Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

Chapter 1 A. A Case Study in Punishment Regina v. Dudley & Stephens

The Purposes of the Criminal Law The Ds, Thomas Dudley and Edwin Stephens and two other gentlemen, Mr. Brooks and the victim, Richard Parker, were stranded on a boat for several days. When it appeared that the whole party would likely die of thirst and starvation, the Ds decided to sacrifice Mr. Parker, who would not have survived much longer, for the good of the rest. As necessary the circumstances seemed where sacrificing ones life would save the rest, that itself does not justify murder. The fact that Dudley and Stephens chose the weakest person to be the victim also does not justify that Parker could not have survived. Instead, by killing him, it is only making certain that he had no chance of survival. Private necessity does not justify murder, except in the case of self-defense.

B. Purposes of the Criminal Law What is a Crime?

Social Condemnation

Retribution

Treatment instead of Punishment?

Deterrence

Conflicting Purposes

M.P.C. Statement of Objectives

5 Generally Recognized principals of punishment

System of Social Control

Chapter 2 A. The Act Requirement M.P.C. and voluntary Acts.

An act that the law makes punishable; the breach of a legal duty treated as the subject matter of a criminal proceeding. Some crimes require one to do some act while other crimes require one to refrain from doing some act. Moral condemnation is a unique sanction because it inflicts suffering on individuals even when the conduct is otherwise efficient. Indeed, the condemnation is moral in character precisely because we are blaming an individual for preferring pleasure to pain in a situation where he should be obeying the categorical imperative. While invocation of a penal sanction necessarily depends on past behavior, the object is control of the harmful conduct in the future. Resentment (perhaps even some hatred) is a good thing, forgiveness of wrongdoers is overvalued in our culture, and there is little room for mercy in the sentencing of wrongdoers (or those involved in sentencing and punishing offenders should keep their sentimentality to themselves for use in their private lives with their families and pets.). The leading alternative to criminalization would be to provide that people who behave badly should simply be treated as sick people to be cured rather than as bad people to be condemned and punished. What would happen if the laws said, if you do something wrong, you will merely be treated as a sick person and we will try to cure you? Compare that to, You are a bad person, everyone should know that you are bad, you will be punished to the extent that youre crime deserves if you commit one. Deterrence is negative, whereas the purposes of law are positive. Many crimes are undeterrable. The grim negativism and the frequent seeming futility of the criminal law when it is considered simply as a means of preventing undesired behavior no doubt help to explain why sensitive people, working at close hand with criminals, tend so often to embrace the more hopeful and positive tenets of curative-rehabilitative philosophy. The purposes of criminal law sanctionsjust punishment, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, and rehabilitation. The purposes frequently conflict. A choice must be made to follow one purpose at the expense of another. The major goal of the criminal law is to forbid and prevent conduct that threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests and that at the same time is both unjustifiable and inexcusable. Subsidiary themes: Subsidiary goals: --to subject those who are disposed to commit --to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders, crimes to public control, within a scheme that safeguards them against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment, --to prevent the condemnation of conduct that is without fault, --to give fair warning of the possible dispositions for criminal offenses, and --to give fair warning of the conduct declared to be criminal, and --to differentiate among offenders with a view to just individualization of treatment. --to differentiate between serious and minor offenses on reasonable grounds. Utilitarian Theory 1. General Deterrence Punish one to deter others 2. Specific Deterrence Punish to deter that person 3. Incapacitation Prevent them from committing more crimes 4. Rehabilitation Treat/teach defendant so they wont commit more crimes Retributive Theory 5. Retribution Punishment for what they didrepayment or revenge Determining what someone deservesTwo factors: 1. HarmWhat were the results of their actions? 2. CulpabilityWhat choice did the defendant make? Achieve socially desirable ends Preserve fundamental individual liberty Maintain a system of property ownership Protect and enable the operation of the state/government The Requirement of a Voluntary Act An essential element of just punishment is the requirement of a voluntary act or omission. 2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an Act. (1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. (2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section: (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

Criminal Liability

Martin v. State

Actus Reus and Conduct(M.P.C)

Fulcher v. State

Robinson v. California

(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. (3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. Common Law Model Penal Code Actus Reus (Act) (includes attendant Conduct (includes causation) circumstance and causation) Attendant Circumstance, if required o Voluntary bodily movement Result, if required Mens Rea (Mental State) No Justification or Excuse (Defenses) o Specific Intent State of Mind for each of the first three o Malice o Purposefully (intentionally) o General Intent o Knowingly o (No mental state needed for strict o Recklessly liability crimes) o Negligently No Justification or Excuse (Defenses) D was charged with being drunk on a public To be convicted of a crime, the violation must be voluntary. highway after police officers forcibly removed One cannot be blamed for an act he was forced to perform. him from his home and placed him on the The accusation of drunkenness in a designated public pace road. cannot be established by proof that the accused while in an intoxicated state, was forcibly carried to that place. To be punished, one must act or fail to act when required to do so. Act must be voluntary. Muscular contraction resulting from ones will or an external manifestation of ones will. For possession crimes, knowledge is an actbut what is meant by knowledge? D drank 7-8 shots of whiskey at bar after The trial court properly received and considered evidence of previously drinking at home. D claims he got unconsciousness absent a plea of "not guilty by reason of into a fight in the restroom them left to find a mental illness or deficiency" because the defense of friend. Does not remember anything after unconsciousness resulting from a concussion with no walking out the door. Found unconscious in a permanent brain damage was an affirmative defense and was ditch. Booked for public intoxication and a defense separate from the defense of not guilty by reason of disturbing the peace. He beat up is cell mate. mental illness or deficiency. Defense of unconsciousness is He had concussion and traumatic an affirmative defense. automatismdoesnt have conscious and willful control of actions. A California statute makes it a criminal A state law which imprisons an individual for being addicted offense for a person to be addicted to the use to drugs, even though he has never touched the drug within of narcotics. Appellant, Robinson was found the state or been guilty of any anti-social behavior there, is an guilty of the offense. infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Imprisonment for a short amount of time is not cruel and unusual punishment when considered in the abstract. However, they feel the issue should not be considered in the abstract. For example, even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of having a common cold. Ds friend had a 10-month-old child who was Omission of an act is only punishable where the duty placed with D. The mother lived in the house neglected is a legal duty and not merely a moral obligation. with D for some time, however the evidence This case reflect the position taken by the M.P.C. that liability was conflicting as to how long and as to for failure to act may only be imposed where the person who whether or not D was paid to take care of the failed to act had a legal duty to perform such act. It also child. D failed to provide for the child and illustrates the difficulty of convicting a person of failure to such failure resulted in the childs death. D protect a child where that person is not a childs parent or was charged and convicted with involuntary guardian manslaughter based on his failure to provide for the child. Should the judge have told it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that D was under a legal duty to provide for the child? A legal duty can be imposed by statue, by virtue of relationship to another, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another and

B. Omissions Jones v. United States

Duty to Act

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

where one has volunteered to care for another and in doing so secluded the person in manner that prevents others from rendering aid. A parent who fails to take any action to stop child abuse can be prosecuted as a principal under the statute. The State does not limit its application to individuals that directly inflict the abuse, it also covers situations where a person has a duty toward a child and exposes the child to a foreseeable risk of abuse. A person may be found guilty of an offense when his omission to act produced a specific result if the person has a legal duty to act and when he can physically perform the act. When a special relationship exists between persons, social policy may impose a duty to protect and this would be considered a sufficient legal duty. The parent must knowingly act in disregard of the facts giving rise to a duty to protect and act.

State v. Williquette

The Appellee was charged with child abuse, for failing to prevent future acts of abuse by her husband, whom she knew was abusing their two kids.

Chapter 3 Common Law Mental States

M.P.C. Mental States

Mens Rea There are four common law mental states 1. Specific IntentWhen the crime requires not just the desire to do the act, but also the desire to achieve a specific result Specific Intent Crimes o Assault o First degree, premeditated murder o Embezzlement o False pretenses o Larceny o Robbery o Forgery o Burglary o Solicitation o Conspiracy o Attempt 2. General IntentDefendant need only be generally aware of the factors constituting the crime. He need not intend a specific result. (Just doing the act. General Intent Crimes o Battery o RapeForcible Rape o Kidnapping o False Imprisonment 3. MaliceWhen a defendant acts intentionally or with reckless disregard of obvious known risks. Malice Crimes o Murder o Arson 4. Strict LiabilityAbsence of a mental stateno intent crimes (act only crimes) Public Welfare OffensesRegulatory or morality offenses that carry a small penalty. o Corrupting the morals of a minor o Selling adulterated food o Selling Alcohol or Tobacco to a Minor o Speeding, etc. Severe Penaltythere is only one strict liability crime that carries a severe penalty. o Statutory Rape There are four M.P.C. mental states 1. Purposefully (Intentionally)The defendant has a conscious objective to cause a specific result or to engage in a particular conduct (It is what the D meant to do.). 2. KnowinglyDefendant is aware of his conduct or aware of the circumstances. The defendant has knowledge of it. 3. RecklesslyWhen the defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk (Intentionally taking a bad risk). 4. NegligentlyWhen a defendant should have known about a substantial and unjustifiable risk (crime of being stupid). A mental state is required for each element of the crime. Different mental states might be required for each element. 2.02. General Requirements of Culpability. (1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. (2) Kinds of Culpability Defined. (a) Purposely.

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. (b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor's situation. (d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. (3) Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto. (4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. (5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely. (6) Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is Conditional. When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (7) Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. (8) Requirement of Willfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears. (9) Culpability as to Illegality of Conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides. (10) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense. A. Legislative Patterns of Criminal Intention Regina v. Faulkner

State v. Jackowski

D, a sailor, was trying to steal some rum when he lit a match and accidentally set the boat on fire. D was convicted of disorderly conduct. D appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury to consider whether defendant was "practically certain" that her conduct would cause public inconvenience or annoyance, when she was charged with intentionally causing public inconvenience or annoyance.

One cannot be convicted for an act that is the unintended and unforeseeable consequence of a lesser offense. The disorderly conduct statute, contains the words "with intent" and not "purposely." This is a purely semantic distinction, and it does not indicate a departure from the MPCs approach to mens rea. The MPC does not differentiate between "with intent" and "purposely." Instead, it uses the two terms interchangeably, explaining in its definitions that "intentionally" or "with intent" means purposely. At common law, crimes committed "purposely" and those committed "knowingly" would both have been specific intent offenses. However, under the MPC knowingly is not purposefully.

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

State v. Ducker

D left her children in the car when she went to her boyfriends for about 10 hrs. Statute for aggravated child abuse: A person knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under 18 years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury or neglects such a child as to adversely affect the childs health and welfare and such abuse results in serious bodily injury. The US Dist Ct for D.C. granted Ds motion to dismiss a count of aggravated identity theft under, holding that "knowingly" had to modify "means of identification of another person," and thus, the government had to prove D knew the "means of identification" he possessed actually belonged to "another person." The government appealed. There was no evidence D actually knew the alien registration number on the card he had belonged to another person (fake card). D Staples was convicted under the National Firearms Act, which criminalizes the possession of a weapon that is capable of automatically firing. D argued that he did not know that the gun would fire automatically.

United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo

Knowing is applicable to the situations in which the accused, while not having the actual intent to accomplish a specific wrongful purpose, is consciously aware of the existence of facts which make his conduct unlawful. A rational trier of fact could find that D knew the ages of her children (circumstances), knowingly strapped her children in the car (conduct), knowingly neglected them over the next nine hrs (conduct), and was aware that her conduct was reasonably certain to cause harm or injury to her children (result of conduct). When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. The mens rea requirement extends to the "aggravated identity theft" statute's defining element -- that the means of identification used belongs to another person.

B. Strict Liability Staples v. United States

Absent a clear Congressional statement that mens rea is not a required element of an offense, the Court should not dismiss with such requirement. Instead the Court should construe the statute in light of the rules embodied in the common law which require some mens rea as an element of an offense. The Court distinguishes this offense from the public welfare/strict liability offenses and reasons that there has been a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private persons in this country. Therefore the Court rests it opinion on the rationale that it is unthinkable that Congress intended to subject such law-abiding, well intentioned citizens to a possible 10 year term of imprisonment if what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional semiautomatic turns out to have worn down into or modified into an automatic.

M.P.C. Strict Liability

2.05. When Culpability Requirements Are Inapplicable to Violations and to Offenses Defined by Other Statutes; Effect of Absolute Liability in Reducing Grade of Offense to Violation. (1) The requirements of culpability prescribed by Sections 2.01 and 2.02 do not apply to: (a) offenses that constitute violations, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the Court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or (b) offenses defined by statutes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides: (a) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation; and (b) although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the material elements of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient culpability and the classification of the offense and the sentence that may be imposed therefore upon conviction are determined by Section 1.04 and Article 6 of the Code.

C. Intoxication & Drugged Condition People v. Atkins

D argued that evidence of his voluntary intoxication was admissible to show that he lacked the requisite mental state for arson. D was outside drinking and noticed that there were a lot of weeds. He piled weeds poured gas, and then lit them on fire. The fire spread rapidly burning for 3 days for 2.5-2.8 miles.

When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, courts ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. The arson statute, does not require an additional specific intent to burn a structure, forest land, or property, but rather requires only an intent to do the act that causes the harm. This interpretation is manifest from the fact that the statute is implicated if a person causes to be burned

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

M.P.C. on Intoxication

any structure, forest land, or property. 2.08. Intoxication. (1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense. (2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. (3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of Section 4.01. (4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is required: (a) intoxication means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body; (b) self-induced intoxication means intoxication caused by substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime; (c) pathological intoxication means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. Where an intoxication or drugged condition defense exists, it is not sufficient simply to demonstrate the use of alcohol or drugs or even the fact that a defendant was demonstrably high. Rather, to be able to successfully use this defense, the defendant must be so intoxicated and/or drugged that he or she is not capable of possessing the specific intent at issue. Mistake isnt technically a defenseIt is really just saying that they dont have the required mental state. Whether a defendants mistake of fact will be a Specific IntentAny mistake can be a defense. defense depends on the mental state for the General Intent and MaliceOnly reasonable mistakes can be crime and whether it was reasonable or a defense. unreasonable. Strict liabilityNo mistake will ever be a defense. Does the defendants mistake negate the mental PurposefullyDid he mean to do it? state? KnowinglyDid he know what he was doing? RecklesslyWas he aware of the risk? NegligentlyWas the risk unreasonable? 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake. (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. (2) Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed. (3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: (a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense. (4) The defendant must prove a defense arising under Subsection (3) of this Section by a preponderance of evidence. D claimed that he mistakenly believed the gun If the defendant was reckless in forming the belief that the was not loaded when he killed his friend. Is gun was not loaded, and consciously disregarded a substantial mistake of fact a defense to reckless and unjustifiable risk that a killing would result from his manslaughter? conduct, then he can convicted of reckless manslaughter. If his mistake would make it that he did not consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk then he cant. Defendant challenged a judgment from the Mistake of fact is a defense to a crime of criminal intent only Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, where the mistake precludes the existence of the mental state which convicted defendant of delivery of a necessary to commit the crime. At common law an honest simulated controlled substance. He thought he and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances was selling cocaine; it was actually which, if true, would have made the act done innocent, is a acetaminophen (Tylenol), which was not a good defense. A person who delivered a substance that was controlled substance. not a controlled substance, but who knowingly represented the substance as a controlled substance, committed the

Degree of Intoxication

D. Mistake of Fact Mistake of Fact Under the Common Law

Mistake of Fact Under the M.P.C.

New Jersey v. Sexton

Iowa v. Freeman

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

Rhode Island v. Yanez E. Mistake of Law United States v. Scarmazzo

D had sex with a girl believing she was 16 when in fact, she was 13. Im guessing the defendants were selling drugs.

offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance regardless of whether the person believed that the substance was controlled or not controlled. Statutory rape is a strict liability offense, to which there is no defense. Ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense to a crime that does not require a showing that the defendants know the illegality of the conduct of which he is charged. Where the crime requires only knowledge, not willfulness, the government need only prove the defendants knew they were performing an act, not that they knew the act was unlawful or criminalized by statute. Ignorance or mistake of the law is no defense. Mistake of law is no excuse. Under the MPC it can be but it is very difficult. (1) The State conceded that defendant presented a proper and complete mistake of law defense; (2) ignorance of the law was not a defense to a crime, but defendant was not charged with knowledge of a penal statute if he was misled concerning whether the statute was not being applied; (3) a mistake of law defense was appropriately recognized where defendant demonstrated that he had been misled by information received from the State; and (4) defendant had been misled by the State to believe that he was not a person prohibited.

Hawaii v. DeCastro

Kipp v. Delaware

D was pulled over when a police officer was harassing him. He called 911. The operator told him that he could leave. D was a person prohibited from possessing deadly weapons but he didnt know that he was. D plead guilty to an earlier crime and was told that his plea would not prohibit him. When he signed the plea form, that portion of the form was marked N/A.

Chapter 4 Test for Actual Causation

Intervening Acts (Jury Question)

M.P.C. on Causation

Causation Proximate or Legal Causation Actual Cause But For CausationThe result Is the actual cause sufficient to impose criminal would not have happened in the absence liability? of the defendants conduct. Usually focus on the foreseeability of the harm Substantial Factor TestTwo More dangerous the activity, the more likely it is to be defendants acting independently commit foreseeable two separate acts that cause the prohibited result, and either defendants conduct alone would have been sufficient to result in the prohibited result, then both are responsible. Dependent (Responsive) Independent (Coincidental or Superseding) Does not usually break the chain of Placed the victim in the situation where the other cause causation, unless the response is bizarre occurred, but that is the only relationship between the or abnormal, and thus, it would be unfair actor & the victim to hold the actor responsible for the Will often break the chain of causation, unless it is result. foreseeable Intervening Acts Will break the chain of causation if de minimis in nature (struck by lightning) Intended Consequences Doctrineany intended consequence of an act is proximate; most often applied when the intent and the results match. Apparent Safety Doctrineonce the danger from the defendant is no longer present, we no longer consider that defendant a proximate cause. The question is: did the victim reach apparent safety? Free, Deliberate, and Informed Human Choicea defendant is not the proximate cause of a result if a free, deliberate, and informed act of another human being intervenes. 2.03. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result; Divergence Between Result Designed or Contemplated and Actual Result or Between Probable and Actual Result. (1) Conduct is the cause of a result when: (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and (b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense. (2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: (a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (3) When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not

Michael MroczkaCriminal Law

Stephenson v. State

People v. Acosta

Commonwealth v. Root

People v. McGee

Chapter 5 A. Accomplice Liability 1. Principles & Accessories Liability for the Conduct of Others

established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware unless: (a) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct. A woman, who had been kidnapped by the The woman whom D abducted was rendered mentally Defendant, committed suicide with a poison irresponsible for her actions in ingesting a poison pill pill in order to forego facing further physical insomuch as D had created an environment which impelled and emotional abuse, including attempted her to the act and from which she could not escape. The rape, from D. woman was at all times in the custody and absolute control of D and the possibility that D would attempt to rape her again was a pressing and overwhelming concern at the time she swallowed the pill. That she would try to take her own life, was the natural and probable consequence of the abuse D had subjected her to. Two police helicopters, assisting in the highThe collision of two police helicopters during the course of a speed pursuit of Ds automobile, collided with pursuit of a fleeing suspect was not a highly extraordinary each other, resulting in the deaths of three outcome. Rather, it was within the realm of likelihood that, in people. D was convicted on three counts of the heat of such a chase, one of the helicopter operators might second degree murder on the basis that his act in a negligent manner. D could have foreseen such a actions in evading police caused the helicopter consequence arising from his own reckless conduct, for collision. which reason his actions were a proximate cause of the collision. D and the victim were racing on the highway. Though D was driving recklessly at a speed far above the The victim was killed when he swerved into a legal limit, decedent himself was engaged in willful lane of oncoming traffic in order to pass Ds recklessness by participating in the race and swerving into a car. lane of oncoming traffic. Decedents decision to race his car in a lane of oncoming traffic was the actual cause of his death not Ds own reckless driving. The action of steering his car into a lane of oncoming traffic was that of the decedent himself and was not forced upon him by D. D was playing cards. They walked out of the When a person inflicts a wound on another which is room. V came out and D shot him in the dangerous, or calculated to destroy life, the fact that the abdomen. V died the next day. D says it wasnt negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of an attending physician the shot, it was the way it was treated that or surgeon contributes to the death affords no defense to a killed him. charge of homicide. Complicity

Accomplice liability PrincipleThe person who commits the crime AccompliceThe person who helps What makes someone an accomplice? Actaiding or encouraging the principle Mentalwith the intent that the crime be committed Accomplice is guilty of whatever crime the principle commits, just as if the accomplice did italso guilty of foreseeable crimes committed by the principle. Does the accomplices guilt depend upon the principles guilt? Accomplice can be guilty even if the principle is never arrested or prosecuted. The accomplice can be guilty even if the principle has a valid defense. Persons who are not accomplices Mere presence does not make one an accomplice Mere knowledge does not make one an accomplice Members of the protected class cannot be accomplices Victims cannot be accomplices WithdrawalHow do you get out of accomplice liability? If they encouragedthey must discourage to withdraw If aideddiscouraging is not enoughmust take affirmative steps to prevent the crime from happening. o Negate assistance (go to the police etc.) Accessory After the Fact (Knowing may be enough) Defendant must assist the principle who has already committed a felony

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with knowledge that the crime has been committed and with the intent to help the principle avoid arrest or conviction (obstruction of justice etc.). Principles and accessories Principals in the First Degree Those who actually, by themselves or with some instrument, committed the crime. Must always be at least one principal in first degree for a crime to have occurred Presence may be actual or construct Actions may be taken through innocent agent Principals in the Second Degree Those who aided, assisted or encouraged others, and were actually or constructively present at the scene, in committing the crime. The principal in the 2d degree must be close enough to render aid to the principal in the 1st degree if necessary M.P.C. Accessories Those who either laid the groundwork for or assisted after the commission of the crime Accessories before the Fact - aided or assisted before the commission without actual or constructive presence at the scene. Accessories after the Fact - knowing of the commission of the crime, aided afterwards in escaping punishment or avoiding detection. Special Rules Principals can be tried in any order, with any results, without a problem. Accessories cannot be tried before a principal (although they could be tried jointly), and Cannot be convicted of a more serious offense than the principal.

Abolition of the degrees of parties and general rule of liability based on actions of preparation or assistance and the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of the offense. See Model Penal Code 2.06(3). No distinctions remain between different degrees of principals, or between principals and accessories (except accessories after the fact). (MPC Sec. 2.06) No requirement exists that a principal be convicted before any secondary party to be convicted Separate, less serious, substantive crime for being an accessory after the factHindering Apprehension or Prosecution (See MPC Sec. 242.3) MPC

Elements of Accomplice Liability Common Law Actus reus: Assistance, aid, encouragement of the criminal enterprise Mens Rea: Intent to bring about the criminal result Standefer v. United States

Act: purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of the offense. Mental state: When causing a particular result the degree of culpability required for that particular element is required.

Accessories After the Fact

Baker v. Alaska

New Hampshire v. Sinbandith

Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the US, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principle. The merger of principles and accessories has occurred in all American jurisdictions. One significant exception, however, is accessories after the fact. When an actor assists another only after the substantive criminal offense has taken place, e.g. harboring a fugitive after a bank robbery, that offense does not merge with the principle offense, bank robbery. D and some friends wanted free pizza by Whether D personally struck the delivery man or not, he was ordering them for delivery and then robbing a principle in the commission of a robbery. the delivery person. That they were captioned accomplice charges does not alter the explicit language of the indictments that put D on notice that he could be convicted as either a principle or an accomplice. Having sufficiently charged D as a principle, the indictments provided D adequate notice to prepare a defense to principle or accomplice liability.

2. The Act of Aiding or Encouraging Lane v. Texas

United States v. Santana

The M.P.C. and Complicity

Just being there and sitting in the truck does not make you an accomplice. Patricia committed no affirmative act in furtherance of the crime. D traveled with another to deal drugs. D had D (1) associated himself with the unlawful venture; (2) meth in his sock. D had gone on the trip twice participated in it as something he wished to bring about; and before and received $100 for each trip. (3) sought by his actions to make it succeed. 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person

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for which he is legally accountable, or both. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. (5) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that offense; or (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. New Hampshire v. Merritt D and girlfriend went shopping. Girlfriend made numerous, expensive purchases with credit cards belonging to another. D was free on count one because he was just present in the store and there was not evidence that he did anything to encourage etc. In the other transactions, D dominated the exchange with the sales clerk, especially at the moment the sale was completed. Also, D selected or assisted in selecting the merchandise that was purchased. D aided in committing fraud by picking out the merchandise and distracting the sales clerk from closely examining the credit cards while the merchandise was being purchased.

3. The Intent to Promote or Facilitate Crime Hawaii v. Soares

To be guilty as an accomplice, a person must act with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime. Attempt Act Common LawConduct that gets dangerously close to the commission of a crime (dangerous proximity testD, V, and the means to commit the crime must be in the same place) MPCConduct that is a substantial step toward the commission of the crime and strongly corroborative of a criminal purpose. o Obtaining illegal items that can be used to commit the crime is a substantial step that corroborates the criminal purpose The state appealed from an order by the trial court (Utah) dismissing, for lack of intent, a charge of attempted murder against the defendant after a jury found him guilty for Mental StateThe specific intent to commit the crime There are no attempt versions of o Reckless crimes o Negligent crimes o Felony Murder It is possible to attempt intentional or knowing crimes It is also possible to attempt malice crimes or general intent crimes or strict liability crimes, but only if you specifically intend to accomplish the particular result

Chapter 6 Attempt

A. Mens Rea State v. Maestas

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the

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shooting at a police officer from a speeding vehicle. M.P.C. and Attempt

offense. There was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant aimed and fired at the sergeant and also that he did so intentionally or knowingly.

5.01. Criminal Attempt. (1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do any thing with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part; or (c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an actor omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. (2) Conduct That May Be Held Substantial Step Under Subsection (1)(c). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under Subsection (1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, if such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime. (3) Conduct Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime that would establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by such other person. (4) Renunciation of Criminal Purpose. When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under Subsection (1)(b) or (1)(c) of this Section, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or prevention. Within the meaning of this Article, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. D placed a latter against a fence in the rear of The tools, the travel, etc. was a substantial enough step and a department store. He had burglary tools on the mental state to constitute attempted burglary. him. D constructed and arranged combustibles in a building in a way that they were ready to be lighted. D offered to pay someone to light it, and they drove towards the building and then he changed his mind. A mere collection and preparation of materials in a room for the purpose of setting fire to them, unaccompanied by any present intent to set the fire, would be too remote. However, if the indictment had been properly drawn, D could have been convicted of attempt when he solicited the other person to light the fire. 1.) "Last act" test an attempt occurs at least by the time of the last act but this test does not necessarily require that each and every act be performed on every occasion. 2.) "Physical proximity" test the defendants conduct need not reach the last act but must be "proximate" to the completed crime. 3.) "Dangerous proximity" test an attempt occurs when the defendants conduct is in "dangerous proximity to success," or when an act "is so near to the result that the danger of success is very great." 4.) "Indispensable element" test an attempt occurs when the defendant has obtained control of an indispensable feature of the criminal plan. 5.) "Probable desistance" test an attempt occurs when the defendant has reached a point where it was unlikely that he would have voluntarily desisted from his effort to commit the crime. 6.) "Unequivocality" (or res ipsa loquitur) test an attempt occurs when a persons conduct, standing alone, unambiguously manifests his criminal intent.

People v. Gibson

B. Actus Reus Commonwealth v. Peaslee

Actus Reus of Attempt at Common Law.

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People v. Rizzo

Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery. However, at the time he was arrested, he never found the targeted individual he wanted to rob.

For the crime of attempt, the law will consider those acts only as tending to the commission of the crime, which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference. The acts that can legally constitute an attempt must actually come or advance very near the accomplishment of the intended crime. In Defendants case, the Court noted that he never found his intended victim, that there was no way in his present situation to actually commit the robbery. Abandonment can occur only before a substantial step is taken.

C. Abandonment State v. Workman

D decided to commit a robbery. They waited outside a gas station with a .22. Attendant saw them. D shot a dummy deer out of season. D argues that it was impossible for them to be convicted because they did not shoot a deer, or shoot at a deer. D shot a dummy deer and was convicted of taking a deer out of season.

D. Impossibility State v. Guffey

It is no offense to attempt to do that which is not illegal. There was no deer, therefore there was no attempt to take a deer. A person is guilty of an attempting a crime by doing an act toward its commission but by reason of being interrupted or prevented fails in the execution of the same. An attempt consists not only of an intent to commit a particular crime, but some overt act designed to carry out such intent. D did these. D could not have known that the property possessed the character of stolen property when it had not in fact been acquired by theft. The criminality of the attempt is not destroyed by the fact that the goods, having been recovered by the police had, unknown to defendants, lost their stolen status. If D believed him to be alive then there is attempted murder. The jury could believe that D believed V to be alive. Legal Impossibility A claim that it was impossible to commit the crime because what the defendant was trying to do was not illegal Legal impossibility is a defense to attemptbut it almost never happens Defendant believes that he is doing something illegal when in fact what he is doing is not illegal.

State v. Curtis

People v. Jaffe

People v. Rojas

Police were selling stolen goods. D attempted to buy them, thinking that they were stolen. Same as above.

People v. Dlugash

Impossibility

D shot V in the head after he was already shot and on the ground for a while. D did not know if he was alive or dead. Factual Impossibility A claim that it was impossible to commit the crime because of some circumstance beyond the defendants control. Factual Impossibility is not a defense to attempt.

Chapter 7 Conspiracy

Solicitation

Conspiracy An agreement between two or more people to commit a crime plus an overt act in furtherance of that crime. (Specific Intent) The crime is in the agreement plus an overt act. Can you have one person conspiracy? o At Common Law, Nothere must be an actual meeting of two guilty minds. o MPCUnilateral RuleCan have a conspiracy if two people reach an agreement even though one of them doesnt really intend that the crime be committed (undercover cop). Vicarious LiabilityA member of a conspiracy is guilty not only of conspiracy, but of all foreseeable crimes committed by coconspirators. Inciting, counseling, advising, urging, or commanding another to commit a crime with the intent that the person solicited commits the crime (specific intent). Completion of the crime is not necessary, the crime is in the asking.

A. Unilateral-Bilateral Conspiracies Miller v. Wyoming

Whartons Rule B. Mens Rea Palmer v. Colorado

D was charged with conspiring to kidnap his Court adopted the unilateral approach to conspiracy. Under ex-wife. D called Powell and asked him to help the original approach he would have been not guilty. him. Powel told law enforcement. Powell was now working as an agent. Two individuals may not be convicted of conspiracy where they have committed a crime that necessarily requires the participation of two individuals. D was convicted of conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter. Conspiracy is always a specific intent crime, and conspiracy liability focuses on specifically intended results rather than conduct. Conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter would require the accused to possess the specific intent to achieve

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an unintentional death, which is a legal and logical impossibility. E. Renunciation or Withdrawal Chapter 8 Homicide Homicide Common Law Homicide Crimes MurderCausing the death of another person with malice aforethought o MaliceMeans 4 specific things under CL 1. Intent to Kill 2. An intent to inflict great bodily harm 3. Extreme recklessnessDepraved heartExtreme indifference to the value of human life 4. Felony Murder o First degree murderPremeditated and Deliberate (actually created by statute) Manslaughter Voluntary manslaughterAn intentional killing committed in the heat of passion after adequate provocation o Must be provocation that would arouse a sudden and intense passion in the mind of an ordinary person and where the defendant did not have time to cool off. Words alone can never be adequate provocation Involuntary ManslaughterUnintentional killing o Killing committed with criminal negligence o Killing committed during a crime that is not felony murder (misdemeanor murder) Felony MurderAny killing committed or caused during the commission of or attempt to commit a felony Six limitations to felony murder 1. Defendant must be guilty of the underlying felony 2. Felony must be inherently dangerous 3. Felony must be separate from the killing itself 4. Killing must be during the felony or during the immediate flight from felony (escape) 5. Death must be foreseeable 6. Victim must not be a co felon o Felony Murder imposes vicarious liabilityall co felons will be responsible for a death caused by one of the felons o In most states, all that matters is that one of the felons caused the death Minority jurisdictions say act actual killing must be done by one of the felons. Model Penal Code Homicide Crimes Murderthree forms o Intent to kill o Extreme recklessness o Felony murder6 felonies BurglaryRobberyArsonKidnappingEscapeSexual Assault Manslaughter o IntentionalAn intentional kill committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance o Reckless KillingAware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk Criminally Negligent HomicideThe defendant should have known about the substantial and unjustifiable risk.

A. Intentional Killings State v. Ramirez M.P.C. and Murder

Deliberation and premeditation may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. 210.2. Murder. (1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. (2) Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6]. D made the decision to use the weapon he was carrying when he was confronted by his intended robbery victim. This demonstrates deliberation. The threatening confrontation, along with the showing of a gun is the type of provocation that could cause a reasonable person to lose control.

State v. Davis

2. Voluntary Manslaughter State v. Redmond

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MPC and Manslaughter

210.3. Manslaughter. (1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. (2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 210.4. Negligent Homicide (1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently. (2) Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree.

Imperfect defense B. Unintentional Killings 1. Unpremeditated Murder State v. Burley 2. Felony Murder Mares v. Wyoming People v. Portillo 3. Involuntary Manslaughter State v. Brooks State v. Powell People v. McCoy Vehicular manslaughter Chapter 10 Sex offenses

When a defendant commits an intentional murder but does so under circumstances which he or she has an honest belief that fits within the parameters of a legal defense, except that the belief is unreasonable.

D was allegedly screwing around with a gun and shot his wife in the head. While burglarizing a home, Ds partner killed an old lady. D raped and murdered a prostitute. D said it wasnt during the rape so its not felony murder

His conduct manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life. Felony murder It is felony murder

People v. Iniguez

D sold a house that he knew fumes leaked from the heated driveway, told them it worked fine. V was attacked by Ds dogs and killed. Negligent homicide based on negligence per se. D hit V with his van while speeding. Gross negligence In a number of jurisdictionapplies to death caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Rape and Sexual Assault Forcible RapeSex without the victims consent accomplished by force or by threat of force, or when the victim is unconscious Statutory RapeHaving sex with someone under the age of consent Strict liability MPCallows a reasonable mistake to be a defense if age were plausible to make mistake--Minority D raped V while she was laying on his wife couch on her stomach. Said she was afraid so she just laid there.

Here are the relevant requirements of rape statutes from several different jurisdictions:

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1. Massachusetts: Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person, and compels such person to submit by force and against the persons will, or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury is guilty of rape 2. Georgia: A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. 3. Alaska: An offender commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree if the offender engages in sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person. 4. California: Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.