Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

150896 August 28, 2008

PUREFOODS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANKAND-FILE, ST. THOMAS FREE WORKERS UNION, PUREFOODS GRANDPARENT FARM WORKERS UNION and PUREFOODS UNIFIED LABOR ORGANIZATION, respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: The petitioner, Purefoods Corporation, in this Rule 45 petition seeks the reversal of the appellate courts dismissal of its certiorari petition, and our consequent review of the labor commissions finding that it committed unfair labor practice and illegally dismissed the concerned union members. Three labor organizations and a federation are respondents in this case Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa Ng Purefoods Rank-AndFile (NAGSAMA-Purefoods), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile workers of Purefoods meat division throughout Luzon; St. Thomas Free Workers Union (STFWU), of those in the farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and Purefoods Grandparent Farm Workers Union (PGFWU), of those in the poultry farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. These organizations were affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO).1 On February 8, 1995, NAGSAMA-Purefoods manifested to petitioner corporation its desire to re-negotiate the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then due to expire on the 28th of the said month. Together with its demands and proposal, the organization submitted to the company its January 28, 1995 General Membership Resolution approving and supporting the unions affiliation with PULO, adopting the draft CBA proposals of the federation, and authorizing a negotiating panel which included among others a PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the unions proposals, it refused to recognize PULO and its participation, even as

a mere observer, in the negotiation. Consequently, notwithstanding the PULO representatives non-involvement, the negotiation of the terms of the CBA still resulted in a deadlock. A notice of strike was then filed by NAGSAMAPurefoods on May 15, 1995. In the subsequent conciliation conference, the deadlock issues were settled except the matter of the companys recognition of the unions affiliation with PULO.2 In the meantime, STFWU and PGFWU also submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership resolutions which, among others, affirmed the two organizations affiliation with PULO. Consistent with its stance, Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The parties then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely.3 On July 24, 1995, however, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas. Five days thereafter, or on July 29, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, four company employees facilitated the transfer of around 23,000 chickens from the poultry farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent) to that in Malvar. The following day, the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises; and on July 31, 1995, 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ.4 Aggrieved by these developments, the four respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal lockout/dismissal and damages, docketed as NLRC Case No. NLRC-NCR-0007-05159-95, with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).5 In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter (LA), Purefoods interposed, among others, the defenses that PULO was not a legitimate labor organization or federation for it did not have the required minimum number of member unions; that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was not arbitrary but was the result of the financial non-viability of the operations therein, or the consequence of the landowners pre-termination of the lease agreement; that the other complainants had no cause of action considering that it was only the Sto. Tomas farm which was closed; that the termination of the employees complied with the 30-day notice requirement and that the said employees were paid 30-day advance salary in addition to separation pay; and that the

concerned union, STFWU, lost its status as bargaining representative when the Sto. Tomas farm was closed.6 On August 17, 1999, the LA rendered a Decision7 dismissing the complaint, and declaring that the company neither committed ULP nor illegally dismissed the employees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, ordered the payment of P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and the reinstatement with full backwages of the STFWU members. In its March 16, 2001 Decision (CA No. 022059-00), the labor commission ruled that the petitioner companys refusal to recognize the labor organizations affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations; and that this refusal constituted undue interference in, and restraint on the exercise of the employees right to self-organization and free collective bargaining. The NLRC said that the real motive of the company in the sudden closure of the Sto. Tomas farm and the mass dismissal of the STFWU members was union busting, as only the union members were locked out, and the company subsequently resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract with the landowner. Because the requisites of a valid lockout were absent, the NLRC concluded that the company committed ULP. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision reads: WHEREFORE, respondent Purefoods Corporation is hereby directed to reinstate effective October 1, 2000 employees-members of the STFWUPULO who were illegally locked out on July 30, 1995 and to pay them their full backwages. SO ORDERED. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,8 the petitioner corporation filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66871. In the assailed October 25, 2001 Resolution,9 the appellate court dismissed outright the companys petition for certiorari on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective since no proof of authority to act for and on behalf of the corporation was submitted by the corporations senior vice-president who signed the same; thus, the petition could not be deemed filed for and on behalf of the real party-in-interest. Then,

the CA, in its November 22, 2001 Resolution,10 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Dissatisfied, petitioner instituted before us the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The petition is denied. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court explicitly mandates that the petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.11 When the petitioner is a corporation, inasmuch as corporate powers are exercised by the board, the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporations board of directors.12 Absent any authority from the board, no person, not even the corporate officers, can bind the corporation.13 Only individuals who are vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must be attached to the petition.14 Failure to attach to the certification any proof of the signatorys authority is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.15 In the instant case, the senior vice-president of the petitioner corporation signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. No proof of his authority to sign the said certificate was, however, attached to the petition. Thus, applying settled jurisprudence, we find that the CA committed no error when it dismissed the petition. The Court cannot even be liberal in the application of the rules because liberality is warranted only in instances when there is substantial compliance with the technical requirements in pleading and practice, and when there is sufficient explanation that the non-compliance is for a justifiable cause, such that the outright dismissal of the case will defeat the administration of justice.16 Here, the petitioner corporation, in its motion for reconsideration before the appellate court and in its petition before us, did not present a reasonable explanation for its non-compliance with the rules. Further, it cannot be said that petitioner substantially complied therewith, because it did not attach to its motion for reconsideration any proof of the authority of its signatory. It stands to reason, therefore, that this Court now refuses to condone petitioners procedural transgression. We must reiterate that the rules of procedure are mandatory, except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate to the degree of his thoughtlessness

in not complying therewith.17 While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice, they are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.18 Be that as it may, this Court has examined the records if only to dispel any doubt on the propriety of the dismissal of the case, and we found no abuse of discretion, much more a grave one, on the part of the labor commission in reversing the ruling of the LA. It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWUs and the other unions affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farms lease agreement was pre-terminated. Ineluctably, the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor organizations right to collective bargaining and violated the members right to security of tenure.19 The Court reiterates that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA will prosper only if there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.20 It was incumbent, then, for petitioner to prove before the appellate court that the labor commission capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or that it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and that its abuse of discretion is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.21 Here, as aforesaid, no such proof was adduced by petitioner. We, thus, declare that the NLRC ruling is not characterized by grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the same is also affirmed. However, this Court makes the following observations and modifications: We deem as proper the award of moral and exemplary damages. We hold that the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Thus, the petitioner company is

liable for the payment of the aforesaid damages.22 Notable, though, is that this award, while stated in the body of the NLRC decision, was omitted in the dispositive portion of the said ruling. To prevent any further confusion in the implementation of the said decision, we correct the dispositive portion of the ruling to include the payment of P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages to the illegally dismissed STFWU members. As to the order of reinstatement, the Court modifies the same in that if it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the employees have been out of petitioners employ,23 the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.24 The releases and quitclaims, as well as the affidavits of desistance,25 signed by the concerned employees, who were then necessitous men at the time of execution of the documents, are declared invalid and ineffective. They will not bar the workers from claiming the full measure of benefits flowing from their legal rights.26 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The October 25, 2001 and the November 22, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66871 areAFFIRMED. The March 16, 2001 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-00-07-05159-95 (CA No. 022059-00) is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner company is ordered to: (1) reinstate the illegally dismissed STFWU members and pay them full backwages from the time of illegal termination up to actual reinstatement; (2) if reinstatement is no longer feasible, pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members their separation pay equivalent to one month pay, or one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; and (3) pay moral and exemplary damages in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00 to the said illegally dismissed STFWU members. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU), petitioner, vs. NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, respondent. x------------------------------------------x G.R. Nos. 158944-45 March 3, 2008

NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU), respondent. RESOLUTION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: On 22 August 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision1 in the above-entitled cases, the dispositive part of which reads WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R. No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestl be declared to have committed unfair labor practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl is AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs. Subsequent thereto, Nestl Philippines, Incorporated (Nestl) filed a Motion for Clarification2 on 20 September 2006; while Union of Filipro Employees Drug, Food and Allied Industries Union Kilusang Mayo Uno (UFE-DFA-KMU), on 21 September 2006, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration3 of the foregoing Decision. The material facts of the case, as determined by this Court in its Decision, may be summarized as follows:

UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestl belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants. On 4 April 2001, as the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU4 was to end on 5 June 2001,5 the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFAKMU informed Nestl of their intent to "open [our] new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004 x x x as early as June 2001."6 In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations. On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only)7, Nestl reiterated its stance that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom."8 Dialogue between the company and the union thereafter ensued. On 14 August 2001, however, Nestl requested9 the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between it and UFE-DFA-KMU owing to an alleged impasse in said dialogue; i.e., that despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective, though, and the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike10 on 31 October 2001 with the NCMB, complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., "retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA".11 On 07 November 2001, anotherNotice of Strike12 was filed by the union, this time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations. The result of a strike vote conducted by the members of UFE-DFA-KMU yielded an overwhelming approval of the decision to hold a strike.13 On 26 November 2001, prior to holding the strike, Nestl filed with the DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction,14 praying for the Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, to assume jurisdiction over the current labor dispute in order to effectively enjoin any impending strike by the members of the UFE-DFA-KMU at the Nestls Cabuyao Plant in Laguna. On 29 November 2001, Sec. Sto. Tomas issued an Order15 assuming jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute. The fallo of said Order states that: CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Nestl Philippines, Inc. (Cabuyao Plant) pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

Accordingly, any strike or lockout is hereby enjoined. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the further deterioration of the current labor relations situation. The parties are further directed to meet and convene for the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) who is hereby designated as the delegate/facilitator of this Office for this purpose. The NCMB shall report to this Office the results of this attempt at conciliation and delimitation of the issues within thirty (30) days from the parties receipt of this Order, in no case later than December 31, 2001. If no settlement of all the issues is reached, this Office shall thereafter define the outstanding issues and order the filing of position papers for a ruling on the merits. UFE-DFA-KMU sought reconsideration16 of the above but nonetheless moved for additional time to file its position paper as directed by the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. On 14 January 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas denied said motion for reconsideration. On 15 January 2002, despite the order enjoining the conduct of any strike or lockout and conciliation efforts by the NCMB, the employee members of UFE-DFA-KMU at Nestls Cabuyao Plant went on strike. In view of the above, in an Order dated on 16 January 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas directed: (1) the members of UFE-DFA-KMU to return-to-work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of such Order; (2) Nestl to accept back all returning workers under the same terms and conditions existing preceding to the strike; (3) both parties to cease and desist from committing acts inimical to the on-going conciliation proceedings leading to the further deterioration of the situation; and (4) the submission of their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. But notwithstanding the Return-to-Work Order, the members of UFE-DFA-KMU continued with their strike, thus, prompting Sec. Sto. Tomas to seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) for the enforcement of said order. On 7 February 2002, Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU filed their respective position papers. Nestl addressed several issues concerning economic provisions of the CBA as well as the non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement Plan in the collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, UFE-DFA-KMU limited itself to the issue of whether or not the retirement plan was a mandatory subject in its CBA negotiations. On 11 February 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas allowed UFE-DFA-KMU the chance to tender its stand on the other issues raised by Nestl but not covered by its initial position paper by way of a Supplemental Position Paper. UFE-DFA-KMU, instead of filing the above-mentioned supplement, filed several pleadings, one of which was aManifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 11, 2002 assailing the Order of February 11, 2002 for supposedly being contrary to law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. The union posited that Sec. Sto. Tomas "could only assume jurisdiction over the issues mentioned in the notice of strike subject of

the current dispute,"17 and that the Amended Notice of Strike it filed did not cite, as one of the grounds, the CBA deadlock. On 8 March 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas denied the motion for reconsideration of UFE-DFAKMU. Thereafter, UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Petition for Certiorari18 before the Court of Appeals, alleging that Sec. Sto. Tomas committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the Orders of 11 February 2002 and 8 March 2002. In the interim, in an attempt to finally resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then Acting Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with an Order19 dated 02 April 2002, ruling that: a. we hereby recognize that the present Retirement Plan at the Nestl Cabuyao Plant is a unilateral grant that the parties have expressly so recognized subsequent to the Supreme Courts ruling in Nestl, Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 90231, February 4, 1991, and is therefore not a mandatory subject for bargaining; b. the Unions charge of unfair labor practice against the Company is hereby dismissed for lack of merit; c. the parties are directed to secure the best applicable terms of the recently concluded CBSs between Nestl Phils. Inc. and it eight (8) other bargaining units, and to adopt these as the terms and conditions of the Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA; d. all union demands that are not covered by the provisions of the CBAs of the other eight (8) bargaining units in the Company are hereby denied; e. all existing provisions of the expired Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA without any counterpart in the CBAs of the other eight bargaining units in the Company are hereby ordered maintained as part of the new Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA; f. the parties shall execute their CBA within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, furnishing this Office a copy of the signed Agreement; g. this CBA shall, in so far as representation is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years; all other provisions shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its effective date which shall be December 5, 2001 (or on the first day six months after the expiration on June 4, 2001 of the superceded CBA). UFE-DFA-KMU moved to reconsider the aforequoted ruling, but such was subsequently denied on 6 May 2002. For the second time, UFE-DFA-KMU went to the Court of Appeals via another Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the Orders of 02 April 2002 and 06 May 2002 of the Secretary of the DOLE, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On 27 February 2003, the appellate court promulgated its Decision on the twin petitions for certiorari, ruling entirely in favor of UFE-DFA-KMU, the dispositive part thereof stating WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, there being grave abuse on the part of the public respondent in issuing all the assailed Orders, both petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated February 11, 2001, and March 8, 2001 (CAG.R. SP No. 69805), as well as the Orders dated April 2, 2002 and May 6, 2002 (CA-G.R. SP No. 71540) of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the case entitled: "IN RE: LABOR DISPUTE AT NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. (CABUYAO FACTORY)" under OS-AJ-0023-01 (NCMB-RBIV-CAV-PM-08-035-01, NCMB-RBIVLAG-NS-10-037-01, NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-11-10-03901) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent is hereby directed to resume the CBA negotiations with the petitioner.20 Both parties appealed the aforequoted ruling. Nestl essentially assailed that part of the decision finding the DOLE Secretary to have gravely abused her discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the Retirement Plan was not a valid issue to be tackled during the CBA negotiations; UFE-DFA-KMU, in contrast, questioned the appellate courts decision finding Nestl free and clear of any unfair labor practice. Since the motions for reconsideration of both parties were denied by the Court of Appeals in a joint Resolution dated 27 June 2003, UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl separately filed the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. G.R. No. 158930-31 was filed by UFE-DFA-KMU against Nestl seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision insofar as the appellate courts failure to find Nestl guilty of unfair labor practice was concerned; while G.R. No. 158944-45 was instituted by Nestl against UFE-DFA-KMU likewise looking to annul and set aside the part of the Court of Appeals Decision declaring that: 1) the Retirement Plan was a valid collective bargaining issue; and 2) the scope of the power of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl was limited to the resolution of questions and matters pertaining merely to the ground rules of the collective bargaining negotiations to be conducted between the parties. On 29 March 2004, this Court resolved21 to consolidate the two petitions inasmuch as they (1) involved the same set of parties; (2) arose from the same set of circumstances, i.e., from several Orders issued by then DOLE Secretary, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, respecting her assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU, Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions;22 and (3) similarly assailed the same Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. After giving due course to the instant consolidated petitions, this Court promulgated on 22 August 2006 its Decision, now subject of UFE-DFA-KMUs Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Nestls Motion for Clarification. In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, UFE-DFA-KMU would have this Court address and discuss anew points or arguments that have basically been passed upon in this Courts 22 August 2006 Decision. Firstly, it questions this Courts finding that Nestl was not guilty of

unfair labor practice, considering that the transaction speaks for itself,i.e, res ipsa loquitor. And made an issue again is the question of whether or not the DOLE Secretary can take cognizance of matters beyond the amended Notice of Strike. As to Nestls prayer for clarification, the corporation seeks elucidation respecting the dispositive part of this Courts Decision directing herein parties to resume negotiations on the retirement compensation package of the concerned employees. It posits that "[i]n directing the parties to negotiate the Retirement Plan, the Honorable Court x x x might have overlooked the fact that here, the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction over the entire 2001-2004 CBA controversy x x x." As to the charge of unfair labor practice: The motion does not put forward new arguments to substantiate the prayer for reconsideration of this Courts Decision except for the sole contention that the transaction speaks for itself, i.e., res ipsa loquitor. Nonetheless, even a perusal of the arguments of UFE-DFA-KMU in its petition and memorandum in consideration of the point heretofore raised will not convince us to change our disposition of the question of unfair labor practice. UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that Nestls "refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice."23 It explains that Nestl set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan. In its words, "respondent Nestl Phils., Inc. insisted that the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue before respondent Nestl would agree to discuss other issues in the CBA."24 It then concluded that "the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in not ruling that respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice. It also committed a legal error in failing to award damages to the petitioner for the ULP committed by the respondent."25 We are unconvinced still. The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by Articles 252 and 253 of the Labor Code, as amended, which state ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force

and effect the terms of conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Obviously, the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of an employers or a unions individual actions is not the test of goodfaith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.26 For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x"27 in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. Herein, the union merely bases its claim of refusal to bargain on a letter28 dated 29 May 2001 written by Nestl where the latter laid down its position that "unilateral grants, onetime company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." But as we have stated in this Courts Decision, said letter is not tantamount to refusal to bargain. In thinking to exclude the issue of Retirement Plan from the CBA negotiations, Nestl, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted, considering that eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed to treat the Retirement Plan as a unilaterally granted benefit. This is not a case where the employer exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining, because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of the bargaining representative. Nestls desire to settle the dispute and proceed with the negotiation being evident in its cry for compulsory arbitration is proof enough of its exertion of reasonable effort at good-faith bargaining. In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that

they deem of absolute necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse does not establish bad faith.[fn24 p.10] It is but natural that at negotiations, management and labor adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the economic issue proposed by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the former but it did not. And the managements firm stand against the issue of the Retirement Plan did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to the point of stalemate. The foregoing things considered, this Court replicates below its clear disposition of the issue: The concept of "unfair labor practice" is defined by the Labor Code as: ART. 247. CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION THEREOF. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labormanagement relations. x x x x. The same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by employers, to wit: ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; (b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs; (c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters; (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the

parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of the recognized collective bargaining agent; [The article referred to is 241, not 242. CAA] (f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code; (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; (h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or (i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations associations or partnerships who have actually participated, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (Emphasis supplied.) Herein, Nestl is accused of violating its duty to bargain collectively when it purportedly imposed a pre-condition to its agreement to discuss and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with UFE-DFA-KMU. A meticulous review of the record and pleadings of the cases at bar shows that, of the two notices of strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU before the NCMB, it was only on the second that the ground of unfair labor practice was alleged. Worse, the 7 November 2001 Notice of Strike merely contained a general allegation that Nestl committed unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith for supposedly "setting pre-condition in the ground rules (Retirement issue)." (Notice of Strike of 7 November 2001; Annex "C" of UFE-DFA-KMU Position Paper; DOLE original records, p. 146.) In contrast, Nestl, in its Position Paper, did not confine itself to the issue of the non-inclusion of the Retirement Plan but extensively discussed its stance on other economic matters pertaining to the CBA. It is UFE-DFA-KMU, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice.

A perusal of the allegations and arguments raised by UFE-DFA-KMU in the Memorandum (in G.R. Nos. 158930-31) will readily disclose the need for the presentation of evidence other than its bare contention of unfair labor practice in order to make certain the propriety or impropriety of the ULP charge hurled against Nestl. Under Rule XIII, Sec. 4, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code: x x x. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice of strike shall as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the efforts to resolve the dispute amicably." (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. (Tiu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123276, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 681, 688.) Employers are accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) This mass of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) In this connection, the rule is that good faith is always presumed. As long as the companys exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of Nestl apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by the CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestl, the award of moral and exemplary damages is unavailing. As to the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary under the amended Notice of Strike: This Court is not convinced by the argument raised by UFE-DFA-KMU that the DOLE Secretary should not have gone beyond the disagreement on the ground rules of the CBA

negotiations. The union doggedly asserts that the entire labor dispute between herein parties concerns only the ground rules. Lest it be forgotten, it was UFE-DFA-KMU which first alleged a bargaining deadlock as the basis for the filing of its Notice of Strike; and at the time of the filing of the first Notice of Strike, several conciliation conferences had already been undertaken where both parties had already exchanged with each other their respective CBA proposals. In fact, during the conciliation meetings before the NCMB, but prior to the filing of the notices of strike, the parties had already delved into matters affecting the meat of the collective bargaining agreement. The Secretary of the DOLE simply relied on the Notices of Strike that were filed by UFEDFA-KMU as stated in her Order of 08 March 2002, to wit: x x x The records disclose that the Union filed two Notices of Strike. The First is dated October 31, 2001 whose grounds are cited verbatim hereunder: "A. Bargaining Deadlock 1. Economic issues (specify) 1. Retirement 2. Panel Composition 3. Costs and Attendance 4. CBA" The second Notice of Strike is dated November 7, 2001 and the cited ground is like quoted verbatim below: "B. Unfair Labor Practices (specify) Bargaining in bad faith Setting pre-condition in the ground rules (Retirement issue)" Nowhere in the second Notice of Strike is it indicated that this Notice is an amendment to and took the place of the first Notice of Strike. In fact, our Assumption of Jurisdiction Order dated November 29, 2001 specifically cited the two (2) Notices of Strike without any objection on the part of the Union x x x.29 Had the parties not been at the stage where the substantive provisions of the proposed CBA had been put in issue, the union would not have based thereon its initial notice to strike. This Court maintains its original position in the Decision that, based on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the Secretary of the DOLE rightly decided on matters of substance. That the union later on changed its mind is of no moment because to give

premium to such would make the legally mandated discretionary power of the Dole Secretary subservient to the whims of the parties. As to the point of clarification on the resumption of negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan: As for the supposed confusion or uncertainty of the dispositive part of this Courts Decision, Nestle moves for clarification of the statement "The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussion hereinabove set forth. No costs." The entire fallo of this Courts Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R. No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestl be declared to have committed unfair labor practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl is AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs. Nestle interprets the foregoing as an order for the parties to resume negotiations by themselves respecting the issue of retirement benefits due the employees of the Cabuyao Plant. Otherwise stated, Nestle posits that the dispositive part of the Decision directs the parties to submit to a voluntary mode of dispute settlement. A read-through of this Courts Decision reveals that the ambiguity is more ostensible than real. This Courts Decision of 22 August 2006 designated marked boundaries as to the implications of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of the DOLE. We said therein that 1) the Retirement Plan is still a valid issue for herein parties collective bargaining negotiations; 2) the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in limiting to the issue of the ground rules the scope of the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute; and 3) Nestl is not guilty of unfair labor practice. Nowhere in our Decision did we require parties to submit to negotiate by themselves the tenor of the retirement benefits of the concerned employees of Nestl, precisely because the Secretary of the DOLE had already assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute subject of herein petitions. Again, we spell out what encompass the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction power. The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. In the case at bar, the issue of retirement benefits was specifically what was presented before the Secretary of the DOLE; hence, We reject Nestls interpretation. Our decision is crystal and cannot be interpreted any other way. The Secretary having already assumed jurisdiction

over the labor dispute subject of these consolidated petitions, the issue concerning the retirement benefits of the concerned employees must be remanded back to him for proper disposition. All told, in consideration of the points afore-discussed and the fact that no substantial arguments have been raised by either party, this Court remains unconvinced that it should modify or reverse in any way its disposition of herein cases in its earlier Decision. The labor dispute between the Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU has dragged on long enough. As no other issues are availing, let this Resolution write an ending to the protracted labor dispute between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division). WHEREFORE, premises considered, the basic issues of the case having been passed upon and there being no new arguments availing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Let these cases be remanded to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment for proper disposition, consistent with the discussions in this Courts Decision of 22 August 2006 and as hereinabove set forth. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIESMANILA PAVILLION HOTEL CHAPTER,Petitioner, - versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 179402 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: September 30, 2008

x-------------------------------------------------x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated 30 May 2007 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96171, which affirmed the Resolution2 dated 5 May 2006 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CC No. 000307-05 NCMB NCR NS 09-199-05, dismissing for lack of merit the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by petitioner National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel (NUWHRAIN) against Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel). Petitioner NUWHRAIN is a legitimate labor organization composed of rankand-file employees of the Hotel,3 while respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation is the owner and operator of said Hotel.4 The factual antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows: The Hotel entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with HI-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU), the exclusive bargaining

agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hotel. Both parties consented that the representation aspect and other non-economic provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement were to be effective for five years or until 30 June 2005; and the economic provisions of the same were to be effective for three years or until 30 June 2003. The parties subsequently re-negotiated the economic provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and extended the term of their effectivity for another two years or until 30 June 2005.5 During the 60-day freedom period which preceded the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, starting on 1 May 2005 and ending on 30 June 2005, the Hotel and HIMPHLU negotiated the extension of the provisions of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement for two years, effective 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2007. The parties signed the Memorandum of Agreement on 20 May 2005 and the employees ratified it on 27 May 2005.6 On 21 June 2005, NUWHRAIN was accorded by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the status of a legitimate labor organization.7 Thereafter, NUWHRAIN exercised the right to challenge the majority status of the incumbent union, HIMPHLU, by filing a Petition for Certification Election on 28 June 2005.8 On 5 July 2007, the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE allowed the registration of the Memorandum of Agreement executed between HIMPHLU and the Hotel, extending the effectivity of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement for another two years.9 After the lapse of the 60-day freedom period, but pending the disposition of the Petition for Certification Election filed by NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU served the Hotel with a written demand dated 28 July 200510 for the dismissal of 36 employees following their expulsion from HIMPHLU for alleged acts of disloyalty and violation of its Constitution and by-laws. An Investigation Report11 was attached to the said written demand, stating that the 36 employees, who were members of HIMPHLU, joined NUWHRAIN, in violation of Section 2, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which provided for a union security clause that reads: 12 Section 2. DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO UNION SECURITY CLAUSE. Accordingly, failure to join the UNION within the period specified in the immediately preceding section or failure to maintain membership with the UNION in good standing either through resignation or expulsion from the UNION in accordance with the UNIONs Constitution and by-laws due to disloyalty, joining another union or non-payment of UNION dues shall be a

ground for the UNION to demand the dismissal from the HOTEL of the employee concerned. The demand shall be accompanied by the UNIONs investigation report and the HOTEL shall act accordingly subject to existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter, provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the HOTEL free and harmless from any and all liabilities that may arise should the dismissed employee question in any manner the dismissal. The HOTEL shall not, however, be compelled to act on any such UNION demand if made within a period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of this agreement. (Emphasis provided) On 1 August 2005, the Hotel issued Disciplinary Action Notices13 (Notices) to the 36 employees identified in the written demand of HIMPHLU. The Notices directed the 36 employees to submit a written explanation for their alleged acts of disloyalty and violation of the union security clause for which HIMPHLU sought their dismissal. The Hotel called the contending unions and the employees concerned for a reconciliatory conference in an attempt to avoid the dismissal of the 36 employees. The reconciliatory conferences facilitated by the Hotel were held on 5 August 2005 and 1 September 2005.14 However, NUWHRAIN proceeded to file a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on 8 September 2005 on the ground of unfair labor practice under Article 248, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Labor Code.15 The Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 000307-05 NCMB NCR NS 09-199-05, entitled IN RE: Labor Dispute at Manila Pavilion Hotel.16 NUWHRAIN asserted that the Hotel committed unfair labor practice when it issued the Notices to the 36 employees who switched allegiance from HIMPHLU to NUWHRAIN. During the reconciliatory conference held on 5 August 2005, respondents Vice President, Norma Azores, stated her preference to deal with HIMPHLU, while blaming NUWHRAIN for the labor problems of the Hotel. On 1 September 2005, the Resident Manager of the Hotel, Bernardo Corpus, Jr., implored NUWHRAINs members to withdraw their Petition for Certification Election and reaffirm their membership in HIMPHLU. The Notices and the statements made by the officers of the respondent and the Hotel were allegedly intended to intimidate and coerce the employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. NUWHRAIN claimed that it was entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.0017

Respondent countered that it merely complied with its contractual obligations with HIMPHLU when it issued the assailed Notices, and clarified that none of the 36 employees were dismissed by the Hotel. It further denied that respondents Vice President Norma Azores and the Hotels Resident Manager Bernardo Corpus, Jr. made the statements attributed to them, purportedly expressing their preference for HIMPHLU during the reconciliatory conferences. Thus, respondent insisted that it did not commit unfair labor practice, nor was it liable for moral and exemplary damages.18 In a Resolution19 dated 5 May 2006, the NLRC pronounced that the Hotel was not guilty of unfair labor practice. Firstly, the NLRC adjudged that the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement between respondent and HIMPHLU, extending the effectivity of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, was entered into with the view of responding to the employees economic needs, and not intended to interfere with or restrain the exercise of the right to self-organization of NUWHRAINs members. Secondly, the NLRC determined that the issuance of the Notices directing the 36 employees to explain why they should not be dismissed was in compliance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions regarding the union security clause. Even thereafter, the Hotel had not acted improperly as it did not wrongfully terminate any of the 36 employees. Thirdly, the NLRC interpreted the statements made by the officials of respondent and the Hotel during the reconciliatory conferences encouraging the withdrawal of the Petition for Certification Election and the reaffirmation by the 36 employees of their membership in HIMPHLU as proposed solutions to avoid the dismissal of the said employees. The NLRC concluded that these statements did not constitute unfair labor practice for they could not have coerced or influenced either of the contending unions, both of whom did not agree in the suggested course of action or to any other manner of settling the dispute. Finally, the NLRC declared that the claim for moral and exemplary damages of NUWHRAIN lacked sufficient factual and legal bases. NUWHRAIN filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC Resolution. It was denied by the NLRC in another Resolution dated 30 June 2006.20 Thus, NUWHRAIN filed a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 96171. In the meantime, on 16 June 2006, the Certification Election for regular rank and file employees of the Hotel was held, which HIMPHLU won. It was accordingly certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for rank and file employees of the Hotel.21

On 30 May 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision22 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 96171, upholding the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CC No. 000307-05 NCMB NCR NS 09-199-05. It declared that the Hotel had acted prudently when it issued the Notices to the 36 employees after HIMPHLU demanded their dismissal. It clarified that these Notices did not amount to the termination of the employees concerned but merely sought their explanation on why the union security clause should not be applied to them. The appellate court also gave credence to the denial by the officers of the respondent and the Hotel that they made statements favoring HIMPHLU over NUWHRAIN during the reconciliatory conferences. The Court of Appeals further noted that the unhampered organization and registration of NUWHRAIN negated its allegation that the Hotel required its employees not to join a labor organization as a condition for their employment. NUWHRAINs Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was denied by the same court in a Resolution dated 24 August 2007.23 Hence, the present Petition, in which NUWHRAIN makes the following assignment of errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE MORE PROBATIVE VALUE TO RESPONDENT HOTELS GENERAL AND UNSWORN DENIAL VERSUS THAT OF PETITIONERS SWORN TESTIMONY NARRATING RESPONDENTS HOTELS VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION. SUCH A RULING CONTRADICTS EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE SUCH AS MASAGANA CONCRETE PRODUCTS INC. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 106916, SEPTEBMER 3, 1999; JRS BUSINESS CORPORATION V. NLRC, 246 SCRA 445 [1995]; and ASUNCION V. NLRC, 362 SCRA 56 [2001]. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT HOTEL IS NOT GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 248 OF THE LABOR CODE AND THE SUPREME COURTS RULING IN PROGRESSINVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. CIR, 80 SCRA 434 [1977] and INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU V. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD., 37 SCRA 244 [1971].24

The instant Petition lacks merit, and must accordingly be denied. NUWHRAIN maintains that the respondent committed unfair labor practice when (1) the Hotel issued the Notices to the 36 employees, former members of HIMPHLU, who switched allegiance to NUWHRAIN; and (2) the officers of the respondent and the Hotel allegedly uttered statements during the reconciliatory conferences indicating their preference for HIMPHLU and their disapproval of NUWHRAIN. This argument is specious. The records clearly show that the Notices were issued after HIMPHLU served the Hotel with a letter dated 28 July 2005, demanding the dismissal of 36 of its former members who joined NUWHRAIN. In its letter, HIMPHLU alleged that it had found these members guilty of disloyalty and demanded their dismissal pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Had the Hotel totally ignored this demand, as NUWHRAIN suggests it should have done, the Hotel would have been subjected to a suit for its failure to comply with the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. "Union security" is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership" or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.25 Article 248(e) of the Labor Code recognizes the effectivity of a union shop clause: Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall prevent the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except of those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) The law allows stipulations for "union shop" and "closed shop" as a means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer. By thus promoting unionism, workers are able to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer.26 In Villar v. Inciong,27 this Court held that employees have the right to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own; however, they must

suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In the present case, the Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a union security provision.28 To avoid the clear possibility of liability for breaching the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and to protect its own interests, the only sensible option left to the Hotel, upon its receipt of the demand of HIMPHLU for the dismissal of the 36 employees, was to conduct its own inquiry so as to make its own findings on whether there was sufficient ground to dismiss the said employees who defected from HIMPHLU. The issuance by the respondent of the Notices requiring the 36 employees to submit their explanations to the charges against them was the reasonable and logical first step in a fair investigation. It is important to note that the Hotel did not take further steps to terminate the 36 employees. Instead, it arranged for reconciliatory conferences between the contending unions in order to avert the possibility of dismissing the 36 employees for violation of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Court, in Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos29 clearly stated the general rule: the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. An employer is not considered guilty of unfair labor practice if it merely complied in good faith with the request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.30 In the case at bar, there is even less possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for unfair labor practice where respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence of HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the Hotel, on the basis of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The only act attributed to the respondent is its issuance of the Notices which, contrary to being an unfair labor practice, even afforded the employees involved a chance to be heard. The cases cited by NUWHRAIN are not applicable to the present case given their diverse factual backgrounds. In Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations,31 the Court declared the employer guilty of unfair labor practice for singling out its workers who refused to join the employers preferred union by not giving them work assignments and regular status, and eventually dismissing said employees. The employer was found guilty of unfair labor practice in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,32 for (1) the dismissal of

some of its striking employees without even giving them an opportunity to explain their side; and (2) the acts of discrimination, including the delayed reinstatement of striking employees and the offering of bribes, bonuses, and wage increases to loyal employees after refusing to bargain with the union. None of these acts were attributed to the respondent in the present case. NUWHRAIN claimed that during the reconciliatory conferences, respondents Vice President Norma Azores expressed her preference to deal with HIMPHLU, while blaming NUWHRAIN for the Hotels labor problems; and the Hotels Resident Manager Bernardo Corpus, Jr. implored NUWHRAINs members to withdraw their Petition for Certification Election and reaffirm their membership in HIMPHLU. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent denied that such statements were made and that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel were merely misquoted. During the reconciliatory conferences, wherein the officers of the respondent and the Hotel acted as mediators, one of the proposals laid on the table to settle the dispute between the unions and preclude the dismissal of the 36 employees was for NUWHRAIN to withdraw its Petition for Certification Election and, in return, for HIMPHLU to re-accept the employees without sanctions. Still, NUWHRAIN asserts that the sworn testimony signed by its six union members that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel did utter the offending statements deserve more credence than the unsworn denial of respondent. NUWHRAIN has the burden of proving its allegation that Norma Azores and Bernardo Corpus, Jr. did make the statements being attributed to them. The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.33 And in labor cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion,34 which NUWHRAIN failed to discharge in the present case. Undoubtedly, the members of NUWHRAIN would owe their loyalty to their union, a natural bias which somewhat puts into question their credibility as witnesses, especially since the success of this case would also redound to their benefit. The fact that six members of the union signed a single statement, instead of each member presenting their sincere and individual narrations of events, gives the impression that it was signed in a perfunctory manner and motivated by a sense of union solidarity. The self-serving statement signed by six of NUWHRAINs members have very little weight, even if made under oath, absent any other independent evidence which

indicates that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel made such hostile and coercive utterances that tend to interfere or influence the employees exercise of the right to self-organization. In the case at bar, the NLRC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel did not make statements that would have constituted unfair labor practice. Findings of fact of the NLRC are given much weight and are considered conclusive by this Court. It is only when such findings are not substantially supported by the records that this Court will step in and make its independent evaluation of the facts. 35 Considering the expertise of these agencies in matters pertaining to labor disputes, the findings of administrative agencies of the Department of Labor are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality.36 Even the surrounding circumstances would contradict NUWHRAINs allegation that the respondent interfered with or coerced its employees in their choice of union membership. In their Reply before the NLRC, NUWHRAIN admitted that before issuing its Notices, the respondent maintained a neutral stand in the dispute between HIMPHLU and NUWHRAIN. 37 Neither did the respondent threaten the 36 employees who shifted their allegiance to NUWHRAIN with any form of reprisal; they were not dismissed for their affiliation with NUWHRAIN. The records are bereft of any instance that would show that respondent rode roughshod over its employees freedom to decide which union to join. In all, respondent had not committed any act which would constitute unfair labor practice. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96171 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner NUWHRAIN. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 180892 April 7, 2009

UST FACULTY UNION, Petitioner, vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, REV. FR. ROLANDO DE LA ROSA, REV. FR. RODELIO ALIGAN, DOMINGO LEGASPI, and MERCEDES HINAYON, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the June 14, 2007 Decision 1 and November 26, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92236. The CA Decision affirmed the November 28, 20033 and July 29, 20054 Resolutions of the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 037320-03. These Resolutions, in turn, affirmed the August 15, 2003 Decision of Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga in NLRC NCR Case No. 10-06255-96. Entitled University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas, Rev. Fr. Rolando De La Rosa, Rev. Fr. Rodelio Aligan, Domingo Legaspi, and Mercedes Hinayon, these decisions and resolutions were all in favor of respondents that were found not guilty of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). The Facts On September 21, 1996, the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) wrote a letter 5 to all its members informing them of a General Assembly (GA) that was to be held on October 5, 1996. The letter contained an agenda for the GA which included an election of officers. The then incumbent president of the USTFU was Atty. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr. On October 2, 1996, Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P., Secretary General of the UST, issued a Memorandum 6 allowing the request of the Faculty Clubs of the university to hold a convocation on October 4, 1996. Members of the faculties of the university attended the convocation, including members of the USTFU, without the participation of the members of the UST administration. Also during the convocation, an election for the officers of the USTFU was conducted by a group called the Reformist Alliance. Upon learning that the convocation was intended to be an election, members of the USTFU walked out. Meanwhile, an election was conducted among those present, and Gil Gamilla and other faculty members (Gamilla Group) were elected as the president and officers, respectively, of the union. Such election was communicated to the UST administration in a letter dated October 4, 1996.7 Thus, there were two (2) groups claiming to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the group led by Atty. Mario, Jr. (Mario Group). On October 8, 1996, the Mario Group filed a complaint for ULP against the UST with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 10-06255-96. It also filed on October 11, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Med-Arbiter of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group as officers of the USTFU. The complaint was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 and entitled UST Faulty Union, Gil Y. Gamilla, Corazon Qui, et al., v. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr., Ma. Melvyn Alamis, Norma Collantes, et al. On December 3, 1996, a Collective Bargaining Agreement8 (CBA) was entered into by the Gamilla Group and the UST. The CBA superseded an existing CBA entered into by the UST and USTFU which was intended for the period of June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1998.9

On January 27, 1997, Gamilla, accompanied by the barangay captain in the area, Dupont E. Aseron, and Justino Cardenas, Chief Security Officer of the UST, padlocked the office of the USTFU. Afterwards, an armed security guard of the UST was posted in front of the USTFU office. On February 11, 1997, the med-arbiter issued a Resolution, declaring the election of the Gamilla group as null and void and ordering that this group cease and desist from performing the duties and responsibilities of USTFU officers. This Resolution was appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), docketed as BLR Case No. A8-49-97 and entitled UST Faulty Union, Gil Y. Gamilla, Corazon Qui, et al. v. Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin of the National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Eduardo J. Mario, Jr., et al. Later, the director issued a Resolution dated August 15, 1997 affirming the Resolution of the med-arbiter. His Resolution was then appealed to this Court which rendered its November 16, 1999 Decision10 in G.R. No. 131235 upholding the ruling of the BLR. Thus, on January 21, 2000, USTFU filed a Manifestation 11 with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. 10-06255-96, informing it of the Decision of the Court. Thereafter, on August 15, 2003, the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC issued a Decision12 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that USTFU failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. The acts of UST which USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1) allegedly calling for a convocation of faculty members which turned out to be an election of officers for the faculty union; (2) subsequently dealing with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA; and (3) the assistance to the Gamilla Group in padlocking the USTFU office. In his Decision, the labor arbiter explained that the alleged Memorandum dated October 2, 1996 merely granted the request of faculty members to hold such convocation. Moreover, by USTFUs own admission, no member of the UST administration attended or participated in the convocation. As to the CBA, the labor arbiter ruled that when the new CBA was entered into, (1) the Gamilla Group presented more than sufficient evidence to establish that they had been duly elected as officers of the USTFU; and (2) the ruling of the med-arbiter that the election of the Gamilla Group was null and void was not yet final and executory. Thus, UST was justified in dealing with and entering into a CBA with the Gamilla Group, including helping the Gamilla Group in securing the USTFU office. The USTFU appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the Third Division of the NLRC which rendered a Resolution dated November 28, 2003 affirming the Decision of the labor arbiter. USTFUs Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs November 28, 2003 Resolution was denied in a Resolution dated July 29, 2005. The case was then elevated to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision affirming the Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA also denied the Motion for Reconsideration of USTFU in the assailed resolution. Hence, we have this petition. The Issues 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 92236 and sustained the National Labor Relations Commissions ruling that the herein respondents are not guilty of Unfair Labor Practice despite abundance of evidence showing that Unfair Labor Practices were indeed committed. 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and in rendering a judgment that is based on a misapprehension of facts. 13 The Courts Ruling The petition must be denied.

UST Is Not Guilty of ULP Petitioner claims that given the factual circumstances attendant to the instant case, the labor arbiter, NLRC, and CA should have found that UST is guilty of ULP. Petitioner enumerates the acts constituting ULP as follows: (1) Atty. Domingo Legaspi, the legal counsel for the UST, conducted a faculty meeting in his office, supplying derogatory information about the Mario Group; (2) respondents provided the Gamilla Group with the facilities and forum to conduct elections, in the guise of a convocation; and (3) respondents transacted business with the Gamilla Group such as the processing of educational and hospital benefits, deducting USTFU dues from the faculty members without turning over the dues to the Mario Group, and entering into a CBA with them. Additionally, petitioner claims that the CA, NLRC, and labor arbiter ignored vital pieces of evidence. These were the Affidavit dated January 21, 2000 of Edgar Yu, the Certification dated January 27, 1997 of Alexander Sibug, and the picture of a security guard posted outside the USTFU office purportedly to "prevent entry into and exit from the union office." The concept of ULP is contained in Article 247 of the Labor Code which states: Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labormanagement relations. (Emphasis supplied.) Notably, petitioner claims that respondents violated paragraphs (a) and (d) of Art. 248 of the Code which provide: Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; xxxx (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of proving such ULP. Thus, we ruled in De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC that "a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process."14 While in the more recent and more apt case of Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) v. Confesor, this Court enunciated: In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.15 (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.16 Given the above rulings of this Court, we shall now examine the acts of respondents which allegedly constitute ULP.

With regard to the alleged derogatory remarks of Atty. Legaspi, the three tribunals correctly ruled that there was no evidence to support such allegation. The alleged evidence to support petitioners claim, the Affidavit dated January 21, 2000 of Yu, is unacceptable. In the Affidavit it is stated that: "6. That in the said meeting, Atty. Legaspi gave the participants information that are derogatory to the officers of the UST Faculty Union." 17 It may be observed that the information allegedly provided during the meeting as "derogatory" is a conclusion of law and not of fact. What may be derogatory to Yu may not be punishable under the law. There was, therefore, no fact that was established by the Affidavit. Hence, petitioner failed to present evidence in support of its claim that respondents committed ULP through alleged remarks of Atty. Legaspi. As to the convocation, petitioner avers that: "Indeed, Respondents, under the guise of a faculty convocation, ordered the suspension of classes and required the faculty members to attend the supposed faculty convocation which was to be held at the Education Auditorium of the University of Santo Tomas." 18 An examination of the Memorandum dated October 2, 199619 would, however, rebut such allegation. It stated: MEMORANDUM TO THE DEANS, REGENTS, PRINCIPALS AND HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS Re: Convocation of Faculty Club As per request of the Faculty Clubs of the different Faculties, Colleges, Schools and Institutes in the University through their Presidents, we are allowing them to hold a convocation on Friday, October 4, 1996 at 9:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon at the Education Auditorium. The officers and members of said faculty clubs are, therefore, excused from their classes on Friday from 9:00 to 12:00 noon to allow them to attend. Regular classes shall resume at 1:00 in the afternoon. Please be guided accordingly. Thank you. FR. RODEL ALIGAN, O.P. (Sgd.) Secretary General In no way can the contents of this memorandum be interpreted to mean that faculty members were required to attend the convocation. Not one coercive term was used in the memorandum to show that the faculty club members were compelled to attend such convocation. And the phrase "we are allowing them to hold a convocation" negates any idea that the UST would participate in the proceedings. Moreover, the CA ruled properly: More importantly, USTFU itself even admitted that during the October [4], 1996 convocation/election, not a single University Official was present. And the Faculty Convocation was held without the overt participation of any UST Administrator or Official.20 In other words, the Memorandum dated October 2, 1996 does not support a claim that UST organized the convocation in connivance with the Gamilla Group. Anent USTs dealing with the Gamilla Group, including the processing of faculty members educational and hospitalization benefits, the labor arbiter ruled that: Neither are We persuaded by complainants stand that respondents acquiescence to bargain with USTFU, through Gamillas group, constitutes unfair labor practice. x x x Such conduct alone, uncorroborated by other overt acts leading to the commission of ULP, does not conclusively show and establish the commission of such unlawful acts. 21

The fact of the matter is, the Gamilla Group represented itself to respondents as the duly elected officials of the USTFU.22 As such, respondents were bound to deal with them. Art. 248(g) of the Labor Code provides that: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxxx (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code. Correlatively, Art. 250(a) of the Code provides: ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining.The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice; Moreover, Art. 252 of the Code defines the duty to bargain collectively as: ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. (Emphasis ours.) In the instant case, until our Decision in G.R. No. 131235 that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office, there was no reason to believe that the members of the Gamilla Group were not the validly elected officers and directors of USTFU. To reiterate, the Gamilla Group submitted a Letter dated October 4, 1996 whereby it informed Fr. Rolando De La Rosa that its members were the newly elected officers and directors of USTFU. In the Letter, every officer allegedly elected was identified with the Letter signed by the alleged newly elected Secretary General and President, Ma. Lourdes Medina and Gamilla, respectively. More important though is the fact that the records are bereft of any evidence to show that the Mario Group informed the UST of their objections to the election of the Gamilla Group. In fact, there is even no evidence to show that the scheduled elections on October 5, 1996 that was supposed to be presided over by the Mario Group ever pushed through. Instead, petitioner filed a complaint with the med-arbiter on October 11, 1996 praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group.
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As such, there was no reason not to recognize the Gamilla Group as the new officers and directors of USTFU. And as stated in the above-quoted provisions of the Labor Code, the UST was obligated to deal with the USTFU, as the recognized representative of the bargaining unit, through the Gamilla Group. USTs failure to negotiate with the USTFU would have constituted ULP. It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of the Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter of the DOLE. Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the Mario Group that the former was not validly elected into office. The subsequent ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 131235 that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office cannot support petitioners allegation of ULP. Had respondents dealt with the Gamilla Group after our ruling in G.R. No. 131235 had become final and executory, it would have been a different story. As the CA ruled correctly, until the validity of the election of the Gamilla Group is resolved with finality, respondents could not be faulted for negotiating with said group.

Petitioner further alleges that respondents are guilty of ULP when on January 27, 1997, "Justino Cardenas, Detachment Commander of the security agency contracted by the UST to provide security services to the university, led a group of persons, including Dr. Gil Gamilla, who padlocked the door leading to the USTFU." 23Petitioner claims that "Gamilla who was and is still being favored by the employer, had no right whatsoever to padlock the union office. And, yet the Administrators of the University of Santo Tomas aided him in performing an unlawful act." Petitioner adds that an armed security guard was posted at the USTFU office in order to prevent the Mario Group from performing its duties.24 To support such contention, petitioner provides as evidence a Certification dated January 27, 199725 of Sibug, a messenger of the USTFU, and a photograph 26 of a security guard standing before the USTFU office. These pieces of evidence fail to support petitioners conclusions. As to the padlocking of the USTFU office, it must be emphasized that based on the Certification of Sibug, Cardenas was merely present, with Brgy. Captain Aseron of Brgy. 470, Zone 46, at the padlocking of the USTFU office. The Certification also stated that Sibug himself also padlocked the USTFU office and that he was neither harassed nor coerced by the padlocking group. Clearly, Cardenas mere presence cannot be equated to a positive act of "aiding" the Gamilla Group in securing the USTFU office. With regard to the photograph, while it evidences that there was indeed a guard posted at the USTFU office, such cannot be used to claim that the guard prevented the Mario Group from performing its duties. Petitioner again failed to present evidence to support its contention that UST committed acts amounting to ULP. In any event, it bears stressing that at the time of these events, the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group as the valid officers and directors of the USTFU was already submitted to the med-arbiter and no decision had yet been reached on the matter. Having been shown evidence to support the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group with no counter-evidence from the Mario Group, UST had to recognize the Gamilla Group and negotiate with it. Thus, the acts of UST in support of the USTFU as the legitimate representative of the bargaining unit, albeit through the Gamilla Group, cannot be considered as ULP. Finally, petitioner claims that "despite the ruling of this Honorable Court, the University of Santo Tomas still entertains the interlopers whose claim to the leadership of the USTFU has been rejected by the [DOLE] and the Highest Tribunal."27 Petitioner, however, fails to enumerate such objectionable actions of the UST. Again, petitioner fails to present substantial evidence in support of its claim.
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In sum, petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 14, 2007 Decision and November 26, 2007 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 92236 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.