Alyssa Hennig Young v.

Huntsville Hospital (1992, Supreme Court of Alabama) Rule of Law: Hospital owes a duty to protect its sedated or anesthetized patients from third-party criminal acts (because there is a special relationship) Facts: Patient (P) at Huntsville Hospital (D) was admitted for treatment of kidney stones and was sedated. She was allegedly sexually assaulted by a male trespasser who had previously trespassed in the Hospital. Patient was assaulted at 6 a.m. which was outside of the posted visiting hours. The hospital had four security guards for the 450 bed hospital. Patient claims emotional distress and alleges a negligent and/or wanton failure to protect her from the criminal act (specifically claiming a special relationship, as she was sedated) History: Trial court entered directed verdict in favor of D and judge overruled P's motion for new trial, probably due to D's lack of legal obligation to P. Issue(s): Whether a hospital owes a duty to protect its sedated or anesthetized patients from third-party criminal acts Holding: The "special relationship" between a sedated patient (who is dependent upon the hospital) and a hospital does create a duty on the hospital's part to protect the patient from criminal acts of third parties. Reasoning: There is evidence that the relationship between the sedated patient and the hospital is a "special relationship circumstance." Special relationships hinge on "dependence or mutual dependence" among parties. In this case, after applying a dependence test, the court concluded the sedated patient is logically dependent on the hospital for "basic bodily protection and care." This type of relationship imposes a duty on the hospital to protect the dependent patient. In this case the court thought that this act was foreseeable, but not wanton. The case was awarded a new trial in trial court based on the fact that the hospital did owe a duty to the patient.

Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc. (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1986). Rule of Law: Foreseeability must be shown by showing that there were prior criminal incidents that occurred at the premises and that the owner was or should have been aware of these incidents. The number and frequency of prior criminal acts at the place where the injury occurred are used to determine whether the crime was foreseeable. Facts: Administer of P's estate is seeking damages from motel owner (D) for death of P. P was outside of motel after a dance. The dance had had several security measures such as the presence of four security guards, personnel checking IDs, searching for weapons, alcohol, and drugs, not permitting pass outs, and checking the motel area and parking lot periodically. After the dance, P was shot by a man who had attended the dance while waiting for her ride. There was a security guard on duty. History: Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. P appealed. Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's ruling. Issue(s): What constitutes sufficient evidence to put owner on notice that criminal acts were likely to occur, thereby imposing a duty to protect against those probable criminal acts Holding: For D. There was not sufficient evidence for D to foresee that criminal acts were likely to occur. Reasoning: If there had been sufficient evidence, the P would have owed D a duty to P to protect against these acts. But this evidence is needed because the general rule is that "absent special relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts of a third person." Two elements must be proven when suing for negligence/wantonness: 1) duty and 2) proximate cause. In either case foreseeability must be shown by showing that there were prior criminal incidents that occurred at the premises and that the owner was or should have been aware of these incidents. The number and frequency of prior criminal acts at the place where the injury occurred are used to determine whether the crime was foreseeable. In this case there hadn't been a single criminal incident at any prior teen dance, making it clear that this act was not

foreseeable. Evidence showing that there had been a murder in the lounge of the motel and a robbery of a guest room in the last 18 months was not considered sufficient as a matter of law to give rise to a duty to protect P.

Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Gosa (Ala., 1996). RULE OF LAW: Hospital did not have a duty to protect P from third party crimes on the hospital's property because the hospital could not have reasonably foreseen probable criminal activity. FACTS: Wright & Gosa (P), employees of BMH (D), are suing BMH for negligence, wantonness, and/or willfulness in failing to provide security. Wright was assaulted in the hospital parking lot (specifically she was shot in the stomach). Wright elected to and did receive Worker's Compensation Disability. HISTORY: Trial Court ruled for both plaintiffs, and also denied BMH's motion for a directed verdict. BMH is appealing. ISSUES(S): Does a hospital have a duty to P to protect from third party crimes on the hospital's property? HOLDING: For the defendant; reversed. The hospital did not have a duty to protect P from third party crimes on the hospital's property because the hospital could not have reasonably foreseen probable criminal activity. REASONING: The court concluded that there was not evidence of a special relationship in this case because the hospital was not forewarned about probable criminal activity and the plaintiff was not dependent upon the hospital to provide basic bodily protection. The court determined that this crime was not foreseeable by considering the number and frequency of prior criminal acts in BMH's parking lot. In this case there had been 57 criminal events in the last five years, but most of those events were mere thefts and were not violent crimes. Among the six crimes that involved a physical touching, only one (this one) involved a gun. This means that there is a per-year average of only 1.6 crimes involving physical touching. The court concluded that it could not be "reasonably foreseeable" that the assault in question would occur. Since the crime was not foreseeable, BMH had no duty to P to protect her from third party criminal acts. DISCUSSION: Other issues, such as workers' compensation immunity and amending pleadings were discussed in this case.

Thetford v. City of Clanton, et al. (Supreme Court of AL, 1992) RULE OF LAW: Innkeeper owes a duty to his guest to protect against third-party criminal acts if the act was foreseeable, shown by substantial evidence. FACTS: Shirley Ann Banks (P) checked into a hotel (D), telling the clerk that she was hiding from her abusive husband. She requested that the front desk to not tell anybody that she was there and to not let her husband enter her room. P showed signs of physical abuse. Her husband came to the hotel and P admitted him to her room. After her husband left her room, she locked her door via the chain on the door. Her husband asked the front desk manager to let him into the room, claiming his wife was "sick or crazy." The manager, with the police officer present, cut the chain to the door, allowing the husband to enter the room. At this point, the husband stated that he was going to kill Shirley Ann, later claiming he didn't really mean that. He convinced Shirley Ann that he would take her to her mothers' house. Later that night her husband fatally beat her at another hotel. P is suing for damages. With regard to the police officer, the police officer initially called to investigate an act of family violence (prior to P's hotel check-in) did not file a report of the incident as required by law. The second police officer that was present for the cutting of the chain also did not file an incident report. HISTORY: Trial court entered a judgment for the defendants (the city and the hotel). Plaintiff appealed. ISSUE: Did the hotel manager owe a duty to his guest to protect her from a third party criminal act in her room? (Specifically, is D liable for wrongful or unauthorized entry?) Was the police officer statutorily negligent for failing to file a family violence investigation report as required by law? HOLDING: The court held that the hotel manager did not act reasonably and the third party criminal act was foreseeable (making the hospital owe a duty to the guest); the summary judgment for hotel defendants was reversed. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the city. REASONING: As a general rule, an innkeeper is liable if he unjustifiably or unreasonably interferes with his guest's right to privacy and to the peaceful enjoyment of his room. The court

further stated that an innkeeper does have a duty not to allow unregistered or unauthorized third parties to gain access to the rooms of its guests. The court determined that innkeepers owe an exercise of reasonable care for a guests' safety. Reasonable care depends on the circumstances in this case since it depends on the grade and quality of the accommodations that a hotel offers. A main component of this standard of care involves foreseeability. Because the innkeeper in this situation was expressly warned about the possibility of a violent crime occurring (showed by substantial evidence), he owed a duty to his guest. He can be, therefore, liable for not protecting his guest. It was also noted that the exact act doesn't have to be foreseeable, but rather a general harm or consequence is what must/should have been foreseeable. Regarding the city, P would have had to prove 1) the statute (family violence act) was enacted to protect a class of persons in which P is categorized, 2) the injury that occurred was contemplated by the statute, 3) D violated the statute and 4) the statutory violation proximately caused the injury. In this case the court concluded that P couldn't prove the lack of written report proximately caused the injury; the act does not provide any resources to help the victims of this type of abuse. Since the elements can't be proven, a jury could not conclude that the city was negligent. DISCUSSION: Dissenting opinion included an argument that the city did proximately cause P's injuries/death because the second officer didn't have any incident report, preventing him from doubting the husband's intentions and allowing the husband to enter the room and leave with Shirley Ann. Another dissenting opinion included an argument that the cutting of the chain was reasonable if the innkeeper thought P was sick; however, the innkeeper also should have re-secured her room, which he failed to do.

Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Assoc. Inc./Soujourner v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Assoc. Inc. (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1988) RULE OF LAW: D owes a duty to protect P from third-party criminal acts if D should have foreseen the probability of such acts. Furthermore, if there is a scintilla of evidence for the non-motioning party, JNOV is improper. FACTS: Nail subleased four blocks from the famers' market (D). There had been a growing feud between Nail and another retailer. The other retailer, Nail and Soujourner all informed the farmers' market manager about the "growing rancor." The farmers' market hired an extra security guard, but the day of the shooting a guard had gone home sick, so the extra guard was filling in for him. No additional guard was called in. Nail and the other retailer were involved in the shootout (i.e. both participating) and Soujourner was trying to escape. Retailer & Retailer Employee (Nail & Soujourner, (P) & (P)) are suing D for injuries sustained in a shootout between competing retailers that occurred on D's land (that P was leasing). HISTORY: Trial Court granted D judgment (re: negligence) "notwithstanding verdict" and ruled for a new trial on other charges ISSUE: Did the farmers' market owe a duty to both plaintiffs to prevent injury from another one of its tenants? {Whether the trial court properly granted JNOV as to P's negligence claims} HOLDING: Court affirmed trial court's judgment against Nail, but reversed trial court's judgment against Soujourner. REASONING: The appropriate rule in this case is that "unless [the D] knows or have reason to know that acts are occurring or about to occur on the premises that pose imminent probability of harm to an invitee; whereupon a duty of reasonable care to protect against such act arises." P will have to prove the D knew that criminal activity was a probability. There is sufficient evidence that D should have known that there was a probability that this dangerous activity was possible (Market was informed and knew for several weeks that this feud was growing, why it was growing, and who was involved). Because of this, JNOV would be improper. There is a scintilla of proof that D had a duty of reasonable care to protect P, which D failed to exercise when it did not call in an extra security guard.

Because Nail was participating in the shootout, the court concluded that he was guilty of contributory negligence (he fulfilled all elements needed: 1) knowledge of the condition, 2) appreciation of the danger, and 3) failed to exercise reasonable care. Soujourner was not participating, however, and was trying to escape (making element #3 unfulfilled) DISCUSSION: Nail Farmers' market, duty/negligence. present in favor also made four other charges against the but they were not directly applicable to Court said that if a "scintilla of evidence" is of the non-moving party, a JNOV is improper.