore cheerful and prelusive. In the main, the ideals have as their content the more or less realized Possible of an attempted perfect humanity, of perfect social conditions; they are therefore, in their guiding images and guiding panels, galvanizing and exemplary. The undistorted and unreified, beautiful human type and the classless relationship in which there is room for him belong here. Finally, the symbols have as their content, most definitely in the main matter, the Possible, which is always only realized in passing, of an unalienated identicality of existence with essence in nature as a whole; hence symbols are engaged and profound. They are, in contrast to ideals, cloaked, i.e. they mean their Own with particularly strong pathos of 'meaning', and do so because they do not

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have as their content a more or less realized Possible like ideals, but in fact have as their content a Possible which is only realized in themselves in passing. And furthermore, above all: this content therefore stands so much in the 'meaning' or as we may say more specifically of symbols: in the 'cipher', because it is more central and consequently for the time being less manifestable than the content of ideals. The respective carriers, existences of a symbolic meaning are of course far more numerous, indeed almost more random than those of the ideal, yet they are in return always related far more extensively in the whole of nature to what is essential. And they are centrally related to it; which on the other hand constitutes the difference of the symbol from the allegory, the simile of a thing with any number of other things without the region of sheer diversity ever being left. The reference of the symbol, however, is directed, as we have seen, precisely towards a uniformity of meaning; which is also why, in contrast to the diverse reference of allegories, which is always ambiguous, genuine symbols ultimately converge in their meaning, namely in the central aspect of their meaning. The socially conditioned respective direction-line towards the central aspect has varied in the history of the symbol which led for long stretches through religion but what has not varied is the respectively and repeatedly intended basic relation of the symbol-simile to an 'Unum Verum Bonum' of essence. However, because this very essence only lies in the Possible which is realized in passing and cannot lie anywhere else, the symbolic and this is now of crucial importance is still cloaked not only in its expression but, in all genuine symbols, also in its content itself. Since the genuine symbolic content itself is still at a distance from its full appearance, and it is therefore also in objectively-real terms a cipher. It is precisely in the light of the real Possible that there thus occurs the overdue notation of a real core in the concept of the symbolic, and therefore of a concept which had previously been understood almost exclusively in subjective-idealistic terms, apart from one or two objective-idealistic versions in Hegel's Aesthetics. In subjective-idealistic terms, because in fact all symbol-content was portrayed only as content that was cloaked for limited human reason, while the content was considered to be completely settled without any distance from itself, radiant in transcendentally existing statics. On the contrary, however, the truth is this: the symbolic communicates itself to its expression solely from the perspective of its object-content, differentiates the individual symbols from the perspective of the objectively real material, whose variously situated content of cloakedness, content of factual identity they respectively depict as this cloaked and

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factually identical aspect. And it is solely this depictiveness of a real cipher, of a real symbol, which finally lends symbols their genuineness. The genuineness of a convergence of meaning which combines with the reality of this meaning in particular objects in the outside world containing an especially high degree of latency. To this category belong symbols like the tower, the spring, the evening breezes in Mozart's 'Figaro', as well as the snowstorm in Tolstoy's 'Death of Ivan Illyich', the starry sky above the fatally wounded Andrei Bolkonsky in Tolstoy's 'War and Peace', the high mountains at the end of 'Faust', and all symbols of sublimity in general. Literature has understood the symbolic region of the real Possible more clearly than previous philosophy owing to its figurative nature, but philosophy incorporates this region with strictness of concept and seriousness of connections. But both realistic literature and philosophy reveal that the world itself is full of real ciphers and real symbols, full of 'signatura rerum' in the sense of things which contain a central meaning. In this meaning-fulness they point in quite real terms towards their tendency and latency of 'sense', of a sense which might one day possibly completely receive man and his concerns. The partial conditionality, and hence possibility of the ripening of this propensity goes through all examples which test humane sense in which the world is so rich. But in fact with greater or lesser distance from the example, with greater or lesser Not-Yet of the full appearance, i.e. with that distance which so variously presents only wishful images, ideals and symbols rather than successful achievement. And which shows the essential Totum of the world in the heavy process of its being raised, never as a result. If the distance is played down, then abstractinfamous optimism arises; but if the distance is understood as the mediated perfectibility which it is, with all the components of danger, then the opposite of infamy arises: militant optimism. So much here for the real Possible and the essence within it in the propensity-state of that perfectible element which receives man with a premonition of his future freedom. According to the most concrete of all Marx's anticipations, the essence of the perfectible is 'the naturalization of man, the humanization of nature'. That is the abolition of alienation in man and nature, between man and nature or the harmony of the unreified object with the manifested subject, of the unreified subject with the manifested object. Such a perspective of absolute truth, that means here, of complete real being in the Real itself and its breadth and depth is unavoidable, on penalty of relativism without outflow opens up once again only real-essential possibility, not yet the real-essential necessity which is only inherent in that possibility itself.

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For this would be a necessity with totally sufficient, i.e. inescapable conditions for the existence of essence, for the essence of existence. On this side of this extreme noncontingency or situationlessness, real-essential necessity is also only possibility, in fact a possibility with conditions which in reality hardly even partially exist. Lasting process, active hope-image of a better world, mediated with tendency, galvanizing ideal, profound symbol, these remain the real perspectives, themselves anticipatory, of real possibility the epitome of the Front-dimensions. Memory: Logical-Static Struggle against the Possible Easy to see how still many a new leaf can be turned over. A Not-Yet exists everywhere, so much is not yet conscious in man, so much in the world has not yet become. But both kinds of Not-Yet would not exist if it could not move in the Possible and turn towards its openness. Even so, the Can-Be has still been astonishingly little thought through and come to grips with. The category of the Possible, although so well-known and used every hour, has been a logical problem. This category has so far remained perhaps the most uncertain of the concepts which have been worked out philosophically in the course of the centuries and honed to sharpness. Certainly, it is the one which has been least followed through in ontological terms; hence it conventionally occurs almost exclusively in formal logic. Even when the theory of categories deals with the Possible, it is predominantly designated only as cognitive definition, not as object-definition. Of course, logicians like Joh. v. Kries, lesser and greater epigones of the usual like Verweyen, and ultimately N. Hartmann, who even calls himself an ontologist, have written diverse separate books on possibility. But since in these latter epigones the Possible is only recognized as conceptual relationship, they have written as good as nothing, that is, nothing real about it. In every case here, but no less in original philosophers too, whom we will consider shortly, the conspicuous emptying of the Possible occurs primarily through the failure to distinguish between still partial knowledge of the conditions and partially existing conditions themselves. Thus the problematically wavering judgement of an objectively decisive factual relation is repeatedly equated with the assertively decisive judgement of an objectively wavering factual relation, i.e. of the objectively existing possibility. The problematic judgement: 'It is possible that Louise is at home' thus covers the assertive judgement: 'It is clear that in the foreseeable future

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it will be possible for a rocket to travel to the moon.' The difference between the first and the second judgement clearly indicates, however, the not only logically, even psychologically immanent character, but in fact the external worldly character of a large part of modality. If the category of possibility is exclusively reduced to the mere knowledge-level of a supposition, then objective possibility must of course evaporate subjectively and idealistically in the external world. The Possible is then demonstrated away, as if no man had ever exposed himself to the modal element of danger, as if he had never really escaped, avoided or fallen prey to it. The Possible is then made into mere 'anthropomorphous introjection', as if not all organisms, with their reflex and reaction apparatus, were geared to an objectively real world of possibility; from the sea-anemone to the scenting deer, to the circumspection of homo sapiens. The Possible is de-realized to the status of 'fiction', as if the concept objective possibility did not fulfil the civil as much as the criminal law (liability, impossibilium nulla obligatio, conditional clause, negligence and so on). Nevertheless, even Sigwart, although he correctly defines mere possibility as something befitting the individual, 'in so far as it contains the partial ground of that which will be' (Logik I, 1904, p. 274), sees in the Possible only an expression of subjective indecision or even the resignation of our limited knowledge. Excess of problematic judgement-modality, underestimation of Objectand object-modality consequently provide the first motive for the idealistic denial of real possibility. But this is joined by a second motive for the denial of real possibility, and it is also to be found in great thinkers, moreover in those who are at no point subjective and idealistic. The block here is the same as the one which has also left the sister category of the Possible: the New as yet not thought through. The block is the coastal trip, conditioned according to class, around the given, indeed the past, is the aversion of static thinking to the world-concept of active openness and blue. This aversion is even to be found in such processive philosophers as Aristotle and Hegel, in spite of the enormous conception of a real dynamei on in the former and of the real dialectic in the latter. The positing of a finished One and All, of a universe in which all Possible is real (Nicholas of Cusa calls God 'possest', perfected 'Could-Be', and even Giordano Bruno leaves no unrealized Possible in the totality of the world): this static Positing has above all obstructed the space of the Open Possible. Thus the categorial concept of possibility as a whole lies in almost pure virgin land; it is the Benjamin among the great concepts. It always appears to be what is fresh, what is coming, that is not supposed

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to be considered here. Even the Sophists, in whom everything firm began intellectually to totter, drew nothing but derision from the Possible. So that everything and nothing is equally possible, since, as Gorgias says, there is nothing at all, neither That-Which-Is-Nothing nor That-Which-Is nor even anything in between, that can pass away or become, i.e. that could relate as possible to one or the other. No more radical, but more central was the denial of the Possible in the Megarian school, where it clearly also combined with the Eleatic theory of immobile being. The Megarian philosopher Diodoros Kronos, characteristically extending Zeno's demonstration of the non-existence of motion, invented his supposed proof of the nonexistence of the Possible. This supposed proof remained famous (under the name of Kyrieuon) for centuries afterwards, both as supposed dialectical masterpiece, and above all in fact on account of the interest which static thinking took in it (cf. Zeller, Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1882, p. 151ff.). Diodoros formed a syllogism: nothing Impossible can proceed from the Possible; but since a Possible that did not become real would allow Impossible to proceed from it, namely another Is than the Is that is, this Possible is itself impossible and the Real proven as the only Possible. Weak though this syllogism is, even the Roman Stoics took it over; in Epictetus and in Marcus Aurelius it plays a significant role in the satisfaction with the world-order free from possibility and full of necessity, and was transmitted to the later amor fati by Cicero (De fato 6, 7). Denial of the Possible, neoStoicism, and amor fati join hands in great affinity in Spinoza: to see sub specie aeternitatis (Ethik II, Proposition 44, Addition 2) means by definition to see everything possible already as necessarily real. Since from the point of view of Spinozistic eternity, because it coincides with the unconditional reason-consequence relationship (as the mathematical Fatum of the world), there is nothing partially conditional, that is, nothing possible any more. Which excludes for Spinoza's God the choice between the infinitely numerous logical possibilities, which a Leibniz of course still left spread out before his God (as realizer). Even inside the existing world, as one which is realized by its creator out of infinitely many possible ones, Leibniz still recognizes possibility as propensity, even though as one which cannot develop anything that is in reality new either, i.e. anything not contained in the whole of the previous world. And even if Leibniz, the only great philosopher of the Possible since Aristotle, also gives space to an infinite number of other possible world-contexts, these 'primae possibilitates' once again only live in the reason of the creator and not as possibilities still capable of realization projecting into this world

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now realized for once. Spinoza, however, even decides, with all the fundamental force of amor fati, against the possibilities in God: 'Things could not be created in any other way or in any other order by God than they are created' (Ethik I, Proposition 33). This is therefore, with regard to the Possible, Diodoros Kronos on a grand scale in metaphysics. And once again it was not as if the distaste for the Possible ended here, this distaste also inhabited philosophies which could quite openly pay homage to the Possible; as in Kant, or more concretely in Hegel. Kant flaunted the ideal, Hegel progress in the consciousness of freedom; nevertheless, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' stresses the Possible just as little as, mutatis mutandis, Hegel's 'Logic' and 'Encyclopaedia'. Thus Kant brings possibility (both that 'a priori to things through concepts' and that 'which can only be taken from reality in experience') over on to the side of pure forms of thought. Of course, all pure forms of thought or categories, hence even the modal ones, constitute experience here, as the 'system of appearances' which has been established through the categories, but as for the categories of modality (possibility, reality, necessity) Kant urges decided caution precisely with regard to experience. Hence the statement: 'The categories of modality have the special property that they do not in the least enlarge, as determination of the object, the concept to which they are ascribed as predicate, but only express the relationship to the cognitive capacity' (Werke, Hartenstein, III, p. 193). Consequently, Kant does not recognize objectively-real Possible at all, objectively-real Real is also only added to the modally Real through intuition and not in the least through connection with an assertive judgement, and hence with a reality-judgement of modality. Nevertheless, even if at the cost of dualism, Kant must make room for possibility, namely in the peculiar area of thinking above recognizable experience, which belongs to moral 'reason' and not to cognitive 'understanding'; which is therefore inhabited by the 'postulate' and by the 'ideal'. The postulate that was later so powerfully mobilized by Fichte: 'You can since you ought to' means possibility as capacity, as potency. The ideal which in Kant is consistently dominant, and abstractly even given precedence to politics: 'Extension of the domination of moral freedom' means, on the other hand, possibility as potentiality of an, unfortunately endless, approach to this ideal in history. But possibility understood in this way is not objectbased real possibility; there are no paths to it in the world of experience of transcendental idealism. And in fact it is by no means separately distinguished even as possibility of obligation, of postulate, of ideal; in the ahistorical field of vision of a 'consciousness

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in general' there was of course inclination, but no constitutive place for the future, for the 'hope of the future', as Kant said in the 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' (Werke II, p. 357). Thus not only 'understanding' of the categories of experience, but also 'reason' as the 'mother of ideas' restricted space for the Possible. And what is the ultimate status of possibility in Hegel, the pronounced philosopher of (concrete) reason rather than (abstract) understanding? Hegel, who is otherwise so objectively idealistic, surprisingly quotes with approval the passage from Kant given above which keeps modality apart from the real object, an approval of Kant which is in fact rare in Hegel. Concerning the Kant quotation he adds: 'In fact possibility is the empty abstraction of the reflection-in-itself, that which was previously called the Inner, except that now it is defined as the resolved, merely posited external Inner, and thus in fact also posited as a mere modality, as insufficient abstraction, in more concrete terms belonging only to subjective thinking . . . In particular, philosophy must not be concerned with showing that something is possible, or that something else is also possible, or that something, however one expresses it, is conceivable' (Enzyklopdie, 143). And even when Hegel understands possibility not only as empty abstraction of the reflection-in-itself, but also as an In-itselfmoment of reality, that which he calls real possibility here is wholly surrounded by the circle of reality that has already become: 'Hence that which is really possible can no longer be any different; under these conditions and circumstances nothing different can follow' (Logik, Werke IV, p. 211). Hegel is evidently also speaking here as an enemy of empty speculation, of the idle rearrangement of history in accordance with what could have happened, of the abstract ideal of 'the way a girl should be', of 'the way the State should be' and so on. But he is also speaking as non-philosopher of the future, as cycle-dialectician of the past or, which amounts to the same thing, of that which is eternally occurring, eternally returning in cycles, in short, that reactionary element in Hegel is speaking here for which in any case philosophy always comes too late to change. For which the thought, according to the preface to the 'Philosophy of Right', in any case only appears in the time 'after reality has completed its formation process and has finished itself'. There is also an element of Diodoros Kronos in this statement, on a scale that has become grand, this time as celebration of the past, the past which supposedly encompasses the whole world. Precisely this pathos of statics, so astonishing in the powerful dialectician, thus caused Hegel to neglect possibility or to transpose it into that which is subordinately over and done with. The following proposition of Hegel's, closing up

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process, is also relevant here: 'That which is internal is also externally available and viceversa; appearance shows nothing that is not in essential being, and there is nothing in essential being which is not manifested' (Enzyklopdie, 139). Against this we could admittedly set the earlier statement from the preface to the 'Phenomenology': 'It is . . . not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period. The mind has broken with the previous world of its existence and imagination and is on the point of sinking it into the past, and is about the work of reshaping it' (Werke II, p. 10). Thus the conclusion from this statement, which Hegel simply did not draw, would then of course be this: where there is a time of 'birth', there is also the womb of a real Possible from which it springs, and where there is 'work of reshaping', the potency of the reshaping and the potentiality of what can be re-shaped must be more than merely empty abstraction of the reflection-in-itself. Likewise, the logic and ontology of the wide realm of the Possible has been stifled by the static delusion that everything possible in the Real has already been thoroughly formed. That consequently it is as unimportant as the ear from which the corn has emerged, or as chesspieces after the game is finished. The truth is however the Marxist one, contrasting with all previous philosophy, that the point is to change the world as a correctly interpreted world, that is, precisely as a dialectically-materialistically processive world, as an unenclosed world. Changing the changeable world is the theory-practice of the realizably real Possible on the Front of the world, of the world process. And at this end the real Possible, which is homeless in every contemplative-static philosophy, is the real problem of the world itself: as the still unidentical character of appearance and real essential being, ultimately of existence and essence within it. Realizing Possibility Man is that which still has much before it. He is repeatedly transformed in his work and by it. He repeatedly stands ahead on frontiers which are no longer such because he perceives them, he ventures beyond them. The Authentic in man and in the world is outstanding, waiting, lives in fear of being frustrated, lives in hope of succeeding. Because what is possible can equally well turn into Nothing as into Being: the Possible, as that which is not fully conditional, is that which is not settled. Hence, from the outset, if man does not intervene, both fear and hope are equally

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appropriate when confronted with this real suspension, fear in hope, hope in fear. This is why the Stoics wise or all too passively wise men advised that man should not settle in the vicinity of circumstances over which he has no power. But since in man active capacity particularly belongs to possibility, the display of this activity and bravery, as soon as and in so far as it takes place, tips the balance in favour of hope. Bravery in this sense is the counter-move to the negative possibility of the wrong path into nothingness. But it is only a counter-move in that, unlike the rash, abstract heroic deed, it secures for itself the most precise mediation with the given conditions. That is: mediates itself with the ripeness of these conditions and with their content which is on the social agenda. Only this is practice according to the respectively Possible in the field of the general possibility-being of unenclosed history and world. Only practice of this kind can lead the matter pending in the historical process: the naturalization of man, the humanization of nature, out of real possibility into reality. A future land, like every Totum of the Possible, but it is full of historically tendential mediation which can be pursued precisely. Just as time, according to Marx, is the space of history, so too the future mode of time is the space of the real possibilities of history, and it invariably lies on the horizon of the respective tendency of world occurrence. That is, theoretically and practically: on the Front of the world process, where the decisions are made, new horizons open up. And the process into this future is solely that of matter which is concentrated and formed through to the end in man, its most highly developed blossom. What is ours and also what is not yet ours has this path ahead of it, it is rough and open. Men and things are united in this track, in this way man and world are connected best. And, not more than a few thousand years ago, the decisive blow was delivered by men, by means of which what we call, in presumptuous, but only temporarily exaggerated fashion, world history was opened up. Man and his work has thus become a decisive factor in the historical world process; with work as a means of becoming human itself; with revolutions as the midwives of the future society with which the current one is pregnant; with the Thing For Us, the world as mediated homeland, towards which nature is in possibility which has hardly even been entered upon, let alone exploded open. The subjective factor is the unenclosed potency to turn things here, the objective factor is the unenclosed potentiality of the turnability, changeability of the world within the framework of its laws, its laws which are however also legally variable under new conditions. Both factors are always interwoven with

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one another in dialectical interaction and only the isolating overemphasis of the one (causing the subject to become the ultimate fetish) or of the other (causing the object, in apparent selfmotivation, to become the ultimate Fatum) tears subject and object apart. Subjective potency coincides not only with what is turning, but also with what is realizing in history, and it coincides with this all the more, the more men become conscious producers of their history. Objective potentiality coincides not only with what is changeable, but also with what is realizable in history, and it coincides with this all the more, the more the external world independent of man is also one which is increasingly mediated with him. There is certainly also a realizing element, with wild efficacity and seed,* even great breadth, in the pre-human and extra-human world. It is here, although with no or with weak consciousness, from the same intensive root from which the humanly subjective potency then also sprang. But man as a realizing element above all in so far as and after it is no longer endowed with false consciousness concentrates even more certainly the central potency in the potencypotentiality of processive matter. This central potency thus stands increasingly in the possibility of itself increasingly meeting, meeting up with the driving core-interest of all occurrence, this origin and content of final real possibility, of identifying it, and indeed of making itself manifestly identical with it. However transfinite all alignments of this kind may be, they nevertheless lie along the rigorous and consistent line of extension of what has been designated as the conscious production of history contrary to unfathomed fate. So that in fact the realization itself of what is realizing, i.e. the adequate manifestation of what is forming history, stimulating process, as the core of real possibility, constitutes the both remotest and yet positively deepest real possibility; with hardly even partially existing conditions. Nevertheless, the whole of the conscious production of history is visible here: grasped, achieved, extended causa sui in society and nature. Whereby the realization of what is realizing, this final real possibility, is the same as the final real problem: to lift society and nature on to their hinges. And precisely the world of this final real possibility, the world of causa sui, which can at least be anticipated in terms of definition, presents itself in exemplary form as: harmony of the unreified object with the manifested subject, of the unreified subject with the manifested object. These are turned towards a near and distant future the basic proportions of human development. However,
*

Cf. Goethe's 'Faust', Part I, 384.

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the hinge in human history is its producer working man, who is finally no longer dispossessed, alienated, reified, subjugated for the profit of his exploiters. Marx is the realized teacher of this resolution of the proletariat, of this possible mediation, which is becoming real, of men with themselves and their normal happiness. However, the hinge in the history of nature, which, in contrast to his own history, man of course influences but does not make, is that agent of extra-human occurrence, still hardly mediated with us, indeed still hypothetical, which is abstractly called natural force and was once called in untenably pantheistic terms natura naturans, which can however be made concretely accessible the moment the working man, this most powerful, highly conscious part of the universal material agent, by no means separated from the rest of nature, begins to emerge from the semiincognito of his previous alienation. Marx is the essential teacher of this approaching mediation with the production-centre of world occurrence in general, of the, as Engels puts it, transformation of the supposed Thing In Itself into the Thing For Us to the extent of a possible humanization of nature. Free people on free ground, grasped thus in a total way, this is the final symbol of the realization of what is realizing and hence of the most radical frontier-content in the objectively real Possible as a whole.

19 Changing the World or Marx's Eleven Theses on Feuerbach


Thinking ahead has long since been announced and there to be heard. Only cowards talk their way out of everything, and liars remain general. Only they conceal themselves in baggy or crazy garments, always try to be somewhere other than where we can catch them out. But what is true can never be defined enough, even when and especially when the matter is still dawning on our vision. Through this early feel for what is essential, even the nineteen-yearold Marx was perfectly successful in formulating sharp central propositions in the surviving letter to his father. This type wants to get to the heart of the matter from the outset, never plays itself out into what is futile, discards it as soon as it recognizes it as such. Thus, with all broadly perceived, carefully considered material that ensues, it is capable of being on the ball again at any time, hitting home and scoring

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points. The grasped element that knows how to grasp itself in this fashion thus shows the points along the way. With and through these the pull forwards now sharpens itself so that even possible sidetracks may still serve it. Of course this directing quality is subsequently not always as easy to survey as it is to quote, in its brevity. For significant brevity is coherent, that is why it is the least quick to put itself into words. Time of Drafting Thus the understanding must repeatedly prove itself anew in such propositions. This nowhere more freshly than in the terse collection of the most terse directions which are known as the Eleven Theses on Feuerbach. Marx wrote them down in April 1845 in Brussels, most probably in the burst of preparatory work for 'The German Ideology'. The theses were not published until 1888 by Engels, as an appendix to his 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy'. Here Engels slightly edited Marx's occasionally sketchy text for style, naturally without the slightest change of content. Concerning the theses, Engels writes in the foreword to his 'Ludwig Feuerbach': 'They are notes for later elaboration, jotted down quickly, definitely not intended for publication, but invaluable as the first document in which the seed of genius of the new view of the world is set down.' Feuerbach had recalled us from pure thought to sensory perception, from mind to man, together with nature as his basis. As we know, this both 'humanistic' and 'naturalistic' rejection of Hegel (with man as the main idea, nature rather than mind as primary) had a strong influence on the young Marx. Feuerbach's 'The Essence of Christianity', 1841, his 'Provisional Theses for a Reform of Philosophy', 1842, and even his 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', 1843, seemed all the more liberating since even the left-wing school of Hegelians could not detach itself from Hegel, in fact did not go beyond a merely internal Hegelian critique of the master of idealism. 'The enthusiasm', says Engels in 'Ludwig Feuerbach', looking back at it around fifty years later, 'was general: we were all momentarily Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new interpretation, and how greatly despite all critical reservations he was influenced by it, we can read in 'The Holy Family' (Ludwig Feuerbach, Dietz, 1946, p. 14). The German youth of that time believed it could at last see land instead of heaven, human, of this world. Meanwhile Marx very soon detached himself from this all too vague

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humanness of this world. His activity on the 'Rheinische Zeitung' had brought him into far closer contact with political and economic questions than the left-wing Hegelians, or even the Feuerbachians enjoyed. This very contact increasingly led Marx from the critique of religion, to which Feuerbach restricted himself, to the critique of the state, indeed already of the social organization which as the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State', 18413, recognizes determines the form of the state. In Hegel's distinction between bourgeois society and state, emphasized by Marx, more economic consciousness was in fact already concealed than in his epigones, even in the Feuerbachians. The separation from Feuerbach occurred with respect and in the first place as a correction or even as a mere amendment, but the totally different, social viewpoint is clear from the beginning. On 13th March 1843 Marx thus writes to Ruge: 'For me Feuerbach's aphorisms are only incorrect on one point, he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. This is however the only alliance through which current philosophy can become truth' (MEGA I, 1/2, p. 308). The 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', 1844, contain another significant celebration of Feuerbach, admittedly as a contrast to the woolgathering of Bruno Bauer; they praise above all among Feuerbach's achievements the 'foundation of true materialism and of real science, in that Feuerbach likewise makes the relationship between ''man and man" into the fundamental principle of his theory' (MEGA I, 3, P. 152). But the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' are already a lot further beyond Feuerbach than they declare. The relationship between 'man and man' in them does not remain an abstract anthropological one at all, as it does in Feuerbach, instead the critique of human self-alienation (transferred from religion to the state) already penetrates to the economic heart of the alienation process. This not least in the splendid passages on Hegelian phenomenology, in which the historically formative role of work is identified, and Hegel's work interpreted in the light of it. At the same time, however, the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' criticize this work because it interprets human work-activity only as mental, not as material. The breakthrough to political economy, i.e. away from Feuerbach's general idea of man, is accomplished in the first work undertaken in collaboration with Engels, in 'The Holy Family', likewise in 1844. The 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' already contained the sentence: 'Workers themselves are capital, a commodity (1.c., p. 103), whereby nothing more of Feuerbachian humanness remains here than its negation in capitalism; 'The Holy Family' noted capitalism itself as the source of this strongest and final alienation.

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Instead of Feuerbachian generic man, with his abstract naturalness which always remains the same, a historically changing ensemble of social relationships now clearly appeared and above all: one that is antagonistic in class terms. Alienation, of course, embraced both: the exploiting class as well as that of the exploited, above all in capitalism, the strongest form of this relinquishing of self, false objectification of self. 'But', states 'The Holy Family', 'the first class feels happy and confirmed in this self-alienation, knows that the alienation is its own power and possesses in it the appearance of a human existence; the second class feels itself destroyed in alienation, perceives in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence' (MEGA I, 3, P. 206). Which in fact showed the respective class-based methods of production and exchange based on the division of labour, particularly the capitalist ones, to be the finally discovered source of alienation. Marx was a materialist at the latest from 1843 onwards; 'The Holy Family' gave birth to the materialist interpretation of history in 1844, and with it scientific socialism. And the 'Eleven Theses', produced between 'The Holy Family' of 1844/45 and 'The German Ideology' of 1845/46, thus represent the formulated departure from Feuerbach, together with a highly original entry into a new original inheritance. Politically empirical experience from the Rhineland period plus Feuerbach made Marx immune to the 'mind' and nothing but 'mind' of the left-wing school of Hegelians. The adopted standpoint of the proletariat allowed Marx to become causally and concretely, that is, truly (fundamentally) humanistic. As is self-evident, the departure here is not a complete break. References to Feuerbach run through large parts of Marx's work, even after the departure of the 'Eleven Theses'. Closest to the abandoned land, if only for chronological reasons, stands 'The German Ideology' which directly followed the theses. Many critical approaches of the theses return in it, although of course the critique of Feuerbach and the murderous demolition of second-rate Hegelian epigones are vastly different here. Feuerbach still belonged to bourgeois ideology, so the analysis of its pseudo-radical manifestations of decay, such as Bruno Bauer and Stirner,* also had to implicate him in 'The German Ideology'. But in such a way that in places the philosopher himself supplied the handle of the logical weapon with which Marx also intervened against him, but above all against the left-wing Hegelians. Consequently, 'The German Ideology' fundamentally
*

Max Stirner, 180656, nom de plume of the German individualist philosopher Johann Kaspar Schmidt.

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begins with the name of Feuerbach and criticizes, starting out from his critique of religion, the simply inner idealistic 'conquering' of idealism. 'It has not occurred to any of these philosophers to inquire about the connections of German philosophy with German reality, about the connections of their critique with their own material surroundings' (MEGA I, 5, P. 10). However, Marx stresses on the other hand that Feuerbach 'is to be greatly preferred to the "pure" materialists in that he realizes that man is also a "sensory object"'. In fact, the recognition cited above indicates the importance of Feuerbach for the early development of Marxism just as much as the critique of his abstract, ahistorical notion of the human being indicates the un- and indeed anti-Feuerbachian character of fully developed Marxism itself. The recognition states: without man equally being a 'sensory object', it would have been much more difficult to have worked out human activity materialistically as the root of all social things. Feuerbach's anthropological materialism thus marks the facilitated possible transition from mere mechanical to historical materialism. The critique states: without the concretization of what is human into really existing, and above all socially active men, with real relationships to one another and to nature, materialism and history would have in fact continually fallen apart, despite all 'anthropology'. In this connection, however, Feuerbach always remains important for Marx, both as a transit point and as the only contemporary philosopher of whom an analysis is at all possible, clarifying and fruitful. The basic thoughts to which Marx critically reacts in this way, and via which he makes productive progress, are essentially contained in Feuerbach's central work 'The Essence of Christianity' of 1841. Feuerbach's 'Provisional Theses for a Reform of Philosophy' of 1842 and the 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future' of 1843 also come into consideration. The earlier writings of the philosopher can hardly have been of any importance for Marx, since Feuerbach, at least until 1839, was too unoriginal, and lay too much under the influence of Hegel. Only from that time on did Feuerbach apply the Hegelian concept of self-alienation to religion. Only from that time on did the earlier Hegelian say his first thought had been God, his second reason, and his third and last was man. This means: just as the Hegelian philosophy of reason had overcome church-belief, so philosophy now put man (with the inclusion of nature as his basis) in place of Hegel. Despite all this, however, Feuerbach could not find the path to reality; precisely the most important aspect of Hegel: the historical-dialectical method, he rejected. It was only the 'Eleven Theses' that became signposts out of mere anti-Hegelianism into reality which can be changed, out of the materialism of the base behind the lines into that of the Front.

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Question of Grouping How the theses should be ordered is both an old and a new question. For the way they stand, for private reference, not intended for publication, they repeatedly overlap. They also present the same content in another place, do not always make the reason for their division and sequence evident. The requirements of teaching have thus occasioned various attempts to rearrange the theses as they belong together and hence to divide them into groups. In doing this, the attempt is sometimes made to let the sequence of numbers stand, just as if the 'Eleven Theses' could be subsumed one after the other, in a direct row. For example, such a grouping which sticks to the numbers looks as follows: Theses 1, 2, 3 are under the heading: Unity of Theory and Practice in Thought, Theses 4 and 5 under: Understanding of Reality in Contradictions, Theses 6, 7, 8, 9 under: Reality itself in Contradictions, Theses 10, 11 under: Location and Task of Dialectical Materialism in Society. This is the arrangement according to figures; since there are several other such arrangements quite different in terms of content, it shows how little instructive the mere place value of the numbers is here. Each of these arrangements treats the order in too exalted a fashion on the one hand, in that they allow it to remain eternally entrenched, as in the Twelve Table Law* or in the Ten Commandments, while on the other hand they treat it in too lowly and formalistic a fashion, as if it was a series of stamps. But numbering is not systematics, and Marx needs this substitute least of all. Hence the theses must be grouped philosophically, not arithmetically, that is, the order of the theses is solely that of their themes and contents. There is, as far as can be seen, still no commentary on the Eleven Theses; only when there is one, arising out of the common cause itself, does the continuously productive coherence of their brevity and depth also open up. Then there appears: firstly, the epistemological group dealing with perception and activity (Theses 5, 1, 3); secondly, the anthropological-historical group dealing with self-alienation, its real cause and true materialism (Theses 4, 6, 7, 9, 10); thirdly, the uniting or theorypractice group, dealing with proof and probation (Theses 2, 8). Finally there follows the most important thesis, the password that not only marks a final parting of the minds, but with whose use they cease to be nothing but
*

Twelve Table Law the earliest Roman legal code, coveting civil, criminal and religious law, introduced in 451450 B.C.

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minds (Thesis 11). Strictly speaking, the epistemological group is opened by Thesis 5, the anthropological-historical group by Thesis 4; since these theses describe the two basic theories of Feuerbach which Marx relatively accepts, and which he goes on beyond in the remaining theses of the respective groups. The basic theory adopted is the rejection of abstract thinking in Thesis 5, the rejection of human self-alienation in Thesis 4. And corresponding to the first basic feature of materialist dialectics, the depiction of which announces itself here, between the individual theses within each respective group there is free, complementary movement of voices; just as, between the groups themselves, continual correlation is taking place, forming a coherent unified whole. Epistemological Group: Perception and Activity Theses 5, 1, 3 It is recognized here that even when thinking we can only proceed from the sensory. Perception, not the concept which is merely taken from it, is and remains the beginning where all materialist cognition identifies itself. Feuerbach reminded us of this at a time when every academic street-corner still resounded with mind, concept and nothing but concept. Thesis 5 stresses this contribution: Feuerbach is 'not content' with cerebrality, he wants his feet on the perceived ground. But Thesis 5, and then above all Thesis 1, both make clear that with contemplative sensoriness, the only kind Feuerbach understands, his feet cannot yet move and the ground itself remains unnegotiable. The person who perceives in this way does not even try to move, he remains standing in a state of comfortable enjoyment. Hence Thesis 5 teaches: mere perceiving 'does not understand sensoriness as practical, as human-sensory activity'. And Thesis 1 reproaches the whole of previous materialism for only understanding perception 'under the form of the object', 'not however as human, sensory activity, practice, not subjectively'. Hence it happened that the active side, in contrast to materialism, 'was developed from idealism but only abstractly, since idealism obviously does not know real sensory activity as such'. The inactive perception in which all previous materialism persists, including that of Feuerbach, is thus replaced by the human activity factor. And this happens even within the context of the sensory, i.e. immediate, fundamentally beginning knowledge: sensoriness as knowledge, as real basis of cognition,

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is thus by no means the same as (contemplative) perception. The concept of activity which is thus stressed by Marx in Thesis 1 in fact derives from idealistic epistemology, and not from idealistic epistemology as such, but only from that developed in the new bourgeois age. For this concept pre-supposes as a base a society where the ruling class sees or wishes to see itself in activity, i.e. work. However, this is only the case in capitalist society in so far as work, or rather: the appearance of work around the ruling class, in contrast to all prebourgeois societies is here no longer a dishonour, but is respected. This results out of the necessity of making profit, out of the forces of production being unleashed in this profitsociety. Work, which had been held in contempt in the ancient slave-owning societies, even in feudal society with its system of serfdom (in Athens even sculptors were counted as philistines), is obviously not reflected in the thoughts of the ruling class either, in total contrast to the ideology of the entrepreneur, the bourgeois, the so-called homo faber. Whose profit-dynamic, becoming free in the new age, forming the new bourgeois age, still by a long chalk progressive, also certainly makes itself evident in the superstructure and activates the base itself. Both morally, in the shape of a so-called work ethic, and epistemologically, in the shape of a concept of activity, a work logos in cognition. The work ethic, preached particularly by the Calvinists for the purpose of creating capital, this capitalist vita activa contrasted with aristocratic idleness, and also with the vita contemplativa of a quiet, monkish, scholarly existence. In parallel fashion, the work logos in cognition, this concept of 'producing' particularly exaggerated in bourgeois rationalism, differed from the ancient and also scholastic cognitive concept of mere receiving: vision, visio, passive depiction. As it survives contained in the concept of 'Theoria' itself, consistent with the original vision-sense of the word. Even Plato is, cum grano salis, ultimately a receiving sensualist in this manner; for however ideally and purely related to ideas his vision pretends to be, it is in fact still essentially receptive vision, and the thought-process is consistently understood in keeping with sensory perception. But then even Democritus, the first great materialist, who in fact sets the tone until Marx, is likewise trapped in this work-shy ideology which does not reflect the work-process. Even Democritus only understands cognition in passive terms; thinking, through which for him the truly real is known, the real dimension of the atoms together with their mechanism, is explained here solely by the impression of corresponding little pictures (eidola), which detach themselves from the surface of things and flow into the person who is perceiving and knowing. On

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the question of epistemological non-activity there is therefore no difference at all between Plato and Democritus; both epistemologies are united by the slave-owning society, which means here: the absence of despised work-activity in the philosophical superstructure. And now: the paradox appears that rationalism, the idealism of the new age, which often distanced itself far from Plato, reflected the work-process much more powerfully in epistemological terms than the materialism of the new age, which never distanced itself very far from its ancient progenitor Democritus. The calmly depicting mirror, this omission of the concept of work, is thus, up to and including Feuerbach, materialistically more common than the pathos of 'production', and especially of the dialectical reciprocal depiction of subject-object, objectsubject on to each other. Among the more recent materialists only Hobbes teaches rational 'production', with the principle which is valid until Kant: only such objects are knowable which can be constructed mathematically. But greatly though Hobbes, with the help of this principle, was able to define philosophy as theory of the mathematical-mechanical motion of bodies, and therefore as materialism, for his part he just as little succeeded in getting beyond the 'form of the object' criticized by Marx, namely beyond merely contemplative materialism. Something different occurred within idealism when 'production' passed from geometric construction into the real work-form of historical genesis. This was first decisively achieved in Hegel; the 'Phenomenology of Mind' was the first work to discuss seriously the dynamics of the epistemological concept of work, at least in historical-idealistic terms. This was also far superior to the merely mathematical-idealistic 'production' pathos, which, in the case of the great rationalists of the manufacturing period, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, had influenced their semi- or total idealism. There is no better witness to this significance of Hegel's Phenomenology, which was not in the least understood by Feuerbach, than Marx in the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts': Marx sees the greatness of the Phenomenology precisely in the fact that it 'understands the essence of work and comprehends Objective man, true because real man, as a result of his own work' (MEGA 1, 3, P. 156). This statement thus best explains the deficiency mentioned above of merely perceiving materialism, up to and including Feuerbach: previous materialism lacks the constantly oscillating subject-object relation called work. Hence in fact it understands the Object, reality, sensoriness only 'under the form of the object', omitting 'human-sensory activity'. Whereas Hegel's Phenomenology occupied, as Marx says, 'the standpoint of modern political economy' (1.c., p. 157). Feuerbach,

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however, still occupied in epistemological terms the standpoint of slave-owning society or even of serfdom, on account of the non-active, still contemplatory element in his materialism. At the same time Marx of course makes it clear that bourgeois activity is still not the complete, right kind. It cannot be so precisely because it is only appearance of work, because the production of value never emanates from the entrepreneur, but from peasants, manual workers, ultimately wage-earners. And because the abstract, reified, confused circulation of goods on the free market allowed nothing more than an ultimately passive, external, abstract relationship to it. For this reason Thesis I stresses: even the epistemological reflection of activity could only be an abstract one, 'since idealism of course does not know real, sensory activity as such'. However, even the bourgeois materialist Feuerbach, who wishes to get away from abstract thinking, who seeks real Objects rather than reified thoughts, omits human activity from this real being; he understands it 'not even as Objective activity'. This is strikingly elaborated in the introduction to the 'German Ideology': 'Feuerbach is speaking specifically of the perception of natural science, he mentions secrets which only became apparent to the eye of the physicist and chemist; but where would natural science be without industry and trade? Even this 'pure' natural science of course receives its purpose and material only through trade and industry, through sensory activity of men. The activity, this continuing sensory working and creating, this production is so much the basis of the whole of the sensory world that, even if it were interrupted for only a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the natural world, but very soon also miss the whole human world and his own ability to perceive, indeed his own existence. Of course the priority of external nature remains at the same time, and of course all this is not applicable to original men, produced through generatio aequivoca; but this distinction only makes sense in so far as man is regarded as being different from nature. This nature which precedes human society is not incidentally the nature in which Feuerbach lives, not the nature which no longer exists anywhere today except perhaps on one or two Australian coral islands of more recent origin, i.e. does not exist for Feuerbach either' (MEGA 1, 5, P. 33f.). How crucially human work, which precisely as an Object is completely homeless in Feuerbach, is emphasized in these lines as an important, if not the most important Object in the world which surrounds men. Accordingly, therefore, the Being that conditions everything now itself contains active men. This has quite astonishing consequences, they make

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Thesis 3 above all especially important challenging not only Feuerbach, but also vulgar Marxists. Two further concepts of the 'sensory world', a bad one and one that is often misunderstood, are therefore worth noting in this truly Objective connection, they are most intimately related to it. They concern, after all, the empiricist favourite children or even trump-cards of that supposedly activity-shy perception which sees the 'circumstances' merely as that which is standing around men. One is so-called givenness, a particularly object-based, i.e. apparently materialistically related concept. However, apart from the fact that it is, semantically, a changeable concept that would not be valid if there were no subject to which alone something is given or can be given, there is in the world which constitutes the human environment hardly anything given which is not equally something worked on. Hence Marx speaks of the 'material' which natural science only receives through trade and industry. In reality, only surface contemplation shows the given; after a little probing, however, every Object of our normal environment reveals itself to be by no means sheer datum. It proves itself instead to be the end result of previous work-processes, and even the raw material, apart from the fact that it is totally changed, was fetched from the forest by work or hewn out of the rocks or extracted from the depths of the earth. So much for the first passive trumpcard which is obviously not one at all, but only counts and wins the trick from the surface standpoint. The second trump-card of supposedly activity-shy perception, however, does employ a perfectly legitimate, in fact decidedly materialistic concept to begin with, namely the primacy of being over consciousness. In epistemological terms this primacy expresses itself as the external world which exists independently of human consciousness, in historical terms as priority of the material base over the mind. But once again Feuerbach hardened this truth one-sidedly, he exaggerated it mechanistically, in that he omitted activity here too. Within the province of normal human environment, independence of being from consciousness is by no means the same as independence of being from human work. The independence of this external world from consciousness, its Objectivity, is instead so far from being cancelled by the mediation of work with the external world that it is in fact ultimately formulated by it. For just as human activity is itself Objective activity, i.e. does not fall out of the external world, so the subject-object-mediation, in that it occurs, is likewise a piece of external world. This external world also exists independently of consciousness in that it does not itself appear under the form of the subject, but admittedly not only 'under the form of the object' either.

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But in fact it represents the interacting mediation of subject and object, in such a way that being does indeed determine consciousness everywhere, but once again historically decisive, namely economic being contains an inordinate amount of objective consciousness. All being is for Feuerbach, however, autarkical primacy, as purely pre-human base, natural base, with man as blossom, but in fact simply as blossom, not as separate natural force. But the human method of production, the metabolism with nature which occurs and is regulated in the work process, even the relations of production as base, all this, illuminatingly, itself has consciousness in it; likewise the material base in every society is again activated by the superstructure of consciousness. Thesis 3 is especially informative concerning the interaction in this being-consciousness relationship, despite the priority of economic being. But it is information which gives no pleasure to vulgar materialism; it does however give human consciousness the most real place in the 'circumstances', that is, precisely inside the external world which it helps to form. Mechanistic environmentalism asserts 'that men are products of circumstances and of education, changed men therefore products of other circumstances and a different education'. Above this one-sided, often even very naturalistic theory of depiction (milieu like soil, climate) Thesis 3 now posits the truth which is so superior to the previous standard materialism, 'that circumstances are in fact changed by men, and that the educator must himself be educated'. This does not of course mean that this change of circumstances could now happen without reference to that objective lawfulness which also binds the subject- and activity-factor. Rather, Marx is waging a war on two fronts at this point, he is struggling both against mechanistic environmentalism, which ends in fatalism of being, and against the idealistic subject-theory, which ends in putschism, or at least in exaggerated activity-optimism. One passage in the 'German Ideology' thus thoroughly complements Thesis 3, namely because it deals with the most salutary reciprocal movement of men and circumstances, of subject-object mediation of a constantly interacting, constantly dialectical kind. So that in history 'on every level a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relationship to nature and of individuals to one another is to be found, which is passed on to each generation by its predecessor, a class of productive forces, capital and circumstances which is indeed on the one hand modified by the new generation, but which on the other hand also prescribes to it its own conditions of life and gives it a particular development, a special character so that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances'

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(MEGA 1, 5, p. 27f.). As stated above, the interaction between subject and object is particularly emphasized in this passage, even with the audible precedence of the circumstance-man-relationship over the reverse, in such a way, however, that man and his activity always remain the specific part of the material historical base, indeed represent its root, as it were, and also its capability for radical change. Even the idea (in theory) becomes a material power, according to Marx, if it seizes the masses; how unequivocally the technological-political changing of circumstances is such a power, and how clearly even the subject-factor understood in these terms remains inside the material world. 'Das Kapital' provides a final elaboration of Thesis 3, now committing man quite decisively to the external world, in fact to nature: 'He sets in motion the natural forces pertaining to his physical nature, arms and legs, head and hands, in order to acquire natural material in a form useful for his own life. Because he acts on and changes nature outside himself through this movement, he simultaneously changes his own nature . . . The earth is itself a working material, but presupposes a whole series of other working materials before it can serve as working material in agriculture, and an already relatively high development of working capacity' (Das Kapital I, Dietz, 1947, p. 185, 187). Thus human activity with its consciousness is itself explained as a piece of nature, moreover as the most important piece, in fact as radical practice precisely at the base of material being, which again primarily conditions the consciousness that follows. Feuerbach, who felt no revolutionary mission whatsoever and who also never got beyond man as a nature-based generic being, had no appreciation whatsoever of this increased primacy of nature, increased by human activity. This is ultimately the reason why history does not appear in his purely perceiving materialism and why he does not manage to get beyond the contemplative attitude. Thus his relationship to the object remains ancientaristocratic, in illogical contrast to the pathos of man which he put again only in purely theoretical terms and as mere blossom of existing nature at the centre of his critique of religion (and no other). He thus looks down on practice from on high, which he only knows as a demeaning business: 'Practical perception is a dirty perception stained with egotism' (Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, 1841, p. 264). It is this passage to which Marx is ultimately referring in Thesis 1 when he says that in Feuerbach 'practice is only understood and fixed in its dirty-Jewish manifestation'. And how much arrogance of this kind there was later when the 'perception' increasingly 'stained with egotism' was added ideologically to socalled pure perception, then with a so-called truth

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for its own sake. How much 'equestrian science' then arose, high on its horse, au dessus de la mle (apart from the dirt in itself); how much aristocracy of knowledge (without aristoi), knowingly in league with dirty practice, restraining from the correct kind. With great presentiment Marx already posited the pathos of 'revolutionary, practical-critical activity' against such pure lack of understanding as Feuerbach's. Thus Marx emphasizes, precisely as a materialist, precisely inside being itself, the subjective factor of production activity which is, exactly like the objective factor, an Objective one. And this has powerful, and in fact also anti-vulgar-materialistic consequences; they make this part of the Feuerbach Theses particularly valuable. Without the comprehended work-factor itself the primacy of being, which is in no way a factum brutum or given fact, cannot be comprehended in human history. It most certainly cannot be mediated with the best aspect of active perception with which Thesis 1 closes; with 'the revolutionary, practical-critical activity'. Working man, this subject-object relation living in all 'circumstances', belongs in Marx decisively with the material base; even the subject in the world is world. Anthropological-Historical Group: Self-Alienation and True Materialism Theses 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 It is recognized here that as human beings we always proceed from alienation. Thesis 4 states the theme: Feuerbach revealed self-alienation in its religious form. His work therefore consisted in 'dissolving the religious world into its worldly basis. But', Marx continues, 'he overlooks the fact that, after the completion of this work, the main task still remains to be done.' Feuerbach, as Thesis 6 determines more precisely, had put religious existence on to a worldly basis in so far as he dissolved it into human existence. This was an important undertaking in itself, especially since it cast a sharp glance at the contribution of human wishes. Feuerbach's 'anthropological critique of religion' derived the whole of the transcendental sphere from wishful imagination: the gods are the heartfelt wishes transformed into real beings. At the same time there arises through this wish-hypostasis a doubling of the world into an imaginary and a real one; when man shifts his best being from this world into a celestial other world. It is therefore necessary to remove this self-alienation, that is, to fetch

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back heaven to men again through critical anthropology and by identifying its origins. Here, however, the logical Marxist argument comes into force, which did not stop at the abstract genus of man, which is quite unstructured in class and historical terms. Feuerbach, who had reproached Hegel so strongly on account of his concept-reifications, does indeed localize his abstract genus of man empirically, but only in such a way as to allow it to be inherent in the single individual, free of society, without social history. Thesis 6 therefore stresses: 'But human existence is not an abstract inherent in the single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social conditions.' Indeed, with his hollow arc between single individual and abstract Humanum (while omitting society) Feuerbach is little other than an epigone of the Stoics and of their after-effects in Natural Right, in the ideas of tolerance of the new bourgeois age. Even Stoic morality had fallen back upon the private individual after the decline of the Greek public polis: this was, Marx says in his doctoral dissertation, 'the good fortune of its time; thus the moth, when the common sun has gone down, seeks the private lamplight' (MEGA I, 1/1, p. 133). On the other hand, however, the abstract genus of man, skipping all national social conditions, was supposed to assert itself in the Stoics as a sole Universal over single individuals, as the place of the communis opinio, of the recta ratio for all times, among all peoples: i.e. as the general human house, incorporated into the equally general-good world house. Only this human house was not the vanished polis, but it was half with assiduous ideology the Pax Romana, the cosmopolitan empire of Rome, and half with abstract utopia a fraternal human league of enlightened individuals. Not without reason, therefore, did the concept of humanitas arise as both a generic and value concept at the court of Scipio the Younger, and the Stoic Panaitios was its author. With his abstract genus of man Feuerbach then above all absorbed the neo-Stoicism which again with hollow arc between individual and generality had emerged in the new bourgeois age. This ultimately in the abstract-sublime concept of the citoyen and in the Kantian pathos of humanity in general, which reflected the citoyen in a German and moral way. The individuals of the new age are of course capitalists, not Stoic private pillars, and their Universal was not the ancient oecumene which was supposed to eliminate nations, but with idealization precisely of the ancient polis the generality of bourgeois human rights with the abstract citizen above it, this moral-humanitarian generic ideal. Nevertheless, there are important economically conditioned correspondences here (otherwise there would have been no neoStoicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth

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centuries): here as there society is atomized into individuals, here as there an abstract genus rises above it, an abstract ideal of humanity, humanness. Marx, however, criticizes precisely this abstract above mere individuals, in fact defines human existence as 'ensemble of social conditions'. That is why Thesis 6 is directed both against Feuerbach's ahistorical view of humanness per se and connected with this against the purely anthropological generic concept of this humanity, as a generality which unites the many individuals in a merely natural way. Marx still definitely retains the value-concept of humanity of course; he does so clearly in Thesis 10. The expression 'real humanism' with which the preface to the 'Holy Family' begins is of course abandoned by the 'German Ideology', in connection with the rejection of any trace of bourgeois democracy, with the gaining of the proletarianrevolutionary standpoint, with the creation of dialectical-historical materialism. But Thesis 10 nevertheless states with all the value-accent of a humanistic opposition, of a 'real humanism' therefore, which however is only valid and accepted to be valid as a socialist humanism: 'The standpoint of the old materialism is bourgeois society; the standpoint of the new materialism, human society or socialized humanity.' The Humanum therefore does not always lie in every society 'as inner, silent generality which unites the many individuals in a merely natural way', it does not lie in any kind of existing generality at all, it is to be found instead in difficult process and gains itself only together with communism, as communism. For this very reason, the new, pro-letarian standpoint, far from removing the value-concept of humanism, in practice allows it to come home for the very first time; and the more scientific the socialism, the more concretely it has precisely the care for man at its centre, the real removal of his self-alienation as its goal. Certainly not, however, after Feuerbach's fashion, as an abstract genus equipped with all too sublime humane sacraments per se. Marx therefore incorporates the very motif of the epistemological Thesis-group into Thesis 9, this time against Feuerbach's anthropology: 'The highest to which perceiving materialism can attain, i.e. the materialism which does not comprehend sensoriness as practical activity, is the perception of single individuals in ''bourgeois society".' A class barrier is thus finally noted, the same barrier which blocked revolutionary activity in Feuerbach's epistemology, and now blocks history and society in his anthropology. Marx's continuation of Feuerbachian anthropology, as a critique of religious self-alienation, is therefore not only logically consistent, but also a renewed demystification, namely of Feuerbach himself or of final, anthropological fetishization. Thus

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Marx leads us from general-ideal man, via mere individuals, to the ground of real humanity and possible humanness. In order to do this, the glance at the processes which really underlie alienation was necessary. Men double their world not only because they have an inwardly torn, wishing consciousness. Rather, this consciousness arises together with its religious reflection from a much closer split, namely a social one. The social conditions themselves are inwardly torn and divided, show an Above and a Below, struggles between these two classes and hazy ideologies of the Above, of which the religious is only one among many. To find this closer aspect of the worldly basis was for Marx precisely the work whose main task still remained to be done, itself a This World compared with the abstract-anthropological This World of Feuerbach. Feuerbach, an undialectical stranger to history, had no eye for this, but Thesis 4 acquires it: 'The very fact that the worldly basis sets itself off from itself and fixes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the self-conflict and the selfcontradiction of this worldly basis. The latter itself must therefore first be understood in its contradiction and then be revolutionized by eliminating the contradiction in practice. Hence for example, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must now itself be criticized and radically changed in practice.' In order to be truly radical, i.e. according to Marx's definition: in order to grasp things by the radix, by the 'root', the critique of religion thus requires the critique of the conditions which underlie heaven, of their wretchedness, of their contradictions and their false, imaginary resolution of these contradictions. Marx had already formulated this so forcibly and unmistakably in the 'Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' of 1844: 'The critique of religion ends . . . with the categorical imperative of overthrowing all conditions in which man is a debased, an enslaved, a forlorn, a contemptible being' (MEGA I, 1/1, p. 614f.). Only after this progressive critique, which is also progressive in practical revolutionary terms, do we arrive at a situation which no longer requires any illusions, either as deception or even as compensation: 'The critique has picked to pieces the imaginary flowers on the chain, not so that man has to wear the dreary chain devoid of imagination, but so that he can throw off the chain and pick the living flower' (1.c., p. 608). In order to do this, the earthly family must first be discovered as the secret of the heavenly one, right down to that matured economicmaterialistic 'secret science' which then causes Marx to say in 'Das Kapital': 'Besides, little familiarity is required with the history of the Roman Republic, for

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example, to know that the history of property forms its secret history' (Das Kapital I, Dietz, 1947, P. 88). Consequently, the analysis of religious self-alienation, in order for it to be a truly radical one, fundamentally goes beyond ideologies to the closer role of the state, to the very closest political economy and achieves here for the first time real 'anthropology'. Achieves it as social-scientific basic insight into the 'relation of men to men and to nature'. Since, as Thesis 7 stresses, 'the religious disposition is itself a social product', the act of producing can and must not be forgotten over the product, as it is by the unhistorical, undialectical Feuerbach. The following passage in 'Das Kapital' once more refers to this ultimate half-measure, that is, untenability of Feuerbach's dissolution: 'It is in fact much easier to find the earthly core of the nebulous shapes of religion through analysis than conversely to develop deified forms from the respective conditions of real life. The latter is the only materialistic and therefore scientific method. The defects of abstractly natural scientific materialism which excludes the historical process can already be seen from the abstract and ideological ideas of its spokesmen, as soon as they venture out beyond their specialized field' (Das Kapital I, Dietz, 1947, p. 389). Furthermore the 'German Ideology' states: 'In Feuerbach materialism and history completely fall apart', thus establishing the basic difference between dialectical-historical materialism and the old mechanical kind: 'Whenever Feuerbach is a materialist, history does not appear in his work, and whenever he takes history into account, he is no materialist' (MEGA I, 5, P. 34). Feuerbach himself had claimed that he was a materialist looking backwards (i.e. regarding the basis of nature), but an idealist looking forwards (i.e. regarding ethics and even the philosophy of religion). Precisely the omission of society, history and its dialectic in Feuerbach's materialism, precisely the feeling occasioned by this that life is missing in the old mechanical materialism, which was the only kind Feuerbach knew, inevitably causes an idealism of an embarrassed kind in this philosopher at the end of his philosophy. It revealed itself clearly in his ethics of life, it shows itself in the hints of a certain Sunday-brotherhood sentimentality. Once again the governing influence here is merely, as Thesis 9 says, 'the perception of single individuals in "bourgeois society"', but once again even religion, which had ostensibly been disposed of, makes itself apparent in Feuerbach, a religion which was merely derived anthropologically by him, not socially criticized. This is evident in the way that Feuerbach does not actually criticize the contents of religion, but essentially only their displacement into an other world and thus the weakening of man and

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his This World. In so far as he consequently sought to remind 'human nature' of its squandered wealth again, there are of course undoubtedly problems involved in this reduction. Who would wish to underestimate precisely the depth of humanity, the humanity of the depth in religion-charged art, in Giotto, in Grnewald, in Bach and ultimately even perhaps in Bruckner? But Feuerbach, with unparalleled heart, soul brotherhood and melting soul, makes out of all this almost a kind of non-denominational pectoral theology. Moreover, he allows almost all the attributes of the father-god to remain, in the unavoidable emptiness of his 'idealism forwards', as virtues in themselves so to speak, and only the heavenly god is struck from the list. Instead of: God is merciful, is love, is omnipotent, works miracles, hears our prayers all that can be said now is: mercifulness, love, omnipotence, working miracles, hearing prayers are divine. Accordingly, therefore, the whole apparatus of theology remains intact, it has just moved from its heavenly location to a certain abstract region, with reified virtues of the 'natural basis'. In this way, however, the problem: humane legacy of religion, which Feuerbach probably had in mind, did not arise, but religion came at a reduced price, to suit a poorly demystified habitual embourgeoisement, which Engels correctly identifies in Feuerbach's stale dregs of religion. Marxism, conversely, is no 'idealism forwards' even with regard to religion, but materialism forwards, wealth of materialism without a poorly demystified heaven which must be brought down to earth. The truly total explanation of the world from within itself, which is called dialectical-historical materialism, also posits the transformation of the world from within itself. Into an other world beyond hardship, which has not the least in common either with the other world of mythology, or with its master- or father-contents. Theory-Practice-Group: Proof and Probation Theses 2, 8 It is not recognized here that thought is pale and feeble. Thesis 2 sets it above sensory perception, with and in which it merely commences. Feuerbach had denigrated thought, because it leads away from the individual into the general; this was evaluated nominalistically. In Marx, however, thought definitely does not aim into the poorly general, abstract, but just the opposite: it opens up precisely the mediated essential context of the

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appearance, one which is still sealed to the mere sensoriness in the appearance. Thus thought, which Feuerbach only allows to be abstract, is concrete precisely when it is mediated, whereas conversely, thoughtless sensory material is abstract. Thought must of course lead once again to perception, in order to prove itself, as pervasive, in the latter, but even at this end this perception is by no means the passive, immediate Feuerbachian kind. The proof can instead only lie in the mediatedness of the perception, that is, solely in that sensoriness which has been theoretically processed and has thus become Thing For Us. This is however ultimately the sensoriness of theoretically mediated, theoretically acquired practice. So the function of thought is, even more than sensory perception, an activity, a critical, insistent, revealing activity; and the best proof is thus the practical testing of this deciphering. Just as every truth is a truth for a certain purpose, and there is no truth for its own sake, except as self-deception or whimsy, so too there is no complete proof of a truth from within itself as a truth which merely remains theoretical; in other words: there is no theoretically-immanently possible complete proof. Only a partial proof can be achieved purely theoretically, mostly still in mathematics; but even here it proves to be only a partial proof of a specific kind, since in fact it never gets beyond mere inner 'agreement', logically consistent 'correctness'. Correctness is not yet truth, however, that is, depiction of reality and also the power of intervening in reality according to the measure of its known agencies and laws. In other words: truth is not a theory relationship alone, but a definite theory-practice relationship. Thus Thesis 2 states: 'The question of whether Objective truth is appropriate to human thinking is not a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the This-worldliness of his thinking. The argument about the reality or non-reality of a thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic question.' That is, a school-bound question in the sense of a dosed thought-immanence (including mechanical-materialistic thoughts); this contemplative boarding-school was the space of all previous concepts of truth. With its theory-practice relationship, Thesis 2 is therefore wholly creative and new; in comparison, previous philosophy really does appear 'scholastic'. Since, as observed above, either ancient and medieval epistemology did not reflect activity, or on the other hand activity as bourgeois-abstract activity was not truly mediated with its object. In both cases, in the ages of the ancient and feudal contempt for work and in the age of the bourgeois work-ethic (without concreteness of work), practice, both technological and political, was regarded at best

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as the 'application' of theory. Not as attestation that the theory is a concrete one, as in Marx, not as the functional change of the key into the lever, of true depiction into intervention with power over being. Thus the right thought and doing what is right finally become one and the same. Activity and partisan attitude are contained within it from the beginning, and therefore emerge again as true conclusion at the end. The colour of the resolution is its own in this conclusion, not an additional colour brought in from elsewhere. Every confrontation in the history of philosophy confirms in this case the Novum of the theory-practice relationship as opposed to mere 'application' of theory. Even when a part of the theory was already aimed at practice: as in Socrates, as in Plato when he tried to realize his utopian state in Sicily, as in the Stoics with logic as mere wall, physics as mere tree, but with ethics as the fruit. As in Augustine, the founder of the site of the medieval papal church, as at the end of the Middle Ages in William of Occam, the nominalist destroyer of the papal church in favour of rising national states. There was undoubtedly a social and practical mission behind all these, but the theory nevertheless led its own abstract, practically unmediated separate existence. It only condescended to 'application' to practice, like a prince to his people, at best like an idea to its utilization. And even Bacon, in the sharp bourgeois-practical utilitarianism of the new age: he did indeed teach that knowledge is power, he wanted to re-establish the whole of science and to give it a new aim, as ars inveniendi, but, despite all opposition to purely theoretical knowledge and contemplative cognition, science remains autarkical, and only its method is to be changed. Changed in the sense of the inductive method, the methodically directed experiment; the proof, however, does not lie in practice, this is rather regarded even here only as the fruit and reward of truth, not as its final criterion and as demonstration. The various 'philosophies of action', which derived from Fichte and from Hegel, and then again, going back to Fichte, arose in the left-wing school of Hegelians, have even less similarity with Marx's practice-criterion. Fichte's 'active deeds' may itself have shown power and line on important national political points, but ultimately it always proved ethereal. In the end, it simply served not so much to better the world of the Not-I by processing it as to remove it completely. All that was proved, so to speak, by this basically world-hostile 'practice' was the in any case settled subjective starting-point of Fichtean ego-idealism, not however an objective truth which first develops with and through the world. Hegel comes closest to a premonition of a practice-criterion, and in fact characteristically on account of the

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relationship to work in his phenomenology. In addition, a transition occurs in Hegel's psychology from 'theoretical mind' (perception, imagination, thinking) to the antithesis 'practical mind' (feeling, driving will, bliss), out of which then, synthetically, 'free mind' was to result. Thus this synthesis proclaimed itself as the self-knowing will, as will which thinks and knows itself, which ultimately, in 'the rational State', wants what it knows and knows what it wants. Likewise the 'practical idea' is already classed above the 'idea of contemplated cognition' in Hegelian logic, in so far as 'not only the dignity of what is general, but also of what is simply real' is appropriate to the practical good (Werke V, p. 320f.). 'All this', notes Lenin, 'in the chapter "The idea of cognition" . . . , undoubtedly means that in Hegel practice is a link in the chain in the analysis of the process of cognition . . . Consequently Marx is establishing a direct link with Hegel when he introduces the criterion of practice into epistemology; see the Theses on Feuerbach' (Aus dem philosophischen Nachla, Dietz 1949, p. 133). However, at the end of his Logic, just as at the end of his Phenomenology and of his fully-developed system, Hegel leads the world (the Object, the object, the substance) almost as far back into the subject as Fichte does; so that in the end, it is not practice which crowns truth, but 're-minding', 'science of appearing knowledge' and nothing more. And also, according to Hegel's famous statement at the end of the preface to his 'Philosophy of Right', 'philosophy always comes too late anyway. It only appears as the thought of the world in the time after which reality has completed its formation-process and finished itself.' The closedcircuit thinker Hegel, the antiquarium of what is unalterably already existing, thus ultimately prevailed over the dialectical process-thinker Hegel with his crypto-practice. There is still in order to measure the distance of Marx's doctrine of practice even in the immediate environment of his youth the practice, soon also sharp practice of the left-wing Hegelians and all that goes along with it. This was the 'weapon of criticism', the so-called 'philosophy of action', when Marx was young. But what was at work here in fact was essentially only a return from the objective idealism of Hegel to the subjective idealism of Fichte; Feuerbach himself identified this in Bruno Bauer. This series of so-called philosophies of action began with the otherwise not uninteresting work by Cieszkovski: 'Prolegomena to Historiosophy', 1838, a work which expressly presents it as necessary to use philosophy to change the world. Thus in these 'Prolegomena' there are even appeals for rational research into the tendencies of history: so that the correct course of action can be taken; so that not instinctive, but

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conscious actions form world history; so that the will is brought to the same peak to which reason had been brought by Hegel; so that in this way a not only pre- but also post-theoretical practice can gain space. This all sounds significant, and yet it remained only declaratory, resulted in absolutely nothing even in Cieszkovski's other writings, in fact the 'interests of the future' became more and more irrational and obscure in his work. Cieszkovski's rejection of speculation became a rejection of reason, activity became an activity of 'active intuition', and the whole will towards the future ultimately ended in a theosophy of Amen in the orthodox church, published at the time of the 'Communist Manifesto'. In Marx's own circle there was still Bruno Bauer's work of course, likewise a 'philosophy of action', even one of the Last Judgement, but in fact the most subjective of all. When reactionary thinking under Friedrich Wilhelm IV put this 'weapon of criticism' to the test, in Bruno Bauer it immediately retreated into individualism, in fact into an egocentricity contemptuous of the masses. Bauer's 'critical critique' was simply a battle in and between thoughts, a kind of l'art pour l'art-practice of the arrogant mind with itself, and eventually Stirner's 'The Lone Individual and his Property' developed from it. Marx himself has said the decisive thing about this in the 'Holy Family', on his own account, as is evident, in the cause of genuine practice and its unmistakableness. In the cause of revolutionary practice: beginning with the proletariat, equipped with the fruitful aspect of the Hegelian dialectic and not with abstractions from the 'wilted and widowed philosophy of Hegel' (MEGA I, 3, p. 189), let alone of Fichtean subjectivism. Fichte, the virtuous man of wrath, did at least still have energetic directives in view, from the 'Closed Commercial State' to the 'Speeches to the German Nation', he philosophized the French out of Germany; the 'critical critique', however, merely paraded in the Tattersalls of self-importance. And, closer to Marx, even in the work of the thoroughly honest Socialist Moses Hess action had a tendency to detach itself from social activity, to reduce itself to reform of moral consciousness a 'philosophy of action' without developed economic theory behind it, without a timetable of dialectically comprehended tendency within it. The concepts of practice until Marx are therefore completely different from his theory-practice conception, from the doctrine of unity between theory and practice. And rather than merely being glued on to theory, in such a way that thought remains purely scientific and does not in the least require 'application', in such a way that theory continues to pursue its own life and its immanent self-sufficiency even in its proofs, according to Marx and Lenin, theory and practice continually

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oscillate. Since both alternately and reciprocally swing into one another, practice presupposes theory, just as it itself further releases and needs new theory in order to continue a new practice. Concrete thought had never been valued more highly than it was here, where it became the light for action, and never had action been valued more highly than here, where it became the crowning of truth. And warmth also definitely seeks to be inherent in thinking here, since it is helpful thinking. The warmth of wanting-to-help itself, of love for the victims, of hatred of the exploiters. Indeed these feelings bring partiality into play, without which no true knowledge combined with good action is at all possible in socialist terms. But a feeling of love which is not itself illuminated by cognition blocks the very helping action on which it would like to embark. It is sated all too easily by its own excellence, becomes the haze of a new pseudo-active selfconfidence. In this case not a l'art pour l'art-critical self-confidence, as in Bruno Bauer, but a sentimentally uncritical one which is stifling and vague. As in Feuerbach himself: he always set his equivocation 'sensation' in place of practice. He defuses love into the general emotional relation between I and You, he reveals the lack of any social cognition even here by retreating to mere individuals and their eternally languishing relationships. He effeminates humanity thus: 'The new philosophy is in relation to its base (!) itself nothing more than the nature of sensation raised into consciousness it affirms only in and with reason what every person the real person admits in his heart' (Werke II, 1846, p. 324). This statement is from the 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', in fact it is the action-substitute from the past, from a bourgeois-conformist, sanctimonious, indeed, very often, Tartuffishly sabotaging past. From a past which, precisely because of its abstractly declamatory love of mankind, does not in the least seek to change the world today for the good, but to perpetuate it in the bad. Feuerbach's caricature of the Sermon on the Mount excludes all harshness in prosecuting injustice, while including total laxness in the class struggle; for this very reason general 'socialism' of love recommends itself to all the crocodile tears of a capitalistically interested philanthropy. Hence Marx and Engels: 'The kingdom of love was preached precisely as opposed to bad reality, to hatred . . . But when experience teaches that this love has not become effective in 1800 years, that it has not been able to transform social conditions, nor to establish its kingdom, then it quite obviously follows from this that this love which has not been able to conquer hatred does not supply the active energy necessary for social reforms. This love gets lost

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in sentimental phrases through which no real, factual conditions can be removed; it makes man lethargic with the enormous emotional pap on which it feeds him. Therefore deprivation gives man strength; those who must help themselves, do help themselves. And that is why the real conditions of this world, the sharp contrast in society today between capital and work, between bourgeoisie and proletariat, as they appear in their most developed form in industrial trade, are the other, more powerfully bubbling source of the socialist world-view, of the desire for social reforms . . . This iron necessity creates a wide audience and active adherents for socialist endeavour, and it will pave the way for the socialist reforms through transformation of present conditions of trade sooner than all the love which glows in all the hearts brimming with feeling in the world' (Circular against H. Kriege, a supporter of Feuerbach, 11th May 1846). Since then, what Thomas Mnzer would not only have called 'contrived belief' but also 'contrived love', has spread in quite a different way than in Feuerbach's relatively harmless time, among renegades and pseudo-socialists. Their hypocritical love of mankind is however only the weapon of war of a much more total hatred: namely of communism; and the newly contrived love is only there for the sake of the war. Together with the mysticism which is not lacking even in Feuerbach, which here still at least wished to be 'forward idealism', i.e. progressive, and which, in the formless roaring of the fulfilment of its heart, of its God-the-Fatherliness made anthropological, had no worse shortcoming than the poorly demystified, non-denominational philistinism mentioned above. But the mysteries of today's profound babbling which is no longer even idealistic almost as different from Feuerbach's mysticism as this was from the mysticism of Meister Eckhart hide their heart up their sleeves, and instead of the empty rosy mist there is today a nothingness exploited by the bourgeoisie. Thesis 8 says: 'All mysteries which lead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the rational solution of this practice.' Here of course a distinction is being made between two types of mysteries: namely those which present what is unclarified, aporias, forest of uncomprehended contradictions as still uncomprehended in reality, and those, called actual mysticisms, which are idolatry of darkness for its own sake. But even things that are simply unfathomed, and especially the misty-line in them, can lead into mysticism; for this very reason only rational practice is the human solution here, and the rational solution only human practice, which keeps to humanity (rather than the forest). And even the word mysticism is not used without reason by Marx on the subject of

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Feuerbach, in fact it is used against the non-sword of abstract love which leaves the Gordian knot alone. To repeat: Feuerbach's mysteries, the love-mysteries without clarity, certainly have nothing in common with that which later emerged as rottenness and night-irratio; Feuerbach lies instead on that German salvation-line which leads from Hegel to Marx, just as the German disaster-line leads from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and the consequences. And love of mankind, in so far as it clearly understands itself as being directed towards the exploited, in so far as it proceeds towards real knowledge, is undoubtedly an imperative agent in socialism. But if the salt can lose his savour, how much more so the sugar its sweetness,* and if Christians of feeling remain locked in defeatism, how much more so socialists of feeling in pharisaical betrayal. Hence Marx also attacks in Feuerbach a dangerous inflatedness, one which enjoys itself as it is, on the bottom line a pectoral practice which achieves the opposite of what the altruism it preaches to and its ineffably universal love intend. Without factions in love, with an equally concrete pole of hatred, there is no genuine love; without partiality of the revolutionary class standpoint there only remains backward idealism instead of forward practice. Without the primacy of the head to the very end there are only mysteries of resolution rather than the resolution of mysteries. At the ethical conclusion of Feuerbach's philosophy of the future both philosophy and future are missing; Marx's theory for the sake of practice started both functioning, and ethics at last becomes flesh. The Password and Its Meaning Thesis 11 It is recognized here that the future aspect is the nearest and most important. But not in fact after Feuerbach's fashion, which never sets sail. Which contents itself from beginning to end with contemplation, which leaves things as they are. Or even worse, which believes it cannot help but rearrange things, but only in the book, while the world itself notices nothing of it. One reason why it notices nothing of it is because the world can so easily be rearranged in false representations that nothing real appears in the book at all. Every step outwards would be damaging here to the
*

'Salt is good: but if the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be seasoned?' Luke 14, 34.

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neatly figured-out book living in its own nature reserve and would disturb the private life of invented thoughts. But even the most authentic books and doctrines often show the typically contemplative desire to be satisfied with themselves in their framed context, one successfully achieved at last 'in terms of a work'. Consequently they even fear a change in the portrayed world which might possibly arise out of themselves, because the work even if, like Feuerbach's, it sets up principles of the future could then no longer hover through the ages in such an autarkical manner. Especially if, as was again the case in Feuerbach, this was supplemented by an intended or naive political indifference, the public was wholly confined to the equally contemplative reader; his arms, his actions were not addressed. The standpoint may have been a new one, but it remained a mere vantage point; conceptual invention thus gave no instructions for real intervention. Hence, briefly and antithetically, Marx states the celebrated Thesis 11: 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; but the point is to change it.' A significant difference to every previous impetus to thought is thus strikingly designated. Short propositions, as we noted at the beginning, sometimes seem as if they can be assessed more quickly than they in fact can. And with celebrated propositions there is sometimes the problem that, very much against their will, they no longer stimulate reflection, or that we swallow them too raw. Then from time to time they cause us difficulty, in this case difficulty which is hostile to intelligence, at least alien to intelligence, and which could not be further from the sense of the proposition. What exactly is intended by Thesis 11 then, how must it be understood in Marx's invariably precise philosophical sense? It must not be understood or rather: misused by mixing it in any way with pragmatism. The latter stems from a region which is utterly alien to Marxism, from a region which is hostile to it, intellectually inferior, ultimately downright disreputable. Nevertheless, 'busy bodies', * as they say in America, i.e. bustlers, repeatedly subscribe to Marx's proposition, just as if it was American cultural barbarity. Underlying American pragmatism is the view that truth is nothing more than the commercial usefulness of ideas. Consequently, there is a so-called aha-experience of truth, as soon and in so far as this is aimed at practical success and actually shows itself to be suitable for bringing it about. In William James ('Pragmatism', 1907), the businessman, as 'American way
*

Bloch is using the English expression here, but seems to have misunderstood its colloquial application.

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of life', to a certain extent still appears to be generally human, is so to speak garnished in a humanitarian way, even in an almost life-promoting and optimistic way. Both on account of the pink packaging of American capitalism still possible at that time, and above all on account of the tendency of every class society to present its special interest as that of the whole of humanity. This is why pragmatism initially also professed to be the patron of those various, interchangeable, logical 'instruments' with which the higher order of businessman achieves almost 'humanitarian success'. But there is no more such a thing, even less such a thing as a humanitarian businessman than there is such a thing as a Marxist playboy; thus after James, pragmatism in America and in the whole of the world-bourgeoisie quickly showed itself for what it is: the final agnosticism of a society stripped of any will towards the truth. Two imperialist wars, the first generally imperialist war from 1914 to 1918, the second partially imperialist war of the Nazi aggressors, made pragmatism ripe even for horse-trader ideology. Now it is no longer a question of truth at all, not even as if it were at least an 'instrument' to be maintained; and the pink package of 'humanitarian success' completely went to the devil who was in it from the beginning. Now ideas wavered and changed like share prices, according to the war situation, the business situation; until finally the utterly disgraceful pragmatism of the Nazis appeared. What served the German nation, i.e. what served German capital finance, was right; what furthered the interests of life, i.e. maximum profit, and what appeared to be useful for its purposes, was truth. These were therefore, in the fullness of time, the consequences of pragmatism; and yet how harmlessly, indeed how deceptively it may have also looked like 'theory-practice'. How speciously a truth for its own sake was spurned here too, without saying that this was done on account of a lie for the sake of business. How speciously concrete too was the demand here for the probation of truth in practice, even in 'changing' the world. How great the falsifiability of Thesis 11 is then in the heads of scorners of intelligence and practicists. Certainly, as far as practicists in the socialist movement are concerned, in moral terms, as is self-evident, they do not have the least in common with the pragmatists; their will is pure, their intention revolutionary, their goal humanitarian. But by omitting the head here, and consequently nothing less than the whole wealth of Marxist theory together with the critical appropriation of the cultural legacy within it, there arises on the site of the 'trial and error method', of tinkering, of practicism, that cruel falsification of Thesis 11 which is reminiscent of pragmatism in

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methodological terms. Practicism which borders on pragmatism is a consequence of this falsification, one which is as always uncomprehended; but ignorance of a consequence is no protection against stultification. The practicists, with at best short-term credit for theory, especially complicated theory, create in the middle of the Marxist system of light the darkness of their own private ignorance and of the resentment which so easily goes with ignorance. Sometimes in fact not even practicism, i.e. still at least an activity, is necessary to explain such alienation from theory; since the schematism of unthinkingness also lives from its own, from inactive anti-philosophy. But it can thus refer even less to the most valuable thesis on Feuerbach; misunderstanding then becomes blasphemy. It must therefore be repeatedly emphasized: in Marx a thought is not true because it is useful, but it is useful because it is true. Lenin formulates the same idea in the pithy dictum: 'Marx's doctrine is allpowerful because it is true.' And he continues: 'It is the rightful heiress of the best that humanity produced in the nineteenth century in the shape of German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.' And he states a few lines previously: 'The whole genius of Marx consists in the fact that he gave answers to the questions which the progressive thinking of humanity had already posed' (Lenin, Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism). In other words: real practice cannot take a single stride without having consulted theory economically and philosophically, a theory advancing with great strides. Thus just as there has been a lack of socialist theoreticians, the danger has always existed that contact with reality would suffer, a reality which is never to be interpreted schematically and simplistically, where practice was otherwise supposed to succeed in socialist terms. Even if these are open doors which the anti-pragmatism of the greatest practice-thinkers, greatest in that they were the most reliable truth-witnesses, holds open, they can still be closed again and again by an interested misinterpretation of Thesis 11. By one which ironically enough believes it can detect in the highest triumph of philosophy which takes place in Thesis 11 an abdication of philosophy, in fact a kind of non-bourgeois pragmatism. Precisely that future aspect is poorly served here which no longer comes towards us uncomprehended, but to which conversely our active knowledge comes; Ratio keeps watch on this stretch of practice. Just as it keeps watch on every stretch of humanitarian road home: against the irrational which ultimately also shows itself in any practice devoid of concept. For if the destruction of reason sinks back into the barbaric irrational, then the

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ignorance of reason sinks back into the stupid irrational; though the latter does not of course shed blood, but ruins Marxism. Even banality is thus counter-revolution against Marxism itself; since Marxism is the consummation (not the Americanization) of the most progressive thoughts of humanity. So much for false understanding, right at the end, where it surfaces. The false equally requires elucidation precisely because Thesis 11 is the most important corruptio optimi pessima. At the same time this thesis is the most succintly expressed one; so a commentary here must go into the literal meaning much more than with the others. So what is the significance of the wording in Thesis 11, what is its apparent contrast between knowing and changing? There is no contrast; even the not contrary, but rather broadening particle 'but' is missing in Marx's original (cf. MEGA I, 5, p. 535); there is just as little sign of an either-or. And previous philosophers are reproached for the fact or rather: it is identified as a class barrier in them that they have only interpreted the world in various ways, not however that they have philosophized. But interpretation is related to contemplation and follows from it; non-contemplative knowledge is thus now distinguished as a new flag which truly carries us to victory. But as a flag of knowledge, as the same flag which Marx though with action, not with contemplative quiet raised above his major work of learned research. This major work is a clear directive for action, but it is called 'Das Kapital', not 'Guide to Success' or even 'Active Propaganda'; it is not a sort of recipe for a quick heroic deed ante rem, but stands in the middle of the res, in painstaking examination, philosophizing contextual exploration of the most difficult reality. With the course set towards comprehended necessity, towards knowledge of the dialectical laws of development in nature and society as a whole. The identification of the first part of the proposition thus pushes off from the philosophers who 'have only interpreted the world in various ways', and from nothing else; it does set sail, but only on an extremely well thought-out voyage, as the second part of the proposition reveals: on that of a new, of an active philosophy, one which, in order to achieve change, is as inevitable as it is suitable. Undoubtedly Marx did direct harsh words against philosophy, but not against contemplative philosophy per se, whenever it was important philosophy from a great age. But precisely against a particular kind of contemplative philosophy, namely that of the Hegel epigones of his time, which was in fact a non-philosophy. Hence, characteristically, the 'German Ideology', which was aimed at these epigones, contains the strongest polemical attack: 'We must set aside philosophy, we must jump out of

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it and, as ordinary people, apply ourselves to the study of reality, for which there is enormous material even in literature, of which philosophers are of course unaware; and if we then come across people like Kuhlmann or Stirner again, we find that we have had them ''behind" us and below us for a long time. Philosophy is about as similar to study of the real world as masturbation is to love-making' (MEGA I, 5, p. 216). The names Kuhlmann (a pietistic theologian of the time) and especially Stirner show only too dearly to which address or kind of philosophy this mighty invective was directed; it was directed at philosophical windbaggery. It was not directed at Hegelian philosophy and other great philosophies of the past, no matter how contemplative these were considered to be; Marx would have been the last person to have missed a 'study of the real world' in the concrete philosopher Hegel, the most knowledgeable encyclopedist since Aristotle. This kind of objection was raised to Hegel by minds fundamentally different to Marx and Engels, the minds of the Prussian reaction, subsequently of revisionism and similar 'political realists', as we know full well. Of real previous philosophy, on the other hand, Marx speaks quite differently even in the 'German Ideology', namely in the sense of a creative real entry into an inheritance. Previously the 'Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' of 1844 had already clearly established that philosophy could not be abolished without realizing it, could not be realized without abolishing it. The former, with the accent on realization, is said for the 'men of practice': 'Hence, quite rightly, the practical political faction in Germany demands the negation of philosophy. Where it is quite wrong is not in the demand but in stopping at the demand which in all seriousness it neither implements nor can achieve. It believes it can achieve that negation by turning its back on philosophy and murmuring a few irritated and banal phrases about it with its head turned away. The limitation of its field of vision does not rank philosophy as well in the precincts of German reality or imagine it even under the rubric of German practice and the theories that serve it. You demand that we should start from real living seeds, but you forget that the real living seed of the German nation has until now only proliferated beneath its skull. In a word: You cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it.' The second, with the accent on abolition, is said for the 'theoreticians': 'The same wrong, only with reverse factors, was committed by the theoretical political faction which dates from philosophy. It saw in the present struggle only the critical struggle of philosophy with the German world, it did not consider that subsequent philosophy itself belongs to this world and is its, albeit ideal, completion.

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Critical of its adversary, it behaved uncritically towards itself, in that it began with the assumptions of philosophy and either stuck at its given results or issued demands and results of philosophy imported from elsewhere, although these assuming they are justified are conversely only to be obtained through the negation of subsequent (!) philosophy, of philosophy as philosophy. We will reserve a closer portrayal of this faction for the moment' (it occurred in the 'Holy Family' and in the 'German Ideology', with the severest critique of degenerate contemplation, of the critical 'repose of knowing'). 'Its basic defect can be reduced to this: It believed it could realize philosophy without abolishing it' (MEGA I, 1/1, p. 613). Marx thus gives both factions of the time an antidote for their behaviour, in each case a reverse medicina mentis: he imposes greater realization of philosophy on the practical men of that time, and greater abolition of philosophy on the theoreticians. However, even the 'negation' of philosophy (itself a very highly philosophically charged concept deriving from Hegel) refers in a most explicit way here to 'subsequent philosophy', not to every possible and future philosophy in general. The 'negation' refers to philosophy with truth for its own sake, i.e. to autarkical-contemplative philosophy, to one which simply interprets the world in an antiquarian way, it does not refer to one which changes the world in a revolutionary way. Indeed, even inside the 'subsequent philosophy', which is of course so fundamentally different from the Hegel epigones, there is, despite all the contemplation, so much 'study of the real world' that even German classical philosophy does not figure in a totally impractical way among the 'three sources and three components of Marxism'. The absolutely new aspect in Marxist philosophy consists in the radical changing of its basis, in its proletarian revolutionary mission; but the absolutely new aspect does not consist in the idea that the only philosophy which is capable of changing and destined to change the world concretely is not philosophy at all any more. Because it is so like never before, hence precisely the triumph of knowledge in the second part of the proposition of Thesis 11, concerning the changing of the world; Marxism would not be a change at all in the true sense if it were no theoreticalpractical primacy of true philosophy before and in it. Not least philosophy which, with staying power, with full cultural inheritance, is well-versed in ultra-violet, that is: in the future-laden properties of reality. Changing in the untrue sense is easy of course in many ways, even without a concept; the Huns also changed things, change can also be brought about through megalomania, through anarchism, even through the ravings of mental illness which Hegel calls a 'perfect

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depiction of chaos'. But sound change, especially that into the realm of freedom, comes about solely through sound knowledge, with ever more precisely mastered necessity. Out and out philosophers have subsequently changed the world in this way: Marx, Engels, Lenin. Practicists from the hollow of the hand, schematists with a horde of quotations, have not changed it, and neither have those empiricists whom Engels called 'induction asses'. Philosophical change is change with unstinting knowledge of its context; for if philosophy does not represent a separate science above all other sciences, it certainly is the separate knowledge and conscience of this Totum in all sciences. It is the progressive consciousness of the progressive Totum, since the Totum does not itself stand as a Factum, but solely circulates with the still Unbecome in the gigantic context of Becoming. Philosophical change is thus a change according to the stipulations of the analyzed situation, of dialectical tendency, of objective laws, of real possibility. That is why therefore in the end philosophical change takes place essentially in the horizon of the future, which is generally incapable of contemplation, incapable of interpretation, but is discernible in a Marxist sense. And seen from this point of view, Marx also rose above the changing accents, cited above, which are only placed antithetically: concerning realization or abolition of philosophy (realization accentuated against the 'men of practice', abolition accentuated against the 'theoreticians'). The dialectical unity of correctly understood accents reads, at the end of the already quoted 'Introduction' (MEGA I, 1/1, p. 621), as is well-known: 'Philosophy cannot realize itself without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot abolish itself without the realization of philosophy.' And the abolition of the proletariat, as soon as it is not only grasped as a class, but equally, as Marx teaches, as the sharpest symptom of human selfalienation, is undoubtedly a long act: a total abolition of this kind coincides with the final act of communism. In the sense in which Marx expresses it in the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts', with a perspective which is at home precisely in the philosophically most extreme 'Eschaton': 'Only here for him (for man) has his natural existence become his human existence and nature for him become man. Thus society is the perfect essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of nature' (MEGA I, 3, p. 116). The final perspective of changing the world which Marx attempted to formulate shines here. Its thought (the knowledgeconscience of all practice, in which the still distant Totum is mirrored) undoubtedly demands just as much newness of philosophy, as it creates resurrection of nature.

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The Archimedean Point; Knowledge Related Not Only to What Is Past, but Essentially to What Is Coming Up To begin with the mind became so powerful, ultimately it becomes expert at being so. And precisely because it has relinquished its earlier, often falsely sublime character. Because it has become a truly political song, finally managed to get beyond contemplated and past material to the present. To a present, furthermore, in those days, which did not countenance the mind as ether, but rather used it as material power. To understand this, the point in time is once again important when, with the other early writings, the 'Eleven Theses' emerged into this powerful light. Marx wrote about it in the 'Communist Manifesto', 1848, that is, a short time later: 'The communists are directing their main attention on Germany, because Germany is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution and because it is achieving this radical change under more progressive conditions of European civilization in general and with a much further developed proletariat than England in the seventeenth and France in the eighteenth century, and the German revolution can therefore only be the immediate prelude to a proletarian revolution.' Hence the particular impetus, one not experienced by Feuerbach, which immediately brought the new philosophy, in statu nascendi, on to the barricades. Already in Thesis 4 the Archimedean point had been discovered from which the old world could thus be lifted off its hinges and the new one on to its hinges, the Archimedean point in the 'worldly basis' of today: 'The latter itself must therefore first be understood in its contradiction and then be revolutionized by eliminating the contradiction in practice.' And so, what is it finally that discovered the starting-point of the 'Eleven Theses', i.e. the beginning philosophy of revolution? It is surely not the new, proletarian mandate alone, however decisively it tore itself free from contemplation, did not take, let alone perpetuate things as they are. Neither is it only the critically and creatively claimed inheritance of German philosophy, of English political economy, of French socialism, necessary though these three enzymes, primarily Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's renewed materialism, were for the formation of Marxism. But rather what finally led to the Archimedean point, and with this to theory-practice, did not appear in any previous philosophy whatsoever, in fact has hardly been fully considered by and in Marx himself. 'In bourgeois society', says the Communist Manifesto, 'the past rules over the present,

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in communist society the present rules over the past.' And the present rules together with the horizon within it, which is the horizon of the future, and which gives to the flow of the present specific space, the space of new, feasibly better present. Thus the beginning philosophy of revolution, i.e. of changeability for the better, was ultimately revealed on and in the horizon of the future; with the science of the New and power to guide it. All knowledge was however previously related essentially to what is past, since only this can be contemplated. The New thus remained beyond its grasp, the present, in which the Becoming of the New has its Front, remained an embarrassment. Thinking in commodityform has particularly intensified this old traditional impotence; since the way capitalism turns all men and things into a commodity not only lends them alienation, but it also makes evident: the thought-form commodity is itself the intensified thought-form Becomeness, Factum. On account of this Factum the Fieri is particularly easily forgotten, and consequently the producing element on account of the reified product, and on account of the apparent Fixum at the back of men, the openness in front of them. But the false reciprocal relationship between knowledge and past is very much older, in fact it has its origin precisely where the work process was not at all considered in cognition, so that knowledge not only had to be, as shown above, simply vision, but the Object of knowledge had to be simply material that has been thoroughly formed, and beingness simply Been-ness. This is the proper place for Plato's anamnesis: 'For truly', says Socrates in the 'Meno' dialogue (81B82A) and points to vision precisely in the primal past of the soul, 'searching and learning are purely and simply memory.' It is the spell of this contemplative antiquarium which despite all social changes in the concept of knowledge has kept philosophy until Marx not only in contemplation, but also in fact in the mere relation to Becomeness inscribed in every contemplation. Even for the thinker of development, Aristotle, essence is the , the 'What-Was-Being', in the sense of enclosed definability, statuary distinctness. Even for Hegel, the great dialectical process thinker, occurrence is totally bent under its finished history, and essence is the reality that has become, in which it 'is one with its appearance'. Not least in Feuerbach, Marx himself notes the same block: 'Feuerbach's whole deduction regarding the relationship of people to one another only goes to prove that people need and have always needed each other. He seeks to establish consciousness via this fact, he therefore seeks, like the other theoreticians, merely to produce a correct consciousness via an existing Factum, whereas for real communists it is a question of

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overthrowing what exists' (Deutsche Ideologie, MEGA I, 5, p. 31). The effect of all this was simply for the spirit of anamnesis to seek its power of cognition precisely where present, and especially future is least to be decided. Whereas, therefore, the mere relation: knowledgepast stands in an almost exclusively tub-thumping relationship to questions of the present, and especially to crucial problems of the future, or in a relationship of the most short-sighted bourgeois class standpoint, it only feels at home as it were (though without the perpetuated class standpoint coming to an end) in the seclusion of the preterite. And indeed all the more at home, the more distant the objects lay back in the past, the more adequate therefore their isolation appears to the repose of contemplation. Hence, in the relation: knowledge-past, the Crusades permit more 'scientificality' so to speak than both the last two World Wars, and Egypt, which is even more distant, more than the Middle Ages. In fact the apparent total Over of physical nature stands or stood there as a kind of super-Egypt or potential of Egypt, a very long way back in the past, with the granite Becomeness of a matter which was pronounced dead, not without methodological jubilation. But how different all this is in Marxism, how greatly its power has passed to the present. How convincingly its new, its general science of occurrence and change proves itself precisely on the Front of occurrence, in the actuality of each decision, in tendency-control towards the future. In Marxism, the past is not graded in an increasingly antiquarian manner either, since history, as both a primitive communist history and as a history of class struggles, does not even make the epoch which lies furthest back in the past into a museum; even less does it make the one which lies closer to it into a science-free moratorium, as happens in bourgeois contemplation. Whereby such large sections of bourgeois erudition, without any concrete knowledge-relationship to the present, either confronted this latter epoch helplessly when it demanded decision, or, in recent times, sold themselves to anti-Bolshevism, over and above all class interests, with scandalous ignorance and lack of wisdom. Even the incomparably superior scientific pioneers of bourgeois society, the great and pure ideologists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who certainly were kept in relation to the present and the future, always confronted what was coming up in their own revolutionary class with illusions or unconcretely overshooting ideals; not only on account of their respective class barriers, but also on account of the barrier against the future, which until Marx was consistently erected with the class barrier. This all unites, the longer it persists, the more so, precisely with the anamnesis or the contemplative-static knowledge-block against

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what is really advancing and coming up. And likewise, now quite decisively: where the knowledge-past-relationship sees only embarrassment in the present and chaff, wind, formlessness in the future, the knowledge-tendency-relationship grasps the What For of its knowledge as a whole: as the mediated new construction of the world. The dialecticalhistorical tendency science of Marxism is thus the mediated future science of reality plus the objectively real possibility within it; all this for the purpose of action. The difference from the anamnesis of the Become, together with all its variations, could not be more illuminating; this is true both of the enlightening Marxist method and of the enlightened, unenclosed matter within it. Only the horizon of the future, which Marxism occupies, with that of the past as the ante-room, gives reality its real dimension. Neither must we forget here the new location of the Archimedean point itself, from which the world is lifted on to its hinges. It likewise does not lie a long way back, in what is past, what is finished and done with, to which earlier, merely contemplative materialism had reduced the world by analysis. This subsequently produced an unchecked retrograde effect, precisely when the demystifying role of this materialism was long since over; it dissolved historical appearances into biological ones, and the latter into chemical and physical ones, right down to the atomic 'basis' of each and every thing. So that, even of historically highly-charged appearances, say of the Battle of Marathon for example, only the muscle movements remained, i.e. the Greeks and the Persians together with the social content of this battle disappeared into entirely sub-historical muscle movements. These then dissolved again out of physiology into organic chemical processes, and organic chemistry in turn, which is common to all living things in any case, finally landed up in the dance of the atoms, precisely as the most general 'basis' of each and every thing. Thus, of course, not only had the Battle of Marathon completely disappeared, for which after all an explanation was supposed to be given, but the whole constructed world was apparently submerged in the generality of a total mechanism with the loss of all its appearances and differences. In this reduction to atomics and nothing but atomics, mechanical materialism saw the heart of the matter; in fact all there was in reality here was that night of which Hegel once spoke, the night in which all cows are grey. What was missing was what Democritus, the first great materialist, termed , the rescuing of appearances, and which he called for in methodology. Here, of course, Feuerbach did the young Marx a great service with his not physical but 'anthropological' materialism, a service

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which is recognized in the whole tenor of the 'Eleven Theses'. Atoms and then the whole of biology do indeed underlie every further construction in evolutionary terms, but the 'startingpoint', as Engels later called it in the 'Dialectic of Nature', then the Archimedean point (for history) is for Marxism working man. His social modes of satisfying needs, the 'ensemble of social conditions', which came to replace the Feuerbachian human Abstractum, the social exchange process with nature itself: all this was now recognized as the only relevant and real basis as far as the realm of history and culture is concerned. This was also a material basis, in fact a much more distinctively material basis than that of the invisible atomic processes, but precisely because it was a more distinctive basis, a historically characteristic basis, it did not make historical appearances and characters into night. Instead it brought light for the first time, a genuine light, in which simultaneously the Archimedean point lay, which means: relation of people to people and to nature. And precisely because historical materialism, in contrast to one-sided natural scientific materialism, was not a contemplative materialism, it discovered at the specific location of its Archimedean point not only the key of theory, but also the lever of practice. Marxism thus least destroys this lever or, correspondingly, the higher, the new organization of living matter to which the lever raises us. Thus once again Thesis 10 states: 'The standpoint of the old materialism is "bourgeois" society, the standpoint of the new materialism is human society or socialized humanity.' And correspondingly, world-changing of this kind occurs solely in a world of qualitative reversibility, changeability itself, not in that of the mechanical Time and Time Again, of pure quantity, of the historical In-Vain. There is likewise no changeable world without the grasped horizon of the objectively real possibility within it; otherwise even its dialectic would be one of marking-time. In fact, a great deal more power of creation has become visible in the worldembracing dialectic of Marxism and comes to science. The hope which Herder sought to invoke hymnically in the 'Genius of the Future': ' . . . for what is knowledge of life! and you,/Gift of the Gods, face of the prophets! enchanting voice/That sings in premonition!', precisely the hope of the knowledge of life became a real event in Marx, so that it might really be such knowledge. The event is not closed, since it is itself a single Forwards in the changeable world, a world which implies happiness. Thus the totality of the 'Eleven Theses' testifies: socialized humanity, allied with a nature that is mediated with it, is the reconstruction of the world into homeland.

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20 Summary Anticipatory Composition and Its Poles: Dark Moment Open Adequacy
But who drives on within us? Someone who does not occupy himself, does not yet emerge. There is no more to be said now, this inner dimension sleeps. The blood runs, the heart beats without us being able to sense what has set the pulse in motion. In fact, if there is no disturbance, then nothing under our skin can be felt at all. That within us which makes us capable of being stimulated does not stimulate itself. Healthy life sleeps, weaving within itself. It is completely immersed in the juice in which it is stewing. Pulse and Lived Darkness For this very reason we cannot feel that we are alive. Precisely this immediate pulse beats alone. Acts like the fulfilment of desire, imagination and so on do not step outside the immediate darkness of their occurrence. But the Now itself ultimately remains the most dark in which we each find ourselves as experiencing beings. The Now is the place where the immediate hearth of experience in general stands, stands in question; thus what has just been lived itself is the most immediately, that is, the least previously experienceable. Only when a Now has just passed or when and for as long as it is expected, is it not only lived, but also experienced. As immediately being there, it lies in the darkness of the moment. Only what is just coming up or what has just passed has the distance which the beam of growing consciousness needs to illuminate it. The That and Now, the moment we are in, burrows in itself and cannot feel itself. Correspondingly, therefore, the respective content of what has just been lived is not perceived. Room for Possible Advance But what is driving in the Now at the same time continually surges forwards. It therefore never remains weaving within itself, since the That of life is greedy. However unexpressed its inner dimension may be, it expresses itself in the fact that it does not have what belongs to it, but

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rather searches for it and intends it outside, i.e. that it is hungry. And the Outside into which the subjective reaches must lie at least within its reach. If there were nothing but narrow, suffocating, firmly established walls around the urging after what the subjective lacks, then there would not even be any urging there. But as it is, something is still open to it, its urging, wishing, doing has room. What is not can still become, what is realized presupposes Possible in its material. There is this open dimension in people, and dreams, plans live within it. The open dimension is also in things, on their leading edge, where becoming is still possible. And urging not only has its outlet or its free space there, where it can still go, still choose, still depart, still take a new path, lay a new path, but apart from the path there is in the objectively Possible something which possibly corresponds to us, whereby the urging does not continue endlessly unsatisfied. This corresponding something is not itself settled and guaranteed as such, it is not receptive, let alone a solution, but it is prepared for its Possible and is thus at least receptive as something prepared. There is a driving in things in which our affairs can still be conducted, a Front in which our future, precisely this, can be decided. Such changeable material is by no means self-evident: there could in fact also be nothing new under the sun.* But as it is, there is in the flow of things, i.e. of events, definitely still a Still and a Not-Yet, which is the same as genuine future, i.e. future composed of what has never been like this. Ages in which nothing happens have almost lost the feeling for the Novum; they live in habit and what is coming is no such thing, but rather as circumscribed as what happened yesterday. But ages like the modern one, in which history, perhaps for centuries, stands in the balance, have the feeling for the Novum in the extreme, they sense what future is, with bated breath, by working to promote what is approaching, the approaching possible. Such ages are the place to experience the correlate of the Possible particularly intensely, beyond shattered Becomeness. The Now of the driving only has room among unclosed things to realize, to make its contents increasingly manifest. Source and Outflow: Astonishment as Absolute Question If something is properly realized, life comes to the place where it has never been, that is, it comes home. In this possible realization of something still possible, however, two moments ultimately constitute source and outflow.
*

Cf. Eccles. 1, 9.

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The source is characterized by the darkness of the Now, in which realization rises, the outflow by the openness of the object-based background, towards which hope goes. It has already been seen: in the process of realization there is something itself unripe and not yet realized, hence it weakens (cf. p. 192); this unripeness makes itself evident in the darkness of the lived moment. It has further been seen: in the object-based background or correlate there is openness, still decidable Real-Possible, there is utopia as Front-determination of objects themselves (cf. p. 204f.); this material capable of ripening makes itself evident as still continuing tendency, still dawning latency. Dark moment on the one hand, adequate openness on the other, consequently characterize source and outflow of the process of coming up; they are the poles of anticipatory consciousness as well as that which corresponds to it in object-based terms. Outflow, however, characterizes a moment of the final state which signifies more than adequate openness, on the contrary: in which the latter presents itself as open adequacy. Invariance of something constantly intended or of a utopian end which is in the direction, this solely valid invariance has also already been distinguished (cf. p. 221); it is Unum Necessarium in the direction, is an always identically disposed element of the utopian final state. And now: open adequacy does not make itself evident in experiences of the continuing world-process, with experimented outflow, but in short, strange experience of an anticipated keeping still. The briefest symbol-intentions of an Absolute have always been experienced in this keeping still, subjective at first, in fact appearing to be lyrical and yet arch-philosophically founded in the matter itself, namely in a flash of utopian final state. Such experiences of a utopian final state certainly do not fix it, otherwise they would not be experiences of mere symbol-intention and not utopian, let alone central utopian ones. But they actually do touch upon the core of latency, and in fact as final question, echoing within themselves. This question cannot be construed towards any readily available answer, or be referred to any material already settled anywhere in the available world. Examples of this are given in the book 'Traces', where 'questioning, bottomless astonishment' is explained with reference to a passage from Hamsun (Ernst Bloch, Spuren, 1930, p. 274ff.). Particularly, however, in 'The Spirit of Utopia', in which such an ultimate symbol-intention was first characterized as 'shape of the unconstruable question', this means in fact, as shape of questions which cannot be bent or construed towards any readily available solutions: 'A drop falls, and it is here; a hut, the child cries, an old woman in the hut, wind outside, heath, autumn evening, and it is here again, exactly as it was, the same; or we read that Dimitri Karamazov wonders in his

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dream why the peasant always says ''babby", and we sense it can be found here; "let the rat rustle as long as it likes! If only it could find a crumb!", and we feel with this little, miserable, peculiar verse from Goethe's "Wedding Song", here in this direction the ineffable lies, that which the little boy left behind when he came out of the mountain again, "don't forget the best thing!" the old man had said to him, but nobody could ever discover and put into words this inconspicuous, deeply hidden, enormous thing' (Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie, 1918, p. 364). We can see from this that it is quite figurative occasions and contents to which the subject thus possibly inclines, but in these, the occasions and contents which are different for every person, but always identical in their significance, the substance of deepest astonishment announces itself, between subject and object, identifying both in intense consternation towards one moment. Thus, once again, the unconstruable, the absolute question certainly also runs towards the moment, into its darkness. Not as a clearing, but as an unmistakable allusion to the immediate darkness of the Now, in so far as its central latency in terms of content nevertheless depicts itself in such astonished questioning, such questioning astonishment. If the content of what is driving in the Now, what is touched in the Here, were extracted positively, a 'Stay awhile, you are so fair', then conceived hope, hopedfor world would have reached their goal. Once More: Darkness of the Lived Moment; Carpe Diem* That within us which makes us capable of being stimulated, we have said, does not stimulate itself. It sleeps warm and at the same time in darkness, wakes itself up least of all with feeling. Even the feeling of internal and external stimuli, at the point where these plunge into the Now, participates in the latter's darkness. Just as little as the eye can see at its blind spot, where the nerve enters the retina, is what has just been experienced perceived by any sense. This blind spot in the mind, this darkness of the lived moment, must nevertheless be thoroughly distinguished from the darkness of forgotten or past events. When past material is increasingly covered by night, this night can be lifted, memory helps out, sources and finds can be excavated, in fact historically past material, even if only patchily, is especially objectifiable precisely for contemplative consciousness. The darkness of the just lived moment, on the other hand, stays in its bed-chamber; topical consciousness only exists precisely in relation to an experience which has
*

This idea originally appears in Horace, Ode XI, Bk. I.

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just passed or for an expected advancing experience and its content. Together with its content, the lived moment itself remains essentially invisible, and in fact all the more securely, the more energetically attention is directed towards it: at this root, in the lived Initself, in punctual immediacy, all world is still dark. In punctual immediacy: does all experience in fact occur punctually and atomistically, consequently in moments and as these? This is denied by vitalist psychologists, they let mental material flow without a pulse. Thus James, regardless of the fact that he allows 'transitive parts of the consciousness', sees psychological life as a stream. Division is regarded by vitalists in general, especially by Bergson, as artifical, as scientific-ideal abstraction, supposedly manufactured according to mathematical models; even the moment would not be an immediate self-locatedness here, both gliding and discrete, but a manufactured fiction. However, all this vitalistic denial of the moment remains quite irrelevant in the present case; since the punctual pulse is in fact part of life, it is not an abstraction from it. Whereas the stream of the consciousness-vitalists themselves is abstract; since what it lacks is precisely the beating pulse, this element of the stream of life as opposed to a waveless, uninterrupted pushing and shoving. The image of the stream of consciousness shows its own abstractness in the fact that it contains almost nothing of a real stream any more, but is instead stationary in itself. The stream of consciousness of the vitalists is also so little a real stream that it manifests neither source nor outflow, and above all it has nothing in common with the only concrete concept of the stream, with that of process, which does decidedly consist of interruptions, namely of dialectical moments of the dialectical context. As certainly as process is not 'composed' of these, following an interpretation which is itself reified and mechanistic, it does nevertheless owe its discontinuous character to them, precisely the 'pulse of liveliness', as Hegel says. James, even Bergson not only fell back behind Hegel on this point, but even behind Hume, who is so much closer to them, namely because he is undialectical. His theory of the 'indivisible moments of time and consciousness' is significantly more concrete than the mere superficial conception: stream of consciousness, with the pulseless abstractness into which it has been reified. The correct version could even be learnt from Husserl here, at least as far as the temporal aspect in the supposed 'act-continuum' is concerned: 'As a movement is being perceived, moment by moment an As-Now-Comprehension is taking place in which the topical phase of the movement itself is constituted.' And further: 'The flowing is not only flowing in general, but each phase is of one and the same form . . . The form consists in a Now constituting

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itself through an impression, and a tail of retentions affiliating itself to this and a horizon of protentions' (Zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewutseins, 1928, p. 391, 476). No flow can be thought of at all, let alone dialectically understood without that Now-Amidst in its time, which is not even itself time, but 'the peculiar something', in Plato's words, out of which the time (not only the conception of time) of the real stream of movement arises and in which movement is united with restless rest itself. Plato, who has a better understanding than James and Bergson of the discontinuous continuum, for this very reason decisively distinguishes the moment ( , the sudden). It figures here as momentum of transition between movement and rest, rest and movement: 'For nothing crosses over out of rest as long as it is still at rest, nor out of movement while it is still moving, into rest; but the moment, this peculiar something, lies between movement and rest, belonging to no time; and within it, out of it, what is moved crosses over into rest and what is resting into movement' (Parmenides, 156 D-E). And finally as regards the flow as one towards outflow (rest) both the tenor of the Faust plan and the related tenor of mysticism has the moment as no abstraction within it. 'Stay awhile, you are so fair': supposedly this can be said to the moment as a highest moment, even to that perfectly fulfilled and so steadfast and steadily lasting moment which is stressed in Eckhart's mysticism as the trice (nunc stans) of perfection. Thus all these statements, so different from each other, are united in their recognition of a real Now; in contrast to the stream of abstraction of the vitalists. And ultimately the pulse remains which also provides the model for the intermitting momentary character of consciousness, or rather: occurs analogously in the body. Derived from the pulse-beat, the mental moment is experienced in the throbbing of its Now, in the forward-surging, also transitive character of all moments. But no more is yet revealed in this immediacy, and becoming aware only stretches to the point where the lived moment can in fact be experienced and characterized as dark. And here the crucial factor is added which has in any case driven the problem beyond mere psychology in all that has come before: the darkness of the lived moment is depictive for the darkness of the objective moment. That is, for the Not-Having-Itself of that intensive time-element which has itself not yet unfolded in time and process as manifested in terms of content. Not the most distant therefore, but the nearest is still completely dark, and precisely because it is the nearest and most immanent; the knot of the riddle of existence is to be found in this nearest. The life of the Now, the most genuinely intensive life, is not yet

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brought before itself, brought to itself as seen, as opened up; thus it is least of all being-here, let alone being-evident. The Now of the existere, which drives everything and in which everything drives, is the most inexperienced thing that there is; it still drives continually under the world. It constitutes the realizing aspect which has least realized itself an active moment-darkness of itself. From which the strange idea emerges that no person is really here yet, is really alive. Because, after all, life means being-present, does not mean only before or after, foretaste or aftertaste. It means plucking the day, in the simplest and most basic sense, means acting concretely towards the Now. But precisely because our nearest, most genuine, continuous being-present is not one, no person is yet really living, precisely from this perspective. Carpe diem in quick, thoughtless enjoyment, it seems so simple, widespread even, but is so rare that it never appears as real plucking. Nothing is more fleeting from the present than that usual Carpe diem that appears to be completely absorbed in the enjoyment of the Now, nothing with less power over being, nothing more banality ante rem. Thus the plucking of the day cannot be achieved so quickly, unless the 'Stay awhile' spoken to the moment is in reality confused with a bed of ease. However much credit is due to elementally forceful contentment, it is only apparently at home in Auerbach's cellar* or even in philistine pleasure in possessions. Already above (cf. p. 181ff.), Lenau and Kierkegaard were recalled as nonmasters of the Carpe diem, not unobjectionable ones, but very worthy objects of consideration. They were both condemned to see the image of the loved-one jostling with the loved-one herself. This may often be weakness of life, but the powerful subject of the Egyptian Helen indicates that with weakness, even with Romantic exuberance, even with a kind of utopian neurosis, the case is not closed. The usual Carpe diem does not get beyond the mere impressible, beyond the surface of the moment of pleasure and pain, in fact it is contrary to the version of it in Horace that which is dispersed, that which does not stay awhile, that which is without present itself. In short: curiosity is just as little utopian as the usual Carpe diem, which in fact jumps from one 'moment' to the next, wasting the day in the day, has power over being. There is only a more genuine contact with the moment in strong experiences and in sharp turning-points of existence, either of our own existence or of the time, in so far
*

The Leipzig wine-cellar where Mephistopheles takes Faust to show him 'how easy life can be' and where he plays tricks on the gullible drinkers.

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as they are noticed by the eye that has presence of mind. Extraordinary men of action seem to offer genuine Carpe diem, as decision at the required moment, as power not to miss its opportunity. Mommsen gives Caesar as an example of this power, calls it 'the sobriety of genius' and continues significantly: 'To this he owed the ability to live energetically in the moment, undistracted by memory and expectation; to this the capability of acting at any moment with gathered strength.' But did Caesar, did most men of action of the class society, which means here: of unfathomed history, equally grasp the moment when they acted in terms of its historical content? This case is so rare that Goethe offers almost the only example, a man furthermore who was not a man of action, but rather a man with incomparable concrete vision. Thus Goethe's statement on the day of the bombardment of Valmy* is relevant here: 'From here on and today a new epoch of world history commences, and you can say that you were present at its inception'; there are, however, not many examples of this kind of presence of mind. Not many such observations of an otherwise unobserved moment: of a transitory moment with the most fertile motif, of a meeting place of highly ramified mediations between past and future in the midst of the unsighted Now. A sudden, not historically horizontal, but vertically striking light then falls on immediacy so that it almost appears to be mediated, though without ceasing to be immediate or overclose nearness. The situation-analyses of Marx and Engels give the most splendid example of fathomed presence of mind, headed by the 'Eighteenth Brumaire'. And Lenin grasped the present with historical insight all his life, right up to that thoroughly thought-out Carpe diem which is called the Great Socialist October Revolution. All this of course already presupposed a totally uncontemplative stance, namely apprehending-comprehending of the topical driving forces of occurrence itself. This cannot be achieved by the class society which necessarily overlooked the truly producing element in face of the product; but the correct path to active topicality likewise only began with situation-analysis. Its goal remains the illumination of that which both drives and remains hidden to itself in the final That-ground of occurrence. Certainly too: all societies are pervaded by in no way merely lyrical, but rather arch-philosophical experiences of the unconstruable question, of absolute astonishment, an incipient Carpe diem in the unusual,
*

20th August 1792, when the Duke of Brunswick's Prussian army, thought to be the best in Europe, was forced to retreat by the army of the French Republic under Kellermann. Goethe was actually present at the bombardment.

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genuine sense; but, on the other hand, how much timidity, how much mere symbol-intention there is in this inconspicuous everyday mysticism, the only kind which has remained, which is worthy of remaining. Everywhere else, Not-there is the condition of the Now, and even the Here of this Not-there forms a zone of silence in the very place where the music is being played. Consequently, not only the existing, but also above all the subject of existing stands in the incognito, precisely therefore what is driving and ultimately what is contained in what exists itself. For this the full Carpe diem would first be crucial, so that the existing-topical material and the environment that borders on it temporally-spatially would not in any way be made gloomy and difficult by the nearness which has this still immediate difficulty in experiencing things. But the moments still beat unheard, unseen, their present is at best in the forecourt of its presence which is not yet conscious, which has not yet become. Darkness of the Lived Moment, Continuation: Foreground, Dead Space, Melancholy of Fulfilment, Self-Mediation The lived darkness is so strong that it is not even confined to its most immediate nearness. Instead it also has an influence in its environment, in the time adjoining the just Now, and then in the space adjoining the just Here. This influence prevents experientially real nearness, particularly as an occurring one, from achieving proper and reassuring distance, that is, from being contemplated in the usual fashion. Consequently, the peculiar twilight of the respectively topical foreground arises which cannot be easily contemplated, but also not easily grasped and known. Several proverbs have more idea of this than most previous philosophers; as for example: No weaver knows what he weaves, or: There is no light at the foot of the lighthouse. And was not Oedipus, because he was himself standing in the light, the last to realize that he had married his own mother? He had competently solved the riddle of the Sphinx which could be contemplated from outside, but he reacted helplessly towards his own case, because it was immediately near him. And so on in the obscure text of the Now-time, of the Here-space, wherever mere contemplation, from a distance, from the usual perspective, ventures forward towards it. This sort of thing appears most treacherously, as we have often noticed (cf. p. 283f.), as soon as reified contemplation, that of something petrified, Become, arrives in

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the present and attempts to say its piece to this something which is near, happening, becoming. Then the habituation to the kind of contexts to which the distancing aspect had given rise way back in the past is torn apart. Even the relative nearness of the nineteenth century makes bourgeois historians characteristically embarrassed when they arrive at this century in the course of their account; opinions intrude in place of the previous contextual judgements. And the completely baffling unscientific approach of these historians is to be remembered when history went to world war; the academic became the tub-thumping or even jingoistic senior primary school master. This not only because of the class-conditioned unconcrete attitude of the bourgeois to the annexes of the Now, but this particular weakness of vision together with the ideological interest in falsification is centrally encouraged by the general collapse of objective contemplation so to speak which nearness causes, and the false judgements of bourgeois partiality step with particular engagement into the breach of topical immediacy which can never be overcome by mere contemplation. All this may be elucidated by considering a problem from landscape painting, in that and in so far as it concerns the difficulty of the Topical together with the adjoining Now-foreground, Here-foreground. The problem of the Topical for painting is: Where does the portrayed landscape begin in a picture? The painter does not include himself in the painting, although he is also immediately located in the landscape, as the innermost ring of the Immediate. However, the second ring of immediacy: the authentic foreground of the picture, can also only be objectified with difficulty; it still has too much nearness to the standpoint of the painter. And precisely the confusion created by nearness causes the relative lack of developed form of the spatial foreground too, the fact that it does not really belong to the authentic landscape. The portrayed landscape therefore does not only begin, as is obvious, outside the painter who is painting it, but also beyond the still diffuse objects of his nearer environment. A concept taken from the physics of the air pump will make this clear: the foreground is for the portrayal dead space, that is, a space from which the atmosphere has not yet wholly escaped. In this case the atmosphere of immediacy, the persisting darkness and the persisting disorder of the Here and Now, of nearness. Hence to the question: Where does the landscape begin? Where does coherent objectification start? we can only answer: beyond detrimental space, at a distance from it, precisely at the point where the darkness of immediacy together with its outskirts begins to stop. And since this curious gap always lies between subject and object of contemplation, precisely as

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dead space sui generis, from which the atmosphere of unmediated immediacy has not yet been sufficiently removed: the difficult problem of the foreground of the landscape painting sharply corresponds methodologically to the above-mentioned difficulty of occurring topicality, occurring in time. Within this, however, the influence of the lived darkness is still incomparably more significant than the subject-matter is itself in the spatial attention-relief, and is not only an example of it, as in the composition of painting. This is already demonstrated by the fact that the Here-space as spatial foreground can ultimately cross over into landscape, can as it were conclude within it, and by the fact that an unfinished trace of nearness does not announce itself in the repose of this conclusion. Whereas the Now-time, as foreground of time, does not automatically run over into what can be comprehended, formed and known, and in fact a new difficulty not automatically into knowability either, which is not passive contemplation, but active tendency-lore. For otherwise this knowability would have to get in its objective grasp what subsequently surrounds the Now-time, i.e. the future as completely as, mutatis mutandis, the landscape-picture the landscape behind the Here-space. Which, as regards the future, except for the next step to be taken, and the next after that, and the grand perspective, quite obviously cannot be the case, not even in the basic science of mastered occurrence, in the finally concre te tendency science: Marxism. And it cannot be so because the future dimension in contrast to spatial distance itself contains unmastered Now, i.e. darkness, just as the Now itself still contains unopened future, i.e. newness, and surges forward to meet it. Past, this dimension which is only ostensibly closed, in fact only for contemplation, and thus can ostensibly be compared with the objectifiable spacelandscape, appears only later in time-consciousness and in time-phase, only after the surging into future, and for this reason cannot after all be compared with the objectified landscape, which directly adjoins space-topicality and stands behind it as finished. On the contrary: what contains the future in the Now-topicality remorselessly continues on its way above and beyond all other past forms even in its foreground-topicality and in all its horizonenvironments. But since the future thus belongs to topicality, the former with all its foreground- and horizon-objectivities also participates in the darkness of the lived moment. And it participates in it in a way which constitutes the most essential characteristic of the future: being sealed off from contemplation, but also still relatively unknown to tendencylore. This connection between moment- and future-darkness was formulated for the first time in 'The Spirit of Utopia' thus: 'The darkness is intensified

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as soon as not only we ourselves but also the other, turned side remains undecided, hence as soon as we turn to the future dimension, which itself, in so far as it is above all logically new, means nothing other than our expanded darkness, than our darkness in the bearing of its womb, in the expansion of its further history; and it is likewise intensified with regard to God as the problem of the radically New, who must not only become visible for us in order to be, so that the whole world-process is reduced elastically to a movement relationship between two "separated" realities, but who contains himself only as hope, as Not-Being-For-Itself, like us in the shadowy dimension of what has not occurred, of what is still unreal' (Geist der Utopie, 1918, p. 372). In line with this uncanny formulation the darkness of the lived moment therefore coincides in its total depth with the essential, but not here-existing mode of existence of the goal-content itself, which was once intended by the mythological term God, and which, according to the passage quoted above, is in fact the goal-content, that does not yet exist here, has not yet been brought out, of existing itself. However, the Carpe diem or present of the absolute goal-content stands in the same ground in which the subject of existing stands, and from the same ground as the latter the goal-content as a Realized* goalcontent is still outstanding: from the ground of that unclarified hearth of existence which is unmythologically termed agent and core of developing matter. So widely, so deeply therefore the root darkness of the lived moment extends; so precisely is it assigned to the Novum in both, to the Ultimum of the content. And it is likewise the same future: what is contained in the womb of the ages, which is called upon to reveal what is contained in the moment. Solely the capability-of-being, which has been encouraged to develop the power of guidance and has been opened up, brings the immediate being of the driving-concealed moment to itself and up; solely this opened transcendere into the Novum opens up immanent existing in terms of content. The nearer the presence is here to the existential creator of occurrence, hence historically to man, and the more radical the self-apprehension of the history-forming subject, the more blind topicality frees itself, the more effectively it can be recognized as the transit point of widely ramified dialectical mediations. The authentic, metaphysical darkness of the lived moment is not yet or only initially illuminated by means of such historical subject-comprehension, but the foreground problem, with
*

As in section 16, Bloch once again begins to alternate 'verwirklichen' and 'realisieren' for to realize. The latter and its compounds are indicated with capitals.

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the crack of Here and Now in the depictions of the world context, is finally grasped. It is assimilated into the problem of the mediated transit point and therein of topical-concrete decision on the Front of world-occurrence. Not that this crack in life, even in non-contemplative life, consequently disappears. For ultimately the influence of the lived darkness is not confined to the various foregrounds mentioned above either. But the blind spot, this not-seeing of the immediately entering Here and Now, also in fact appears in every realization. Indeed, seeing is only dimmed by all too near distance, whereas the kind of realizing which has been available so far does not darken in a foreground of any kind, but in the realized material itself. Even genuine Carpe diem is not exempted from this melancholy, namely when it is not merely presence of mind, but plucks the fruits of a fulfilled hope. And the experiences of central astonishment, in the unconstruable question, are only spared this melancholy because they in fact contain merely lightning signs of a here-existing Now, a Here and There, and this in representative, often ludicrous Objects, but not, not yet in the realized subject-matter in and for itself. Everywhere else there is a crack, even an abyss in the realizing itself, in the actuated-topical entrance of what has been so beautifully foreseen, dreamed out; and this abyss is that of the ungrasped existere itself. So the darkness of nearness also gives the final reason for the melancholy of fulfilment: no earthly paradise remains on entry without the shadow which the entry still casts over it. It is not just that a fiasco threatens when too far-fetched dreams are supposed to be realized, or when all too sublime dreams jeopardize their fulfilment. A trace in Realizing itself is even still felt and is present where appropriate goals have been Realized, or where monumental dream-images appear to have entered reality with skin and hair, with body and soul. There is a realizing which disregards the deed of the realizers themselves and does not contain it; there are ideals which pretend to be elevated, remote from tendency, abstractly fixed, and thus also suppress the unfinished, unrealized aspect of their realizers. Precisely in the melancholy of fulfilment this most profoundly not yet fulfilled aspect in the subject announces itself in exactly the same way as the insufficient aspect in the fixed material of the ideal criticizes itself within it. It is therefore also necessary increasingly to set free the element of realizing simultaneously with the element of the future society. A similar process has in fact already been seen in the problem of realization (Egyptian Helen): the wish- or ideal-content, precisely when it reaches its realization-goal, arrives at a point of darker reality than it possessed

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in the hovering, utopian, merely existing real character. And to repeat: Realization, however much it cancels contemplative distance, never acts entirely as Realization, because there is something in the subject-factor of Realization itself which has never realized itself. The subject-factor of lending existence is itself not yet here, it is not predicated, not objectified, not Realized; ultimately this is what is announced in the darkness of the lived moment. And this incognito still remains the basic impediment which accompanies every realization, when it is a full one. To remove it, to educate the educator himself, to create the creator himself, to Realize the Realizer himself, all humanistic wishful dreams are directed towards this; they are the most radical and the most practical. Growing self-mediation of the producer of history is thus not merely the help to realize concrete tendency-anticipations concretely, it is also the help to introduce realization without its peculiarly bitter trace. Without that remaining minus which characterizes the immediate aspect of existing itself that has remained dark, and which ultimately constitutes the element of non-arrival in arrival. A being-human which in its sphere of existence is no longer encumbered with anything that is alien to it, a Realizing element that is itself Realized: this is the border-concept of realization as fulfilment. More on Astonishment as Absolute Question, in the Shape of Anxiety and of Happiness; The Directly Utopian Archetype: Highest Good We said that what is driving in the Now also surges forward in the future into something open. This openness has a double location in mental activity behind it, from which its fruits are expected and also driven. The one location remains anxiety, of a kind which is all the greater the more uncertainly it can expect its causes from all sides. Neither the neurotic anxiety which may stem from unusable libido, nor the normal real anxiety in dangerous situations is relevant here any longer, but rather an anxiety which is both unconditional and related to something final. Even anxiety-dreams, as already noted, even children's horror of the dark, even fear of ghosts only border atavistically on this anxiety, but they do indicate the direction. For the believer, hell was populated with nothing but phobias of this kind, even when external anxiety, that towards unknown nature, no longer needed to be anything like as great. Hell has disappeared thanks to the Enlightenment, but the correlate problem of utterly pervasive horror, of metaphysical horror, has remained. Its abode is always the Now, a bloody

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gash in the darkness of the Now and of what is to be found within it. It is beyond doubt that such an immediate horror exists, that it is of a different kind from the terrible real anxiety towards the really Become. Its element is the unbearable moment, an often, though not always pathological figment, an almost crippling terror in itself. Epilepsy, in the aura before the attack, seems to have a particularly close connection with this unbearable state, paranoia supplies the images of it closest to the anxiety-dream, the anxiety-dream in broad daylight. Bchner's fragment about the poet Lenz going mad gives us an unforgettable account of this: 'Can't you hear anything?' asks the mad poet, 'can't you hear the terrible voice which is screaming around the whole horizon and which we usually call silence?' And in Bchner's 'Woyzeck', anxiety is aroused everywhere by a roaring nothingness, by the wind, by the evening sky, by the expectation of an uncertain negative something below, above all things, threatening the poor devil from every direction. Anxiety appears in all these testimonies which are still so very distant from one another as an expectation on the uncertain darkest side, on the side of the strangulating, staring nothingness in the Real-Possible. This unpicturable thing is also noted pictorially, in Drer's 'Melencolia', in fact both this side and the other side of the astrological references contained within it. Even on the other side of the Saturn shining out of the eyes of the woman figure, whose emblems fill the engraving, only interrupted by the friendlier square of Jupiter, on the wall behind the figure. Saturn, however, the star of brooding and yet also of collection, does not explain, although he is also the star of misfortune, the ground into which Melencolia is gazing. Collection is only in the eye of the figure, perhaps in the sphere in the foreground, perhaps even in the dog curled up asleep, but not in the ensemble of Objects, nor in the object at which the figure is gazing. This object itself is not in the picture, but precisely its completely uncollected nature is indicated by the ensemble. Dehio strikingly drew attention to the dissolute aspect of this interior: the compasses rest idly in her hand, scattered, mournful light lies on scattered Objects, the order which otherwise characterizes scholars' studies of the sixteenth century is completely missing, there could be no greater contrast than between this ensemble and the tidied one in the engraving 'St Jerome in his Cell'. This in fact means: Drer's engraving 'Melencolia' pictures, with astrological aids, anxiety as the contact with a possible abyss which does not even have a bottom on which the fall is dashed. The engraving pictures stupor into which a desperation opened up in enduring Now stares; Drer's 'Melencolia' is thus the invaluable

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