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Selected and Edited, with Historical Introductions by

HAROLD TEMPERLEY Professor ModernHistory in the University Cambridge of of




Professor ModemHistory in the of University London of

* * '., ITT7T* t

y v






Chancellor of the University

of Cambridge
magisalii homines quam
alii mores

TACITUS, Hist, n, 95.




1783-1801; 1805-6






origins, Duke of

Leeds (pp. 1-2); the influence of Lord Grenville (pp. 2-3)

Document of war (p. 8)

The case against the French Revolutionand the

Dispatchof 31 December 1792(pp. 3-8). Aftermath and declaration

EUROPE. Pitt's views for the future Concert of Europe, 1792, 1805 (pp. 9-10) Document 2. Pitt's Memorandum theDeliverance Security on and of Europe,19 January 1805 (pp . 10-2



3. CANNING AND NATIONALITY, 1807-9 (a) SPAIN. Pitt's alleged views upon (p. 22); Canning's policy in Portugal and Spain, extracts from speeches, June 1808, 8 28 April 1823 (PP- 22-4) (b) GERMANY. Canning on nationality in Norway and Poland (P- 25)
Document 3. Canningon the future of Germany thedanger and from Prussia,,16 May 1807 (pp. 25-7)

Document 4,




The Cabinet Memorandumof 26 December1813;

or Instructions Peace-Making 29-34) for (pp.

5. THE CONGRESS SYSTEM, Castlcreagh the European, treatment of France after the war; the Tsar and the European Alliance (pp. 34-9) Document 5. Memorandum the Treatiesof 1814 and 1815, on Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1818 (pp. 39-46) 6. CASTLEREAGH AND NON-INTERVENTION (pp. 47-8) Document 6. TheStatePaperof May 1820; or theFoundation of British ForeignPolicy (pp. 48-63)



18-2 7

7, KUROPK. Canning andthr An ti- Congress Policy, 1mAppral to Public Opinion (pp. 64 (>) Document 7. Extract from Sfwwh ix Dcwmbet Mi, on of if newsource, England* power(pp. W> 7) of s

Cannings tear of French Inlrrvrntum from Spain; (Jonum'ivia} Recognition of Spanish America (pp. f>H70} Document 8. The Pati/inac Memorandum, October tK;?--;;nr "handsojf" to Enrobe theNrw U'orld (pp. 7<> in b;.

Introduction (pp. 7^)7), Document 9. (Mnwntfs thrnt

recognition, March 18^5 (pp. 77 H 25
<). THK OLD WORLD; OUAKANTKK. Cantuiu'/s idr.

Treaty obligations (pp, Bi--^) Document 10. Cannirttfx Doctrineof (ludrtitttt'?, i, 1823 (pp. 8^-4)
Constitutions and Constitutionalism. Document Claiming on uho!dim<

balance1*b<*twcrndespotismand democracy (pp, J?,

11. (fanning on (lon\titution\ and (^

4 December 1824 (pp, H(> 7),



10. PALMKRSTON AND BEL(HUM, iB;ji 7 (pp. HH Document 12, Palmar on the.d*\\ignvof Eram'f in lMt*iurn> ston 7 January1831(pp. 90 -i)
Document 13. Patrmrston on norhintenwititm in

18 February 1831(pp. fjr-

Document 14. Palmerxttm theneed French on for troops t Belgium, August 17 1831(pp. 912-3) Document 15, Palmerston interventionJM$>htM, on in 7 1831(p- 94) Document 16* Pdmerslorfs estimate thevalue theBelgian of of Guarantee, 7 October 1837(pp. 94 8) Document 17. Mettermch the and Belgian Guaranty Srftfamber M 1837(pp. 98-100)




Document 18. Palmerston thenature theinterference Spain, on of in 24 June 1835 (p. 104)
Document Document

19. Palmerston the conflictingprinciples.,c. 9 June on 20. Palmerston refusesa EuropeanCongress Spain, on
21. Palmerston describes his achievement to his con-

1836 (pp. 104-5) 9 August 1837 (pp. 105-6) stituents, July 1847 (pp. 106-7) 31 (b) PALMERSTON AND THE CONSTITUTION GREECE, 1841 OF (pp. 107-8)
Document 22. Palmerstonargueswith Metternich, 18 February

1841 (pp. 108-11) Document 23. Palmerston argueswith Guizot aboutpromoting Constitutionalism, March 1841 (pp. 111-3) 19
Document 24* Palmerston recommends humanitarian policy to

Guizot, 19 March 1841 (pp. 113-6)






FLEET, 1835 (pp. n 7-20) Document 25. Wellington revokes "discretionary the order" to the British Fleettoproceed Constantinople', March 1835 (P- I!20 to 16

(pp. 121-4)

Document 26* Palmerston warns Mehemet AH, 7 July 1838 (pp.124-6) Document 27. Palmerston thePersian and Gulf, 29 November 1838 (pp.126-7) Document 28. Palmerston warnsSultanMahmud,15 March 1839 (p. 127)



29* Palmerstonmakts the British Linn nwr, a Drctmbrr

1839 (pp. 127-8} Document 30- Pattncrston Am$ Lmis Philippe ti2 Nwrmher and 1839 (PP- x8~3<>)
Document 31 * Pahmntim and AlHtcrnich tmFramr^ and th* Strait*

Convention, Afaj>1841(pp. 130-1) ro Document 32. Pdmmton exchange viewswith Metternich the on Palmentonian theory Guarantee, May 1841(pp. i;ji ; of in



RUSSKLL, 1841-53


Document 33*



Palmewtan instructs Niclwltu

/ m thr u

of theBritish Constitutionn January 1841 (pp. i;^ (!) t


OF THE ORTHODOX SUBJECTS OF TURKEY (p. i:J) Document 34. Stratford Rtddifft in.\truttrtt/wcmmd f*ruthnM d?. to Turkeyand forbearance RUMM, Ftbrmry ittf>;j (pp, i;^^ 44) to 35 16, CROSSING TUB RUBICON (pp. 144 (i) Document 35, Clarendon justifiesthestndinR the RritUi PttH qf through Dardanelles, September (pp. 146.jy the 30 1853


OF 184^9

17, THE DELUGE IN EUROPE (pp. 153-5) Document 36* Palmerston dutinguisfm bttiwen Treaty and Guarantee , 6-14 March 1848(pp. 156-7) Document 37* Application LordJohnRuwdtvf Patmtntoifs by principle^ September (PP* 14 1859

18. PALMERSTONAND RUSSIA, 1848-9(pp. 158-9) Document 38- Palmerston explains Kwsia his nasms to for recognizingnew the regime France, March in ssB 1848 (pp, 159-60) Document 39. Palmerston recommends neutrality Russia to and advises togive ruletoPoland, April 1848 her home 14 (pp, 160-1)





Palmerston declares to Nesselrode that he will not

bedrawninto war.,2 December 1848 (p. 162)


(a) ITALY (pp. 162-5) Document 41. Palmerston recommends grant of a constitution the as a panacea Italy, 22 February1848 (p. 166) for
Document 42. Palmerstonon Austrian rule in Italy, j November

1848 (pp. 166-9) (b) HUNGARYAND THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION, 1848-9 (pp. 169-71)

43. Palmerston refuses protestagainst Russia'sarmed to

44. Palmerston declares Austria's existence to be essential

intervention Hungary, 17 May 1849 (p. 172) in to theEuropean balance power,21 July 1849 (pp. 172-7) of

REFUGEES (pp. 177-9) Document 45. Palmerston communicates decisionto support his Turkey against Russia and Austria over the Hungarian Refugees, 6 October 1849 (PP* *79~8o) Document 46. Palmerston moralizesafter the crisis has ended, 28 October 1849 (p. 181)




21. LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND THE QUEEN (pp, 182-3) Document 47. Granville'sGeneral Statement ForeignPolicy, of 12January1852(pp. 183-6) 22. GRANVILLE AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA (p. 186) Document 48. Granvilleadvises Spain to pursuea Constitutional Policy,31 January1852 (p. 187)

23. DERBY REBUKES PALMERSTON (pp. 187-8) Document 49. Malmesbury warns France against aggression
againstSwitzerland,5 March 1852 (pp. 188-9)

Document 50. Matmesburfs advances Austria,15 March 1852 to (p. 189)







Document 51. Ahtrdftn and Glnthfant m the Nnpk\

October 1851toDecember (pp. Mr-i'H) 18552


REPLY(pp, 193-4) Document 52- Gladstone. tht Mtpln Gwrrnmrnt md tht (!nu <m Mwaiiw Principle* January1853(p. 195) y Document 53. Aberdeen a prthAwtrian pvtitv, on (P- Z9(>




25, MALMESBURY AND FFALY (pp, 197 ft) Document 54^ Mdnmhuy r&twnxtmtes with y<w/mm, January 1859 (PP- ^)B 2fK)) Document 55* Malnmbwy invitesAustria to submitto Arbitration before goingto war, ui April 1859(pp* ttoo~i) Document 56* Matnmbury in Palmtrstvnian win^ M) A/*ritt 2 May 1859(pp. aoi-a) Document 57. Malmwbury disclaims anntxationhtpolityt an i May 1859(p. aoa)









ANNEXATION OF NICE AND SAVOY (pp, 303-5) Document58* LordJohnRussell theindependence on of A

?Jufy 1859(p. 205) Document 59. LordJohnRussell a history gives (/British Poli at Congresses 18*5, 15November (pp, 306-7) since 1859
(pp. 207-8)

Document 60. Patmentotfs ona Congress^ views 6 Merck1849



Document 61 TheBritish view of French pledges disinterestedof ness respect Savoy, July 1859 (pp. 208-9) in to 4 Document 62, Lord John Russell thecession Nice andSavoy on of > 26 March 1860 (pp. 210-2)

(a) THE PRE-GARIBALDIAN PHASE, 1857-9 (p. 212)

Document 63. Palmerston theKing of Naples,17 March 1857 on (p. 213) Document 64. Clarendon theKing of Naples', January1858 on 2 (P- 2I3)
(6) THE SECOND GARIBALDIAN OR PHASE, May to November 1860 (pp. 214-7)

Document 65, Palmerston GaribaldiandSicily, 26 May 1860 on (pp. 217-8) Document 66. LordJohn Russell declines interfere to with Garibaldi in Naples,29 August 1860 (pp. 218-9) Document 67. Lord John Russell defends right of theNeapolithe tansto change their Government, August 1860 (pp. 219-20) 21 (c) THE THIRD ORPOST-GARIBALDIAN THERECOGNITION PHASE, OFREVOLUTION, October 1860 (pp. 221-2) Document 68. Lord John Russell recognizes the Garibaldian Revolution Naplesand Sicily, 27 October in 1860 (pp. 222-5) Document 69. Palmerston proposes stop Spain by force from to invadingItaly, 29 October 1860 (p. 226) (d) THE AFTERMATH 226-9) (pp. Document 70, Palmerston Austrian rule in Venetia^ Sepon 21 tember 1860 (pp. 229-30) Document 71, Russell fails to persuade Austria to sell Venetia^ 18 November 1863 (pp. 230-1)







1831-63 (pp. 232-9) Document 72. Palmerston takesthefirst stop,25 February 1863 (P-



Document 73. Ru\stll &ndPatnifntou tfarlttim th$ idra it/ to war with Russia,ai Afrit xtW>;j (pp. $q<>ij

Document 74. Patmentan urgrt fin ijwwr/irtfr wfwr\tj>\15 ,1% 1863 (p-*40 Document 75, Palmenton */$**'* m imirjwndmtPtttttnttinM an AustrianArchduke A*iw& A/cjyi8<i;j (pp. .|t 4) <iv ;$* Document 76. RusMtt's amwwof'JMOrtobrrto t*nn(t t* dispatch 7 StpUmbtr of -Ruxxtll adhtw to M,\ tlnf/i in u Austria^ September (P* a4 30 1863
Document 77. Palment&n

(pp. 244-5)

Document 78* Palmmim amend* Ru^fll'x d^jHtUh,8 Ortober 1863(pp- 246-7)

Document 79* Palmtrxtonand Rwell un iht tlvrigwi ttf Rw\iti in

Asia, x-a /l^u^ 1860(p.







PRUSSIA; x86a3 (pp, 348-9) Document 80* Disraelion Bismarck^ dm^m and Government, 9 July x86a(p. 249)
Document 81 . Paltnwston and Rusmlt m Bismarck and P

militarystrength, 1860-3 (pp, 350-1) Document 82. Pdmmt&n Russell and adm* tht King &JP andBismarck beconstitutional, (pp. 35r--a) to 1863

Document 83* Palnwrston the situation Stpttmttr 1863 on in

(p. 252)

Document 84* Patmerston's warningto th&stwh&attempt to attack Denmark, July 1863(pp. 33


TATION TO A CONGRESS, NOVEMBER ferift 1863 (PTT Document 85. Pabwrston iht gtwralfunctions a on of

8 November (pp. 254-6) 1863 Document 86. Palmtrston's particular Qbjictwns a C to 18 November (pp- 256*8) 1863 theCongress November (pp, > 19 1863

Document87* JSwwtfV ^owfi^^T^ Cabintfs demim rtfu$* to



31. THE GERMAN INTERVENTION, NOVEMBER 1863JANUARY 1864 (pp. 259-62) Document 88. Russelltalks to Apponyion theSchleswig-Holstein crisis, 19 December 1863 (pp. 262-5)
Document 89. Palmerstonon the obligations of the Treaty of

1852 on Denmarkand Germany, January 1864 (p. 265) 18 Document 90. Palmerston'advice Denmark,19 January 1864 's to (pp. 265-6) Document 91 . Discussionof Cabinet members hearing that on
Francewill not use force, 26-7 January 1864 (?"

FERENCE, 25 APRIL-25 JUNE 1864 (pp. 267-8) Document 92. Palmerston -warns Austria againstsending fleet to a theBaltic, I May 1864 (PP* 268-72) 33. DECLINE OF BRITISH PRESTIGE, MAY-JUNE 1864 (p. 272) Document 93- The compromise scheme Lord John Russell, of 5 May 1864 (pp. 273-5)

Document 94. Clarendon's comment, May 1864 (pp, 275-6) 5

Document 95. The British Cabinet* decisionat the conclusion s of

the Conference, June 1864 (p. 276) 25

Document 96. Palmerston' s comment, May 1864 (pp. 276-7) 6

34. THE AFTERMATH, 1864-5 (pp. 277-9) Document 97, Palmerston Russell, 13 September to 1865 (pp.








(pp, 281-6) Document 98* Palmerston thenatureof Alliancesand a possible on breach with France,14 December 1856 (pp. 286-7)

Document 99. Clarendon's comment,, December 15 1856 (p. 288)


FENCE (pp, 288-91) Document 100. CountRechberg Palmerston the naval and on and military powerof France,30 June 1859 (pp. 291-2)



Document 10L f^rd >/m Rw\fit m Mr mal nf mmnimnmg England's $lrtnsth> naval number iHy* (!*" *W) Document 102, Palmmtm tmfont m a /V<wriyirArr, 23
1864 (p. 1*93)

Document 103. Palmtrston HW,tt 3wmty tWift (pp, tin


AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (p. -^4) Document 104* Pdmttstm m tfo foturf J Mft\tt, i <Vwmkfr

1855(P* ^95) Document 105* Pttlmffsfan t/tf atlwwttwf* r// Mtmwrly in tut Mexico an indtptndftit and Suutlt* Jnnmry iBh-j (p. uj^i HJ Document 106* Patrnmtwitm tihnry and Ihr S^uth (p, y Document "107. Glwlthm on tm inttrprnttrnt titmtlvtn eracy,? >(? iBfjG (p. i

THE NORTH, x86a-3 (pp. ti{(> )

Document 108. Ar^yWs rtntltrtum / /A/1 t&lwvt tfahiwi t*f n Nowmbw 2862&gain\tintfrventwn^ /1/^r71887 (pp. ^;|ii **j 7 Document 109. Pdmmtm and ttunxrll tfitt think war ptn\iblt bctmen England theJVbrM, /l/?7ifWvj(pp. and ag 39, BRAZIL- ARBrrRATION, iWij (p, Document 110, 7/te inapplicability ifa prinripl* o qf to England^ Jnn- 1849(p. 301} xa Document 111* Palmerston c&mpans ttrazil to a Fishwoman, February 6 1^63 (p, 301) Document 112* JPalmmton JUra%il*s m demand Jw 4 May 1863(PP-3*-a) Document 113. Th* Arbitration Awardby faupoUXing vf th* Belgians, jfune1863(p, 303} iB

40* THE SLAVE TRADE (p, 303) Document 114* Palmerston theAberdeen 31 Jufy iBfia m Actt (pp. 303-4) Document 115. Tkt execution thi Ab$*d$m Msgreatest of Act* achievement^ 1 February (p, 304) 7 1 864 Document 116* Patmtrston's uttoranc* tht Slam Trade last m t January 1865(p* 304)










AND GUARANTEE (pp. 305-6) Document 117. An Austrian view of Stanleyand theprincipleof non-intervention,July 1866 (pp. 306-7) 3 Document 118. Stanleyappliestheprincipleof non-intervention in the case the war between of Prussiaand Austria,July-August 1866; to Italy in 1867 and to Polandin 1868 (pp. 307-8)

AND THE GUARANTEE (pp. 309-10)

119. Stanleyon the obligationsto Luxemburgbeforethe


Conference 30 April 1867 (pp. 310-1) met, AFTER THE CONFERENCE (pp. 311-2) Document 120. Derby's interpretation theguarantee, May of 13 1867 (P- 312) Document 121. Stanley's authoritative interpretation of the guarantee, June 1867 (pp. 313-4) 25 Document 122. Count Bernstorff refusedfurther explanations,

July 1867(p. 314)


TEE, AND ITS AFTERMATH (1867-1914)(pp. 315-6)






(P* 317)

Document 123. Gladstone expounds principles policyin reply his of to criticisms the Qy&en> April 1869 (PPby 17

MENTS (pp. 318-9)

Document 124. Clarendon makes final effort with Prussia, his 9 March 1870 (pp. 319-23)

(pp. 323-4)

Document 125. Gladstone discourses annexations, September on 25 1870 (pp, 324-7)



48, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION (pp. ^7 H, Document 126. (*latfakmr an*w\ in dtftnt? r?/whttwfi'tri> ruary 1873 (PP>$& )

49, RUSSIA, THE BLACK SEA CLAUSES AND THE STRAITS (pp. 330 t) Document 127* (ttttthttwtfminh mil tftf piintipln innttml in Ihf Russian Circular<;/9 Nm'rmtw 1^70 (pp, ;j;ji ;$) Document 12H(imnvilh ffjkth tm tin 'tn/wrtiff 7mi/v r/iH;,h n> Dmmbtr 1870 (pp. ;$;|;| 4) Document 129. (Xadrfunf d'Jinsitht imjttiwtwtn nf a ^ (p. ;$;$!
50, THE NEUTRALITY 01- BKIXJHLM <pp, Tii 7* Document 130. (*ranvillt explain* fa Lwi\ ilw i;v*y w

AngMfaneh Treaty,4 .-if/^ttv< iHyt* (pp. 3^7 H; Document 131 (tlttthhmr thfrnth Itn {witty fa the thine **f Ctmwwtut, Augustilljn (pp. ;j;tH 40; i<> Document 132. 7'A<? /-?# OJ/icmM/WU rtrrr uftinitw m the character the i8;jy Vmi/y, <> uf /Iw^a/ 1870(pp. ; JH,

(a) PoimiOAf, (pp. 341 ^) Document 133* (famvill* atknmt>ted$M ttriti\h u tht Portugal undertltt Antimt Trtatm\ hut tnrrwt judgment tu fa inUrprt!taiwnt fabru&ry1873(p, 343) uj

ANDRA9Y*S OVKHTURE ll^l *J(pp, 34;$^) UK Document 134. (*mw)ilt*declines pledge tttiti\h ( ttt the butpromisw communication Austria* free with ttMt$Mf) Afnil t;> (PP-345-6)




11174 i


52, THE OPENING MOVES OP FRIENDSHIP, FEBRUARY 1874(P- 347) Document 135* Derbynptus in friendlyoverturn JromAustria* Hungarya6 February 9 1874(pp, 348-9) Document 136. D$rby discusses international the Mtuatian wiik ^ 27 February 1874(PP*349^5 U











WAR SCARE OF 1875 (pp. 351-2) Document 137. Derby instructsOdo Russellto supportRussian diplomatic action,8 May 1875 (pp. 352-3) Document 138. Derby's interviewwith Miinster, 9 June 1875 (PP- 353-4) 54. BISMARCK'S OVERTURE OF FEBRUARY 1876 (pp. 354-5) Document 139. Derby repliesto Bismarck, 16 February 1876 (P- 356)

THE 55.


DERBY 1876-80




(a) DERBY(pp. 357-9) Document 140. Derby defines British position in a secret the communication Russia,17 July 1877 (p. 359) to (i) BEACONSFIELD 360) (p.
Document 141. Beaconsfield reasserts intention to maintain the his

integrityand independencethe OttomanEmpire, 6 August 1877 (pp. of 360-2)


(PP- 363-5) Document 142. Salisburydefines British policy on the eveof his

appointment theForeignOffice, March 1878(pp. 365-6) to 21 Document 143. Reportof the CabinetCommittee the Treatyof on SanStefano, March 1878 (pp. 367-72) 27 Document 144. The SalisburyCircular to the Powers, i April 1878 (pp. 372-80)

(PP*381-4) Document 145. Salisbury explains to Layard his views on Turkey-in-Asia,9 May 1878 (pp. 384-5) Document 146. Greece and the internal Government Turkey, of 30 May 1878(pp. 386-7)



Document 147, Salisbury pwpws an a^rmnrnf with Twkry concerning Straits,ifi June1878(p. ;{HM) tfur Document 148, Reactmfirldtummrntsun ths wvrA **/ iht
Congress, Ja/y 1878 (pp. ;jH-'<>) a



AND iBBo 5




TION (pp. 390 !)

Document 149. (ttaJtttmrstairs hit printiph\ t>/\fwrn\n/Wros %j November 1879 (pp. 391 -4)


Document 150, (*ranvitlr annmnm fa ihf /V?rr* thr aftittolf vf

thenewadministration^Ahw iBBo (pp, ;$tjr,li) 4 Document 151. A privatewptnmttiim /w/wv h (*tttnrillf% uf 5 May 1880 (p. 39?) Document 152, Glrttlstonr's rfflntiam tm lirithti /W;V 2;$ *Ur;y n 1880 (p. 398)





BUT DO NOT ACHIEVE IT (p. Wf) \ I iKfl'lff Document 153. Gladstones comments the draft dhptitth to tin Goschtn,June1880(pp. 399-400) Q Document 154* (iranvill* expounds attitwlt uf Mr /jherat the

Government Cyprus to the Convention earns dhtippwvttl thr find the uf

Qjwen, Jum 1880(pp. 400'5) 10 Document 155. (Sladstum suggests handing Cypnufa 6>mr ttwr 17 December (pp. 406-7) 1880

(p. 407)

Document 156, Gladstone contemplatesme offtM'?, 16-19 the September (pp, 407-8) 1880 Document 157, Glodstow explains policy fa th* Cabiwt> Ids 30 September (pp. 408-10) 1880 Document 158* Turkey cMapsts Gladstone and rtj&w$i4-1a October 1880(pp.









DREIKAISERBUND (pp. 411-2) Document 159. Gladstone proposes warningto Austria-Hungary, a 13-28 December 1881 (pp. 412-3)


Document 160. Granvilleexplains limits imposed the uponhis policy, 22 April 1881 (p. 414) Document 161. Gladstone recognizes that his hands are tied, 22 April 1881 (pp. 414-5)



AND 1882-5






EGYPTIAN ADVENTURE (pp. 416-7) Document 162. Granville explains the dispatch of skips to Alexandria,23 May 1882 (pp. 417-8) Document 163. Granvilleissues instructions the Conference for of Constantinople, June 1882 (pp. 418-9) 21
65, THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (p. 420) Document 164. Granvilleexplains attitudeto thebombardment^ his 12 July 1882 (pp. 420-1)

66. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUDAN (pp. 421-2) Document 165. Granvilledefines attitudeof the Government the ^ 13 December 1883 (pp. 422-3)

QUESTION (pp. 433-5) Document 166* Bismarck theEgyptianConference bargain uses to with Granville ColonialQuestions, June 1884(pp. 425-6) on 14 68. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT (p. Document 167. Granville explains impossibility the affixing & date, for theevacuation Egypt, 28 April 1885(p. 427) of Document 168. Turkeycomplains Salisbury thepolity of th? to of LiberalAdministration, June 1885(pp. 41 30










TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIMES /pp. Document 169, Sathhwv gim imtwtfiwn for the (Imfnmt


CfinsltMtinttpki tifplrmhrr 1885(pp. 4^1 i?) M Document 170. &tlfabttryfM<tx afotmutttfar Mr ti&n*H) Nmrnbw iftH^ (p. 4*w) / ^rf *f^i#rF[f Document 171. Ktilhbwy dtfttm the Hriti\h ttttituJs fa the '
offferliru 4 Dmmbrr
*f ' W








FOREIGN POLICY (pp. 433 4} Document 172* /frw/vry maintain*the polity uf tii\ in relationto Gmci*tB /Wmmtv iBH(> (pp. *j; 71. BATOUM AND HIE STRAITS fpp, .j^fi 7) Document 173. AVrr/wy twitn <t M/Wi^*//w^AM dhpttfr/t {T*1 / / ^'^> (Pl>-417 40/ 7 J7^ ''I J *t^I I

QTLJESTION, 1886(pp. 441-3) Document 174* Cmjklmtid Mfmmmdmt (twtmuniMtrd to Austria-Hungary 22 tm Qctobtr iSSfi (pp. 441*4)










a February (pp,448-50)" 1887 Document176, Salisbury defines limitsof rwprmtm with the
Italy, i a February (pp*450-1) 1887 Document177,Salisbury^sittnce on Brithh obligations to 26February (p450 1887

Document 175* Kdiabwy''*rmvtim to the tM&n Mrrtwr,




Document 178. Salisburydefines attitudeto the evacuation his of Egypt, 27 April and 3 May 1887 (p. 453) Document 179. Britain obtainsthesupportof the CentralPowers and pays theprice demanded Bismarck, 17 February, 14 April and by 4 May 1887 (pp. 453-4)

Document 180. Salisbury recognizes need acknowledging the for the existence the Mediterranean of declaration, May 1887 (p. 454) 26

DECEMBER 1887 (PP- 454~8) Document 181. Salisburyagrees, unwillingly, to strengthen the Accord Trois, 2 November a 1887 (pp. 459-60)
Document 182. Salisbury communicates adherence nine his on

points, 12 December 1887 (pp. 460-2)

76. THE FALL OF BISMARCK (pp. 462-4) Document 183. Salisbury theresults Bismarck's on of fall, 9 April 1890(pp. 464-6)

OF THE STRAITS (pp. 466-7) Document 184, Salisbury consults with Austria-Hungary to the as replyto Turkey,I October 1891(pp. 467-8) Document 185. Salisburylays downhis ownprinciplesregarding theRule of theStraits, 2 October 1891 (pp. 468-9)

78. THE


AND 1892-5



ACCORDA TROIS (pp. 470-3)

Document 186. Rosebery assures Austria-Hungary his recognition of of Near Eastern interests, of hiscontrol foreignpolicy, 14 June 1893 and of (PP- 473""4)
Document 187. Rosebery explains attitudeto theMediterranean his Agreements, June 1893 (pp. 27 Document 188. Rosebery relieson the strength the BritishJleet, of 28 December 1893 (PP- 477-80)



Document 189. Rosebery refuses givebindingtuHtranen to c<m

cerning Constantinople, 31January (pp.480 7} 1894

79. THE BASIN OF THE NIGER (p. 488) Document 190. Kimberley adopts attitwlt of watcftfulnrs\ an

towards Germany in African gtttxiitms,March ;ji i%4 (p. *\\\\\)

Document 191- Kimberley maintain? Britishintmsti in thr AVi<fr Valley, April 1894(p. 489) ii
80. ROSEBERY, KIMBERLEY, AND THK POLICY OF THE FREE HAND (pp. 489-91) Document 192. Rosebery thrmtmtto returnt<ta (mlkv nf thr tw Hand,13June,14June 1894(pp, 491""'-<) Document 193* Kimberhy defines pMttiimin icttftitwfa (t hh andRussia, November 21 1894(pp, 492



RUSSIA AND GERMANY, 1895(pp, 494 ^


1896-7 (pp. 495-6)

Document 194, Salisbury refuses pttdgt him\?tf fa fa

20 January1897(pp. 496-9) 500)


Document 195. Salisbury mak^an overture fa l898 (PP-500-1)

(i) GREY KIMBERLEY 501-3) AND (pp, Document196. Sir Edward Gnfs warning Frttwe&&U to penetration Me, 128 tothe March 1895 (PP 5<> Document 197, Kimberley rdnform Grefswarning April i
l895 (PP-5^4-5)



Document198, Salisbury Britishinttmts* Amml asserts a





85. THE PROBLEM OF AFRICA (pp. 51^ 5)

Document 199. Salisbury confirms Britishobligations /V>r/wctf/ it)

under AncientTreaties, the October 1899(pp. 515-6)
86. THE END OF "ISOLATION" (pp. 516 8)

Document 200. Memorandum the Marquessnf Sat bury* by it 29 May 1901(pp. 518-20) EPILOGUE THEEDITORS 521-3) BY (pp. NOTEBYTHEEDITORS, Canning, Spain and British Trade! the SpanishColonies 1810-24 (pp. 5123-6)




Aberdeen, Doc. 53

Clarendon, Docs, 104, 106, 124

Gladstone.,Docs. 51, 155-6,158

Granville, Docs, 47, 108, 125, 127-29, 151-3, 157, 159-61, 164 Layard, Docs. 79, 81 iv, 82 ii, 102-3, 111, 116, 141, M5-7
Russell, Docs. 69-70, 72,74-5,77-8,
93-6, 105, 112, 114

81 i, H, iii, 83,85-6,89-91t

StratfordCanning,clcRedcliffe,Doc. 11
Tenterden, Docs. 130, 148

Wellesley,Doc. 98

Austria(Vienna),Docs.64,71,73,75T80, 87-4*, 92,100,109t J17,

119, 174, 183-i, 186-9, 192-9

British (London), Docs. 3, 19, 20, 22-5, 36, 38-43, 4K-50 54-5, 56 i, ii, 57-9, 61, 63, 65-7, 76, 82 J, 101, 118 a, c, OI-2

133-8, 140, 143, 150, 154, 162-3, 165-71, 17H-K0,190-1 Netherlands Hague),Doc. 36 (The
* References to Documentsnumbrmi In thr trxi. are

HIS volume representsa selection by the Editors of unpublished and published documents dealing with * u foreign affairs, from the rise of the Younger Pitt to the death of Salisbury. It contains both official papers and private letters; speeches otherpublic statements policy. and of
Should the volume be successful, the Editors will consider

the editing of a selection from the eleven volumes of the series British Documents the Originsof the War, which they edited on

in conjunctionwith Dr G. P. Gooch,
A selection of documents extending over a period of a century always offers problems and difficulties. The Editors have had access a large number of unpublished materials, to public and private, so that many of the documents that they have chosenare new. But a selection of documents dealing with foreign policy offers lessdifficulty than one relating to internal affairs. Despite opposedparties, and even opposed policies,the continuity of ideasin British diplomacy is striking. The famous State Paper written by Sir Eyre Crowe on i January 1907reproduceswhat are virtually Canning's ideas on foreign policy eighty yearsbefore. Most of the assumptions underlying these views were accepted by all statesmen from Pitt to Salisbury, though their methods of application and

interpretation may have differed. The balanceof power, the sanctity of treaties, the danger of extending guarantees,the value of non-intervention, the implications of what Castlercagh called "a Systemof Government strongly popular and
national in its character" were understood by all. It is true that Palmerston, in his robust vigour, was ready to interpret 'non-intervention' in a sensewhich would have surprised Gastlereaghand Canning; that Russell glorified the revolutions which Disraeli disliked; that Salisbury hated publicity

and parliamentary control; that Gladstone preferred the concertof Europe to the balanceof power. But thesediffer-



ences not prevent from.seeing thereis a great do us that similarity between views all these the of men,despite the illogicalitytheir of methods. are There times (lastlrreagh when is English, whenCanning European, in when Pahnerston admits superiority moral the of ideas, when Gladstone relies
on the Britishfleet,and whenSalisbury lindapublic opinion
of value. What is more remarkableh that the ideasof Phi, as

stated the earlypages this book,clearlyanticipatethe in of dangers violent of nationalism, themerits a League and of to enforce peace, thenecessity England steer middle and for u> a
coursebetweenthesealternating policies.

The main principlesof selectionare simple; awl they derive,asit were,from the natureof the soil and from the English character. Englishmen neversay all they meanin published documents in public speeches, that secret or so dispatches private and letters must supply keyto whatour the statesmen thoughtto beimportant*We havefortunately been
able to make abundant use of materials of this kimi, and

public and privateutterances equallyrepresented are here. Our firstprincipleof selection beento giverepresentative has
extractsfrom different categories documents; another bun of
been to ensure that the documents should shew what Is

specifically British point of view* Foreign policy as u the wholeis the expression the contrasted combinedviews of and of a numberof differentand often opposed nations*The present book aimsnot at shewingwhat is universal in the currents tendencies diplomacyin the period, but at or of revealing Britishcontribution it. Nothingis omitted, the to therefore, because ischauvinistic-orprejudiced,Such just it

tendencies indeedit is necessary times to emphasise. at A documentinserted becauseexpresses is not it or summaris/ies aninternational standpoint, becauseexpresses* but it a British
or nationalstandpoint,in a word, when it revealsthe British

mentality. British oflooking things The way at underPitt; theBritish attitude towards congresses Castlcreagh; under towards recognition the ofrevolted under states Canning; the British intervention crisis, Palmerston at a with *making the

lion roar5; Disraeli dreaming ofEmpire; Gladstone pleading



for arbitration; Salisbury uniting the Bulgarias in face of Europe's opposition; these are the truest and most characteristic aspectsof British policy. The painter must not shrink from portraying rugged features, and here, as in the caseof Cromwell's picture, realism is the best art. The principles of selectionthus adopted haveled the Editors to seek their materials in widely different sources.They have used freely the official documents in the Foreign Office archives, choosing both published and unpublished papers, including some that were intended for publication from the start. Where thesewere curtailed at their original publication, the omissions have been marked. They have gone, with equal freedom, to the numerous private letters and private minutes which are now available for nearly the whole of the period. Sometimesthey have included the record made by a foreign ambassador of an English statesman's views-for this is on

occasion particularly illuminating. But alwaysthey havehad in mind their main object, that of illustrating the ideas of policy that English statesmen had in mind, and the ways in which they sought to put their ideas into action. Each document (or in somecases seriesof documents) has been prefaced by a short introduction explaining its significance,and summarizing the policy which it represents. As far as possiblethe sources from which further material can be found are indicated. The Editors have studied a good deal of the material, most of which is still unpublished, between the years 1841 and 1896. Their work in collaboration with Dr G, P. Gooch on British Documents the Originsof the War on hasrequired them to study the whole of the archive material from the year 1897 and to read freely in the papers of the preceding years. They are thus enabled to give original material for this part of the century as well as for the earlier periods.They havehad specialpermission publish material to betweenthe years 1885-96from the archives not yet open to the public. For no period, however, have they hesitated to include documents which were more public in character if they represented essential features British policy. They hope of that the collection of material, together with the introductory

/ Vti/ \- f


matter, will afford suggestions further study, and will give for

a generalview of the mostcharacteristic phases British of

policy in the nineteenthcentury,

June 1938


The Editors acknowledgewith gratitude their indebtednessIn many quarters.They owemuch to the facilities grantedthem in the ForeignOffice archives,aswell asthoseof Paris, Vienna and the Hague; and in the Public Record Office and the British Museum in London. They wish particularly to put on record their recogni* tion of the help given them by Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.G.M.GM and by the officialsof the British Museum and the Public Record Office. They haveusedfreely the private papersof Lord Aberdeen
and Sir A. H. Layard, now in the British Museum; and those of Lord Russell, Lord Granville, Lord Tenterden, and Lord Stratford

de Redcliffe which are on deposit in the Public Record Oilire.

Much of the rest of their material comes from the official corre-

spondencein the Record Office or the Foreign Oilier. They wish further to expresstheir thanks to three owners of valuable manuscriptsfor allowing them accessto documents not

opento the public; to the presentEarl of Clarendonfor the useof the private Clarendonpapers,which include invaluable lettersof
Palmerston and Russell; to the late Lord Gladstone for accessto

the private Gladstone papers;and to Sir Victor Welksley for the useof the private Wellesleypapers,which contain the correspondenceof the secondEarl Cowley with Russell and Clarendon,
In some casesthe most vivid account of the attitude of British

Foreign Secretaries has been found in the reports of the, ambassadors Austria-Hungaryin the Vienna archives, of from which a number of documentsare here quoted*They wish to record their appreciation thegenerous givento thembythedistinguished of help archivists, Dr Ludwig Bittner and Dr Lothar Grossin this connexion,.

ofdocuments. Editors in particular, acknowledge The wish, to thr

Materialhasofcourse oftenbeentakenfromprintedcollect mm

permission tothem reprint granted to documents the uf from Z{#

Stratford CanningS.Lane by Poole (published Longmans, by (/rmi & Co.), G.P.Gooch's Correspondence Rumlt Dr Later ofLord John (Longmans, & Co.), Green LordMorley's of<Glad$tont Life (Mao millan& Co.), Lady Gwendolen LifeofRobert Cecil's Afarqwn uf
Salisbury permission Lady Gwendolen (by of Cecil and Hodder
(John Murray).

and Stoughton), G. E. Buckle, Letters Quern and The of Victim

They wish thank to further A. Ramm, Miss MA, for herhelp in thepreparation themanuscript press. of for







[The name and fame of the younger Pitt are associatedwith great administrative and legislative reforms. He is acclaimed as the PeaceMinister par excellence, he is sometimesheld to have and ruined his reputation by embarking on a war with the French
Revolution. The loftiness of his character was indeed maintained and the title of the " Pilot that weathered the storm" is deemed to have been

deserved. But the comparative failure of his war-administration has blinded historians to the merits of his foreign policy. That

policy had been formulated before the storm of the revolution broke, and it continued to be followed by British statesmenafter
its force had abated.

That Pitt had a foreign policy at all was the discoveryof Oscar Browning. All subsequenthistorians have admitted that it was characterized by boldnessand vigour. Coming to power after the humiliations and disastersof the War of American Independence, Pitt madehis influencefelt at once. And hisinfluencewaspersonal and direct, for his first Foreign Secretary was a mere clerk in his hands/ His aim was undoubtedly to restore British prestige in Europe and overseas,and he was not afraid of novelty. A commercial treaty was negotiated with France, to shew that our

enmity with her was not eternal. Yet in 1788lie had taken steps
along with Prussia to defeat French influence in Holland, In

1790 he successfullybraved the wrath of Franco-and deterred her from backing up Spain in her claims to the Western shore of

Canada* Pitt followed up thesestriking successes mediating by

between Turkey on the one side and Russia and Austria on the other. He was at first successfulbut finally met defeat over the

Qczakov incident (1791). He had intended to stop the further

advance of Russia in the Black Sea, but he was threatened with

defeat in Parliament. The British public had no objection to Russia's advancjyag along the Western shores the Black Sea,or of to leaving the Turk to his fate. So Pitt gave way* It was his first defeatin diplomacy and it was inflicted by the British public. This incident ended the political career of the Duke of Leeds, and brought Lord Grenville on the sceneas Foreign Secretary, He came to power at a crisis, for the French Revolution, after


almostdestroying old monarchy, threatening other the was all powers Europe. Grenvillewasan aristocrat,He w;w cold, in
able, haughty, unbending* He was likely^ in fact, to encourage Pitt in resisting,and not in conciliating,the new revolutionary
movement in France. The fact was most unfortunate, for the wild doctrines of the revolutionaries were calculated, in any case, to

alarm Pitt, His strong turn of abstract thought was opposedto their theories overturningthe existingorderandof releasing of all

peoples from their obedience Kings, His practicalmind dr~ to ploredtheir financialandlegislative excesses, Nonethe less, Pitt
seems to have shewn all the moderation that he dared, Ik

held aloof from the Kings of the Continent when they went to war with France in 1792. He reduced our armed forces*spoke optimistically of prospectsof peacein his Budget speechof February 17912, viewedwith relative unconcernthe deposition and of Louis XVI in August. He kept up unofficial connexionwith the Republic which ensued,and made a formal statement that no changein neutrality was intended. But the invasion of Belgium by the revolutionaries,the thrrat to Holland,* and the French victory over the Awtrians at Jemappes(6 November 1792)all tended to convert Pitt to thr view that the French Revolution mast be resisted by aims, Thr French decreeof 19 November appealed to subjectsin rise against
their rulers, in obedience to the law of rial urn When Frawr

added the declaration that she intended to open thr Scheldt contrary to existing treaties, and to annex Savoy (8 November; in defiance her pledge of no annexation,shecompletedPitt** of conversion-! The executionof Louis XVI on ax January 179;$ proved to be the decisive occasion, but not the real cause of rupture, Chauvelin had originally been accreditedto England asambassador Louis XVI. His functionshad beenmipemlrd by onthe deposition the King on 10Augustandon the, of proclamation of a republic,but he remainedin Englandand held unofficial intercoursewith the British Government,When, however, the King himself was dead, Chauvelin's functions causedto rxbi. Grenvilletherefore wroteto him on 24January,handinghim hi* passports dismissing and him from the country. Of courts the

technical reason thisstep much for was strengthened thefart by thattheFrench King's execution offered anunrivalled Pitt opportunity for mobilizingBritishpublic opinionagainst regicide a
republic. i *t "^ * KJ t^i The documentthat followswas written when the breach * The "Holland" used consecrated word is as bypopular thoughthr wage, "
Netherlands" is technically the correct term*

t On 13November Grenville the DutchGovernmentformul 1792 gave a

pledge defend if attacked, his to them and private of26 letter November luggaiu

r f ^CJegT n T^as foi2ing ^ hostilitis onEnglanddocument* (. pubhshed by-J.Holland English] Rose, Historical] R[tvwo]t [mia], Il7~a3, 324-30. had tothe decision in December/ Pitt come same early


between England and France was considered by both Pitt and

Grenville to be already inevitable. It sumsup the caseagainst France in powerful sentences, and indicates the three causesof dispute. There is first the decree of the French Republic of 19 November 1792which invites all peoplesto revolt againsttheir Kings, thereby inciting them to sedition and meddling in their
internal affairs. The secondis the attempt of the French Republic

to force Holland to throw open the Scheldt to navigation. She proposed to overthrow an old treaty-right in the name of the natural right of Belgium to have access the sea.The third point to is a demand that France shall renounceher plans of cc aggression and aggrandisement", her attack on the whole systemof Europe, as much on treaty-rights as on settled institutions. The dispatch here reproduced clearly anticipated a refusal, and may be taken as the British caseagainst the French Revolution. Most people have seenin its sentences hand of Pitt rather the than of Grenville. Other letters, however, written by Grenville on about the same date*"shew very similar sentimentsand a distinct desire to force a crisis while public opinion was favourable, There can be no doubt that the dispatch embraces Grcnvillc's view of the differences between British and French principles.]

Document 1. Thecase against French the Revolution and theDispatch 0/31 December 179$!

I havereceived,Sir, from you a note [of syth of December], in which, styling yourselfminister plenipotentiary of France, you communicate to me, as the king's secretary of state, the instructions which you state to have yourself received from the executive council of the French republic. You are not ignorant, that sincethe unhappy eventsof the loth of August, the king hasthought proper to suspendall official communication with France. You are yourself no otherwise accredited to the king, than in the name of his most Christianmajesty* The proposition of receiving a minister accredited by any other authority or powerin France,would be a new question, which, whenever shouldoccur,the king would havethe right it to decide according to the interests of his subjects, his own
K HistoricalM8S. Commission, Dropmorc MSS, of J* B. Fortcucue,w[1894], f Lord Grenville to M* F, Chauvelin, Whitehall, 31 December 1793*This is from the AnnualR^gister^ 1793?"Chronicle, State Papers,*.*', xx6~xg, The

original dispatchwasin Frenchof which the draft is in [Public RecordOffice],

F[oreign] O[fHce], 127/40.But, as this wan doubtlesswritten in English tot,

the aboveis probably the true versionand corresponds exactlywith the French.

dignity, theregard and which owes hisallies, to the he to and

general system Europe,I am therefore inform you,sir, of to in express formalterms, and that I acknowledge in no you otherpublic character than that of minister from his most Christian majesty, and that consequently cannot he you admitted to treat with the king's ministersin the quality,
and under the form stated in your note*

But observing you haveentered that into explanations of some the circumstances of whichhavegivento Englandsuch strong grounds of uneasiness jealousy,and that you and speak these of explanations, beingof a natureto bring our as
two countries nearer,I have been unwilling to conveyto you the notification stated above, without at the same time ex-

plaining myselfclearlyand distinctlyon the subjectof what you have communicated me, though under a form which to
is neither regular nor official. Your explanations confinedto three points*: are
The first is that of the decree of the national convention of

the igth of November,in the expressions which all England of saw the formal declaration of a design to extend universally the new principles of governmentadopted in France, ami to encourage disorderand revolt in all countries,evenin those which areneutral. If this interpretation^ whichyou represent asinjuriousto the convention, could admit of any doubt, it is but too well justified by the conduct of the convention

itself.* And the applicationof theseprinciples the king's to dominions been has shewn unequivocally, thepublicrecepby tion givento the promoters sedition this country tmtl of in f by the speeches madeto themprecisely the time of this at decree, since several and on differentoccasions*!
denounced in general England particular interpreted Kings and in and the decree follows: [France] justdeclared,the as "She has by orgtn fcrrrpw of sentatives, she make that will common withallpeoples cause resolved thrww it* offthe and only yoke obey themselves." B.Buche* P.a Roux, P.J, e Hittatr*
Parlemntaire Revolution de la franfaise, [1835], 378* Paris xx,

* ThePresidenttheConventionthesessionsi November ,. of at of 1793

t Ghauvelinagreed the had that French invitation topeopla rii* agftiiuf to their sovereigns apply neutral but "to thote didnot to states, only people? who. afterhaving acquired liberty conquest, have their by may demanded the fraternity assistance republic,the the ofthe by solemn unequivocal md n expression of the general will".


Yet, notwithstanding all theseproofs, supportedby other

circumstances which are but too notorious, it would have been with pleasure that we should have seen here such explanations, and such a conduct, aswould have satisfiedthe dignity and honour of England, with respect to what has

already passed,and would have offered a sufficient security in future for the maintenance of that respect towards the rights, the government, and the tranquillity of neutral powers, which they have on every account the right to

Neither this satisfaction, nor this security, is found in the terms of an explanation which still declaresto the promoters of sedition in every country, what arc the cases which they in may count beforehand on the support and succourof France; and which reservesto that country the right of mixing herself in our internal affairs wheneversheshall judge it proper, and

on principles incompatible with the political institutions of all the countriesof Europe* No onecan avoid perceivinghow much a declaration like this is calculated to encouragedisorder and revolt in every country. No one can be ignorant how contrary it is to the respectwhich is reciprocally due from independent nations, nor how repugnant to those principles .which the king hasfollowed, on his part, by abstainingat all
times from any interference whatever in the internal affairs of France. And this contrast is alone sufficient to shew, not

only that England cannot consider such an explanation as satisfactory,but that she must look upon it as a fresh avowal of thosedispositionswhich shesees with sojust an uneasiness and jealousy. I proceedto the two other points of your explanation, which concernthe generaldispositions Francewith regard to the of
allies of Great Britain, and the conduct of the convention and its officersrelative to the Scheldt, The declaration which you there make, ''that France will not attack Holland so long as

that power shall observean exact neutrality", is conceived nearly in the sametermswith that which you was[sic]charged to make in the name of his most Christian majesty in the monthof June last- Sincethat first declaration made,an was


officer, stating himself beemployed theservice France, to in of has openly violated boththeterritoryandtheneutralityof the republic,in goingup the Scheldtto attack the capital of Antwerp,notwithstanding determination the governthe of ment not to grant this passage* the formal protesthy and whichtheyopposed Since same it. the declaration made, was the conventionhas thought itself authorizedto annul the rights of the republic,exercised within the limits of its own
territory, and enjoyedby virtue of the sametreatiesby which her independencesecured. is And at the verymomentwhen, under the name of an amicableexplanation, you renew to me in thesame terms promise respecting independence the of the and the rights of Englandandher allies,you announce me* to that thosein whose nameyou speakintend to maintain these open and injurious aggressions. It is not, certainly, on such a declaration as this, that any reliance can be placed for the continuance of public tranquillity. But I am unwilling to leave, without a more particular reply, what you sayon the subjectof the Scheldt. If it were truethat thisquestion in itselfof little importance, would is this only serveto prove more clearly, that it was brought forward only for the purpose insultingthe alliesof England,by the of infraction of their neutrality, and by the violation of their rights,which the faith of treatiesobligesus to maintain. But you cannotbe ignorant,that herethe utmostimportance is attachedto thoseprinciples which France wishesto establish by thisproceeding, to thoseconsequences would and which

naturally result fromthem;andthatnotonlythose principles, andthose consequencesnever admitted England, will be by but that she andeverwill be,readyto oppose is, themwith
all her force.

France have right to annulthestipulations can no relative to the Scheldt, unless havealsothe right to setaside she

equally the othertreaties all between the powers all of

Europe, all theother and rights England, of herallies. of or

She even nopretence can have to interferethequestion in of opening Scheldt, she thesovereign the unless were



the Low Countries, or had the right to dictate laws to all Europe.* England will never consentthat France shall arrogatethe power of annulling at her pleasure,and under the pretence of a pretendednatural right, of which she makesherselfthe only judge, the political systemof Europe, establishedby solemn treaties, and guaranteedby the consentof all the powers. This Government, adhering to the maxims which it
has followed for more than a century, will also never seewith indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereignof the Low Countries, or generalarbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really

desirousof maintaining friendship and peacewith England, she must shew herself disposedto renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement,and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, without disturbingtheir tranquillity, without violatingtheir rights,f With respect to that character of ill-will which is endeavoured to be found in the conduct of England towards France,I cannot discuss because speakof it in general it, you terms only, without alledging a single fact. All Europe has seenthe justice and the generositywhich have characterised the conduct of the king: his majesty has always been desirous of peace: he desiresit still, but such as may be real, and solid, and consistent with the interests and dignity of his own dominions, and with the general security of Europe. On the restof your paper I saynothing, -Asto what relates to me and to my colleagues, king's ministers owe to his the
majesty the account of their conduct; and I have no answer

to giveyou on thissubject, morethanonthat of theappeal any which you propose maketo the Englishnation. This nation, to
* In his speech overtures peace, February1800,Fitt said: **T on of 3 [the Scheldt]claim we discussed so much on accountof its immcd^tte not importance (thoughit wasimportantbothin a,maritimeandcommercial view)
as on accountof the generalprinciple on which it wasfounded/* t This seeian be a reference the Frenchannexation Savoy, deference to to of in

to the expressed of its inhabitants. wish Thia had beendecided the French by Convention #8 November 792despite fact that in May of that yearthe of 1 the

French Government declared had against annexations conquests also all or (v*
supra,p. a and n.)


according that constitution which its liberty and its to by prosperity secured, whichit will always ableto are and be defend against every attack, director indirect,will neverhave with foreign powersconnexionor correspondence, except throughthe organof its king; of a king whomit lovesand reveres, whohasnever an instantseparated rights, and for his his interests, hishappiness, the rights,the,interests, and from and the happiness his people. of
[The reply of Le Brun, the Foreign Minister of the French Republic, to Grenville was deliveredon 7 January 1793, He maintained that the French decree of 19 November did not authorizeseditionin a country, It merely saidthat Francewould go to the aid of a nation "in which the generalwill, clearlyand unequivocallyexpressed, should call the French nation to its assistance fraternity". He pointed out that the Dutch ware and
not seditiouswhen they revolted against Spain, and that France

and England had aided them, As regardsthe French decrees for openingthe Scheldt,Le Brun argued that its closing had brru concluded eeby treaty without consentof the Belgians" who u nmv reenter into the rights which the houseof Austria had laken away from them". He suggestedthat England and Holland should have "a direct negotiation with Belgia |>/V[. Ifthe BHgiam, by any motive whatsoever, consent;to deprive themselves of the navigation of the Scheldt, France will not opposeit, She will know how to respect their independenceeven in their erron?/" Grenville seemsto have been affected by certain discmnionH in the French legislaturebeforeha gavehis answer* is January On 1793, reportofBrissot, behalfof the Committee Diplomacy a on of andDefence, presented the FrenchConvention,It dcrlam! was to

its conviction all means beenexhausted preserving that had for peacewith England and recommended "the most vigorous measures repelthe aggression the Court of St Jainea",The to of same the Convention day decided askfor various to explanations,
amongothers, of the meaning of British armaments.GrenviJle answered(18 January) that the explanationwas"insufficient",

On the atst the news the execution King LouisXVI wan of of knownin England, in consequencethisevent, and, of Chauvclin wasdismissed handed passports dayslater. Mm and his three departure the preludefor a war lasting,with brief interwas ruptions,for overtwentyyears.]













[It is possibleto shewthat Pitt was thinking of the security of Europe and of the future even in the crisis of 1792-3. As Russia had begun an overture for intervention in France, Grenville instructed his representative, in reply, to distinguish carefully
between two kinds And of intervention.* there is also "a There concert is first between "an other interGov-

ference for the purpose of establishing any form of Government]

in France".

[ernmenjts to provide for their own security at a time when political interests are endangered both by the intrigues of France in the interior of other countries, and by their views of conquest and aggrandisement", The former policy wasfavoured by despotic monarchies like Russia, the latter by a parliamentary state like

England. The British proposalwasin fact to get Franceto abandon her conquests,withdraw within her borders, and offer to abandon seditious propaganda in the internal affairs of other states. If the proposal was rejected by France Pitt proposedto use a form of pressureby creating a European Concert or League. In fact we have here, in a very rudimentary form, a sketcli of the future settlementof Vienna during the years 1814-15.1 Pitt's ideas were modified, but not essentiallychanged, after his war on the French Revolution began. His attitude during the years that followed wasnot wholly consistent,for he varied between demands for "security" and a desire to make peacewith the new military republic.^ During his second ministry and towards the
end of his life, he formulated views as to the future settlement of

Europe not unlike thosejust quoted- They are of peculiar interest, for they formed his legacy to Castlereagh. What the master first sketched in 1792 and formulated in 1805, the pupil put into practice at the Congressof Vienna in 1815, Pitt's ideaswere marked by no special tendernessto nationality. He wasperhaps led to suspectthe principle because Tsar Alexander

proposedto useit as an excusefor obtaining the whole Kingdom of Poland for himself, Pitt was, therefore, extremely cautious in his reply to Russia on 19 January 1805. But he adds specific proposals here to the general principle of concert formulated in 1792. He was determined to recover from France Holland,
* Lord Grenvilleto Charles Whitworth, No, 13,of 29 December *79a'This is of greatimportance,thoughtoolong to bereproduced here. B[ritish] M[uaeum] Additional'] MSS, 34,446,ff. 292-5. f Theseproposals, more rhetoricalform, arc repeated a declaration in in by
Lord Grenville of 12October 1793sentto CharlesWhitworth at St Petersburg*!, F.O. 65/25.

J V.J. Holland Rose,Napoleonic Studies, [1906], Chap, n, Pitt's plansfor the

settlement of Europe.



Belgium the left bank of the Rhine, He proposed make and to a strongindependent Hollandby addingto it Flanders from Antwerp Maestricht remainder Flanders, Luxemto The of with burgand Juliersandotherterritoryadjacent between Mrasc thr and the Moselle, proposed give to Prussia**In this way he to Holland would be strengthened, Prussia and engaged agaimt France. As regardsItaly Pitt was equally opportunistic. He proposed strengthen Kingdomof Piedmont to the with Cknoa,
to link Milan south-west of the Adda with Parma and with

Piacenza. meant make He to Tuscany "virtually Austrian and ", to assignAustria all Lombardy and Venetia in return for relinquishingBelgium. ThustheAlpswereprotected against France by anenlarged Piedmont aninterested and greatPower (Austria),
while on the Rhine and on the Flemish barrier an enlarged

Hollandanda newgreatPower(Prussia) stoodassentries* Here we havepurely " balanceof power" ideas,which were largely appliedat the settlement Vienna. But by suggesting special of a
guarantee treaty between Russiaand Englandto carry theseideas into effect,Pitt brokenew ground and foreshadowed guarantee a system and sanctions suchas Castlereagh subsequently developed
at Vienna,


2. Pitfs Memorandum on the Dellvmtmr

and matte

Security Europe, JanuaryiBo^J of 19

The Result of the Communications which have bmi

by Prince Czartoriskito His Majesty's Ambassadorat St Petersburgh, of the confidential and explanations whichhave beenreceived from your Excellency, beenlaid beforeHi has Majesty;and His Majestyhasseen with inexpressible Satis-

faction,the wise,dignifiedandgenerous policy,whichThe Emperor Russia disposed adoptunderthe present of is to calamitous Situation Europe.His Majesty alsohappy of * V f is Af to perceive, the viewsand Sentiments the Emperor that of respecting means effecting deliveranceEurope, the of the of and providing its futureTranquillity Safety, for and correspond

soentirely HisOwn.Heistherefore with desirousentering of intothemost explicit unreserved and explanations onevery
to carry out, v. infra, p. 25 and n.

* Castlereagh tothis i October as idea was* alludes on 1814, an Pitt trying

t ForCastlereagh, v.irtfra, 28-9sgq, pp.

J F.O. 65/60. printed toto C, K. Webster, Mphma First in in British V '!"~#VW9*1-!' L ThePassa&cs in theversion App' omitted published by ?eBf^ Government, 1815, given double 8May are in square brkdL.I Cp. A & P., [1814-15], 261-6. xm, w J








point connectedwith this great object, and of forming the

closest Union of Councils and Concert of Measures with His

Imperial Majesty, in order, by their joint influence and exertions, to insure the cooperation and assistance other of Powersof the Continent, on a Scaleadequateto the Magnitude and importance of an Undertaking, on the success of which the future Safetyof Europe must depend. For this purposethe first Step must be, to fix as precisely as possible,the distinct objects to which such a Concert is to
be directed.

These, according to the explanation given of the Sentiments

of the Emperor,in which His Majestyentirelyconcurs, appear

to be three:

ist To rescue from the Dominion

of France those Countries

which it hassubjugatedsincethe beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood
before that time.-

stndly To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recoveredfrom France, as may provide for their Securityand Happiness, and may at the sametime constitute a more effectual barrier in future against Encroachmentson the part of France.3rdly To form, at the Restoration of Peace, a general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and Security of different Powers,and for reestablishinga general Systemof Public Law in Europe.The first and second Objects are stated generally, and in their broadestExtent; but neither of them can be properly considered in detail, without reference to the nature and Extent of the meansby which they may be accomplished. The first is certainly that to which, without any Modification or Exception, His Majesty's wishes,as well as those of the

Emperor,would be preferablydirected3 nothingshortof and it, can completely* satisfythe viewswhich both Sovereigns form for the Deliveranceand Security of Europe.-Should it be possible unite in Concertwith Great Britain and Russia, to the two other great Military Powersof the Continent, there
* Underlined in original



seemslittle doubt that such an union of Force would enable

themto accomplish that is proposed.-But (astherei all if too muchreason imagine to maybe the case) shouldbe it foundimpossible engage to Prussia theConfederacy,may in if be doubted whether suchOperations couldbe carriedon in all the Quarters Europe wouldbe necessary flic of as for
success the wholeof this Project, ([Thechief points howof everto whichHis Majestyconsiders doubt asapplicable, this relate thequestion theentire to of Recovery theNetherlands of andthe Countries occupied France theleft Bankof the by on Rhine.-His Majestyconsiders essential* on thisSupit even positionto include nothinglessthan the Evacuation the of North of Germany of Italy, the Re-establishment the and of Independence the United Provinces, of Switzerland, of and the Restorationof the Dominions of the King of Sardinia, and Securityof Naples;But, on the sideof the Netherlands, it might perhaps moreprudent in this ease confine* be to fhe
views of the Allies to obtaining somemoderateacquisition for the United Provinces,calculated (according to the Principle specified under the second Head) to form un additional Barrierfor that Country. His Majesty, however,by no means intendsto imply, if very Brilliant and decisive SUCCCHH .should be obtained, and the Power of France broken and overcome

by operations otherQuarters, alliesmight not, in such in the

a case, extendtheir viewsto the Recoveryof the whole or the greaterpart of theseTerritories, but as, in the first instance,

it does appear not probable theycanbere-conquered that by the operations the War without the aid of Prussia, of His Majesty inclinedto think that this objectoughtin any is
Treaty of Concert, to be described in such Terms as would

admit of the Modifications stated,-] here

TheSecond of itself Point involves it many in important Considerations. Views Sentiments whichHis The and by Majesty TheEmperor Russia equally and of are animated in endeavouringestablish Concert, pureand disto this are
interested.[The insular Situationand extensive ressources of GreatBritain, aidedby its military Exertions Naval and Superiority; theimmense and power, established the Conti-



ncntal Ascendency remotedistance Russia, and of already givelo the Territories thetwo Sovereigns of aSecurity against the Attacks of France^-even after all her acquisitions of
Influence, power, and Dominion,-which cannot be the lot

of any other (Immtry.--They have thereforeno Separate Objects of Their own in the Arrangementswhich are in question --no personalinterestto consultin this Concertbut that which growsout of the general interestand Securityof Europe, and is inseparably connected with it.J Their first View therefore, with respectto any of the
Countries which nuty be recoveredfrom France, must be to

restore,asfar as possible, their ancientRights,and provide for the I menial happiness their inhabitants;but in looking of at this Object, they nmsl not losesightof the generalSecurity of Europe,on which even that Separate objectmustprincipally depend. Pursuantto this principle, therecan be no question that, whenever any of theseCountriesarecapableof beingrestored to their former independence, and of being placed in a Situation in which they can protectit, suchan arrangement must be most congenial to the Policy and the Feelingson which thin Systemis founded,--But there will be found to be
other Countrirn among those now under the Dominion of Kruncr, to which theseConsiderations cannot apply,-where cither the ancient Relation*of the Country are HO completely destroyed that theycannotberestored, where or independence would be merely nominal ami alike inconsistentwith the

Securityf*rthe Country itsrlf or for Europe.-Happily the larger numbern of the first description* Shouldthe Armsof the Allies he successful the full extent of expellingFrance to from all thr Dominion*shehasacquiredsince Revolution, the it would certainly be the first Object as has alreadybeen statedU>reestablish Republics the United Provinces the of and Switxrrlawl, the Territories of the King of Sardinia,
if fp"

Tuscany, Mode-mi (underthe protection Austria)and of Naples. the But Territories Genoa,theItalian of of Republic, including three thr Legations, Parma Placentia, on and and theotherSide Europe, Austrian of the Netherlands the and


Stateswhich have beendetachedfrom the German Empire on the left Bankof the Rhine, evidentlybelongto the Second

Class. With respect the Territories to enumerated Italy, in Experience shown little disposition has how existed some, in
and how little meansin any, to resistthe Aggression or Influenceof France.-The King of Spainwascertainly too mucha Partyto theSystem whichsolargea partof Europe of hasbeen victim, to entitletheformerinterests His Family a of in Italy to any Consideration; does pastConduct nor the of Genoa, any of the otherStates themanyclaim,dthrr or give ofJustice Liberality,-It is also or obvious these that Separate PettySovereignties wouldnever againhaveanysolidexistence: in themselves, would only serve weaken impair the and to and forcewhich ought to be, asmuch aspossible, concentrated
in the hands of the chief Powersof Italy.-It is needless dwellparticularly on the state theNetherto of lands.-Events haveput out of the questionthe Restoration of them to theHouseof Austria-they arethereforenecessarily open to new Arrangements, and evidently can never exist Separate and independent.Nearly the sameconsiderations apply to the Ecclesiastical Electorates, and the other Territories on the left Bank of the Rhine, after their bdng otire detached from the Empire,and the former possessorsthem of

indemnified.-Thereappearsthereforeto be no posnibie objection,on the strictestPrinciplesof Justice and Public" Morality, to makingsucha Disposition with respect any to of these Territoriesasmay be mostconducive the genera! to Interests;and there is evidently no other modeof accomplishingthe great and beneficent objectof re-establishing

(after much so misery bloodshed) Safety Repose and the and

of Europeon a solidandpermanent basis,-It is fortunatetoo that sucha plan of arrangements is in itselfessential the as to

End proposed, alsolikely to contribute, tinegreatest is in degree, secure means which great canbat to the by that end
be promoted,-

It is evidently theutmost of importance* absolutely if not indispensable purpose, secure vigorous for this to the and effectual co-operation ofAustria Prussia; there both and but



is little reasonto hope, that cither of thesePowers,and especially Prussia, bebroughtto embarkin the common will Cause, without the prospect obtainingsomeimportant of acquisition compensate Its exertions. the grounds to for On which have beenalreadystated,His Majestyconceives that nothing could NO much contributeto the generalSecurityas giving to Austria fresh meansof resistingthe viewsof France on the Hideofltaly, and placing Prussia a similar Situation in with respectto the Low Countries;and the relativeSituations of the two Power*would naturally makethosethe quarters to which their viewswould respectively directed." be In Italy, sound Policy would require that the Power and Influenceof the King of Sardiniashouldbe augmented, and that Austria shouldbe replacedin a Situation which may enableher to uiford an immediateand effectualSupportto His Dominions in easeof their being attacked. His Majesty
seeswith Satisfaction, from the Secret and Confidential com*

mmric.atxom recently receivedthrough Your Excellency, that the Views of the Court of Vienna arc perfectlyconformable to thin genera!principle, and that the extension which She at aims might not only safelybe admitted, but might evenbe increased with advantageto the generalInterest,-In other respects His Majestyentirely concursin the outline of the Arrangement which He understands The Emperorof Russia to bedrsirtmsof seeing effected this Quarter,-His Majesty in considersit as absolutelynecessary the generalSecurity, for that Italy shouldbe* completely rescued bothfrom the Occupation arid Influenceof France,and that no Powers should be left within it, who are not likely to enter into a general systemof Defence: maintainingits Independence.-For for

thinpurpose is essential theCountries composing it that now what is called the Italian Republic* shouldbe transferred to
other Powers, In distributing theseTerritories, an Increase of Wealth and Power should undoubtedly be given to The

King of Sardinia, it seems and material HisPossessions, that m well m the Duchyof Tuscany(whichit is proposed to
restore The GrandDuke)should brought immediate to be into

contact, ready or Communication those Austria, with of On



this Principle Partof the Milanese the South [the to West

of the Adda,andj the wholeof the Territorieswhich now compose Ligurian the Republic, well as,perhaps [[as Parma andPlacentia,! might,it is conceived, annexed Piedbe to mont. [The threeLegations might in His Majesty's opinion,
be annexed to the Territories of Austria, and the addition

which may be madeto the acquisitions proposed that for Power,with advantage the commonCause.-And the to Duchy of Modena,placedas it would be betweenthe nrw Acquisitions Sardinia, the Duchyof Tuscany of and (which may be considered under this arrangementan virtually Austrian) might safelybe restoredto its former Possessor. The observations which have beenstatedrespecting the Situation of Sardiniain Italy, seem, a great Measure,to in apply to that of Holland and Prussia, relation to the Low in
Countries; with this difference however, that the Picdmontcsr

Dominions, affording in themselves considerable meansof defence,they may be perhaps sufficiently Snum* in the possession The King of Sardinia, supportedby Austria; of whereas Netherlandsbeing more open and exposed the scrm scarcecapable of being securedunlessby annexing a considerable part of them to Prussia, and placing Holland in u Second of defence* line With this view (supposing Knmceto
be reduced within its ancient Limits) it might be proposed
* ^stf m ft

to annexto the United Provinces, an additional Barring as the part of Flanderslying within a military line to be drawn from Antwerpto the Meuse Maestricht,andthe remainder at

of theNetherlands, together theDuchies Luxembourg with of

andJuliers, and the other Territories betweenthe Meuseand the Moselle, to Prussia,-

His Majesty indeed sostrongly importance fells the both of augmenting Inducements the to Prussia take to part,and
of rendering it a powerful and effectual Barrier for the

Defence, only Holland oftheNorth Germany not of but of

against France, He should that even consider asadvisable it

in addition what been to has already proposed, into to put Possession Power Territories may reof that the which be

covered France theleftBank theRhine, from on of Eastward



of the Moselle-andHis Majesty entertains strong a conviction that this arrangement it not in other respects (if be thoughtliableto insuperable Objections) wouldbeinfinitely moreeffectual theprotection theNorthof Europe, for of than
any other that can be devised

His Majestyis however aware, that greatdifficulties may arisein regulatingthe proportionate Acquisitions Austria of and Prussia, sucha wayasto prevent in their beingthesource of mutual jealousy-and this consideration is which, it
amongstothrrs, hasoperated a greatadditionalInducement an of acquisition for Austria on the side of Italy* He thinksit alsoimportant to remark,that theAcquisition io be heldout to Prussia oughtnot to be measured merelyby what would be in itself desirable,but by the considerationof what may be necessary outweighthe Temptations to which
France will not fail to oiler to that Power to secure its co-

operation*Thesewill probably be on an extensive Scale,and in a quarter much morecalculatedto produceeffects Injurious to the Interests of Austria and of Russia herself-While, on th:other hand, if the ambition of Prussia be gratified in can the Manner proposedat the Expense France,it will be of
diverted from the views which it will otherwise form towards

the North, the Accomplishment which would tend to of increase,to an alarming degree,its Influenceboth in Germany*and over the secondary Powers the Baltic*-But if, of notwithstanding powerfulConsiderations,shouldstill it be thought by His Imperial Majestythat the Augmentation here proposedto the Territoriesof Prussia greaterthan is ought to h? admitted, His Majestywill, (thoughnot without Reluctance)concur in any other arrangement may be that thoughtpreferable, whicha largerPortion theNetherby of lands may be allotted to the United Provinces, and the Acquisitions Prussia of confined within narrowerLimits; but

He trusts that, at anyrate,it will not benecessaryreduce to themto any thing less than the Territories the left Bank on
of the Rhine betweenthe Meuseand the Moselle,and it will,

in thiscase, requiremuchconsideration,whathands in the

Territories on the left Bankof the Rhine, Eastof the Moselle



canbest placed whether maybesafely in the be or they left

possession France,of In the eventof Prussia being prevailedupon to enter not into the concert,I have already stated His Majesty's Conviction, that the Viewsof the Allies 05 thin Sideof Europe: must be more limited; and in that caseprobably nothing morecanbeexpected to obtainthe complete than evacuation of the North of Germany, and the Re-establishment the of Independence Holland, together of with the Barrier here statedwithin the Line drawn from Antwerp to Maastricht, leavingthe other Territorieson the left of the Rhine in the possession France.]).,, of [Details,etc. of the plan of campaign and the amountof force necessary obtain the objectsstatedabove.] to Supposing Effortsof the Allies to havebeencompletely the successful, the two objectsalreadydiscussed havebeen and to fully obtained,His Majestywould nevertheless considerthis
Salutary Work as still imperfect, if the Restoration of Peace were not accompaniedby the most effectual measuresfor giving Solidity and Permanenceto the Systemwhich shall thus have been established. Much will undoubtedly be effected the future Repose Europeby theseTerritorial for of Arrangements, which will furnish a more effectual Barrier than hasbeforeexisted againstthe Ambition of France. But

in order to renderthis Securityas completeas possible, it seems necessary, the period of a generalPacification,to at form a Treatyto whichall the principalPowers Europe of shouldbe Parties,by which their respective Rights and Possessions,they then havebeenestablished, as shall be fixed

andrecognized, theyshould bindthemselves and all mutually to protect support other, and each against attempt any to

infringe them-It should re-establish a general compreand

hensive system Public of Lawin Europe, provide, far and a*

as possible,repressing attemptsdisturb general for future to the Tranquillity, above for restraining projects and all, any of
Aggrandizement Ambitionsimilarto thosewhich have and

produced the Calamities all inflicted Europe the on since disastrous of theFrench sera Revolution, Treaty |This

PITT ON THE SECURITY OF EUROPE 19 should be put under the SpecialGuaranteeof Great Britain

and Russia, and the Two Powers should,by a separate engagement, bind thtmsrfves eachotherjointly to take to
anactivePart in preventing beinginfringed.Such Treaty its a might alsobe accompanied moreparticularandspecific by Provisions, which the severalPowersof Italy might be by
united in a closer Alliance for their own immediate Defence.

How far any similar systemcould be adoptedfor giving additional Securityfor the Germanic Body,is well deserving of Consideration. Their present Stateiscertainlyveryunsatisfactory, with a view either to their own immediateinterests, or to the Safely of Europe, At the sametime it appearsto His MajrMtyvery doubtful whether,from local circumstances, and other causes, would everbepossible consolidate it to them
into any effectual System. Should this be found to be the case, the evils to he apprehendedfrom their weak and exposed State might (as far as relates to the danger from France) perhapsbe remedied,by adopting a system(but on a larger Scale) .similar to that formerly established by the Barrier Treaty for the Protectionof the Netherlands.It might not be difficult to settle somegeneral plan for maintaining^at the joint expense the different Powers the Empire, Fortresses of of

of sufficient Strength, and properly garrisoned, along the

coumc of the Rhine from Basic to Ehrcnbreitstein, com-

manding ilw principal approaches from Franceto the most exposed partHof Germany;and the Military Custody these of Fortresses (without infringing in other respects the Terrion torial Rightsof the Power whose in Dominions theymight be placed)might be confidedto the two greatPowers Gerof many,according theirrespective to means occupying of them* It aeems desirable, order to givefurther Securityto also in

the UnitedProvinces (under of theArrangements any which havealreadybeen discussed) theyshould called that be upon to enterinto an Engagement jointly with Great Britainand
Russia maintain,at all times to their Army on sucha Footing

as may be thoughtnecessary provide their Defence to for against sudden Attack, In additionto thisStipulation His

Majesty hisElectoral in Capacity, perhaps induced might be



tokeep considerable (inconsequence a Force ofarrangements

with the British Government)ready to be employedon the first Alarm for the Defence the United Provinces;and His of

Majesty also ready enter aConcert other would be to into with

Powers defraying Expense maintaining all times for the of at an adequate effective and Garrison consist German to of Troops garrisoning Fortresses existing, herefor any now or
afterto beestablished, whatever betheline ultimately on may
fixed as the Dutch Frontier-

Having thus statedwhat more immediatelyrelates to the specific objects the Concert, to the means IK: of and to employed giveit effect, to therestill remains greatand one important Question Consideration, that in how far, for and
either now or hereafter,the viewsof the Allies ought to he directedtowardsthe Re-Establishment Monarchyin France, of and the Restorationof the Bourbon Family on the Throne* His Majestyagrees entirely with The Emperorof Russiain thinking, that sucha Settlementis in itself highly desirable for the future both of Franceand Europe,and that no fair occasion oughtto beneglected promotingit* But 1Ic at ihr of sametime thinks, that it ought to be consideredonly a secondary objectin the Concertnow to be established, and one which couldin no case justify the prolongation the? of War, if a Peace couldbe obtainedon the Principle whivh
have been stated, It is one with a view to which no active or

decidedmeasures be taken, unlessa serial of great and can signalSuccesses previously shall havebeenobtainedby the Allies,and a strongandprevailingdisposition the return for
of their Monarch, shall then manifest itself in the Interior of

France. themeantime, orderto affordevery In in reasonable

chance theattainment thisobject, Majesty for of His entirely agrees The with Emperor Russia, it ishighly of that important thatin theconduct theWar,and thepublic of in Declarations andLanguage theAlliedCourts, greatest should of the care betaken prevent apprehension Minds any to any in the of part of theFrench Nation, anydesign of eitherto dictateto them Force particular by any Form Government*to of or
attemptto dismember antientTerritoriesof France, the







Such arc the Sentiments

and Observations



ajestyis desirous offering to the Consideration The of of Emperoron the greatOutlinesof the importantsystem which They are equally anxiousto establish. His Majesty will receive., with the utmost attention and satisfaction,every freshCommunicationof the opinion of His Imperial Majestyonall theDetails connected soextensive with a subject. In the meanwhile, from an anxietyto lose time no in laying the foundationof this greatWork, His Majestyhas directed u Project to be? prepared of a ProvisionalTreaty,
conformable to the Sentiments which appear to be enter-

tained both by the Emperor and himself; and which, if it should meet with His Imperial Majesty'sconcurrence. is He readyimmediatelyto conclude.!




with a checkwhenever encountered he national rmstanrr", anci

["Napoleon", is related have Pitt to said, "wouldh.ivr mrt

hedeclared Spain theplace it, andthatthen that was for

would intervene, This was declaredto hr onr of Pitt'x lairst utterances.If authentic,it might deserve ruloRiwn of Ac-ton the

as"the mostastounding profound and prediction nil political in history5',* theconversation nothave But could taken plarr umtrr the circumstances described*It wsisreported by a Spaniard, whose memory failedhim asto both datrsurn!farts. Thrrr arc* further difficulties.That the policy of favouringnationality in orderto conquer Napoleon formedno part of Pitt's programme, we knowfrom hisprivateletters,from histofliria! dbpairhf$and from hispublicspeeches, manwho did adoptthat doririnr The was Canning. He had beenthe spw.iulpupil of Pitt hut hrrr departed from the master's tenets. No oneran rxawwr cither
Pitt's memorandumof January 1805,or Cant [enough1?* at work Viennain 1814, report that they wttrc in favourof nationality. and It is hard to study the policy of Canning between1*107 and lOuf) and report that he was not. Portugaland Spainofferedthe first examples nationswhich of roseagainst Napoleon, In 1807 FrenchforceenteredPortugal, one and towardsthe end of the year another one enteredSpain, By military menaces a policy of inconceivable and bullying Napokon first securedthe abdication of the old Spanish Bmirboa King
Charles IV, and then of Ferdinand hi son, Ferdinand had hmi

proclaimed King in March 1808ut Madrid, but he wan lurctd to

Bayonne, whereNapoleon bullied him into abdicating(fi May)*

The old King wasthen induced to hand over the imccowionto the

Spanish Grownto Napoleon.He indicatedbin brotherJoseph

Bonaparte his choicefor King on 13 May, and it wanconfirmed as

bya deputation ninety of Spanish grandees Bayonne June?)* to (15 These proceedings viewed were with the utmost indignation by
the Spanish people, They all hatedforeigners had no ideaof and supporting candidature a Frenchman theirthrone, the of to what-

ever Grandees think.There nonational might was organ capable of resisting Napoleon. Spanish Kings andoldwere new captive
* Acton, Lectures onModern History [1906], ^39,It htt been 33, twwn by J. Holland Rose, William andthe Pitt GnatWart[l0n] 524,tc.,that the story cannot truein theformgiven, Ktt's ami*n*tionaf be and attitude well if described same m the author's Napoleonic [1906^ Studies* Chap, n.



at Bayoimc, Cortes nationalassembly not exist,the the or did

French troops garrisonedMadrid, The Spaniardsdid not care and rose m masse. Local and sporadicrisingsburst out in the provinces, and sturdy local patriotsset up juntasor provincial governments, Anturias, Galieia, Andalusia declared against all war Napoleon, The situationwasa verypeculiarone, Joseph Bonapartr wastechnicallyKing of Spain,and Spainwastechnically at war with England.What thenwasEnglandto do? France had encouraged pcopk to riseagainst their Kings,wasEngland do to the .same?If wancertainly something newfor a foreignpowerto
ignore the official organ of a state, and to enter into relations with
sectional rebels or organisations within that state.

Canning facedthe,newand complex situationwith vigour and boklneHH. helpedthe strugglingjuntas of eachprovincewith He money* with arms and with equipment, because they were the only governmental machineryavailable.But hewouldnot recogni*e the provincial juntas as political entities,,for he earnestly sought to promote the formation of a Spanishnational assembly. He thus did everything to make possible national unity* His doctrine, us proclaimed on 15 June 1808, was revolutionary* Canning ignoredJosephBonaparteand recognized Ferdinandas King, Spain wantechnically at war with England, and remained so in Hpileof popular revolts. Canning swept all that aside. "It will neveroccur to usto considerthat a stateof war exists[between England and Spain]**., We shall proceed upon the principle, that any nation of Europe that starts up with a determinationto oppose a power [France] which, whether professinginsidioxxs peaceor declaring open war, is the commonenemyof all nations, whatever may be the existing political relations of that nation
with Great Britain, becomesinstantly our essentialally."*

This doctrine is at fimt sight a revolutionary one. It appeals to a people to fine againstits government, and thereforeinterferes in its internal attuirs. Now Revolutionary France had donethis often enough* It was preciselyfor that reasonthat Pitt and GrttnviHc went to war with her in 1793 (0. supra> pp. 1-8).

Wannot England thenadopting methods haddespised the she and denounced? Every nation is driven into different positionsby war and England had alreadylearneda gooddealfrom France, Napoleon trying to crushand absorb was everynationin one uniform military Empire,The process whichhe deposed by the

crownwjtsan act of violence whichprecluded explanation all or * 15Junei8t>8, /wdto, R. Thcrry, ed [1828], 35*-V.m article n, by J, Holland Rote,Canning theSpanish * and PatriotsAm[encan] V f&t[oncaQ
xn, October 1

Spanish KingsandsubstitutedFrench was a one deemed be, to in itself,a destruction legitimate of right andan interference ^in Spam's internal affairs* "The unprincipled seizure theSpanish of


comment, avowed most and the determined rapacity.It rrvcalrd to thewhole world that his [Napoleon's] robberies wouldbeonly

limited his by power. proclaimed unanswerably what It him ml>e

lished government independent in theworld1,11* and nation
It will be seenthat the British Government here links "estab-

hewascalled His Majesty's in Speech thethrone, thed<r from at of thelastsession [1808].,.'the common enemy everyestabof

therefore nation wasjustified in revolt* It cannot br denied the that thiswas,in some sense, newdoctrine. It couldhardly have a arisen save underpressure war andwithout the obvious of convenience allyingwith the Spanish of people, ffm idea had a Yet root in the past. Canning, Burke,uriderHtood a nation like that had rights and wasembodied law, Burkehad proteNted agaimt the original partition of Polandon this aarncground. *Thr present violent dismemberment,..of Poland,without theprrtewr
of war or even the colour of right, is to be considereda.H first the

lished government" "independent to nation". The arrow! has become "legitimate"asthe first and5sunitedwith it in reas sistance Napoleon hisaggressive to and imperialist!.Napoleon haddeposed Spanish against will of thenation,ami the King the

very great breach in the modern political systemof liuro|w\"f Canning saw that it was possibleto protest against a similar breach by recognisingand defendingthe nation* The r,am of Spain,of the nation in revolution,wasthe cause, legitimacy and of stable government. Thereis no doubt that Canningunderstood what he wandoin^ and thereis no doubt that the measure, not new in priwipJr, if wasnew in practice. For it meant allying with a nation not with a government, it meant breaking with a government which no Spaniard trusted and negotiating with individuals who wer** patriots. In after yearsCanningdid not repenthi* deeumm thaw to haverecognized claimsof a nationstrugglingfor freedom, the
" \J-P 1l *

" Whentheboldspiritof Spainburstforth indignantaguimtthe oppression Bonaparte.. discharged gloriousduly,, of of J the recognizing withoutdelay rightsof theSpanish the nation,andof at once adopting gallant that people thedmrwtamitywith into England.It wasindeed stirring,a kindlingoccasion: no a and man who hasa heart in his bosom,can think evennow of the

noble enthusiasm,animated the exertions, undaunted the courage* theunconquerable perseverance Spanish ofthe nation...without feeling blood his glowandhispulses quicken tumultuous with
throbsof admiration," J]

* Quarterly May1809, Article Canning Sharon foview, 447, by and Turnrr. t Burke 1773. A,B.C.CobbanCmb[rti&} m V. in Hut[ormt} }aumML it, No. i, [19126], 43. t Spuefos, R. Therry, 106-7, ed. v, Speech theHouse Commons in of on
Negotiations relative Spain, April A to 28


GERMANY ^ * "** f t f "* " * Vk Jf


foir.ihly rwnprHcd Norway to submit to a union with Swedenin

[Canning aiwrtn! Urndoctrine! national of rightastoSpain and not a* to Spainalone*.He wasckr.plyshocked whenBritishships
1814. lir aho serumto havebrr.n much preoccupied the with

and lie had no part in the ViennaKnttlement, Duringhisperiod

of oiiitT lie did, howevert frame hta definite views for the future

Polish problem and drrainrd of the*restoration of Poland as a nation at the (longrrsH Vienna. When holdingofficebetween of 1807 n CammtK<*ou!cl attempt to carry out these no* projectSj

of anotherpotrntMl nation,(*nmany* They arcgivenin thepaper thai follows.They shewthat Claiming the ideathat the future had of Germanyfthuuidhe cmfederalprinciples,and that its domination hy Prtmlt* a military power, would he disastrous,* He ia interesting notethat in 1814 in Canning spoke Germany of as

jrvidrnilywanted ayntem onerfederal representative. a at and It

**w>lunger a name bm a nation", and he can thereforehardly have welcomedwhat the Congress Vienna did for Germany, of However that, may he, there can he no doubt that the document that follows IK of profound importancein the development of Cunning**and Kngbnd'Kkkait on the subjectof nationality.]

Document 3* Canning the on futureof Germany the and tfanffrfrom Pruma^ 16 May iSoyf

I havereceived privateIntimations that Mr dcHardenberg immediatelyupon \m return to Power,, beenbusiedin has framing a Planof*Pacification Germany for whichis founded upon the ideaof placingall the States theNorth underthe of superintendingProtectionand military Authority of Prussia -and that Hanoveris specisiliy intendedto be comprised in thin Arrangement* Your Excellency seek Opportunity will an .. *to induce Mr dc Hardenbergto openhimselffully -. *upon this subject* And if you shouldfind occasion believe, to that lie indeedentertainsthe extravagant idea of raisingPrussia
i OctotwriHi4, IM* pow*r '*ii peculiarly military,andconsequently somewhat encroaching" doubts expediemcyplantingher on the left bankof urtd th of Thiji Inthedraftj theArchives copy(which wouldhave contained original) the
t Ciuming fa It^rd G. LevewnCower,No. 6 16 May 1807, F.O*65/69.

* CmtlcrreAgh had Im *upidon*,He describes tlo Prussia Wellington, to

the Rhine, C, K, Webster,British Diplomacy (rBt^ts), [^ai],


to thatsort Supremacy theother of over Stairs nr it's

which Francehasassured Herselfewerthe remaining parts to

of Germany,Supremacy in theCasrof the House a which of Austria, longusage, ancient from and prescriptive Veneration, hadbecome littleoppressive Exerdse, unfort as in its as unatdy it has proved beinefficient its operation, w!mh m to in hut
a newPower,and that new PowerPrussia, a Poweressen-

tiallymilitary, depending it'sgreatnessa Monarchy and for as of the first Order,lessupon the goodGovernment it's of People, upontheextentof its Army; Your Kxrellewy than
will not hesitate declare the mostunequivocalterms ilh to in

Majesty's determination to consent thecreation surh not to of a predominant Power Prussia; the Resolution the in and of
British Government not to sufler the Electoral Dominions of

His Majesty beincorporated a System little favour;* to in so blc to the Happiness Interestsof His Subjects. and The Experience which Hanoverhashad of the Kxartion and Tyranny belongingto the Military Laws of Prussia, especiallywhen enforcedupon neighbouring States, has excited that Countrya Repugnance Pru&riuu in to Protection, which would make any Arrangement,founded upon that Principle,in the highestdegree: distasteful.* * His Majesty perfectly is readyto cooperate tint Restorafor tion of the Prussian Monarchy all it's own Kstatrs,ami to to all its formerSplendour, wouldevengladly consent He to any arrangement (not affectingHis own Dominions) which might consolidate improvethe Powerand Rcsourm of and Prussia;and build Her future greatness a more solid on

Foundation, that of a militarySystem, than admirable! in

Theory till it wastried in action; but of which the Vice

andtheWeakness since (long discovered some thehat by of

Politicians Europe, perhaps a littlesuspected of and not by Prussia Herself) been have unfortunately toomanifest made
to all the World, at the momentwhen the existence the of

Monarchy to bestaked it, came upon Butto attempt re-establish same to that factitious Power,

and give Strength Support subjectingIt, in a to it and by to

great degree, other the neighbouring Countries whichareas




much entitled as Prussia the recoveryand maintenance to of their Independence, a Projectin which there would be as IH little of Polity asof Justice,and which on both Accountsmust he laid asideanabsolutelyimpracticable. The Safrty of the North of Germany (when the Statesof Germany shall have been restored)may be provided for by a federativeSystrmvin which aswell asHanover? Saxonyand arc entitled to bear their part, not as subordinate sals, hut as great and independent Members, and they would probably be found willing to do so. But they arc not willing to choose themselves Sovereign for a -"ami still lessa Sovereign whoseSystemis known, and has hern felt to l><\that of considering Her Allies not somuchthe
Sharers of Her Councils, as the Recruiters of Her Army-

a Powerwho himprovedHerself unequal Her owndefence; to hut who would repair that Instrumentwhich has broken short in Her own Hand, at the Expense Her Neighbours, of and then rail upon them to trust exclusively it for their to

,. .You will requestthe Interference the Emperorof of RviKsia check and discountenance suchProjectsas are to any
attributed to the Prussian Cabinet.. *.





[Theperiod during which Castlercugh Fom^nSrnrtary was wasthe most important Britishdiplomacy.It vviturjwcd in th
formation of the Grand Alliance, the <tcfoit of Napolnm, hr

CongressVienna, thereconstructionKumpr, In all of of and of these Gastlereagh alarge had share* skillin binding Great His ihr Alliance together histactin handling and foreign jmtrntai" \nl
him to seek a system government Con^ir?** Confor of l>y am! ference-He thus became ultimately the moat "Kumpran*1 of
British statesmen,

Doc.4, hereprinted,exhibits views thr BrJiinh the of Cabinet as to the resettlement Europe, of after Napolwnhad Wit tlr*
of 1814.The suggestions the British Cabinet wrrr thrrrforr of tentative in character,though they were largely realised in fart. Briefly summarizing, maysaythat; au rciuh of the Vienna we settlement,France was excludedfrom the: Low CounWf** am!
the Rhine. What is now Belgium (with some slight tlJfferewvs)
was united to Holland, to make u Htrong Dutch state* l*rw*ia got

feated Leipzig before had at but he fought immortal bin campaign

the districts South of the Rhine, but France retained Alsace-

Lorraine, Piedmontwas strengthened with Genoa*Austria with Lombardy and Venetia* Of the coloniesEngland took what Him thought necessary, returned the rich sugar inland of Ouado but loupe to France,andJava and other fertile Dutch Indian Mauds to Holland.Thustheideas Pitt in 1805, well ai of thtt <Sahinrt of as in 1813,werepretty well carried out* Sofar, anyBritishstatesmen the daymight havedictatedthe of Viennasettlement* it is in the arrangements Ruarantmng But for

that settlement originalitywasshewn*It b enough *uy that to here Castlereagh,accordance thetcn*ywir-old that in with proponal of Pitt, proposed general "a accord guarantee and between Great the Powers Europe, a determination support amuigo of with to the ment agreedupon, and to turn the generalinfluence,and if
necessary general arms, against the Power that shall first the

attempt disturb continental to the peace",* Theguarantee! were not new,theoriginality in applying guarantee the whole lay a to of Europeandmakingthe Powers subscribe it, But list Tar to
* To Liverpool, February V.C.K. Webto,The 13 18x8. *Mf Mia Castlereagh [i93I],Chap, 4,Chap, the it quoted 1813-15, vn, via, 3-4; text
on pp. 428-9.



rrfu*rri to includeTurkeyIn thtsguarantee, Napoleon returned

from Elba, awl thr guarantee its original form wasabandoned, in hrrr *hnv* thr tmiriirtiim* which Castlereagh receivedfor the prarc-i and thr nrxt or will hcwwhat he considered had been achtfvrcl at Viennaand in thn subsequent Conferences.]

Ultimately(!.iMlrrraghrrlicd emothermeans, asperiodic such mmicm*,to krqi the peace Europe. of The document printed

Document 4* 7'A<" dttkinrtMemorandum December of%& 1813; hi.\tructitwxjar Peace* Making*

f*HMr,NT: Thr I,wl <;)mmriU*r,Thr JxrdiVmtkm, Ixird Privy Seal,Earl of le,trl !Ufhtirl, Kurl uf Hurktoghatn,Krl of Muigraw.,Viscount **| VtMmmf .NJrlvitlr, Mr, VAnnhturt, Mn B, Btiihum, Vis[coun]t

Thr llirre* Allied Powers havinginvitedthe PrinceRegent to snul a Pirntpoinntiuryto the Continentcharged with full I'owm lo Ural both with friendly and Hostile Powers all in mattm, whi<kh <-<*ntcrn generalInterests;and His Royal the
HifdmnM, having prcviouBly received from the Ministers of
* jP " 4 f | ff

the Huid l*owc?rn Ix>ndonsatisfactoryAssurances the in on Murttitnr Q^itrstion! beenpleased Compliance the has in with d<**ire the Bait!Allies* to direct HpsJ M[ajesty]Js of Secretary
of State for F<irci{rnAifairs to proceed forthwith to the Head Quarter!* of the Alhc m Execution of this EspecialService* ft. j* t *** * l-1^ i
*T A * /* , * * Y*I * "" fl "

Lore!Ca^ticrcagh Charged the first Instance enter h in to into tmch Preliminary Explanationsas may be necessary to
uncertain with precision the Basison which it is proposedto Negotiate.
A " **

He is to Endeavour to Establish a Clear and definite under-

standingwith the Allies,not only on all Mattersof Common lntcrest uponsuchPoints, are likely to be discussed but as with the Enemy* that the Several ao Allied Powers in may their Negotiations with Franceact in perfectConcert,and together maintain one CommonInterest. If Call'd on for an Explanation theviews hisGov[en> of of menjt asto Termsof Peace, the sacrifice Conquests, and of
lit* *

whichO[rea]t Britain is disposed makefor the general to

F.O, 130/1. Thii hasakeady been published C, K, Webster, by British



Interest, is to State, with respect thelatter, It must he that to

in a great Measure governed theNature theCondi* be by of tionsWithrespect theContinent, to whichtheAllied Powers

may be Enabled obtainfrom the Enemy. to
If the Maritime Power of France shall be restricted within

duebounds theEffectual by EstablishmentHolland-The of Peninsula Italy in Security, Independence, and and Gjmijt
Britain consistent her own Securitymay then he induced with

to applythegreater proportion her Conquests promote of to the general Interests.If on the Contrary the arrangement shouldbe defective any of thesePoints,G[rca|t Britain in must secure proportionable a shareof thoseConquests to
render her SecureagainstFrance. If Call'd on for more detailedExplanationhe may State,

that the objects sineQua Non upon which G[reajt Britain canventureto divestherself her Conquests any material of in degreeare, ist the AbsoluteExclusionof France from any Naval Establishmenton the Scheldt, and Especially at AntwerpandsndlyThe Securityof Holland beingadequately providedfor underthe Houseof Orangeby a Barrier, which
shall at leastIncludeJuliers andAntwerp aswell asMaastricht with a SuitableArrondiscmcntof Territory in Addition to Holland asit stoodin 1792. It being understoodthat Wcsd
shall also be in the hands of one of the Allied Powers* It must be understood that the Monarchies of the Peninsula

mustalsobe Independent under their LegitimateSovereigns Their Dominions leastin Europe at beingguaranteed aguhm attackby France.The Allied Powers take Engagements to to this Effect, and to Stipulatethe Amount of Succours be to
"K'W T.,1 jJ

actually furnished in such Case,

If noneacceptable the Continental to Powers G[reajt

Britain will be prepared Confine Casus to the foedcris the to Continent, being nevertheless herselfbound to afford the StipulatedSuccours, providedHolland and the Peninsula
shall be secured.

In consideration such Arrangement Hollandand of an for

for the Restitution the Conquests fromFrance of made as

thePeninsula, Britain bedisposedStipulate G[rea]t will to

THE APPROACHOF PEACE 31 Enumeratedin the Margin and in this view to render them

availablefor the purposes Negotiation. of Malta being Always understood RemainBritish, The to Mauritius and Bourbon-Guadeloupe theSaintes and cannot
be restored to France.

The Mauritius is retained as being when in the handsof an Enemy a most Injurious Naval Station to our Indian Commerce, whilst it is oflittle Comparative Valueto France. Guadeloupe is insisted upon as a debt of Honor to Sweden. If by the Successof the Allied Arms Holland and the Peninsula shall be secured above, Conquests as the Specified in the Margin may then be applied to Compensate other demandswhich our ContinentalAllies may have to bring

If the Restorationof Guadeloupe shouldbe madea point Sine Qua Non by France and consequentlyof War with
Sweden, the Latter Power might in an Ultimatum be compensatedby Bourbon, or a Dutch Colony, Holland in that Canetaking Bourbon, Holland being Secured by a Barrier as above, the Dutch ColoniesasSpecified the Margin to berestored Hollandin to The Capeof Good Hopeisexcepted, a Position as connected with the Security of our Empire in the East, but in lieu of this Colony Gfrcajt Britain to appropriateTwo Million Sterling to be applied towardsthe Improvementof the Dutch Barrier. With respectto the Danish Conquests, is proposed It they should (with the Exception of Heligoland) be made Instrumental to the Executionof our Engagements Sweden. to In all Communicationson the Expediencyof Peace,the

sameCourseto be pursuedas heretofore-viz to Evincea desireto Conform as far as possibleto the generalInterests of the Continent-To giveto the Alliesthemostunequivocal Assurances a firm determination supportthemin Conof to tendingfor an Advantageous Peace to avoideverything and thatmightcountenance aSuspicion G[rea]Britainwas that t Inclinedto push themforward theWarfor[her]ownpurposes. in The UtmostExertions be used preventanyrelaxation to to

in the Military Operations, whilstNegotiations pending. are



Also to direct Forceasmuch as possible from all Quarters

uponHollandandthe Low Countries. To Explain thePrince Grange, tin: BritishFmve to of that

in Holland, (exclusive 2000 Russians), of cannot;at present

be carriedbeyond10,000 Men and must be considered as

liable to be withdrawn to Reinforce Lord Wellington.

ShouldAustriapropose Settlementof the Arch Duke the Charlesin the Netherlands, Propositionto be.favorably the
received. It may be proper to remark at the saim* dine, that
f A JL

much must depend the Success the War in Flanders, on of If the Enemyshouldbe driven backwithin Antiont France by Connecting Considerable of the GermanTerritory a part
on the Left Bank of the Rhine with Brabant etc. an Inter-

mediaryPowerof Considerable Importancemight he erected^ and one which supportedby Austria would form a most Important Barrier both for Holland and Germany* If the*
Successesof the Allies should be more circumscribed or should

the objectof giving to Holland an adequateBarrier have to beacquiredby Negotiationand not by Conquest, may then it not be prudent to aim at More, than such an Extcrmon of
Holland as before described.

The Princeof Orangeto be discouraged from any attempt to extendHolland on the Sideof the Netherlands beyond J Its AncientLimits,without the Express Consent the Allies. of The proposedMarriage to be Confidentially to be Con-

fidentially[sic]open'dto the Sovereigns HeadQuarters, at with the intendedLimitation of the Succession, Prince the
of Orange'sConsent being previouslyobtain5tl
If Barrier for Holland should not be securedto the Extent

propose therestitution theDutch [d], of Colonies beproporto

tionately Limited.

As the Barrier Holland an object for is mostdeeply Interesting all the Allies,G[rea]tBritainis willing to to
purchase by a doubleSacrifice, Cessions to France it by both

andto Holland.If theAllies should carry Point, not this so

important their to Own Security,well tothat Gfreajt as as of

Britain, the latter Powerwill in that Casehave no other

alternative to preserve Colonial than her Conquests a as

THE APPROACH PEACE OF 33 Counterpoise the dominion of the Enemyand on these to groundsto withhold thoseCessions which shewould otherwise be prepared to make to France-*

TheOssionof Conquests G[rca]l Britainbeing by declared

to be Contingent upon Equivalent Securitiesto result from the Gmtinc'JUulArrangements, Especially the Side and on

of Holland and the Low Countries, generalStipulaany tion which dws not expressly declarethe principleby which it isto beregulated connect pointedly and it with these objects, appears objectionable* In any Arrangement Italy, the Military Line of theAlps, of and the Roadslately opcn'd in the directionof Italy to be
particularly attended to. with respect to the Internal Arrangementof Italy, It is highly Expedientthat the King of Sardiniashouldberestored, perhapsreceiving Genoain Exchange Savoy. for If Austria Connects herselfwith Murat, the SicilianFamily to have Tuscany and Elba, The Popeto be restoredto the Estates the Church, of The Milanese,Modcna,Parma*Plascentia to be subject etc
to dLscusHion.

The Prince Regent'sMediation,if solicitedby the Allies in the Arrangementof the Internal Affairs of Germany, be to

G[reu]t Britain to declareher readiness, shoulda General Peace nignttd,to Sign a Separate be Peace with the United States of America on the StatusQyo Ante Bdlum, without Involving in such Treaty any decisions upon the Pointsin disputeat the CommencementHostilities. of A direct Proposition treatin London to havingbeen lately made to the American Gov[ernmen]tthis offer not to be stated, unless Subject the should brought be forward.
Should such an offer be made to America, a Time to be

limitedwithinwhichherAcceptanceorrefusalmust bedeclared. TheQuestion to theArrangement Denmark be as with to Subject discussion Sweden* to with The distribution of the Commandin the North, to be
reservedfor Consideration at Head Quarters.
"Jj* a r * 3



The5 Millions Subsidy begranted may under following the

ist Reserve to the sending as Homethe RussianFleet.

sndlyTheaccepting, required, proportion the Same if a of

in Credit Bills.

3rdlyTheSigning such of Engagements Especially and with respect Holland thePeninsula, mayJustifyboth to and as
to the British Publick and the Allies so great an Exertion in
favor of the three Powers.

The Treatyof Alliancenot to terminatewith the War, but to Containdefensive Engagements eventualobligations with to supportthe Powers attack'd by France,with a certain extentof StipulatedSuccours,
The CasusFoederis to be an Attack by France on the

European Dominions any oneof the ContractingParties. of Spainandif possible Hollandto beincluded Contracting as

Sweden beingbeyondthe Baltick is less Interestedin bring Included,or rather hasan Interestnot to participate:. Humbly Submitted for your Royal Higlmm's Sanction, [Signed] GeorgeP|rim:e] Efegmtj*
5, THE CONGRESS SYSTB [The Treatiesof Parisand Vienna endedthe long period of the* Revolutionary Napoleonic and warsand transformed map of the Europe, A comparison the termswith thoseforeshadowed of in the Cabinet Memorandumof 26 December1813in xwefuK The Treaty of Vienna, signedon 9 June 1815,actually before the decisiveday of Waterloo, containedno fewer than 121clauwe,f Its provisions into several fell greatgroups* The first of thene may
be best indicated by describing it as the settlement of the Balanre of Power. The principle was that each Great Power was to obtain

theterritoryor its equivalent it hadheldin 1805,Except that in

the case Russia wasfairly carriedout, Russia n large of this got part of Poland, includingWarsaw capital,whichsherecovered the from Prussia, promised forma national and to kingdom Poland of

and to endow with a constitution. the opinionof both her In

John Robinson was to be sentas "Assistant,with the rank of Mintaer Plenipotentiary,with Full Powers etc-in case your illne&s otherwk?1*. of or

* An additionalparagraph these to instructions that the Horn Frctdrrk says

| V.Hertslet, [of Europe Treaty], Map by [1875], 208-74* *>





wantoo great, and upsetthe Balanceof Power. Alarm wasinjudges thought necessary.

Castlereagh Metternieh accession and this ofpower population and

creased thr factthatAlexander by maintained army nearly an of a million men,which wasabouttwicethe number good that
AHregards Germany balancing power fairlycarried the of was out. Prussia complained she less that got thanthe1805 standard, andthiswas true. Butshe hada great of Polish had deal territory in iHofj,and nheexchanged for half of Saxony for the this and
Rhine Province, It is singular that Prussiaat the time showed

nospecial dcairrforthinlast acquisition, which made ultimately her

thr national championof GermanyagainstFrance. prrvrnting her from armr&ing all Saxonyas she had desired. Further* Mcttrrnich erertedBavaria oncemoreinto a powerful state,on whoseco-operation Austria could depend, Hanover, from its Htitishconnexion, obtained goodaccession territory, a of The other smallerstates Germany of werecut up and carved out
It* suit Austrian or Prussian convenience,and the total number
of German Nfaten included in the new Federation was reduced to

Austriaadjusted balance the against Prussia Germany in by

thirty-nine. Austria retained,in dlVttt, the headship Germany, of though Pmsniawas not far behind her in authority. Austria did not aim at gains in Germany, but in Italy, She acquired VVnclia and recoveredLombardy* All the other states in Italy were really satellitesin her train. Piedmont acquired Genoa, and was helped by this acquisition to defend the North against Fiance, Hie Papal Stateswere restored,and Napleswas
again set up as a kingdom under a Bourbon. By a secrettreaty

made (with CuHlIcrca^h's approval) betweenMcttcrnich and the King of Naples thr latter promised not to grant a constitution without Austria^ commit, Metternich's avowed object was to break up and dismemberItaly, ami he regardeda constitutionas likely to lead 10an agitation againsthis views. The next important phase thesettlement of concerned Holland and Uclghim, These were united into one kingdom, again with the idea of sirengthemiigthe resistingpowerof small states against Kranrr*. GaHtlrreagh further restoredto the United Kingdom of the Netherlandsthe enormously rich Dutch colonyof Java,and

km her two million pound* fortify herfrontieragainst to France, Switzerland recognised independent guaranteed wan an and by all thei*o\vt?r. Spain Portugal and recovered oldboundaries their ia Europe, Denmark deprived Norway, was of whichwas handed
ta Sweden,This aruletncnt causedheartburnings,as Castlereagh

had to threatenNorwaywith a blockade beforeshegaveway. Buif thoughthis incidentwasan unpleasant it wasnot one one,

forwhich practical diplomats blame will Castlereagh.acritical At momentSweden refused join the coalition to against Napoleon



unless Norway promised her,and Gastlcrcagh comwas to wan

pelledto pay the price.
Certain other settlementswere made by, or in consequenceof,

theTreaty Vienna. property of The claims individuals had of who suffered the war werefairly met.The vexatious by disputes to us diplomatic etiquette precedence finally scttlrtl A and were
doctrine as to international rivers was laid down, winch wan

important thefuture. slave for The tradewas declared inhuman

andit was abolished France, by Spain, Holland,andSweden, and promised be abolished Portugal. to by This greatconcession to humaneideaswas almostsolelydue to Gastlcrcagh, and to the British popularagitationbehindhim, It hasbeencustomary denounce peacemakers Vienna to the of asreactionary illiberalin the extreme.It is indeed and true that they represented old regimeand were, to a large extent the > untouched the newideas.But theyrepresented bestand by the not the worstof the old rigime, and their settlement avertedany greatwar in Europefor forty years. Accordingto their lights the
settlement was a fair one. The settlement disregarded national

claims, forced 'unnatural unions' on Norway and Sweden* on Belgiumand Holland, But in eachcasethe ally and the stronger partner (Sweden Holland) demanded and the.Allies did and it, not seetheir way to resistthe demand. A more seriouscriticism was the disrespect paid to the views of smaller powers,Though the settlementwas supposedto be in favour of the old order and existing rights, the smaller stateswere ruthlessly sacrificed for the benefit of the larger. For this sideof their activities there in little excuse,and it is the gravest criticism of their actions, The work of Vienna, interrupted by Napoleon,was completed by two treaties, signed Parison sjoNovember at 1815*Of UH*HC one,the Second Treaty of Pari$ modifiedthe termsimposedon Franceby the First Treaty of Parisof 30 May 18x4,bound France to carry out the new arrangements, submit to the frowirra of to 1790, to pay an indemnity, and to return the works of art to

foreigncapitals. The second treatywasthe Quadruple Alliance betweenthe Four Great Powers-* They bound thciwclvttt to maintainthe arrangements Chaumont, of Vienna,and Parisby armed force for twenty years,both as regardsthe territorial boundaries fixedand asregards perpetual now the exclusion of Bonaparte hisdynasty and fromthethrone France* of Finally, by Article VI, theyagreed *renew to theirmeetings fixedperiod* at *

to discuss matters common 'of interest9, this articlelay the In

germ of future international government,

Alexander sought, further, bindall monarchs to together a in Christian unionof charity, peace, loveby a solemn and declaration, issued 26 September andto besigned on 1815,
* Thetexts the and of First Second TreatiesPaware of printed Herttlet, m Map, [1875], 1-28, i, 342-69; of theQuadruple that Alliance, ibid,

THE CONGRESS SYSTEM 37 alone.The Regentof Great Bzitain wasunableto signit, for

couMtitutinnal reasons, though sent private he a lettertoAlexander, expressing sympathy thesentiments. thisexception his with With
it wansignrd by everyking in Europeand by the President the of literal* as a hateful compactof despots againstthe libertiesof

Swiss Republic.It became known, was and regarded European by mankind.It wannot that,nor hadit anydiplomatic binding or force. Charity ami love* not capable beingdefined diploare of in
matic terms, and no one* exceptAlexanderthought seriously of the Treaty. Castlcrragh called it a *pieceof sublimemysticismand nonacnac'. Mattornichmade profane aboutChristianity conjests in nectiwuvithit. Neitherregarded himself in anywaybound it,* as by The bond which Cnstlereagh and Mctternich did recognize was that of the (Quadruple Alliance, But they differedgreatlyabout its interpretation. According to Castlcreagh, England wasbound to defend the territorial limits laid down at Vienna for twenty yeans. She was bound alsoto meetperiodically in congresses with
her AIHr.% hut sht* was not bound to interfere in case of internal

revolution in any country (other than an attempt to restore Napoleon), Mettermch argued that the Quadruple Alliance did commit Us membersto armed interferenceto suppress internal revolution in any country, if the Congress thought it advisable.In
the end these two views were bound to come into conflict,

The first meeting of the Powers-in accordance ** with the proA visions of Article VI of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliancetook placeat Aix-Ia-Chapellein the autumnof 1818. The published protocols of the Conferencedealt primarily with the settlement with France, including the much debatedquestionof her future rciatiom with the Quadruple Alliance Powers. In brief: the Quadruple Alliance was maintained, and France was invited to takepart in their present future deliberations, and consecrated to the maintenance thepeace, treaties whichit isfounded, of the on the rights and mutual relationsestablished confirmed these or by treaties,and recognised all the European by Powers". This note, dated 4 November,was accepted the Due de Richelieuon by the ittthuf The part taken by the British representatives these in decisions beenfully analysed Professor has by Webster,J it is and

sufficient hereto quotehisconclusion: On thewhole, " Castlereagh was victorious. He kept his country unpledged exceptto the obligations which shehad takenat Paris. Where Alexander was permittedto havehis way the objectionable phrase imposed no definiteobligation. Moreover, system reunions, the of under Article VI, was maintainedin its full vigour, and Francewas admitted to them. But they werenot madeautomaticexceptin
the caseof a revolution occurring in Franceitself,"
* For text v* Hertitet, Map, [1875], jt, 317-20.
f F, ibid* 5S7~75*

K ibid. 155-6.

J 0. K. Webster, Fomgn The Policy Castlenagh, of x$X5-x8**, [1925], 121



The unanimity theAllies,suggested the wordingof thr of by published documents, covered facta widediv*rgriircof vifws in
as to the character of the Alliance, This was the subject of critical

discussions extending from 13 to 21 Octobrn* the protagonists

being Alexander Castlcreagh. Tsarexplained views and The his in a longmemorandum 8 Octobcrfcommunicated the of to
Conference the I4th; Metternich's on wereembodied a letter in dated7 October;! Castlcreagh his verbally,Thr 'abstrao gave tionsand sweeping generalities* the Russian of paperalarmed bothWellington and'Castlcreagh, theythoughtIf wouldbe and 'hazardous' attempt writtenanswer. to a They therefore derided
sto invite the Ministers to a free discussion of all that had hern

written', andin' anextended conversationCbstlerragh \ explained his attitude. On 19October, wrotehomea privateand conhe fidentialletter describing what had takenplace,and enclosing, amongother documents, memorandum his own. AH he a of himself said, he had 'thrown* into it the substance his stateof
ments to the other ministers. The memorandum wan written ibr

the information of the Governmentat home,although, anProfessor

Webster tells us, it was shown to Mctternich.|| It records the arguments whichCastlereagh to meetthe*abstractions' with tried of the Tsar. It explainsat length the interpretation which Castlereagh placed on the treatieswhich governedthe Congress system. It was a private document,never intendedfor formal communication,far lessfor publication, and may be taken as expressingCastlereagh's most sincereviews.
Great interest


to it

Is &


\ *




interpretationwhich Castlereagh placedon the binding character of treaties, and the meaning of a guarantee. It givesto clasnificn* tion of the two treatiesof Parisand the Treaty of Vienna*-none of which, he said, ccontain any express guarantee*,It arguesthat these treaties 'cannot be said to form an Alliance, in the trict sense the word*; while, in contrast,thoseof the Quadruple of Alliance both at Chaumontin 1814and Paris in 1815did* It expresses, clearly and with telling emphasis* British view of the the natureof theAllianceand the character theguarantee* of and

in bothrespects sounds keynote thepolicywhichwasto be the of developed the succeeding in years. The differences between Powers Aix-Ia-Chapelle in the at were themselvesserious a warningthat theAlliancemightnot holdfor long. Even when issue the seemed settled Prussian a proposal was madefor a territorial guarantee which emphasized breach the
between Britain and the continental Powers. The fact was that
* Cp. Professor Webster's account, cit, x45-55. op,
Wellington, x8$8-72y 743-51, xn,

| V. Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence andMemoranda Meg qf of the

J P.O.92/35. CitedC, K, Webster, dt. 149, op.

F.O. 92/35.Castlereagh Bathum,No. 13,Private to and QonfldemiaJ, 19October 1818, || a K. Webster, <ft.161op,

THE CONGRESS SYSTEM 39 between Russia, AustriaandPrussia,, threeoriginalmembers the

of the Holy Alliance, a bond existed which did not touch Britain

fear of revolution. Alexanderaloneamongthem clothedhis fear in the languageof abstracttheory, but the practical limitations which CnKtltrrnfth here placeson the obligationsof the Powers to interfere in the eventof revolutionwere in reality as little to the

-the bondthat in the course timewasto make of co-operation impossible. wana bondof autocrats; bondstrengthened It a by

taste Metteraich, natural of The* sequel AixJa-Chapelle to was

the policy expressed the StatePaperof 5 May 1820(Doc* in 6). Moreover^it is significant that even the measure agreement of which Castlerengh had with the Allies was not sharedby all his colleagues hoim% that amonghiscriticstheprominent at and place was taken by his successor, Canning,*] Document 5* Memorandum the Treaties 1814and1815, on of Aix-ta-CkapdlC) October i8i8f

The Benign Principles theAlliance the26thSept[embe]r of of 1815,having beeneither formally or substantiallyadhered to by all Powers, may be considered constitutingthe European as System,in matter of political Conscience* J It would, however,be derogatoryto this solemnact of the Sovereigns, mix its discussion theordinary diplomatick to with obligations, which bind Stateto State, and which are alone
to be looked for in the Treaties which have been concluded
in the accustomed Form.

The presentDiplomatickPositionof Europemay be considered under two distinct Heads; ist The treatieswhich may be said to bind its Statescollectively* sly The treatieswhich

arc peculiarto particular States. Under the first Head, may be enumerated, Treaty of The Peacesignedat Paris 30th May 1814,-The Act of the Congress Vienna,signed of June gth 1815, and the Treaty of Peace, signed Paris,the 20thof Nov[embe]r at 1815.
* Op.Buthurftt** letterto Caitlcreagh aoOctober brig of 1818, Correspondence
.,.<>/ Viscount GasilmQ$k) [1853% 55-8. xn>
Vunna(and rd. 1934)*166-71,

f Original K0 93/35* in Printed toto C. K, Webster, Congress in in The qf

J V< Hwwlet, Jfefflj>ti8751l)i,3i7-ao so-called Alliance This the is Holy Treaty signed the Austrian Russian by and Emperors the King of Prussia, and etc* The Prinei! Regent GreatBritainannounced-In to aninvitation of reply to sign-that"theforms theBritish of Constitution.. .preclude from me acceding formally thi* Treaty**, expressed "entireconcurrence" the to but his with



Thesetransactions, which all the Statesof Europe, (with to

the exception the Porte)are at this day eithersigningor of acceding Parties, beconsidered the greatOharte,by may as which the Territorial System Europe, unhinged by the of
eventsof war and Revolution, has been again restored to order. The Consent of all the European States, France included,hasnot only beengiven to this settlement,but their Faith has beensolemnlypledgedto the strict observance of
its arrangements, These Treaties contain some few Regulations not strictly

Territorial, but it maybe asserted, the generalCharacter that of their Provisionsis of that nature, and, that they contain, in no case,Engagements, which have been pushedbeyond the immediateobjectswhich are madematter of regulation
in the Treaties themselves.

It is further to be observed,that none of thesethree Treaties

contain any express guarantee, generalor special,by which their observance to be enforced,saveand exceptthe temis porary Guaranteeintended to be assuredby Article 5 of the Treaty of 1815which regulatesthe Army of Occupation to
be left in France.

There is no doubt, that a breachof the Covenantby any oneStateis an Injury, which all the other States may?if they shall think fit, eitherseparately collectivelyresent* the or but Treatiesdo not impose, express by stipulation^ doing so, the as matter of positive obligation. So solemna Pact, on the
faithful execution and observance of which all Nations should

feel the strongest Interest,may be considered, under the as Protection a moral guarantee, the highestNature, but of of asthose who framedthese did not probablyseehow the acts wholeConfederacy could,without theutmostInconvenience, be made collectively to enforce the observance these of Treaties, the execution of this duty seemsto have been
deliberately left to ariseout of the Circumstances the Time of

and of the Case, the offending and State be broughtto to reason suchof theinjuredStates, might,at themoment by as thinkfit to charge themselves theTask defending with of their
own rights, thus invaded.

If thisAnalysis these of Treaties correct, be they cannotbe



saidto form an Alliance,in thestrict sense the Word,They of no doubt form thr gcmcnil Pact, by which all in regulated, whirh, at that moment was open, in Kurope to regulation, hut they ran hardly be Matedto give any specialor superior securityto thr parti of the*Europeansystemthus regulated,
ascompared with those parts, which were not affected by these
i * * /

Negotiations, upon which consequently thoseTransactions arc wholly sitem, and whirh rent,for their title, upon anterior Treaties,or public'k Acts of equal and recognised Authority,
Under the* ad Hrad, vi/t, that of Treaties which are

peculiarto particular States,may be enumerated, Treaties the of Aitiancr of Chuumom and Paris* an signed by the four greatAllied Powers.There wasu Treaty of Alliance, deriving its Principlefrom that of Chuumnnt, intermediately .signed at Vienna,via on the tfflth March iljf 5, by nearlyall the Powers, but asthr Stipulations thisTreaty arcdeclared havebeen of to satisfied theTreaty of Peace [Parisj of (noI Nov[cmbe]r by of 1815,and to have thereby becomeextinct, it will make the statement more clear, to omit the further mention of it, in
The treaties anterior to that of Ghaumont between the same

Powers may be usefullyreferredto, asexplainingthe events

ji f'\4JF+ ** * dW**l Dtrtn wincn |n%nrsi 4* MUVC T% V"fc&" tnis Jlf cornDinstuon >"%.%% l > J9h iucAt F i Jtt "* &L *" *%fr to &111 Jfe% 1^4 j*3* *** * jBflt **** 4** %*%h Dctwccn *% ^ n p*\ ^^4* J^t
^ ij

4 Principal Powers Europe, as opposed France*at a of to momentwhen the great Massof thoseStates, who afterwards joined the Allies, and constituted with them the coalitions which, in the years1814and 1815, operatedagainstFrance,, were yet under the yoke of that Power, The treaties QuadrupleAllianceconcluded Chaumont of at and Paris may be considered Treatiesof Alliance,in the as strictestand most enlargedsense the word; They havea of professed object;Theydefine steps betakenin pursuit the to of that object; And they declarethe stipulatedForce,by which that object is to be attainedand secured, Thesetwo Treaties form one system,consistent its purpose,but in

and Conservation Europeagainstthe of may be statedto be the avowed Principle




TheTreaty Chaumont 1814 of in aimed effectuating at an ImprovementtheState Europe thepreliminary in of as Condition to a Peace with France,and at defendingby the force of the Alliance,thetermsof that Peace, made.The Treaty if

of Parisin 1815 only to placethe Stateof Things, as had established the Treaties Parisand Vienna,under the by of
Protection of the Quadruple Alliance.

Thetreaty Chaumont tothisAlliance Character of gave that of Permanence whichthe deeprootedNature of the danger against whichit was intended provide, to appeared require, to viz twenty yearsfrom March 1814,with an eventualContinuance. This Character of Permanencewas atlciitionally

recognised theLanguage theParis by of Treaty,th<: wholeof the Provisions whichproceed, only uponthe admission of not
of a dangerstill existing,but upon the necessity keeping of alivetheprecautionary Arrangements theTreatyevenafter of the Army of occupation shall havebeenwithdrawn, The [2nd] ParisTreaty also aimedat specifying with Precision.,as far as Possible,the GasusPoedcrisupon which the Contracting Parties should be bound to furnish their Stipulated Succours. Wherethat could not be done,the object was, to provide a Modeby which the Case doubt might be decidedat the in
time it should arise.

Three distinct Cases provided for in Articles 2 and 3 are of the Treaty,* the two first beingcases fact are clearand of specifick, third beinga Case a mixedNature,dependent the of for its just Solutionupon the Circumstances the Event of which shall be alledged give occasion it, is left to be to to decidedin concertby the Allied Courts when the moment shall arrive,"f

In construing obligations this Treaty,the Recital the of whichits Preamble contains no doubtto beheld in vicw.J is
* V.Hertslet, [1875], Map, 1,373-4. Art.II-pledges signatory (i) the power* to exclude ^Bonaparte the dynasty France.(li) Art, 111-pledges to from them maintain lineofmilitary a posts France a certain in for number yc&nr, of t This refers the following to passage (Hi) Art. II, "And as the same in Revolutionary Principles, upheld last which the criminal usurpation, again, might under forms, other convulse andthereby France endanger rtpoae other the of States" under these circumstancesPowers "concert.. the will .rnettures", *tc. J Preamble: " Considering therepose Europe essentially that of is interwoven withtheorder things of founded themaintenance Royal on ofthe Authority



It serves showthe Degree which the Order of things to in then established Franceoperatedas a Motive with the in Allies in makingthe Treaty, and the deepInterestthey felt in their Consolidation a Means thegeneral as to Tranquillity; -but as it was not required that Franceshould bind herself, in the enactingPart of Her Treaty, to maintaininviolatethe political order of things then existing,it doesnot appear
competentfor the Allies to consideran Alteration in that order

of things, whetherlegally effectuated, brought about by or indirect means, in itselfconstitutingsuchan Infraction of as

the Peaceas the Allies are entitled to take Notice of, independent of the Considerationof how far that Changegoes

immediatelyto endanger their own repose safety. and The Principle of guaranteeing both King and People to the establishedorder of things was much talked of at the time; by someit wascontended that a species guarantee of havingbeengivento the King by the arrangement placing for an army of occupationin Francecoupledwith the Instructions to the Duke of Wellington for the employmentof the Troops,
whilst they should remain there, that the Allies should give the Nation the same security their libertiesby guaranteeing for their Charte, but neither Alternative was adopted and no guarantee was given beyond what grew out of the circumstances above alluded to.

A guaranteewhich was in its nature temporary, and was expressly limited to a period not exceeding yearsby the five provisionscontainedin Art[icle] 5 of the generalTreaty of Peace.* The 4 Powers,it is true, took further measures of Precautionin their Treaty of Alliance, signedthe sameday aswill appear reference the5thArt[icle],f butthisArticle by to proceeds uponthe principlethat afterthe armyof occupation
and of the Constitutionalcharter, and wishing to employ all their meansto prevent the generaltranquility (the object of the wishesof mankind and the constantend of their efforts)from being againdisturbed" etc. * Cp, the and. Treaty of Paris,signed20 November1815* f Art. V; "The High ContractingPartieshaving agreedto the dispositions laid down in the precedingArticles, for the purposeof securingthe effectof

their engagements during the temporary occupation, declare,moreover, that even afterthe expiration thismeasure, saidengagements still remain of the shall
in full force and vigour, for the purpose carrying into effectsuchmeasures of

asmay be deemed necessary the maintenance the stipulations for of contained in Articlesi and a of the present Act." This is fromthe Quadruple Treatyof
Alliance signedat Paris,20 November1815,



shouldbe withdrawn the Allies could only justify an Interference the affairsof a Foreign State, upon the ground of in

considering own safety their compromised that, indeand pendently such Consideration, could justlyclaim of a they not anyright of interference, in prudence or charge themselves
with the taskof redressing violations the internal Constituof tion of France; In this Sense latter part of Artflele] 3 is the framed, being onlyArticlein eitherTreatywhichtouches the the question,*-The true point therefore Consideration for under this Article must alwaysbe:-Ls the safetyor Interest, of the Alliancesofar compromised the eventasto justify by
recurrence to War? or is it a case if not for actual war, at least

for defensive precautions? finally is it a ease or whichthough moreor lessto be disapproved, regretted, or neitherjustifies the former nor requires the latter Alternative? The Case admitsin goodsense, well asaccordingto the wordsof the as
Treaty, of no other solution; it would have been impossible to have proposedto France an express Article to preserve inviolate the order of things as therein established^for no state of things could be more humiliating than that of u State which should be bound to its neighbours,to preserveunchanged internalSystem, that anyfundamentalchange its and in it, without their consent first had and obtained* should In

itself be cause War-If sucha Principlecannotbe mainof tained,for a moment argument, qualificationof it that in the the change, be tolerated, to mustbe legallymade,is not less so,for howcanforeign States safely left to judge of what be islegalin another State, whatdegree Intrigueor violence or of shall give to the Change Characterwhich is to entitle the

themto interfere-The safe only Principle that of the Law is of Nations-That State a rightto endanger neighno has its bours itsinternal by Proceedings, thatif it docs, and provided theyexercisesound a discretion, Theirright of Interference is clear.It isthisrightupon which latterpartofArticle3 the

expressly itself, notupon Covenant founds and any supposed

to be madeby France* The Allies are presumed have a commonInterest in to
* V, $upm> 43, n. x, p.

judging question this soundly it arises-Iftheyareof when



opinion that the Circumstancesof the case prudentially considered, constitutethe existence the danger,against of which the Article intended to provide, Then they are bound to concur in furnishing the stipulated succours, but till the casearises,none of the Contracting Partiesare engaged for more, under this branch of the Art[icle] than an eventual
Concert and decision-

Having discussed endeavoured state with precision and to what the existing Treaties have really done, there will remain opento fair discussion question;-Have theydoneenough, the or doesnot much remain yet to be done? No questioncan be more proper for examinationand no Gov[ernmen]tmore disposedto consider it than that of Great Britain, whenever any clear and specifickproposition shall be brought forward, alwaysholding in view the Inconvenience agitating in time of of Peace,Questionsthat presuppose state of war or disa turbance- The desire of the Prince Regent always is, to act cordially with His Allies, but in doing so,to stand quite clear in the view of his own engagements to be supposed have not to taken engagements beyond the Text and Import of the Treaties signed.
The Problem of an Universal Alliance for the Peace and

Happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and of Hope, but it hasneveryet beenreducedto practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it nevercan; but you may in practice approachtowardsit, and perhaps the design has never been so far realized as in the last four years-during that eventful Periodthe Quadruple Alliance,

formedupon Principles altogether limited hashad, from the Presence the Sovereigns, of and the unparalleled unity of designwith which their Cabinets have acted,the power of travelling so far out of the sphereof their immediateand primitive obligations, without at thesame time, transgressing any of the principlesof the law of Nationsor failing in the delicacywhich they owe to the rights of other States, to as
form more extended Alliances such as that of the 25th March

1815*at Vienna, To interpozetheir goodofficesfor the

be mobilized eachContracting by Power, signed Vienna, March1815. at 25
V, Hertslct, Map, [1875], "> 2058-9.

* The Treaty of Allianceagainst Bonaparte arranging 150,000 to for men

46 CASTLEREAGH settlementof differences subsistingbetween other States, To take the initiative in watchingover the Peace Europe and of

finallyin securing execution its Treaties the mode the of in

most consonant the Convenienceof all the Parties, to The Idea of an " Alliance Solidaire" by which each State

shallbe boundto supportthe Stateof Succession, Government, and Possession, within all other Statesfrom violence and attackuponConditionof receiving itself a similar for guarantee must be understood morally implying the as previous establishment sucha System general of of Governmentasmaysecure enforce and uponall Kings and Nations an internal System Peaceand Justice; till the mode of of constructing a System such shallbedevised, Consequence the
is inadmissable, nothing would be more immoral or more as prejudicial to the Characterof Governmentgenerally, than the Idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the supportof established Powerwithout any Consideration of the Extent to which it was atmsccL (hen u Systemof Till administrating Europe by a generalAlliance of all it's States can be reducedto somepractical Form, all Notions of general
and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned ami States
JL *wj'

must be left to rely for their Security,upon the Justice Wisdomof their respective Systems, aided by suchsupport as other Statesmay feel prepared to afford them, and an Circumstances point out andjustify without outstepping may thosePrinciples which are to be found in the Law of Nations, as long recognizedand practiced,

The beneficial effects whichmay be expected be proto ducedby the four Allied Powers consultingtogether,ami interposing, timeto time? from theirgood offices* theyhave an hitherto done,for the preservation Peace of and Order, Is considered equallytrue with respect five Powers:-The as to Introduction France sucha System, rendering of into not it
too numerousfor convenientConcert, whilst It must add immensely the moral Weight and Influenceof such a to Mediating Power,






[With the year 1820the tragedyof Castlereagh begins.As was indicated on p. 39, his structure of European governance was collapsing, Francehad paid her indemnity and was no longer feared. The four Allies could therefore afford the luxury of disagreement.Revolutionwasabroadin Europe,actuallylifting its headin Spain, Portugal, Naples,and about to do so in Greece. In Spainrevolutionbeganwith the New Year, and presented the three military monarchs of Central Europe with a problem. All of them, being despots, wished to suppress revolutionseverywhere by the united forceof monarchies. Though this scheme never had beensanctioned Vienna or by Castlereagh, at they proposed an
active systemof interference in the internal affairs of other States.

They invoked the " Holy Alliance" to defendtheir pretensions.At the time Gnstlereagh ridiculedtheideaof being boundby it as had **too 'sublime'" (cp. p. 37), In additionthe PrinceRegent not had signedthe Holy Alliance Treaty, though he had expressed verbal agreement with its principles (cp. supra,p. 37). But this fact had the important result that neither British Cabinet nor Parliamerit were officially committed. Castlereagh had no intention of allowing England to join a leagueof despots.His reply therefore was the State Paper of 5 May 1820. It is the most famousState Paper in British history and the one of the widest ultimate consequence.Castlereagh there statesthe principle of non-intervention, the obligation of England to follow a " system strongly national and popular", her refusal to interfere by force in the
internal affairs of other States. It meant therefore the end of that

system of European co-operation which Castlereaghhad done so

much to promote. It was to end because other Allies would the not confine themselvesto the objects settled at Paris and Vienna during the years 1814-15. "If they will be theorists,we must act in separation", said Castlereagh,This State Paper explains his reasonsat length. The Paper was drawn up by Castlereagh, order to definehis in policy with regard to Spain, on 5 May 1820,and then circulated to the principal Governmentsof Europe. It was recognizedat onceby Gentz (Dtipiches Inldites^ [1841], n, 56-7) asof considerable importance. But what entitles it to evengreater considerationis that Canning always declared it to have been the origin of his own policy (z>, infra, p. 48) and publishedsomeextractsfrom it as a Parliamentary Paper in the spring of 1823.* He referredto it
* Accounts] & P[aper$], [1823], xix, 69-71, F. Temperley and Penson,

Century Diplomatic of BlueBooks No. 119,The questionhas beenraisedas to , whether Canning influencedGastlereagh drawing up this State Paper, Its in



at length Parliament 14April 1823, was with the in on "It not intentionof separating himself any degree in from thosewho preceded . .nor with thedesire claiming himself him. of to^ any
merit that belonged them,that henowfelt himself to calledupon
much misunderstood narrowed by some,and extended by others it was also in the records of the country, and known to all the

to repeat hehadstated a former andwhathadbeen what on day

_ that, applicable the considerations whichthe Congress to on wasto beemployed, hadfoundin the records hisoflico(and he of world)astate paper, laying down principle non-interference, the of with all the qualifications properlybelonging it. When,thereto
fore, with whateverdegree courtesy, had beenascribedto of it him, that he had appliednew principlesto a new case,he:had thought just to remind House afactof whichit was it the of indeed alreadyin possession. principle of non-interference The with the independence foreignStates, laid downin the document of was to which he alluded, as broadly, clearly, and definitely us it was possible any statesman wish to lay it down" (Cunning, for to Speeches^ v, 5-6). Canningin these wordsdefinitelyclaimedthis StatePaper the basis his ownforeignpolicy. It will hefount! as of of value to comparethis State Paperin its entirety with the more guarded Circular of 19 January i8i, which was made public
in toto Sitthe time.*]

Document 6, TheStatePaper 0/5 May 1820; or the Foundation British Foreign of Policy*

The Eventswhich haveoccur[r]ed in Spainhave,as might be expected, excited,in proportionas they have developed themselves* utmost anxiety throughoutEurope* the [The RussianDespatchof March the 3rd, written when
sentimentsbear a striking resemblanceto those uttered by Cttimmg in the Cabinetin October iSiB (v. $upra9 39, and n,, and Cliuitirrragh'xCVf^/ww/rmr, p.

xn, 56-7). Canning certainly claimed the timeto have: uointt iwewr ujxw at had inf
it (0.S,L. Poole,Life qf Stratford Redcli/e^ 888J>i, c)i). But thin evidencei* not de [i

sufficient takethe main raponnibility from (Jaatlercagh. to Probably,*Staplettm is right whenhe says(Political qfCanning) Life LiB^tJ,3, 141) ** Whether or w*i : Mr. Canning had any handin the drawing up of this particular ;mper, cannot be positivelyaffirmed;but Lord Londonderry himselfwould, ixThupg,nearer !y
have denied that there had been occasions on which he had received mwUtftncc

from Mr. Canning.'*

printedin A. & P,>[*Btt3],xix, 69-71;the suppress! puw&gei supplied are

throughthekindness Professor of Webster. supprasicd The pjuwngroi f ndc*ttl rr herein doublesquarebrackets, The full text hasbeen published by I'rofeisor

* V. iqfra,p. 64, n. I. The text that followsis from P,Q7/148;it wanpartly

Webster Cambridge ofBritishForeign in History Policy, uj3|, 6^3-33, A gooti ( dealof commentary the StatePaperof 5 May i to> is to be found in FM* on 7/148.For theJanuaryCircularandits remitssecKO. 7/158*




the first News of the Military Insurrection in Andalusia had reached St Petersburgh,invites the Allied Powers confidentially to discusswhat measures They should adopt., or what attitude They should assume,i. In casethe King's Gov[ernmen]t should be unable to suppressthe revolt,2. In case the King should spontaneously solicit the Support of His Allies. 3. In casethe Insurrection should be protracted.The Despatch from Mr. Roseof the 3ist March, referring to a later period of the Insurrection, reports that the Russian Minister at Berlin, M. Alopeus,had suggested the Prussian to Gov[ernmen]t the necessityof referring the whole Question of Spain to the considerationof the Allied Ministers at Paris, including the Minister of France.Prince Hardenberg in a Letter to Lord Castlereaghof the 3 ist ult[im]o refers to M. Alopeus's Suggestion and appears to approve of the discussionbeing referred to Paris. It is also understood that the Language held at Paris by
some of the Allied Ministers is that the Moment is arrived

when the Sovereignsthemselvesshould assemble,under the extraordinary Provisions of the Treaty of Alliance,-] The British Cabinet, upon this, as upon all other occasions, is ever ready to deliberate with those of the Allies, and will unreservedlyexplain itself upon this great questionof common interest; but as to the form in which it may be prudent to conduct these deliberations, They conceive, They cannot too early recommend that course of deliberation which will excite the least attention or alarm, or which can least provoke jealousy in the mind of the SpanishNation or Gov[ernmen]t. In this view it appearsto them advisable studiously to avoid any reunion of the Sovereigns;-to abstain, at least in the present Stage of the Question, from charging any ostensible
Conference should be with limited Commission to those to deliberate confidential on the ajffairs of Communications


conceive it preferable that their Intercourse

between the Cabinets which are in themselvesbest adapted to approximate ideas, and to lead, as far as may be, to the



adoption common of principles, ratherthan to hazarda discussion in a Ministerial Conference, which, from the neces-

sarily limited Powers the Individuals composing must of it,

ever be better fitted to execute a purpose already clodded

upon than to framea course policy underdelicateand of

difficult circumstances.

There seems lessmotive for precipitating any Step of the this nature in the caseimmediately under consideration, as, from all information which reachesus, there exists in Spain no order of thingsupon which to deliberate,, as yet any nor governing Authority with which ForeignPowerscan communicate :-

The King'sAuthority,for the moment least,, at seems be to dissolved;His Majestyis represented the last Despatches in from Madrid, as having wholly abandonedHimself to the
Tide of Events, and as conceding whatever is called for by the ProvisionalJunta and the Clubs;-The Authority of the provisionalGov[ernmen]tdoesnot appearto extend beyond the Two Castilles and a part of Andalusia:--Distinct Lorn! Authorities prevail in the various Provinces,and the Kin^s personal Safetyis regardedasextremelyliable to behazarded by any stepwhich might lay Him open to the Suspicionof entertaining a design to bring about a Counterrevolution, whether by internal or external means," This important Subjecthaving been referredto, and con* sidered by, the Duke of Wellington, his Memorandum*

accompanies Minute:-His Grace this does hesitate, not upon his intimate experience Spanish of Affairs, to pronouncethat the Spanish Nationis of all the European People that which
will the leastbrook any interferencefrom abroad;-He states the many instancesin which, during the last War, this distinguishing Trait of national Character rendered them

obstinatelyblind to the most pressingConsiderations of publickSafety;-He states imminentdanger which the the in Suspicion foreign of interference, more and especially interof

ference thepart of France, likelyto involve King; on is the

Wellington) Series, New [1867],i, n6-ai.

* This is not reproduced here. It is printedin Despatches Dukt tf of th$





and he further describesthe difficulties which would oppose themselvesto any military operations in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of reducing by force the Nation to submit themselvesto an order of things to be either suggestedor prescribed to them from without. , Sir Henry Wellesleyhas, in coincidencewith this opinion, reported the alarm which the intended Mission of M. la Tour du Pin had excited at Madrid; the prejudice which, in the opinion of all the Foreign Ministers at Madrid, it was calculated to occasionto the King's interestsand possibleSafety;He also reports the stepswhich it was in contemplation to have adopted,on the part of the King to endeavourto prevent the French Minister from prosecuting his journey to Madrid, when Intelligence of the abandonment of the Mission was
received from Paris.

At all events therefore until Some Central Authority shall establish Itself in Spain, all Notion of operating upon Her Councils seems utterly impracticable, and calculated to lead to no other possibleresult than that of compromising either the King or the Allies, or probably both. [The Emperor of Russia,in the severalCases which H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] has successively suggested deliberafor tion, is altogether silent upon the particular Casewhich has really occurred:-It may therefore be inferred that His Imperial Majesty's reasoning is not meant to be applied to that total changein the order of things previously existing in Spain, which has been effected with the avowed Concurrence and under the formal Sanction of the King:-This Change, no doubt forced by circumstances, beenregularly notified has by His Majesty to all Foreign Powers, and is apparently acquiesced if not adoptedby, the great Body of the Nation. in, In these circumstances,can the other Statesof Europe, in

prudence proceed publickly to deliberate upon the King's Acts, much more to call them into question? If not would it be wise to give advice, wholly unasked, which is very little likely too contain any suggestion the salutary modification for of the Constitution of 1812 other than such as will readily occur to those publick Men within the Country who have



good Intentions, whose and influence means effectuating and of

an amelioration of the Constitution are likely to be weakened

rather than strengthened an interference by from abroad ?j| The present Stateof Spainno doubt seriously extends the range politicalAgitationin Europe, it mustnevertheless of but be admitted that there is no portion of Europe of equal magnitude, whichsucha Revolution in couldhavehappened, less likely to menace otherStates with that direct andimminent dangerwhich has alwaysbeenregarded,at least in this Country,asaloneconstituting Case the which wouldjustify
external interference.-If the Case is not such as to warrant

such an interference If we do not feel that We have at this

momenteither the right or the meansto interferewith effect by force;-if the Semblanceof such an interference is more likely to irritate than to overawe,and if We have proved by experience little a Spanish how Government, whetherof King or Cortes,is disposed listen to advicefrom Foreign States, to is it not prudentat leastto pause beforeWeassume attitude an whichwould seem pledgeus in the eyes Europeto .some to of decisiveproceeding? Before We embark in such a measure^ is it not expedient leastto ascertain at with some degree preof cisionwhat We really meanto do? This Course temperate of and cautiouspolicy, so befitting the occasionand the critical position in which the King is personallyplaced, will in no degreefetter our action, when, if ever, the casefor acting
shall arise:-

In the meantime, asindependent States, Allied Powers The may awakenthrough their respectiveMissionsat Madrid, with notless effect thanwouldattendanyjoint Representation

a salutary apprehension the consequences might be of that produced any violence by offeredto the King's personor family, or by any hostileMeasures directedagainstthe Portuguese Dominions Europe, the protection wh[ichj in for of G[rea]tBritainis boundby specifick Treaty;In conveying suchIntimation, however,the utmost any Delicacy should observed, tho[ugh]It is to be prebe and
sumed that the Views and Wishes of all the Allied Powers

mustbe essentially same that the Sentiments the and They





are likely to express cannot materially differ, it doesnot follow that They should speakeither in their corporate character or through any common Organ;-Both which Expedients
would be calculated rather to offend than to conciliate or to

persuade. There can be no doubt of the general Danger which menaces more or lessthe stability of all existing Governments

from the Principles which are afloat, and from the circumstance that so many Statesof Europe are now employed in the difficult task of casting anew their Gov[ernmen]ts upon the Representative Principle: but the notion of revising, limiting or regulating the courseof such Experiments, either by foreign Council or by foreign force, would be as dangerous to avow asit w[oul]d be impossibleto execute,and the Illusion
too prevalent on this Subject, should not be encouraged in our Intercourse with the Allies.-That Circumstancesmight ariseout of suchExperimentsin any Country directly menacing

to the safetyof other Statescannot be"denied,and against

sucha Danger well ascertained, Allies may justifiably, and the must in all prudence, be on their guard; but such is not the presentCase;fearful as is the Example which is furnished, by Spain, of an Army in Revolt, and a Monarch swearing to a Constitution which containsin its frame hardly the Semblance of a Monarchy: there is no ground for Apprehension, that Europe is likely to be speedily endangeredby SpanishArms. [The Argument against any ostensiblestepwhatever being taken by the Allies to interpose even their good officesin the affairs of Spain, and the seriousdifficulties that must present themselvesto an armed Interference under any Circumstances in that Country, have been so forcibly detailed in the Duke of Wellington's Paper as to exhaustthat part of the Question. It remains to be considered what Coursecanbestbepursued by the Allies in the present Critical State of Europe, in order to preservein the utmost Cordiality and vigour, the Bonds which at this Day sohappily unite the great European Powers together, and to draw from their Alliance, should the moment of Danger and Contest arrive, the fullest extent of Benefit, of which it is in it's nature susceptible:-J



In this Alliance as in all other human Arrangements,

nothing is more likely to impair or evento destroyits real utility, than any attemptto pushits dutiesand obligations beyondthe Sphere which its original Conception understood and Principles* warrant:-It wasan unionfor the Rcconqucst will and liberation of a great proportion of the Continent of Europefrom the Military Dominionof France,and having subdued Conqueror took the State of Possession the it as established thePeace by undertheProtectionof theAlliance :-It never however was intended an Union theGovernmentthe as for of World,orfor theSuperintendence Internal of the A/fairsof other

pt providedspecifically againstan infractionon the part

of Franceof the Stateof Possession created: It provided then

against Return of the Usurperor of any of his family to the the Throne: It further designated Revolutionary Power the
which had convulsedFrance and desolatedEurope, as an objectof it's constant solicitude;but it wasthe Revolutionary Powermore particularly in it's Military Character actual and existent within France against which it intended to take Precautions, rather than againstthe Democratic Principles, then asnow, but too generally spreadthroughout Europe. In thusattemptingto limit the objects theAlliancewithin of their legitimateBoundary,it is not meant to discourage the
utmost Frankness of Communication between the Allied

Cabinets;-their ConfidentialIntercourseupon all Matters, however foreignto the purposes the Alliance,is in itselfa of valuableExpedientfor keepingthe current of Sentimentin Europe equable asuniformasmaybe: It is not meant as and

that in particularand definiteCases, Alliancemay not the (andespecially invitedto dosobytheParties when interested) advantageously interpose, dueCaution, matters with in lying beyond Boundaries their immediate particular the of and Connection; whatisintended becombated forming but to as anypart of theirDutyasAllies, the Notion, too peris but ceptiblyprevalent, whenever greatPoliticalEvent that any
his speech 30 April 1823. of

* Thepassages italicized quoted Canning theComment here were by in m




shall occur, asin Spain,pregnant perhapswith future Danger, it is to be regarded almost as a matter of course,that it belongs to the Allies to chargethemselves collectivelywith the Responsibility of exercising someJurisdiction concerning such possible eventual Danger.One objection to this view of our duties, if there was no other, is, that unlessWe are prepared to support our interferencewith force, our judgement or adviceis likely to be but rarely listened to, and would by frequent Repetition soonfall into completecontempt. Solong as We keepto the great and simple conservative principles of the Alliance, when the dangers therein contemplated shall be visibly realized, there is little risk of differenceor of disunion amongstthe Allies: All
will have a common interest; But it is far otherwise when

We attempt with the Alliance to embracesubordinate,remote, and speculativecases danger;-all the Powersmay indeed of have an interest in averting the assumed danger, but all have not by any means a common faculty of combating it, in it's more speculative Shapes,nor can they all without embarrassing seriously the internal administration of their own affairs be prepared to show themselves jealous observation in of transactions,which, before they have assumeda practical character, publick opinion would not go along with them in counteracting.This principle is perfectly clear and intelligible in the case of Spain: We may all agree that nothing can be more lamentable, or of more dangerous example, than the late revolt of the SpanishArmy: We may all agree,that nothing can be more unlike a monarchical Government, or lesssuited to the wants and true interests of the Spanish Nation, than the Constitution of the year 1812;We may also agree, with shadesof difference, that the consequence this state of of things in Spain may eventuallybring dangerhome to all our own doors, but it doesnot follow, that We have therefore equal means of acting upon this opinion; For instance the Emperor of Russia,from the nature of his authority, can have nothing to weigh, but the physicalor moral difficulties external from his own Gov[ernmen]t or Dominions, which are in the



way of hisgivingeffect his Designs:-If H[is] Ifmperial] to M[ajesty]'s Mind is settled uponthese points.His Action is
free and His Meansare in His own hands. The King of Great Britain, from the nature of our Constitution, has on the

contraryall His means acquirethroughParliament,and to

He must well know that if embarked in a War, which the

Voice of the Country doesnot support,the Efforts of the strongest Administration whicheverserved Crownwould the soon unequal theprosecution the Contest. Russia be to of In thereis but little publick Sentiment with regard to Spain,
which can embarrass decisionof the Sovereign; In Great the

Britainthereisa greatdeal,andtheCurrentof that Sentiment runs stronglyagainstthe late Policyof the King of Spain. Besides, People thisCountrywouldprobablynot recogthe of nize (unless Portugalwasattacked)that our Safetycould be sofar menaced any Stateof thingsin Spain,as to warrant by their Governmentin sendingan Army to that Country to
meddle in it's internal affairs; We cannot concealfrom ourselves how generallythe Acts of the King of Spain since His restorationhave renderedHis Governmentunpopular and how impossible would be to reconcilethe Peopleof England it to the useof force,if sucha Proceeding could for a moment be thought of by the British Cabinet for the purpose of replacingpower in His hands,howeverHe might engageto qualify it. The principle upon which the British Government acted in the discussions with respectto the Colonies,(vh: never to employ forcible meansfor their reduction) would equallyprecludethemfrom anyinterventionof suchaeharaeter

with regardto Old Spain. The interpositionof our good offices, whether singly,or in concert with theAllied Govfern-

men] if uncalledfor by any authoritywithin Spain, ts,

evenby the King Himself,is by no means from a like free inconvenience far as regards Positionof the British as the

GovernmentHome; speciesintervention at This of especially

whencomingfrom Five greatPowers, moreor lessthe has

air of dictation menace, thepossibility it's being and and of

intended be ultimatelypushed a forcibleintervention to to h

always assumed orimputed anadverse The by party. grounds of




theintervention thusbecome unpopular,the intentionof the partiesis misunderstood, publick Mind is agitatedand the perverted,and the GeneralPolitical Situation of the Government is thereby essentiallyembarrassed.-

This Statement only meantto prove,that We oughtto is see somewhatclearly to what purpose of real Utility our Effort tends, before We embark in proceedings which can never be indifferent in their bearingsupon the Government taking part in them.-In this country at all times, but
especiallyat the presentconjuncture, when the whole Energy of the Stateis requiredto unite reasonable men in defence of our existingInstitutions, and to put down the spirit of Treason and Disaffection which in certain of the Manufacturing Districts in particular, pervades lower orders,it is of the the greatestmoment, that the publick Sentimentshould not be distractedor divided, by any unnecessary Interferenceof the Governmentin eventspassingabroad, over which they can havenoneor at bestbut very imperfectmeansof controul.Nothing could be more injurious to the Continental Powers than to have their affairs made matter of daily discussion in our Parliament, which neverthelessmust be the consequence of Their precipitately mixing themselves the affairs of other in States, We shouldconsent proceedpari passuwith them if to in such interferences. It is not merely the temporary inconvenience produced to the British Government by being so committed, that is to be apprehended,but it is the exposing ourselvesto have the publick Mind soured by the effectsof a meddling policy, when it cantend to nothing really effectual, and pledgedperhapsbeforehandagainstany exertion whatever in Continental Affairs;-the fatal effects of such a false

step might be irreparable when the moment at which we might be indispensably called upon by Duty and Interest to take a part should ar[r]ive. These Considerations will suggesta doubt whether that extremedegreeof unanimity and supposed concurrenceupon all political subjects w[oul]d be either a practicable or a desirable principle of action among the Allied States,upon matters not essentiallyconnectedwith the main purposesof



the Alliance. If this Identity is to be soughtfor, it can only be attainedby a proportionate degree inaction in all the of

States. position the Ministers Parisfor instance The of at can never be altogetheruniform, unlesstheir languageupon
Publick Affairs iseitherof the mostgeneraldescription,or they

agreeto hold no publick language whatever:-The latter Expedient perhaps mostprudent, thenthe Unaniis the but mity of the Sentiment, thus assumed be established, to will
not be free from inconvenienceto someof the parties, if the Cabinetsof other Statesby their publick documentsassign

objects that Concert, which,at leastasdescribed them, to to by the others cannotconveniently subscribe. fact isthat wedo The not, and cannotfeelalikeupon all Subjects:-Our Position, our Institutions,the Habits of thinking, and the prejudicesof our People, renderusessentially different;-We cannotin all
matters reason or feel alike; We should lose the Confidence

of our respective Nationsif we did, and the very affectation of suchan Impossibilitywould soonrender the Alliance an Objectof Odium, and Distrust,whereas, we keepit within if its common Sense limits, the RepresentativeGovernments,awl thosewhich are more purely Monarchical, may well find each a commonInterest,and a commonfacility in dischargingtheir Duties under the Alliance, without creating an Impression that they have madea surrenderof the first principles upon which their respective Gov[emmen]tsare founded,-Each Government then retain it's due facultyof independent will Action, always recollecting,that they have all a common Refuge theAlliance,aswellasa common in Duty to perform, whenever sucha Dangershall really exist, as that against

whichtheAlliance specially was intended provide. to Thereis at present very naturallya widespread apprehension thefatalConsequences publick of to the Tranquillity of Europe, maybeexpected flowfromthedangerous that to

Principles thepresent at workmore less every of Day, or in European Consequences nohuman State, which foresight can
presume to estimate.

In all Dangers first Calculationof Prudence to conthe is siderwhat we shouldavoidandonwhat weshouldendeavour





to rely:-In consideringContinental Europe as divided into two great Masses,the Western, consistingof France and Spain,, the Eastern of all the other Continental States still subsisting with somelimited exceptions, under the form of their ancient Institutions, the great Question is, what Systemof General and defensive Policy (subjectof courseto specialExceptions arising out of the Circumstances the particular Case)ought of the latter Statesto adopt with a view of securingthemselves againstthosedangers, which may directly or indirectly assail them from the former.-By the late Proceedingsat Vienna, which for all purposesof internal tranquillity, bind up the various Statesof Germany into a single and undivided Power, a great degreeof additional simplicity aswell as Strength has beengiven to this Portion of Europe. By this Expedientthere is establishedon that side of Europe, instead of a multitude of dispersedStates,two great Bodies,Russia and Germany, of the latter of which, Austria and Prussiamay for purposes of internal tranquillity be regarded as component parts. In
addition to these there remain but few Pieces on the board to

complicate the Game of Publick Safety. In considering then how the gamecan bestbe played, the first thing that occursfor our Considerationis, what good can theseStateshope to effect in France or Spain by their mere Councils? Perhapsit would not be far from the truth to say, None whatever:-When the chancesof Error, Jealousy and National Sentiment are considered,the Probability of Mischief would be more truly assignedto the System of constant European Interference upon theseVolcanick Masses:Of this truth the Duke de Richelieu seemsfully satisfied, as appearsby the manly and earnestIntreaties which he has lately addressedto certain of the Allies3 Courts that, they would keep their Ministers quiet at Paris, and that abstaining themselves from all advice or interference,They would leave the French Government to combat for themselves and upon their own views of things,the dangers which surround them.What could The Allied Powerslook to effectby their Arms, if the supposition of an armed interference in the internal affairs of another State could be admitted? Perhapsas little;



Because supposing finally triumphant,We havethe in them problemstill to solve/howthe countryin which suchInterference had been successful was to provide for its SelfGovernment after the Allied Armies shall have been with-

drawn, without soonbecomingan equal Sourceof dangerto the tranquillity of neighbouring States; whenweconsider but how muchdanger mayariseto the internal Safetyof the rest of Europe,by the absence thoseArmieswhich must be of withdrawn to overrun the Country in which the supposed Interference to takeplace,-what may be the clanger was of theseArmiesbeing contaminated,-what may be the incumbrances be addedby suchrenewed to exertions the already to overwhelming Weight of the debtsof the different States,what the local irritation which must be occasioned pouring by forth suchimmense armiespressing severely they must do as uponthe resources Countries of alreadyagitated inflamed, and -no rational Statesmansurely w[oul]d found his prospects of Security on such a calculation: He would rather be of opinion,that the only necessity which could in wisdom justify such an attempt is, that which, temperately considered, appears leaveto Europeno otheroption, than that of either to goingto meetthat dangerwhich they cannotavoid,or having it pouredin thefull tide of military invasionupontheir own States.-The actualExistence sucha dangermay indeed of be inferred from many circumstances short of the visible
preparations for attack, but it is submitted that on this basis

the conclusion shouldalwaysbe examined. If this positionis correctlylaid down,it may be asserted, that thecase supposed, only does at present not not exist,but the chances sucha dangerhavelatterly ratherdeclinedin of

proportion both France Spainarealmost as and exclusively

and deeplyoccupied their own internal embarrassments; by

The military Power Franceat this day is circumscribed in withinthose limitswhich notmore are thancompetent the to necessary oftheInterior;Thatof Spain uponeven duties is a morereduced Scale, whilstthemilitary Establishments all of theotherEuropean States, especially of Russia, and that were

never perhaps any at period theirhistory of upon footing a of





more formidable efficiency both in point of Discipline and Numbers;* Surely then, if theseStatesman preserveharmony among themselves,and exercisea proper degreeof vigilance with respect to their interior Police, there is nothing in this state of things which should prevent them from abiding with patience and with firmness the result of the great political processto which circumstances have given existencein the Statesto the Westward of their Frontiers. They may surely permit theseNations to work out by their own means,and by the lights of their own Councils, that result which no doubt materially bearsupon the generalInterestsof the World, but which is more especially to decide their own particular destinies,without being led to interfere with them, at least so long astheir own immediate Security is not directly menaced, or until some Crisis shall arise which may call for some specifick, intelligible and practicable interposition on their

The principle of oneStateinterferingby forcein theinternal

affairs of another, in order to enforce obedience to the governing authority, is always a question of the greatest possiblemoral aswell aspolitical delicacy, and it is not meant here to examine it.-It is only important on the present occasionto observethat to generalizesucha principle and to think of reducing it to a System,or to imposeit as an obligation, is a Schemeutterly impracticable and objectionable. There is not only the physicalimpossibility of giving execution to such a System, but there is the moral impracticability arising from the inaptitude of particular Statesto recognize, or to act upon it.-No Country having a Representative Systemof Gov[ernmen]t could act upon it,-and the sooner such a Doctrine shall be distinctly abjured as forming in any Degree the Basisof our Alliance, the better;-in order that States, in calculating the means of their own Security may not suffer Disappointment by expecting from the Allied Powers,a support which, under the specialCircumstances of
* It was estimatedin 1826that Russiahad a European army of 860,000men
(which exceeded the total forces of France, Prussia, Austria and England in

Europe), Wellington said that half that number would have been enough for



their National Institutions they cannot give;-Great Britain

hasperhaps equalPowerwith any other Stateto oppose Herself a practical intelligibleDanger, to and capable being of broughthometo theNationalFeeling:-When theTerritorial Balance Europe disturbed, caninterfere of is she with effect,
but Sheis the last Gov[ernmen]tin Europe, which can be

expected, canventure commitHerself any question or to on

of an abstract Character,

Theseobservations madeto point attention to what is are practicable whatisnot.-If thedreaded and Moral Contagion shouldunfortunatelyextenditself into Germany,and if the flame of Military Revolt shouldfor example,burst forth in any of the GermanStates, is in vain for that State,however it anxiously sincerely deprecate and we sucha Calamity, to lurn it's Eyes this Country for the means effectuallysuppressing to of sucha Danger;-If External Meansare indispensable it's for Suppression, suchStatemust not reckonfor assistance upon Gov[ernmen]tsconstituted as that of Great Britain, but it is
not therefore without it's Resource.

The internal Peace eachGermanStateis by Law placed of under the protection of the Army of the Empire: -The Duty which is imposedby the Laws of the Confederacy upon all German States,to suppress,by the Military Power of tin; whole,mass, Insurrection within the Territories of Each and Every of the Co-Estates, an immenseResource itself, and is in oughtto giveto the Centreof Europea sense Securitywhich of previousto the Reunion of Vienna was wholly wanting:--

TheImportance preventing LowCountries, Military of the the Barrierof Europe, from beinglost,by beingmeltedclowninto the general Mass FrenchPower, of whetherby Insurrection, or by Conquest, might enable BritishG0v[emmem]t the to act morepromptlyuponthis, than perhaps uponany other

Case aninternal of Character canbestated;-Butupon that

all suchCases mustadmitourselves be,and our Allies we to shouldin fairness understand that we are, a Powerthat must

takeour Principle action, of and our Scale acting,not of

merelyfrom the Expediency the Case,but from those of

Maxims, which System Government a of strongly popular,



and national in it's character has irresistibly imposed upon us.] We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces Systemof Europe, but this Country cannot, and the will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution:-The Alliance which existshad no such purpose in view in its original formation:-It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredlythe sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it, and it would now
be a breach of Faith were the Ministers of the Crown to

acquiesce a Construction being put upon it, or were they in to suffer themselvesto be betrayed into a Course of Measures, inconsistent with those Principles which they avowed at the time, and which they have since uniformly maintained both at Home and Abroad, [and which were more fully developed in a confidential Memorandum delivered in by the British Plenipotentiaries to those of the Allies, at Aix la Chapelle, bearing date in October 1818,to which Memorandum they now refer as more fully Illustrative of their Sentiments.]*
* The text is given supra, Doc. 5, on pp. 39-46.





[Castlereagh's Paperof 5 May 1820had definedthe State principles BritishForeign of policyto which,aswe haveseen (p, 48), Canning theoryadhered. therewereimportant in But differences practice. During 1821,the New Holy Alliance in (Austria, Russia Prussia) intervened tin: internalaffairs and had in of Naples, threatened intervene those Spain, declared to in of and
suchinterventionto be a duty, Castlcroagh protestedagain in a
wise he was not able to offer much effective opposition. There
were several reasons for this attitude but the main one wan that

circulardispatch January1821-which published.*Otherof was during 1821 Greek the revoltflourished therewangreatfear and
that the excitableTsar Alexanderwould go to war with Turkey to bring aid to his co-religionists/)* Castlereagh knewof no way of restraininghim but by talking of Union and by proposing new Congress,He thereforeproa posed summon newCongress Verona. So up till his death to a at Castlereagh still usingEurope; the Congress to keep was and idea Alexanderat peacewith Turkey, Immediately after Gastlereagh's death the Congress opened at Verona. But by this time the danger of war with Turkey had passed Canningcould take a bolder line. The only fear was and that Franceby herself,or Austria, Russiaand Prussia common, in might interfereby forceto put down the constitutionalmovement in Spain. Canning'spolicy is given in his own words. He instructed the British representative(the Duke of Wellington) as follows: "If, as I confess seereason to apprehend*. .there fa I entertained by the Allies a determined project of interference by force,or by menace, the presentstrugglein Spain,so convinced in are His Majesty'sGovernmentof the uselcssness danger of and any such interference,-so objectionabledoesit appear to them in principle, and so utterly impracticable in execution-that, if the necessity shouldarise,or (I would rather say) if the opportunity shouldoffer, I am to instructyour Graceat oncefrankly and peremptorilyto declare,that to any such interference,come whatmay. Majestywill not be a party."$ His
Diplomatic BlueBooks, 95. No.

* Text in A, & P., [i8ai,] xxn, 1-4; cp. Tcmpcrley Pcnion,dntop rf and t V, C. K. Webster, Fonign The Policy qfCa$tltm&h> /#/5~,w,[Jf)U5] '$ J Quoted Temperley, Foreign in Tkt Policy Canning, tf



The Duke of Wellington executedhis instructions on 30 October

1823an<^3 effect, broke up the Congress Verona by refusing in of to commit England to the policies of the Continent. He refused to agreewith the New Holy Alliance which had one policy, or
with France which had another. "We stand alone," said the

Duke, "and we do soby choice." This was in fact the death blow

to the Congress system, though, asso often, the effect of the blow was not immediately seen. But in December 1823 Spain asked the Powers to attend a Congressto discussthe question of her
revolted American Colonies. Canning refused to attend and said

England would take her own courseregardless the Powers. By of the end of 1824 he initiated stepsfor recognizing three Spanish American Statesas independent (Argentine, Columbia, Mexico)
When Tsar Alexander summoned a Congress on Turkey in

December 1824 Canning refused in effect to attend, and it broke up in confusion by the May of 1825. That was the last Congress of the old type. Canning had ended it all in three years. In his State Paper of 5 May 1820 Castlereagh proclaimed separation from CongressionalEurope. Canning enforced it. The difference lay not in principle but in the meansused, Castlereagh had beenhampered by his past relations with despotswho affected

to believehe wasnot in earnest, by havingto revert to Congress and policy at Verona. In addition "throughout his career, therefore, Castlereaghwas impatient of Parliamentary criticism and that of public opinion generally... he could hardly hope to make his fellow countrymen understand his point of view".* Canning, who came fresh to power without embarrassments^ who wasa greatorator, sawthat a breachwith despoticsovereigns would be popular, and that the public would support him in breaking off from Congresses.Even during his first ministry he had published Blue Books with unusual frequency and got the popular applause for doing so.| He now evoked rounds of applausewhen he spokeof "the immediate object of England" as being to "take care that the war should not grow out of an assumedjurisdiction of the Congress;to keep within reasonable boundsthat predominatingareopagitical [of the despots];" spirit and of his desire"to get rid of the Areopagusand all that".J That utterance seemedthe appeal of an orator. But immediately after he quotesfrom Castlereagh's State Paper of 5 May 1820saying that the Areopagitical spirit is "beyond the sphereof the original conceptionand understood principlesof the Alliance", which was never "intended for the government of the world or
* G. K. Websterin Camb. Hist, Journ.i. No. z, [1924], 159. t Temperleyand Penson, Century Diplomatic Books, i. of Blue p. J Speech 28 April 1823,Speeches, R. Therry, v, 63, of ed.



for the superintendence the internal affairsof other States*', of

What is new, therefore,is not the principle of separationfrom the isolated. A British Cabinet, supported by Parliament and the
bolt in the hand of a British Minister* It was Canning who

New Holy Alliance, the popularappealand the relianceon but public opinion to supportEnglandwhen she; stoodaloof and people, stronger was thana foreign despot, supported millions by of bayonets, Opinion stronger armies was t hunderwas than and a
discoveredthis new source of strength and power.

Document 7* Extract from Speech lu December of 1826, onthenewsource England's of power* Sir, I set out with saying that there were reasons which inducedme to think that nothing short of a point of national faith or national honour I will not saywouldjustify, but would makedesirable the present at moment,anyvoluntaryapproximation to the possibility of a dangerous war* Let me be understood,however, distinctly, as not meaning to say thai I dreadwar in a good cause(and in no other may it be the lot of this country ever to engage!) from a distrust of the strength of the country to commenceit, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it, indeed-but upon far other grounds: I dread it from a consciousness the tremendous of power Great Britain possesses pushinghostilitiesin which of we may be engaged,to consequences which I shudder to contemplate.Some yearsago,in the discussion the negotiaof tions respectingthe French war against Spain, I took the liberty of adverting to this topic. I then stated that the position of this country in the presentstateof the work} was one of neutrality, not only betweencontendingnations, but between contending principles;and that it wasby neutrality

alone that we couldmaintain that balance, preservation the of whichI believed be essential peace safety the to to and of
world. I then said that I feared that the next war which shouldbe kindled in Europe,would be a war not so much of

armies, of opinions. as Fouryears'experience.,, confirmed has rather than alteredmy opinion, It is, to be sure,within narrowlimits that this war of opinionwill be confined; but
* Temperley, Foreign ofCanning, Policy 579-81.



it is a war of opinion that Spain (whetheras Governmentor as nation) is now waging againstPortugal; it is a war which
has commenced in hatred of the new institutions of Portugal.

How long is it reasonable expectthat Portugalwill abstain to

from retaliation? I fear that the next war to be kindled in

Europe,if it spreadbeyondthe narrow limits of Spainand

Portugal, will be a war of most tremendouscharacter-a war not merely of conflicting armies,but of conflicting opinions. (Cheering.) I know that if into that war this country enters (and if she do engage,I trust it will be with a most sinceredesire to mitigate rather than exasperate,and to contend with arms, rather than with the morefatal artillery of popular excitation), she will seeunder her banners, arrayed for the contest all the discontented and restlessspirits of the age, all those whowhether justly or unjustly-are dissatisfiedwith the present
state of their own countries. The consciousness of such a

situation excitesall my fears, for it showsthere existsa power to be wielded by Great Britain, more tremendous than was perhapseveryet brought into action in the history of mankind. (Hear.) But, though it may be "excellent to have a giant's power it may be tyrannous to useit like a giant". The knowledge that we possess this strength is our security; and our business not to seek opportunities of displaying it, but to is content ourselveswith letting the professors violent and of exaggerated doctrines on both sides feel that it is not their interest to convert an umpire into their competitor. The situation of this country may be compared to that of the Ruler of
the Winds.

" CelsasedetAeolus arce, Sceptratenens;mollitque animoset temperatiras; Ni faciat, maria ac terras coelumque profundum

Quippeferant rapidi secum, verrantque auras.'5* per

* This is the text of the speechas actually delivered, A corrected version

wassubsequently issued owing to the pressure George The chiefpoint of of IV. alteration was that England would find on her side the discontented arty of countrywith whomshewent to war, not of all countries, V. Temperley,Foreign
Policyof Canning, 579-85.











[Canning recognized Latin America, Argentine, the Columbia,

Mexico, Venezuela,Honduras, Brazil, as nations. In this sense he "called the New World into existence11. situation in 18^3 The must be very briefly sketched. For itiany years the struggle between Spain and her revoltedColonieshad beenproceeding. They had beenloyal until loyalty became impossible, finally and

separated from the Motherlandbecause the corruptionand of

inefficiency of her rule. At the period with which we deal, the year 1823, States theRio dola Plata (themodernArgentine the of Republic) had beenentirely free for many years. Kquully free was Columbia (which included the modern Venezuela)* The struggle was nearly hopeless Chile. In Mexico the Spanish in loyalistsheld a castle,veritably a castle in Spain, and the only
one. In Peru a balanced contest was still maintained. From 18120

onwardsthe SpanishMonarchy was in the throes of revolution at home. Ferdinand VII had to appoint a constitutional ministry* It actually negotiated with the Rio de la Plata on (he basis of independence, but this attempt was ultimately disavowed by Ferdinand VII. His act convinced England that there coukl be no reconciliationsaveon the basisof independence, and that it was hopeless Spain to attempt the recoveryof her authority for by force. Castlereagh undoubtedlytook this view and referred to recognition in 1822as**a matter of time and circumstance1'*In 1823, however, France precipitated events, Her Government thought that the constitutionalistsin Spain were too violent and were endangering peace.The French Bourbon Louis XVIII thought it a duty to prevent the Spanish Bourbon Ferdinand VII from beingbullied into too extreme constitution.So a Frencharmy a crossed Pyrenees "free" the Spanish the to King, This actionwas a menaceto peaceand was regardedwith great jealousy by

England. But Canningsaid Englandwould not fight if three conditions observed, were France not to remain was permanently in Spain;she notto violate territorialintegrityof Portugal was the (which England was pledgedto defend); and shewas not to attemptto appropriate part of the Spanish any Colonies herself, to
It is the third of these points with which we are concerned*In the old daysthe trade with Spanish America had been mono-

polized the MotherCountry, by The Spanish Colonies opened



their ports as they revolted, and their trade fell naturally and almost mechanically into England's lap. As Spain herself was clearly incapable of reconquering her Colonies, there was no danger that England would be deprived of this trade. But if French soldiers victoriously subdued Old Spain, French sailors might attempt to reconquer the Spanish Colonies. In that case King Louis might plant French princes in Spanish America and restrict the Spanish colonial trade to French ships. Canning was determined to prevent either possibility. As the French army advancedinto Spain the Spanish constitutionalists retreated beforeit, dragging the captive Ferdinand along with them. The Spanish people did not like the constitutionalists because they were liberals and opposedto the Church. Hence the French army, this time, was as popular in Spain as Napoleon's
had been detested. Within a short time the French army had

victoriously advanced to Madrid and finally shut up the constitutionalists in Cadiz. In Septemberits fall was only a question of time. Canning hesitated no longer. "The Pyreneeshad fallen,
he would maintain the Atlantic." He accredited consuls to various

ports of the South American States in order to make clear that he would retain uninterrupted commercial relations with

In the first days of October 1823, before Cadiz had actually fallen, Canning had several interviews with the French Ambassador,the Prince de Polignac. The result is given in Doc. 8,
which follows. The principles established were three: not to interfere. First,

France was definitely warned off any interference "by force or by menace", and Polignac, thus challenged, definitely promised
Second (in the part of the memorandum left

unpublished at the time). Canning said that he would not enter a Congresson the future of Spanish America unless the United
States were invited to become a member of it. Third, England

declaredshewould recognize SpanishColoniesasindependent the

at once if any attempt was made to restrict her existing trade with

them. As regards the first point, it has been suggestedthat the threat of France to intervene by force of arms in Spanish America was not very real. But this policy waspursued by a strong minority in French governmental circles, and among others by Polignac himself. It might soon have become that of the French Government as a whole. Anyhow Canning's action settled that the New World should develop unhindered by the arms of Europe. It remained under the protection of the British Fleet until the United Stateswas strong enough to put the Monroe Doctrine into
* According to more recent international law, this stepwould imply ultimate diplomatic recognition, but it was not the intention of Canning to concede more
than commercial recognition at the time.



As regards two otherprinciples the Canning shewed distinct originality. The ConferencesGreatPowers hithertobeen of had confined Europe, Canning prepared includea power to but was to
from the New World and thus introduce the United States into

worldpolitics. The Congress not meetsothe projectnever did

materialized. But Europe was horrified and astounded by

Canning's proposal invitea Republic share deliberations to to the of Kings. It wasan important testimony the powerof the to
United States renderedby Canning in the very year that President

Monroeproclaimed famousdoctrine. As regardshis third his principleCanning shewed he would not, in any case, that interrupt Britishtradewith the Spanish Colonies that hr regarded and the question the recognition their independence Great of of by
Britain as one of time only.]

Document 8. ThePolignac Memorandum, October or uhands off" toEurope theNewWorld in ThePrincedePolignac havingannounced Mr. Canning, to that His Excellencywas now prepared to enter with Mr* Canning into a frankexplanation the viewsof his Governof ment respecting questionof SpanishAmerica, in return the
for a similar communication which Mr. Canning had previously offeredto make to The Prince de Poltgnac,on the part of the British Cabinet; Mr. Canning stated that the BritishCabinethasno disguise reservation that .subject; or on That their opinionsand intentionswere substantiallythe sameas were announcedto the French Government by the Dispatchof Mr* Canningto Sir CharlesStuart of the JJIHI of March, which that Ambassadorhad communicated to M, de

Chateaubriand, which had sincebeenpublishedto the and


That the near approachof a crisis,in which the Affairs of

Spanish America mustnaturallyoccupy greatshare the a of

attention of both Powers,made it desirable that there should
Mr, Canning,begun Thursday October andconcluded 9th Sunday Octotorlath 1823", enclosureCanning Stuart, 84of9 November P.O.146/58. in to No, iB3f Part published A. & P., [1824], in av, 641-53, Tempcrlcy lVntm v. and
Foreign Policyof Canning, 114-18.

* " Memorandum a Conference of between The Princecfc Puligum: and

Century Diplomatic Books, 131.Op-ajio J9U?,&K 4^53* The of Blue No. xi suppressed passages printedfor the first timeby Temperley th* were in Cambridge ofBritish History Foreign [1933], 633-7, Jio Policy K, Op- Tempcrtey,








be no misunderstandingbetween them on any part of a

subject so important.That the British Government were of opinion, that any

attempt to bring SpanishAmerica again under its ancient submission Spain, must be utterly hopeless;-that all to Negotiationfor that purposewould be unsuccessful;-and that the prolongation renewalof War for the sameobject,, or would be only a waste of human life, and an infliction of
calamity upon both parties to no end. That the British Government would, however, not only abstain from interposing any obstacle, on their part, to any attempt at Negotiation which Spain might think proper to make, but would aid and countenance such Negotiation, provided it were founded upon a basis which appeared to them to be practicable, and that they would, in any case, remain strictly neutral in a War between Spain and the Colonies,-if War should unhappily be prolonged;-But that the junction of any foreign Power in an enterprize of Spain againstthe Colonies, would beviewedby them asconstituting an entirely new question; and one upon which they must take suchdecisionas the interest of Great Britain might require. That the British Government absolutely disclaimed, not only any desireof appropriating to itself any portion of the Spanish Colonies; but any intention of forming a political connection with them, beyond that of Amity and Commercial Intercourse. That, in these respects,so far from seeking an exclusive preference its Subjectsover thoseof other foreign States, for it was prepared, and would be contented, to seethe Mother Country (by virtue of an amicablearrangement) possession in of that preference;and to be ranked, after her, equally with others, only on the footing of the most favoured Nation. That, completelyconvincedthat the ancient systemof the Colonies could not be restored, the British Government could not enter into any stipulation binding Itself either to refuse or to delay its recognitionof their Independence*->

That the British Government had no desireto precipihas

tate that recognition, so long as there was any reasonable chanceof an accommodation with the Mother Country, by



which sucha recognition might comefirst from Spain; but that It could not wait indefinitelyfor that result; that It could not consent makeIts recognitionof the New States to dependent uponthat of Spain;andthat It wouldconsider foreign any interference forceor by menace the disputebetween by in Spain theColonies, a Motivefor recognizing latter and as the
without delay.That the mission of Consuls to the several Provinces of

Spanish America, no new Measure the part of this was on Country;-that it wasonewhichhad, on the contrary,been delayed,perhaps long, in consideration the state,of too of Spain,afterhavingbeenannounced the Spanish to Government, in the Month of Decemberlast, as settled; and even
after a List had been furnished to that Government of the

Places whichsuch to Appointments intended br made.111 wore to That suchAppointmentswereabsolutelynecessary the for protection BritishTradein thoseCountries.-That the old of pretension Spain interdictall Tradewith those of to Countries was, the opinionof the British Government, in altogetherobsolete;-but that,evenif attempted boenforced to against; hers, ot it was,with regardto Great Britain, clearly inapplicable!.*-That permission trade with the SpanishColonieshad to
been concededto Great Britain in the Year iSio, when the

Mediation of Great Britain betweenSpain and her Colonies wasaskedby Spain, and granted by Great Britain;f--That this Mediationindeed not afterwards was employed, because Spain changedher Counsel;--but that it was not therefore practicable Great for Britainto withdrawCommercial Capital once embarkedin SpanishAmerica, and to desistfrom Commercial intercourse once established,-

That it had beeneversince distinctlyunderstood, the that Trade was opento British Subjects, and that the ancient Coast Lawsof Spainwere, far asregarded so themat least,
tacitly repealed.[* Note.Mr. Canning read ThePrince Polignac here to dc Extract* Two of Dispatches addressedSirWilliam Court, the5thandsBth Demnbrr to & on of
tions theSpanish to Government, in original.] Note
t This seems be inaccurate, noteat endof volume, to v*

1822, which that Ministerwasdirectedto makettale successive xn communica-







That, in virtue of this understanding, redresshad been demanded of Spain in the Year 1822, for (among other grievances) seizures Vessels allegedinfringementsof those of for Laws,which redress SpanishGovernmentbound Itself by the a Convention (now in courseof execution) to afford.That Great Britain, however, had no desire to set up any separate right to the freeenjoymentof this Trade;-That She considered the force of circumstances, and the irreversible progressof events,to have already determinedthe question of the existenceof that freedom for all the World;-But that,
for Herself, She claimed and would continue to use it; and

should any attempt be made to dispute that claim, and to renew the obsoleteinterdiction, such attempt might be best cut short by a speedy and unqualified recognition of the Independenceof the SpanishAmerican States.That, with thesegeneral opinions, and with thesepeculiar claims, England could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subjectof SpanishAmerica, upon an equal footing with other Powers,whoseopinions were less formed upon that question,and whoseinterestswereno way implicated in the
decision of it.

That She thought it fair thereforeto explain beforehand, to what degreeHer mind was made up, and Her determination taken [so far as Mr. Canning had explained it.-] The Prince de Polignac declared, that his Government believedit to be utterly hopeless reduceSpanishAmerica to to the state of its former relation to Spain;-that France disclaimed, on Her part, any intention or desire to avail Herselfof the presentstate of the Colonies,or of the present Situation of FrancetowardsSpain,to appropriateto Herself any part of the Spanish Possessions America; or to obtain in for Herselfany exclusiveadvantages; that, like England, and Shewould willingly seethe Mother Country in possession of superior Commercial advantages, amicable arrangement; by
and would be contented, like Her, to rank, after the Mother Country, among the most favoured Nations.-Lastly, that

She abjured, in any case,any designof acting againstthe

Colonies by force of Arms.-



[Mr, Canninghavingalludedto certain reports in the

Newspapers, attack, intended of some or attack, a French by

Naval Forceagainstthe Independents Columbia,!the in Prince Polignac [thatsofar fromintending such de said, any hostileact, the FrenchGovernment recalledthe only had Line of BattleShipin those Seas, "Jean Bart*';"-which the
is on its return to France.-])

That asto what might be the bestarrangement between

Spain Her Colonies, French and the Government couldnot give,norventure form,anopinion, to until TheKintf of Spain
should at liberty.-That theywouldthenbemuly to enter be uponit in concert with their Allies,and with Great Britain
among the number,

In observing whatMr, Canning saidwith respect upon had to the peculiarsituationof GreatBritain in reference such to
a concert*the Princede Polignac declared sawno diflieulty he to preventEngland from taking part in the* (Jonjafrrss* however Shemight now announce differencein the view the which Shetookof the Question from that takenby the allies " The refusalof Englandto cooperate the work of reconciliain tion might affordreason think either that Shedid not really to
wish for that reconciliation, or that She hud some ulterior

object in contemplation,two suppositions equally injurious

to the Honour and Good Faith of the British Cabinet, The

PrincedePolignac further declared that he couldnot conceive what could bemeant,under present circumstances, u pure by and simple acknowledgement the Independenceof the of SpanishColonies;sincethoseCountriesbeing actually distracted by civil Wars, there existedno Government in them which could offer any appearance solidity and thai the of acknowledgement of American Independence, longu,s HO swell astate continued, appeared him to benothinglotsthanureal to sanctionof Anarchy, The Princede Polignac observed that in the interestof

humanity, especially that of the Spanish and in Colonies, it would be worthy of the European Governments concert to
* In the versionprinted in B.RS.P,the word "Ccmfcrfnw" is wbtiwt*tl for "concert" and ''Congress"






together the means of calming in those distant and scarcely civilized regions passionsblinded by party Spirit; and to endeavourto bring back to a principle of Union in Government, whether Monarchical or Aristocratical People among whom absurd and dangeroustheories were now keeping up Agitation and Disunion. Mr. Canning without entering into any discussionupon abstract principles contentedhimselfwith sayingthat however
desirable the Establishment of a Monarchical Form of Govern-

[men]t in any of those Provinces might be, he saw great difficulties in the way of it, nor could his Government take upon itself to recommend it.* [Mr. Canning further remarked that he could not understand how an EuropeanCongress could discuss Spanish American Affairs without calling to their Counselsa Power so eminently interested in the result, as the United Statesof America^ while Austria, Russia and Prussia, Powers so much lessconcernedin the subject were in consultation upon it. The Prince de Polignacprofessed himselfunprovidedwith any opinion of His Governmentupon what respectedthe United States of America; but did not/or himselfsee any insuperabledifficulty to such an Association. He added, that he saw the lessdifficulty in a Congress upon this subject, as such a mode of treating it had been proposedat Verona by the Duke of Wellington. Referring to the Convention said to have been concluded between the Govern [men] t of Buenos Ayres and the Commiss[ione]rsfrom Spain, and especiallyto the declaration of the BuenosAyres Legislature accompanyingthat Convention which promised a Subsidy to Spain in the War against France; the Prince de Polignac was not prepared to say,how far sucha declaration might be considered his Government by
* In the version printed in B.F.S.P. the final sentence this paragraph ends of asfollows: " Saying that,-however desirablethe establishment a Monarchical of form of Government, in any of those Provinces,might be, on the one hand, or whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it, on the other hand-his Governmentcould not take upon Itself *to put it forward as a condition of their

t This proposal soremarkable in that age,asadmitting an overseas Republic to a Congress, was of coursecarefully concealedfrom the public.



as actofhostility an against France:-But,uponMr, Canning's observing the declaration only eventual conthat was and ditional, it depended itsconfirmation twoCircumthat For on
stances:-ist. The Ratification of the Convention by the King

ofSpain; $>dly-The and acceptancetheliketerms the of and

conclusion similar Conventions of with Spainby nil the other

Statesof SpanishAmerica;-neither of which had yet occurred, and further that, evenif carriedinto effect,such a subsidy wouldhavedoneno moreagainst Francr, than the Colonies might havebeen bound to do, if still under the*
Controul of the Mother Country;-The Prim:*:chr Poligmu;

waswilling to admitthat thiscase not onewhich could was be expected change to practically Viewsof his Governthe ment,with respect thegeneral to question Spanish of America, or muchto influence general the principles Policy,by which of
that questionmust be decided. But uponthis point The Princedc Polignao said, that he was speakingonly his own individual opinion, and that opinion not formedupon mature reflection.3*

[The Polignac Memorandumendedall questionof Fmirh or Europeaninterference forcein the New World, but it wiw not by until the last day of 1824that Canning completedarrangements for negotiating commercial treatieswith the most ndvatiml of the new independent Republics.Thesewere Rio <lnla Plata f Argentine), Columbia Mexicorespectively, politiral rrrogmtion and Full followedin 1825 w^h the ratificationof thr treaties. In thin way Canningrecognized New World, It: will, perhaps,bt* unfits! the

to indicate rival theories recognition prevailed tim the of that at

time. There were three, and the first two started from ideal banes,

TheAmerican UnitedStates' or viewerreda little by cxcntH of zeal,Theyweretoo readyto recognize revolted a colonybrrauw it wasa republicwithoutconsidering it wanHufflciently if stable, The Spanish view,whichwasheldalsoby Russia, Austria and
Prussia, was that a King alone could grant recognition to his

revolted subjects. otherwords, In subjects couldonly revoltby permission their King,The objection this waspractical of to
* A P.S, 15October isomitted, deal* Canning'* of tin* of 1823 It with virw Dukeof Wellington's attitude regards Spanish as the Colonial ilw it
of Veronawith quotations.




Obviously subjects might in the future, and had in both past and

present, revolted and formed a State before Kings were willing to recognizethe fact. Such-arevolted State waslike an illegitimate
baby. Its existence could not be denied, whether its father

recognized it as his or not. Canning reconciled these two points

of view. He admitted the one view of recognition, which came

from the King or former sovereign at his own will. This was dejure. But there was also a recognition de facto which was based on a practical appreciation of whether the new State had shewn a sufficient degree of force and stability first to achieve its independence, and next to discharge internal and external acts of sovereignty. Provided it had, it mattered little whether the State
was a monarchy or a republic.
The "fact" was that

Stability was the first test of

and could act for itself.

legitimacy. British recognition of a new State was not the recognition of a right but of a fact, "or rather of an opinion of a fact".
the new State existed

Any British Ministry would have recognized the Spanish American Coloniesin any casewithin a year or two after Canning recognized them. Englishmen are a practical race and awake to facts. Yet it was owing to Canning's insistencethat the Colonies were recognizedin 1825. And it was his peculiar power of thinking out principles to their conclusion which laid down the theory of recognition, a theory which has been adopted by every country in the world as a permanent part of international law. There are many illustrations of Canning's views, but the dispatch before us contains them in relatively short compass. It was written in reply to a remonstrance of the Spanish Minister. It is a model of
diplomatic argument and an instance of extreme common sense

applied to international law. We can only wonder to-day why it was then necessary point out to Governments that facts could to not be ignored, and that recognition of a new state of things could not be indefinitely delayed.]

Document 9. Canning's theory of'recognition, 25 March 1825* [The dispatch beginsby a detailedrefutation of the chargethat "Britain has uniformly put forward the basis of independenceas the sinequdnoncondition of her counseland assistance Spain to in negotiationwith her Colonies".]

To comenow to the secondcharge againstG[rea]t Britain, the alleged violation of general international Law. Has it
* Note from GeorgeCanning to the Chevalier de Los Rios, Minister Pleni-

potentiary of His Most Catholic Majesty, 25 March 1825,F.O. 72/309. Cp. B.F.S.P.xii, 909-15. A few passages little importancehave beenomitted, of
and the argument in them summarized.



everbeenadmittedasan Axiom, or everbeenobserved by

anyNationor Gov[ernmcn]ta practical as Maxim,that no

circumstances, no time shouldentitle a de and factoGovfern-

men]tto recognition? should or entitleThird Powers, who mayhavea deep interest defining establishing in and their
relations with a defacto Govfcrnmcnjt,to do so? Such proceeding thepartofThird Powers, mbfedly a on nd< doesnot decidethe questionof right, againstthe Mother

The Netherlands had thrown off the Supremacyof Spain,

longbefore endof the i6th Century;but that Supremacy the wasnot formallyrenounced Spaintill flic Treaty of Westby phaliain 1648,Portugal declared 1640, independence in her of the Spanish Monarchy;but it wasnot till zMJft, Spain that
by Treaty acknowledged independence. that During each these of intervals, abstract the rights of Spain may be said to haveremainedimexlmguished.But Third
Powers did not, in either of those instances, wait the nlow

conviction Spain,before of theythoughtthemselves warranted

to establish direct relations, and even to contract intimate

Alliances,with the Republiekof the United Netherlands,as well as with the New Monarchy of the HWIKC ttragan/.u,* of The Separation the SpanishColonies of from Spain hits
been neither our work, nor our wish- Events in which the

British Gov[ernmen]thad no participation, decided that separation: separation a which we are still of opinion might
have been averted, if our Counselshad been listened to in

time. But out of that separationgrew a state of things, to whichit wasthe duty of the BritishGovjrrmnenjt, (hi proportionasit became plain and legitimateinterestof the the nationwhose welfare committed it's charge.) conform is to to

its measures, well as its language, hastilyami preas not cipitately, withduedeliberation circumspect but and ion. To continue callthat a possession to of Spain,in whichall Spanish occupation power been and had actually extinguished
the Houseof Braganza,





and effaced,could render no practical serviceto the Mother Country;-but it would have risked the peaceof the World. For all political communitiesare responsible other political to communities for their conduct:-that is, they are bound to perform the ordinary international duties, and to afford redress for any violation of the rights of others, by their citizens or subjects. Now, either the Mother Country must have continued responsible actsover which it could no longer exercisethe for
shadow of a controul; or the Inhabitants of those Countries,

whose independent political existence in fact, established, was, but to whom the acknowledgement that independence of was denied, must have been placed in a situation, in which they were either wholly irresponsiblefor all their actions, or were to be visited for suchof thoseactions as might furnish ground of complaint to other Nations, with the punishmentdue to
Pirates and Outlaws.

If the former of thesealternatives,the total irresponsibility of unrecognizedStates,be too absurd to be maintained; and if the latter, the treatment of their Inhabitants as Pirates and Outlaws, be too monstrousto be applied, for an indefinite length of time, to a large portion of the habitable Globe; No other choice remained for Great Britain, or for any Country having intercoursewith the SpanishAmerican Provinces,but to recognizein due time, their political existenceas States, and thus to bring them within the pale of those rights and duties,which civilizedNationsarebound mutually to respect, and are entitled reciprocally to claim from each other. The example of the late revolution in France, and of the ultimate happy restoration of H[is] M[ajesty] Louis XVIII, is pleaded... in illustration of the principle of the unextinguishable right in a legitimate Sovereign. [Examples are then given of how "every power in Europe, and, specifically,Spain amongstthe foremost39 only recognot nized the successive governments France,after the monarchy of was overturned, "but contractedintimate allianceswith them all39.]

... The appeal,therefore,to the conductof the Powers of



Europe, even thatof Great and to Britainherself respect with

to the FrenchRevolution,doesbut recall abundantinstances

of therecognition de of facto Gov[ernmenjts G(mt jt Britain by perhaps laterandmorereluctantly than by others, by but G[rea]tBritainHerself, however reluctant, afterthe example setto Her by theotherPowers Europe,and specifically of by
Spain. ,., M. Zea declares that The King of Spainwill neverrecognize the new Statesof SpanishAmerica; and that lijisj

M[ajesty] never will cea*seemploy forceof armsagainst to the his rebellious Subjects, that part of the World, in
Wehaveneither the pretension, the desireto nmtroul nor H[is] C[atholic] M[ajcsty]*s conduct:--But this declaration of M. Zea comprises complete a justiJicat of our conduct ion in having taken the opportunity which to us seemed ripe for placingour relationswith the New States America on a of definite footing. For this declaration plainly shows,that the complaintagainstusis not merelyasto the mode,or tint lime of our advances towardsthose States; shows It that the* dispute between and Spainis not merelyas to the questionof fart, us
whether the internal condition of any of thoseStates, be such

as to justify the entering into definite relations with them: that it wasnot merelya reasonable delayfor the purpose of verifying contradictory reports, and of affording opportunity for friendly negotiation,that was required of us: It shows, no extentof forbearance our part would have that on satisfied Spain,andthat, deferour advances towardsthe New Statesas long as we might, we should still have had to make them,without the consent Spain;for that Spainis deterof mined againstall compromise, under any circumstances and at any time, and is resolved upon interminableWar with her
late Colonies in America.

M, Zea concludes declaringthat H[iJ Cjutholic] with Majestywill protestin the mostsolemnmanneragainstthe measures announced theBritish by Gov[crnmcn an jt9 violating existingTreaties,and the imprescriptible rights of the
Throne of Spain. Againstwhatwill Spainprotest?







It has beenproved that no Treatiesare violated by us;and we admit that no question of right is decided by our Recognition of the New Statesof America. But if the argument on which this declarationis founded be true, it is eternal;-and the offenceof which we are guilty in placing our intercoursewith those Countriesunder the protection of Treaties,is one of which no time and circumstancescould, in the view of Spain, have mitigated the



[The theory of Guarantee generally receivesall sorts of reckless applications during and after a great war. It is obviously necessary
to give guarantees in war time, which cannot be maintained in

peace. Thus, for example, when Napoleon drove the King of

Portugal out of Lisbon and forced him to take refuge in Brazil,

England guaranteed the successionof the House of Braganza,

But this obligation was promptly annulled in 1815with the arrival

of peace. None the less, the theory of general guarantee was widely mooted. Gastlereaghhad great trouble in persuading the despotsof Europe that England would not guarantee Monarchs their thrones. But liberals were equally anxious that England
should guarantee constitutions to certain countries, as for instance

to Sicily and Spain. When the French invaded Spain in 1823,in

order to overthrow its too constitutional Government, the British

liberals urged Canning to retaliate by guaranteeing to Spain the eventual restoration of her constitution. Canning was thus urged

by despots assist the destructionof a constitution, in Spain; to in

and by liberals to assistin the restoration of one. In each case he refused the petition.

In stating his decision Canning laid down the doctrine of guarantee in its most classicform. He points out the dangers of

extending such an obligation and the necessity observingit. of

He distinguishes between a guarantee and a defensive alliance,

He points out the difficulties and dangersinherent in a territorial guarantee, and the enormously increasedrisks of a guarantee of internal institutions, by an external power. It is safe to say that the doctrine was never so brilliantly expounded before or since. It isof interestto observe that, despitehis objectionsto guarantee, Canning was sometimesprepared to offer one. But the limits within which he acted shew his prudence. Thus he offered to defend Cuba "for Spain against external aggression", if Spain would accept " British good officesto recognizethe independence



of theSpanish Colonies". thecase a dispute In of between Brazil

and BuenosAires he offered to guaranteethe free navigation of the Rio de la Plata estuary,if both Governmentsdesired it. In both casesthe Governmentsconcerned refused his offer, which

accordingly lapsed. it should notedthat, in each But be case, the guarantee "maritimeprotection". was Thiswasuof thedomain of England andonewhichshe " could immediately practically and
enforce. On the other hand, while Canning was quite clear that
the extension "to the Colonial Possessions of the drown

England's treatyobligation Portugal to meanta promise defend to her Europeanpossessions againstany enemy,he did not admit

Portugal",* In the case Greece, did indeedcontemplate of he a guarantee accepted all the Powers. hedeclined > by But t< proceed
with it when Austria and Prussia withheld their assent. On the

whole Canning was extremelyreluctant to give*any guarantees, and he nevergaveone which he could not enforce, ]

Document 10 Canning's Doctrine Guaranteet of 18 September 1823!

TheBritishGovernment not, in anycase, will undertakeany guarantywhatever, eitherof territory or internal Institutions, The scrupulousness with which England is in tint habit of fulfilling her obligations makesit the more necessaryfor her not to contract them lightly, A guaranty is one*of the mostonerous obligationswhich oneStatecancontract towards
another. A defensive Alliance binds the Government con-

tractingit, to cometo the aid of its Ally, in cane an unproof vokedattackupon hisDominions:and to makein his behalf, everyreasonable practicableexertion,-practicable in and
extent, and reasonablein duration. But it does not bind the assistingGovernment to the alternative of either a successful

result,or an indefinite prolongation the War, A guaranty, of strictlyconstrued, knows limitseitherof time,or of degree, no

It would be, unless distinctlyrestricted that respect, in

claimable a War commenced the Powerto whom the in by guarantyis given,aswell asin a War of unjust aggression
t Printed Stapleton, in Political ofCanning, Life [i%$i],I, 427-30, with mistakes. version fromTemperley, This is Fonign Polity Canning, of 59 where textis taken the fromtheoriginal dispatch, 185/91, P.O. Chinning u> A Court, 54,18September received September. No, 1823, 30

* Cp.Temperley, Foreign of Canning, Policy 539-411, .infrap. #5. ami



against that Power; and the integrity of the territory of that

Power must be maintained, at whatever cost the effort to

maintain it is prolonged: nay, thoughthe guaranteed Power

itself should contribute almost nothing to the maintaining it. If... the engagement to be restricted in these particulars, is
it would constitute an unilateral defensive Alliance, but it

would cease be a guarantee. Objectionableas a territorial to guaranty is shown to be, the objections to a guaranty of internal institutions are infinitely stronger. It is difficult to say whether theseobjections apply with greater force to the party giving, or to that which receivessuch a guaranty.
The very principle on which the British Government so earnestly deprecatedthe War against Spain, was, that of the right of any Nation to change, or to modify, its internal

Is that War to end in His Majesty's consenting to assume to Himself the province of defending, against all Challengers, from within, aswell asfrom without, the Institutions, whatever they might be, which the War may leave standing in Spain? Is His Majesty to guaranty the Constitution of 1812, indifferenceto which, to saythe least..., is the singlepoint upon which anything like an Agreement of opinion has been found to exist in Spain? or is He to guaranty the antient despotism, the restorationof which, with all its accompaniments, appears to be the object of by far the largest party in the Country? or is it to be in behalf of somenew system,struck out at a heat, at the winding up of affairs at Cadiz, that the faith of Great Britain is to be pledged, and that Her blood and treasure are to be forthcoming? or is it only to the undoubted right of the Spanish Nation to reform its own Government, that the sanction of His Majesty's guaranteeis to be added? If such a guarantee were anything more than the mere affirmance of an abstract proposition, against whom would it have

practically to operate? clearly againstthe Spaniardsthemselves and in the endless : struggles which might be expected from the then distracted state of parties in that Country,
against every party by turns?



Couldanythingbemoreunbecoming than the assumption of sucha right by a foreign Power? Couldanything more be intolerable to the Country with respect to which it was

It is hardly necessary add that while His Majestymust to declineaccepting sucha right for Himself,he could not acknowledge in any other Power* it The exercise such a right must necessarily of Ic*a<l an to intermeddlingwith the affairs of the guaranteedSlate, such asto placeit, in fact,at the mercyof the Power who givesthe

Russia,in former times, guaranteedthe Constitution of


The result is known-and

it was inevitable.

The natural
from inter-

and necessary course thingsmust,in sucha case,overbear of

even the most sincere and studied

positionon the part of the guaranteeing Power. There can be no doubt that His Majesty's Allies will feel how little such an arrangement would be compatible with the Engagements which they stand bound to each other; by to maintain the Stateof territorial possession established at the Peace, and the rights of independentNations,
Constitution and Constitutionalism

[It is commonlysuggested that Canning was the chief deviser and practiser of the policy of allying with constitutional .states " againstdespotic ones. Thus Lord Salisburysayss Palmmton wan the disciple Canningandwith him believed of that foreignpolicy shouldfollow your political proclivities**,* This has some truth in respectto Palmerston, very little in respectto Canning, Canningcertainlythought that British public opinion was, in case war, an enormous of force,f He alsothought that if England was fighting with a despotic power,shewould find the liberals of that countryon her side. But hedid not apparently wish to unite
with the discontented of all countries. His aim was to hold the

balance between "the conflicting principles'*of despotism and liberty. He did not like despotisms, did he like democracies, nor
ments theOrigins theWar,[1930], 780, on of vi,
t V. supra,pp. 65-7,

* Lord Salisbury, August 31 1896, Gooeh Tempcrley, in and British fiocv-


In "the ancient world Their existence.. .was in war."

He said

the same of the democratic or liberal republics of the Middle Ages, whereas"long intervals of profound peace are much more readily to be found under settlements of a monarchical form". He goeson to argue, very much on the lines of the accompanying

document, that it is England's freedom and constitution that is her strength,but freedom"ceases be a distinction, in proportion to
as other nations become free'1.* This was on 28 April 1823.

Canning was not therefore the champion of constitutionalism as such; in fact it was only with reluctance that he ever accepted any such role. England only came over to the constitutionalist side because despots the would have noneof her. Even so Canning allied England with a despotic state (Russia) and a constitutional one (France) by a treaty signed in the last month of his life. He
was thus still "holding the balance".

The chief reason for describing Canning as a champion of constitutionalism is becauseof his defence of Portugal in i8s6.f
Portugal had just received a free constitution. For that reason

despotic Spain tried to upset it. Sheused all sorts of methods such as arming, organizing and equipping Portuguese deserters who crossed the border. Finally, when frontier incidents had taken place, Canning held that the British guarantee of territorial
integrity arose and must be honoured. He therefore sent troops

to defend Portugal. Not unnaturally British troops were considered the defenders of the constitution, as well as of the frontier, of Portugal. But this was the effect, and not the intention, of Canning's move.

There can be no doubt that Canning himself had not desired,

and had done nothing to secure, the grant of the Portuguese
constitution. J He had in fact been embarrassed when he heard

the news and was forced willy nilly into supporting it. Early in 1826 he had been concerting measureswith despotic Russia to
save Greece from Turkey, and it did not suit him to be driven

into the constitutionalist camp. He could not avoid taking advantage of the situation for political purposes. But it is noticeable that during the last months of his life he was trying to recall Dom Miguel as Regent to Portugal, and he can hardly have believed that he was a respecter of constitutions. He did believe

(and rightly) that the Portuguese public wished for Dom Miguel and, just beforehis death, wasworking at a compromise whereby Miguel would accept the constitution in return for being made
* Speeches, R. Therry, v, 125-6. ed. | V. his speech supra,pp. 66-7.

J V. on this point Sir R. PeePsspeechof i June 1829 in tne House of Commons: "Nothing could bemore express than the disclaimerby Mr Canning, that the [British] army was not sent out for the purpose of supporting political institutions." The testimony is the weightier as Peelwas not wholly friendly to Canning. V. Hans.Deb.y New Ser., xxi, 1626.



Regent. Thisscheme never matured, it shews Canning hut that wasveryfar frombeingan indiscriminate supporter constituof tions. idea he'was, dueto thepolemical The that is arguments of Stapleton Lady Canning, weretrying to discredit and who his
successors. It has been uncritically accepted by historians,

master. His true mind is undoubtedlyrevealedin the following conversation which he had with Stratford, "the third great

especially those Portugal* But it wasnot the ideaof the by of

Canning",a diplomatasimperious ableashimself,] and
Document 11, Canning Constitutions on and 4 December i8s&4t
General Politics

GreatBritain maintainsa policy of her own,,suited to her positionand Constitution, Shewill be no party to a general interference the concerns other states;though prepared in of to interfereon special occasions her opinion justifying such in interference. Why should the Governments, forming the H[oly] Apliancc]be lookingcontinuallyto partiesin foreign
States, and not to the Governments in thdr relations with those States. Gr[cat] Brfitain] is ready to live on terms of amity with arbitrary Governments,why should they not do

the samewith respectto free States,so long a,snothing be doneby the latter to violate their rights or to prejudicetheir just interests.The principle of British Policy in shown in nothing more than in her abstainingfrom controuling the interference the Allied Sovereigns of with Spain ami Naples^ when She could not herselftake part with them, Orleat) Jt Is 4 Brptain] in communicating with despotic Governments docs not complainof their principlesof Government; why then

should theycomplain her freeinstitutions thespirit of of and

her nation in dealingwith Her? Not, on the other hand, a
* Cp. alsoTemperley, Foreign Policy Canning, -C'h,The vtew put of 457 forwardby Mr E, Prestage Transactions Royal in of the Historical fa 4th Sen, Socit xvn, [1934]* 94~7>is based Portuguese on authorities, crrtainlymmconmvc who the situationby representing Canningasthe champion cowtitutiow, This of

viewis flatly contradicted the evidence the BritishArchivaland by the by of

testimony Peelgiven above, F. p. 85 note, of

t KO. 352/9, "Private;Memorandaa conversation Stratford of [of Canning] with the Secretary Stateand Mr Plantaon leavingthe ForeignOffice of Dec[embe> 1824, 4th previously getting for Petersburg Vienna. to out and
^""i G[eorge]Cfannmg]." I" ^ J*N * "fc f h <h **r


British tinent. Interest Much to have free States established better and more convenient for


on the Conus to have

neighbours,whoseInstitutions cannot be comparedwith ours in point of freedom.The principle of all this [is] a middle course for England between Jacobinism and altruism, with a view particularly of preventing the extreme parties from coming to an open rupture.*

Believes her general habitual policy to be what Esterhdzy states, favourable to connection with England. P[rince] M[etternich] hasacquired great influenceover the Emp[eror ] Alexander] and is not backward in making professionsto this country, but his declarationscannot be dependedupon.
* This same thought is indicated in Canning's speechof 28 April 1823.
Speeches, R. Therry, v, 127 and 129. "Can it be either our interest or our ed.

duty to ally ourselves with revolution?.. .Our station then, is essentially neutral: neutral not only between contending nations, but betweenconflicting




Canning save in terms of reverence. "

[Palmerston undoubtedly looked to Canning hismaster. up as The Morning Chronicle, press his organup till 1848, neverrefers to
We do not think that

England hada minister ever betterqualified preserve from to her war than Mr Canning. certainlyneverwasthere a Minister Yet
who discussedthese difficulties which must arise between countries

with morespirit, ability and decision."* Palmerston much said the same his speeches,! I might be allowedto express in "If in onesentence principlewhichI thinkoughtto guidean English the Minister,I wouldadoptthe expression Canning,and saythat of with every British Minister the interests England ought to be of the shibbolethof his policy." In the portrait of Palmerston paintedat theheightof his powera bustof Canning noticeable is
in the background.

Though Palmerston was the pupil, he was far from carrying out thepolicy of the master. Canningwascreditedby hissecretary with eea systemof policy" which is no more than to say that his policy suited the needs the age. Canning deprecatedthe laying of down of " fixed resolutions eventualprobabilities ", and declared for that "casesmust arise upon facts which it is utterly beyond the powersof human foresightto combineand calculatebeforehand". J Yet he wassupreme the intellectualconception policies,and in of in the following out of their legal implications. The consequences of such doctrines as those of recognition, non-intervention and guarantee were actually more clearly conceivedby Canning than by any of his successors. formed,in fact, a system, They though onecapable futuremodification.Palmerston," of thoughgenerally desirous keepEnglandon the sideof liberal opinions", had no to system policy relative to foreign states. He wrote thus, in his of bluff fashion,to Clarendon. " When peopleaskme, as Howden does, what is calleda policy, the only answer that we mean for is to do what may seem be best,upon eachoccasion it arises, to as

makingthe Interests Our Country of one's guiding principle." "'England', he said to me once,"is strongenough brave to
consequences.'"[I Here is the contrast between the two men,

2 April 1845.

t Hans. Deb., Ser., 3rd xcvn, 123,i March1848.

} Temperley, Foreign Policy Canning) of 471.

PieClar. Papers. Palmerston Clarendon, July 1856. to 20

just quoted.

cededby a passage similarto that in the letter from Palmerston Clarendon to

|| Sir H. Bulwer, of Palmerston, i, 346.Thissentence preLife [1870], is



Thereis no case which Palmerston's in departurefrom principle

is more clearly indicated in thesettlement Belgium. than of By theViennasettlement Belgium been had unitedto Hollandand to theHouse Orange bothraceanddynasty of and werehateful

Francehad an idea of settingforward a French royal prince, the Due de Nemours, as a candidate for the Belgian throne. The Belgians were ready to accepthim. A Congress at Londonto decidethe gravequestion. It had sat sat in one form or another since November 1830. Its president was Palmerston;Talleyrand, the wisesthead in Europe, was the French representative.Finally a settlement,by which Belgium wasto be neutral and independentand PrinceLeopold of Coburg to becomeits ruler, was suggested.It was devisedby the Great Powersand acceptedby Belgium. All would have been well had the Dutch accepted settlement They did not and Leopold's the too. desirefor Luxemburg gave them an excusefor intervention. In the first days of August 1831they invaded Belgian territory and beat the Belgian troops. They were only kept back from Brussels by the advanceof a French army into Belgium. The danger was
extreme. The French were in Belgium, the British fleet was in the Downs ready for any emergency. Palmerston told the French that

to her. The Revolution 1830 Francedeposed absolutist of in the Charles and setLouisPhilippeon the throne.The success X of thisrevolutionstimulated Belgians revolt against Dutch. the to the In November, whenGreyandPalmerston into office, just came therevolted Belgians Congress a declaration National in issued of Independence November (18 1830) subsequently and excluded the House Orange of from the throne.The danger veryreal. was The Frenchhada goodcase intervening restore for to orderand Prussiamight take the opportunity to attack her old enemy.

they must leave Belgium early in September. They agreed to do

so. The crisis was over.

The Dutch King remainedto be coercedand wassoultimately, despiteRussiandisapproval and Prussianand Austrian abstention. A Frencharmy and a British fleet proceeded againstAntwerp. The fortress,blockadedby seaand bombarded by land, surren-

dered theAlliesandwashanded to overto Belgium(May 1833). Thissuccess consolidated Leopold's positionon theBelgianthrone.
But it was not until 1839, after endlessconferenceshad met and seventyprotocols been signed, that peacecame. Then the famous

TreatyofLondon, neutralizing guaranteeing independence and the of Belgium, wassignedby Austria,France,GreatBritain, Russia andPrussia April 1839). was "scrapof paper"which (19 This the Germany up whenshe tore invaded Belgium 1914. in

In 1793 andGrenville Pitt wentto warwith France keep to Belgium Hollandindependent her. The same and of burning question touched Britishinterests 1830.All theold suspicions in




the territorial settlement of Vienna was made. No British states-

of French aggression been had aroused, the first breach and in

man,of course, wouldhaveallowed Frenchinfluence dominate to in Belgium.Soif Belgium to be madea separate was state,she
must take rank as a separatenation.
The documents that follow are, in two instances (Docs. 12 and

14)quotations Bulwer's from Life. His authority notimpeccable is

but, in this case,the sentiments can be supportedfrom other evidenceand are to be inferred from the speeches Parliament. in In Docs. 16 and 17 Palmers argueswith Metternich about the ton meaningof guarantee. reference infra,pp. 156-7,will shew A to that when defining his meaningin 1848he actually rose to the heightofa general principle.He shews curiously a practicalturn of mind in theparticularquestion Belgium.Providedthe French of weregot out of Belgiumhe did not object to revising the Treaty of Vienna or to infringing Canning'spet theory of " non-intervention". His easy methodof interpreting that policy justifies the famousmot of Talleyrand. When asked to define < non-intervention" the latter repliedthat it wasa word signifyingmuch the same as "intervention". That is the result of not having a "system".]

Document 12. Palmerston thedesigns France Belgium, on of in 7 January 1831*

In a conversation which I had a few days ago with Talleyrand, about the affairs of Belgium, I mentioned to him an idea which had occurredto me, as an arrangementwhich might probably smooth someof our difficulties. The King of
the Netherlands would wish his son to wear the crown of

Belgium; the Belgianswant much to have Luxembourg. Could not the King give up Luxembourgto his son, on condition hisbeingelected theBelgians? might not of by and the Belgians choose Princeof Orange,on condition that the he shouldbring Luxembourg with him? Talleyrandlooked very grave, and said he thought his Government would not like to seeLuxembourg united to Belgium. I askedwhy, inasmuch it had beensounitedhitherto, and would not as

be moreinconvenient France to whenunitedto Belgium

alone,than whenunited to Belgium joined with Holland.
He said, the fact was that their frontier in that direction is

very weak and exposed, Luxembourg and runs into an

of Palmerston, 27-9. n,

* PalmerstonViscount to Granville, Private, January 7 1831, Bulwer, Life


undefended of France.He thensaid,Wouldtherebeno part means makingan arrangement which of by Luxembourg might begiven France'? confess felt considerable to I I surpriseat a proposition muchat variance so with all the language and professions whichhe and his Government havebeenholding.
I said that such an arrangement appeared to me to be

impossible, that nobody and couldconsent it. I added to that

Englandhad no selfishobjectsin view in the arrangements of Belgium,but that we wishedBelgium to be really and substantiallyindependent.That we were desirousof living upongoodterms with France, that anyterritorial acquisibut tions of France such as this which he contemplated would alter the relations of the two countries,and make it impossible
for us to continue on good terms. I found since this conversation that he had been making similar propositions to Prussia about her Rhenish provinces, in the event of the possibility of moving the King of Saxonyto Belgium and giving Saxony to Prussia.To-day he proposedto me that France should get Philippeville and Marienburg, in consideration of France using her influence to procure the election of Leopold for Belgium. I do not like all this; it looks as if France was unchanged in her system of encroachment, and it diminishes the confidence in her sincerity and good faith which her conduct up to this time had inspired. It maynot beamiss for you to hint.,uponany fitting occasion, though areanxious that we to cultivatethe bestunderstanding France., to be on the terms with and

of themost intimate friendshipwith her, that it is only on the yet supposition she that contents herself the with finest territory Europe, in and notmean open new does to a chapter encroachment of and conquest.

Document 13. Palmerston non-intervention on in Belgium,

18 February 1831*

There was nothing in the principle of non-interference, fairly and reasonably down,which prescribed a State laid to the absence all interference what passed a neighof in in bouringcountry,whenthat whichwaspassing concerned the interests the otherparty: andif Belgium of chose Sovereign a
* Hans. Deb.,3rd Ser.,n, 702-3,18February1831.


whomightbecome dangerous the neighbouring to States,

thoseStates a right to say"Such a person us will be had to

dangerous, such person refuse recognise". and a we to He said,therefore, the Powers Europe a right to say that of had
to France, "You cannot consistently, your relations with with other Powers, accede the appointmentof the Due de to Nemours King, and therebyvirtually attachBelgiumto as yourself". On the onehandtheyhad a right to saythis to France;andon the other, they had a right to sayto Belgium,
that if the Due de Leuchtenberg was elected, becausehe, from the circumstances his family, would make Belgium of

the centre politicalintrigues, theywouldnot acknowof him ledge.He said,that this wasnot interferingwith Belgiumin any sense inconsistent soundandrational principles. with
Document 14. Palmerston theneed Frenchtroops on for evacuating Belgium, August1831* 17

I like not your letter nor your despatches,f thosewhich nor Talleyrand read to me to-day by desire of Sebastiani. The despatcheswhich Talleyrand himself writes to Sebastianiare perfect, and evidently written that he may read them to me. What elsehe writes I cannot tell, but I am not so sure that what he reads to me is all he sends,and that
the rest is in the same tone.

Onething is certain-the Frenchmustgo out of Belgium, or we have general andwarin a given a war, number days.But, saythe of French,wemean go out, but we mustchoose owntimeand our to our ownterms. time,however, have The they agreed besettled the shall by

conference, it must asearly is consistent theobjects and be as with for whichthey professed go in. to Theycame at theinvitationof analliedsovereign, in whose neutralityandindependence haveagreed guarantee, they to andtheymarched theaccomplishmenttheobjects for of which the five Powers haveall beenaimingat. What termsthen are
n, 108-10.

* Palmerston Granville, to Private, August 17 1831, Bulwer, ofPalmerston, Life

[t Theystatedthat the French wouldnot go out of Belgium without some previous arrangement to the fortresses. by Bulwer.] as Note



theyentitledto make to theirretreat?None! With regard as to thefortresses, makethemunderstand their pretensions that are utterly inadmissible. The very basisupon which we can agree thedemolition anyof these to of fortressesthesecurity is
derived from the guarantee of France and of the other

That guarantee, then,mustbegivenin thefullestand most

formal manner before we can stir a step; and to dismantle these fortresseswhile the French have them in possession would be a disgraceto all the five Powers;and as to making France a party to the treaty for their demolition, that is impossible. Nothing shall ever induce me to put my name to sucha treaty, and I am quite surethe Cabinet never would
sanction it.

We have had no Cabinet to-day upon your letter and your despatches, becausewe want to learn the result of my letter

and Grey'sof Saturdaylast. Sebastiani and Soult apparently want to pick a quarrel with all their neighbours,or to compel everybodyto submit to their insolenceand aggressions. They miscalculate their chances,however, I think; and they will find that a war with all the restof the world, brought
upon them by a violation of their word, will not turn to their advantage, nor redound to their honour. They will not be

thebetterableto carryon thewar on the Continentfor losing all their commerce, and for being deprived of the revenue arisingtherefrom. ruin of their seaports create The will general distress throughout the country; the Chamberswill soonbe

sickof barrengloryif they succeed, of defeats or brought

needlessly uponthemif theyfail; the ministrywill be turned out, andthe King maygo with them.The Carlistparty will makean effort, and with the Republicans give much may

embarrassment. Austriaand Prussia well prepared are for


The Belgianswill not join the French.*

[* Thisdecided language, whicha less resolute minister wouldhaveavoided

aslikelyto provoke reallyprevented aswill beseen thefollowing war, it, by extract froma letterof Lord Granville, dated Paris, August 1831: 15 "My representationsTalleyrand's and despatches state public of the of feeling in



Document 15. Palmerston intervention Belgium^ on in 7'December 1831*

He must altogether deny, that the Government this of country been had instrumental imposing in uponBelgium a
Government inconsistentwith the wishesof the people of that

country. thecontrary, people Belgium chosen On the of had

their own form of government,and had electedtheir own

sovereign. circumstances whichthe Government The under

of this country had interfered were simply these:-Both HollandandBelgium wereanxious beseparated, it was to but

impossible themto agree for uponthe termsof suchseparation, andtheinevitable consequencebeingleft to themselves of would havebeen,that Europemust have been involved in war. By the interference which had taken place,peacewas preserved^ Europesavedfrom the horrors of war. It and would have been a war of principle too, into which it was probableEnglandwould soonhave beenbrought. By the interference which had taken place this consequence was

Document 16. Palmer stores estimate thevalueof the of BelgianGuarantee, October J 1837! .. .Her Majesty'sGovernmentis inclined to think that Prince Metternichis mistakenin supposing that the questionas to the Fortifications Diestis with Prussia questionof Peace at a or War: The Prussian Government much too enlightened is not to seethat War upon such grounds would be wholly unjustifiable;and it hastoo much foresightnot to be aware of the inconvenientconsequences Prussiaherself which a to War socommenced would inevitablyproduce:But if Prussia
England havealarmed them(P6rier Sebastiani)little, andproduced and a the
return to France of 20,000men, and of the retreat of the remainder into that

half-measure, which Talleyrandis instructedto announce, the immediate of

part of Belgium between Nivelles the French and frontier." Note by Bulwer,] * Hans. Deb., Ser., 106-7, December ycd ix, 7 1831,

offortificationsDoc. 17. theKingof theBelgians. reportof Metternich's at Diest by A views is added in

120/160.Palmerston replyingto a protestby Metternichas to the erection is

t Palmerston Sir F. Lamb(Vienna), 127,7 October1837, to No. F.O.



were to be so infatuated as to begin such a War, She must

abideby it's results;and uponHer and Her advisers the responsibilitythose of results would exclusively fall. ... Withregard thenecessity such defence Belgium to of a for as proposed the Works Diest at would afford against Attack an
from Holland, the slightest glanceat the Map is sufficientto
shewthat those Works have not been resolved upon by the

BelgianGovernment without good and sufficientreasons.

Prince Metternich indeed-isof opinion that the Guaranteeof Austria,England,Franceand Prussia ought to be to Belgium a sufficientsecurity,without any Fortifications; and he has
written down as a Memorandum a Sentence recording some Declaration said to have been made at some time or other by

those four Governments The King of the Netherlands,and to to TheKing of theBelgians, the effectthat theformerwould to not be permittedto make any attack upon the latter. But PrinceMetternich is too experienced Statesman, a and is too
conversantwith international Transactions, to lay much stress upon a mere Memorandum of such a Declaration, without any date of time, or any statement of the formalities which rendered it an engagementbinding on the four Powers, and to which the Belgian Governmentcould appeal in caseof need,
There exists however a much more formal Guarantee of the

integrity and independenceof Belgium in the 25th Article of the Treaty of November 1831, to which Russia, as well as the other four Powers, was a Party; and there can be no doubt that if Papersecurities could be taken as standingin steadof military defences, Belgiummight by virtue of that Guarantee,

consider Herselfoneof the safest Countries Europe, in

But unfortunately the History of the World abounds with

instances shew,that it is unwisefor any Stateto rely to entirely it's defence, uponthemostsolemn for even engagements otherPowers, Her Majesty's of and Government regret
to say that the conduct of Austria Russia and Prussia with

respect theAffairs Belgium notformed striking to of has any exception thewarning bederived thisrespect to to in from theexperiencepreceding of Times.It is impossible put to into words any language Declaration in a moreprecise,



positive, unqualified, that whichwas and than drawnup by

the Russian Plenipotentiaries the Conference, made in and anAnnexto the4gthProtocol the I4th of October1831 of ;That Document,after referring the Belgian Plenipotentiary
to the communicationwhich had been made to him of the

24Articles., proceeds thus:-"Les cinq Cours reservant se la tache, prenantengagement et f d'obtenirVadhiswn la Hollands de
aux Articles dont il s'agit, quand memeElle commencerait

par lesrejeter; garantissant leurexecution; convainde plus et cusque ces Articles, fondes desprincipes sur d'equiteincontestables, offrent a la Belgiquetousles avantages qu'Elle est en droit de reclamer;ne peuventque declarerigi leur ferme determinationde s'opposer, par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir.,au renouvellement d'une lutte qui, devenue aujourd'huisans objet, seraitpour les deux Pays,la source de grandsmalheurs,et menaceraitPEurope d'une guerre generate, le premier que devoirdes cinqCours deprevenir. est Maispluscettedetermination proprea assurer Belgique est la
sur son avenir, et sur les circonstancesqui y causent maintenant de vives alarmes,plus elle autorisera les cinq Cours a user ^galementde tous les moyensen leur pouvoir pour amener Tassentiment la Belgique aux Articles ci-dessus de mentionnes, dans le cas oil, contre toute attente, Elle se refuserait a les adopter, et pour faire cesserles sacrifices qu'une telle resolutionde sa part imposeraitk la Hollande."
A similar Declaration was at the same time made to The

King of the Netherlands. The Belgians relying upon this Declaration accepted, though with much reluctance, the 24 Articles thus sent them; but The King of the Netherlands rejected those Articles.

The Denunciationin the Annex has been doubtlessprepared by the RussianPlenipotentiaries the belief that the in ,24 Articles would be at once acceptedby The King of Holland to whom they were highly favourable; and that the
repugnance to subscribe to them would come from the Belgians;and if such had been the result, the three Powers

would have beenready enoughto carry the Denunciation

into effect.



But when the reverse of what they expected took place,

whenthe 24 Articleswereaccepted Belgium,and refused by by Holland, from that momentthe three Powers resolved to
consider the Denunciation of the Annex as a dead Letter;

and no persuasion argumenthas ever beensufficientto or induce them to take one single step in execution of their solemnly recorded pledge,to obtainthe assent Holland to of thoseArticles. Nay more; the five Powers Nov[embe]r in 1831 signed Treatywith The King of the Belgians which a by They formally acknowledged Him as King, and solemnly guaranteedto Him the Territory describedin that Treaty. But for a long time after that Treaty was signed, neither
Austria nor Prussia sent any Minister to Brussels; and even up to the presentday, Russiaprofesses have only partially to acknowledgedThe King of the Belgians,and refusesto hold any diplomatic intercourse with Him. Moreover for some time after the Treaty of 1831 was concluded, the Dutch continued to retain possessionof the Citadel of Antwerp, which by that Treaty the five Powers had guaranteed to Belgium; and when at last in 1832 Great Britain and France invited the other 3 Powers to unite with them in carrying into executionthoseterritorial arrangements of the Treaty, upon which all the five were agreed, and to which none of the Reserves accompanyingthe Ratifications applied, the Three Powers positively refused to fulfil their engagements, and retired in consequencefrom the Con-

ference; and when afterwards Great Britain and France, faithful to their own stipulations, employed the necessary
means for compelling the Dutch to evacuate the Citadel of

Antwerp, a PrussianArmy assembled upon the Frontier of the Prussian RhenishProvinces, placing itself in a position and attitude much calculatedto encourage resistance the of
the Dutch.

It cannot thenbe surprizing The King of the Belgians if with theexperience these of factspresent His mind, should to
think it better to provide means of His own to resist the constantlythreatenedAttack of the Dutch, than to trust for his safety to the already broken Guarantee of the three


Powers;and it must be remarked, that all the arguments

which are usedto shewthat the projected Fortifications are

unnecessary, wouldequallytend to prove that any Belgian Army isneedless, that thewholemilitary forceof Belgium and mightsafely disbanded. if for wantof anArmy,or for be But want of fortified positions supportan Army, Belgium were to again overrun a sudden by irruptionof theDutch,andif the Troops TheKing of the Netherlands of werein possession of
Brussels, the other great Towns of Belgium, it may well and be doubtedwhetherthe three Powerswould take any steps

to expelthe Dutch, and whethertheir boasted Guarantees would be proof againsta "Fait accompli"
Document 17. Metternich theBelgian Guarantee, * and 22 September 1837*

Prince Metternich in speakingupon the fortifications of Diest saidthat it wasfor Prussia questionof Peaceor Wana I askedin reply why he said more than Prussiaherself; and insistedupon the necessity a security to the Kingdom of of Belgiumagainstthe possibility of an attack from Holland?This security the Prince said was to be found much more completein the guaranteegiven by the Four Courts of Austria, England,Franceand Prussiato that of Belgium than in the fortification of a point of the frontier.Upon rny expressinga doubt as to the existenceof this guarantee, he offered to shew it me in the acts, and at my requestwrote down what it is. I copy his words"Les Coursont declare RoisdesBeiges desPays-Bas, aux et qu'ellesne souffriroientpas, que le dernier commette des actes d'hostilitecontrela Belgique qu'ellessauroient et deslors les empecher"-

Whenthe Princehad giventhis paperin, I saidthat supposing the King of Belgium to have full confidencein this

Guarantee, it wouldnotprevent Dutchfrommarching still the to Brussels, therewasnothingin the wayto stopthem if [He thensaidthat thefortifications wereoffensive.]
* Lambto Palmerston, 63,22 September No. 1837, P.O.7/265.



... All hisreasonings repose upontheideathat in case War of the Belgick fortresses wouldprobablyfall into the handsof France,and that the Northern ones, Diest were addedto if them,wouldform a formidablebasis offensive for operations against Territory of the Confederation. represents the He
himself to have had a similar discussion with the Duke of

Wellingtonand Lord Gastlereagh the year 1815with in regardto the erection thefortresses the Southern of on frontier of Belgium, whichhe persisted regarding built for the in as profit of France,while they defended them on the ground that England would alwayshave time to come to their
defence.The event, he contends,proved the soundness his of views, and he now implores Her Majesty's Government to look beyond the policy of the moment; to consider the great chances there are of Francebeing the first to occupy Belgiumin the eventof a war, and to considerthe formidable position, in which the occupation of a securebasisfor operation on the Meuscwould placeher, and the extent of Territory which it would lay at her mercy. As I have no means of estimating the value of these considerations, which can hardly be appreciated without referenceto competent Military Judges and as the meansof security which Prince Metternich holds out to Belgium coincides in part with the views taken in Your Lordship's No. 14 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, I have thought it best to submit his reasonings to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government without entering into further controversy upon them. All I think necessaryto add is, that the Prince's manner has impressedme with the conviction that his objections are made in good faith. It is to be remarked that he fully admits the right of King Leopold to be secured against attacks from Holland. The only question then that remains, relates to the nature of that

I am unacquainted with the guarantee which Prince Metternichasserts exist,but if it does to exist,which I cannot doubtafterthe mannerin whichhehaspledged himselfto it, I cannotbut feel that if conjoinedwith the diminution and removalof the Dutch forcefrom the frontier, it will give a



bettersecurity Belgium-and in the interests Englandto of a saferone than the erection of new fortresses which may
hereafter be turned to other usesthan those for which they were designed.*



[That Palmerston "generallydesirous keepEnglandon was to the sideof liberal opinions" is admitted by his biographer. That wasin fact his nearest approachto a "system". He derived from Canningthe view that any war of the future would be a war of opinion. It was to be betweenthe "two great parties. . .one
which endeavoursto bear sway by the force of public opinion; another which endeavoursto bear sway by the force of physical
control... .There is in nature no moving power but mind. . .in

human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public

opinion; and he who cangraspthis power,with it will subduethe fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose."t He thought that, if the Belgiantrouble had involved Europe in war, "it would.. .have been a war of opinion, and the consequences must have been most lamentable",J One reason for this approaching conflict was that the despots-ofEurope had promised constitutions in their hour of need and broken these promises their hour of triumph. "When Bonaparte was to be in dethroned,the Sovereigns Europe called up their people to of
their aid; they invoked them in the sacred names of Freedom and

National Independence; the cry went forth throughout Europe:

and those,whom Subsidies no power to buy, and Conscriphad tions no force to compel, roused by the magic sound of Constitutional Rights,startedspontaneously arms.The long-suffering into Nationsof Europeroseup asoneman,andby an effort tremendous andwide spreading, a great convulsion nature, they hurled like of the conquerorfrom his throne. But promisesmade in days of distress, were forgottenin the hour of triumph.J> Palmerstonplanned thereforeto support constitutional monarchieseverywhere againstdespoticones,to promote the growth of constitutionaland parliamentarygovernment, as to restrict so by opinion the military forcesof despotsand the Neo-Holy Alliance. He proclaimed principlequite openlytowardsthe this
* For Palmerston's doctrineon the general nature of guarantee Doc. 32 v. infra,wherehe convicts Metternichof inconsistency. t Hans. Deb,,New Ser.,xxi, 1668,I June 1829. J Hans. Deb.,3rd Ser.,rx, 966,26January 1832.

Hans. Deb., NewSer., xxni, 82, 10March 1830.



endof 1832."I am prepared admit., theindependence to that of

constitutionalStates, whetherthey arepowerful, like Franceor the

UnitedStates, of less.. or .importance, asthe minor States such of Germany,never can be a matter of indifferenceto the British Parliament, I shouldhope,to theBritishpublic. Constitutional or,
States I consider to be the naturaf Allies of this country; and... no

English Ministry will performits duty if it be inattentive to the

interests of such States."* Now here we have a curious and

almost sentimental idealism revealedin a man supposedto represent the businessinstincts and hard-headedness John Bull. He of

is prepared definitely not to be an umpire, as Canning was, ee betweenthe conflicting principles of despotismand democracy".
He means to take sides. He has forgotten the master's dictum cnot, on the other hand, a British Interest to have free States
established on the Continent". His course is his own and it is a

very different one, despite the fact that his biographer claims it as "the full completion of Mr. Canning's policy ".f

One of Palmerston's reasonsfor supporting constitutionalism was that it would separate parliamentary France from despotic Russia. Over the Belgian affair the three Eastern despots of

Russia, Prussia and Austria had shewn dangerous tendencies. Palmerston,who had worked in the War Office for twenty years, knew the extent of their military power, but he knew that it stopped at high-water mark. The seawas the domain of England on which her navy rode supreme.The military despots were only to be fearedif Francejoined them, with a navy powerful in the Mediterranean. celt must not be forgotten that one great danger
to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and

Russia."J In that case mostformidable military power in the the world would advance to India overland, while France was obstructingEnglandin the Easton the sea.That dangercould only be avoidedif Francewere separated from Russia.

Palmerston intended keepFrance theright track". And to "in the right track wasthat of constitutional liberty, to which Russia wasutterly opposed. chance His came 1834 in whena prospect
appearedof forming a constitutional blocin the West. There was

a chance makeSpain, to Portugal, France England in and one

a constitutional allianceand Palmerston took it.]
t Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, 188. n, ii, 268; in italics in original.

* Hans. Deb., Ser., 1045, August 3rd xiv, 2 1832. supra, 88. V. p.

t PalmerstonGranville,June1838, to 8 quoted Bulwer, ofPalmerston, in Life





[Thesituation theIberianpeninsula a very peculiarone. in was In Portugal Spaintherewasa war, in eachcase girl nieces and of against wickeduncles.Eachof the girl nieces a constitutional had policy,eachof the wickeduncles despotic a one.The triumph of
innocence and constitutions was therefore in the interests both of

England and of sentiment. In Portugal virtue had almost triumphed already. In 1826Canning had sent troops to defend Portugalbut they had in effect helpedthe constitutionalists.On
their withdrawal the young Maria II becameunpopular and was

ultimately deposed her uncle Dom Miguel (1829). But the by constitutional party had raised a rebellion in the Azores, and finally had receivedreinforcements from Brazil and England. They landed in Portugal and seizedOporto (1832). Miguel, though absolutist, was popular and for a time confined them to the coast. But matters changedin 1833w^en the British captain Napier was put in command of the constitutionalist fleet. It was tiny but its crewswere mostly British mercenariesand desperate blades. Napier sallied boldly out, destroyedor captured Miguel's whole fleet, and returned to Oporto in triumph. The constitutionalist forces, elated by this success,moved on Lisbon and captured it. Their success was startling and the young Queen entered her capital in triumph. But the battle was not yet won. Miguel wasstill in the field and drawing great assistance from the absolutistsover the border in Spain. He and the absolutist pretender in Spain also drew money and assistance"from the DespoticPowersof Europe", i.e. from Austria, Prussiaand Russia. There wasthus,in Palmerston's view, a world struggleof opinion and he must take sides. " Maria's causehas won the day in Portugal",wrotePalmerston October1833), (8 "though the race is not quiteover The triumph of Maria [in Portugal],and the accession Isabella [in Spain], will be important events in of Europe, will givegreatstrength the Liberal [and constituand to tional] party. England,France,Belgium,Portugal,and Spain,

looked uponmerely a mass opinion, as of form a powerful body in Europe."* He decidedto make it still more powerful by

constitutionalizing Spain, and allying with constitutionalist

In Palmerston's the Spanish view and Portuguese problems wereone,and despotism mustbe crushed simultaneously both in countries. Some outside assistance necessary. Spainthe was In

* PalmerstonTemple, October Bulwer, ofPalmerston. n, to 8 1833, Life [1870],


situation was critical. Ferdinand VII,


the old absolutist King,

died in the autumnof 1833. Isabella,a child Queen,succeeded. Her mother Christina became Regent and adopted a mildly constitutionalpolicy. Don Carlos,Isabella'suncle, claimed the throne,raiseda rebellion andappealed reactionaries to throughout

Spain.Palmerston thought situation grave to demand the so as

a veiled intervention by England. He did it by negotiating a treaty between Great Britain, France, and the constitutional Govern-

ments SpainandPortugal, thepacification thepeninsula. of for of * The girl Isabellaand the girl Maria wereto help oneanotherto expel Miguel, the Portuguese, and Carlos,the Spaniard, pretendersfrom the Iberian peninsula. England was to lend naval aid; Francealsopromisedhelp. This was the treaty finally signed
on 22 April 1834.

According to Palmerston "it was a capital hit and all my own

doing" (12 May 1834). It certainly was immediately effectivein driving out the Portuguesewicked uncle and forcing him to leave the country he had misgoverned. Even before the ratifications were exchangedthe Miguelists laid down their arms. Miguel had undoubtedly a good many thousand men still under arms, and
if he had marched into Spain and taken Carlos with him, there might have been serious trouble. But he and his army surrendered without bloodshed,"f
It took longer, however, to deal with Don Carlos. France

disconcerted Palmerston by tending to favour Don Carlos in deference to Austria, Russia and Prussia. All sorts of methods, none of them consistent with non-intervention, were tried, but

Palmerston stopped short of direct intervention. His justification

was that none of his methods would have succeeded unless the

Spanish nation had desiredthem to do so. He relaxedthe Foreign EnlistmentAct to enablea volunteermilitary legion to be raised in England for service in Spain, which became the best aid of Isabella. He allowed arms and equipmentto be exported to the constitutionalists and prevented their going to the Carlists. The British navy cut off Carlist suppliesand occasionallybombarded their coasttowns. Finally he lent the QueenRegenthalf a million pounds for military expenses. The Carlist movement lived on in the Basque provinces, finally flickeredout in 1839. It seemed but as if Palmerstonhad triumphed.

The four documents that followshewPalmerston's opinions well. Doc. 18 shews peculiarview of intervention; Doc. 19, his his view of the natureof the conflicting principles;Doc. 20, his refusalto submit to a EuropeanCongress; Doc. 21 is a broad
popular account of the whole transaction to his constituents on

the hustings.
* Text in Hertslet,Map> [1875], 941-4. n,

f Palmerston Temple, June1834, to 27 Bulwer, of Palmerston, Life H, 197.



one. The constitutions of Spain and Portugal fully justified the

"struck out at heat". The constitutional bloc in the West failed

The sequel provedthat Palmerston's triumph was a barren

scepticism whichCanning always had extended institutions to

to balancethe three despoticmonarchies the East. Portugal in

and Spainproved moreimportantwhenendowed no with constitutions than when without them. Both proved unable to restrain

Franceor evento keepher in the Alliance. By 1840France and

England were estranged. 1846 In Spanish affairscaused serious a

breach betweenEngland and France. It would probably have been better in the end to have adhered to Canning's doctrine of non-intervention with more strictness,and to have left Portugal and Spain to their own futile and sordid disputes.The causeof constitutionalismsucceeded Belgiumjust because people were in a ready and able to receiveit. For exactly the oppositereasonit failed in Portugal and Spain. There is perhaps no episodeof Palmerston'scareer more to his credit than his Belgian achievement, and none lessto it than his building of castlesin Spain and
his adventures in the country of Don Quixote.]

Document 18. Palmerston thenatureof the interference on in Spain,24 June 1835* In the first place, the present interference (for he took it to be generally allowed that it was in principle an interference)was founded on a treaty arising out of an acknowledgementof the right of a sovereign, decidedby the legitimate authorities of the country qver which she ruled. In the case

of a civil war, proceeding either from a disputedsuccession

or from a long revolt, no writer on national law denied that other countrieshad a right, if they chose exercise to take to it, part with either of the two belligerents.

Document 19. Palmerstontheconflicting on principles.,

c. 9 June 1836! Draft preparedJune 9/36

Entirelyapprove Language by L[or]d Granville the held on thisunexpected suggestion Mons[ieu]rThiers. of

it comments "B", i.e.Backhouse, isby Permanent Under-Secretary, 1827-42.
* Hans. Deb., Ser.,xxvin, 1162-3, June 1835. 3rd 24 t Rough noteby Palmerston,June 1836, 9 P.O.96/18. The draft on which



It is well known that from the Commencement the Civil of

warin Spain 3 Courts Especially ofVienna the and that have Entertained notion putting Endto theContest a the of an by Marriage between Infant the Queen theSon Don and of Carlos. If theContest going in Spain merely Rivalnow on were a shipbetween Individuals a Proposal unitingin Two such for
a Common Interest the Conflicting Claims might appear

plausible specious. anyPerson takes limited and But who so

a viewof theEvents whichhave been passing thePeninsulas, in mustindeedbe a very superficial observer human affairs. of The struggle Spainis not between in Persons between but Principles-Carlosand Isabellaare the nameswhich have

C been forward therallyingCryof theTwo Parties, put as but

therealQuestion issue whetherSpainshallfall backunder at is, the arbitrary Systemof Gov[ernmen]t which has so long paralized [sic] the Natural Energiesof the SpanishNation, or whether a Constitutional System similar to that which existsin England and in France and in Portugal shall be established alsoin Spain-between theseopposingPrinciples no alliance can take Place; one or other of them must predominate,and it is sufficientlyobviousthat the Scheme of Marrying the Infant Queen to the Son of Don Carlos now 18 or 19yearsold, is foundeduponthe Hope that suchan
arrangement would give Predominance to the Party of Don


* ;'

Carlosthat is to the supporters absoluteGovernment... . of


Document 20. Paimerston refusesEuropean a Congress

onSpain., August1837* 9
Mr. Villiers' No. 201.

Mr. Villiers [is] to be instructed assure Queenof to The Spain nothing a State Things Spain which that but of in of at present thereareno Symptoms, whichwefervently and

hope never arise, will could induce British the Gov[ernmen]t to become Parties a European to Congress the Purpose for of regulating affairs Spain; it is needless say the of and to
* Rough by Palmerston, note 9 August 1837, 96/19. P.O.



that no such Congress could have any practical Resultsas long asGreatBritaindeclined belongto it, and refused to to acquiesce its Resolutions.... in The Queen may thereforeconfidently reckon upon a continuanceof the cordial sympathy and active assistance of G[rea]tBritain,anduponhavingFranceto a certaindegree with her in measures whatevermay be the SecretFeelingsof the FrenchCabinet-Thus supportedby the two great Powers who are more immediately in contact Geographically and Politically with Spain,The Queenhasnothing to apprehend from the DespoticPowersof Europe except a continuance... of thosesupplies moneywith which it is well known they of
have for the last two years furnished Don Carlos. The Patriotism and Energy of the Spanish Nation will therefore not be controuled by any Foreign Interference in Favour of the Pretender and if that Energy and Patriotism shall succeed as we trust it will in firmly establishing the Queen Isabella on her Throne without any Interference of Foreign Armies in her Favour, although the struggle may on that accountbe somewhat longer, and although the Sacrifices which the SpanishNation will have been required to make may on that account be somewhatgreater, still the Result will be morehonourableto the Nation and more advantageous

to the Queen; For a Throne which is foundedupon the

spontaneous attachment of a Loyal People, and which has

beenestablished their own nationalexertions by restsupon

a far firmer Basis than one which has been raised under the

Protection of foreign Bayonets, Pfalmerston] 9/8-37.

Document 21. Paimerston describes achievement his his to

constituents, July 1847* 31

...Wetookpart with the people Spain-with those of who wanted constitutionalliberty, equal laws, a Parliament, justice, Inquisition-against no those were havingno who for Parliament, justice, muchInquisition. succeeded; no but We
2nd ed., 25-6.

* Speech Palmerstontheelectors Tiverton, July 1847. of to of 31 Pamphlet,


and by meansof very trifling assistance, which could not possibly havedetermined events, the Spanish if peoplehad not been on that side,we enabledthem to work out their
liberties with smaller sacrifices than they must otherwisehave submittedto, andwith less sufferingthan they mustotherwise have encountered There was a struggle in Portugal very similar to that which I have mentioned as taking place in

Spain...Did wesetup Dom Miguel? No; weput him down.

We threw our influenceinto the scaleof liberty, freedom, and constitutional rights; and, by our assistance, that causeconquered, and the Portuguese nation becamepossessed a of Parliament, and of all those rights which are essential for securing the liberties of a nation.





[The documentsthat follow are a compendium of Palmerston's

views on constitutionalism which, as has already been noticed, differed considerably from those of Canning.* He had a real and sincere belief in the efficacy of constitutions, which the Master did not share. Thus, in his argument with Metternich in Doc. 22, he plainly regards the Prince's attitude as absurd. He shews

Metternich that the persistencein absolutism is persistence in

folly, when the King, like Otto of Greece, is a fool. In Doc. 23

he informsGuizot that" Her Majesty'sGovernment not happen do

to recollect any country in which a constitutional Government
has been established that has not on the whole been better off in

consequence". The style of reasoning is now different.


Guizot, being a professed Parliamentarian, can be twitted for his

reluctance to press a policy which is an article of his faith- In

Doc. 24 Palmerstontakesup the humanitarian ground and departs evenfurther from the Canning doctrine of non-intervention. The principle, to which he refers in Doc. 23, that under which the ThreePowers (France, GreatBritain and Russia) guaranteed

"a realand bonafide Constitution Greece",wasan extremely to dangerous one. It justified exactlythat sort of meddlinginterference theinternal in affairs other of States against whichCanning hadwarnedthe despotic Governments Europe. of The despots of Europe wished interfere suppress had to to constitutions Spain in or Naples, because disliked they constitutional principles.Palmer* V. supra, pp. 84-6,



ston wished to interfere in countries already endowed with con-

stitutions,if he thoughtthey workedbadly or were in dangerof comingto grief.Yet, in practicalfact, the dangerof Great Powers interfering in the internal affairs of small Statesis alwaysreal and serious, whetherthey wish to promoteor to suppress constitutions. A study of thesedocuments shews that Palmerstonproposedto insiston a bonafide constitutionbeingerected Greece.He wanted in Guizot to join him in enforcing "the removal of the Bavarian
Camarilla and the entire abolition of the irresponsible Referen-

daires,... interposed between the King and the Ministers of State". In Doc. 24, inflamed by a real humanitarian zeal, he goeseven further. He proposes prevent the Government of to Greece from placing soldiers at free quarters, from poisoning brigands,from torturing prisoners, from conniving at "the Slave Trade". Of theseonly the last could, by any conceivableargument, be considered other than a purely internal affair of Greece. Palmerston, acting in a spirit of genuine benevolence, is thus advocating a policy of "restless meddling activity". Greecewas too feeble to resist him, but the consequences this policy were of ultimately serious to Europe, to England and to Palmerston

Document 22. Palmerston argues with Metternick, 18 February1841*

I have to acknowledge Receipt of Your Excellency's the Despatch No. 19 of the 5th Instant inclosinga copy of a despatch addressed PrinceMetternichto PrinceEsterhazy by on the Affairs of Greece, and a copy of a Private Letter to Your Excellency the samesubject. on With reference thewishexpressed PrinceMetternich, to by
that the English Minister at Athens should receive directions

to placehimselfon a footingof perfectconfidence with the AustrianMinister,I haveto stateto Your Excellency that I have reason believe those to that Two Ministers already are on perfectlygood and confidentialterms, and that the best understanding existsbetween them; and Her Majesty's

Government moreover informed theopinions have been that of Colonel Prokesch to theEvilsExisting Greece, as as in and to the Remedies whichoughtto be appliedto themdo not differverywidelyfromthe opinions Sir Edmund of Lyons.
* PalmerstonLordBeauvale, 38,18February F.O.120/193. to No. 1841,

PALMERSTONAND CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1830-47 But Prince Metternich, admitting the Existence of these Evils, seemsto think that the only remedy is to "renforcer Pattitude Roy ale".
Now if the Evils of Greece arose from the weakness of the

Royal Authority, and from encroachments madeupon it by popular Power,sucha remedymight bejust and appropriate; but the presentEvils of Greece arisepreciselyand solelyfrom the "attitude Royale"; they are occasionedby the obstinate pertinacity with which a King devoid of all capacity for governing insists upon grasping and retaining in his own
hands, not only all the Powers of the State, but all the details of the Administration of every Department. In this state of things to "renforcer Pattitude Royale", if indeed it were possible to do so, (which seemsdoubtful, for absolute Power could not well be carried further,) would only be to increase the cause of the present Evils, and therefore to aggravate the Evils themselves. The Evils being universally known to arise from want of

any controul upon the Royal will, the only practical remedy
must consist in Some Machinery which would afford such
a controul. Prince Metternich seems to think that such a

controul would be found in the appointment of able Ministers who would give King Otho good advice in the Secret recesses
of his Closet.

But, in the first place, who is to appoint those Ministers? They can be appointed only by King Otho himself; and it is not likely that King Otho would of His own accord chuse Personswho would give him advice different from his own

opinions;But supposing out of deference the urgent that to

Representations of Great Britain and Austria such Ministers

were to be appointed; who is to guaranteethat King Otho wouldtaketheadvice theywouldgiveHim? The probability is that He would not do so. What would thesegood Ministers then have to do ? Why of courseresign!-But in that case King Otho would be delighted; He would accept their Resignations without Hesitation, and would appointin their
stead the bad Ministers whose advice would be more suited
to his taste.




It seemsthen that the only real Controul which can be


established theobstinate wrongheaded upon but opinions of King Otho., must foundin some be institution whichwould
render the effectsof his own will imperfect,,unlesssupported

; -[

by the concurrence other Persons, of whose He should will

not be able intirely to command. But such an arrangement,

though mightaffordan effectual it Controul overKing Otho, mightnotalways controul will in a manner His advantageous
to the real interests of the Greek Nation; unless the Persons
in whom this Power of Controul was vested, were themselves

liable to be controuled by the opinion of their fellow subjects; because, otherwise,they might pursue their own private and

separate interests prejudices or without regardto the general

Interests of the Greek Nation.

Therefore,in order that the measures the Government of shouldbe calculatedto promote the general welfare., seems it indispensable that the Power of the Executive should be limited, so that new Laws should not be made, that new Taxes should not be imposed, and that Publick Expenses
should not be incurred, without the consent of some bodies

of men answerableto the Country at large for the manner in which they might give or withhold their consent on such

But this is what in common parlance is called a Constitution; for such bodies can only be assembliesmore or less numerous according to the Circumstancesof the case,chosen

by Publick Election,or holding their privilegesby a Tenure placing them in a stateof Independenceof the Crown; and invested with a share in the power of Legislation, and authorized takecognizance the Revenue Expendito of and
ture of the Country. What particular form of an Institution of this kind would

be bestadaptedto the present wantsand condition of Greece Her Majesty's Government not pretendto be ableat once do to say; but it doesappear to them that unlesssome Institutionsof this kind be established, King Otho will neverhave able and proper Ministers;-and that neither the allotment

of Lands, anyothergreat nor measure whichmayberequired

PALMERSTONAND CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1830-47 III for the welfare of Greece can stand the slightest chance of being adopted.

There may be in assemblies this Kind, as allegedby of

Prince Metternich, much idle and unprofitable talk; but, nevertheless, suchassemblies true interestsof a Nation in the are sure to be brought into publick discussion;abusesand Evils of all kinds are made publickly known, remedies are

publicklyproposed examined, general and the intelligence of thenationis broughtto bearpracticallyon the General welfare,
and the Country is sure to advancein the Career of improvement.

Document 23. Palmerston argues with Guizotabout promoting Constitutionalism, March 1841* 19
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency'sdespatchNo. 89, of the i2th Instant, stating that Mons[ieur] Guizot had read to you a despatch upon the Affairs of Greece, which he has addressed to the Baron de Bourqueney, and reporting the substance of a Conversation which you held with Monsieur Guizot upon that subject. The Baron de Bourqueney read to me two days ago the despatch in question, and I intend to have a further Conversation with him upon the Subject. In the meanwhile, I have to statethat your Excellencyhas correctly expressed the sentimentsand views of Her Majesty's Govern[men]t on this

Her Majesty'sGovern [men]t is not pedantically attached to anyparticularFormof politicalConstitution;andalthough

they may be of opinion that the Form which, with some

variationsin eachCountry, hasbeenestablished England in and France,is, on the whole,the best,they by no meanswish

to press immediate the adoption that FormupontheKing of of Greece. on theotherhand,the ThreePowers by But, did, their Proclamation the 30thof August,1832, of pledgethemselves to'theGreek Nationthata Constitution should given, be and a similar promisewasmadeby the King of Bavariain

* Palmerston Lord Granville (Paris),No. 84, 19 March 1841, F.O. to



the name of His son in a Letter from Baron Gise to the Greek

Secretary ForeignAffairs, for Under these circumstances, certainly appears to Her it Majesty'sGovern[mcn]tthat the Three Powersarc bound
in honour not to allow this matter to rest as it does, and that

howevergradual the stepsby which a real and bond fide

Constitution is arrived at, such a Constitution is the end which the Three Powers ought to resolve to reach.*

As to the practicability of establishinga Constitution in Greece, is alwayseasyto say,with regard to any Country it
in which men do not wish to see Constitutional Government

established,that such Country is not fit for it, and that it would not work there; but Her Majesty's Government do not happen to recollect any Country in which a Constitutional systemof Governmenthas been established that has not on the whole beenbetter off in consequence that system of
than it had been before. However there is no reason that because Two Parties are

willing to go different distancesin the same Road, they should not go on together as far as both are disposedto go; and althoughthe FrenchGovernment for sometime past has
been less constitutional in its view of Greek Affairs than the

British Government has been, Her Majesty's Government will beglad to cooperate with that of Francein effectingthose preliminaryImprovements which at all events would pavethe way for the further measures which Her M[ajesty]'s Government think ultimately necessary;and H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]twould be glad to know what stepsMonsieur Guizotwould propose take,in order to carry hisviewsinto to

Your Excellency will stateto Mons[ieu]r Guizot that one indispensable preliminary to any improvementin Greeceis the removal of the Bavarian Camarilla, and the entire abolition of the irresponsibleReferendaires, who, after the Bavarian
* Cp. Palmerston,on 2 March 1848,in Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., xcvii, 138. He there refersto this obligation of 1832as " giving a pledgethat that Sovereign

shouldgive to the Greeknation a constitutionalsystemof government.We,

therefore, do stand in the position of parties who have undertaken certain
in honour to see carried out."

obligations towards people Greece; thoseobligations . .we arebound the of and ,


Model, have been interposedbetween The King and the Ministersof State. It is absolutelynecessary that the Greek
Ministers who are at the head of the various Departments of

the public Service, shouldcomein personal contactwith the King, shouldthemselves explain to him the measures they propose, should person and in receive Pleasure his thereupon. Youwill givea Copyof thisdespatch Mons[ieur]Guizot. to
Document 24. Paimerston recommends humanitarian policy to Guizot, 19 March 1841* I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Y[our]

Excellency's] Despatch 93, of the I5th Instant, enclosing No. a Copyof the Reply of M[onsieur] Guizot to the Communication which you had addressed him renewing the proposal to of H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t that a joint Representation should be made to King Otho by the Representatives of
the Three Powers at Athens, relative to the system of cruelty and torture practised by the Agents of the Greek Govfernmen]t. I have in reply to instruct Y[our] E[xcellency] to present a Note to Mons[ieur] Guizot, expressingthe sincere regret of H[er] M[ajesty]*s Gov[ernmen]t t6 find the sentiments of the French Government so different from those of H[er]

M[ajesty]'sGovernmentupon questions suchas the employment of Torture to extort confession, and the stationing Troops at free Quarterson the Population of a Country as
a means of punishing Families for an assumedconnivance at the Offences of their Relations. The French Government

considers any Representation King Otho upon such that to matters these as wouldgivehimjust offence exhibitingthe by Appearance a wish to "intervenir a toutpropos of dans les
moindres actes" of his Administration.

Her Majesty'sGovern[men]ton the contrary, cannot look upon theseas small and minute detailsof Administration, but asgreatcryingenormities involvingimportantandfunda-

mental Principles Government, in theopinion H[er] of and, of

* Palmerston Granville, 85, 19March1841, 27/619. to No. P.O.


M[ajesty]'s Government, Powers, being the who specially

authorizedand invited by the Greeks to choose them a

Sovereign, KingOthoontheThrone Greece, placed of arc

bound out of a regardfor their own honour to express

unreservedly to KingOthothestrong disapprobation which theymust necessarily at measures repugnant the feel so to practice civilized of Nations thepresent in times, thehopes in of beingablethereby only to rescue GreekNation not the
fromsuch Oppressions but also prevent recurrence now, to the
of such abuses of Power in future.

H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t concerned have are to

further to state,that the African SlaveTrade is notoriously
carried on to a considerable extent in the Mediterranean in

Greek Vessels and without any attempt on the part of the GreekGovernment preventor to punish it; and charges to havebeenmadeagainst GreekGovernmentto which no the Replyor Denial hasyet beenmadethat the Agents of that Govern[men]t have beenin the habit of endeavouringby stratagem poison to Persons accused beingRobbers,instead of of resortingto thosemeans which are usedin other Countries to arrest the Offenders,and to punish them by due process
of Law.

With regard to the employmentof Torture to extort Confession, Mons[ieur] Guizot says,that the French Minister at Athens acknowledges it has that been practised, M(c>nsieur] but Lagrene alleges that it hasbeenpractisedonly in two cases, the one,that of a Maltese Subject Her Majesty,the other, of that of a TurkishSubject the Porte. of Now,upon this, Her Majesty's Government would beg to

remark,that the factsadmittedby Mons[icur] LafjrtSn<5 do

not seem warrant the conclusionhe draw* from them, but to would rather lead to a contrary inference. For how can

Monspeur] Lagr6n knowthat these cases the only two are ones whichTorture been used, mighthe not in has thus and withmore justice said these cases theonly have that two were ones whichpublicattention been to had called;and why? because hadprobably theonlycases whichthe these been in

Greek had Police ventured torture who so to men, being entitled


to claim the protection of the Ministers of Foreign Powers had the means of making their suffering known by appealing to Advocates placed in a situation authoritatively to demand redress;and is it not fair to suppose that the Persons who have been in the habit of thus inflicting Torture, must have carried their practice to a great extent upon native Greeks before they could have become so regardless of consequences to as hazard its infliction upon a subject of the Sultan, and a subject of Her Britannic Majesty. Monsieur Guizot sayshowever that the Greek Government has relieved Itself from all responsibility in this respect, by ordering the Persons who inflicted these Tortures to be criminally prosecuted. H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t regret that they cannot concur in this view of the matter; because, as long as M[onsieur] Tzinos and the other Persons of higher station than him by whose advice and orders these Tortures have been inflicted, are retained in their respective Offices, it is impossible to consider the prosecution of the
Gens d'Armes, who were the immediate Instruments of the

cruelty, as anything but a measure of evasion. With regard to the stationing the Troops at free Quarters, H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t know, that the Edict under which it was done has nominally been rescinded but they have not yet been informed whether the practice has actually

Monsieur Guizot seemsto think that, to address to King Otho a remonstrance against Acts so revolting as those which have been adverted to in this Note, would be a greater Interference with the Independent action of King Otho than to point out to him the Measures of Government which they think it would be most for his advantage to adopt. Her Majesty's Government certainly cannot, upon any general principle, concur in this view. Her Majesty's Gov[ernmen]t are undoubtedly ready to join with that of France in recommending such measuresof improved Administration as may tend to secure to the Greek Nation that civil and political Freedom which the Treaty of 1827was destined to securefor them. ButH[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t cannotbut think,



that to recommend TheKing of Greece to new arrangements of his Provincial Councils,or a new organisation of his Councilof Stateis a stepwhich requiresstrongerand more peculiargroundsto justify it than would be necessary to authorizeRemonstrance theemployment Torture, a against of the placingTroopsat freeQuarters,the protectionof Slave

Trade, the secret and destruction supposed of Robbers by










[Few persons recollect that Wellington was once Foreign Secretary, fewer still understand that, in that capacity, he performed one of his most memorable services. The circumstances

of his doing so were peculiar. In November 1834, William IV became dissatisfied with the Whig Ministry and expelled them
from power. Peel, whom he wished to head the new Ministry,

was absent in Rome. The King, therefore, made Wellington temporarily First Lord of the Treasury and Secretary of State. In that capacity he absorbed all offices of the Crown until Peel's
return. There were murmurs as to his unconstitutional position,

though a Secretaryof State could legitimately transact all business of the Crown and act for every department of Government. The
Duke was as unconcerned by the murmurs as he had once been

by bullets, and the murmurs soon changed to admiration when the crowds watched the old hero riding from office to office every
day, and transacting alone and with such care the businesswhich had previously taxed the energies of four active Ministers. Peel

returned late in December and Wellington, though abandoning

his other offices, remained Foreign Minister. Palmerston himself

admitted that the affairs of that office were never more punctually and correctly handled. In one direction Wellington did make a
change and a momentous one. This does not seem to have been due to any question of party, for in regard to supporting the

constitutionalists in Spain he carried out Palmerston's measures

of which he was known to disapprove. In the instance in question

he altered the policy of the previous Government becausethe

change appeared to him essential. The change was due to his

sagaciousjudgment and cool practical mind. It was taken in reference to policy at Constantinople. Palmerston had already won fame in his handling of the affairs of the Near East. He had started well in 1832 by enlarging the boundaries of Greece.. But towards the end of 1832 his policy became hesitating and uncertain. Mehemet Ali, the ambitious




Pasha Egypt, of threw hisallegiance theSultan attacked off to and

him in Asia. His warlike son, Ibrahim, advanced into Syria,
advancedinto Asia Minor and won his "crowning mercy". The

winning victories everywhere. July 1832 beattheTurksat In he Horns, entered Aleppoand conquered Syria. In December he
Turkishforces wereutterly routed,the GrandVmer wascaptured

at Konieh, Egyptian the troops occupied AdanaandCilicia.They mightsoon at Smyrna even Constantinople, the be or at unless
Great Powers intervened.

StratfordCanning wrotefrom Constantinople hogged and the

British Government to send the fleet to Constantinople. The Sultanwould be reassured, Ibrahim would never dare to attack for

either Constantinople Smyrnawith the British flag flying or or Britishships theharbour.Aboveall, the Russians in would have no excuse intervention. SuchwasStratford's plan and MVtt<T~ for nichfrom Viennapressed same the advice. Palrncrstou himself wouldlike to haveadopted But it did not suit his more timid it. colleagues the Cabinet. And Palmerston now reaping the in was fruits of his resolute and restlesspolicy elsewhere.The biggest British fleet was coercing the Dutch over the Antwerp aflair (v. supra, 89), anotherBritish squadronwas observingaffairs p. in Portugal.There literally were not the shipsto send. If sent at all they must go in such commandingforce as to overcome the
Egyptians, and at the moment such force was not available.
him into the arms of Russia.

Palmerston therefore refused Sultan's the request aid and flung for

Russiadid not refusethe Sultan'sappeal. It was not to her interest do so.TsarNicholas decided a new policy at to had on thetimeof theTreatyof Adrianople (1829).* It wasthat,a weak neighbour (Turkey)wasbetter than a strongone, and that a speedy collapse theTurkishEmpirewouldbring in France of and

England share spoils.If., however, gradually to the it dissolved Russia might absorb "lion'sshare". was Tsar's the This the policy
suddenlyfrom the blue and threatened smashthe Turkish to Empireat a blow. He musttherefore resisted all costs. If be at

andIbrahim looked upsetting altogether. appeared like it He

Palmerston notgive Nicholas would aid, would.In responses to the frenzied ofthe appeal Sultan, Nicholas a naval sent squadron and transports aRussian aboard with army them. theendof By
February arrived theBosphorus, for thefirstandlast they in and

time history Russians in friendly in the were occupationConof stantinople. Tsar's anchoredtheBosphorus The ships in just oppositewindows British the ofthe Embassy.soldiers His paraded
its shores fraternizing theirTurkish with comrades-in-arms, The

tatenRussia, by J.Kerner by is printed R. in'Russia's inthe New' K Nrw

East the of after Peace Adrianople', Camb. Hist.Journ.,3 [1937] v,No

* Thetextof theprotocol 16 of September recording drrmon 1829, the






result was decisive for Ibrahim.

He was merely a dashing soldier,

but his father Mehemet Ali said that the gamewasup. Hisec bluff" was definitely "called", and he threw down the cards. He secured the administration during his lifetime of Syria and
Palestine, he also obtained a veiled control over Adana and thus

got a gate into Asia Minor. On theseterms the Egyptians made peacewith the Sultan (5 May 1833). Russia did not intend to saveTurkey for nothing, and Turkey was ready to pay a definite price for the service rendered. The Sultan considered (and with somejustice) that France favoured the Egyptians, he thought (and again with some justice) that England had failed him in the hour of need. Russia had not and to Russia he was correspondingly grateful. Count Orlov, the Tsar's representative, shewed the most delicate courtesy and
insinuating address. He won the assentof all the Turkish Ministers, as some said, by golden arguments. At any rate, he induced the

Turks to sign the celebrated Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi(8 July 1833). It provided for mutual alliance betweenRussiaand Turkey and defenceof each other's territories, during eight years. A secret article provided that Russiawould not ask Turkey for armed aid in caseof war. She would only require Turkey to closethe Dardanelles to ships of war, i.e. to prevent a British or French fleet from entering them. This treaty was interpreted by Palmerston
and by France as placing Turkey in a state of vassalageto Russia. They tried, and vainly, to prevent the ratification of the treaty.

Turkey seemedbound to Russia, pledged in case of need to admit Russian ships into the Bosphorusand to stop British and French ships at the Dardanelles. A violent anti-Russian agitation arosein England which Palmers did nothing to restrain. Lord ton Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, whose
windows had been commanded by Russian naval guns for three months, was more violent still. As a result of all this popular

agitation and ministerial excitement, Palmerston addressed an

instruction to Ponsonby (10 March). This informed him that a secret Admiralty order had been issued to Sir Josias Rowley,

commanding the Mediterranean Squadron. By this " discretionary order" he was authorized to comply with any request of the Turkish Government, addressedto him through Ponsonby. He was to sail to Constantinople,if so ordered by Ponsonby,to defend it "against any threatened attack of the Russians". The only restriction on him was "provided that, in a naval point of view, he should consider his force adequate to the emergency".* The
French had given similar orders to their Admiral, but Ponsonby

was not compelled to consult the French Minister before sum1"

* Palmerston to Ponsonby, 10 March 1834, endorsed: "App[rove]d William R."F.O. 78/234. V. G. W. Crawley, Camb.Hist. Journ., m, No. i,
[1929], 61; Temperley, Englandand the Near East, The Crimea,[1936], 76-7.




moning fleet.The power the thusgivenhim wasdangerous.

Ponsonby, extreme an anti-Russian, it in hispower summon had to the Britishfleetand produce war, without consulting own his
Government first.

It was this "discretionary order" which Wellington studied

during brief his tenure theForeign of Secretaryship. WashingLike ton andMarlborough, hada profound he understanding sea of power. it was But inconsistent hisideas controloverit with that
should be exercisedat one of the extremities, and not at the heart

of theBritishEmpire.Neitherdid it accord with his ideasthat

an Ambassador should commit the Foreign Minister to a course

of policyor plunge England war,withoutthe Cabinetitself into beingconsulted the issue.He alsosaw,with a gooddeal of on sagacity, the "discretionary that order" had beenissued during a periodof greatexcitement, that much of that excitement and
wasnow allayed. He knewwell enoughtoo that Lord Ponsonby
was a fanatical anti-Russian and that the thunderbolt, if in his

hand,might be launched without due consideration,He brought the matter beforethe Cabinet,who thereupon revoked the order. The dispatchthat follows is the draft not, as usual, the original. This draft wasin Wellington's own hand, a fact which shewsthe importance attachedto it, and is endorsedwith the approval of
William IV. " The Sailor King "
at the discretion was as fanatical and anti-Russian

as Ponsonbyhimself, and had approved the original instruction. But he doubtless now sawthe naval objectionsto placing the fleet
of an Ambassador.

What is still more interesting is the sequel. In those days a

changeof ministry was often followed by a reversalof foreign policy. But even Palmerstonwould have hesitatedto change
openly so deliberate a revocation of orders and a revocation

formally approved by the King. After he returned to office in

1835 Palmerston nothingfor some did time. Ponsonby remonstrated against "the fatal dispatch"of Wellington intimated and that he wouldhaveresigned he not thoughtWellington had

would ^soon out of office.But Palmerston be seems have to appreciated douche common which the ofcold sense Wellington had applied. waited He until May1836 before cancelling "fatal the dispatch But, when renewed discretionary ", ". even he thec' order
it was with considerable limitations. He warned the ardent

Ponsonby there noimmediate that was danger. When, 1838, in Ponsonby suggested ordering the fleet,he waspromptly up
snubbed Palmerston. in 1839, by Even whenMehemet was Ali

again attacking Sultan, the Palmerston Ponsonbybe warned to "sparing" using power, insisted hisnotacting of his and on save in concert theFrench with Ambassador. obvious, It is therefore

that Wellington's one important while action, Foreign'Secretary' was teach to Palmerston inprudence moderation alesson and ]




Document 25. Wellington revokes "discretionary the order"to theBritishFleet proceed Constantinople,March1835* to to 16 .. .1 have receivedH[is] M[ajesty]'sCommands inform to Y[our] Excellency]thatit does appear H[is] M[ajesty] not to that Affairs in the Levant are at this period in sucha State as to require that the Discretionshouldbe vestedin the
Ambassador at the Porte and the Responsibility imposed

upon that Officerof placingthis Country in a Stateof War

with Russia.

Under these Circumstancesthe King's Servants have decided that the Directions contained in a Despatch from the Secretary Stateto Sir JosiasRowley dated 3ist Jan[uar]y of 1834,and that thosefrom Lord Palmerston to Your Lordship dated loth March 1834 containing a Copy of the abovementioned Instructions should be countermanded, and I have

to signify to Your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure accordingly. The Instruction under which the operations of the Fleet in the Mediterranean and its Relations with the Embassy at
the Porte are to be directed in future, are contained in a

Despatch to Your Lordship dated 15 Feb[ruar]y 1834. The Instructions to the Admiral dated Sept[ember] 19 1834 referable to the Conduct of H[is] M[ajesty's] Naval
Forces in the Mediterranean Alii in case of a Collision between

the Naval Forces of the Ottoman Porte and those of Mahomed

will likewise be countermanded.





[Palmerston generally is admitted havescored greatsuccess to a in dealingwith MehemetAIL He won a victory over Mehcmet Ali, over France, over Turkey,and over the majority of his colleagues the BritishCabinet."The boldconception the in and brilliant performance wereworthy of that name;but the domestic difficulties whichLord Palmerston to struggle with had place the
draft is endorsed "App[rove]d William R."

* Wellingtonto Lord Ponsonby, 5, 16 March 1835,F.O. 78/251. No. The




exploit beyondthe happiest achievement the Elder Pitt. The of expulsionof the Egyptiansfrom Turkey remains a great monument alike of diplomatic skill and administrativeenergy." So
Disraeli in Tancred, and the utterance is not only important in

respectto Palmerston, because but Disraeli himself in after days attempted achieve same to the results the Near East. in The factsmay be simply related, MehcmetAli and his son Ibrahim had grownmoreformidablethan ever.The old Sultan
Mahmud was anxious to reduce his rebellious vassal, and to take

from him Adana,Syria and Palestine. Finally, in April 1839the Turkish forces beganthe struggleby crossingthe Euphrates.Two monthslater, at Nisibin, they were annihilated by Ibrahim. The
Turkish fleet sailed to Alexandria and surrendered without striking

a blow. Mahmud died (i July) beforethe newsof either disaster reached Constantinople. Abdul-Medjid,a seventeen-year boy, old became Sultan,without an army, without a fleet and without money. Palmerston endeavoured getup a Europeancombinato tion to restrainMehemet from profiting by his conquests. Ali This plan wasdefeated the obviousreluctanceof France to engage by in any measures coercionagainstMehemet Ali. Egypt had, of
since Napoleon, been the dream of French ambition and Mehemet

Ali would preferto be the vassal Francerather than of Turkey. of And the Egyptianfleet, addedto the French,would threaten British seapowerin the Mediterranean. Palmerston not deterred the reluctance France,and was by of

he^foundwillingpartner Austria.But Russia first refused a in at tojoin a European Conference. FivePowers The (Austria, France, Great Britain,Russia, Prussia) presented ajoint Noteto theTurks on27July 1839, objectof whichwasto stopfuturehostilities the between Egypt and Turkey. ImmediatelyafterwardsRussia approached England Palmerston and madea desperate effort at
a compromise with France. It broke down because France wished

Mehemet to retain Ali more hisconquests Palmerston of than was ready admit. to Nevertheless probably hewas genuinely anxious to avoidseparation France.Finally, as Franceremained from
recalcitrant,he concluded Convention a between fc ur Powers the

pashalic. Mehemet didnotaccept terms wouldbe If Ali these he

(Austria, Britain, Great Prussia Russia) 15 1840. and on July By thisagreement Mehemet was beexpelled theHoly Ali to from Cities Arabia, Crete, Adana from of from from and North Syria. South and plus Syria Acre, Egypt, was retain ahereditary he to as confined Egypt; to England Austria and pledged themselves to naval intervention to subdue All the him. Four Powers signing
theQuadruple Treaty agreed defend to Constantinople if Ibrahim attacked it.
France leftoutof thistreaty.It was mortalaffrontto her was a andmany persons thought warwith England that wouldfollow.






But Palmerstonhad completelymeasured gravity of the crisis. the

He did not believe there would be war, for the British navy was

too strong.Though he could not avoid leaving Franceout of the treaty* he was asprudent ashe could afford to be in public. As MehemetAli refusedto accept the terms, the consulsof the four Powersconcernednotified him of his deposition (123 September).
He received the news with calmness. He announced that "this

wasthe fourth [time he had beendeposed], and that he hopedto get over it as well ashe had done the other three, with the help of God and the Prophet",-f Probably he counted less on the Prophet than on the French. But he was doomed to disappointment. The French offered the angriest of protests but they were
not ready to fight.

Even in August 1840Admiral Stopfordwas off the Syrian coast with a naval squadron. Stimulated by his presencethe Lebanon revolted, for all Syria hated Ibrahim's tyranny. Stopford captured Beyrouth (3 October) and then Acre (3 November), which had
once baffled Napoleon. Before the end of the month Napier,

Stopford'slieutenant, appearedat Alexandria and forced Mehemet Ali to sign a Convention submitting to the Powers and restoring
the Turkish fleet. The agreement was disavowed but the result was decisive. Ibrahim and his hitherto invincible army were meanwhile moving back to Egypt along inland roads. He had no further thought of armed resistance to the Powers.

The liquidation of the whole affair took place by a solemn publication of firmans on 10 June 1841. Mehemet AH became

hereditary pashaof Egypt and of Nubia, etc. with an obligation

to pay tribute and to limit his army to 18,000 men. France still

held aloof. But her game was lost. She was finally induced to

join the Straits5Conventionof 13July 1841,in conjunction with all the Great Powersand Turkey. It was signedjust after the expiry of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The preambleof this Conventionpaid a vaguehomageto the " inviolability" of the Sultan's"sovereignrights". The articlespledged the Sultan to closeboth Bosphorus and Dardanellesto shipsof war (with specified exceptions to light vessels) accordingto as ec the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire". Russiathought she had gained an advantageby stopping British and French war shipsat theDardanelles, EnglandandFranceby stoppingRussian shipsat the Bosphorus. vaguegeneral The recognitionof sovereign rights pledged all powersin support of Turkey. It also released

Palmerston theFrench and fromall fearof the effects theTreaty of of Unkiar Skelessi. had,in fact, not only expiredby effluxof It time but a purelyRusso-Turkish connexion beensuperseded had
* Palmerston a lengthy has defence histreatment France a private of of in letterof 27July 1843.Bulwer, ofPalmerston, Life [1875], 426-33. nr,
t Quotedin Cambridge Modern History, 570. x,



byageneral European agreement.wasanimportant It European

settlementand one for which Palmerston can claim a good deal
of credit.

The documents selected representative are and not complete,

but theyareof "great interest importance.Doc. 26, dated and 7July 1838, asolemn is warning England Mehernct that by to AH she speaks forherself. only None less attempt Mehemet the any by
Ali to throw off the Turkish yokewill not only be impossiblebut
British attitude is shown in Doc. 27. Palmerston announces

will ultimately produce Britishintervention.Onereason the for

England's determination navally to control the PersianGulf? which led next year to the British occupationof Aden (1839). Doc. 28 warns the Sultan (as it proved vainly) not to attack Mehemet Ali. Doc. 29 may be described a roar of the British as lion. It shows that Englandwas prepared to act alone even in December 1839. Doc. 30 detailsthe attitude to Louis Philippe
and to Franceabout the sametime, and is important as shewing

the approach Russia, to which ultimately resultedin the Treaty of 15July 1840,signedwithout France. In Doc. 31 Palmerston exchanges viewswith Metternich on the Straits' Convention and in Doc. 32 on the theory of guarantee.* This last is of much importance Metternich's as theoryis a different onefrom that he previously held. V. supra, Doc. 17, pp. 98-100.]

Document 26. Palmerston Mehemet 7 July warns Ali>

Her Majesty's Government havereceivedthe Communica-

tionmade through oftheIntention thePasha Egypt You of of

to throwoffhisAllegiance theSultan,andtodeclarehimself to the Independent Sovereign those of Provinces the Turkish of

Empire, hehas appointedthe which been by Sultan govern. to

The British Government havereceivedthis announcement

withextreme Regret; Youareinstructed express and to to thePasha deep the concern thisIntelligence occawhich has sioned butatthe time state HerMajesty's them, same to that Government yetabandon hope fullerCondonot the that sideration subject, more ofthe and mature Reflection, both

upon nature thecontemplatedandupon the of step, its

inevitable Consequences, thePasha come a may lead to to
morejust and prudent Resolution.
* V.supra, dispatch Canning, 82-4 the of pp.

TwoMotives represented are as impelling Pasha the thus

f Palmerston Campbell, 7July P.O. toColonel No. ax, 1838, 78/343.








to rebel againsthis Sovereign and to attempt to dismember the Turkish Empire. The oneis a Regardfor his own Fame, the other an anxiety for the future Fate of his Family.-But, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, both these Motivesought on the contrary stronglyto operateto dissuade the Pashafrom adopting the contemplatedCourse. For, with respectto his own Fame, he ought to recollect that if he has hitherto risen progressivelyin the esteemof the Nations of Europe, it has been in consequence the Pains of
he has taken to establish the authority of the Law among the Peoplewhom he hasgoverned,and by reasonof his successful exertions to give the ascendancy to Justice in all the Transactions between Man and Man, so as to secure to every man the Possession enjoymentof what rightfully belongsto him. and But if now the Pashashould himself set all thesePrinciples at naught, and should give to the world by his own Conduct a signalexampleof violent Injustice and of wrong deliberately done, instead of leaving behind him a name to be respected by future ages,he will tarnish the Reputation he has already acquired, and be included in the List of Men who, according to the extent of their means, have, upon a larger or smaller scale, endeavoured to appropriate to themselves by Force Things which belonged of Right to others.

But equally erroneouswould be the expectationthat by

such an attempt he would improve the Condition of his Family. Far different would be the Result. For, successin such an enterprize being impossible.He would only involve

his Family in the inevitableRuin which He would bring

upon Himself; and thus He would destroy those very Persons for whosefuture welfare He feelsso strong an Interest.

Her Majesty'sGov[ernmen]tat onceand decidedlypronounce the successful execution of the attempt to be impossible;and its inevitable Consequence be Ruin to the to
Pasha; because they know that the Conflict which must

necessarily brought on by suchan attempt, would not be be betweenthe Pashaand the Sultan singlehanded,but between the Pashaand the Sultan aided and supportedby all the
Powers of Europe.




Were the Contestindeed to lie between the Turkish and

Egyptian Forces tothemselves, left it would in thepresent not

state Things safe thePasha reckon of be for to uponobtaining
the same success that which attended his arms in 1832; as

But it is needless saythat if the Great Powersof Europe to shalldetermine assist uphold the Sultan, the Result of to and the Contest mustbethe overthrowand expulsionof the Pasha. The British Government,however, speaksonly for itself; but feelsitself bound, in return for the frank and unreserved
Communication which it has received from the Pasha, to

declareto him, in a manner equally unreservedand explicit, that, if He should unfortunately proceed to execute his announcedIntentions; and if Hostilities should (as they

indisputably would)breakoutthereupon between Sultan the

and the Pasha, The Pashamust expectto find Great Britain takingPart with the Sultanin order to obtain Redress so for flagrant a Wrong done to the Sultan, and for the Purposeof preventingthe Dismemberment the Turkish Empire; and of the Pasha would fatally deceive himself if he were to suppose that anyJealousies amongthePowers Europewould prevent of thosePowersfrom affording to the Sultan, under such Circumstances, everyassistance which might be necessary the for Purpose upholding,enforcing, vindicating hisjust and of and legitimateRights.

Document27. Palmerston thePersian and Gulf,

29 November 1838*

Youstated yourdespatch 5ofthisyear, Mchcmct in No. that

Ali, in replyto a communication by my despatch which

No. 25,of the 8th of December, had beendirectedto you maketo him, had assured that he had not the leastidea you of extending authoritytowards Persian his the Gulf.

Youalso stated your in despatch 54of thisyear No. that thePasha's had forces been entirely successful in Arabia, and particularlythe in Nedjib Country the and Hedjaz; that and
* Palmerston Campbell, 29 toColonel No. 30, November P.O. 1838, 78/343. It was largelyconsequence m ofthis suspected that was r danger Aden occupied by the British Government 1839. in








the Assii tribe of Arabs had entirely submitted to the Pasha's forces under Achmet Pasha and you added that you considered these successes have afforded a very great relief to to Mehemet AH, as Arabia will in consequence longer drain no Egypt of men, money, and provisions. The advices however which Her Majesty's Government have recently received from Bagdad, represent the Egyptian forces as being about to cross the Peninsula of Arabia to Lahsa and Katif, with the ultimate Purpose of taking
Possession of the Island of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

I have to instruct you to ask Mehemet AH whether the fact is so; and you will add that Her Majesty's Government hope and trust that he will upon full consideration abandon any intention of establishing himself on the Persian Gulf, because, as you have already declared to him, such a scheme on his part could not be viewed with indifference by the British

Document 28. Palmerston warnsSultan Mahmud, 15 March 1839*

Her Majesty'sGovernmententirely approvethe language which, as reported in your despatchNo. 28, you have held with the view of inducing the Sultan to avoid committing
himself in any way at present; and I have to instruct Your Excellency to press strongly on the Sultan that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet AH, it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.
Document 29. Palmerstonmakesthe British Lion roar.,

2 December 1839!

I have to instruct Your Excellency to continue to urge the

Turkish Government to remain firm, to make no concession

to Mehemet AH, but to trust to the support of its Allies. The

British Government has taken its line; and the course of the
* Palmerstonto Lord Ponsonby,No. 38, 15 March 1839,^-^- I95/I55t Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby,No. 180, 2 December 1839,P.O. 195/158.




negotiation duringthelastfew Monthsought to inspirethe

Turkish Government with confidence in Great; Britain. For

it has beenthe British Governmentwhich has mainly preventedthe Porte from being pressed the Five Powersto by submitunconditionally all the demands Mehemet to of Ali. Francehasfor sometime declared her opinion, that such a settlement the only one that is practicable; and she has is labouredto persuade other Powersto adopt her views* the If GreatBritain had givenway to France,and had consented to support French the propositions, Austria,and Prussia, and Russia wouldprobably have acquiesced themalso:because in those Powershave intimated that they would support any arrangement whichEnglandand Franceshould haveagreed upon. But Englandhasstoodfirm to the Principleswhich she laid downin the outset the negotiation,and her steadiness of has encouraged Austria to adhere to the same line, while it has made it impossiblefor Russia to adopt the views of France,evenif shehad beendisposed do so; because to Russia having contractedspecial engagements protect Turkey, to could not appear to be less friendly to that Power than
England is. In like manner the avowed desire of France to supportthe pretensions MehemetAli has led to no result, of and will lead to none aslong as the Porte is true to its own

" Document30. Palmerston KingLouis and Philippe,

22 November 1839*

With reference Your Excellency's to Despatch the of 18th Instant, marked "Secret Confidential", and reporting a Conversation YourExcellency heldwith The which had King of the French, the subject the Turkishand on of

Egyptian Question, to observeYourExcellency, I have to thattheupshot theremarks HisMajesty that of of upon

occasion appears be,thatin proportion the course to as of
events haverendered active the assistance the Powers of of

Europe necessary formaintainingIntegrity Indcthe and

1839,F.O. 146/211.

* PalmerStontoLordGranvmejNo.37i Secret Confidential, and aa November








pendenceof the Turkish Empire, exactly in that proportion and precisely for that reason, the French Government has becomeunwilling to afford to the Sultan any assistance alL at With respectto the notion that the Five Powersacting in union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the

Pasha Egypt to evacuate of Syria,that opinionis one which it can scarcely worth while seriously argue; the disparity be to
of Forces between the two Parties in such a contest, being so

infinitely great, that resistanceon the part of the Pashamust

necessarily be vain.

The King of the French, however, seemsto be of opinion, that the Sultan would be more seriously injured in his Independence by receiving Assistancefrom Russia, than by having his Empire practically dismembered, and by being deprived permanently of the resources of a large portion of his own Territories. In this opinion, Her Majesty's Government cannot concur. It is undoubtedly a misfortune for a Sovereign to be under the necessity of receiving Military or Naval Aid from another Sovereign to defend him against hostile attack. The receiving of such Aid is a publick and undeniable proof of great weakness the part of him who on receives it; and real Independence is not compatible with great weakness. Such aid also, if given by the single Act of the Sovereign who affords it, entitles that Sovereign to ask in return, favours and influence, which must trench upon the future Independence the Sovereign of who hasbeenprotected. But if Russia were to give Assistance to the Sultan, not as acting upon her own single Decision, but as acting in pursuance of a Concert between the Five Allied Powers, such Assistance would of course not bring after it any favours of concessions from Turkey to Russia, that would be injurious to the Independenceof Turkey; and then, the only question

would be, whether the Independence the Turkish Empire of

would permanently and for the future, be most affected, by the temporary occupation of some part of the Turkish Territory by a friendly Russian Force, which would come in to restore that Territory to the Sultan, and which would go out again, when that purpose was accomplished; or by the



permanent occupation Territory ahostile ofsuch by Egyptian

Force, whichhavingcome to conquer, in wouldstay in to retain;andwouldby retaining, practically sever suchTerritoryfromthe Turkish Empire.But surelytherecanbe no doubthowthat Question mustbe answered,* [France refused respond thisappeal the Convention to to and of 15July 1840 signed thefourotherPowers was by withouther
at London. Execution followedby Englandand Austria, Ibrahim wasdefeated October)and Acre takenon 3 November. By (10

9 December Mehemet in effectsubmitted. But the usual AH tedious delays supervened it wasnot until 13July 1841that and France signed Straits'Convention the with the other Powm.J
Document 31. Palmerston Metternich on France,and the and

Straits* Convention, May 184if 10 With referenceto Your Excellency'sdespatch No. 79 of the ssd Ultimo, reporting Prince Meltermch's opinion as to the moment at which it would be most expedient that France should affix her signature to the Convention, the Draft of which wasinitialled on the 15th of March, I have to stateto Your Excellencythat Her Majesty's Government have felt great pleasureat learning the very sound and judicious view taken by Prince Metternich of the matters treatedof in this despatch. It is perfectly true, as His Highnessobserves, the Isolation of France can only cease that when that Treaty in the execution of which the four Powers

areengaged, to whichFrance not a party,, and is shallhave

beenfully carried into effect; for the Isolation of France arises

fromthefact, thefourPowers undertakenpolitical that have a operation which France declined takepart in; andwhen to
that operationis finished,and the four Powersfall back into the ordinarystateof quiescence whichall Powers when in are

theyarenotactively engaged anycombined in measures with

Allies, theFour then Powers France all beequally and will

* Palmerston lengthy^defence attitude France a has a ofhiswhole to hi pnvate of5July F.Bulwerl^ Palmerston, Tempcrlcy, letter 1840 tf n,356-61; England the East, Cnmea, n. 196, 420-^2 and Near The [1936], pp t Palmerston Beauvale, I0 May M ^0/194. toLord No. 97, 1841, Op. Temperley, and Near The Englandthe East, Crimea, Chap, [1936], v








isolated: either

and this is a distinction overlooked


seems to have been

or not understood

in France.

The French think

that the Isolation

of France will


by the signatureof the proposedTreaty, and that this Treaty will make France enter again into "the European Concert" but the proposedTreaty containsno stipulationsfor action or for concert; it merely records the determination of the Great Powersto respectthe decisionand intention of the Sultan in a matter with regard to which he is intitled as an independentSovereignto declarehis wilL
Document 32. Palmerston exchanges viewswith Metternichon the Paimerstonian theory Guarantee, May 1841* of 10 With reference to Your Excellency's despatch No, 80 of the ssd Ultimo, reporting Prince Metternich's opinion that it would not, in the present state of things, be expedient for the Powers of Europe to enter into a guarantee of the Integrity of the Turkish Empire, I have to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government intirely agree with Prince Metternich in that opinion. But Her Majesty's Government cannot quite concur with Prince Metternich in the reasons which, in his despatch to Baron Sturmer, he gives for that opinion. Prince Metternich arguesthat a State which is guaranteed loses thereby its Independence and becomes a Mediatized State; that the guaranteeing Power becomesa protecting Power, and that, while it is inconvenient to have even one Protector, to have severalwould be an intolerable Burthen; that in fact there is but one form of guaranteefree from these
inconveniences, and that is a defensive Alliance.

Now Her Majesty's Government quite admit, that when a singlePowerguarantees another,suchan engagement does

place the weakerPowerin a situationof dependence upon

the stronger, which must derogate from the Freedom of Action, and from the intire Independence of the weaker
* Palmerston Lord Beauvale, 98, to May 1841,F.O. 120/194. to No. This dispatch should carefully be compared Canning's with classic utterance, supra, v.
pp. 82-4, and Palmerston'sof 1848,v. infra, pp. 156-7.



Power, mustgivethe stronger a preponderant and one influence. But this effect cannot be produced in the same

degree when guarantee givenby several the is Powers;

because is probable thosePowers it that would all have
differentviewsandwishes; theseoppositeand conflicting and

impulses woulddestroy eachother.

At all eventsAustria has not always held these opinions;

because joinedwith the other four Powers guaranShe in teeing, merelythe Integrity, but the Independence not of Belgium, provingtherebythat She did not consider a guarantee Integrity as being necessarily of destructive of Independence; the result,in the case Belgium,has and of notshewn theguarantee that deprived Belgium anyportion of
of her Independence.*

Again; FranceGreatBritain and Russiaguaranteed the integrityand Independence the Kingdom of Greece, of and althoughForeign Influencehas, during the reign of King Otho, exerted mostinjurious swayin Greece,yet this evil a
hashad no connectionwith the guarantee. The evil of a guarantee the Stateto which it is given is, to that it leadssuch State to rely upon Foreign Aid for its defence;and then, when the moment comes when that aid is wanted,it may upon some pretence other be withheld, or or it may arrive too late,

In thepresent of Turkey,if thestatus of 1839 case quo had been maintained, if Mehemet hadbeen in occupaand Ali left tionof Syria, Sultan the wouldhave been constantly exposed to animminent serious and danger there and mighthave been a reason thefourPowers why should entered engagehave into mentsto cometo hisassistance against Mehemet whenAli
ever wanted; but now that Mehemethas been driven back

intoEgypt, theSultan recovered and has possession ofSyria andofhisFleet, may good and by managementperand severance himself make stronger Sea by landthan by and Mehemet can Ali possibly there tobenostanding be, seems
danger against whichit canbe necessary the Allies to for
* V*supra, 17,pp.82-4,, Doc.

guarantee Sultan; thereforewould, many the and it on








accounts, be better that Turkey and the other Powers of Europe should stand towards each other in the ordinary relation in which independent Statesreciprocally stand.
But Prince Metternich's observation as to the effect which

a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Powers, France included, would have, seemsperfectly wellfounded; and that would alone constitute a weighty reason why the Sultan should not desire to have such a

As to that part of Prince Metternich's despatch to Baron Sturmer, in which he expressesan opinion that the Sultan would do better to revert to the old systemof selling Pashaliks and farming His revenues, rather than adhere to the newly introduced Plan of collecting the Taxes by receivers of his own, Her Majesty's Government cannot concur in that opinion, and would seewith extreme regret it's adoption by the Sultan. They look upon the changewhich the Sultan has made in this part of his administration as an improvement of the very greatest importance as regards both the Interests of the Sultan and the welfare of the people; and though this Reform, like many others which involve great changes of System,may require sometime to comefully and completely into operation, there cannot be a shadow of doubt that it
would be calamitous to rescind it.



RUSSELL, 1841-53


[The originsof the CrimeanWar really go back to Russia's signing Treatyof Unkiar Skelessi Turkey in 1833, the with This was abrogated theStraits5 and Convention substituted 1841 was in asa European, ratherthana Russian, protection Turkey, but of the integrity and independence Turkey were not, in feet, of guaranteed the Powers. by The most immediate result of the
Straits' Convention was that Tsar Nicholas, delighted at the

separation England of from France overEgypt,tried to makethat separation lasting. In effect,he asked Englandto enterwith him into a secret alliance against France in the winter of 1840, Palmerston refusedand in his reply of 1841laid down the whole doctrineof obligationsby which a British Cabinet and Parliament
can be bound. This is a doctrine of fundamental importance to the understandingof British diplomacy. It would have been well

if Nicholas had appreciatedand acted on his advice, Hud he done so-he would not have endeavoured by his conversations with Aberdeen in 1844, and with Seymour in 1853,* t() obtain resultswhich only decisions the Cabinet or of Parliament could of give. Had he marked Palmerston's warning the Crimean War might havebeenavoided.The Tsar'sconversations with Aberdeen, 1844, and with Seymour in 1853, discussedin more detail the partition of the Turkish Empire and in 1853specific proposals were made.Thesewere as follows, and may be compared with proposals the samesubjectoutlined by the Tsar in a memoon randumto Field-MarshalPaskievid In the following table the formeraredesignated (S) and the latter as (P)*f as

(a) Not to be a permanent possession Russia,but might be of

temporarily occupied (S).

(V) To be a freeport but no annexation (P),

Moldo- Wallachia.

(a) Independent underRussian protection (S), (4) "Not independent Russian"(P). but
* Forthetwo latter,v. G. B. Henderson History, in October1933, 240-7; andTemperley, England the and Near East, Crimea, The [1936], Chap, passim. x

t Quoted Temperley, from England the East, Crimea, and Near The [ 1936], 461.





(a) Independent under Russian protection (S).

(b) Independent (P).


(a) Independent (S). (b] Northern part and Constanzato be Russian (P). Most of Bulgaria to be independent (P).

Not to be enlarged (S).


Russia to garrison Bosphorus, and Austria to garrison the

Dardanelles (P). Turkish coasts Adriatic and Archipelago. of To go to Austria (P).

(a) Crete and other isles to go to France. England to have

Cyprus or Rhodes (P).

(b) Crete to go to England, if she wanted it (S).


Egypt to England (S and P).

It should be noted, however, that Nicholas, neither in 1841

nor in 1844 nor in 1853, provoked the suspicions of British

Ministers, though they regarded secret agreements with him as

potential developments the future as absurd. But they believed in in his disinterestedness and acceptedhis pledge as to not wishing
to break up the Turkish Empire. In March 1853 even Palmerston regarded Nicholas as "a gentleman" whose pledge could be trusted. The later misinterpretation of the Seymour and Aberdeen conversations was a phase of war psycl ology and of war propaganda. The theory that Nicholas invited England to rob Turkey

of Egypt in the South, while he robbed her in the North, should

be relegated to the sphere of legend. It is neverthelesstrue that he would have done well to heed Palmerston's warning given in 1841.]

Document 33. Palmerston instructsNicholasI in the obligations of the British Constitution,11 January 1841*

I have received Your Excellency's despatchNo. 76 of the 22nd of December, marked "Confidential", reporting the wish expressed You by The Emperor of Russiathat some to engagementshould be enteredinto betweenEngland and the
* Lord Palmerston to the Marquis of Clanricarde, No, 6, n January 1841, P.O. 181/168.

136 PALMERSTON, RUSSELL,CLARENDON other three Great Powerswho are Parties to the Treaty of

July, with the viewof providing the contingency an for of attackby France upontheliberties Europe:andI haveto of
instruct Your Excellency thereuponto state to His Imperial

Majesty Her Majesty's that Government muchgratified arc by the confidence which he reposes the Government in of England, by thefrankandopen and manner whichhehas in been pleased communicate views opinions Your to his and to
Excellency. Her Majesty's Government be equallyopen will with The Emperor,and will stateto His Imperial Majesty exactly their sentiments the subjecton which he has on
touched in his conversation with Your Excellency.

Oneof thegeneral principles whichHer Majesty's Government wish to observe a guidefor their conductin dealing as with the relationsbetween Englandand other States,is, that changes which foreign Nations may chuscto make in their
internal Constitution and form of Government, arc to be

lookedupon as matterswith which Englandhas no business to interfereby forceof arms,for the purposeof imposing upon suchNations a Form of Governmentwhich they do not wish to have, or for the purposeof preventing such Nations from having Institutions which they desire.These things arc consideredin England to be matters of domesticconcern,which every Nation ought to be allowed to settle as it likes. But an attemptof oneNation to seize to appropriate and to itself territory which belongs to another Nation, is a differentmatter;because anattemptleadsto a derangesuch ment of the existingBalance Power,and by altering the of relativestrength States, tendto create of may dangerto other Powers; and suchattempts therefore, British Government the

holdsitselfat full liberty to resist, upon the universally

acknowledged principle of self-defence.

Now,it is quitetrue,asstated TheEmperor, any by that Country, asFrance, instance, under plea such for may, the
andpretextof alteringits ownInstitutions, seek overthrow to

theexisting Governments ofother Countries, thepurpose for

of addingthose Countries its ownTerritories, of assoto or

ciating them its ownaggressive andsuch with system; pro-





ceedingswould ceaseto be domestic changesof arrangement, and would assumethe unquestionable character of external

aggression.-SuchattemptsEngland has in former times on many occasions resisted;and it is highly probable that if a similar case wereagainto arise,Englandwould again pursue
a similar course.

But it is not usual for England to enter into engagements with reference to caseswhich have not actually arisen, or which are not immediatelyin prospect:and this for a plain reason. [All formal engagements the Crown, which involve of the question of peaceand war, must be submitted to Parliament; and Parliament might probably not approve of an engagement which should bind England prospectively] * to take up Arms in a contingency which might happen at an
uncertain time, and under circumstances which could not as

yet be foreseen. It is true that His Imperial Majesty hasspokenof an understanding which need not be recorded in any formal Instrument; but upon which He might rely if the Turn of Affairs should render it applicable to events. But this coursewould not be free from objections. For, in the first place, it would scarcely be consistent with the spirit of the British Constitution for the Crown to enter into a binding engagementof such a nature, without placing it formally upon record, so that Parliament might have an opportunity of expressingits opinion thereupon, and this could only be done by some written Instrument; and to such a course the objection which I have alluded to above,would apply. [But if the engagement were merely verbal, though it would bind the Ministers who made it, it might be disavowed by their successors; and thus the RussianGovernmentmight be led to count upon a system of policy on the part of Great Britain, which might not eventually be pursued. Under these circumstances, it seems to Her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should be
* The passages enclosed brackets have already been published by Major in John Hall, Englandand the Orleans Monarchy,[1912], 320, and there has been a fuller publication by Professor S. Rodkey since. V. alsoTemperley,England F,
and the Near East, The Crimea,[1936], 251-3.



satisfied trustto thegeneral to tendency thepolicyof Great of Britain, whichleadsher to watch attentively,and to guard
with care the maintenance of the Balance of Power:] and Her

Majesty's Government that His Imperial Majestywill hope not think that thispolicyis theless deeplyrootedin the minds of Her Majesty'sGovernment, they should not think it if expedient enterat the present to moment into engagements
such as thosementioned by The Emperor.*



[The real grounds England's of goingto war with Russiawas the pressure Britishpublic opinion,which ultimately regarded of Turkey as a lamb and Nicholasas a brutal and ravening wolf.
But that was not the first opinion of the British Government on

the disputeasto the Holy Places, between Napoleonand Nicholas. As will be seenfrom Doc. 34 the first impressionof the British Government 1853 that the Frenchhad, by undue* in was influence, obtained an unfair decision from the Sultan in December 1852 and that England's influence must be used to redressthe balance in favour of Russia,by putting pressure Turkey. It will also on
be seenthat the influence of the Tsar's conversationswith Seymour

had caused British Governmentto be distinctly favourable to the him and to believe that he did not desireto seisse Constantinople. It is alsoimportant to note that Stratford de Rcdcliffc, who had been reappointedAmbassador, had a large sharein drawing up his own instructions! and seems have been quite friendly to to
the Tsar.] * Cp. P.O.65/262.From Clanricarde, 76, 22 December No. 1840."The him-the assurance Ambassadors-my of word would be amplesecurityto him, if I wasauthorized pass Thesubsequent to it." history thisoffer,which of is connected the Tsar'sconversations Aberdeen 1844,and with with with in Seymour 1853, be foundin Temperley, in will England theNearfiat, The and
Crimea, [1936], Bk rv, Chap. x.

Emperorsaidhe did not requirea Treaty-a clearunderstanding would suffice

Stratfordhimself,qualifiedby somesuggestions the new Prime Minister from

t The instructions followwerebased a memorandum that on given by

Aberdeen. Theyare dated February the draft is actuallysigned 25 and by

The Crimea, 1936], 314-15. [

LordJohnRussell, hehadasked successor but his to drawthem andthe up, BlueBook gives themasClarendon's.Temperley, V. England the and Mar East,







Document 34, Stratfordde Redcliffe instructed counsel to prudence Turkeyand to forbearance Russia,25 February to 1853*

The Queen has been pleasedto direct that at this critical period of the fate of the Ottoman Empire, Your Excellency should return to your Embassyfor a special purpose and charged with special instructions. Your Excellency is aware that the preservation of the independenceand integrity of Turkey entersinto the general and establishedsystemof European policy: that the principle is solemnly declared and sanctioned by the Convention of 1840^ and is acknowledgedby all the Great Powersof Europe. [But while the general principle is acknowledged, the
inclination of different Powers is very different, and must be

carefully borne in mind. Great Britain adopts it in all sincerity, without mental reservation; is animated by sincere friendship for Turkey; and has no after-thought on the subject. France is likewise desirous to maintain it, partly from the traditions of her policy, partly from jealousy of the Powers which, being the nearest neighbours to Turkey, would claim to possess fairest portion of the inheritance in case of her the

Austria is likewise disposed from policy and interest to maintain the independence of the Porte; but several causes of dissention have arisen of late years, and her passionsmay lead her to depart widely from the road of her true interest, and her conservative policy. The case of Russia is altogether different. The possession of Constantinople was a favourite dream of The Empress Catherine. The wars which Russia has waged with Turkey, both during Her reign, and down to the period of the peace of Adrianople, have all ended in the aggrandizement of
* Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe, No. i, 25 February 1853, F.O.

195/396. Published with some omissionsin A. & P., [1854], LXXI?[1698],

96-8. Cp. Temperley and Penson, Centuryof Diplomatic Blue Books, No. 460. The omissionsmade in the Blue Book are indicated above by the useof double square brackets.

"f The date is given in the Blue Book as 1841. On the relevanceof the 1840
and 1841 conventions from this standpoint cp. Temperley, Englandand theNear East, The Crimea,[1936], 146.



Russia,and the depression the MahometanPower,The of conquest Constantinople a favouriteobjectof national of is

ambition. Millions of Christian Subjectsof the Porte long to

reverse triumphsof the FifteenthCentury,and to make the

the Crescent inferior to the Cross.

But thepossessionConstantinople Russia, of by giving her a commanding position onceon theBalticandtheMediterat ranean,would not beseen with complacency otherPowers. by The difficulty of arrangingthis point preventeda cordial Alliance betweenNapoleonthe First and The Emperor Alexander:an attemptto cut the knot by Russiawould at this moment unite against all the Powers Europe,The her of EmperorNicholasis conscious this difficulty, and with a of
moderation at once magnanimous and wise is content to forego the prospectof this brilliant prize* But the weakness the Turkish Empire and the presumpof tion of its rulers may bring on a danger which no one seems willing to invite, and hasten a crisis which no one is anxious to precipitate.]] The object [therefore] of Your Excellency's Mission at this time is to counselprudenceto the Porte, and forbearance to those Powerswho are urging her compliance with their demands.You are instructed to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war, and to persuadethe Powers interested to

look to an amicable terminationof existingdisputes,

[The disputeswhich more immediately demand attention

arethose whichrelateto Montenegro the Holy Places, and The defence Montenegro of may be prolongedor the Mountaineers submitto theTurkishforce;and in either may case Sultan the maybeunwillingto returnto the status quo that hasbeen peremptorily insisted uponby Austria, But] the question theHoly Places Syriaoffers of in [morel dangerto the Peace Turkey. Howeverindifferent to their of

respective merits, Porte nowunavoidably the is exposed to therivalpretensions ofRussia France, animated and each by a politicalinterest,aswell as by religious zeal,and both
appealing engagements to allegedto havebeencontracted towards eachof them by the Porte. Threatenedfrom both






sides,and unable to satisfyone party without displeasingthe other, the Sultan is placed in a position of embarrassment and danger.,renderedmore critical by the internal weaknessof the Empire, and the specialcharacter of the points
at issue.

It is therefore

to be feared that if the Three*


do not modify Their demands,and should continue to maintain towards the Porte the dictatorial, if not menacing attitude they have lately assumed, they may, without any deliberate intention of departing from those principles of European policy to which I have above alluded, acceleratethe dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and produce the catastrophe that all are concerned in averting. England however is in a position to neutralize by her moral influence these alarming contingencies; [for England has the important advantage of having no special interest in the pending questions, and of being viewed by the Porte with less mistrust and stronger hopes of eventual assistancethan
any other Power in Christendom;]) and the Porte will learn

with satisfaction that even before your arrival at Constantinople the best efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been directed to restrain encroachment and to obtain every fair concessioncalculated to settle the existing differences. With this object Your Excellency is instructed to proceed to Constantinople by way of Paris and Vienna. You will inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government have great satisfaction in believing that the interests of France and England in the East are identical; and that nothing therefore need prevent their cordial cooperation in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. In communicating with M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the Holy Placesin Syria, Your Excellency will govern Yourself by the languageof the despatchesof Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley and Colonel Rose, copiesof which are herewith enclosed; and You will explain to him the fatal embarrassmentto which the Sultan may be exposed, unduly pressed France upon a question if by
* "Two" in the Blue-Book version.



of suchvital importanceto the Powerfrom which Turkey has most to apprehend. At Vienna Your Excellencywill state to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government have received with sincere pleasure assurances thefriendlydisposition Austria the that of
towards the Porte was unchanged; and that her conservative

policy in the East would be rigidly adhered to; that the increasing tendencyto disorderand weakness the Turkish in Empirecallsfor moderation forbearance the part of and on
the Sultan'sAllies,,and in such a policy the cordial cooperation of Her Majesty's Government may be relied upon by Austria; Jand that with reference to Montenegro You are instructed to support the demandsof the Austrian Minister at Constantinople asfar asthey may be consistent in with the honour and independence the Sultan.]] of To the Sultan you will say that Her Majesty, in directing Your Excellencyto proceedforthwith to Constantinople, manifests feelingsof friendship by which She is animated the towardsHis Highness, and at the sametime Her opinion of the gravity of the circumstances which Her Majesty has in reasonto fear the Ottoman Empire is now placed. [[With respect to Montenegro Your Excellency will state

that Her Majesty's Government not disputethe rights of do the Porte, but are of opinion that those rights should be assertedwith extreme moderation, consideringthe slight
authority that the Sultancanexercize overthe wild inhabitants of that distantportion of His dominions; and You will recom-

mendthat theforcenowemployed against Montenegrins, the whichis maintained such at greatcost noadequate for object, shall be withdrawn at the earliestopportunity that is consistentwith the honourand dignity of the Sultan.] As regards Holy Places, Majesty's the Her Government are unwillingto giveyouanyspecial instructions, preferto and leaveYour Excellency unfettered the exercise your in of

judgmentand discretion, muchmay depend your as on communications M. Drouynde Lhuys, uponthe with and
state in which you find the negotiation betweenRussia and

the Porteon Your*arrivalat Constantinople,







[In usingyour bestendeavours bringingto a successful for terminationthisunseemly dispute whichreflects little credit so
on the two denominationsof Christians engagedin it, Your Excellency bearin mind that Her Majesty's will Government

withoutprofessing give an opinionon the subject, not to are insensible the superior to claimsof Russia both asrespects the Treatyobligations Turkey,andthe loss moralinfluence of of that The Emperorwould sustainthroughoutHis dominions if, asthe Ecclesiastical Headof His Church,He wereto yield any privileges hashithertoenjoyed, the Latin Church it to
of which the Emperor of the French claims to be the Protector .J

Your Excellency will [then], with all the frankness and unreserve that may be consistent with prudence and the dignity of the Sultan, explain the reasonswhich lead Her Majesty's Government to fear that the Ottoman Empire is now in a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievancesof Foreign Nations which the Porte is unable or unwilling to redress, maladministration of its own affairs, the and the increasingweakness executive Power in Turkey, of have caused the Allies of the Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming, and which, if perseveredin, may lead to a generalrevolt amongthe Christian Subjectsof the Porte, and prove fatal to the independence and integrity of the Empire, a catastrophe that would be deeplydeplored by

Her Majesty'sGovernment,but which it is Their duty to represent the Porteis considered to probableand impending
by someof the great European Powers. Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan thai it is with

the objectof pointingout these dangers, with the hope and

of averting them, that Her Majesty's Government have now

directed You to proceedto Constantinople. You will endeavour to convince the Sultan and His Ministers that the

crisis one is whichrequires utmost the prudence theirpart, on

and confidencein the sincerity and soundness the advice in*

They will receive from You, to resolve favourablyfor their it future peaceand independence.
* "Of "in the Blue Book.



Your Excellency's long residence the Porte,andintimate at

knowledge the affairs Turkey,will enable to point of of you

out those reformsand improvements which the Sultan, under

His present difficulties, havethe means carryinginto may of effect,and in what mannerthe Porte may bestestablish a systemof administrationcalculatedto afford reasonable security the development its commercial for of measures, and
the maintenance its independence of recognizedby the GreatChristianPowers the presumptionof its proving a reality on and a stablebond of peacein their respective relationswith the Porte,and generallythroughoutthe Levant. Nor will you disguise from the Sultan and His Ministersthat perseverance their presentcoursemust end in alienating the in sympathies the BritishNation; and making it impossible of for Her Majesty's Governmentto shelter them from the impending danger, to overlook exigencies Christenor the of dom exposed the natural consequences Their unwiseto of policy and reckless maladministration. It remainsonly for me to say that in the event, which Her Majesty's Government earnestlyhope may not arise, of imminent dangerto the existence the Turkish Government, of Your Excellency will in such casedespatcha Messengerat once to Malta,* requestingthe Admiral to hold himself in readiness,but you will not direct Him to approach the Dardanelles without positiveinstructions from Her Majesty's




and had setdedthe Holy Places dispute,in accordance with his

[Stratford Redcliflfe de reached Constantinople 5 April 1853, on

instructions, 5 May, Unfortunately that very day the by on Russian Prince Mengikov, hadbeen ona special who sent mission to Constantinople, presentedfar-reaching of demands, a set which
even Aberdeen declared to be "unreasonable" and which were

considered equivalent a demand a Russian to for protectorate overTurkey.! MenSikov's were terms ultimately refused he and

* "Archipelago?"pencilled themargin theMS.original is in of t V. Temperley, England the and Near East, Crimea, The [1936], Chap,xn




retired in dudgeonon 21 May. A crisis then supervened. The Tsar had causedalarm by his activity in armaments in January and Napoleon excitementby sendingthe French naval squadron to Salamis, in consequence the first report of MenSikov's of activity in Constantinople. In this demonstrationEngland had refusedto join, but on i June she'agreed join with France in to sending the French and British squadronsto Besika Bay, just
outside the Dardanelles. The reasons for this move were that

British public opinion had resentedMensikov'sconduct at Constantinople. On 27 May the Tsar, by an independentand almost
simultaneous decision, sent orders to his troops to crossthe Turkish

frontier and occupythe Principalitiesof Moldavia and Wallachia.

This created a tense situation-which the four other Powers tried

to avert by a Conferenceat Vienna during June and July. Their representativesthere drew up a note which, they hoped, would
satisfy both Russia and Turkey. Unfortunately the Ambassadors

of the Powers were negotiating an agreement with Turkey at Constantinople at the sametime. The two propositions killed one
another. The Tsar accepted the "Vienna Note". The Turks refused it because they were annoyed at the refusal of the Powers

to accept their proposition. The Turkish refusal took place on 19 August. The British Government at first thought of forcing the Turks to accept the " Vienna Note", and of recalling Stratford if he failed to secureTurkey's submission. But on 16 September Clarendon received an authentic version of an interpretation of the "Vienna Note" by Nesselrode,the RussianChancellor, which
would have given to Russia all the superiority over other Powers at Constantinople which Mensikov had claimed. This inter-

pretation was professedly basedon Article VII of the Treaty of

Kutchuk Kainardji, but was wholly opposed to the views of the
other four Powers at the Vienna Conference. Clarendon described

it as "violent"

and next day (the lyth) abandoned all intention leaked out in

of pressing the " Vienna Note" further upon Turkey, as did

France. Rumours of the "violent interpretation"

the pressand Clarendon expecteda storm. On 23 Septemberhe

and Aberdeen were informed by the French Ambassador that a

sedition had broken out in Constantinople,endangering lives the of Europeansand of the Sultan. Aberdeen and Clarendon thereupon, without even waiting for confirmation from Stratford and

without consulting the Cabinet, sent orders to Stratford to call up the British fleet outside the Dardanelles to Constantinople,

thereby violating the Straits' Convention. Such a step required considerable defence, so by way of anticipating this movement and justifying it beforehand,Clarendonwrote the dispatchwhich follows. It sumsup the whole caseagainstRussia and the attitude of Great Britain on the Eastern question. It accusesRussia of "seeking to obtain a virtual protectorate over the Christian subjects



of the Porte", and statesgenerally the British view on the whole

Eastern question on the needof supportingthe integrity of and


War was declaredby the Turks on Russiaon 4 October, and theTurksbegan hostilities Europeon 23October,and extended in them to Asia. The British and French naval squadrons passedthe Dardanelles on 22 October-a day before the Turks began
hostilities. Russia still maintained a defensive attitude and de-

clared she was not at war with Turkey. Finally she intervened

and destroyed Turkish naval squadronat Sinope(30November). a This decided the British Government to join with France on 24 December sendingtheir naval squadrons in into the Black Sea, and in turning back Russianvessels found there. This was the final cause of war. This decision is explained in a dispatch of 24 December(A. & P., [1854], LXXI, [^99], 753-4), but it contains no new statement of principle.]

Document 35. Clarendon justifiesthesending ike British of Fleetthrough Dardanelles, September the 30 1853*

I have alreadyinformed you that two Dcsp[atchcjsfrom C[oun]t Nesselrode B[aro]n MeyendorfF to were communicatedto me by B[aro]n Brunnowannouncingthat the Turkish Modificationsof the Vienna Note had been rejectedby the Cab[ine]t of St Petersburg,and stating the grounds upon
which that decision was founded.

These despatches .wouldappearto precludethe hope of an amicablearrange [men]t betweenRussia & Turkey, and as their effectmay consequently desastrous to Europe, be [sic] theyhave rec[eive]d serious the attention H[erJ M[ajcstyJ's of Gov[ernmen]t and I shallnow proceed statethe opinion to
that has beenformed of them, with referenceto the intentions

of theConference Viennain framingtheNote, to the motives of of theOttomanGov[ernmen]t proposing in amendments, and to therepeated declarations theEmp[ero]rthat he desired of

no newright nor anyextension influence Turkey. of in In his first Desp[atc]h C[oun]t Nesselrode alludesto the termsin w[hic]h the Notehad beenaccepted St Petersat

burg, theunderstanding if anychanges introand that were

* ClarendonSeymour, 222, September P.O. to No. 30 1853, 195/4012, The original is in F.O. text 181/290. PublishedA. & P., [1854], in LXXt, [1699], 555-8. Temperley Pensoo, ofDiplomatic Books, 460 Cp. and Century Blut No, a.




duced at Constan[tino]ple, the RussianGov[ernmen]t would be at liberty to withhold its assent.The Russian Gov[ernmen]t had of course a right to make this condition, or to suggestamendmentsto the Note. The Turkish Gov[ernmen]t, possessing similar right, exercised a it by proposing certain modifications. The Conferencehad no power to imposethe Note on either party. Its position was that of a mediator endeavouringto do equal justice to both parties, & its intention was to guard the honor & independence of the Sultan, & secure to Russia what She was entitled to claim, but no more: viz: the maintenance of existing

Treaties, and the status quo in matters of religion. The

Conference therefore could not refuse to entertain the modi-

fications of the Porte, altho5 regretting the lossof time w[hic]h they occasioned. They were not looked upon as altering the sense of the Note, nor at variance with the intentions of the Conference; & they were unanimously recommended to the acceptance of the Russian Gov[ernmen]t, the Russian Minister at Vienna, it is understood, concurring in the

They have been rejected but the Russian Gov[ernmen]t did not take its stand upon the condition on w[hic]h the note had been accepted; viz. that of no change being made, but has fully entered into the objections to w[hic]h it considered the modifications were liable, & w[hic]h showed that inferences were drawn from the note, and claims were to be

established by means of it hereafter altogether inconsistent

with the views and intentions of the Four Powers. The

frankness of this proceeding on the part of the Russian Gov[ernmen]t, and the determination that its intentions should not be misapprehended,are doubtlessvery proper; but, on the other hand, H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t feel that, even while retaining their own original interpretation of the Note, it would now be highly dishonorableto pressits acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the power to whom the Note is to be addressed,that another & a totally different meaningis attachedto it by that Power. And even if this were not dishonorable, it would be



in the highestdegree impolitic for the reasons statedin

C[oun]tNesselrode's desp[atc]h first with reference]to

admitting anyamendment,, that the Emp[cro]rwould of viz: expose himselfe renew to political relations Turkey with under unfavorableauspices w[hic]h would deprive them of all solidity thefuture,andinevitably for bring abouta freshand
more decidedrupture".

H[er] M[ajesty]'sGov[ernmen]t earnestly desire see to the

relations between Russia & the Porte reestablished on a

friendly and permanentfooting; and they consequently can

be no party to an arrangement w[hic]h the Cab[ine]t of St Petersburg shown has would frustratethe objectw[hic]h
they have at heart.

C[oun]t Nesselrode declares* that the modificationsare by no means insignificanteitherin their spirit or their "arricre so pensee"as might at first sight be supposed; but he appears not to be aware that this declaration goesfar to justify the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t in proposing them; and H[is] Ex[cellency] altogether fails to show by what right or in reparation of what injury Russiaclaims admissionsand concessions from the Sultan who is unwilling to make them, and whoseindependence Russia together with the other Powers of Europe has determined to respect. With regard to the first objection in Count Nesselrode's note, I have to observe that the Conference at Vienna in

advertingto the active solicitudeat all times displayed by theEmp[ero]rs Russia themaintenance theprivileges of for of & immunities theGreco-Orthodox of Church, simplyintended to recordthe anxietyw[hic]h everySovereign must feel for the welfarein a foreignCountryof the religion he himself professes. But the Conference no means intended to by

affirmthat the immunities privileges question and in were solelydueto the solicitude the Emperors Russia, of of and thePorte justified asserting many these is in that of privileges areof a dateanterior theexistence diplomatic to of relations
between the Two Countries.

Count Nesselrode toother alludes grievances specifies but

* Alteredto "appearsto think" in the Blue Book.




none exceptthat regardingthe Holy Places, w[hic]h hasbeen

satisfactorily settled. Nor have any other grievances connected with religious matters at any time been put forward by Russia, and it was not for the Conference to assumethe existenceof wrongs of w[hic]h they had no knowledge. But

C[oun]t Nesselrode wherethen wasthe objectof P[rin]ce asks,

Menchikoff's mission? the answer to that is the assurance

repeatedlygiven that it was to settle the question of the Holy Places, and to obtain a guarantee for its not being again disturbed. That question has been settled to the satisfaction of all Parties, and the Vienna Note contains a guarantee against w[hic]h Russiaraisesno objection. The modification proposedby the Portewith reference the Treaty of Kainardji to appearedto H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t wholly uncalled for, until they read the objection made to it by Count Nesselrode's Note. H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t considered that the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji and the maintenance of religious privileges had been dis-connected
in the Note in a manner not to be mistaken; and indeed this

is admitted by C[oun]t Nesselrode.But the RussianGov[ernmen]t, while disclaiming all pretension to exercisea protectorate yet affirms that all these religious privileges and immunities are direct consequences the Treaty, which was of doubtless a solemn engagement taken by Turkey towards Russia; and the fulfilment of that engagement, but no more it was the object of the Conference to secure. By C[oun]t Nesselrode'sinterpretation of the Note however, Russiawould under the SeventhArticle of the Treaty be entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities, w[hic]h are of that peculiar character that She would be constantly able, if so minded to interfere betweenthe Sultan and his subjects; and thus the religious Protectorate w[hic]h is abjured, and the new rights and extendedinfluence w[hic]h are equally
dis-claimed would be established.

It is superfluous to say that no such intention was entertained by the Conference;nor can the Treaty of Kainardji, by any subtlety of reasoning, be so construed. By the 7th Art[icle] of that Treaty the Porte promises to protect the



C[hris]tianreligion in all its Churches throughoutthe

Ottoman dominions;but in the sameArticle the Min[iste]rs

of Russia permitted makerepresentations favourof are to in a newChurch,andits Ministers;and this Clause wouldhave been whollyunnecessary if Russian diplomacy alsobeen had
allowedto make representations every matter connected on

with religion.* If the Article bore the sense that C[oun]t

Nesselrodenow seeksto attach to it, and if the two Con-

tractingParties beenagreed had uponit, it is reasonable to suppose at the signingof the Treaty a stipulationso that importantasthat of maintaining privileges immunities the &
of the Greek Church would not have been omitted.

The third objectionraisedby Count Nesselrode even is more than the two w[hic]h precedeit, at variancewith the
intentions of the Conference, w[hic]h assuredlywas not that the Sultan should enter into an engagementwith Russia to concedeto the Greek Church all such advantagesas might be grantedto other C[hris]tian denominations only those but advantages which were conceded Communitieswho, like to the Greeks,were Ottoman Subjects.The spiritual head of the R[oman] Catholicsin Turkey, as elsewhere,is a foreign Sovereign, if it pleasedthe Sultan to enter into a Conand cordat with the Pope, conferring privileges upon R[oman] Catholics,not subjects the Porte, surelythat ought to confer of no right upon the Emp[ero]r of Russiato claim all the benefits

of that Concordat the GreekCommunity, for Subjects the of Porte, whose spiritualHead, Patriarch Gonstan[tino]plc the of
is also a subject of the Sultan. No C[hris]tian community being subjectsof the Sultan

would have any right to participatein the privilegesand advantages the Sultanmight conferupon Russian that Convents, Ecclesiasticslaymen; or such example theRussian for as Churchand Hospitalaboutto be built at Jerusalem:-and

in the same manner GreekCommunity the consisting of manymillionswouldhave right to participate advanno in tages granted foreign to ConventsEcclesiastics, w[hic]h or and
* For the text of this article and the different Russianand British inter-

pretations ,Temperley, and Near WuCrimea, England the East, [1936], 467-9.




might not for many and obvious reasons be fitting for a G[hris]tian Community subjectto the Porte. In fact if the Sultan has at any time, in the exerciseof his SovereignAuthority conferred religious privileges upon a community not subject to Him, or if He at any future time should think proper to do so, C[oun]t Nesselrodeclaims that Russia should have a right to demand that several millions of Greekswho are subjects of the Porte should at once be placed upon the footing of Foreigners, and should enjoy, through the intervention of Russia, all the advantagesw [hie] h the Sultan, for reasonsof w[hic]h he is the only competent judge, may have granted to such Foreigners. How such a claim can be reconciled with the professed desire for the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the strict status quo in religious matters, it is not for H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t to explain; but they considerit exhibits a total disregardfor the feelingsand interestsof the EuropeanPowers who, in common with Russia, have declared that They will uphold the independence of Turkey, and who, cannot therefore see with indifference that Russia should thus surreptitiously seekto obtain a virtual Protectorate over the C[hris] tian Subjects of the Porte.And with respect to C[oun]t Nesselrode'ssupposition that somenew privilege not mentioned in the recent Firmans might be granted to the R[oman] Catholic Establishments in Palestine to the prejudice of the Native Communities H[is] Ex[cellency] appears to have overlooked that by the Vienna Note the Porte engagesthat no change shall be made in the order of things lately established at Jerusalem, without previous communication with the Gov[ernmen]ts of Russia and

I have now fully stated in what spirit & with what intentions the Vienna Note was framed; but in interpreting it as C[oun]t Nesselrodehas done by his objections to the modifications, H[is] Ex[cellency] not only does not prove, but he does not even advert to, any obligation by w[hic]h the Porte is bound to make concessions utterly irreconcilable with its independence. But H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t are



compelled consider theclaims forwardby Russia to that put areequally irreconcilable theassurance noextended with that poweror influence sought Turkey.They deeplyregret is in
that suchclaimsshouldhave beenmade for ovenwere they successful would be useless Russiaif She sincerely they to desires independence the OttomanEmpire; but under the of any circumstances must producefeelingsof suspicion& they distruston the part of the Porte; & differencesbetweenthe
two Powers will thus in future, as of late, be a source of

anxiety to Europe and exposethe general peace to constant dangerof disturbance* You will communicatethis Despfatcjh to C(oun]t Ncssclrode, or to M. de S6niavine should Cjounji NcsHclrodebe still absent,and alsogive him a Copy.-






[The policy of Palmerstonduring 1848-9 may be made clearer by a very brief sketch of general movements in Europe. On 25 February 1848, Louis Philippe, the King of the French, fled
to England. There had been a long battle with the parliamentary opposition which had ended in street fighting by revolutionaries.

The Government had fallen becauseof its unpopularity and the King's nerve had failed at the crisis. A Republic wasdeclared, and the famous Lamartine became Foreign Minister. This Republic was soon occupied with its internal troubles, and Lamartine
declared that France did not intend to interfere with other nations.

His utterance was a little ambiguous as he suggestedthat the

Treaty of Vienna needed revision at the same time ashe disclaimed
interference with other States. Palmerston viewed that utterance

with sympathy. He knew the difficulties of reconciling different

parties in a Cabinet and accepted the declaration in good faith.

He thought that a recognition of the new regime would be the best way to help France and to pacify Europe. He cheerfully

recommendedthis course other Governments(v.infra,pp. 159-60) to

and adopted it himself as soon as possible. France herself electrified

Europe not by her interference but by her example. Germany,

Austria-Hungary, and Italy had long groaned beneath the iron

rule of Metternichand autocracy. Germany, Italy and Hungary all

wanted to be nations and all wanted to be free. France had shewn

the liberals and patriots of Central Europe that a governmentcould be overthrown. The example fell like a spark on gunpowder. In March an earthquake wave of revolution swept over all Central Europe. There was never anything like it in suddenness; there was no resisting it. Every King or princelet in Central Europe either had to promise a liberal constitution or to appoint a liberal ministry. Most of them ran away from their capitals. Every one of them yielded to his people. Metternich, who refused to yield, was forced to resign and fled from Vienna on 13 March exclaiming "after me the deluge". The foolish Emperor, whom
he left, yielded everything for the deluge was indeed at hand. Ferdinand issued an Edict giving liberal constitutions both to

Austria (15 March) and to Hungary (17 March). Frederick

William IV did the same in Prussia on the i8th and declared for

a Pan-German policy. Even before that (on the i6th) the King of Bavaria had abdicated in favour of his son. By the end of March

154 PALMERSTON REVOLUTION 1848-9 AND OF a Vorparlament met at Frankfurtto arrangefor the union of had all Germany onestate. A NationalGerman in Assembly in met May and appointed Archduke the John, a popular Habsburg,
Reichsverweser or Imperial Vicar. Germanyseemed alreadyone. But the unity of Germany not dependon talkersat Frankdid furt. It depended whetherthe rulers of the two strongest on
German States could assert themselves and restore order in their

German territories. The Austrian Emperor twice fled from turbulent Vienna to Innsbruck. But by the end of October 1848 Vienna was restored to order and the feeble Emperor abdicated (December)in favour of the eighteen-year-old Franz Joseph, Prince Schwarzenberg, who was the real ruler of Austria, soon ended the power of the Austrian Germansin parliament or in executive. In November (1848) the PrussianKing finally summoned his soldiers to his aid and reduced the Prussian Parliament

to impotence. Soearly asSeptember Prussian Austrian troops and had quelled disorderand intimidated the Pan-GermanNational Assembly Frankfurt. At any rate by the end of 1848it was clear at that the German revolution, in itself, was likely to be mastered by the older and more reactionary forces. England had some very slight repercussions Continental of unrest. On 10 April a monster demonstrationof Chartists on Kennington Common ended in a complete fiasco. vtYesterday", wrote Palmerston., "was a gloriousday, the Waterloo of peaceand order." He was secureat home and refused to be dismayed by eventson the Continent. Palmerstonhad always told Mctternich that his systemwould tumble into ruins, and was delighted at his fall and flight. "Feeblenessand decay were the inevitable con-* sequences" his system. But Germany now had aspirationsfor of national unity, she might become free and liberal He recommended constitutions, whether for separate States or for all Germany,as a speedycure for all her ills. Queen Victoria and PrinceAlbert, the restof the Cabinetand theworld might protest and lift up hands of horror, but he was unmoved. Ashasbeenverywell said,Palmerston "judged the movements

of 1848 their propervalue. He did not fall into panicfear at at what washappening, manyof his dispatches filled with and arc the undisguised of jubilation of a prophetjustified in his note
prophesyingat the last. He knew that the end of social order had

not comein England, and, in spiteof barricades fugitive and royalty,believed thesame true of Europe, that was Therewas probably oneman,apartfromhimself, whose only on judgment he placed reliance, thatmanstrongly any and corroborated this

belief... Stratford .Sir Canning.. shivering .saw burghers relieve the guardwith white-gloved students a deserted in Berlin,and witnessed nocturnal disturbancesVienna; yet he wrote at and home firm beliefthat Central his Europe sound heart. was at





What was true of Germany was true of the rest of Europe; and3
if there was trouble ahead, it was the fault not of the peoples, but of the Courts."* That was Palmerston's view from Downing

Street too. He saw and judged more accurately and coolly than anyone elsethere. If "not a great man" he was " the right man9'.
He was indeed the one sane statesman, the one cool head, among

the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers. While Queen Victoria and the other Ministers were deploring the fall of thrones and sovereigns, Palmerston was urging the upholding of treaties. At an early date in 1848 he took care to lay down his idea of the treaty obligations which England was prepared to maintain. It was as well to do this when a revolution was sweeping over Europe, threatening the territorial integrity of every State and appearing to obliterate every old landmark. In Doc. 36 Palmerston himself specifically and narrowly limits the treaty obligations of Vienna to those affecting Saxony, Savoy
and Switzerland. In fact, he had very recently taken the

line that England would not even necessarilybe bound by her

guarantee to Switzerland. When Switzerland was in revolution in 1847 and the Powers were threatening to intervene, Palmerston minuted as follows. " Instruct Mr. Peel to say whenever the matter may be mentioned, that L[or]d Minto made no Declaration...

as to what England would or would not do in the Event of any Foreign Power interfering by Force of Arms in the internal
affairs of Switzerland. The British Gov[ernmen]t have reserved to itself unfettered Freedom to act as it may think fit on such an occasion if it should unfortunately happen."f He seems to be getting near the sentiment expressedwith much greater cynicism by Lord John Russell in the Commons (8 May 1856): "If a treaty be found injurious to the interests of a country and some means

of violating it are obvious, I do not know of what country in Europe we could predicate a strict observanceof the Treaty. "J By March 1848,however, Palmerstonseems prepared, in British interests, to maintain by force the integrity of Saxon Prussia,and
the neutrality of Switzerland and of Belgium against all comers.

He was particularly resolute as to defending the latter. But he will not do the same for the Prussian Rhine province or for
Austrian Lombardy, on the ground that in neither case is he

pledged by guarantee. His view of England's obligations was strictly confined to guarantee, and he further shewed prudence in refusing to be drawn into the European imbroglio by his liberal
sympathies or opinions.]
* G. Sproxton, Palmerston the HungarianRevolution,[1919], 8. and t P.O. 96/21, Minute signed "Pfalmerston] 2/10/47". J Cp. a curious minute by Lord Hardinge in 1908 where he gives certain circumstances under which it is "doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality". Gooch and Temperley, vin, 378. V. also Ashley, Life [of Palmerston],[1876], i, 92.


Document 36. Palmerston distinguishes between Treaty andGuarantee, 6-14 March 1848* With reference your Lordship's dispatch No. 52 of the to

gthinstant reporting BaronGanitz's version a conversation of

I had held with the Chevalier Bunscn, I have to observe that the latter seems to have overstated what I stated to him in

the conversation which he gavean account, I did not say of f "That Englandwould unflinchinglymaintain the arrangement of the Treaty of Vienna1''; but on the contrary I especially guarded myselfagainstbeing understood make to any declarationasto what Englandwould or would not do in any case which hasnot yet happened.I distinctly said that I hadno Poweror Authority to giveanysuchpledgein a matter which, if ever the caseoccurredwould have to be considered and determined by the Governmentand by Parliament, I moreover drew the attention of Chcv[aI5c]r Bunsento the
distinction between Treaties without and Treaties with a

guarantee observing the first Descriptionof Treatiesgave that the contracting partiesa Rightto maintain all the Stipulations which such Treaties contained, but imposed no obligation to do so; and I pointed out that the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 containsno guaranteeexcept in regard to the portion of Saxonywhich was allotted to Prussia,and in regard to some of the arrangements connectedwith Switzerland,
[This next document, dated 6 March 1848, actually reports Palmerston'sipsissima verba a conversation in with Baron do Bunsen. The reportwas receivedby a Dutch diplomat at the time from

Bunsen is heresubjoined.J agrees Palmemon's and It with own account, is fuller, vivider and in the first person.] but I [Palmerston]distinguishbetween a Treaty and a

Guarantee. factofhaving The been of thesignatory one powers

* Palmerston Westmorland to (Berlin), 50,14March1848* No. /W t V. P.O.64/285, Westmorland Palmerston, 53, <> to No, March Canitzapproves Bunsen's of report"in which [PalmmtonJ you state that the interests England the territorial of in arrangementsEurope of wentnow the same theyhadbeen theyears as in 1814 1815, that you wouldunand and
flinchingly uphold them".

172,9 November1854. He transmits communication "a made at the time"

J V.Nederlands Archief, Rijks Constantinople, Zuykndc Nyrvfilt,No. From

(6 March 1848) requests hisname notbementioned, thatof and that may or Baron de Bunsen.




of such a treaty gives the right to intervene, but does not impose on it the obligation to do so, in the casein which the state of possession has been changed.* It is otherwise with a guarantee which involves the obligation of maintaining the state of possession. Similar guarantees have been given by England to the King of Prussia the province of Saxony; to Switzerland for and to Belgiumfor their neutrality and integrity, f England has guaranteed neither Lombardy to Austria, nor the Rhine Provinces to Prussia. It has the right of aiding them in caseof attack but has no obligation to do so.

Document 37. Applicationby Lord John Russellof Palmerstorfs principle, 14 September 1859^ [Palmerston's distinction between guarantee and obligation was later explained by John Russell with retrospective reference to Cracow (1841) and actual application to Parma and Modena (1859).]...Rights acquired or confirmed under the Treaty of Vienna and which do not form the subject of a special guarantee give to G[rea]t Britain as a contracting party a right but do not impose on her an obligation to interfere. For instancethe Republic of Cracow had a separate existence secured to her by the Treaty of Vienna; that separate existence was annulled, and Cracow was annexed to Austria [1846], but although H[er] Majesty considered
* Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studiesin Diplomatic History, [1930], quotes (pp. 121-2) an utterance of Gladstone as to Palmerston's holding this view. Gladstone suggests that it was well known that he held it. It ought to be mentioned that Palmerston, who in 1848 accepts the guarantee as binding England to interfere as e.g. in the caseof Belgium.,is quoted elsewhereas having expresseda different doctrine (v. infra, p. 339). The probable explanation is that he did actually say different things at different times. Indeed, as quoted supra, p. 155, he had declared on 2 October 1847 that he reserved"unfettered freedom" to England, if Switzerland's neutrality were violated. Yet, according to his statement on this page to Bunsen, the guarantee to Switzerland imposed an obligation.] "f PrussiaandSaxony, Arts. XV and XVII of Final Act of Congressof Vienna, 9 June 1815, Hertslet, Map, [1875], i, 221-3; Switzerland, Art. LXXXIV, ibid, I,

64-5, 259-60; Belgium, Art. II of BelgianTreaty of 19 April 1839,MM- nJ 9^rJ Lord John Russell to Fane (Vienna), No. 74, 14 September 1859, -P.O. 7/564-



that annexation a manifest violation of the Treaty of Vienna

H[er] Majesty not consider did herself boundto defendby forceof armsthe independence Cracow. of Soalso Powers Europeacknowledged, theTreaty the of by
of Vienna,the addition of Belgiumto Holland, but the rights

therebyacquired the King of the Netherlands not by did

avail when an insurrection of the Belgian people made it

expedient the eyes Austria,aswell asof other Powers in of to sanction separation Belgiumfrom Holland. the of The reasonswhich then prevailed against the rule of Holland in Belgiumappearto H[er] M[ajcsty]'s Gov[crnmen]t to be applicableto the rights of reversionof Austria
in Tuscany and Modena.

The abstractright of Austria to interferein Tuscany and Modena on account of her right of reversion ought in the opinion of H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t to yield to the interest of Europe. The renewal of a contest in Italy for Austriansupremacy theoneside,andItalian independence on on the other would be so great an evil that some sacrifice ought to be made to avert it,...




[Palmerston's dealings with the Tsar in the period of revolutions are most revealing. Nicholas I, the great religious and political autocratof the day, the greatupholderof legitimacyand divine right, was horrified by the way thrones had tumbled down in
from their capitals. He had determined to restore order wherever

CentralEuropeand the manner whichKings had run away in he could. He wastherefore mostunwillingto recognise now a regime France.He did not admitthat even deposed in the Louis Philippe been had legitimate was and most unwillingto recognize a republic.Heincreased rigidityof hisrulein hisownpolicethe governed dominions particularly thedanger ofPoland, and in spot Histroops entered Moldavia Wallachia theexpress and with view of restoring authority theprinces of preventing the of and any chance a republic of being proclaimed, in May 1849 sent Then he Russian troopsinto Hungary. The Magyars had beatenthe

armies theImperial of Habsburg would, all probability, and in have formed themselvesindependent for an republic for the but



intervention of the Imperial Romanoff. After a gallant resistance

Hungary was crushed and, as the Tsar's Marshal informed him,

lay "at the feet of Your Majesty". The powerful intervention of the Tsar had finally crushed revolution everywhere in Central
Europe. Such is the briefest outline of Nicholas5policy. Palmerston's com-

munications are highly characteristic. Doc. 38 indicates clearly

the intention of the British Government to recognize the new

regime in France assoonasit is stable.This is pure Canning!te doctrine and it is excellent common sense. But in Doc. 39 Palmerston

not only recommendsRussia to be neutral but actually suggests Nicholas' granting some form of self-government to Poland, in spite of a previous contention that every State [even Russia presumably] "has the right" to decide such a matter for itself.
This was very rash counsel and certain to make Nicholas more anti-Polish still. In Doc. 40 Palmerston shewspretty clearly that, whatever may be England's liberal sympathies, she is not going to be drawn into war.]

Document 38. Palmerston explainsto Russiahis reasons for recognizing newregimein France,28 March 1848* the
[Lord Bloomfield to thank Count Nesselrode for his com-

official relations

On the abdication of King Louis Philippe

were broken off with France. But the British

Ambassador, Lord Normanby, remained at Paris to deal with events. As soon as a Government is established in France, new credentials will be given to our Ambassador,and diplomatic intercourse regularized.] ...But independently of these considerations belonging to the local interests and geographical position of Great Britain, it may be right to remind Count Nesselrode that it is an Established Principle of the British Government in regard to its Foreign relations, to acknowledge the right of every State to decide what shall be its own form of Government; and
therefore the Government of Great Britain is in the habit

of acknowledging any Government establishedin a Foreign State when such Government shall appear to be firmly and permanently established.
* Palmerstonto Bloomfield (St Petersburgh),No. 70, 28 March 1848,F.O.

This is referred to, infra, Doc. 39.



Withregard thegreatdifference to whichCountNesselrode

points between recent out the Revolution France that in and ofJuly 1830, Majesty's Her Government entirely concur in
the distinction so well and so clearly pointed out by Count Nesselrode. The late revolution is certainly a much greater internal convulsion than the former one; but it seemsto Her

Majesty's Government thecauses thetwo events that of have

not been so dissimilar as the extent of their results. Both

events werebrought about by a blind disregard,on the part of the Monarch and His Ministers, of public opinion-In
each case the Government shut its eyes and its cars to the

timely warnings which were affordedby a great variety of significant indications; and in eachcasethe Government
found the military force upon which they relied for support, fail them when They wanted to bring that force into conflict with the Peoplein a causewhich public opinion had pronounced to be unjust.

Document 39. Palmerston recommends neutralityto Russiaand advises togivehome to Poland,, April 1848* her rule 14

I inclosefor Your Lordship's information a Copy of a Despatchdated the JJ Ultimo from Count Nesselrode to BaronBrunnow,which hasbeencommunicated me by the to latter, containinga statement the opinionsand determinaof tionsformedby the Emperor Russia the subject the of on of recentevents Franceand otherpartsof Europe, in I haveto instructYourLordship sayto CountNcsselrodc, to with reference the inclosed to Despatch, nothingcan be that
wiser or more dignified than the determination which His Imperial Majesty has taken to maintain a neutral attitude

with regard theevents to whicharepassing otherCountries, in

and to confine himself to such defensive measures as in his

judgmenthe may deem necessary the protectionof his for own Dominions;and Her Majesty's Government have the morereason applaud course thepart of theRussian to this on
* Palmerston toBloomfield, 94,I4 April1848, 65/344. No. F,0.

PALMERSTON AND RUSSIA, 1848-9 Government,

Government also has resolved to follow.


because it is the course which the British

His Imperial Majesty may rest assuredthat the friendly sentimentswhich Count Nesselrodeexpresses towards Great Britain, are fully reciprocated by Her Majesty's Government towards Russia; and Her Majesty's Government will at all times feel great pleasure to communicate without reserve with the Russian Government on the progressof events,and are convinced that a good understanding on these matters
between the British and Russian Governments must have

an important and beneficial influence on the maintenance of the Peace of Europe. With regard to any plots which might be carried on in the United Kingdom with a view to disturb the internal tranquillity of any part of the Emperor'sDominions, His Imperial Majesty may be assuredthat Her Majesty's Government will at all times endeavour to prevent the hospitable shelter which this Country affords to Foreigners from being perverted so as to serve as a means for disturbing the tranquillity of other

Of courseit is not for Her Majesty's Government to suggest to His Imperial Majesty any courseof policy with reference to matters which more peculiarly concern the internal affairs of his own Dominions, although such affairs may by reason of peculiar circumstanceshave a closebearing on the general interests of Europe; but His Imperial Majesty will no doubt in the exerciseof his own enlightenedjudgment well and maturely consider whether it would not be possible for him to direct that some arrangements might be made in regard to the Kingdom of Poland, which might avert the danger of conflicts, the results of which must in any case,and however they may end, be lamentable and afflicting.*
* Cp. another letter to Bloomfield of r i April 1848,Ashley, Life, [1876], i, 91
and note.



40. Paimerston declares Nesselrode to that he will


not bedrawninto war, 2 December 1848*

I havereceivedyour despatch No. 69 of the 20th Ultimo,

reporting conversation CountNesselrode theaffairs a with on of SicilyandLombardy, with reference the opinions and to expressed Count by Nesselrode England that wouldeventually be drawnin to takepart with oneor otherBelligerent any in EuropeanWar, I have to instruct you to say to Count
Nesselrode,if he should recur to these opinions, that the Continental Powers would be much mistaken if they reckon

upondrawingGreatBritain into a war broughton by them by pursuing course a diametricallyoppositeto the counsels
of Great Britain, and of the dangers of which the British Governmenthad unavailingly warned them*



(a) ITALY [The revolution of 1848ran a violent coursein Italy. It was, in essence, national uprising against foreign or uncongenial a domination. Italy wanted to be one nation just becauseshe was sohopelessly divided. Naplesand Sicily wereruled by one tyrant, Parma and Modenaby another, Tuscanyby a third. Lombardy and Venetia were controlled by the foreign soldiersof the detested Austrians.There were only two rulers whom a patriotic Italian could tolerate.The new Pope,Pius IX, for oncewas a patriotic Italian, and shewed liberal tendencies the Papal States, But, in asthe revolutiondeveloped proveda broken reed.The Papacy he is international, national, noPopecouldwork long for the not and freedomandunity of Italy. Salvationwasto comefrom the North, from the King of Sardinia, who alsoruled Piedmontand Savoy, CharlesAlbert, though a wavering politician, was a genuine Italian patriot who hated the Austrians. At the critical moment

in February1848he camedownat last on the right side. Not only did he declare against war Austriaandfight for the union of Italy, but hegranted constitution hissubjects. a to This decision led him to defeat,to deposition, exileandto death,but it made to hissonKing of a unitedItaly. It wasthesupreme justification of
Palmerston'scontention that a constitution was the cure of all ills,
P.O. 65/346.

* Palmerston Buchanan Petersburgh), Got, December to (St No. 2 1848,



The course of events may be briefly described. In February 1848 Charles Albert granted a constitution, and the one truly Italian prince in Italy thus identified national independencewith political liberty. Metternich had long been hated by Italians as a bloody tyrant, and his fall (13 March) produced uprisings in Lombardy and Venetia. After five days' street fighting Milan was occupied by Italians, and the Austrians withdrew from Venice.

On 23 March CharlesAlbert issueda proclamationthat he would aid the peopleof Lombardy and Venice againsttheir tyrannical oppressors. His army crossed the Ticino and the fight for the union of Italy really began. It is not correct to say, although the charge was subsequently made by Queen Victoria and in the
Commons, that Palmerston addressed no word of caution to
Charles Albert before he declared war.* But, once the declaration

was launched, he hoped it would succeed. For a time it looked as if the liberals and patriots of the other States of Italy would co-operate with Savoy and a united Italian

front be shewn. Naples and Sicily rose and their miserable King promised them a constitution and all sorts of liberal reforms, with every intention of breaking his word at the first opportunity. The
Grand Duke of Tuscany made promises likewise and was a little more sincere about keeping them. Pope Pius IX did the same, but the stormy course of revolution speedily frightened the timid old man into reaction. Disunion ruined everything. Even had

the rulers been more amenable, the patriots were divided.

Mazzini, who displaced the Pope at Rome, wanted a republic and had an immense following everywhere. The Tuscans wanted a federation, Charles Albert a constitutional monarchy. The net result was failure. On 25 July 1848, Charles Albert was heavily

defeatedat Custozza.This meant the Austrian reconquestof Milan

and the defeat the nationalidea.The l^ope of finally sent French

troops to the Papal States. They crushed Mazzini's Roman Republic and, distrusting Austria, remained in military occupation of the Papal States. Reaction triumphed everywhere else. The Grand Duke broke his promisesin Tuscany; King "Bomba" returned to Naples and brutally mishandled the patriot leaders. These rulers seemed to have won, but their triumph was as inglorious as it was brief. There was to be no place for them in a
free and united Italy.

Among all the lawful rulers of Italy Charles Albert alone

remained faithful to his word and to his ideals. He had been

defeated and his troops expelled from Austrian territory, but he

would not give up the idea of a united Italy. Austria demanded

the status quo., CharlesAlbert refused.The sword was drawn again, and the Austrian army under Radetzky moved on the Sardinian.

On the field of Novara (23 March 1849) CharlesAlbert sought

* V. G. Sproxton, Palmerston theHungarian and Revolution, [1919], 23 n.


deathin vain,andhisarmywashopelessly defeated. abdicated He andleft Italy. His sonVictor Emmanuel madepeace retired and
within his own territories. There he remained true to his ideals.

Despite pressure Austriaandotherreactionaries Italy, he from in steadily maintained constitution whichhe hadsworn.And the to
the one Italian ruler, who had kept his vows, was one day to rule
over all Italy.

Palmerstonunderstood that the revolution of 1848was due to

strong national impulses countries Italy, With those in like national aspirationshe had much sympathy,for he understoodtheir
strength. Queen Victoria and the more conservative British statesmen viewed uprisings and revolutions with horror. They saw in them nothing but a breach of treaties, a defiance of sovereigns, destruction the old order. Palmerston more a of was optimisticbecause did not predictlong life for an Empirelike he the Austrian in Italy, which was basedon force, not on the consent -ofthe governed.He thoughta Government based forcea sham on thing, and one basedon consenta real thing. In his view concessions and constitutionswere the only safety for the petty rulers of Italy. This is clearly indicated in Doc. 41. His only remedy for Austrian rule in Italy was that it should cease. He did not think that even his favourite remedy of a constitution would succeed Lombardy or Vcnetia. It might have done if tried in in time. But national feelingwas at last awakein Italy, and would never be allayed until the Austrian had left her soil.* Palmerstonwas undoubtedly right, as eventshave proved. But his doctrine was too revolutionary for contemporaries. It wasnot, however, by any means so revolutionary as it scorned. Even in the Treaty of Vienna England had never guaranteedher Italian possessions Austria, as Palmerstonwas at pains to point out, to "The Treaty of Vienna they [the Austrians] themselves at set noughtwhen they took possession Cracow,and they havenever of fulfilled their engagementto give national institutions and a nationalrepresentation their Polishsubjects. to They cannotclaim the treatywhen it suitstheir purpose,and at the sametime, when it suitstheir purpose, rejectit. "f This was good sense though unpalatable advice. As regardsthe cession territory it meant a disturbancein the of

European balance power of but, asPalmerston pointedout, that wasthelesser evil. The real danger wasthat Francewould intervene attackAustriain Italy. Shehad already and senttroops to support Pope.Austriacould defend the not Milan against France and wasmuch saferbehindthe Alps. The Austrian reactionaries thoughtthat, if theyyielded revolution Milan, theywould to in
Problem in European Diplomacy, 1847-184^ [1934], 89-90, 338-42. f Ashley, r, 107, Life, private letterto Ponsonby 31August1848, of
* For a discussion Palmerston's of policyin Italy v. Taylor, TheItalian



never recover power in Budapest or Vienna. They were reactionaries everywhereand by instinct. Palmerston himself thought that the expulsionof the Habsburg from Italy would not" diminish the real strength nor impair the real security of Austria as a
European Power". He wantegl Charles Albert to rule over a

Kingdom of North Italy, including Parma, Venetia and Lombardy. Austria would not go so far. She wished to retain Venetia

under her direct rule, and to give a kind of home rule to Lombardy 'under an Austrian prince.* These negotiations failed, and after Gustozza in July 1848 Austria raised her terms and ended all
hope of peaceful solutions.

On the day that Charles Albert was defeated at Custozza,

Victoria wrote thus to her Prime Minister: "The Queen must tell Lord John [Russell] what shehas repeatedly told Lord Palmerston, but without apparent effect, that the establishment of an entente cordiale with the French Republic, for the purpose of driving the Austrians out of their dominions Italy, would be a disgrace this in to country."| Yet Palmerston succeededby much tact in confining French intervention to the Papal States. His own point of view

was very clear. "I do not wish to seeItaly emancipatedfrom the Austrian yoke by the help of French arms, but perhaps it would
be better it should be so done than not done at all; and if it were so done at a time when England and France were well together,

we might be able to prevent any permanently bad consequences from resulting from it. But the great object at present is to keep things quiet; to reestablishpeacein Northern Italy, and to trust
to future events for greater improvements"J (28 December 1848). The same spirit inspires Doc. 42. Palmerston addressesan eleventh hour counsel to Austria, just before her final and successful campaign against Charles Albert was undertaken. His advice was disregarded and the young Emperor Franz Joseph went forward in Italy to a brief triumph and a lasting defeat. Palmerston clearly foresaw this result, for he wrote (9 September 1849): ecHe

[Franz Joseph]holdsItaly just aslong asand no longer than France chooses let him have it. The first quarrel between Austria and to
France will drive the Austrians out of Lombardv* and Venice. " V His prediction was right, though his time-table was a little amiss.

In ten years Napoleon III drove the Austrians from Lombardy.

Seven years later, by the aid of Bismarck, the Austrians were expelled from Venetia.]
* Ashley, Life, i, 98-100.

f Quoted by G. Sproxton, op.cit. 23. Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell,

25 July 1848. J Ashley, Life, i, 114. Private letter to Abercromby of 28 December i Ashley, Life, I, 141.



OF 1848-9

Document 41. Palmerston recommends grant of a the constitution a panacea Italy, 22 February as for 1848*

With reference the Conversation to which your Lordship had with Baron Canitz on the affairs of Italy as reported in your Despatch 30 of the I4th Instant, I have to desire No that Your Lordship will take an opportunity of observingto Baron Canitz that the example of what has happened at Naples wouldseemstronglyto shewthe wisdomwith which The King of Sardiniahasactedin yielding betimesto the reasonable desires His Subjects.For if The King of Naples of had madetimely concessions, had sentover to Sicily by and the 12thofJanuarythe Scheme moderate of reformwhich the Sicilians werethenexpecting, outbreak the whichsubsequently happened would not havetaken place,and the samereforms
which would in that case have satisfied the Sicilians would

alsohave contentedthe Neapolitans. But The King of Naples hasby his own delay and obstinacybrought upon himself the necessityof going far beyond the point to which he had previously refusedto advance.For the subjects the King of Naplesthis result is no doubt of very advantageous, and thus out of evil good has come; but to other Sovereigns who are desirousof keeping the direction of their own affairs in their own hands and of retaining with regard to their peoplethe graciouscharacterwhich belongsto those who voluntarily grant, instead of being reduced to the moreor less humiliating positionwhich belongsto thosewho reluctantlyyield to physicalor moral coercion,the late events

in Naplesand Sicily oughtto serve a Document 42. PalmerstonAustrian in Italy, on rule
7 November 1848! SendCopy to L[or]d Ponsonby with Instructionsto com-

municateit to B[aro]n Wessembergh at sameTime to and

request that most serious attention to the Statements con-

tained in this and in other Reportswh[ich] have been

* Palmerston Westmorland to (Berlin), No. 30, 22 February1848, P.O.

f Minute Palmerston, by 7November P,0.96/22. 1848,



rec[eive]d from the Same Quarter. He will at same Time say that H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t are persuadedthat These simple Statements of Facts must surely convince B[aron] Wessemberg that it is impossible to expect that a Provincein which there existsthroughout the whole Population both in the towns and in the Country District and from the Noble to the Peasant such deeply rooted Hatred of
Austrian Domination can ever become either a secure or

useful Possession the Imperial Crown. It cannot reasonably of be imagined that any national Institution which the Emp[ero]r may grant to the People of Lombardy can alter their National antipathy to Foreign Rule, or have any other effect than that of affording them greater Facilities of throwing off the yoke from which they are so anxious to get free. If indeed such Institutions as are now promised had been granted to the Lombards Ten or Fifteen years ago there is no saying to what Extent practical Independencemight have reconciled them to nominal Subjectionbut mattershave now gone much too far between the Italian and the Austrian Gov[ernmen]ts to make it possible that any such connection could be permanent; and if the whole of Lombardy is in a state of either passive or active Resistance to Austrian Rule now when the Province has been recently reconquered, and is occupied by an overwhelming Austrian Force exercising authority by all the Powers and Severities of Martial law, what sort of obediencecan the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t expect to meet with from the Lombards when the Austrian Troops shall have retired, when the local Gov[ernmen]t shall be administered by the very Italian Nobles who are now in voluntary Exile to avoid any Contact whatever with the Foreign Invader, and when there shall be assembleda Parliament composedof Italians, and elected by the People who are now under Circumstances of the most extreme Difficulty engagedin a desperatebecausewholly unequal Struggle with the regular Force of Marshall [sic] Radetsky. . . . The presentmoment is a most favourable one for Austria to make an arrangement by which Lombardy would be
released from Austrian Rule. The armies of Austria have



OF 14-9

reoccupied Lombardy and therefore Concession the would manifestly theresultof choice not of localcompulsion, be and [Mentions danger the from France.] ... It is impossible doubt that an efficientand powerful to
FrenchArmy aidedand supported a generalRising of the by Italians would be too strong for the Austrian Forcesin Italy, and the Probabilityis that in sucha CaseAustria would lose everything the Southof the Alps. It may be said indeed to such a Conflict might bring on a more Extensivewar in EuropeandotherPowers might takePart with Austria, But is the Austrian Gov[ernmen]tsurethat the Sympathies even of Germanywould be with Austria and her attempt to rivet her yokeupon the Italians, and would not the Principleof nationality which is now the rallying Cry of Germany tell againstAustria in such a struggle? Nor would the Principle of antient Prescriptionbe much morein her Favor, because although that Principle may be pleadedby her in the Case of that small Part of Lombardy which as the Duchy of Milan has long been connectedwith the Imperial Crown,,yet that Principle would be strongly invoked against the Republic of Venice, a State which has played a distinguished Part in history during nearly Fourteen Centuries of Freedom, and the Austrian Title to which goesno further back than the Treaty of Vienna and its transfer to her by Buonaparte by the Treaty of Campo Formio. H[er] M[ajesty's] Government] have good Reason to believe theAdministrator the German that of Empirehimself anAustrianArch Duke[John], andknownto bepassionately attachedto the Statewhich wasthe Country of his Birth and the Residence wherehe haspassed greaterPart of a long the life, is strongly opinionthat Austriaoughtto Emancipate of Lombardy;and if H[er] Mfajesty's]Government] are not

misinformed same that opinion prevails Extensively many in

Parts of Germany.

H[er] M[ajesty's]Government]would earnestly entreat

the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t to take thesemattersinto its most

serious earlyConsideration; if it should but and uponReflection arrive now at the SameConclusion to which it had come



some months ago when M. de Hummelauer presented his second Memorandum there are many obvious and weighty
Reasons on account of which it would be most desirable that

the P[leni] P[otentiaries] whom the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t

is about instructed to send to the Conference at once to make known of mediation the Intentions should be of the

Austrian Gov[ernmen]t on this Subject. P[ALMERSTON] 7/11/48.



[The revolution in Hungary was the most remarkable event of 1848,for it had a unique and peculiar character. Perhapsfor that
reason Palmerston's policy towards it was then, and is now,

frequently misunderstood. Except in some aspectsit was not a liberal revolution; it wasthe uprising of a very strangenation which had a strangely conservative character. The Magyars ruled the Kingdom of Hungary, but formed lessthan one half of the population. The other and larger half was Slav or Ruman and antiMagyar in both cases. But the Magyars proper were a strongly
legal and conservative nation, who had inherited from ancient

times a constitution and a sturdy tradition of self-government.

Thus in its early stagesthe Hungarian revolution was a demand

for what we should call Dominion Status or ResponsibleGovernment. But there was this difference. The Kingdom of Hungary

was older than the Habsburgs or Austria and, in demanding selfgovernment, the Magyars were demanding not the revolutionary

rights of man but the historic rights of Hungary. It was only by

a series of accidents that they were driven into a revolutionary position. What Hungary asked was not a constitution, cc which they had possessed since the days of Magna Carta", but freedom
to work it.

On 15 March 1848the Emperor Ferdinand, in his capacity of

King of Hungary, conceded freedom of the press and responsible government. These reforms were in action in April. The Hungarian

executivebecamepatriotic and national, and the German bureaucracy were expelled. It looked as if the Hungarians might still remain conservative. Kossuth, however, an orator of burning

power, a real revolutionist, formed the idea of supporting a liberal

and united Germany, thus checkmating Habsburg absolutism or
reaction. To this movement the reactionaries of Vienna were

naturally opposed,and they found ways of exciting opposition to

the Magyar in the discontented Slavs and Rumans of Hungary.

At the end of October a Slav Imperialist army united with a


German one in front of revolutionary Vienna. They entered it and

reaction triumphed. In the first days of October the Vienna

reactionaries had already dissolved the Hungarian Parliament

and senttroopsagainstKossuthand the RevolutionaryGovern-* ment. They found willing alliesin the Slavsof the Hungarian Kingdom,who wereonly too delighted attacktheir Magyar to
masters. In Decemberthe Emperor Ferdinand was removed and
from being over.

FranzJoseph succeeded. struggle The wenton and Budapest was recaptured the Austrians January 1849,But it wasvery far by in
Kossuth was an avowed revolutionary, yet the Hungarians had

a strong casefor resistance constitutionalgrounds.They took on a legal and a quite defensible that Ferdinandwas still King line of Hungary. Schwarzenberg replied to this by publishing a constitution octroyde March 1849)which, in effect, annihilated (4 the Hungarian constitution. It was six centuries old, and the promises Vienna to observe had recentlybeen again broken. of it The patriotism and valour >ofthe Magyarswere displayed to the full. At first they had some successes Kossuth finally issued and a declaration of Independence (14 April) declaring the perjured Habsburgs deposed. This bold step thoroughly frightened the Austrians, who appealed to Russia for aid. It was known on ii May that the Tsar would give it. Against the well-equipped Russian army resistancewas hopeless,though a gallant struggle continued. Finally on 13 August the main Hungarian army surrendered and by October all resistanceended. Long before that executionsand a reactionary reign of terror had begun. Palmerston's attitude to all this was incomprehensible Hunto garians.That is intelligible enough. Kossuthsawthat Palmerston wasanti-Austrianin Italy and wishedthe Austriansto be expelled from the plainsof Venetia and Lombardy. But it was a great mistaketo suppose that Palmerston anti-Austrian in Hungary was and wishedto expelAustria from the plains betweenthe Danube and the Theiss. Palmerston feared that, if Austria went out of Hungary,Russia wouldcome it. Russia-alreadyestablished into in Moldaviaand Wallachia-would add Hungary,with its halfSlav population, to her other domains,dominate the Danube from its mouth to Budapest and control all Eastern Europe,

Palmerston couldnot therefore for anindependent wish Hungary*

That is why he steadily declined all official intercourse with

Kossuth refused to interest and even himself thequestion, in until Russia intervened. Russia Palmerston's was bogey, her interso
ventionmadehis interestin Hungaryacute. Russiawas one thing to which Palmerston was alive, British

public opinionwas another, and Britishpublic opinionhad gradually stirred thegallant been by resistancethe Magyars. of Palmerston therefore conciliate had to British public opinion and,





so far as possible, to restrain Russia. He knew it was no good protesting against her intervention. He refused point blank to do so, as Doc. 43 shews. He had, in fact, anticipated the possibility of Russian intervention by somemonths. The increase of Russian forces in Moldavia and Wallachia, plus at least one incursion
across the frontier, had warned him of what was likely to happen.

He thought that Russian intervention meant the restoration of Hungary to Austria intact, and that he could not but approve. Doc. 43 indeed representsPalmerston asregretting Russian intervention. But in this, as in so many other cases,he may have had regard to future publication. Other dispatches suggestthat he
accepted, if he did not welcome, Russian intervention.*
Palmers ton's idea seems to have been to reconcile the British

public to the Russian intervention by inducing Austria to give generous terms to Hungary. A large-hearted amnesty, plus a restoration of her constitution, would, he thought, solve all difficulties. These are the ideasbehind the famous speechhe delivered on 21 July 1849, of which extracts are reproduced in Doc. 44. It never attained the popular repute of his Civis Romanics Sum speechof 1850, but is, diplomatically, of far greater interest. He puts the casefor the survival of Austria on the ground of British interests, he expresses hope that Hungary may receiveher old the constitution. Politically the speech was a masterpiece, for its sentiments brought the liberals to his side, while its realism won
over the conservatives.

By August the struggle was over and in September the bloody and brutal reprisalsbegan.They were of a very horrible character. Noble Hungarian womenwerefloggedon their bare backs,thirteen Generalswere shot, scores patriots died on the scaffold. All this of causeddeep indignation to Palmerston. He thought such acts as politically foolish as they were barbarously cruel. "The Austrians
are really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves by the
undeserved name of civilised men. Their atrocities in Galicia, in

Italy, in Hungary, in Transylvania are only to be equalled by the

proceedings of the- negro race in Africa and Haiti."f He was therefore delighted to receivedelegationsor petitions from Upper
Tooting or Gamden Town, protesting against theseinhumanities,

or describing the Emperors of Austria and Russia as "odious and

detestable murderers and assassins". The Queen, as usual, pro-

tested, but Palmerston had gauged the public aright. If protests from fifty British cities could teach Austria humanity, he would have rejoiced. If Austria would not give Hungary homerule, then
one day Austria would suffer as many calamities as she had in 1848. Meanwhile Austria was anchored once more as an element in the balance of power.]
* Several are quoted in G. Sproxton, op. cit. 82-6. Ashley, Life, i, 139, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 9 September 1849.



Document 43. Palmerston refuses protestagainst to Russia's armed intervention Hungary,17 May 1849* in

I haveto acquaintyou that Her Majesty'sGovernment

approve language the whichyouheldto CountNcsselrode, as reported your despatch 151,of the sd instant, in No.
relativeto themilitary assistance be affordedby Russia to to

Much as Her Majesty'sGovernment regret this interferenceof Russia,the causes which have led to it, and the effectswhich it may produce, they nevertheless have not consideredthe occasionto be one which at presentcalls for

anyformalexpression the opinions GreatBritain on the of of




Palmerston declaresAustria's existenceto be

essential theEuropean to balance power,21 July 1849! of

...Austria has been our ally. We have been allied with Austria in most important European transactions; and the remembrance the alliance ought undoubtedly to create in of the breastof everyEnglishman,who hasa recollection of the

historyof hiscountry,feelings respect of towardsa Powerwith whomwehavebeen suchalliance.It is perfectlytrue, that in in the courseof thoserepeatedalliances,Austria, not from any fault of hers, but from the pressure irresistible necessity, of wasrepeatedly compelled departfrom the alliance,, to to and breakthe engagements which shehad bound herselfto us. by Wedid not reproach with yieldingto the necessity the her of moment; and no generousmind would think that those circumstances ought in any degreeto diminish or weaken
the tie which former transactions must create between the

Governments twocountries. there higher ofthe But are and

largerconsiderations, whichoughtto render maintenance the

oftheAustrian empire object solicitude every an of to English

statesman. Austriais a most importantelement thebalance in
* Palmerston toBuchanan, 141, May1849, 65/361. No. 17 P.O.
t Hans. Deb., Ser.,cvn, 808-15. 3rd



of Europeanpower. Austria standsin the centreof Europe, a barrier againstencroachment the one side,and against on invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenanceand integrity of Austria as a great European Power; and therefore anything which tendsby direct, or even remote, contingency, to weaken and to cripple Austria, but still more to reduce her from the position of a first-rate Power to that of a secondary State, must be a great calamity to Europe, and onewhich everyEnglishmanought to deprecate,
and to try to prevent.... I firmly believe that in this war between Austria and Hungary, there is enlisted on the side

of Hungary the hearts and the soulsof the whole peopleof

that country.* I believe that the other races, distinct from the Magyars, have forgotten the former feuds that existed between them and the Magyar population, and that the greater portion of the people have engagedin what they consider a great national contest. It is true, asmy honourable and gallant friend has stated, that Hungary hasfor centuries been a State which, though united with Austria by the link of the Crown, has nevertheless been separate and distinct from Austria by its own complete constitution. That constitution has many defects; but some of those defects were, I believe,remediednot long ago,and it is not the only ancient constitution on the continent that was susceptibleof great improvement. There were means,probably, within the force and resources of the constitution itself to reform it; and it might have been hoped that thoseimprovementswould have been carried into effect. But, so far as I understand the matter, I take the presentstate of the caseto be this: without going into the detailsof mutual complaintsasto circumstances

which have taken place within the last year, or year and a half, I take the questionthat is now to be fought for on the plains of Hungary to be this-whether Hungary shall continue to maintain its separate nationalityasa distinctkingdom, and with a constitution of its own; or whether it is to
* A notablemistake. Large numbers Serbsand Croats of foughtunder Jellacicagainst Hungaryand the Rumans Transylvania the Slavs of and rose
in rebellion against her.



be incorporated moreor less the aggregate in constitution that is to be given to the Austrian empire? It is a most painful sight to seesuchforcesas are now arrayedagainst Hungary proceeding a warfraughtwith suchtremendous to consequences a question on that it might have beenhoped
would be settledpeacefully. It is of the utmost importance to Europe,that Austria shouldremaingreat and powerful; but it is impossible disguise to from ourselves that, if the war is to be fought out, Austria must thereby be weakened, because, the one hand, if the Hungarians should be sucon cessful, and their success should end in the entire separation of Hungaryfrom Austria, it will beimpossible to see not that this will be sucha dismemberment the Austrian empireas of will prevent Austria from continuing to occupy the great positionshehas hitherto held amongEuropean Powers.If, on the other hand, the war being fought out to the uttermost, Hungary shouldby superiorforces entirely crushed,Austria be in that battle will have crushedher own right arm. Every field that is laid wasteis an Austrian resourcedestroyedeveryman that perishes upon the field amongthe Hungarian
ranks, is an Austrian soldier deducted from the defensive forcesof the empire. Laying aside those other most obvious considerations that have beentouched upon asto the result of

a successful war, the success which is brought about by of foreign aid-laying that wholly aside,it is obvious that even the success Austria, if it is simply a success force, will of of
inflict a deep wound on the fabric and frame of the Austrian

empire. It is therefore muchto be desired, simplyon not the principleof general humanity,but on the principleof soundEuropean policy, and from the mostfriendly regard to the Austrian empireitself-it is, I say, devoutly to be wished this greatcontest be broughtto a terminathat may tion by some amicable arrangement between contending the parties, which shall theone on hand satisfy national the feelings of theHungarians, ontheotherhand,notleaveto Austria and another a larger and Poland withinherempire It is most desirable foreignnations that shouldknow that,,on the one hand, England sincerely is desirous preserve maintain to and



peace-that we entertainno feelings hostilitytowards of any nationin the world-that we wishto be on the mostfriendly footingwith all-that we havea deepinterestin the preservation of peace, because we are desirous to carry on with advantagethose innocent and peacefulrelations of commerce that we know must be injured by the interruption of our friendly relations with other countries:but, on the otherhand, it is also essentialfor the attainment of that object, and even essentialfor the protection of that commerceto which we attach somuch importance, that it shouldbe known and well understood by every nation on the face of the earth, that we are not disposedto submit to wrong, andthat the maintenance of peaceon our part is subjectto the indispensable condition that all countriesshall respectour honour and our dignity, and shall not inflict any injury upon our interests. Sir, I do not think that the preservation of peaceis in any degreeendangered by the expressionof opinion with regard to the transactions in Hungary or other countries. I agree with those who think-and I know there are many in this country who entertain the opinion-that there are two objects which England ought peculiarly to aim at. One is to maintain peace; the other is to count for somethingin the transactions of the world-that it is not fitting that a country occupying sucha proud positionasEngland-that a countryhavingsuch various and extensiveinterests, should lock herselfup in a simple regard to her own internal affairs, and should be a passiveand mute spectatorof everythingthat is going on around. It is quite true that it may be said, "Your opinions are but opinions,and you express them againstour opinions, who have at our commandlarge armiesto back them-what are opinionsagainstarmies? Sir, my answer opinions " is, are

stronger than armies. Opinions, they arefounded truth if in and justice, will in the end prevail againstthe bayonets of infantry, the fire of artillery, and the chargesof cavalry. ThereforeI say, that armedby opinion,if that opinionis pronounced with truth andjustice,weareindeed strong, and

in the endlikely to make opinions our prevail;andI think thatwhatis happening thewhole on surface thecontinent of



of Europe,is a proof that this expression mine is a truth. of Why, for a great many yearsthe Governments Europe of imagined theycouldkeepdownopinionby forceof arms,and that by obstructing progressive improvement they would preventthat extremityof revolutionwhich wasthe objectof
their constant dread. We gave an opinion to the contrary effect,and we havebeenblamed for it. We have beenaccused of meddling with matters that did not concern us, and of affronting nationsand Governments giving our opinion by as to what was likely to happen; but the result has proved, that if our opinions had been acted upon, great calamities would have been avoided. These very Governments that used to say, "The man we hate, the man we have to fear, is the moderateReformer; we carenot for your violent Radical, who proposes suchviolent extremes that nobody is likely to join him-the enemy we are most afraid of is the moderate Reformer,because is sucha plausibleman that it is difficult he to persuade peoplethat his counsels would lead to extreme consequences-thereforelet us keep off, of all men, the moderateReformer, and let us prevent the first step of improvement,becausethat improvement might lead to extremities and innovation/'-those Governments, those Powers of Europe, have at last learned the truth of the opinions expressed Mr. Canning, "That thosewho have checked by improvement, because is innovation, will one day or other it be compelled to accept innovation, when it has ceasedto be improvement." I say,then, that it is our duty not to remain passive spectatorsof events that in their immediate consequences affect other countries,but which in their remote and certain consequences sure to come back with disasare trous effect upon us; that, so far as the courtesies of inter-

nationalintercourse may permit us to do, it is our duty, especially whenour opinionis asked, it hasbeenon many as occasions which we havebeenblamedfor giving it, to on state opinions, our founded theexperience thiscountryon of anexperience mighthave that been, oughtto havebeen, and an exampleto lessfortunate countries. At the sametime, I am quitereadyto admitthat interference oughtnot to be




carried to the extent of endangeringour relations with other countries. There are cases like that which is now the subject of our discussion,of one Power having in the exerciseof its own sovereign rights invited the assistance another Power; of and, however we may lament that circumstance, however we may be apprehensivethat therefrom consequences great of dangerand evil mayflow, still we are not entitled to interpose in any manner that will commit this country to embark in thosehostilities. All we canjustly do is to take advantageof any opportunities that may present themselvesin which the counselsof friendship and peace may be offered to the contending parties.. . .Sir, to supposethat any Government of England can wish to excite revolutionary movements in any part of the world-to suppose that any Government of England can have any other wish or desire than to confirm and maintain peace between nations, and tranquillity and harmony between Governments and subjects, showsreally a degree of ignorance and folly which I never supposedany public man could have been guilty of, which may do very well for a newspaper article, but which it astonishesme to find is made the subject of a speechin Parliament.




[Palmerston proved "a daring pilot in extremity". He had steered the British ship with wonderful skill through the stormy waters of 1848-9. What is more, by August 1849 all seemedover. Palmerston had averted war from England during the stormiest

of all periods for Europe. Yet the crisis for England was still to
come. Within two months Palmerston had actually to risk war in defence of a weaker State against the two greatest Powers of Eastern Europe.

The question that arosewas apparently a trivial one, yet it brought four Powersto the verge of war. When nervesare frayed and passions high, slight incidents often produce seriousresults. In the sameway a fly or an insectmay cause disasterby obstructing the delicate mechanismof a great engine. In this casethe quarrel wasabout political refugees had fled to Turkey. Oneof them who was the Hungarian revolutionary,Kossuth,who carriedwith him the historic Hungarian crown and buried it on the bordersof his
native land. In addition to Hungarian refugeesthere were many



Poles,someof them Russian subjects like Generals Bernand

Dembinski, and all of them revolutionaries. The Emperors of
Russia and Austria thirsted for the blood of revolutionaries and

demandedthe surrenderof their rebelsfrom Constantinople. The Turks did not feel at all inclined to surrender thesepolitical

refugees. Theyhavea traditionalfriendship Hungarians for and

so did not want to surrender them to the Habsburg. They well
understood that the Poles are the enemies of the Russians and did

not want to surrender them to the Tsar. They knew that to surrender either was to abdicate their independencefor ever. But in the last resort the Turks were weak and knew that they could not resist Russia and Austria without help from outside. "The Sultan", wrote Stratford Canning, is "accessible to secret information and he is always more or lessfearful of Russia."* The Tsar

senthim a stately letter (which was presented 7 September), on askinghim to give up the Polishrefugees. "Russia", he explained, "has intervenedin Hungary in virtue of the same.. .principle which was present when I spontaneously offered aid to Your Majesty to establish order [in Moldavia and Wallachia] last year."f Could the Sultan,or dare the Sultan,resistthe pleading of this masterful protector? On 16 SeptemberStratford Canning reported that the Austrian and Russianrepresentatives had sentperemptory notesdemanding the surrenderof the "rebels". They had, said he, the full intention of "consigning the most illustrious to the Executioner". If they were not surrenderedthey would break off diplomatic relations with the Porte. The Ambassadors England and France both of advised the Porte to stand firm and not surrender the refugees. They declaredthat the Austro-Russiandemandswere not justified by previous treaties. But they could not of course pledge the Governments France and England to the support of the Turks of
without orders from home. So the decision had to be made in
Paris and London.

Palmerstonseems have had no doubt as to the decision, and to

for oncethe Queenwaswith him. Shegenerallywas for resisting

the pretensions of Russia. The Cabinet also concurred and on

6 Octoberthe decision was takenand embodied a dispatch. in

The Turks were to be supported, the British Mediterranean squadron was to go to the Dardanelles, and the French Govern-

ment to be askedto sendtheir fleet as well.J Such was the im

* StratfordCanning Palmerston, 257,25August1849, to No. RO. 78/778. t Stratford Canning Palmerston, 271,5 September F.O.78/779. to No. 1849,
440-2) with one passage omitted. But it is theredated6 Octoberby mistake. "V.R." againstit in pencil. Cp. Temperley,England theNear East, The and

I Thisdispatch printed theBlue is in Book & P.,[1851.!*, [1324], (A. tvnr,

The originalis in P.O. 195/325, Palmerston Canning, 241,7 October. to No. It is endorsed "Reed Oct. 24 Waring". The draft dispatch (P.O.78/771) has Crimea, [1936], 264,wherethepassage suppressed the BlueBookis given. in




portance of the dispatch that three couriers carried copies of it by different routes. A gallant courier, who half killed himself in

the effort, arrived on the 26th with one copy. He had made a record ride from Belgrade, but he lost the race by two days. The one that actually reached Constantinople first was that carried by MessengerWaring, who came by steamerfrom Marseilles and arrived on the 24th.* This dispatch carried the day. Stratford Canning bore it exultantly to the Sultan, saying" the cause honour and humanity of has been vindicated". In fact the Tsar had already given way at St Petersburgh. Russia and Austria, involved as they were elsewhere, had no desire to try conclusions with the Franco-British

fleet. They withdrew their pretensions,the Turks were triumphant and the Hungarian refugeeswere saved. The whole incident is a good example of Palmerstonian diplomacy. By his skilful managementhe had kept public opinion behind him throughout the whole period. It was now that he had
his reward. The British Cabinet saw that, if Turkey once yielded

up the refugeesat the demand of two powerful foreign despots, her independence would be gone. They were determined to protect the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan. The

British public,'not understanding rather subtlepoint, was this

determined to protect gallant refugees against alien tyrannical

despots. As Palmerstonwrote: 'eThe Sultan has clearly right upon his side. That is the universal opinion of all men of all parties, and of all newspapers in this country, "f With this backing Palmerston knew he would be triumphant. But he did not, in
fact, believe that Russia and Austria would fight. He thought that cca little manly firmness" would do the trick. And it did. So

Palmerston concluded the year 1849and his handling of the whole problem of those stormy years with a spectacularsuccess. Docs. 45 and 46 are private letters. They have been selected as being, among all the papers of the period, the most revealing
as to Palmerston's views on the crisis.]

Document 45. Palmerston communicates decision support his to Turkey against Russia and Austria over the Hungarian Refugees, October 6 1849^

I sendyou a despatchto be communicatedto Schwarzenberg. We have endeavoured make it as civil as possible, to so as not to leave him any ground for saying that he cannot
* Lane Poole,Life of Stratford Canning, [1888], n, 197-9, is a little misleading.
, t Private letter to Lord Bloomfield, 6 October 1849, quoted in Sproxton, op. cit. 126-7.

J Palmerstonto Ponsonby(Vienna), 6 October 1849,Ashley, Life, i, 153-5.

The real ruler of Austria.



yield to threats.Wemakenone;andin my verbal communications with Brunnow and Colloredo* I have said nothing about our squadron being orderedup to the Dardanelles. But it is right thatjw shouldknow and understandthat the Government have come unanimously to the determination of takingthis matterup in earnest, and of carrying it through. We haveresolved supportTurkey, let who will be against to her in this matter. It is painful to seethe Austrian Government led on in its blindness, its folly, and its passionate violenceinto a courseutterly at variance with the established policy of Austria. If there is one thing more than another which Austria ought to do, it is to support Turkey against Russia;and hereis Schwarzenberg, his fondness bullying in for the weak, co-operatingwith the Russian Government to humble Turkey, and to lay her at the feet of Russia. But you understandthesequestionsso thoroughly that you
will no doubt have been able to lay before the Austrian
Government and Camarilla the full extent of the mistake

they are making. They are besidesuniting England and Francein joint action, which is not what Austrian Governmentshavehitherto beenparticularly anxiousto do. I cannot believe that the two Governments will push this matter further. The rights of the caseare clearly againstthem. Both Colloredo and Brunnow, though I beg they may not be quoted, acknowledgethat the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is required of him. Metternich,t I am told, says it is a great mistake. What could Austria hope to gain by a war with Turkey, supported,asshewould be, by England and France? Austria would loseher Italian provinces,to which sheseems attach to suchunduevalue, and sheneverwould seethem again.. *. I cannot conceive that, in the presentstate of Germany,it

would suit Austria to provokea war with Englandand

France; and I do not think that such a war would be of

any advantage evento Russia

shouldbe studiedin Sproxton, cit, 126-7. op.

* Respectively Russian Austrian the and diplomatic representatives atLondon, "f The ex-Austrian Chancellor nowan exileresiding England, was in t Thesimilarprivateletterto Bloomfield Petersburgh),October1849, (St 6



Document 46. Palmerston moralizes after the crisishasended, 28 October 1849* ., . All things however have turned out well. The English Government and nation have shewn a spirit, a generosity, and a couragewhich doesus all high honour. We have drawn France to follow in our wake, after much division and difference of opinion in the French Cabinet and public. We have forced the haughty [Russian] autocrat to go back from his arrogant pretensions; we have obliged Austria to forego another opportunity of quaffing her bowl of blood; and we have saved Turkey from being humbled down to absolute prostration. All this will be seenand felt by Europe; all this should be borne in mind by ourselves, and ought to be treasured up in grateful remembrance by Turkey; but all this weought not to boast of, and on the contrary we must let our baffled Emperorspassasquietly and decentlyaspossible over the bridge by which they are going to retreat.
* Private letter to Stratford Canning, 28 October 1849, Lane Poole, Life of Stratford Canning,[1888], n, 202. An article on Great Britain and Kossuth by D. A. Janossy, with many extracts from British documents, is in Archivum

Europae Centro-Orientalis Lukinic, Budapest[1937], Tome in, 53-190. ed.





[When Lord Palmerston's resignationwas demandedin December 1851, QueenVictoria, after accepting Lord Granville
as his successor, askedLord John Russellas Premier to get the new ministerto preparea generalstatement foreign policy. of
This was done to commit the Cabinet in future in regard to the

manner whichsuch in policywasto be "practically applied".Lord John,whodid notwishto besocommitted, repliedonDecember 29 with studious generalities, "it is verydifficult to lay downany e.g. principles fromwhich deviations may not frequefitlybe made".*
He instructed Lord Granville in the very driest style-as follows: cel sendyou a letter from the Queen which imposesupon you

the duty of preparinga programme. I have told H.M. that it is not the policy of this country to make engagements except on a
view of the circumstances of the moment and that any rule may

be broken through.f That the bestrule after all is to do to othersas we wish they should do unto us. Still you may write a sketch of what you conceiveour foreign policy should be."J The memorandum, of which the text is here subjoined, is only an unsigned draft and was perhaps not even presented to Lord John Russellor to the Cabinet. It was evidently not presented to the Queen for there is no copy at Windsor, A further memo-

randum,for reasons shortlyto be explained, apparentlynever was

even drafted.

CharlesGreville, to whom Granville shewedhis draft, described

it as "a seriesof commonplaces", there is one section in but which real changewas foreshadowed. Choice of men of ability
* Thesetwo documents in Queen are Victoria's Letters, A. G. Benson ed. and

Lord Esher, Ser.5 of Chap. Cheap [1908], 351-3. ist end xx. ed., 11, f Hereis an illustration.He proposed adopta certaininterpretation to of
a Treaty of 1854betweenTurkey and Sardinia "even if the Law of Nations

andthe general necessity everyGovernment providein particularcases of to 'or its security not override Treaty" (.P.O. did that 195/663, JohnRussell Lord
to Sir H. Bulwer,No. 219,8 April 1861). J Russell Granville,29 December to 1851.

Greville, Journal, [1885], Part,in, 442-3, 14January 2nd ap. 1852,






and stricter disciplinefor ambassadors meant something novel, and "new measures securethe efficiencyof those" entering to
diplomacy were a revolution. They portended testsby examination "no doubt" to "please the educational propensitiesof the Prince [Consort]".* Even the "commonplaces " are worthy of study, for they conceal
a humour as dry as that of Lord John himself. There are hints at

the overbearing conduct of Palmerston, and an obvious reference

to the Don Pacifico caseand the CivisBritannicus policy. By Sum implication also Lord Granville disclaims active interference in the internal affairs of other nations of the Palmerstoniantype. On the other hand, however, the principles of Mr Cobden are
condemned in the assertion that "non-intervention" does not

always mean a policy of negation or Free-Trade a policy of aggression. Apparently Granville proposes steerthe Cabinet ship to between the Palmerstonian Scylla and the Cobdenite Charybdis. The practical application of his generalprinciples seems have to given Lord Granville pause for thought, and he had apparently not written a line of his further memorandum by the third week
in February.
The draft

By that time it was unnecessary to write it, for

that follows is therefore one of the few memorials of

Palmerston carried a motion against the Government on the soth,

and Lord John Russell handed in his resignation on the 25th, one of the weakest of ministries.]


47, Granville'sGeneral Statement ForeignPolicy, of 12 January 1852!

In obedienceto Her Majesty's gracious Commandstransmitted by you, I will endeavourto state, altho' very imperfectly, the views of Her Majesty's present Government with respectto the Foreign Policy of Great Britain. I will point out what I conceive to be the objects of that Policy, the principlesof action,by which those objectsareto be obtained, and the application of thoseprinciples to our relationswith the principal countries of Europe.

In the opinion of the presentCabinet,it is the duty and

the interest of this country, having possessions scatteredover

the whole globe,and priding itself on its advanced stateof civilization, to encourage moral, intellectual and physical
progressamong all other nations.
* Greville,Journal,[1885], 2nd Part, m, 442-3, ap. 14January 1852.

t PteGranville Papers, Granvilleto Lord John Russell, London,12January




Forthispurpose Foreign the Policy Great of Britain should

be marked justice,moderation, self-respect, this by and and

country should herrelations other in with States byothers do

asit wouldbe doneby. While the Cabinetdo not believe that all considerations a highercharacter to besacrificed of are

to thepushing manufactures anymeans every our by into possible oftheglobe, considering great corner yet the natural advantages our ForeignCommerce., the powerful of and
meansof civilization it affords, one of the first duties of a

British Gov[ernmen]tmust alwaysbe to obtain for our Foreign Tradethat security whichis essential its success. to Britishsubjects all classes, of engaged innocentpursuits, in
are entitled abroad as well as at home to the protection of

their Gov[ernmen]t. Where they have been treated with injustice, theyhavea right to expectthat redress shouldbe demandedin strong but dignified language, followed if necessary corresponding by measures; where they may, by
their ownwantonfolly or misconduct,havegot iilto difficulties in a ForeignLand, they haveno right to expect assistance, and even where they unwittingly but imprudently subject themselves the penal lawsof the country in which they find to themselves, canonly claim thosegoodoffices,the efficacy they of which must dependupon the friendlinessof our relations with the country in which the difficulty has arisen. The Cabinet adhere to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries,as one tending most to maintain the dignity of the Crown, the security of the Country, and to strengthen lastinginfluenceof this Nation the upon the opinion of the world. They do not attach to the word "non-intervention" the meaningimplied by some who useit, viz. that Diplomacy is become obsolete, and that it is unnecessary this country for

to know,or takea part in what passes other countries. in H.M.'s Gov[ernmen]tought to be informed accuratelyand immediately, theirAgents, every by of importanteventwhich
may arise.

With regard to occurrences likely to have international consequences,general canuniformlybe applied. In no rule



each case,the Gov[ernmen]t must exerciseits own discretion, whether it shall interfere at once, or remain aloof till its arbitration or good officesbe required. The latter coursemay

often be advisablewhen, as at present,opinion abroad is in extremes,and the Foreign Policy of England has obtained, whether justly or unjustly, the reputation of interfering too
much. It will also often be found advisable to combine with

other great Powers, when no sacrifice of principle is required, to settle the disputeswhich may arise between other

With respect to those internal arrangements of other

countries, such as the establishment of Liberal Institutions

and the reduction of Tariffs, in which this country has an indirect interest, H.M.'s Representatives ought to befurnished with the views of H.M.'s Gov[ernmen]t on each subject, and the arguments best adapted to support those views, but they should at the same time be instructed to press these views

only whenfitting opportunities occur, whentheiradvice and

and assistance required. The intrusion of advice which is are suspected to be not wholly disinterested, never can have as much effect as opinions given at the request of the person
who is to be influenced.

With referenceto the support to be given to those Countries which have adopted Liberal Institutions similar in Liberality to our own, it will be the endeavour of H.M.'s Gov[ernmen]t
to cultivate the most intimate relations with them.

It will be the duty of H.M.'s Gov[ernmen]t to inform them of all that may exposethem to danger, and to give them, when required, frank and judicious advice. It will exert its influence to dissuadeother Powersfrom encroaching on their territory, or attempting to subvert their institutions, and there may occur casesin which the honour and good faith of this country will require that it should support suchAllies with more than friendly assurances. H.M.'s Cabinet believe that every assistance,within the one competency Gov[ernmen]t should be given to all those of undertakingswhich tend to promote a more rapid interchange of knowledge and opinions among various countries; they




believe that such increased intercourse will tend more than

anything to promote Peace the world. else the of

The Cabinetis alsoof opinion that new measures should be taken to securethe efficiency of those who enter into the

diplomatic career, whoarepromoted that professionand in

that a stricter disciplineshould be establishedamong the membersof each mission,and that those personswho combine those personal qualities which engage respect and popularitywith activity in obtaininginformation,and zeal in executing instructions, their shouldbeselected represent to Her Majesty,at the different Courts. I will now endeavourto showhow the principles which I havelaid down as adoptedby H.M.'s Gov[ernmen]t can be appliedto our relationswith the different EuropeanNations and the United States;but it must be remembered that one
unforeseen event may, like a move on a chessboard,necessitate perfectly different arrangements.*





[In view of the implied condemnation of Palmerstonian policy in the "General Statement", Doc. 48 is amusing. Granville, in

one of the very few decisionsof his brief Ministry, advocated interference Spain,with the view of encouraging in constitutional tendencieson true Palmerstonian lines. In point of fact, such interference not required,but the fact that it wascontemplated was is instructive. This was all against the Canningite tradition. Another instruction was thoroughly Canningite. Lord Granville, fearingapossible Spanish attackon Portugal,stated;"The Spanish Government well aware that wereany Spanish Military Force to be directed to enter Portugalwithout the consent,and against Will, of the Constitutional the Organsof that Country, G[rea]t Britain would be bound by Faith, by Honour, and by regard HerownInterests, for practically fulfil theobligations to imposedupon Her by the stipulations those[Anglo-Portuguese] of
Treaties."!] * Wehaveto thankthe Dowager Countess Granvilleand the present Lord
Granville for permission publishthe text of this memorandum, to and Lord
Fitzmaurice for advice and information in connexion with the incident. He

published his Lifeof 2nd in EarlGranville, [1905],I, 49-52,a carefulsummary, with comments, thememorandum, LordJohnRussell's of and letterreproduced above in ibid,i, 49. Section was is 21 originally published Camb. Journ., in Hist.
n, No. 3, [1928], 298-301.

t Granville Howden, 23, 31January1852, to No, P.O.72/801.



Document 48. Granville advises Spaintopursue a Constitutional Policy,31 January 1852* Your Lordship'sreportsrespecting stateof thingsat the the Madrid and the fears which you have expressed organic of changesin the systemof Gov[ernmen]t in Spain, have caused someanxiety to H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t. I have to instruct Your Lordship to state to the Spanish Gov[ernmen]t, that while H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t do not think it right or expedient to tender advice to other countries, as to the changeswhich may be adopted in them
with respect to their internal administration, yet the very intimate nature of our relations with Spain, and the share which we happily havehad in establishingthe presentdynasty on the Throne, would make us deeplyregret that any changes
should be made which would affect the constitutional cha-

racter of theJSpanishGov[ernmen]t, with which the reign of H[er] Gath[olic] Maj[est]y has hitherto been identified, and
which was one of the main considerations which induced

H[er] Majesty's Gov[ernmen]t to give assistance Queen to Isabella in the long continued struggle with Don Carlos. You will alsopoint out, that should this differencebetween Her Cath[olic] M[ajest]y and Don Carlos be effaced, the partisansof Don Carloswould enter upon a renewedstruggle with advantages they do not now possess. the other hand, On the friends of the Constitution would no longer defend the
Throne with the zeal and enthusiasm they have hitherto




[On thefall ofRussell's Government, theresultofPalmerston's as

motion in the Commons, Derby came into power. On 27 February

1852 Derbydelivered speech the Lords,obviously a in repudiating Palmerston'spolicy and especiallyhis expressions.He recommended "observing to all Foreign Powers-whether powerful or weak-a calm, temperate,deliberate and conciliatory courseof
* Granville to Howden (Madrid), No. 24, 31 January 1852. Enclosure in Granville to Sir H. Seymour, No. 45, 9 February 1852, P.O. 181/280.
Original text in P.O. 185/252.




conduct, in actsalone,but in wordsalso".* Again he not suggested: indulging vituperation intemperance "Not in and of language, submitting but equally the honourandjusticeof to

other countries the claim we should be the first to acknowledge

ourselves."t Aberdeen, isinteresting note,not only " entirely it to acquiesced" declared but therewasno "shadeof difference"
between him and Derby nor had been"for the last ten or twelve

years".JTherealincident, whichDerbyandAberdeen in had

mind,wasat theendof thereception Kossuth, of whenPalmerston receivedaddresses reflecting on the Tsar and the Austrian Emperorasmurderers assassins,] and Document 49. Malmesbury warns France against aggression against Switzerland, Marchi852 5

[Mentions the anxiety of the new Governmentas to a reportthat the Frenchintendto marchinto Switzerland,] After the Speeches respectively madeby the Earl of Derby and Lord John Russellat the openingof the presentParliament, neither the membersof the late, nor of the present Gov[ernmen]tof Her Majestycan be exposed the suspicion to of approvingvirulent strictures on the part of any National PressagainstGov[ernmen]tsin alliance with Great Britain; andit is needless add that H[er] M[ajesty's] Government] to can only look upon Socialist Doctrines as revolting in their nature; but H[er] M[ajesty's] Government] feel strongly that to occupyand [sic] Independent,and Neutral Country, with a Military Force for the Suppression such Strictures of and Doctrines, to establish entirely new Principle. is an
If admitted it will put an end to all the smaller States to

which it may in turn be applied,inasmuchas it will make their internalGovernment dependent upon the momentary

interest arbitrary and demands theirmorepowerful of neighbours.

.. .Thefirst object H[er] M[ajesty]'s of Gov[ernmen]t will be to preserve Peace Europe; believing an the of and that abstinence all interference from openly indirectlywith the or
* Hans.Deb.3rd Ser., cxix, 892.

t Ibid.893. j Ibidf9I2-I3. Malmesbury Gowley to (Paris), 9 Confidential,March1852. No. 5 Enclosure Malmesbury Sir H. Seymour, 14,16 March 18^2,F,0. in to No,
181/267. Originaltextin .P.O. 146/436.




choiceof nations asregardstheir own Gov[ernmen]tsbe these despotic or Constitutional, is the Policy most efficient for this result, they are not lessanxious to seethis courseadoptedby other countries, and especially by one whose alliance, and amity is so much valued by H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t as that of France: and if H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t may be allowed to speakin a frank and friendly spirit to that important Power, so remarkable for its History and love of* Glory, it would ask of France and of the remarkable man whom she has chosenfor her Leader, | whether under almost any circumstances a military movement initiated by so great a nation against the smallest of European Stateswill contribute to her Renown....


50. Malmesburfs advances Austria., to 15 March 1852^

...In proportion to the value which H[er] M[ajesty]'s Gov[ernmen]t place upon the maintenance of a cordial friendshipwith Austria, the oldestAlly of England,cemented not only by the tie of mutual interest, but by the recollection of past efforts in a commoncause,was the regret with which H[er] M[ajesty]'s present Gov[ernmen]t on succeedingto office, found that the result of the events of the last few years had been to substitute for these friendly relations a tone of mutual suspicion,if not of actual alienation, and to give to their diplomatic correspond ce a character quite at [en] variance with the dispositions which ought to subsist between

* The text in F.O. 146/436has "love of military Glory".

"f Napoleon III.

{ Malmesburyto Buol, 15 March 1852. Enclosure Malmesbury Sir in to H. Seymour(St Petersburgh), 22, 16 March 1852, No. F.O. 181/268. Original
text in F.O. 120/265.




[Aberdeen not been had fortunate a negotiator hisfirst as in diplomatic essay 1814, in whenhe dismayed Castlereagh by offering Rhine the frontier Napoleon; were negotiations to nor his in regard Portugal Greece to or happy duringhisfirst periodat theForeign Office.But hissecond periodwasmarked conby
siderablesuccess regard to the United States. In 1846 the in

Queen regretted theGovernment resigned internal that had for reasons whentheyhadachieved decisive just a success foreign in politics. Theyhadconcluded Oregon the Boundary Treatywith
In respect Europe to Aberdeen pacific.He tried to mainwas tain friendly relationswith, Francethrough his friend Princess
Lieven, who had the ear and the heart of Guizot. He did not indeed avoid a very seriousdispute with France over Tahiti in 1844,nor did he emerge from it with much credit. He was involvedin the early stages the sordid disputeabout the Spanish of Marriages can hardly be held responsible the denouement, but for and indeedmight perhapshaveavertedit.* But he had definite ideas in respectto conciliating two, at least, of the despotic powers Europe. of These beenalienated had bothby Palmerston's mannersand by his intervention in favour of constitutionalism in Portugal, Spain,Greeceand Belgium* Aberdeen,whosenature was gentle and trustful, believed that the establishment of personalrelations with the Ministers and Sovereigns these of Courts might really improve diplomatic intercourse. He was
an old friend of Metternich and Nesselrode, he knew Schwar-

the United States (1846),and solveda problemwhich had baffled all negotiators sincethe daysof Canning.

zenberg, he knew the Tsar. His attempts to improve relations

with Russia are describedabove (pp. 134-5); here we may confine ourselves those with Austria. The difficulty of reconto ciling political with personalfriendshipswas there strikingly revealed; but, paradoxically enough, the revelation came when Aberdeen ceased beForeign had to Minister. It wasonly in 1853 that the full developmentof his pro-Austrian policy was seen. Aberdeen sharplycriticized had Palmerston during 1849 his for attitudetowards Naples for his attemptsto preventits King and
* Gp.JonesParry, TheSpanish Marriages, [1936],passim.





from indulging in barbarous and savage reprisals towards his

subjects. Palmerston described his action later thus: "The

English Government went so far as to break off diplomatic relations with Naples avowedly on the ground of the tyrannical

Government of the late King."* Aberdeen had particularly attacked Palmerston for saying that such grievances, when unredressed, were the true causeof revolution. In 1850 he returned

to the charge, asserting that Palmerston had deeply injured Austria by his attacks on her in Italy, and that " Naples, like other
Governments, was entitled to manage her own internal affairs". In 1851 Aberdeen was suddenly confronted with an indictment of

Naples more severethan any that even Palmerston had made. It

came from a man who was no advocate of Italy, from a "stern unbending Tory", from a Peelite and a personal friend. And this
intervention was the first time that a name, afterwards renowned

throughout Europe, was mentioned with reverenceor enthusiasm

by Liberals.

Gladstone had gone to Naples on a pleasure trip, and had remained to investigate the state of the prisons and the treatment of political criminals. He sawwhat the crushing of the revolution had meant in Naples, he saw the fruits of King "Bomba's"

tyranny. The King had sworn to a constitution, promisingto all his subjects parliamentary government, freedom of speech, and
freedom from arbitrary arrest. The constitution was still in ex-

istence, though over half of the members of the Parliament thus

created were in gaol or in exile. These political prisoners were

loaded with chains, and, though usually professional men or learned persons,were coupled with the vilest felons.Thousandsof

political Liberals remained in gaol, without knowing their

offences, and without any prospect of being brought to trial. The

filthy and loathsome cells were seldom visited by officials and never by the doctors. Gladstone saw with his own eyesthe "sick

prisoners,men almostwith death in their faces". He estimated that some twenty thousand were in prison for political offences,
and modern research deems this figure too small and his other

chargesfully made out.|

Worse than all this cruelty and corruption, in Gladstone's

view, was the moral atmosphere. The judges, the police, the
Ministers were terrorized or vile. Not only was the practice of the

Government unspeakable, but the very doctrines it inculcated

were thoseof perjury. This truth was well illustrated not only in the publicationsenjoinedfor usein the schools, in the Official but Replyof theNeapolitan Government Gladstone's to assertions. That denounced"the unhappy constitution of 1848", and spokeof the
* G. & D. 22/20, PteRussell Papers.Palmerstonto Russell, 19June 1859.

t V. G. M. Trevelyan,Garibaldi theThousand, and [1909], Chap, in, passim.

He relates some horrors which Gladstone did not discover.




"warm desire" for its abolition. It declared that the constitution

wasobtained " agitators by alone". Yet "the King of Naples told the world,on the loth of February1848,that he grantedit
to [the constitution] the unanimous desire of Our Most beloved subjects'".*

Gladstone was determined that these iniquities should either end or be revealed to the world. He consulted Lord Aberdeen

and agreed with him to try private remonstrance the first in instance.Failing its success, Gladstone intimated that he would appeal thepublic. He prepared pamphlet the purpose. to a for Impressed the enormities by there related,Aberdeenat length
wrote to Prince Schwarzenberg(2 May). Gladstonewaited for a

reply for seven weeks, then became impatientand publishedhis

first letter to Lord Aberdeen, together with a second. Aberdeen

says that, two days afterthepublication, Schwarzenberg length at answered saying that he would make private remonstrances at Naples.Assoon, however, Schwarzenberg as heardof the appeal to the public, he declinedany further assistance and expressed
deep indignation at Gladstone'spamphlet. Doc. 51shews Aberdeen'sview of the situation after publication. Attached to it are a seriesof extracts shewing the sequel.]

Document 51. Aberdeen Gladstone theNaples and on Atrocities,October 1851 to December 1852^ You will probably have seenthe Neapolitan Statementin
the " Debate" in three numbers of which it is contained.

I would sendit to you, if I did not conclude that you must alreadyhavereceived I havenot yet seen in a pamphlet it. it form. The bestfeature of this Defence,is the tone in which it is written. It is dignified, and consideringthe nature of the accusation, sufficientlycourteous. This is calculatedto pro-

ducea favourable impression; although but somepointsare satisfactorily disposed the worst of your accusations of, remain unanswered.

The question foreigninterference delicate; because of is it mustbeoneof degree, mustinvolvea right of reciprocity. and

To besuccessful, anyGovernment with whichrespects itself,

Aberdeen, 203-5. Gladstone's, [1893], For v.Morley, Bkin, Chap. Life, VI. t PieGladstone Aberdeen Gladstone, October Papers. to 29 1851,
1851The ; Second dated July;andtheExamination Official Letter 14 ofthe Neapolitan fop!)>, January 29 1852. Aberdeen's of thecase, Stanmore, of For side v. Life



it is clear that friendly and-confidentialexpostulation offers the bestchance. As we havelost this in a great measure, we mustseehow we may bestnow go to work. For my part, I shallalways readyandhappyto do anythingin my power be calculatedto diminish human suffering,and to promote improvements in the Neapolitan, or any other Government, for which I am well awarethere may be amplegrounds* With your disinterestedand benevolentviews, I am sure you must be distressed the practical encouragement at given to the promotion of revolution throughout Europe ____
[After saying that he has just received a new letter from Prince Schwarzenberg,Aberdeen goeson] The substance is plain enough and pretty much what I anticipated. He says that the publicity given to these accusationshas entirely deprived him of the meansof exercisingany influence, even in the most confidential manner. He takes no notice of my appeal founded upon the admitted sufferingsof individuals, without reference to their guilt or innocence; but enters into a sort of justification of the Neapolitan Government.
[When Gladstone informed Aberdeen that he waspreparing an Examination the OfficialNeapolitan of ReplyAberdeen askedhim to
seethat it was not addressedto him. e' I cannot bear the thought

of seeing you practically united with Kossuth and Mazzini.'7* Gladstonereplied : " You need not be afraid, I think, of Mazzinism
from me, still less of Kossuthism, which means the other plus

imposture. Lord Palmerston and his nationalities55(i December 1852). Aberdeen closedthe controversy mournfully: "My only f difference with you relates to the mode of your proceeding."]

Gladstone Palmerston the OfficialNeapolitan and and Reply [What is interestingabout the whole matter is that "the mode of proceeding had beenforced on Gladstoneby the horrors of " Neapolitan rule. Though he wasstill far from supportingPalmerston'sidea of nationalism in Italy it was utterly impossibleto keep silence on such enormities. Here was a man with a respectfor governments "as the representatives a public, nay of a Divine of authority", denouncinga government termsthat evenPalmerin
ston had never used. "It is such violation of human and written
stone'sreply is in Morley, Life, [1903], i, Bk m, Chap. vi.

* Pte Gladstone Papers. Aberdeento Gladstone, November1852. Glad29 t PteGladstone Papers. Gladstone Aberdeen,I December to 1852.




lawasthis,carried for thepurpose violatingeveryotherlaw, on of unwritten and eternal,human and divine;.. .The effect of all thisis, totalinversion all themoralandsocial of ideas 1 have
seenand heardthe strong and too true expression used, 'This is
Gladstonehad in his controversywith Naples reached the position of Hildebrand in his contestwith the Empire. The secular power

thenegation Goderected a system Government.'"* of into of

wasEvil, visible and personified.

The NaplesGovernment the chargewith an <cOfficial met Reply". It attempted refute Gladstone's to statements point by point,and wasableto find a few errors.Gladstone admitted
these his Examination the...Neapolitan in of Reply,and shewed the in mostdamaging fashion how that Reply full of errorsand inwas consistencies.But, before the Examination had been published, Palmerston (thenin the lastdaysof his second ForeignSecretaryship) intervened.He caused diplomaticagentsto distribute his copies Gladstone's of Letters Naplesto everyGovernmentin on Europe. The Neapolitan Ministerin Londonasked that copies of the Official Reply should likewise be circulated. Palmerston grasped chance telling a Neapolitanofficial something the of of what England thought of his Government. He repeated his
familiar views on its badness and warned him of the revolution

which its excesses would produce. He flatly declined to circulate

the Official Reply. It consisted said "of a flimsy tissueof bare he denials and reckless assertions mixed up with coarseribaldry and
common-place abuse".

Remonstrances to the treatment of prisonersby a foreign as state do not often benefit the prisonersthemselves.It is quite possible,asAberdeen contended,that Gladstoneand Palmerston actually injured the prisonerswhom they tried to help. But they had evokedsympathy throughout the world for their sufferings. This example had at least the effect of changing a Conservative into a Revolutionary. Gladstonenow argued that the existing order in Napleswasmore dangerous than any revolution, and that Palmerston'sattacks on it had beenright. Any Government, like Austria, condoningand supportingsuchan order, was condoning a systemcertain to end in disorder.This point of view is embodied in the first document that follows (Doc. 52). In the second (Doc. 53) Aberdeen(just after becomingPrime Minister at the

endof 1852) reiterates oldideathatAustria his mustbesupported,

whether she supports wrong or wickednessor not. Thus the

doctrines new and old conservatism foreignpolicy are of in opposed. is easy see It to whyAberdeen's policywasa failure, whyAustria drivenfromLombardy, why Kinge'Bomba's'' was and heir fled from Naples beforeGaribaldi.]
* FirstLetter Gleanings, in [1879],rv, 6-7.



Document 52. Gladstone theNaplesGovernment the on and Conservative Principle, January1852* 7

...The principle of conservation the principle of progress and

are both sound in themselves;they have ever existedand must

everexisttogetherin European society, qualifiedopposiin

tion, but in vital harmony and concurrence; and for each of thoseprinciples it is a matter of deep and essential concern, that iniquities committed under the shelterof its nameshould

be stripped of that shelter... .Nor has it ever fallen to my

lot to perform an office so truly conservative, as in the
endeavour I have made to shut and mark off from the

sacred cause of Government in general, a system which I believed was bringing the name and idea of Government into shame and hatred, and converting the thing from a necessity and a blessinginto a sheercurseto human kind. For I am weak enough to entertain the idea that, if these things be true-if justice be prostituted, personal liberty and domesticpeaceundermined, law, where it cannot be usedas an engine of oppression,ignominiously thrust aside, and Government, the minister and type of the Divinity, invested with the characteristics an oppositeorigin,-it is not for the of interests of order and conservation, even if truth and freedom

had no separateclaims, that the practical and effective encouragement silent connivanceshould be given either to of
the acts or to the agents. This policy, in the extravagant development of it which I have stated, is a policy which, when noiseless attempts at a remedy have failed, ought, on the ground of its mere destructiveness, be stripped,beneath to the public gaze; and this, too, beforethe strain it lays upon human nature shall haveforced it into someviolent explosion....
* Examination theOfficial of Neapolitan Reply,7January 1852.Gleanings, [1879],
iv, 116-17.



Document 53. Aberdeen a pro-Austrian on policy, 29 March 1853*

[Aberdeen instructs Clarendon suppress to a sharp despatch to Count Buol.] ... I think the greatestmisfortuneof the present is our alienation day from Austria. It is an entirely
new feature in our foreign policy, and deranges all our
calculations. Austria is a State with which I should have

thoughtit impossible quarrel;andhowever to desirable be to

on the best terms with France and Russia, is the only Power

on whose friendshipI shouldhavethoughtthat we could confidently rely. I fully admit that the irritation and hostility on the part of Austria are most unreasonable,and that we may be justified in shewing our resentment. But the most difficult task in politicks is the exercise forbearance,especiallywhen wehave of mostreasonto complain. We must makesomeallowancetoo, for the recollection of past injuries, on the part of Austria, which are probably not yet forgiven. If we add the attempt on the life of the Emperor, the outbreak at Milan, and the

machinations the Refugees, which the centre is supof of

posedto be in London, the irritation of the Austrian Govern-

mentmaybeaccounted andasall thishowever for; irrationally, is connected with Englishpolicy, we are made,more or less,
responsible. Our first object ought to be to convince the Austrian

Government our sincerity,andto leadthem to believethat of we have no object in view but their own real welfare.
29 March 1853.

* B.M. Add. MSS.43,188, Aberdeen Pte Papers. Aberdeen Clarendon, to





[Lord Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary,had already servedin that capacity during 1852-3 (v. supra, pp. 187-9). He emphasized the difference between his own and the Palmerston Government by filling vacant diplomatic posts with men of his own party;* but otherwise his policy did not differ much. "I assume",he said threeyearslater, " that the generalprinciples are the same, by which I mean that we wish always to support constitutional governments,and to support them and encourage them as much as possible; and the principle of non-interferenceis generally recognized now.5>-f He was soon to illustrate the difficulty of reconciling "non-interference" with "the support" and "encouragement" of "constitutional Governments".
The documents subjoined shew admirably his attitude. Doc.

54 is written after Victor Emmanuel, as King of Sardinia, had informed his Parliament that he would redress the wrongs of
Italy. He was confident, of course, of the secret support of France.

The document is a very mild version of the real sentiments of Malmesbury. "I can muster no patience towards that little
conceited to Sardinia mischievous State now called 'Sardinia'" for whom to the rule

"Europe should be deluged in blood".J Malmesbury suggested

that a constitutional state owes obedience

of law in its relations not only with its own subjectsbut with its neighbours. He followed this up by suggestionsin Paris of a

general disarmament. Count Rechberg said that if "England should give to Austria a formal guarantee of security against
attack from France, Austria would agree to stop armaments".

She would go to a Congress and there settle her difficultieswith Sardinia. As England refused so extensive an obligation,
* This was the view of Vienna on whom Lord Augustus Loftus was imposed.

The Austrian Ambassador in England was extremely unfavourable. Thus

"I found him [Malmesbury]more mediocreand feeblethan usual... .1 pronounceda monologue usual." W.S.A. vni/55, BerichteausEngland. From as
Apponyi, 9 February 1859.

t Diplomatic Service,Report of the Select Committee,[1861]. A. & -P.,

[1861], vi, 459, p. 199, 1932.

i Papers ist Earl Cowley, of [1928], Col.F- A. Wellesley, private letter,

Malmesbury to Cowley,January 1859,p. 175.

W.S.A. vui/53, Weisungen nach England. Count Rechberg Count to

Apponyi, 9 April 1859.



Austria patience, lost refused disarm, threatened to and Sardinia. Malmesbury, Doc. 55, theninvoked in that interesting provision
for mediation introduced by Clarendon into the protocols of the

Treatyof Paris(1856). Austria declined wentto war.This and result (as Doc. 56 shews) caused Malmesbury assume to an
attitudehardlyconsistent neutrality or the sentiments an with of exponent arbitration.But in Doc. 57 herecovers of himself and shews singular a aversion from annexing new territory. It is worth noting that the NeapolitanGovernmentin 1852 suggested Gladstone's that Letters "but a part of a covert are scheme cherishedby England for obtaining territorial acquisitions in the Mediterranean at the expenseof the Two Sicilies".

Gladstonereplied: "The prevalent, and the increasingly prevalent,disposition this country is againstterritorial agof grandisement." He added in 1878: "This salutary disposition
was, in no small degree,perhaps, due to the steady policy and action of all the various Administrations between the peace of

1815,and the date of this Tract [1852]."* It will be seenthat Lord Malmesbury pursuedthe samepolicy during 1859.
As soon as Malmesbury retired and Russell succeeded him,

Palmerstonwrote exultantly as follows: "How refreshing it must have been to the people of the Foreign Office to have to read two such despatchesas yours to Bloomfield and Elliott after

Malmesbury's milk and water." (22June 1859.)"]*] Document 54. Malmesbury remonstrates Sardinia, with 13 January1859!

The Telegraphic despatchwhich you have sent to this

OfficeandthePublic Journals givesonearlythe same report of The King of Sardinia'sSpeech His Chambers to that Her
Majesty's Government have no reason to doubt that these
statements are correct.

Assuming them to be so, I cannot for a moment conceal

from the SardinianGovernment apprehensions the which that address caused Her Majesty's has in Government, while everysubsequent hasbroughtto them tidingsfrom hour

abroad indicating that the PublicMind shares deeply in


Her Majesty's Government surprised theSardinian are that

* Gleanings, [1879],iv, 131,133and note.
P.O. 167/105.

| G. & D. 22/20, Russell Pte Papers. PalmerstonRussell, June1859. to 22 J Malmesbury SirJames to Hudson (Turin),No. 10,13January 1859,



Government,by whoseadvice His Majesty'sSpeech was delivered, not foresee effectthat it waslikely to prodid the ducein a Country, so easilyagitated as Italy has everbeen by either her just or exaggerated hopesof changes her in
internal policy. The language uttered from the Sardinian Throne, if accurately reported by you, is calculated to excite thosewho

are oppressed thosewho indulgein impossible and theories to look to Sardinia as the Champion of both and to trust to the
Sword of Savoy for a realization of their desires.

None more than Her Majesty's Governmentsympathize with the wrongs which portions of the Italian Peoplehave endured on the part of their Rulers. Her Majesty's Government know them to be almost intolerable, but they are equally convinced that it is not by provoking the terrible curseof a European War that any part of Europe will acquire

real freedom^orher peopleobtainhappiness.

If a consequence fatal to the prosperity of all Countries so should arise as a war, I wish you to point out to the Sardinian

the utter


as to its results in which


all be involved.

The only certainty that Her Majesty's Government can foreseeis, that consideringthe elementswhich it must upheave, its duration and its miseries will be prolonged to an incalculable period.

In a War so begunthe Republicans everypossible of hue, the dreamers of every impracticable theory, the exiled Pretenders to Thrones, and all in short who seekGain, Power or Revenge,will expect to find their account. If Sardinia believes that from sucha struggleShewill come

forth in a moreprosperous honorable and positionthan She occupies present,Her Majesty's at Government believe she will be utterly deceived this deadlylottery. in England has alwaysviewed in Sardinia the model for Europeof a youngConstitutional Statedaily increasing in prosperity, the fruit of her liberty sowisely as granted a by PoliticSovereign, soreasonably and enjoyed anintelligent by
and grateful People.





It wasa sinceresatisfactionto Her Majesty's Government

equally by every felt successive Administration point out to Sardiniaas a living argumentto refute the statements of
those who maintained that Constitutional States were im-

possible Italy. The experiment beentried and until in has

now has vindicatedthosePrinciplesof Civil and Religious liberty which both Englandand Sardiniarepresent. But if Sardiniashouldunfortunately be the first to provoke by eitherimprudence ambitiona calamitywhich Provior dence has averted from the most important and richest territoryof Europefor forty threeyears,Sardiniawill show theWorldthat a popularGovernment maybeasunwiseandas grasping the singlemind of an ignorantor despoticRuler. as Such a consummationto a career so brilliantly begun as that of Sardinia would be most deeply deplored by Her Majesty'sGovernmentfor the sakeof Sardinia Herself. But for the interests of humanity in general Her Majesty's Governmentmust be still more anxious,and you will frankly showCount Cavour the terrible responsibilityof the Minister who unassailed any Foreign State, and with no point of by honor at stake,appearsto invite a EuropeanWar by addressing himselfthrough his Sovereignto the suffering subjectsof
other Powers.

This imprudent act has however been committed, and in the panic which has followed Count Cavour may already read public opinion: Her Majesty'sGovernmenthave nevertheless thoughtit a duty which they oweto Europeto express without reserve their sentiments concernand anxiety at an of addressfor which, not only to Her Allies, but to the God

whom in that address invokes,Sardiniais deeplyreShe


Document 55. Malmesbury invites Austriato submit to Arbitration before to war,21April 1859* going

A meeting theCabinet heldassoon possible of was as after the receiptof Your Lordship's telegram Yesterday of after* Malmesbury toLoftus (Vienna), 282, April 1859, 7/563. No. 21 &0.





noon, announcing that a summons to Sardinia to disarm had

beendespatched from Vienna in the previousnight; and on its breaking up I desiredYour Lordship by telegraphto acquaint Buol that Her Majesty's confidential Servantshad determined to protest in the strongestmanner against the step taken by Austria which they lookedupon asinevitably involving the early breaking out of War in Italy. By this precipitate step the Cabinet of Vienna forfeits all claim upon the support or sympathyof England whatever may be the consequences that may ensuefrom it, and Her Majesty's Government seeonly one means of averting the calamities with which Europe is threatened. That result might possiblybe attained if the Austrian Governmentwould declare its readinessto act on the principles to which its
plenipotentiary acceded in the Conference of Paris of 1856, and H[er] M[ajesty]'s G[overnmen]t still cherish the hope that Austria may even now be induced according to the terms of the 23d Protocol of the i4th April to refer her differences with other Powers to the friendly mediation of an impartial and disinterested Ally.*


56. Malmesburyin Palmerstonian vein,

29 April, 2 May 1859 i. 29 April 18594

...I understand from them [your despatches]that you are convinced there is no treaty offensive and defensivebetween France and Russia. If so the war may be localized but you may aswell let it be known as y[ou]r private opinion that we must be involved in it if it reachesthe Baltic by blockadesor other commercial annoyances.
* A. & P., [1856], LXI, [2073], 143-8. Protocolsof Conferences held at
Paris relative to the GeneralTreaty of Peace(1856). This protocol containsthe discussionat which Cavour made himself very objectionable to Count Buol. But "the Plenipotentiariesdo not hesitate to express,in the name of their Governments,the wish that Statesbetweenwhich any seriousmisunderstanding

may arise,should,beforeappealingto arms,have recourse, far as circumas

stances might allow, to the good officesof a friendly Power".

t Malmesbury to Cowley (Paris), Private telegramof 29 April 1859,D.

1.5 p.m., P.O. 96/26.





ii, 2 May 1859.*

I should prefer entering anagreement Russia into with and

France and Austria for the neutrality of the Adriatic and

Baltic;if youcannot that,-for EastShore the Adriatic get of up to Trieste;if not the Adriatic,-at all events Baltic. the
You will see at once that if the Baltic was made safe, we

could., with comparative ease, keepout of the War-but if

France or Russia act in a hostile manner in that sea, it will be

hardly possible us not to interfere. for Document 57. Malmesbury disclaims annexationist an policy, i May 1859!

Althougha serious refutationof the speculation mentioned in your telegram yesterday that Englandlooksto obtainof J ing possession Sicily asa result of the presentcommotionin of the Southof Europe,seems nearly asabsurdasthe imputation itself, it may nevertheless desirable that you should be be
able to say on the direct authority of instructions from home that if all the great Powersof Europe were to combine to offer to this Country the possession Sicily, the offer would of be unhesitatingly declined.
* Malmesbury Sir John Crampton (St Petersburgh), to No. 181, 2 May 1859,P.O. 65/532.The sense this documentis considerably of expandedin
a private letter to Lord Gowley of 2 May 1859, Malmesbury, Memoirsof an
Ex-Minister, [1885], 482.

t Malmesbury Sir J. CramptonNo. 182,I May 1859, to F,0. 65/532.

"One of my Colleagues told me in strict confidence has that the Emperorof Russia intimatedto him the suspicion Englandhad beenplaying a double that game, wishedfor war in Italy in hopes obtainingSicily for herself." and of

J SirJ. Crampton Malmesbury, 198, April 1859, to No. 30 #0/65/535.








[The union of North Italy had become a possibility when Palmerston and Lord John Russell took office (18 June 1859). A week later Napoleon III and the Sardinians heavily defeated the Austrians at Solferino (24 June). On 8 July an armistice was signed, and on the nth Napoleon made a preliminary peacewith Austria at Villafranca without consulting the Sardinians. By this
peace Napoleon held Austrian Lombardy in trust to deliver to

Sardinia, which he very soon did. So much was gained. But it

was intended to restore Parma, Modena and Tuscany to their

detestedrulers; and the Romagnawas to go back to the Pope,who had so disgracefully misgovernedit. But none of the peoples of
these areas intended to return to slavery. They all summoned

assemblies, and began demanding the rule of the constitutional King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel. Russell, as Doc. 58 shews, generally supported the idea that "consent of the governed" should be the principle for the rearrangement of North Italy.
He and Palmerston were denounced as revolutionaries for

taking this line, just as the latter had been for a similar Italian Policy in 1848. They were not popular with the Queen or their colleagues.* But the fact is, both men were now thoroughly
convinced that it was more revolutionary to restore Lombardy to

Austria or the princelets to the thrones of North Italy than to

hand the territories over to Victor Emmanuel. For Victor

Emmanuel at least had popular support. The times were full of peril, but on a balance of chancesit was saferto back the peoples than to restore the kings. For the first might ensurepeace,while
the second must engender war.

Lombardy was annexedto Sardinia, but the fate of the rest of North Italy hung in the balance. The usual expedient of a European Congress suggested, a solution of theseills. But was as to a Congress Powers few werewilling to agree.The Popedid not want it, because NapoleonIII had inspireda pamphletsuggesting the reduction of his temporal estatesto a minimum. Austria was hostile. So was Lord John Russell, for precisely oppositereasons,
* V. supra., pp. 163-5, 182.

204 PALMERSTONAND RUSSELL as Doc. 59 shews. He announced them in a dispatch full of historical allusions,after his manner. He decided against the intervention of England in any Congress Italy likely to on

impose settlement thedisputed a of areas, whichwascontrary to

the will of the peopleinhabiting them. This attitude helped ultimatelyto uniteall North Italy underthe King of Sardinia. Thereremained only Venetia,which Austria retained,and the Romagna, whichFrench troops continued garrison. to
But there was to be one excessivelyunpleasant incident for

England. Napoleon agreed theBritishproposal, to formulated on 15January1860,* that the States CentralItaly shoulddecide of
their destinies. But, whereas Lord John Russell wanted assem-

blies,he insistedon plebiscites, the instrumentsof decision. as Napoleon prevailedand the districtsconcerned voted by overruling majorities union underthe King of Sardinia(March for 1860).The first Italian Parliament, including representatives from Parma, Modenaand Tuscany,met at Turin in April 1860 onlyto find itselfcalledon to discuss cession SavoyandNice the of
to France. Plebiscites were taken here in April and the vote was for union with France. Despite assertionsto the contrary, the wish of the inhabitants of both areaswas probably to be annexed to France. It was, however, the view of Lord John Russell and of Palmerstonthat the verdict of the plebisciteswas securedby a

trick. In this they were probably in error,f But no incident provedmoreharmfulto Franco-British friendshipin this era asthis.
Palmerston and Russell had cause for their irritation. For the

annexation of Savoy to France affected the treaty dispositions of Vienna in certain districts adjoining to Switzerland. It was, moreover,asPalmerstonand Russellconceived,a flagrant breach of previouspledges. Even if it were possibleto explain away the promisesof 1859,there were othersof an earlier date which could
not be dismissed.Thus Derby, who was out of office and no friend

to Russelland Palmerston, wrote: we shall be quite justified in

stating, if necessary,the positive assuranceswhich we had from

Louis Napoleon [in 1852]... .He does not, however, deny these

assurances, restshis demandof Savoy on the readjustment but which is taking place of the territorial limits of Northern Italy. The pleais futile enough;but it relieves him from the necessity of denying his former engagements, while it leaveshim free, in his ownmind, to dispense them."J with
* These proposals reallyanticipated a private letter of Palmerston are by of 4 December 1859to Persigny, Cowley o. Papers, by F. A. Wellesley, ed. [1928], 189-91. V, alsoRussell Cowley,15January 1860,P.O. 27/1322,and from to Gowley 27January 1860, of P.O.27/1332.
58-101, 370-725.

t SarahWambaugh, Plebiscites, [Carnegie-Endowment, York, 1920], New J Malmesbury, Memoirs anEx-Minister, of [1885], 514. Privateletter,Derby

to Malmesbury, 5 March 1860.

ITALY AND NAPOLEON'S ANNEXATION 205 Doc. 61 shews Britishideaasto the natureof Napoleon's the
pledgein 1859. Matters cameto a headwhen Napoleonmadea violent attack on British policy to Cowley at a levee. This was'on* 6 March and provoked strong private remonstrances.* Russell made an excessively long remonstrance.f He also made a violent speech the Commons to openlyexpressing distrustof Napoleon on 26 March (Doc. 62). Palmerston told Flahault that he agreed ,with every word, knowing that he would report the interview to Napoleon. An acrimonious discussiontook place about which much dispute has arisen. There does not seem any doubt that Palmerston said the Emperor's conduct rendered confidence impossible. Flahault then said that would mean war, and Palmerston answeredthat war would be acceptedif the price of peace was toleration of the Emperor's misdeeds, The breach between J
Palmerston and Napoleon was complete, and became a serious

hindrance to their future joint action in Europe. Over a year later Palmerston told an Austrian agent that "he would like an alliance with us [Austria] more than any one". His judgment on

Napoleon was not modified. "He continuesto watch his [Napoleon's] progress with the same mistrust." He was "against a Congresswhich, he knows, Napoleon wants".]


58. Lord John Russellon theindependence of States,? July 1859!!

...The balance of power in Europe meansin effect the independence of its several States.The preponderanceof any one Power threatens and destroysthis independence. But the Emperor Napoleon by his Milan proclamation, has declaredthat the "enemies" of the Emperorrepresenthim as makingwar to aggrandize territory of France.... The inthe dependence Statesis never sosecureaswhen the sovereign of authority is supported by the attachment of the people. J[OHN] RUSSELL.
* Cowley Papers, by F. A. Wellesley, ed. [1928],200,refersto it but does not
quote the dispatch. It makesclear that Russellreplied to these"extraordinary and insolent terms" in a dispatch he directed "to be kept outof theoffice".The

original account in Letters is ofQiieen Victoria, Ser., ist [Cheaped.1908], m,390-4. | The mostimportant is to Cowley, No. 288,22 March 1860, P.O. 146/892.
{ The two main authorities are Palmerston's note of the conversation the at

time (27 March 1860), Ashley, Life, n, 190-2, and Flahault's report of
what Palmerstontold him, Cowley Papers, by F. A. Wellesley,[1928],202-3. V. ed.

also,Spencer Walpole,Life of LordJohnRussell, [1889],n, 321; Malmesbury, Memoirs anEx-Minister, of [1885],517-8; Vitzthum yon Eckstaedt, Petersburg St
andLondon,[1887], n, 52-4.

W.S.A. viu/62, BerichteausEngland. From Apponyi, 13July 1862. No date, but after the Milan Proclamation NapoleonIII, P.O.96/24. of





Document 59. LordJohnRussell givesa historyof British

Policy Congresses 1815,15November at since 1859* It may be useful the present at momentto recall to mind
the conductwhich Great Britain haspursuedsincethe peace

of 1815, both whenshepassively abstained from, and when sheactivelyparticipated European in affairs. In 1818 pretensions wereput forward by someof the Great Powers regulateand direct the internal affairs of all other to

In 1821thesepretensions were put in practice at the Congresses Troppauand Laybach. A largeAustrian army was of sentto Naplesin orderto change internal government the of the Two Sicilies and 40,000 Austrian troops were stationed there in order to suppress institutions in that Kingdom. free Against the principle upon which this aggression was based. Lord Castlereagh,in the name of'Great Britain, protested. In 1823 another interference was sanctioned by the Congress Verona in the case of Spain, whose form of of internal government was not agreeable to the theories of the
Great Powers.

The Duke of Wellington went to Verona, but remonstrated. Mr Canningdeclared that the principleslaid down by the allies struck at the root of the British Constitution. Thus far Englanddid not concur and protested. But in

1825Englandacknowledged or moreof the Republics two

of South America, and the Northern Powers in their turn


In 1827was signedthe Treaty between Great Britain,

France and Russia whichled veryspeedily the indepento

dence of Greece.

In 1830BelgiumroseagainstHolland, and Great Britain

was active, bothin theCabinet onthesea, concerting and in

the measures which led to the establishment of the independence Belgium. of * Russell Cowley, 498, November F.O.27/1287. to No. 15 1859,

ITALY AND NAPOLEON'S ANNEXATION 207 Thus in these five instancesthe policy of Great Britain

appearsto have been directed by a consistent principle. Sheuniformly withheld her consent actsof interventionby to
force to alter the internal government of other nations; she uniformly gave her countenanceand, if necessary, her aid,
to consolidate the de facto Governments which arose in

Europe or in America. There is every reason why we should pursue a similar

course regardto the affairsof Italy; namelyby withholding in our assent any measures intervention by force to regulate to of the internal government of Italian States;and by using our influence to maintain and consolidateany regular and orderly
governments which the Italians may form for themselves.
[It is of interest to compare the above with Lord Palmerston's
view of ten years before. Doc. 60, and also with that of four years later, Doc. 85.]


60. Palmerston's viewson a Congress, 6 March 1849*

This notion of a European Congress settle all pending to matters and to modify the Treaty of Vienna so as to adapt it to the interests and necessities the present time soundswell of enough to the ear, but would be difficult and somewhat dangerous in its execution. First in regard to pending matters, someof them relate to parties who did not sign the Treaty of Vienna and who perhapsmight not chuseto submit their affairs to the decision of the new Congress;and the new Congresswould not have the power and assumedright which recent conquestvestedin the Congress 1814-1815. At that of time all Europe may be said to have been occupied by the armies of the allies. Nations counted for nothing, sovereigns submitted to the decisions of the Congress, and its resolves became easily law. But nowadays sovereignscount for little,
and nations will submit to no external dictation without the

actual employment of overruling force; and a Congress

* G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence Lord John Russell, [1925], I, of
Palmerston to Russell, 6 March 1849.





might not find it easy giveeffectto its resolutions to without establishingEuropean a gendarmerie. in regardto France, Then the notion of modifying the Treaty of Vienna implies some intention of askingfor cessions France which the other to Powers wouldnot be disposed consent If the modificato to. tionsin question relatedto the past only, and were to be stipulations givinga European sanction violationsheretoto
fore committed of the Treaty of Vienna, such as what has been done about Poland and Cracow, neither England nor France would much like to give their sanction to things which they have protested against and condemned. If the proposedmodifications relate to future changes of still existingarrangements, seems me that sucha chapter had it to better not be opened. On the whole therefore I should be for giving a civil but declining answer,pointing out the many
difficulties which would arise in such a course.

Document 61. TheBritish viewof French pledges of disinterestedness in respect Savoy, July 1859* to 4 I have afforded Count Walewski an opportunity of giving me as much information as he might choose,respectingthe intentions attributed to The Emperor of annexing Savoy to France,to which Capt[ai]n Harris despatchNo. 4 of the ist inst[ant] forwarded by this Messenger, relates, I regretto saythat His Excellency's language wasnot over satisfactory.He stated,indeed,that he could give me the positiveassurance therewasno understanding that whatever upon the subjectbetweenFrance and Sardinia, but he did not deny that the question had been more than once discussed, and that The Emperorhad entertained the idea that

if Sardiniawasto become largeItalian Kingdom, it was a not unreasonable expectthat sheshouldmake territorial to
concessions elsewhere, f

I saidthat I trusted TheEmperor hisownsake, that for and

t A good ofinformation to howfar pledges given 1859 be deal as were in will found theDebate theLords, 23April 1860, in in on quoted Cowley in Papers, ed.
by F. A. Wellesley, [1928],203-6;cp. Hans. Deb.,3rd Ser.,GLVn, 2112-39. * Gowley Russell, 101, July 1859, to No. 4 P.O.27/1299.

ITALY AND NAPOLEON'S ANNEXATION 2OQ for the sake his reputationwith Europe of wouldabandon any such idea of territorial aggrandisement, he still harboured if it. I called to Count Walewski's recollection suspicions the which had beenexcitedin Europeon the breakingout of the presentwar as to The Emperor's intentions suspicions which had beensomewhatallayed by His Majesty'sposteriorproclamations, but I ventured to predict, that if after his solemn
declarations that he had no selfish interests in the war. His Majesty were now to endeavour to obtain an increase of territory, every Government would condemn him, while if he wished for peace, he might seriously compromise the chances of an early arrangement. If His Majesty desired to recover the- confidence of Europe, let him beware of all attempts at aggrandisement. Count Walewski replied that asfar as his personalopinion was concerned, he agreedwith me, but there were others who considered that France ought to be indemnified for the expensesof the war. I said that I was sorry to hear this, for that I had hoped that the same course would have been followed as at the end of the Crimean war, when it was agreed that no indemnities should be asked of Russia by the belligerents. If, however,Austria was to be required to add a pecuniary compensation to the territorial concessions she

would probably be calledupon to make,I sawbut little hope of an early peace.The fact also that Austria was so much impoverished that she could hardly pay her own expenses,
ought not to be lost sight of. Count Walewski, however, contended that the casesof Russia and Austria were very different, and he went on to argue that the expenses incurred by France, ought to be paid

in someway or other; if not by Austria, by Sardinia and Italy in general, and if this could not be effectedin money,it might be taken into account wheneverthe territorial distribution of Italy should comeunder consideration. Although I feel persuaded that Count Walewski is not favourable to any project for the annexationof Savoy to
France, his language leads me to apprehend that some attempt of the kind may be made.





Document 62. LordJohnRussell thecession Nice on of andSavoy., March 1860* 26

... I donot followthe right hon.Gentleman [Mr. Horsman]

in his depreciation the character the Emperorof the of of

French;but it is obviousthat the course haspursued,as I he

expected, asI saidfrom the first, franklyand fairly to and

the French Government,has already produced a great deal of distrust. I believemyselfthat if when the war was begun

lastyeartheEmperor theFrenchandthe King of Sardinia of hadsaidopenlyto the world, "The King of Sardiniahasto sustain greatwar againstthe empireof Austria; he cannot a sustain alone;the Emperorof the French has determined it to help him, but the Emperorof the Frenchexpects, has and stipulatedby treaty with the King of Sardinia, that if the
territories of that King are very much increasedin Italy that portion of the territories of the King closeneighbouring on France and on the French side of the Alps shall be given to the Emperor of the French"-if that bargain, not so unlike many others which have occurred in the history of Europe, had been openly declared, I will not say what amount of indignation would have been entertained in regard to it; but I must say,looking to the circumstances under which the question has been brought forward, and with which it has beenattended,especially after the declarationof the Sardinian Government that they would neither sell, exchange, nor surrender territory, the course this that hasbeenpursuedhas produced great distrust in this country, and I believe it will produce great distrust all over Europe. Sir, I very much doubt whetherstrongResolutions, evenstrong language, or on the part of this Housewould have produced any great effectupon the ultimate issueof this affair. We have beentold that the passionatelanguage held in this House made it
necessaryfor the French nation to insist on their Government

doingwhat hasbeendone.That is rather a pretextthan a true representation.It is evidentthat it is a plausible pre* Hans. Deb.,3rd Ser.,CLVII, 1257-8,26 March 1860.





text to say, "We should have negotiated or concededthis point, but the insulting language used is such that our honour is at stakeand we can no longer give way." I say that is a plausible pretext; but, be this as it may, there has been declaredfrom the beginningof thesediscussions, immediately after the first debate that took place in the House of Lordsand the declarationwascarried by The Times newspaper all over Europe-that, although strong languagemight be used on the subject, there was no intention of going to war on account of it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) said in one of his speeches that we might be quite sure no man in this House wished to go to war for Savoy; now, if there had been entire liberty to Her Majesty's Government to negotiate on this subjectalthough certainly they would not have threatened waralthough they would still lesshave pledged the Government

and the countryto go to war, still it is a differentthing, not

saying anything on the subject, and declaring from the commencement of the negotiations that whatever may be the issuewe will not go to war. Sir, my opinion as I declared it in July and January I have no objection now to repeat-that such an act as the annexation of Savoy is one that will lead a nation so warlike as the French to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other acts of aggression; and, therefore, I do feel that, however we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French Government, and certainly I do wish to live on the most friendly terms with that Government-we ought not to keep ourselvesapart from the other nations of Europe, but that, when future questions may arise-:as future questions may arise-we should be ready to act with others and to declare, always in the most moderate and friendly terms, but still firmly, that the settlement of Europe, the peaceof Europe is a matter dear to this country, and that settlement and that peace cannot be assuredif it is liable to perpetual interruption-to constant fears, to doubts and rumours with respectto the annexation of this one country, or the union and junction of that other; but that the Powersof Europe, if they wish to maintain that





peace, mustrespect eachother's rights,mustrespect each

other's limits, and, above all, restore and not disturb that
commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which

tendsto peace, whichultimatelyformsthe happiness and of




(a) THE PRE-GARIBALDIAN PHASE, 1857-9 [The Naplesquestionhad two distinct phases. The first wasdue
to the situation createdby the misgovernmentof King "Bomba"

after 1848,and in no way alleviatedby his successor Francis II (1859),whom Palmerston called "Bornbalino". The second was due to that createdby Garibaldi's arrival in Sicily. During the first phase Palmerston considered situation sobad as to justify the foreign interventionin the internal affairs of Naples (v. Doc. 63). Clarendon (v.Doc. 64) usedlanguageof extraordinary violence to the Austrian Ambassador,and declared England would not lift a finger to savethe tyrant. Thus the indignation of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretarywas asgreat as that of Gladstone* and led equally to revolutionary conclusions. It had led in fact already to strong action. In October 1856the British and French Legations had beenwithdrawn from Naples, becausethat Government had disregardedtheir remonstrances to the ill-treatment of political as prisoners and other abuses. Russia had remonstrated at this stepon the groundthat * endeavour obtain from the King of to to Naples concessions regards the internal government of his as Statesby threats, or by a menacingdemonstration,is a violent usurpationof his authority, an attempt to governin his stead;it is an open declarationof the right of the strong over the weak".-f Now this is a case intervention upon humanitarian grounds, for and raisesa problem still hotly debatedby jurists^ What is interesting, however, that this problemwas raisedduring the is firstperiod,before question Garibaldi'sgoingto Naples any of had arisen.It is alsointeresting that Clarendon had alreadydecided to do nothing to prevent "the chastisementof the crimes" of

King Bomba. That wasa stage the way to applauding on the ventureof Garibaldi, and to recognizing Victor Emmanuelas
King of Italy.]
* V, supra, 191-5. pp.

t T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, [1877],m, 510-11,n.


J V. infra, pp. 227-8.









Document 63. Palmerston theKing of Naples, on 17 March 1857* The Two Governmentsmight have objected to withdraw their Missionsfrom Naplesupon the ground that the King of Naples governslike a Tyrant, but asthe Two Gov[ernmen]ts have taken that step and have broken off diplomatic Relations with Naples they would render themselvesperfectly ridiculous if they sent their Missions back without having obtained somemore changes the Neapolitan system. in P[ALMERSTON] 17/3/57.
Document 64. Clarendon the King of Naples, on

2 January 1858! [After Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador, had referred to Muratist plots, Clarendon spoke thus to him.] I hold the King of Naples to be the most execrable monster who ever sat upon a throne. I find him not only the shame of humanity but also that of his own class of sovereigns,and I shall not raise a finger to prevent the just chastisement of his crimes coming to him. We shall not give a coin or a man or express a wish to defend him. Certainly we should not look kindly on a Murat on the throne of Naples but, when you add up the account, anything is better than what now exists and I quite understandthat thesepoor Neapolitanswant to be rid of him at all costs. [Apponyi says] I could only laugh, shrug my shouldersand say passionblinded him. [Clarendon replies] ...They are five centuries behind all Europe in education, roads, railways, posts. Oh it is a detestablegovernment and it is all one to me if they change it.
* Minute by Palmerston,17 March 1857,on Cowley to Clarendon,No. 422,
16 March 1857, P.O. 27/1192. t W.S.A. vm/50, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. i. B., 2 January





[Russell attained office 18June 1859, before on Jus* Solferino wasfought. Italy wasthe onesubject foreignpolicy about of
which Russell was better informed than Palmerston. Like him he

was wholly in favour of a strong and compact Kingdom of Italy, formedby unitingFlorence Modenato Piedmont.It and

"would I believe, be an excellent thing for that mechanical

contrivance, balanceof power. At all events is enoughfor us the it that the Tuscanpeoplewish it, and that there is no strong reason againstit." But he saw no advantage a union of all Italy. in "I daresaythedreamers touniteNaples Sicily,andmake wish and a kingdomof the wholeof Italy. But that is wild and foolish. It would make a despotisminstead of a free government, an unwieldy power insteadof a compactone, and it would increase tenfoldthe European difficulties.35* wasvery anxiousto make He the King of Naplesreformhis Government, wasfar from wanthe ing to takehisKingdom from him. He thought of giving him half the Rornagna,and Piedmontthe other half. Palmerstonhimself held the sameviews at this time. He wished the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to be well instead of badly governed. He did not wish it to form part of a united Italy. He thought it better for the interestsof England that it should remain separate, for, in the case of war between France and England, it would "side, at least by its neutrality, with the strongestNaval Power".f
Garibaldi was the active agency which induced Russell and

Palmerston acquiesce the absorptionof Naplesand Sicily in to in a united Italy. Russellat least admitted that the exampleof the revolution of 1688justified the deposition of sovereignsfor misgovernment. When the Queen wrote that she cc could not make
out what the doctrines of the Revolution of 1688 have to do with

this", he explainedat length.J The correspondence lasted four monthsand concludedwith specialreference Naples. Russell to compared King to thelastStuart,andtheKing of Sardiniato her William III. He implied that a revolution was at hand. "Of course King of Sardinia no right to assist peopleof the the has the Two Sicilies, unless wasasked do so,asthe Princeof Orange he to wasasked thebest by menin England overthrow tyrannyof to the James II-an attemptwhich hasreceived applause all our the of great public writers and [with a significantthrust at his German
25 August 1859.

* G. P. Gooch, LaterCorrespondence JohnRussell, of Lord [1925],n, 238-9, t Letters Queen of Victoria, Set.,[Cheap 1908], 428.Palmerston the ist ed. m, to

Queen, January1861. admits io He havingheldthisviewin thesummer 1860. of

J G. P. Gooch, CorrespondenceJohn Later ofLord Russell, [1925], 253-5,12 II, January 1860.V.Letters Queen of Victoria, Ser., Chap, ist in, xxix, passim.




sovereign] is the origin of our present form of Government." Russellthen wrote to the Queen, "he cannot seeanything morally wrong in [the King of Piedmont] "giving aid to an insurrection in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. But he admits that to do so

for the sakeof making new acquisitionswould be criminal" (30 April 1860). Before Garibaldi ever started on his expedition, Russell was prepared to applaud it. Palmerston had an even more advanced
view, as Doc. 65 shews. A day before Garibaldi entered

Palermo with his red-shirted "Thousand", Palmerston suggested

that Sicily might be united to Sardinia if the Sicilians wished it.

But he drew the line at Naples. Napoleon drew the line at

Sicily. By the end of July he was thoroughly alarmed at Gari-

baldi's progress. Sicily was already Garibaldi's by a conquest

which seemedmiraculous. Napoleon feared a Garibaldian descent on the mainland which would encourage the King of Sardinia to
attack Austrian Venetia. He therefore instructed his Ambassador

to suggestthat England and France "should not remain passive spectators" and "that the Gommanders of our naval forces
should at once be authorised to declare to General Garibaldi that

they had orders to prevent him from crossingthe Strait". The proposal was not in itself unreasonable. Napoleon thought
he had done enough for Italy. He was threatened by Prussia on

the Rhine, and by Austria from Venetia. French troops were holding the Romagna, and he did not want to be embarrassedby
Garibaldi's marching on Naples and Rome. Palmerston too feared the results of further Garibaldian enterprise. Garibaldi's invasion of the mainland might upset the balance of power and destroy the condition of peace which was slowly being attained in North Italy. The new King, Francisco, in his terror at Garibaldi's success, was promising all sorts of constitutional reforms at Naples. A mild but firm intervention by France and England

might confine Garibaldi to Sicily and confirm King Francisco in

the path of virtue. The decision to support Napoleon in preventing the Gari-

baldiansfrom crossingto themainland had almostbeentaken by the

British Cabinet. But Gavour, who had some inkling of what was

going on, sent a warning to Lacaita in London. This distinguished

Italian exile, who had aided Gladstone in exposing the horrors

of Neapolitan prisons, was now begged by Gavour to intervene.

He was a friend of the Russell family, and managed to get a private

interview with Lady John Russell,who was ill in bed. Shesent a messageto her husband, who was actually closeted with the
French Ambassador, discussing the details of the Franco-British

schemeto prevent Garibaldi from crossingthe Straits. Lord John

was lured from the French Ambassador to his wife's bedside.

There he was assailed the entreatiesof a sick woman and by the by





passionate eloquence Lacaita. If Garibaldicrossed Calabria, of to Italy wasmade. If Lord John prevented him, he would be for everhatedby theLiberals Europe.*The greatLiberal listened, of
was moved, and gave way.

It is certain at least that on 23July Lord John tried to senda privatemessage Garibaldithat he" oughtto be content to with the wholeof Sicily and not stir any further the fire of.. .insurrection j ".
It is also certain that the Cabinet on the 25th came to a decision

which greatly surprisedthe French, and this "on Lord John's recommendation".J He informed Cowley at Paris that the
Cabinet had decided that tcno case had been made out for a

departure on their part from their general principle of nonintervention. That the force of Garibaldi was not in itself sufficient

to overthrowthe Neapolitan Monarchy. If the navy, army and the peopleof Napleswereattachedto the King, Garibaldi would be defeated; if on the contrary, they were disposedto welcome
Garibaldi, our interference would be an intervention in the

internal affairs of the Neapolitan Kingdom." After casting doubts on the sincerity of the King of Naples in his constitutionalism Lord John ended: ccIf Francechuses interfere alone,we to shouldmerely disapprove course,and protest,against it. In her our opinion the Neapolitansought to be the masters,either to reject or to receive Garibaldi." This dispatch, dated 26 July, settledthe courseof British policy, preventedFrance from interfering, and allowed Garibaldi to pursue his glorious march to

Doc. 66, which is here given under date of 29 August, repeats the phrases of this dispatch of 26 July. The line taken in

Doc. 67 moreovershewsthat England was not unfriendly to Austrian rule in Venetia, and still not wholly friendly to a union of both Naples and Sicily with the now enlarged dominion of Victor Emmanuel in North Italy. But Lord John's hostility to the King of Napleswas extreme, "I suppose",he wrote to our Minister at Naples, "that Garibaldi, if not killed or wounded, will succeed Naples. In that caseyou must suspendyour at functions awaitinstructions.But do not follow the King to and Gaetaor any otherplacewherehe may lay his falseheadon his
A, 315,which seem provethe authenticity the tale. to of
to Elliot, 23July 1860.

* G. M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi the and Making Italy,[1911],105-9, App, of and

t G. P.Gooch, Correspondence Russell, Later ofLord John [1925], 265, n, Russell

J Spencer Walpole, ofLord Russell, Life John [1889], 324.LordJohnin his u, SelectionsSpeeches.,. Despatches..., ir,224, notadmitthe from and from [1870], does
Lacaitaincident,but thisis intelligible.Thereis no letterfrom Palmerston the at

Syrian question,which hadrefusedjoin France a military in they to in expedition. It wastherefore intelligible theyaccepted advice tojoin in a that the not
naval enterprise with France.

critical date, heand rest theCabinet much but the of were preoccupied the with





uneasy pillow'5* (6 August). A month later to the very day, the much abused monarch fled from Naples to Gaeta. For the Garibaldian troops had landed on the mainland on 19 August and
were threatening the capital. Twenty hours after the King had

left, Garibaldi with half a dozen redshirts entered Naples. He

defied the guns of the forts and received the surrender of six

thousand armed men. Here was a living proof of Palmerston's

doctrine that "opinions are stronger than armies". Here Russell was justified. " If the King of the Two Sicilies had not been misled by bad advisers, Garibaldi could not, with 12000 men, have overthrown the Monarchy" (24 October). On 15 October Garibaldi, who had become dictator, signed a

decree, transferring the whole heritage to the King of Sardinia. "I -decreethat the Two Sicilies, who owe their redemption to
Italian blood and who elected me freely as Dictator, shall form part of Italy, one and indivisible, with its constitutional King

Victor Emmanuel." On 21 October plebiscites in Sicily and

Naples endorsed this transfer by immense majorities. Meanwhile Victor Emmanuel himself had taken a hand, his army had advanced into South Italy, his fleet had bombarded the poor King

of Naples at paeta.

On 26 October Garibaldi met Victor

Emmanuel in the Abruzzi, and saluted him as King of Italy. On 8 November Victor Emmanuel received in Naples the formal

decision of the plebiscitesand assumed sovereigntyof the Two the

Sicilies. Garibaldi was still at his side. On 9 November a British

ship sailed from the Bay of Naples. Garibaldi was on board and
was leaving for his solitary home on the rocky isle of Gaprera.

He was poorer than when he had left it. All honours had been
refused, a dowry for his daughter, a castle, an estate and a Dukedom. But he carried with him a seed bag of corn for his farm, his only reward for making Victor Emmanuel King of Italy.]


65. Palmerston Garibaldi and Sicily, on 26 May i86ot

I conceive that it is the Interest of England and therefore the object of the Policy of the English Gov[ernmen]t that Sicily should remain attached to Naples forming with Naples one Monarchy, but that cannot be expectedunless the Kingdom of the Two Siciliesis better governedthan it has

* G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence Lord John Russell, [1925], n, 266, of Russell to Elliot, 6 August 1860. At the end of the month Palmerston was


expect every Day to hear of Bombalino's Flight from Naples".

G. & D. 22/21, Pie RussellPapers.Palmerston to Russell, 31 August 1860. f Note by Palmerston, 26 May 1860,P.O. 96/26, on Cowley to Russell, No. 611, 21 May 1860, -P.O. 27/1338.





hithertobeen-If Garibaldisucceeds is probablethat Sicily it will declareitself separated from Naples and united to
Sardinia. That union would be very difficult in its practical

and permanent working,but neitherEnglandnor France

would do well to endeavour to constrain the will of the Sici-

lians on such a Question.*

P[ALMERSTON] 26/5/60. Document 66. LordJohnRussell declines interfere to with Garibaldiin Naples, Augusti86of 29

...Thesubstance a letter read to me by M. deJancourt] [of

appears havebeen same that of Monsieur to the as Thouvenel's conversations with you, and it is not of vital importancewhetherthe interference suggested to prevent was Garibaldi from landing in Neapolitan territory, or from invading Roman territory. In either case forcible interference suggested the internal affairs of It2ily, and to such is in forcible interference Her Majesty's Government strongly object. Her Majesty's Government do not deny that the consequences may be serious,but in their opinion the Enlperor of the French and the King of Sardinia may avert the worst of those consequences refraining from any attack on the by Venetian frontier of the Empire of Austria.... It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this course is clear and simple; namely that the Italians should be allowed to maintain or to change the Governmentsof Naplesand Sicily, and of Rome, accordingto their wishes, but that Franceshoulddiscourage attackupon Venetiaby an
Sardinia, for France is bound to maintain Sardinia in the

possession Lombardy, and thereforethe contestcould not of be an equal one, and it must also be borne in mind that if, Sardiniabeingworstedin the war, Francewere to come to

her assistance, is possible the GermanPowers it that might

move to the assistanceof Austria, and that thus the War * A muchlonger argument these is in Russell Gowley on lines to (Paris),
. 555, 4 June 1860,F.O. 27/1325.

t Russell Cowley to (Paris), 833,29August1860, No. F.O. 146/907.





might assumeEuropean dimensions. Austria, on the other hand, cannot be again permitted to occupy and govern Naples and the Roman States without a renewal of the miseries of the last forty years for Italy, and a prospect of disturbance of the peaceof Europe. Document 67. Lord JohnRussell defends right of the the Neapolitans change Government, August1860* to their 21

In reply to the enquiriesmade by Count Rechbergand reported in your despatchNo. 19 of the gth instant, I will give you, as far as the presentuncertain aspectof affairs in Italy admits, an answerto Count Rechberg's questions. The project of Italian Unity hasfound great favour among high and low in Italy. The reason why Italy has long been merely a geographical term is supposedto be found in its division into separatestates.The wish for independence which has long prevailed is therefore now connectedwith a
wish for Unity. Her Majesty's Government are alive to the dangerswhich endeavoursto accomplish that Unity may produce by disturbing political relations between other States exciting national ambition among the Italians and leading to events which might injuriously alter the existing Balance of Power in Europe. Her Majesty's Government have on these grounds urged the King of Sardinia to use his influence with General Garibaldi to induce that chief to refrain from invading the Kingdom of Naples. But they are convincedif the King of Naples possesses the attachment of his people, he will run no risk from Garibaldi's incursion, even supported by the cry for Unity.
If on the other hand the affections and confidence of his

Neapolitan subjects are alienated from him, and if the Neapolitan nation desireto form part of a united Kingdom of Italy, Her Majesty's Government would not feeljustified in attempting to impose upon them a Government in which
* Russell to Fane (Vienna), No. 9, 21 August 1860, P.O. 7/587.





they can have no confidence, and under which they can enjoynosecurity.Buteven all Italy comprising if morethan twentymillionsof Inhabitantswereformedinto one Kingdom,Her Majesty's Government wouldsee that change in no reason any further aggrandizement France. for of In anyfuture European war Italy thus enlargedwould be freeto join France,or to unite with the adversaries France of
or to remain neutral. But Her joining in any coalition against Francewould not be probableunless independence her were threatenedby French ambition. Her Majesty'sGovernmenttherefore would opposeany further annexation of Italian Territory to France on the pretenceof Dangerto Franceby the incorporation of Italy
into one state.

It is impossible howevernot to fear that Italy, formed into one Kingdom comprising Naples, Sicily and the States of the Pope,in addition to the presentDominions of the King of Sardinia might threaten the position of Austria in Venetia, and any menaceof this kind might be supported by discontent and even by insurrection in Venice, and in the Italian
Towns in the Province of Venetia,

Her Majesty's Government would discourage as much as possibleany such aggressivetendency, and would use all

their influence at Paris to dissuadethe Emperor of the French from assistingSardinia in an aggressive war against

More than this Her Majesty'sGovernment cannot engage to do. They are persuaded that Austria is more than a match for Italy singlehanded,and they do not believe that unless other complicationsarise the Emperor of the French will
incur the cost of blood and treasure which would be the

certainresultof hisparticipation a freshwar in Italy. Nor in canthey think it probable that the King of Sardiniawould lightly engage singlehanded anenterprize, endof which in the wouldbedoubtfulandthe Dangers whichwould becertain. of





(c) THE





[Before Garibaldi actually set out for Caprera, but after he had saluted Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, England took two diplomatic decisions of great importance. The Russian and the French Emperors had expressed their displeasure at Victor
Emmanuel's proceedings by withdrawing their Ministers from his

court. The Prince Regent of Prussiaexpressed strong disapproval

of his actions. At this critical moment Lord John Russell came out

with his famous dispatch of 27 October, printed here as Doc. 68.

This, in effect, justified the proceedings both of Garibaldi

and of Victor Emmanuel in language so bold and on principles apparently so revolutionary as to staggerthe world of diplomacy.
The dispatch was published at once so that the whole world saw the discomfiture of the pundits of reaction. They saw also that

England intended to recognize Victor Emmanuel as King of

Italy at the earliest possible moment.* The authorship is undoubtedly that of Russell. The arguments

about the revolution of 1688and the quotations from Vattel had

been employed by Lord John in his correspondence with the Queen, ten months before,f But the principles that the Neapolitans had won the right to choose their own King, and that the British Government supported them, were fully concurred in by
Palmers ton.








is as obscure

as the

first is renowned. It has always been held that England's influence in promoting Italian unity was moral not actual. Here we

have definite proof that Palmerstonwarned off Spain from armed

interference in Italy by a threat of force. This transaction, though hidden from the public, was well known to diplomatists. It probably contributed to prevent Napoleon III from interfering by force to relieve King Francisco at Gaeta. The actual aid rendered

by England at the end of October was, therefore, material aswell

as moral.

Lord John Russell remained throughout his period of office a warm friend of Italy. His friendship took unconventional ways of expressingitself. On one occasionCount Apponyi, the Austrian
* The recognition actually took placeon 30 March 1861,after the openingof
the first Italian Parliament. Napoleon III recognized Victor Emmanuel on 25

t V. two lettersof Lord John Russellto QueenVictoria, 11January 1860, and herreply; andtwo of 30April andherreply. Letters Queen of Victoria, istSer., [Cheap ed. 1908], in, 383-4, 397-8. SpencerWalpole in his Life of Lord John Russell,

[1889],n, 327,findsthe arguments in a dispatch nearlyeight only of weeks before.





Minister, admired a handsome stick that Lord John carried. " I amgladyoulikeit," saidLordJohnwith a quickupwardlook, "it belonged onceto Garibaldi." On anotheroccasion whole the

diplomatic were corps entertained Russell's by brother, Duke the

of Bedford,at WoburnPlace. Apponyi's son,who wasin attendance,could not find his hat as he wasleaving. Russellsaid: "I'll

giveyouone." He brought oneof hisown,fitted it on to the out youngman'shead, crushing down."There," saidhe,"I hopeit it will get some goodliberal ideasinto your head."* The sameunconventional style is visible in the dispatch of 27 October 1860.]

Document 68. Lord JohnRussell recognizes Garibaldian the Revolution Naples Sicily,27 October in and i86o|

It appears the late proceedings the King of Sardinia that of havebeenstrongly disapprovedof by severalof the principal Courtsof Europe. The Emperor of the French, on hearing of the invasion of the Papal States by the army of General Cialdini, withdrew his minister from Turin, expressingat the sametime the opinion of the Imperial Government in
condemnation of the invasion of the Roman territory. The Emperorof Russiahas,we are told3declaredin strong termshis indignation at the entranceof the army of the King of Sardiniainto the Neapolitan territory, and haswithdrawn
his entire Mission from Turin.

The PrinceRegentof Prussia alsothought it necessary has to conveyto Sardiniaa sense his displeasure; he has of but
not thought it necessary remove the Prussian Minister from to

After thesediplomaticacts,it would scarcely just to be Italy, or respectful theotherGreatPowers Europe, to of were the Government Her Majestyany longerto withhold the of
expressionof their opinion.

In doingso,however. Majesty's Her Government haveno intention to raisea disputeupon the reasons which have
Apponyi,who was at that time chargdd'affairesto his father in London. In

* These anecdotes toldto Professor two were Temperley CountAlexander by

Spencer Walpole, of Lord Russell, Life John [1889], 329,welearnthat GariH, baldiexchanged withRussell hisvisitto London 1864. sticks on in t LordJ. Russell SirJ. Hudson, October to 27 1860. Russell, Selections from Speeches... and fromDespatches..., n, 328-32, & P., [1861], [1870], A. LXVII,




been given, in the name of the King of Sardinia, for the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan States.Whether or no the Pope wasjustified in defending his authority by meansof foreign levies; whether the King of the Two Sicilies, while still maintaining his flag at Capua and Gaeta, can be said to have abdicated-are not the arguments upon which Her Majesty's Government proposeto dilate. The large questionswhich appearto them to be at issueare these:-Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from Governments with which they were discontented? and was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan

There appear to have been two motives which have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan Statesto have joined willingly in the subversion of their Government. The first of the*se wasa that the Governmentsof the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided soill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty and the general welfare of their people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition. The secondmotive was, that a conviction had spread since the year 1849, that the only manner in which Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong Government for the whole of Italy. The struggle of Charles Albert in 1848, and the sympathy which the present King of Sardinia has shown for the Italian cause, have naturally caused the association of the name of Victor Emmanuel with the singleauthority under which the Italians aspire to live. Looking at the question in this view, Her Majesty's
Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the

bestjudges of their own interests. That eminentjurist Vattel, when discussing lawfulness the of the assistance given by the United Provinces the Prince to of Orange when he invaded England, and overturned the



throne of JamesII, says,"The authority of the Prince of Orangehad doubtless influence the deliberations the an on of
States-General,but it did not lead them to the commission of

an act of injustice; whena people for from goodreasons take up armsagainstan oppressor, is but an act of justice it and generosity assistbrave men in the defenceof their to

Therefore,accordingto Vattel, the question resolvesitself into this:-Did the peopleof Naplesand of the Roman States take up arms againsttheir Governments good reasons for ? Upon this gravematter Her Majesty'sGovernmenthold that the peoplein questionare themselves bestjudgesof the their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaringthat the peopleof SouthernItaly had not good reasonsfor throwing off their allegiance to their former Governments; Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore,pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. There remains, however, a question of fact. It is asserted the partizans of the fallen Governments that the by peopleof the Roman Stateswere attached to the Pope, and the people of the Kingdom of Naples to the Dynasty of FrancisII, but that SardinianAgentsand foreign adventurers have by force and intrigue subverted the thrones of those Sovereigns. It is difficult, however, to believe, after the astonishing events that we have seen,that the Popeand the King of the Two Siciliespossessed love of their people. How wasit, the one must ask,that the Popefound it impossibleto levy a Romanarmy, and that he wasforcedto rely almostentirely

uponforeignmercenaries? How did it happen,again,that Garibaldi conquered nearly all Sicily with 2,000men, and marched from Reggio Naples to with 5,000?How, but from the universal disaffection the people the Two Sicilies? of of Neithercanit be saidthat this testimony the popular of will wascapricious causeless. or Forty yearsago the Neapolitan people made attempt an regularly temperately and to reform their Government, underthe reigningDynasty. The Powers Europeassembled Laybachresolved, of at with the




exception of England, to put down this attempt by force. It was put down, and a large foreign army of occupation was left in the Two Siciliesto maintain social order. In 1848the Neapolitan people again attemptedto secureliberty under the Bourbon Dynasty, but their best patriots atoned, by an imprisonment of ten years, for the offence of endeavouring to free their country. What wonder, then, that in 1860 the Neapolitans, mistrustful and resentful, should throw off the Bourbons, asin 1688England had thrown off the Stuarts? It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of the ties which bind togethera Sovereignand his subjects in is itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiancebecomeconfused; the successionof the Throne is disputed; adverse parties threaten the peace of society; rights and pretensions are opposed to each other, and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknowledged on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. The subversion of existing power has not
been followed, as is too often the case, by an outburst of

popular vengeance. The extreme views of democrats have nowhereprevailed. Public opinion has checkedthe excesses of the public triumph. The veneratedforms of Constitutional Monarchy have been associatedwith the name of a Prince who represents ancient and glorious Dynasty. an Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstancesof the revolution of Italy, Her Majesty's Government can seeno sufficient ground for the severecensurewith which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia hav visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyesrather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edificeof their liberties, and consolidatingthe work of their independence, amid the sympathiesand good wishes of Europe. P.S. You are at liberty to give a copy of this despatch to
Count Cavour.







Document 69. Paimerston proposes stopSpainbyforce to

from invading Italy, 29 October 1860* [Letters 26and28Octobershew of that Napoleon had III suggested England to that Spainwaspreparingto intervene by forcein favourof Francisco King of Naples.]
There is no Force in the Queen's argument. It does not in the leastfollow that because prevent Spain from invading we

Italy weare therefore bound to assist Countenance or France in invading Austria or any other Part of Germany. I think it is quite impossible us with a powerful Fleet for in the Mediterranean to stand by and seeSpain crush by
Force of arms the nascent Liberties of Italy; our Preventing such an outrage would in no fair sense of the word be deemed Interference in the affairs of Italy; and I am confident from the little which I have seen in those Parts of the

public Feeling on the Italian Question that if we were to shrink from taking our Line on such a Question if it should arise,we shouldbe deemed be betraying our own Principles to and abdicating the Position which this Country ought to hold among the Nations of the world.. . . [As a result of the inquiries instituted Spain disclaimed all idea of interference by force.]

[The consequences international diplomacy of Lord John to Russell'sfamousdispatch of 27 October 1860are worth studying. Its popular success immediate and resounding. Russell'sdiswas patch waspublishedeverywhere,his name wasblessedby millions

of Italians. It madeit possible Italy to be one and powerful. for But the ultimate questionis whether this immensegain was effected a lossof too much. England approvedthe dissolution by of the bondsbetween monarchand subject,sanctionedthe force exercised a revolutionarydictator againsta sovereign peace by at with all other powers, and disregardedthe Great Powers of
Europe. All of them viewed her with horror and amazement.

The despotsof Europe,Alexander II of Russia,Franz Joseph of Austria, the Prince Regent of Prussia,met in conclave in
* G. & D. 22/21,PteRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell, October 1860. to 29

October. The latter

the Prince Consort

of his views.


"He seems very unhappy about Lord John Russell'slast published Despatch,which he calls a tough morselto digest, in which he sees a disruption of the Law of Nations as hitherto recognised,and of
the holy ties which bound people and sovereigns, and a declaration on the part of England, that, wheresoever there exists any

dissatisfactionamong a people, they have the privilege to expel

their sovereign, with the assuredcertainty of England's sympathy. The Prince sees great difficulty in the way of future agreement with

England, if that is to be the basisof her policy." The saying went

abroad: "Any Emperor or President. . .who entertained an inconvenient sympathy for Canada, for Ireland, for India, or for the Channel Islands, will remember that Vattel and Lord John Russell approve of foreign intervention against oppressive and unpopular governments." The real objection of rulers to Russell's action was to a foreign power's applauding the deposition of a ruler by his subjects. Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort were evidently affected by this argument, though far from believing in the divinity of kings. Russell had been, in fact, compelled to rely on Vattel and general principles, because Victoria had asked him to quote precedents for his action in applauding a breach of international law. He had therefore to justify himself in her eyes and in those of the world. He would have done much better to repeat the views he expressed to Granville on general principles of foreign policy: "There is no rule which may not be broken through." Vattel, as Russell said, considered it permissible to succour a people oppressedby its sovereign; other jurists such as Wheaton and Bluntschli defend the right of aiding an oppressedrace.f But the particular case in point was stronger than the general principle. The oppression exercised by King Bomba had been unspeakable, but Francisco had promised reforms after the loss of Palermo, and had appointed a constitutionalist Ministry. Russell
took the view that Francisco could not be trusted, and that

Garibaldi and his Thousand could not have overthrown a kingdom with 90,000 soldiers, unless the people had supported him. From this point of view the argument was fairly good. It might be argued, in fact, that Victor Emmanuel, who had established the
rule of constitution and law in Piedmont, would establish it in

Naples and in Sicily if he ruled there. Russell could therefore justly claim that he was disavowing a royal system of disorder and lawlessness and recognizing a royal system of order and law. His oft-repeated analogy of William Ill's descent upon England had a basis of fact. "I come among you", said William, as he landed in England, "to secure your liberties." He received a very old
* T. Martin, Life of PrinceConsort, [1880], v, 226-7. | Gp. Hall, International Law, [1924], Part II, Chap. VEX, 340 n.





man, who said to him: "But for your Highness, I should have survived the Law." With theseprofessions William, though not an

English prince, invaded England. With the same professions

Victor Emmanuel, who was an Italian, invaded Naples.

Otherjustificationscanbe found, the bestbased the model of on the Treaty of Vienna.The argumentis thusput by Lord Acton. " In 1815the Germans wantedterritory (fromFrance). Alexander (Emperor Russia) of decided that a better security would be (the adoptionby Franceof) a popular constitution. It wasimposedon France as an alternative for territory (restored to her). It (the constitution) was the security of European peace. By how much more popular founded on general opinion, by so much more valuable in the eyesof Europe."* The inclusion of Naples and Sicily within Piedmont meant to Palmerston and Russell the
extension of constitutionalism and therefore of peace, order and

legality. But this way of looking at it was not wholly sound. Canning
believed that a nation had a right to depose its ruler; or that a

portion of it, like oneof the Spanishcolonies, had a right to throw off the sovereignty of a parent state like Spain, In such case, when the rebels had acquired a certain degree of force and consistency, England would recognize the state as a republic or as independent. But he never admitted that this could be done against treaty rights, and the union of Naples and Sicily to
Piedmont violated the Treaty of Vienna and disturbed the

balance of power. It was a strong step to assumethat the will of Naples and Sicily overrode thosetreaty rights when that will was
aided to successby Piedmont from without.
nation must be able to do its will.

" Burke says the

Yes, but not its criminal will.

In that caseit losesits right to independence." Again, the ideal of

the unity of Italy meant revolution. Were Palmerston and Russell justified in promoting it? "Revolution is the right to make one's own government,who has the right? Not every part of (the) country. Not (La) Vendee for instancebut Ireland."! It

is therefore fair question a whetherNaplesand Sicily, a part of the Italian peninsula, had the right to disturb the whole of it.
To these questions no direct answer can be given. Palmerston

later stated, in connexion with Schleswig-Holstein, "If the Duchies had forced themselvesfrom Denmark by their own

exertions,they would have acquireda right to dispose themof selves" (19 September 1865).^ This was good Canningite doctrine. But Naples and Sicily had only done this with the
armed aid of the King of Sardinia, and their action disturbed the

whole peninsula. But Palmerstonand Russellargued that as the

* Acton MSS. 5443,CambridgeUniversity Library. t Acton MSS. 5462,CambridgeUniversity Library.

J G. P. Gooch,LaterCorrespondence JohnRussell, of Lord [1925],n, 316.





return of Francisco to Naples was "impossible" the union to

Piedmontwas the solution mostlikely to lead to peace. It was to be defendedthereforenot on generalprinciples but as a special



and Russell do not seem to have faced is the

ultimate consequences justifying the irregularities of Victor of

Emmanueland Garibaldi, which wereopposed all conventional to notions of law or right. This harvest was bound to bear bitter
fruits, which the British Ministers soon tasted. Rattazzi said to

Layard, ceAgainstAustria all methods are good", and Russell and the Queen were shocked to hear such expressionsin the mouth of a "regular government".* Palmerstondid not, indeed, believe that Venetia could remain permanently part of Austria.
He, therefore, proposed to her the common-sense expedient of selling it to the enlarged Piedmont for money. He actually con-

templated sending Clarendon to Vienna on a special mission for

that purpose at the end of 1860. In mid-July 1862 Palmerston told Apponyi: "There were only two ways to sell it [Venetia] or govern it in a conciliatory way. You [Austria] did neither."

Russell also indulged in plain speaking: "In caseof an attack on

Venetiano Englishministercouldevertakepart and lot with us,

in face of so pronounced a public opinion in his country."f Doc. 70 shewsPalmerston'sview of the hopelessness Austria's of
permanently retaining Venetia. Doc. 71: shews the final failure

of Russell's well-meant attempt to give her compensation elsewhere.] Document 70. Palmerstonon Austrian rule in Venetia^

21 September i86oj ...Pray observewhat Perry saysof the state of Venetia and of the systemof Austrian Government in his Despatch No. 8, of the 14th of this month. What a Picture he gives. People arrested and kept in Prison some without Trial, others including a Lady of Rank and Family, after acquittal. The whole Population ripe for Revolt; The Garrison who are to defendthe Place against attack, on the Point of melting and spiking the guns they are expected to fire off! all this in addition to the wholesale sequestration of Property as a
* W.S.A. vm/66, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. IB of 3 January 1863, ff. y-q. Russell gave him this information.

"f W.S.A. vm/64, BerichteausEngland. From Apponyi, Nos. 52A and B of

16-17 July 1862.

J G. & D. 22/21, Pte Russell Papers.Palmerston to Russell, 21 September




Punishment evadingarrestand Imprisonmentby leaving for the Country, and the minute Interference with the Shirt Pinsof men and the Finger Ringsof women.* Canany Manbelieve theoccupation a Countryon that of
these Conditions can be a source of Strength to any Govern-

mentor Empire;andcananyMan believe anoccupation that

on these Conditions can be lasting. . .every liberal minded

manwill rejoicewhenthe day of its overthrowarrives. It is an act of political Infatuationin Austria to cling to the
Possession a Country which it cannot hold without crushof

ing it and Treadingwith her Iron Heelon the Necksof the resentful Population Austriaaslong assheholdsVenice
will have every Italian her bitter Foe.. . Cavour and Victor Emmanuel may say and promise what they will, but when Italy shall havebeenwell organizedas one and undivided, which it soon will have been, barring Rome and its immediateneighbourhood, They will be forcedinto a Quarrel with Austria about Venice,and the sympathies Europe will of go with them, and Military success crown their efforts.... will
Document 71. Russell fails to persuade Austria to sell Venetia, 18 November 18631
Not without visible embarrassment Lord Russell tried to

introduce the second question.. .as one which might be treated in [European] Congress. He called to his help a letter of the King of the Belgianswhich he had just received and which, mentioning the difficulties raised by Napoleon

Ill's project, containedamongothersthe following passage "If therewasquestion an abandonment Austria of her of by Italian provinces, is clear that this could only be effected it in return for amplecompensations [elsewhere].93
This was the point which Lord Russellwished to reach and

I resolved settlethis question to onceand for all

" We are

* V. Letter of 13September. AustrianEdict sequestrated propertyof An the 500persons Venetiaif they did not return at once. Men werepunished in for wearingtie-pinsof threecolours(the Italian tricolor) and womenfor wearing ringswith white markson them,called"the tearsof Italy".
November 1863.

t W.S.A.vni/67, Berichte England. From Apponyi,No. 86B of 18 aus





often slow... in deciding... but on this point we have not had a moment's hesitation and I have been charged by the Emperor and his Government not to leave a shadow of doubt on a resolution which is irrevocable, whatever may happen. We might losea province as the result of an unfortunate war, we have a sad instance of this, but to sacrifice one lightheartedly, while sitting round a greentable, to satisfycapricesand I do not know what imaginary need for reshapings the map of of Europe. Never! We prefer to run the risksof war.3' "That is very plain language", my interlocutor contented himself with saying. He had heard me with attention mixed with surprise. "I rather expectedthis point of view, [he said] but it is another question if it is a wise one." "It is the language England would undoubtedly hold", replied I, refusing to be disconcerted, "if a Congress arrogated to itself the right of disposingof one of its possessions. Do you agree?" The minister remained silent. "As for compensations," replied I, "allow me to tell you, Austria recognizesno-one, not even a European Areopagus, who has the right to offer them. It could only be at the expenseof its neighbours, and I repeat to you we do not wish to despoil others, in order to be despoiled ourselves." "Yet", said Lord Russell, "there are examples. The
House of Lorraine renounced its Duchy to obtain Tuscany."

"And now", cried I, "its successors possessneither the one nor the other. If that is what you call compensations, your historical quotation is not a happy one.. . . Do you not seethat the Danubian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) are the only compensation that could be offered to us for Venetia and would not (the cessionof) theseprovinces imply the Eastern question and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire?"
This observation made Lord Russell think and after some

moments of silence he said, "If for one reason or another we

decline to enter the Congress, can we reckon on Austria following our example?" "I believe I can say so", said I, and these words seemedsomewhat to impress him....




RUSSELL, 1860-3*





[The British side of the Polish question has hitherto had very

little light thrown on it. There are a goodmany official dispatches in the Blue Books of 1863,! but neither Sir SpencerWalpole nor Dr Goochhaspublished anything material from the private papers of Russell, nor has Ashley from those of Palmerston. These gaps can be at least partly filled from the Russell MSS., from Palmerston'srough notesin the Record Office, and from the Archives of
Vienna. The Editors have also been fortunate in being able to

quote some unpublished opinions of that great authority, Sir

Ernest Satow, on the diplomatic bearing of the questions really at

Russell treated the Polish question in 1863 much as Palmerston

treated it during 1831-2. In 1815 the Tsar Alexander I had signified his intention of granting a constitution to Poland in the Treaty of Vienna and the Powers of Europe signatory to the Treaty had taken note of the fact. Thesewere England, France,
Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Portugal and Spain. In fact the first four were the only ones who counted apart from Russia. The relevant Article of the Treaty of Vienna runs as follows: C Article ler. Le Duche"de Varsovie, a ?exception desProvinces

et Districts, dont il a e*teautrement dispose" dans les Articles suivants,estreuni a PEmpire de Russie. II y sera lie*irreVocablement par sa Constitution, pour tre poss6d6par Sa Majeste
FEmpereur de toutes les Russies,SesH^ritiers et SesSuccesseurs a

perp6tuit6. Sa MajesteImperiale sereserve donnera cet fitat, de

jouissant d'une Administration distincte, Textension int6rieure qu'elle jugera convenable. Elle prendra avec ses autres Titres,

celui de Czar, Roi de Pologne,conform^ment au Protocole usite"

et consacre* pour les Titres attaches a Ses autres Possessions.

Les Polonois,Sujetsrespectifs la Russie,de FAutriche et de de la Prusse, obtiendront une Representation et des Institutions
* The authorswish to acknowledge received the past from an unhelp in published thesis W. F. F. Grace(Ph.D.,Cantab.),thoughthis hasnot been by
consulted in the present instance.

. Temperley Penson, and Century Diplomatic Books, 643-643 of Blue Nos. h.







Nationales, reglees d'apres le mode d'existence politique que

chacun des Gouvernements, auxquels ils appartiennent jugera

utile et convenable de leur accorder."

The question of the meaning of " Constitution" is certainly obscure. The Article quoted above as printed in B.F.S.P. (1814-15), n, 11, has a capital CC",which may have led the Foreign Office in 1831and 1863to supposethat a detailed written constitution
was thereby promised to Poland.* Even this is a disputable point, for at this period "Constitution" was a word of varied and dis-

puted meaning. But probably the Tsar himself was actually

thinking of granting a constitution of the modern representative type to Poland in connexion with this Article of the Treaty. The

first part of the text of the Polishconstitution whichhe actually

granted suggests aboveinterpretation of the Treaty. Once the the
constitution had been granted, the Article of the Vienna Treaty was executed, and that ended the matter. It is not easy to seewhat right the Great Powers (other than Russia) had to interfere so long as Poland formed a government and administration separate

and distinct from Russia, and was held by a personal tie. That at least was the opinion of our Ambassadorat St Petersburghduring
the crisis.t
* A

After the rebellion of the Polesagainst Russia in 1831 the Tsar

(and not unnaturally) deprived them of most of their constitutional privileges. His son destroyed almost all that remained in 1863. On both occasions the question arose as to whether the consent of the guaranteeing Powers of the Treaty of Vienna (France, England, Prussia and Austria) was necessary to these changes, or whether these Powers had in fact guaranteed the constitution to Poland. Was it the duty of these Powers to interfere to make Russia restore the constitution intact to Poland?

In 1831 Heytesbury, as has been shewn, thought not. But the governments, both of England and of France, thought differently. France, constitutional, bourgeois, notoriously friendly to Poland

since the days of Napoleon, wished to protest. England of the

Reform Bill in the heyday of furious zeal for constitutions, under Whigs like Russell, Durham and Grey, wished to do the same. Palmerston is believed personally to have deprecated protest. But he sent off one, none the less. ccThe Constitution once given, became the link which, under the Treaty, binds the Kingdom of Poland to the Empire of Russia; and can that link remain unimpaired, if the Constitution should not be maintained?" This passagereveals the British Government as prepared to contend
that, if Russia reduced Poland "to the state and condition of a
* This fact doubtless influenced British statesmen but no argument can properly be based on it, for the "British and Continental modes of using capitals is quite distinct" [Satow]. f Heytesbury (St Petersburgh) to Palmerston, Separate and Secret, i October 1831, ^.0.65/193.





Province", England might refuse to recognize Russia's title to

that country. '' It cannot be admitted
that the revolt of the Poles...

can absolvethe Emperor. .. from his obligation to adhere to that Constitution."* From this position England never wavered. Nesselrode's reply to Palmers expresses ton exactly the opposite view. It started by asserting that the constitution was "not a
necessaryconsequenceof the treaty of Vienna, but a spontaneous

act of his [Alexander's] sovereign power". "If it had been the intention of the contracting Powers to stipulate in favour of the [Polish] Kingdom a specialcharter, and to guarantee it, there can be no doubt that such a stipulation would be expressedin a manner more explicit and formal." When the text of the constitution was published, none of the signatory powers attempted to
examine or comment upon it. "All of them, on the contrary,

recognized, either expresslyor by their silenceon the subject, that in granting this Constitution to his new subjects,the Emperor had followed the dictatesof hisfreewill." j This is perhapsstraining the
meaning for the intention to give a constitution was noted by the signatory powers. It does not appear, however, that they were

judges of the performance of the Tsar's intention. The caseis like

the Declaration made by Italy at Versailles in 1919 when she

annexed a part of the German Tyrol. Italy published a Declaration that she intended "to adopt a broadly liberal policy towards its new subjects of German race, in what concerns their language, culture, and economic interests "4 This Declaration was quoted

by the signatory powers of the Austrian Treaty in their official reply to Austria of 2 September 1919. The Italian Government fulfilled their promise by making linguistic and other concessions
to Germany in the Italian Tyrol. When, however, someyears later

they withdrew these concessions becauseof real or alleged sedition, the other Powersmade no protest or comment. The Declaration was not indeed formally embodied in the Austrian Treaty, as was Alexander's in the Treaty of Vienna, but in both casesthe

other signatory powerspossessed right of remonstrance. a The Polish constitution was actually granted by Alexander on
24 December 1815. Later some restrictions were introduced by
him, but the constitution was not withdrawn until after the

revolt of 1830.The reasons withdrawing it are thus statedby for Nesselrode the dispatch already quoted, of 1832. "The Polish in constitution was annulled by the very fact of the rebellion. Will it be necessary us to proveit? It is a recognized that between for fact government and government,the Treaties and conventionsfreely consented by both parties are put an end to by a state of war to
* Palmerstonto Heytesbury,23 November 1831, No. 52, P.O. 65/190;
printed in Hertslet, Map, [1875], n, 875-80.

f Nesselrode Lieven,3January 1832, to P.O.65/204. { V. Temperley, History the of Peace Conference, [1921],iv, 284.







and must be renewed, or at least expressly confirmed on the conclusion of peace. All the more is it so with an act which is not

two-sided, but granted by a sovereignto his subjects,and the first

condition of which is the obedience and faithfulness of the latter.

All the more so, I say, is such an act annulled by a state of war when the war is the necessary consequence of insurrection and treason?3' So far Nesselrode'sargument. Sir Ernest Satow deemed
it "unanswerable". He adds the comment: "I don't see that

there is anything [in the Article of the Treaty] to hinder them [the Russians] from modifying these [the articles of the constitution] from time to time, in the way of extension or contraction, as might seemdesirable.* Surely it cannot be argued that they were bound to maintain unaltered for all time the shape they had given them when they started on this paragraph" [Article I of Vienna Treaty]. In 1832 the Russian Government adhered to the line given
above, and refused all concessions to the remonstrances of

England and of France. A generation later, when Russell was Foreign Minister, Palmerston is found supporting him in a series

of protestsexactly like the old ones.The argumentswere, in fact,

the same on both sides. It is extraordinary that Palmerston, having received a severe rebuff thirty years before, should have courted another. It is the more remarkable since he is supposed

personally to have disapprovedof the protest, which he signedfor

the British Cabinet, in 1832. One explanation is that the almost octogenarian Palmerston was overborne by the more vigorous Lord John Russell. This thesisis hardly sustained by the facts. In 1848 Palmerston suggestedto the Tsar that he might enlarge the constitutional freedom of Poland (Doc. 39), and Russell, who was Premier, may have concurred in this suggestion. The latter could not, however, have shared in the developments of 1856,
for he was not then in the Government. It was then that Palmer-

ston got Clarendon privately to raise the Polish question at the Congress of Paris. The Russians managed to prevent him from putting it officially before the Congress by giving the assurance that the new Tsar intended immediately to grant again to the
Poles their national constitution and the use of the national

language. When, after the outbreak of revolution in 1863, the fear arose that the Polish constitution would again be annulled, Palmerston had a strong motive for interference. For the Russian promises to him had been broken. As he could not remind the Russians of these officially he had to invoke the Treaty of Vienna. In the course ultimately taken Palmerston and Russell were entirely at one. The first wrote to the secondwhen unable to
* In point of fact, as Heytesbury had pointed out to Palmerston (F.O. 65/193, i October 1831): "This Constitution has already been altered and modified upon several occasions, without the slightest reference to Foreign Powers, and without the,slightest remonstrance on their part."



attend a Cabinet meeting: cc give you my Proxy, for I think our I views and Policy on pending Questions are identical."* Alexander II had madesomehalf-hearted attempts to conciliate Poland. But the Poles were angry and suspiciousand perhaps
concessionsactually encouraged them to revolt. When conces-

sions were succeededby harsher measures, revolt began. In January 1863, the Russian Government introduced conscription
into Poland, and took care to conscript the leading members of

the Opposition. Revolt actually began on 212 January 1863 and developed thereafter into a futile and bloody civil war. The
revolution merely exhibited a frantic and active hatred of two

nations for one another. It was part of the old and irreconcilable
conflict between Pole and Russian, Catholic and Orthodox, Latin

and Byzantine. The revolt had no chance of successand was

drowned in blood.

In February Bismarck improved the occasionby negotiating a convention (that of Alvensleben) between Prussia and Russia.f This, though never actually ratified, proved the beginning of a permanent understanding betweenRussia and Prussia.The news of this entente, not alliance, greatly excited the French. Napoif leon wished to protest along with England in an identic note.

Palmerston opposed ashe thoughtit "a trap1"which would this,

lead to war. J Napoleon then dropped his protest against a RussoPrussian alliance, and took up the cause of Poland direct. His

proposal for an Anglo-Austro-French suggestionfor conciliatory

measures to Polish rebels coincided with a milder initiative from

Palmerston himself on 25 February (v. Doc. 72). This joint suggestion, which waspresentedin threeseparatecommunications, was eventually rejected by Russia in mid-April. The British communication of 10April had laid stress the Treaty of Vienna on and refused to acquiescein the doctrine that Poland's revolt in 1830 justified the suspensionof her constitution. This was "so
contrary to good faith, so destructive of the obligation of Treaties,

and so fatal to all the international ties which bind together the community of European states". The revolt of the Polescould not

releasethe Tsar from the contractedobligation. But a passage added at the end said "the condition of things" in Poland "is a source of danger3 not to Russia alone, but also to the general peace of Europe.. .which might, under possiblecircumstances, produce complications of the most serious nature ". To this
* G. & D. 22/22, Pte Russell Papers.Palmerstonto Russell, 25 May 1863.

Russellsays[Selections Speeches.. from Despatches..., from .and [1870], n, 235]:

"Lord Palmerstonhimselftook a large part in framing the despatches." t V. Die Auswartige Politik Preussens, HI, von R. Ibbeken [Oldenburg, Bd.
1932], Nos. 164-9.

J To the King of the Belgians,13 March 1863,Ashley, Life, [1876], n, 232.

Russellto Lord Napier, 10 April 1863,Selections Speeches.. from from .and

Despatches..., [1870], n, 393-7.






menacing conclusion Prince Gorcakov replied by a refusal of the terms proposed and a polite reiteration of the old arguments of

On the previous day (9 April) Russell made a still more aston-

ishing suggestion the RussianAmbassador.He proposeddealing to

thus with the difficulty that the Tsar could not give representative institutions to Poland and deny them to Russia: "Why should they [representative institutions] not be granted at one and the same time to the kingdom of Poland and to the Empire of Russia?" Russell adds, with almost touching nawete,"Baron Brunnow had no information as to the intentions of the [Russian] Emperor on this subject, and I did not press him further". This was magnanimity indeed! England had a case, based on the Treaty of Vienna, as to recommending representative institutions for Poland. But the recommendation to give them to Russia was an astonishing

attempt to interfere in her internal affairs, for which no treaty

right could be pleaded. But this interview of 9 April was even more menacing in its

tone than astonishingfor its suggestions.Brunnow asked, aswell

he might, "whether the communication Her Majesty's Government were about to make at St Petersburgh was of a pacific nature. I [Russell] replied that it was, but that as I did not wish to mislead him I must say something more. Her Majesty's Government had no intentions that were otherwise than pacific,

still less any concert with other Powersfor any but pacific purposes. But the state of things might change.The presentoverture
of Her Majesty's Government might be rejected as the representation of March 2 had been rejected by the Imperial Government. The insurrections hi Poland might continue and might assume

larger proportions

If in such a state of affairs the Emperor of

a threat of war to Russia if she did not

Russia were to take no steps of a conciliatory nature, dangers and complications might arise not at present in contemplation."*
seems to be almost

attend to England's remonstrances. War was not, however, intended by either Palmerston or Russell.

They made this fact quite clear by their declarations to the

Austrian Minister at the end of April, which are given in Doc. 73. But on this fact the Blue Book is silent and there are no dispatches at all published between 2 May and 17 June. The next step was actually taken by Palmerston in mid-May when he suggested

pressingRussiato grant an amnestyto the Polishrebels (Doc. 74). The overture of Palmerston on 31 May (Doc. 75), in which he suggested an Austrian Archduke as King of an independent
Poland, is remarkable for its rashness. Only the refusal of Austria averted grave consequences. On 17 June Russell sent a
* Russell, Selections from Speeches.. from Despatches..., [1870], n, 397-9. .and



dispatch demanding six points, an amnesty plus a settlement of

Poland on the lines of the Treaty of Vienna. Austria and France

endorsedthis programme. Russiareplied by saying that shewould consent only to a conferenceof the powers directly interested in
Poland. These were Prussia, Austria and Russia and, as Prussia

and Russia were allies, they would always outvote Austria. For

the rest Russia promised to considerthe six points and report the results to France and England (13 July 1863). Austria refuseda conferenceon theseterms and England and France were left out
in the cold.

Napoleon,who was the most rebuffed of the three sovereigns,

wished now for a real intervention. He proposed an identic note

from Austria, France and England. Austria declined and England

decided, on Palmerston5 urging, to keep u within the limits of s

reciprocal diplomatic communication33.* War was thus averted.

Russell would have done well to say little more, for the Russian

reply had been sharper to France than to England. But he addressed dispatch in his best lecturing style to St Petersburgh a (11 August) ."j"This pointed out that the Polish clausesof the Treaty of Vienna included all the signatory powers, and that a
conference, which excluded France and England, would be

contrary to its terms. He added: " It would not be'open to Russia to enjoy all the benefitsof a large addition to her dominions, and to repudiate the terms of the instrument upon which her tenure depends." This can hardly bear any other meaning than that England will now refuseto recognizeRussia'stide to the Kingdom of Poland as defined at Vienna in 1815if she continued to refuse
to restore the constitution.

Russia was now secure. Prussia sided with her, Austria was

obviously very timid, England was ready enough with words but France was not ready with swords. Prince Gorakov ultimately addresseda dispatch dated 7 September to Russell denying his
conclusions. This provoked the final reply of Russell of 20 October. J It is interesting to see how Russell wished still to be

defiant and how Palmerston succeededin watering down his

wine. The difference is a real one. For Palmerston saw the *'bluff5' had failed and wished to extricate himself without further

loss of dignity. Russell still wished to continue a controversy in

which England had already been humiliated. What is even more astonishing is that, in an interview with the Austrian Minister on

17 November, Russelltried to raise the question again. He asked

if a European Congress met and decided on the separationof Polandfrom Russiaunder a foreign or a Russianprince, would
* So announced the Queen,n August1863. V. Letters Queen to of Victoria,
2nd Ser., [1926], i, 103.

t Russell, Selections Speeches.. from Despatches..., from .and [1870],n, 410-17. t This dispatch printed in A. & P., [1864],LXVL, is [3243],582.







Austria agree to use force against Russia to secure her consent?

Apponyi answeredthat he would like to know if England would

use force. "As I had foreseen. Lord Russell told me that this

eventuality had not been examined yet and that, not being ready to answer me, he begged me for the present to consider his

question as not having been put (comme non avenue)."* In this

way even Lord Russell was at last reduced to silence about Poland.]


72. Palmerston takesthefirst step, 25 February 1863!

[On 25 February Palmerston saw the Austrian Ambassador and suggested that the Russians should give an amnesty to the revolted Poles and return to the situation created by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. "The idea only came to me this morning, I have

spokento no-one not evento Lord RusselL"J What follows is what

he advised to Russell.]

.. .Our communication in conjunction with France ought to be mainly addressedto Russia the real culprit rather than to Prussia an incidental accomplice, and who might reasonably say "mea res agitur paries cum proximus ardet". I daresay that cunning old Fox, Bmnnow does his best to persuade us not to say anything to his Government, but public opinion in this country as well as in France is getting strong upon this subject, and we shall not stand well if we do not do something. In past times personal influence did much to embarrass the action of the British Government], Mad [am] Lieven had great influence over Lord Grey and put much water into my wine, while at PetersburgDurham's inordinate vanity and desire to be well with the Russian Court entirely gagged him as our mouth piece about Polish affairs; and accordingly we do not I think stand quite satisfactorily as to our Language and Course in those times.
* W.S.A. vin/Gy, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 86A of 18
November 1863. "f G. & D. 22/22, Pte Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, 26 February

1863. A letter of 25 February is to the same effect and commends the suggestion that the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna should approach

J W.S.A. vm/66, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 150 of 25 February 1863.





Document 73. Russell Palmerston and disclaim ideaof the goingto war with Russia,21-2 April 1863* ... The answersof Lord Russell [21 April] can be briefly stated. As for desiring or meaning to make war on Russia,
the Minister answered with an absolute No. But as to what

England would do in casethe Emperor Napoleon took the initiative in such a war, and as to knowing whether England had the firm resolution to prevent such a war the Chief Secretaryof State was much lessexplicit [Some discredit is then thrown on Hennessy's report, though Palmerstondid not think he had invented it all.] Lord Palmerston said [22 April] cc Hennessyis deceived Mr in thinking that Parliament in a given case,would drag the [British] Government into war; he believed the contrary would happen, if the Government gave Parliament and the nation sufficient reasons. For despite the uricontested and unanimoussympathiesof the British public for Poland, a war
is not desired by the country and is against its interests.

.. .The diplomatic demarche 10-11 April] we made at [of St Petersburghin concert with France and Austria is enough at present.. .who knows what the future will bring? You know we do not like to pledge ourselves beforehand and in this business our best policy is to keep our liberty of action, exceptin so far as our interests and circumstances limit it." APPONYI. "But have you at least a strong intention of preventingwar" said I to him, " if that could be attained by a strict understanding between our two cabinets." PALMERSTON. cc How do you meanto prevent it? "..."The only meanswould be to threaten France by putting ourselves on Russia's side and that is and will always be absolutely impossible us. Neutrality is theleast for that we could do, and you see that according to your version, that is all France would ask of us. The Emperor Napoleonis strong enoughto
* W.S.A. vni/68, Varia. Lettre particuliere. From Apponyi, 22April 1863.
Apponyi started by reading the contents of a private letter from Rechberg, of

the i6tha which related to NapoleonIll's interview with Mr PopeHennessy in which he hinted at creating an independentPoland by making war on Russia.







make war alone".... [Palmerston then discussed the question of Polish resistance.] [Apponyi comments]..."The plans of the Emperor Napoleon do not seemto surpriseLord Palmerston,he seems to expect anything. What has surprised me is that I have found the [Prime] Minister more disposedto suffer, or even to second,to somedegree,the projects of this Sovereignthan resolutely to oppose them.".. Document 74. Palmerston urges immediate an amnesty, 15 May 1863* Might it not be well to say that all these Questions would require much Time for Consideration and Discussion,that in the meanwhile a great Effusion of Blood much sacrifice of Life, and all the Calamities incident to civil war would be going on, and that therefore we wish to suggestwhether as a first step towards other arrangements, and indeed as a necessarypreliminary to other arrangementsit would not be well to proposeto the Contending Parties an armistice to last
for a sufficient time. -or

P[ALMERSTON] 15/5-03.

Document 75. Palmerston suggests independent an Poland with an AustrianArchduke King, 31 May 1863! as
[On 25 May Palmerston wrote a letter to Russell proposing that a European Conference on Poland should be held and
attended by the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna. "Nothing can now be expected to produce Tranquillity but that which the British G[overnmen]t avowed its Desire to see in 1815, namely a separate and independent Kingdom of Poland." J This

idea seemedso pleasingto Palmerston that he proposedto secure

it by Austrian support and by putting an Austrian Archduke on the throne. Austria had suggestedthat Russia should govern as
she had done in Galicia. This idea did not suit Palmerston. So

he sent for Apponyi (31 May) and expounded his new and rash policy. He deprecated suggesting to Russia that she should institute in her CongressKingdom of Poland a constitution and
assembly on the model of that in Austrian Poland, i.e. Galicia.]
* G. & D. 22/22, Pte Russell Papers.

| W.S.A. vm/66, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 380 of I June

J G. & D. 22/22, Pte Russell Papers.Palmerstonto Russell, 25 May 1863.





... We have reasons for claiming that the Emperor of Russia 'should fulfil the engagementsof his predecessor. For

the Russian interpretation of the treaties of 1815 with

reference to Poland is the constitution given spontaneously [octroyee] by Alexander I. That, and not the legislative assembly [Diete] of Galicia must be taken as the starting point of negotiation. We must invoke a Russian, not an Austrian, precedent. If this constitution led to the revolution of 1830,it was not becauseit was bad, but becauseit was not observed; because the Grand Duke Constantine [the Viceroy] was a man without faith or law [sansfoi ni loi], the National Assembly [Diete] was only convoked at long intervals and all the promised institutions little by little
became dead letters. If the constitution were re-established

now, it could not be in this position again, for this time it would be placed, so to speak, under the moral guarantee of

Europe, as a result of formal engagements^ taken by the Emperor of Russia.... [Palrnerstonthen discussed questionof an armistice the
and amnesty, expressingthe belief that the Polish revolt was extending.] .. The national enthusiasm, which Russia at-

tempts to excite, is purely artificial [factice], and were it genuine would make her task more difficult. A party is beginning to form which favours a cessionof Poland, as being only an embarrassmentand source of weakness for
Russia and there is even a report that they had the idea of ceding the Kingdom to Prussia. "To say truth", continued Lord Palmerston, "my inner feeling is that the best solution of this inextricable question would be to reconstitute an independent Poland beneath the sceptreof a foreign Prince, and I believe an Austrian Archduke would be the arrangement most welcome to Poland." I beggedmy interlocutor not to speakto meof suchventure-

some projects, whichmycourtwasin nowaydisposed favour. to The emptyglory of seatingoneof its princeson the throne of Polandwould in no way makeup to the Imperial Housefor the lossof a fair and rich province of which the westernPowers could certainly not offer us the territorial equivalent. "I do not see" [replied Palmerston] why Austria should





not keep Galicia and Prussia Posen. You would only have to give up Cracow, a choly city5 of the Poles, and this sacrifice would be amply compensated the presenceof a friendly by and allied Kingdom on your frontiers. It would separateyou from Russiaand rid Europe of this 'Muscovite promontory' which juts into the centre of civilization. Besides,I believe more than you do in the power of dynastic ties, especially when the interests of peoples are identical. But, I repeat, I here only give my personal opinion and, if Austria is against it, let us speak no more of it and return to the actual
situation.3 J. ..

[Apponyi then explained that, in respecteither to armistice or to imposing the Polish constitution of 1815 on Russia, "We should never associateourselveswith putting compulsion on Russia to adopt a programme which we should think incompatible with our own interests'5.] Lord Palmerston answered that the refusal of Russia3 however regrettable, would not necessarilybring war along with it. If one could not negotiate without fighting, diplomacy would be useless, and we should then need only generalsand admirals... .The danger of doing nothing is, in his view, greater than that of acting. He believes in truth that, for the time being, the Emperor Napoleon desires sincerely to avoid a war. Those of the Crimea and of Italy gave him and the French nation glory enough....A war against Russia would soon assume colossal and incalculable proportions, and the Emperor would only resolveon it at the last extremity. But once the expedition to Mexico ended, it was possiblefor him to turn his eyesto Poland. If the horrors of war still continued there, he might say to France "I have tried in vain to come to an understanding with England and Austria. They have turned their backs on me. Let us finish alone an enterprise worthy of a great nation, the liberation of the Polish people." Lord Palmerston draws the conclusion that it is best to go with France up to a certain point, for in this way she is grouped and controlled..., [Palmerston in response inquiry said his remarksapplied to the kingdom of to Poland asdefined for Russiain 1815.]... Your Excellency will
see from this interview that if the ideas of Lord Palmerston




are clear enough as to the proposalshe has to make, they are vague and illusory as to the consequences likely to result. I think he has not here revealed his whole thought, perhaps so as not to discourageAustrian cooperation. Lord Palmerston has too strong a dose of British pride to imagine that England could remain inactive beneath the blow that a Russianrefusal would give her. He believestoo strongly in the final triumph of the Polish causeto let himself be discouraged. He will therefore let himself be gently forced to follow France in any stepsshetakesforward, and will end by being dragged into making common causewith her, while leaving her with the largestshareof the risks and expenses a of hazardous enterprise.
Document 76. Russell's answer of 20 October to Prince Gorcakov's dispatchof 7 September-Russell adheres his to draft in opposition Austria, 30 September to 1863* State to Count Rechberg that if a contract is violated on one side, it can hardly be held to bind the other. Poland is united to Russia in the first article of the Treaty of Vienna by
its Constitution. Where is this Constitution? Russia rules

only by the sword of the executioner, England has no wish or intention to go to war for Poland. The dispatch is very moderately expressed, and the British Gov[ernmen]t cannot consent to say less if it says any thing. T> Document 77. Paimerston advises moderation, 2 October 1863!

Is not this Draft superseded a later Despatchfrom Paris by stating that the [French] Emperor agreesto our proposed Communicationto Russia? If that is so this Despatchis
unnecessary and need not be sent.

Butif it is to goI should muchrecommend beinggreatly its


* Roughdraft by Russell, F.O. 96/27,for telegramto Bloomfield,No. 145, 30 September 1863, F.O.7/649.He is remonstrating Rechberg wanting with for
to moderate his dispatch.

G. & D. 22/22,PieRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell, October 1863. to 2






All that is therein said might be well said in a Conversation which was not to be made public and which bound nobody to any Conclusions, but much of this Draft seemsto me inexpedient in a Document which is liable to be laid beforeParliament and to be published to the World. In the first Place I think much is to be said against the opinion herein expressed that the Poland of 1815could not be erected into a Separate State independent of Russia. My own opinion is that suchan arrangementwould be practicable if Russia willingly or unwillingly was brought to consentto it, and that such an arrangement would be a great Gain to Europe-There seems be no ReasonWhy Sucha Kingdom to should not Stand aswell as Saxony, Wurtemberg or Hanover. The Difficulty would be, not to maintain Such a Kingdom but to prevent it from trying to absorb Posen and Gallicia.
It would be better therefore I think not to commit the

Government in a Despatch to an opinion on which all do not agree, and on a Point on which we are not called upon to
record or form a Decision.

Secondly all you propose to Say about the Difficulties of making war against Russia for Poland is no Doubt full of weight, but there is much to be said the other way, and I am inclined to think that if England and France were really determined to force Russia to give up the Kingdom of Poland they would be perfectly able to do so without the Co-operation of Austria; and in that Case instead of our having to defend Sweden,Swedenwould probably give us effective assistance.But assumingthat all that is said in this
Draft about the Difficulties of such a war to be unanswerable

Surely there is no use in proclaiming this to the World and telling it to Russia, and we should be doing so by sending this Despatch to Paris. If Such a Despatchis to go in answer to Drouyn's* first opinion it ought I think to be confined simply to Saying that Drouyn's object appearsto be war, and that the British Gov[ernmen]thave not at presentany Intention of making
war for Poland.

* Drouyn de Lhuys-Foreign Minister of NapoleonIII.


PALMERSTONAND RUSSELL Document 78. Palmerston amends Russell'sdispatch, 8 October 1863*

I seethat Rechbergvehemently objects to the concluding Passage your proposedDraft to Napier on Polish affairs, in in which you purpose to say that Russia by leaving unfulfilled the Engagementstaken by her with Regard to the Kingdom of Poland by the Treaty of Vienna will loseall the International Right to Poland which She had acquired by that Treaty. I know that the Poles have always urged us to say something to that effect, but I own I never could see that they could derive any advantage from our doing so. If we were prepared to take measuresfor wresting the Kingdom of Poland from Russia, it would be very proper to lay the Foundation for sucha Measureby telling Russiathat Shehas
lost her international Title to Poland; but as we have no such Intention3 and Austria has no such Intention and as I much

doubt whether France has any such Intention or has easy means of executing Such an Intention if She had it, I do not seewhat practical advantage is to be gained by Such a Declaration to Russia, however true and just it may in itself be. In Fact Russia might take advantage of it to Say in Reply, Well and Good. If I no longer hold Poland by the Treaty of Vienna, I am releasedfrom all the obligations which you Say the Treaty of Vienna imposed upon me. I now by your own admissionhold Poland by my own Strong Hand and Stark Sword; I am at Liberty to deal with Poland henceforwardas I chuse,and you have no Right to Say any Thing to me about Warsaw any more than about Moscow or Siberia. You might I think give way to Austria on this Point without any real Sacrifice. [The crucial part of the dispatch,asfinally senton 20 October, was modified as follows: "Her Majesty's Government acknowledgethat the relationsof RussiatowardsEuropeanPowersare regulatedby public law; but the Emperorof Russiahasspecial obligations in regard to Poland.
* G. & D. 22/22,PteRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell, October1863. to 8







Her Majesty'sGovernment have, in the despatchof August 11 and preceding despatches, shown that in regard to this particular
question the rights of Poland are contained in the same instru-

mentwhich constitutesthe Emperor.., King of Poland." Gorcakov,

in reply to this,, acknowledged "the friendly disposition" and "moderation" of the British Government.*]

Document 79. Palmerston Russell thedesigns and on of Russiain Asia, 1-2 August i86o"f The Russian Gov[ernmen]t perpetually declares that Russia wants no increase of Territory that the Russian Dominions are already too large and that the whole attention of the Gov[ernmen]t is directed to internal Improvement. But while makingin the mostsolemnManner theseDeclarations the Russian Gov[ernmen]t every year adds Large Tracts of Territory to the Russian Dominions, and the only
Shadow of Foundation for the above Disclaimer is, that these

yearlyacquisitions not madefor the Purpose addingso are of

much Territory to an Empire already too large but are carefully directed to the occupation of certain Strategical Points, as Starting Places for further encroachments or as Posts from whence some neighbouring States may be kept under Controul or may be threatened with Invasion. With regard to such matters at least, the assertionsof the Russian Gov[ernmen]t are not entitled to the slightest Confidence. P[ALMERSTON] 1/8/60. Lord Palmerston has returned the Draft to St. Petersburg about Russian Designsin Central Asia without alteration but with this comment. [L] This is all true enough but yet the transport of an army from Tiflis to the Punjab is no slight matter. Let the Despatch go tomorrow to Petersburg and the next day to Brunnow. AUG[UST] R[USSELL], 2
* Russell,Selections Speeches.. Despatches..., from .and [1870], n, 419-20. The statementin Salisbury,Essays Foreign on Politics,[1905], 202-4, that the dispatch wasamended because a suggestion GorSakov of of himselfseems quite unfounded. f B.M. Add. MSS. 38,991,PteLayard Papers, 170. Minutes by Palmerston, f.
I August 1860, Layard and Russell, 2 August 1860.








[The failure of Palmerston over Schleswig-Holstein was his greatest diplomatic defeat. The question was one about which the Austrian Minister reported Russell as knowing very little.
Palmerston had studied it for years and knew it in all its details.

Yet in this contestBismarck deceivedthis Nestor of diplomacy and outfaced a veteran practised in the calling of "bluffs".
A warning signal had been given by Bismarck to Disraeli (Doc. 80), but it cannot be proved that it ever came to the ears of
Palmerston or Russell. The other documents shew why, if it did,

these warnings were disregarded. Palmerston, whose military

knowledge was considerable, did not think that England's twenty thousand soldiers could stop three hundred thousand Prussiansand Austrians. As will be seen,he thought the French army infinitely superior to the Prussian, a military misconception

prevalent in England until 1870and held by so great a foreign military authority as Todleben. Now, during 1863,Palmerston hoped for French co-operationin favour of Denmark, until the very end of the year. Apart from this fact Palmerston, full of his belief in constitutionalism, believed that the arbitrary course of the King and
Bismarck's defiance of the Prussian Parliament must end in

disaster. Public opinion would not only stop Bismarck from war, it would lead him and his King to abdication, to exile and to the block. Palmerstonbelievednot only that the French army would
beat the Prussian but that the majority in the Prussian Parliament

would ultimately reduce Bismarck and his King to submission.

He was thus the victim of a double blunder, as the documents

shew. They suggestthat Bismarck is "crazy", that his unconstitutional methods stimulate assassins murder his King, and to

risk the loyalty of the Rhine province. Between July and August 1863 Palmerston and Russell were obsessed the notion that by France would destroy Prussia if it came to blows, and that Bismarck and his King would be drowned by the rising tide of






parliamentarianism. It is easy to understand then why Palmerston made his fatal boast that if certain (i.e. German) Powers attacked Denmark, it would not be "Denmark alone" with whom

they might have to fight. This utterance was at the time a fair
representation of the political situation. Napoleon was anxious

to act with England, Russiawas not yet alienated. But before the end of the year British policy over Poland had estranged both Russia and France. Napoleon had also been deeply wounded by a British refusal to attend a Congress. It was at that unfortunate
juncture that Palmerston's boast was remembered.]

Document 80. Disraeli on Bismarck*s designs the and PalmerstonGovernment, July 1862* 9
[Bismarck visited England in June 1862. The famous conversation he is alleged to have had with Disraeli has sometimes been
discredited. He is said to have used these words: "As soon as the

army shall have been brought into such a condition as to inspire respect, I shall seize the first best pretext to declare war against
Austria, dissolve the German Diet, subdue the minor States, and

give national unity to Germany under Prussian leadership."!

Apponyi's account makes it probable that the substance of this

utterance is authentic. Only the insistenceon the " I" is different. Apponyi makes Bismarck give his policy as one for Prussia, not necessarily one for himself.]

What I know is that he [Bismarck] has seen Mr Disraeli and said to him that Germany could only find her safety in the supremacy of Prussia, and that according to him the only policy for Prussia to follow was to do in Germany what Sardinia had done in Italy. Mr Disraeli in relating these proposals to one of my colleagues added that he had enough confidence in the existing English Cabinet to be convinced that they would reject such insinuations and never lend a hand in projects of
this kind.
* W.S.A. vm/64, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 51 B of 9 July 1862, ff. 24-5. The usual account is that given by Vitzthum von Eckstaedt, St Petersburg London, [1887], n, 172. W. H. Dawson, The GermanEmpire., and [I9I9l> I3 158-61, questions the account on the ground that Bismarck said he
was about to become Minister-President of Prussia, a fact not then certain. But it will be seen that, according to Apponyi, he made no such claim.

Buckle, Life of Disraeli, [1916], rv, 341.





81. Palmerston and Russell on Bismarck and

French military strength, 1860-3

i. 8 October 1860.* ... I had no Idea that Prussia had such serious Intentions

of attacking France during the late Italian war as these Papers disclose.Ma Foi elleFa chapp6e belle. Shewould have been fairly Trounced if she had carried her Intentions into execution, and her Rhenish Provinces would by this Time havebeen Part of the French Empire.... ii. 21 Januaryi86i.|
... It may be doubtful whether Prussiais not falling into a Trap about her Quarrel with Denmark and whether France may not be lying in wait for a Rupture betweenthoseParties
to side with Denmark and threaten Rhenish Prussia.. ..

iii. 3 March 18634 ... The French probably thought that Prussiawould not or could not back out of their agreementwith Russia,and that

if She did not do so upon the Representation England of France and Austria France would have a fine opportunity of occupyingthe RhenishProvinces, ostensibly a Measure as of Coercion but intending that Measureto end in Conquest. Peoplesay that the Conductof the King of Prussiais making his Subjectsin those RhenishProvincesturn their Thoughts much towards France.
iv. 27 June 1863.

Thisishighly probableandindeedmoretfian probable,and the gentlemenat Frankfurt and the crazy Minister at Berlin
* G. & D. 22/21, Pte Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, 8 October 1860.

Palmerston just seen had papers relatingto Prussia's military preparations the on
Rhine in 1859.

t G. & D, 22/21,PteRussell Papers, Palmerston Russell, January 1861. to 21

t G, & D.zzlzz, PteRussell Papers. Palmerstonto Russell,3 March 1863. At this time there was a secret Treaty between France and Russia. V. B. H.

Simmer,'The SecretFranco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859% Eng. Hist.

Rev.XLvm, [January 1933],65-83.

B.M. Add. MSS.38,989, Layard Pte Papers, 147. Palmerston Russell, f. to

27 June 1863,with note by Russell, 10July. It is not clear to what "This" in

the first line refers. A similar letter (26 December1863)from Palmerston to Walpole,Life of LordJohnRussell, [1889],n, 388n.

Russell says"the Frenchwould walk over" the Prussian army, o. Spencer


[Bismarck] should have this impressedupon them. Any aggressiveMeasure of Germany ag[ains]t Denmark would most likely lead to an aggressive move of France ag[ains]t Germany.,and speciallyag[ains]t Prussiathe main instigator of such aggression. The PrussianProvinceswould at once be occupied by France and in the presentstate of the Prussian
army its system of drill Formation and movements, the first
Serious Encounter between it and the French would be little

lessdisastrousto Prussiathan the Battle of Jena. P[ALMERSTON] 27/6-63. Baron Gros told me that the Pr[ussian] Government] was about to make representations in Germany similar to Mine. A war of France ag[ain]st Germany would be no light matter. R[USSELL] JULY [1863] 10
Document 82. Palmerston Russelladvise King of and the PrussiaandBismarckto beconstitutional, 1863 i. Palmerston, June 1863.* 27 a. C[oun]t Bismarck might be privately told that if The King's Life is in Danger G[oun]t B[ismarck] and the unwise and unconstitutional system he is persuading the King to adopt were the true Causesof that Danger. P[ALMERSTON] 27/6/63. b. C [oun] t Bismarck might be reminded that the Insurrection in Poland was provoked by the notorious violation of the Treaty of Vienna by Russia, and that it does not seem [fit] for Prussia one of the Parties to that Treaty to assistRussia in maintaining her violation of that Treaty. P[ALMERSTON] 27/6/63. ii. Russell,17-19 August1863.! ...What will the King of Prussiado? but abdicate, I guess. R[USSELL] AUG. 63. 17
* P.O. 96/27. Rough Notes by Palmerstonunder this date. t B.M. Add. MSS. 38,989, Pte LayardPapers, 254, Russell to Layard, f.
17 August 1863.




[Russell gives instructions to write privately to Lowther regretting the King of Prussia'sdecision to refuse to attend the Council of German Princessummonedby the Emperor of Austria.] There can be no Germany without Prussia. R[USSELL] AUG.19 63.*
Document 83. Palmerston thesituationin September on 1863!

... These German Gentlemen appear to be determined to mettre le feu aux Etoupes,as Bulow usedto say. When we remonstrate with them it is the old story of the shoulder of mutton which one Thief had not got and which the other had not stolen. Austria and Prussia say that execution dependson the other Members of the Diet, and the other Members say it all dependson Austria and Prussia. But they ought all to understand that they are beginningan affair the endof which may be different from the Beginning, and not by any means
agreeable to them.

Document 84. Palmerston's warning to those who attemptto attackDenmark,23 July 1863^

.., There is no usein disguisingthe fact that what is at the bottom of the German design, and the desire of connecting Schleswigwith Holstein, is the dream of a German fleet, and the wish to get Kiel asa Germanseaport.That may be a good reason why they should wish it; but it is no reason why they should violate the rights and independenceof Denmark for an object which, evenif accomplished, would not realize the expectationof thosewho aim at it. The hon. Gentleman [Mr Seymour Fitzgerald]asks what is the policy and the course of Her Majesty'sGovernmentwith regard to that dispute. As I have alreadysaid,we concur entirely with him, and I am

satisfied with all reasonable in Europe,includingthose men


* B.M. Add. MSS. 38,989,Pte LayardPapers, 258, 19 August. Note by f.

f G. & D. 22/22, Russell Pte Papers. Palmerston Russell, September to 29 1863.

J Hans. Deb.,3rd Ser.,CLXXH, 1252,23July 1863.


in France and Russia, in desiring that the independence, the integrity, and the rights of Denmark may be maintained. We are convinced-I am convinced at least-that if

any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights and interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt would find in the result, that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend. 30. THE BRITISH




[No event affected Europe in general, or England in particular, more than the British refusal of Napoleon's invitation to a European Congress. It divided France and England just when their united strength was needed to opposeAustria's and Prussia's attempt on Schleswig-Holstein. By the end of 1863 Napoleon was sorely embarrassed. There

were hints of disasterover his venturein Mexico; Prussiahad

rudely repelled his attempt at intervention in Poland. He blamed England for failing to support him in both cases. He therefore

proposed to redeem his reputation by summoning a European

Congress at Paris. He would settle the problems of Italy, Schleswig-Holstein, Rumania, Poland. He hoped that England would

help him to restore his damaged reputation. Palmerston saw in

this proposal a trap. His distrust of Napoleon, since the annexation of Nice and Savoy, had been increased since the Polish

imbroglio. A Congress might enable Napoleon to carve Europe

and escapefrom all the remaining bonds of the Treaty of Vienna. Palmerston began his attack on the proposal by a historical sketch. This was on the lines of previous arguments both by himself (1849) and by Russell (supra,pp. 206-8). On this occasion, moreover, Russell was not wholly unfavourable to the idea of a Congressuntil 18 November. But the arrival of a new letter from

Palmerstonclinched his decision,and on the igth he informed the

Austrian Minister of the British decision.

Prussia had already accepted Napoleon's invitation, though

with some reservations. Austria ultimately refused though with

some courtesy. England's refusal, which was proclaimed to the

world, completed the final severance between Napoleon and England, and it was Schleswig-Holstein which felt the results of
that severance.]





Document 85. Palmerston thegeneral on functionsof a Congress, November 8 1863* This Proposal of a Congressseemsto require very serious Consideration.We might simply accept,or simply refuseor ask what Questionswould be considered,and what excluded.
At the End of a war when States of Territorial Possession

have been forcibly changed,a Congress may be necessary in

order to Settle what should thenceforward be the Boundaries

of Statesand the Rights of Sovereigns; and so it was in 1815, and to a less Degree in 1856 after the war with Russia. But what are the unsettled Territorial Questions of the present Day? The arrangementsof Vienna of 1815 have in many Instances it is true been modified, and in some violently set aside, the modifications were sanctioned at the Time by Treaties, are we prepared now to legalize the violations-to some we should willingly give our Sanction from others we should withold it. The Separation of Belgium from Holland was a modification regularly Sanctioned at the Time and not

requiring any freshassent. The Elevationof Napoleonto the

Throne was a setting aside, not of the general Treaty of 1815,

but of a separate Engagement, it hasbeensanctioned but by the acknowledgement all civilized Nations and requiresno of
Confirmation. The Transfer of Lombardy to Pie[d]mont was an alteration of the Treaty of Vienna, but was sanctioned by the Treaty of Villa Franca. The Cession Nice and Savoy of to France were alterations of the Vienna Treaty, but were regularized by Treaty, only that in the Caseof Savoy the Stipulation of Vienna about the Neutrality of Chablais and Fraucigny has been dropped. The Cessionrequires no Confirmation, and we should not sanctionthe leaving out of the neutrality Condition. Theseare the Changesmade by formal Compactsat the Time. There are somemade without proper Sanction, someof which we could... not sanction. The annexation of Tuscany, Parma Modena Emilia Naplesand Sicily to the Kingdom of Italy, were all Breaches of the Treaty of
* G. & D. 22/22, PteRussell Papers.Palmerston to Russell, 8 November 1863.


Vienna which have as far as I recollect received


no direct

Europeansanction by any formal Treaty. To theseTransactions however we should most willingly give our sanction. Cracow has been swallowed up by Austria in violation of the Vienna Treaty, are we prepared to give our formal sanction to that absorption? perhaps it was sure to happen sooner or later, for a little Republic could hardly be long lived between Three Military Powers. The Kingdom of Poland has been misgoverned in violation of the Vienna Treaty but Russiadoesnot seeminclined to govern it better. Well then there are Two Functions which the Congress would, or might have to perform. The first to make regular, the Changesthat have practically been accomplished and those are chiefly what I have just mentioned. The other Function would be to bring about and to sanction changes which are wished for, or which would be desirable. This last Function might range over a wide Field, and would give

Riseto moreDifference than agreement.

Many Sovereignsand States wish to have what belongs to their Neighbours, but are there many of those neighbours who would consent to the Cessionsasked of them, and is the Congress be invested with the Power possessed that of to by Vienna in 1815: to compel submission to its Decrees? Does the Emperor conceive that his Congresswould give its Seal to his Map of Europe of 186a? If there was any chance that a Congress would give Moldo Wallachia to Austria and Venetia and Rome to Italy and incorporate Sleswig with Denmark, and separate the Poland of 1815 from Russia and make it an independent State not touching the Question of The Rhine as a French Frontier nor the relieving Russia from what was imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris such a Congress would be a well doer by Europe but such Results can scarcely be expected. The Congress-if it met would probably separate without any important Results. But there would be France and Russia on one side, England and Austria on the other and the other Statesacting according to their views of the Questions discussed. What States are to be represented? Coursethe 5 who signedthe Vienna Treaty, of



and probably Turkey in addition as well as Italy. But I see the German Confederation, and the SwissConfederationare to be invited. Switzerland is an independent aggregate,but the German Confederationconsists partly of Delegates from Powers who would have Representatives their own. *of Would Belgiumand Holland be represented.Here would be 13 or 14 States some of them no Doubt with Two Representatives.What a Babel of Tonguesand what a Confusionof
Interests. It is not likely that war would follow out of it, but there would not be much Chance of any considerable

Results. I doubt whether we should evenget Spain to give

up her Slave Trade, or France to abide [by] and faithfully to
execute her abandonment of that Crime.

Document 86. Paimerstorf particular objections a s to Congress, November 18 1863*

[Russell, in an interview with the Austrian Ambassador two days after (v. Doc. 87), also deprecated a Congress. Count

Apponyi indicated that Austria would be unfavourable. Russell

seems to have been converted by Palmerston's letter and this

interview (v. supra., 253).] p.

I think your proposedLine of answerto the Emperor is the safe and the true one. A Congressmeeting to discussthe Affairs of Poland, Italy, Denmark and Moldo Wallachia, could come to no other Result than that of formally recording, and making more irreconcileable, fundamental Differencesof Interests and Opinions. Why should we expect Russia to be more willing to concedeto Europe about Poland in verbal Controversyround a Table, than shehasbeenin courteous diplomatic Communications, and if the Congresswere to obtain no Concession from Russia,Europewould haveno Choiceexceptsubmitting to Humiliation or reverting to war. Italy would be an equally unpromising Subject of Discussion. Would the Congress have merely to record and establish by EuropeanSanctionthe present Condition of Italy, as
to territorial Possession, would it be asked to restore some or
* G. & D. 22/22,Pte Russell Papers. Palmerston Russell, November to 18 1863.



Parts of Italy to former owners, or would it be invited to urge and to Sanction further Transfers and Changes.The first of these arrangementswould not suit Austria, the Pope or the King of Italy. Austria and the Pope would not like to sanction by Treaty the changesand Transfers already made; The King of Italy would not like to record by such a Treaty
his abandonment of all Pretension would to Venetia and Rome. and the French The second alternative suit Austria

Emperor, especiallythe latter who is bent upon separating Naples from the Italian Kingdom, and on restoring a Separate Monarchy of the Two Sicilies. But this would not suit the Italians if they are wise, though from what I have heard from some of them, I suspect that in their present shortsighted Turn of mind, they would give up the Ten Million Neapolitans and Sicilians in Exchange for Venetia if they could so get it. But this would be a bad European arrangement, Naples and Sicily ought to remain as they now are, a Part of united Italy. As to the last alternative the Task would be hopeless. Who can expect that at present at least Austria would give up Venetia, or that the Emperor would throw over the Pope. As to Austria we know that if any Proposalswere made about a Cessionof Venetia, She would leave the Congress. If indeed the Schemewhich you say Aali is inclined to, could be effected, and the Moldo Wallachian Provinces could be given to Austria in Exchange for Venetia, Italy making money Compensationto Turkey, sucha Scheme would be good for Austria, Italy, and Turkey, but would no Doubt be much opposedby Russia,and probably objected to by the Moldo

The Two really European Questionsbeing thus put aside there remain only the Dispute between Denmark and the
Diet and the Contumacy of Prince Couza and neither of these

Matters, as you justly observe seem to be in their nature of sufficient Magnitude and Importance to require that Europe should assemblein Congress,in order to settle them. The State of Europe in 1815 was wholly different from
what it is now.

At that Time

the Success of French

arms had



swept away most of the territorial Boundaries, and separate Sovereignties which existedbefore 1792; The Tide of Conquest which at first ran from West to East, then returned back from East to West and swept away almost all that France had established. Europe was a political Waste, and required the action of a Body of Inclosure Commissioners to allot the Lands and to give holding Titles. This was done at Vienna in 1814 and 1815. But nothing of the Kind exists in 1863, and nobody wants an improved Title to any Possession except those who ought not to get it, as for Instance
Russia to the Kingdom of Poland, Austria to Cracow,

France to Savoywithout neutrality and the Popeto what he

holds and as much as he could get back. It is quite certain that the Deliberations of a Congress would consist of Demands and Pretensionsput forward by some, and resolutely resisted by others and that there being no Supreme Authority in Such an assemblyto enforcethe Opinions or Decisionsof the Majority, The Congress would separateleaving Many of the Memberson WorseTerms with Each other than when they met.* Document 87. Russell's account the Cabinet'sdecision of to refuse Congress, November the 19 1863! [Palmerston's letter (Doc. 86) was written to Russellthe day
before the Cabinet meeting of 19 November. On the 20th Count

Apponyi cameto tell him formally what he had alreadyprivately

indicated on the i8th, that Austria would refuse to attend, and

Russell addressedhim as follows.]

It was essential... to know the questions which Napoleon III meant to submit to the deliberations of the Congress. We have lately had confidential but certain information on the subject. They were first, Poland; then the relations of Germany and Denmark; then the affairs of Italy; finally thoseof the Danubian principalities. I admit theseto be the
* There are two other letters from Palmerston printed in Ashley's Life,

[1876], n, 236-44, one of 15 November 1863to Leopold King of the Belgians

and the other of a December to Russell.

t W.S.A. vni/67, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 87A of 22 November 1863, ff. 434-9, reporting an interview with Russell of the 2oth.



four most important questionsand that a Congress could not assemble without occupying itself with them. On the other hand, not one of these questions could hope to be satisfactorily solved in a Congress, or would not lead, after estrangement of interests and irremediable disputes, inevitably to war. We could no longer hesitatewhen we once had this conviction, and in the cabinet council of yesterday we decided to decline to take part in the Congress. I had already prepared a despatch giving our motives; it was approved by Lord Palmerston and my other colleagues and this morning I have submitted it to the Queen, who gave her
cordial assent.*

[The dispatch was ultimately sent under date of 25 November 1863. It was actually published in the Gazetteon the 27th before
the French Government received it. This circumstance and the

sharpnessof the dispatch itself were deeply resentedby Napoleon,


[Palmerston's boast of July 1863 had suggested that England would defend the integrity of Denmark. England's refusal to

join Napoleon's Congressmade it unlikely that France would

support Palmerston in any such defence. It was soon to be re-

vealed that neither Queen, Cabinet nor Parliament would support

him either.

It is necessary explain the situation by a few brief words4 to

The essential point is to realize that the Danish kingdom had attached to it three Duchies, Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. All these were juridically distinct from Denmark proper, that is they had certain rights and privileges of their own. Holstein and Lauenburg were overwhelmingly German and Holstein, as a

member of the Bund or German Diet, was entitled to its protection. The Danish attempt to interfere with the rights, or to alter
the status of Holstein, was therefore certain to be resented and

likely to lead to war. There had been actual war between the

German powers and Denmark after the revolution of 1848and it

is of historic importance that it was Russell and Palmerston who
* The Queen had already told King Leopold "this Congress is in fact an impertinence" [12 November 1863], Lettersof Queen Victoria,and Ser., [1926],

t The text is in Hertslet, Map, [1875], n, 1583-8. J The general situation is very well summarized in Gooch, Later Cone" spondenceLord John Russell,[1925], n, Chap, xv - and generally v. L. D. Steefel, of The Schleswig-Holstein Question, Harvard Press,[1932].




patched up a peaceand avoided a general war. It was a casein

which a goodtemporarysettlement produceda permanentunrest. And the two British negotiators paid the price by seeing their patchwork torn to pieces. The instrument which pacified the north was signed at London by Malmesbury for England on 8 May 18512. really represented It the ideas of Palmers and Russell.* This settlement was a good ton
one for the time being, but it had several defects. It was not

signed by the German Bund, but by Austria and Prussiaas individual powers. It did not guarantee the settlement, it merely acknowledgedthe integrity of the Danish monarchy and declared it an important element in the Balance of European Power. Similarly, Prince Christian of Glucksburg was simply acknowledged as heir to the childless King Frederick. There was no guarantee but merely an acknowledgment by the signatory
powers (i.e. Austria, England, France, Russia, Prussia and

Sweden). This amounted merely to a suggestionthat none of the signatory powers (e.g. Austria or Russia) were likely to disturb the integrity of Denmark. If they did, France and England gave
no pledge to defend Denmark by force of arms. If France were

friendly and public opinion favourable in England the two

together would doubtless prevent Russia and Austria from attacking Denmark. That is what Palmerston hoped would

happen when he made his boastin July 1863. But, if France were f estrangedfrom England and Palmerston was opposedin his own Cabinet or by the majority in Parliament, Denmark would be at the mercy of Austria and Prussia.That is what actually happened
in 1864.

The secondpoint left doubtful was the nature of the settlement. It was hoped of coursethat Denmark would govern Schleswigand Holstein according to their old privileges. But there was nothing except their own promiseswhich could compel the Danes to do
so. Holstein was predominantly German, Schleswig was receiving an increasing quantity of German settlers, German nationalism was a rising tide. A violent chauvinism reigned in

Denmark of which the childlessKing Frederick had to take notice. He finally tried to solvethe difficulty by granting self-government to Holstein and incorporating Schleswig in Denmark. This compromisepleasednobody. Palmerstonand Russellhad at first been by no meansfriendly to the Germans.When Mr John Ward produced a memorandum

favourableto their claims,Palmerston would not publish it as a

* Text of the Treaty of 8 May 1852in Hertslet, Map, [1875], n 1151-5-

It is really a formal recognition the protocolalreadysignedunder Palmerof ston'smediationby all the Powers above mentioned exceptPrussia, August 2
1850, cp. ibid, n, 1137-8. V. supra,p. 249.





Blue Book.* In the autumn of 1862 Lord John Russell went to

Gotha, came under German influences, and wrote the famous

"Gotha dispatch". This was really a settlement of the SchleswigHolstein difficulties on moderate German lines. The attempt failed and the crisis became graver. The Prince of Wales became betrothed to a Danish Princess in the autumn of this year, and married her in March 1863. In the same month King Frederick

issued a declaration proclaiming his intention to take action against the Duchy of Holstein, which was practically in revolt.
Russell pressed King Frederick to abandon his purpose. He not

only refused, but prepared a new constitution unifying all the provinces. He proposed to unite Schleswig,Holstein and Lauenburg under the Danish Crown, and destroy all their separaterights and privileges.
Frederick VII died suddenly leaving his new unifying and revolutionary constitution unsigned. The Prince of Glucksburg succeededwith the title of Christian IX and, after a few days of hesitation, signed and issued the new constitution, unifying all his dominions, on 18 November 1863. He would probably have lost

his throne if he had not thus given way to Danish public opinion. Yet it was impossible for the German Bund as a whole, or for Austria or Prussiaseparately, to accept such a defiance. Holstein
was a member of the Bund and obviously the German powers could not let her be treated as an integral part of Denmark. It was the moment for her to free herself from what she thought unjust coercion. The Duchy of Holstein refused allegiance to the new King. The Prince of Augustenburg claimed both Schleswig and Holstein and many Germans supported him. Austria declined to receive the Danish envoy sent to announce the accession

of the new King.

doubted that

Prussia followed suit. No one seems to have

Bund had determined on a Federal

the German

Execution, which meant that German troops would occupy Holstein. The Danish King revoked the March patent on 4 December, but this step, urged by Russell, passed almost unnoticed. to affect The furies were the situation. unloosed and concession was too late

Russell sent Lord Wodehouse as special envoy to Denmark to congratulate the new King on his accession. He seized the opportunity to define British policy. There seem to have been

strugglesin the Cabinet, becauseRussell'soriginal draft implied


a threat of war".

Eventually the instructions recommended

cc patienceand impartiality" to the Great Powers,and instructed

Wodehouse (No. 4 of 9 December) to "point out to M. de Bismarck the dangers of any execution in Holstein by German
* I.e. in 1857. I* was only published in pursuance of an addressin 1864, v. A. & P., [1864], LXV, [3292], 729-41; cp. Temperley and Penson, Century of DiplomaticBlue Books,No. 660.





troops at the present time, but you will not press this point, if it should appear inexpedient to do so".* Wodehouse in his interview with "M. de Bismarck" tried to stress the binding character of the Treaty of 1852,as pledging the Powersto preserve the integrity of Denmark. But Bismarck met him with the telling argument that the King of Denmark had already broken the pledges with regard to the position of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. Article III of the 1852Treaty said "the reciprocal Rights and Obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark, and of the Germanic Confederation [Bund], concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, Rights and Obligations established by the Federal Act of 1815, and by the existing Federal Right, shall not be affected by the present Treaty ".f The Bund found it impossible to give way over this and on 24 December the German

Bund troops entered Lauenburg and Holstein for purposesof

Federal Execution.

Doc. 88 shews what Russell thought, just before the Federal

troops had entered Holstein, but when he regarded their invasion

as inevitable. It will be seen that, while he does not propose to take action because of the German occupation in Holstein, he hints that a German occupation of Schleswig will be a casus belli

for England. Events movedquickly. AustriaancfPrussia decided to occupy Schleswig, The Bund wanted to support the claims of
the German prince Augustenburg, Austria and Prussiato uphold the Treaty of 1852. The Bund refused to occupy Schleswig,
Austria and Prussia decided to do so-and sent an ultimatum to

Denmark on 16 January demanding the withdrawal of the

November Constitution in forty-eight hours.]

Document 88. Russelltalks to Apponyion the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, 19 December 1863^

The question of Schleswig-Holstein played a great part in my last interview with the Principal Secretaryof State.... While taking into account the difficulties which involve the
* The dispatches in P.O. 21i/i 10.To Lord Wodehouse, are Nos. 4 & 5 of 9
December 1863 (v, also P.O. 22/306, which shewsthat both were seenby the

Cabinet and the Queen). G. & D. 22/273PteRussell Papers, containsa seriesof commentsby membersof the Cabinet modifying the original dispatch. These are not given by L. D. Steefel,TheSchleswig-Holstein Question, [1932], 137-8. From Wodehouse, 3 of 12 December 1863,reporting Bismarck,No. 6 of No.
13 December, reporting King William, P.O. 211/110. Bismarck repeated this

argument to Austria-"no fulfilment of the Danish obligations of 1851-2, no Treaty of London", L. D. Steefel,The Schleswig-Holstein Question, [1932], 100. t Hertslet, Map, [1875], n, 1153. J W.S.A. vm/67, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 93A of 19 December1863.



position of the two great German powers [Austria and Prussia] and doing justice to their moderation, at least as comparedwith the exaggerations ultra-German fanaticism, of Lord Russelldeeply regretsand is seriouslyalarmed at the
determination of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to con-

sider the Treaty of London asinvalid in their eyes, unlessthe Danishconstitutionof 18 November[1863] *swithdrawn, in so far as it relates to Schleswig,between now and the ist of January. He hopes,in fact, that this concession be made will and that the Cabinet and Rigsraad [Parliament] of Copenhagen will be induced by the efforts of European diplomacy to make this concession easyfor the [Danish] King who is personally in favour of it. But if this arrangement fails, would that be reason enough to consider the Treaty as null and to deliver Denmark to anarchy, thus opening anew the question of the succession with all the train of different claims and more or less contested or contestable rights? In such conduct England would only seethe manifest violation of a solemn treaty and a greater danger for Austria and Prussia than that which they would run by resisting the tide of German popular passions. Lord Russell hopes that the measure of federal execution
will be limited to Holstein: but even in such case can they

prevent the separatistparty organizing itself, under the protection of federal bayonets, and proclaiming the Prince of Augustenburg? Can they prevent the Pretender himself from entering the Duchy and putting himself at the head of his partisans? Can they avoid a conflict with the Danish troops near the bridgeheadsof Frederichstadt and Rendsburg which the Danes seemdetermined to defend? Those are the complicationsto be fearedand the Principal Secretary
of State fears Austria and Prussia will be drawn further than

they intended at the outset, and without wishing to be. In such casethe affair would assume very disturbing proportions,
the British Government could not answer, from now onwards,

for the attitude which circumstancesmight impose on it. Having pressed interlocutor to know if he saw a possible my case in which the Government would actively take part in



favour of Denmark he answered me, begging me however to consider his words confidential and private, that if the German Powers, for example, repudiated the Treaty of London, contested King Christian's sovereignty over Denmark, invaded Schleswig, and supported there the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg, England might consider these acts as a cams belli, and lend Denmark the aid of her fleet.* The sympathiesof the British public for the Danish cause were stronger than was generally believed, especiallysince the marriageof the Princeof Walesand despitethe desireand interest the country had in the maintenance of peace, he would not be astonishedto seepublic opinion on fire for this causeas for that of Poland and of Italy. Lord Russell doesnot doubt our goodwill nor even that of the Cabinet of Berlin, to circumscribe the question as far as possiblewithin reasonable and moderatelimits, and he still hopesthese dispositions, joined to the effortsof British French and Russiandiplomacy, will succeedin producing a peaceful

He told me that, sofar as he knew, General Fleuryf had no preciseinstructions and was only charged to declare that, whatever happened, Denmark ought not to count on the material support of France....
learnt of the Austro-Prussian ultimatum. They shew that his fear

[Palmerston expressed viewsin January1864 whenhehadjust

was a German unification of Schleswig-Holstein.They shew also

that, despite boasts,he had no intention of going to war for his Schleswig alone. Moreover, by 27 January one thing was quite clear to the whole Cabinet-France would not join England in using force to defend Denmark. Palmerston, however, still J recommendedtrying to obtain "the co-operation of France in diplomatic[i.e. not military] action". It was all in vain. On
i February the Prussian forces crossedinto Holstein followed after
* Thisseems be the extentof Russell's to threat, v.infra,pp. 274-5; alsoG. & D.

22/23, Russell Pte Papers^ Gladstone Russell, July 1864. "I apprehend to i that your 'menaces', far astheywerespecific, reference as had whollyto the invasion of Schleswig; that theywereconfined theperiodbefore [Russell] and to you were aware therewould be no cooperation that beyonda moral one by Franceand
Russia maintaining the Treaty of 1852." in f Frenchdiplomatist on specialmission, 1864., initialled by Gladstone,27January 1864,

* G. & D. 22/27, Russell ?& Papers. Minuteby George Grey,26January



a short time by the Austrians. This stepwasnot opposed the by

German Bund, which remained content with' Federal Execution

in Holstein. Now the seriousness this steplay in the fact that of



Austria and Prussia were signatories of the Treaty of 1852,wnicn

the Bundwasnot. Hencetheywerebreakingthe Treaty., relying

on the pretextthat Denmark broken first. Austriaand had it

Prussiamaintained,however,that they were merely occupying
Schleswig as a "material guarantee" to induce Denmark to see

Document89. Palmerstonthe on obligationstheTreaty of of

1852 on Denmarkand Germany., January 1864* 18

... I tookgreatPainsin the Negotiations whichled to the Treaty of 1852to obtain from the Germans abandonment an of this Pretension a Sleswig-Holstein and youwill to State; seeby looking back to the Correspondence in the that
Negotiations and Interchange of Engagements the Course in

of whichDenmark promised to incorporate not Sleswig with

Denmark, the, Germansrenouncedtheir Demand for the

Union of Sleswig with Holstein. Germans The cannot with

Justice or Reasonclaim the Engagementof Denmark not to incorporate Sleswig and in the same Breath retract their

Engagement to ask for the union of Sleswig not with



90. Palmerston'*s advice to Denmark,

19 January 1864!

... What has happened about Holstein ought to be a Lesson them [The Danes]. If they had revokedthe Patent to of March 63 in proper Time, Holstein would not have been

occupied German by Troops...If they nowquicklyrepeal

the new Constitution as it regards Sleswig,Austria and Prussia

will have no Pretence invading Sleswig.... for Denmark mustnot suppose any of its non German that Allieswould
go to war with all Germanyin order to expel the Austrian

andPrussian Troops fromSleswig uponthemere Question of

* G. & D. 22/15,PteRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell, January 1864. to 18
For Russell's view of the German violation of their pledges v. infra, pp. 273-5-

f G. & D. 22/23,?& Russell Papers. Palmerston Russell, January 1864 to 19

The Danish King had revoked the "March Patent" on 4 December1863,
too late.





whether Sleswig and Holstein should be administratively united into one Duchy to be held by the King of Denmark or whether they shouldremain with separateinternal organization. Great Powers like Russia may persevere in wrong doing, and other Statesmay not like to make the Effort necessary compelling it to take the right Course. But no for suchImpunity in wrongis possessed a smallandweakState by
like Denmark. Such a State is sure to be coerced by its

StrongerNeighbours,and common Prudenceand a Regard for its own Interests and safetymust counselit to set itself right with the least possibleDelay....
Document 91. Discussion Cabinet of members hearing on that Francewill not use force.,26-7 January 1864* I do not think that theseDespatches deprive us of the Hope of the Cooperationof Francein diplomatic [i.e. non-military] action for the Maintenance of the Treaty and*of the Integrity of Denmark, and if no diplomatic action was ever to take
Place unless there was beforehand a formed Intention to

follow it up by Force there would be an end to all Negotiation and it would be better to begin by an Ultimatum and follow it up by an immediate Blow.... -or -i c / /c r 7 P[ALMERSTON] 26/1/64. We now know that France will not join us in the use of
force in defence of Denmark....

G[EORGE] G[REY] 26 JAN[UARY]1864. W. E. GLADSTONE] JAN[UARY] 1864. 27 It is quite clear... that France will not risk war in order to support the treaty of 1852-that is the integrity of the present Danish territory. But I do not think that Lord Russell ever proposed that we sh[oul]d do so. His original proposalwasto

offermaterialassistance the eventof an attemptto placethe in Duke of Augustenburg directly or indirectly in possession of
Schleswig.... & ~r -. TA7r n r n C[HARLES] W[OOD] [26 JANUARY 1864].
* G. & D. 22/27, Pte Russell Papers. The final conviction as to the refusal of

Franceto useforcewasdueto a dispatch 25January 1864 of from Gowley.



DON 1864


25 APRIL-25


[The Cabinethad considered rejectedthe useof forceearly and in January. On 2 FebruaryDerby, the leaderof the Opposition, made a pacific speech,largely under royal influence. But the invasion of Holstein by Austro-Prussianforces on i February
created a new situation. Palmerston even thought that the

Austro-Prussians might occupy Copenhagenand on 21 February

the Channel fleet was ordered home, and the intention to send a

British squadron to Copenhagenwas made known to France and

Russia.* They were asked to join in the naval demonstration. Here, however, Russell had gone too far, and the Cabinet took steps to check any demonstration. On 24 February they decided in effect to revoke their previous decision and inform France and Russia that there was no more question of sending the fleet to Copenhagen. They were satisfied with Austro-Prussian assurances

and did not believethat an attack by the Austrian fleet was any longer contemplated. As England thus subsidedFrance became
more bellicose, especially as the Austro-Prussian troops went

beyond Holstein into pure Danish territory and invaded Jutland.

This fact was known in Paris on 21 February. It created a new situation once more. Denmark, with her own kingdom invaded,
was at last really at war with Austria and Prussia. But none the

less, as before related, the British Cabinet had decided against sending the fleet on 24 February, with no dissentients save Palmerston and the Chancellor, f On the same day Russia, in ignorance of this decision, refused the previous British request to join in a naval demonstration. Her attitude was due partly to the

fact that Russianshipswere bound in ice in the Gulf of Finland

till mid-May. It was also due to the Tsar's hatred and suspicion

of Napoleon III, whom he wished to keep in isolation, and to his

friendly feeling for Bismarck. Austro-Prussians had invaded Jutland on 20 February. This advance may have been an accident due to military ardour or strategic reasons,but it had the important result of clarifying the situation. Austria agreed reluctantly to support the invasion of

Jutland in a Convention of 6 March which she signed with

Prussia. As hostilities had already begun at seabetween Denmark and the German lands the whole basis of things was changed,

War dissolves treatiesand thus destroyedthe great aim of Russell, which had been to maintain the integrity of the Treaty of 1852.
* V. L. D. Steefel, The Schlesuuig-Holstein Question, [1932]., 178.

"f Ibid. 179,199-200;v. alsoLetters Queen of Victoria, Ser., [1926],i3160-8. 2nd





All he could do, therefore, was to press on the negotiations for a Conference of the Powers at London. Clarendon, who had just entered the Cabinet, went on a private mission to Paris, but

Napoleon declaredquite frankly he was not prepared to go to war with Germany. Russell'sonly resourcewould have been to offer France compensation the Rhine-and that was all against on
his and Palmerston's ideas.* Then finally on 18April the Prussians

capturedDiippel, thussecuringa bridge-headinto the isle of Alsen. The Conferenceopened at London on 25 April 1864. It included representativesfrom Great Britain, Austria, Denmark,
France, the German Bund, Prussia, Russia and Sweden. All of

the territory of Lauenburg and Holstein was occupied by German troops; Austro-Prussian troops occupied all Schleswig except Alsen and part of Poland. An Austrian naval squadron was, it was thought, about to proceed through the Channel and North
Sea to reinforce the German fleet in the Baltic. Palmerston,

always sensitive as to naval movements, determined to stop this one and had an interview with Apponyi, the Austrian Minister, a for the purpose, on i May. This is what he called ce notch off my own bat55. It was followed by heated discussionin the Cabinet as to how far the incident should be recorded in a dispatch. There were remonstrances from the Queen and the wnole ended in a rather feeble compromise between RusselPsdirect demands and
the milder views of the Cabinet. The account of the conversation

here given is that of Apponyi, which confirms, but considerably amplifies, Palmerston's own version. f A careful study of the whole incident shewshow far England's reputation had already sunk, if

evenPalmerston could speak her asbeingconsideredpoltronne5' of c

in Germany. There is something pathetic in his claim to divine the instincts of that public in England which had so recently deserted him.]

Document 92. Palmerston warnsAustria againstsending a fleet to theBaltic, i May 1864^

The First Minister opened the interview by saying he wishedto have a frank explanationwith me on the subjectof our [naval] squadron. "You know our opinion", said he,
* Gp. Palmerstonto Queen Victoria, 22 February 1864: "If the Rhenish provincesof Prussiashould be added to France,everybodyin England would say that it servedPrussiaright; but everybodywould feel that it was a severe

blow to Englishintereststhroughsuch a changein the balanceof Power."

Letters Queen of Victoria, and Sen, [1926], i, 165.

t Palmerston Russell, May 1864, to i Ashley,Life, [1876],n, 249-52. J W.S.A.vm/7o,Berichte England. FromApponyi, No, 42G of 3 May aus 1864. In the original the dispatch almostwithout paragraphs. is Thesehave
beeninserted at appropriate places.


"about your conduct towards Denmark. You think it right, we think it unjustifiable and I maintain that glory, if there is any in this war, belongs to the conquered not to the conquerors. However that may be since the war began our first impulse was to side [de prendre fait et cause]with the Danes.
But it was winter, our fleet was condemned to inaction. Our

army is small and British direct interests are not sufficiently engagedfor immediate action to appear indispensable.We decided then to wait and to confine ourselves representato tions to which I must say, you have paid no attention. We hoped that you would be moderate and conciliatory. In stead of that you occupied Schleswig, after occupying Holstein; next you invaded Jutland and now, not content with your victory on land, it is said that you are going to send your naval forces into the Baltic and reunite them to the Prussian boats, perhaps with the aim of occupying the Danish isles one by one, and ending the war by un coup d'eclat, by dictating peace at Copenhagen. Look here, there are things which can be suffered (des chosesqu'on peut passer), and things which cannot. I consider the passage of an Austrian squadron through our Channel and past our ports, to give help in a war which we strongly condemn, as an insult to England, and I am resolved, for my part, to leave the Cabinet rather than suffer such an affront. I am convinced that the country sharesmy views in this respect,for I flatter myself that I can divine the instincts and opinions of my countrymen. It is generally thought, and especiallyin Germany that England is cowardly [poltronne], that it wishesto avoid war at any price; you can easily be deceived. You know the price I attach to good relations with Austria; but if you enter the Baltic a struggle is inevitable, and that means war. A war between England on the one side and Austria and Germany on the other-for I doubt not that Germany would join you-would be a great calamity. We have no army to invade Germany with, nor one comparable with yours, but our navy is strong and we can do you much harm. There are ports in the Adriatic and Baltic and there are other enemies who only wait for the




opportunity to fall upon Austria. All this deserves be to seriouslyconsidered, and I thought it more loyal to warn you in a friendly way of our mode of thought, so as to avoid disastrousconsequences."[So far the conversation agrees
with Palmerston's own version, what follows is much fuller.] I thanked Lord Palmerston for his frankness and said that, although nothing which he had just said was new to me, it was valuable to hear it from his own mouth. I had long since known, I added, that England objected to our going into the Baltic. This eventuality had been more than once the subject of my conversations with Lord Russell,with the King of the Belgiansand several [British] Ministers* had spokento me in the same sense. I had always answered that there was no

questionof crossing North Sea. I had given the most the

formal assurances, read dispatches, communicated the instructions given to our Admiral, and I was only surprised that after all this they seemedto attach more credence to

reports,of which they might find a difficulty in disclosing the

source, than to the word of an Ambassador speaking in the
name of his Government.

"But", exclaimed Lord Palmerston, "your assurances are not conclusive, at bottom they are limited to saying that for themoment have no intention of crossing Baltic; but if you the circumstancesaltered, a new order from Vienna might modify your resolve.This can only satisfyus for thepresent. Also we have arranged that Russell should addressyou an official communication to let you know that if your intentions change,we can rely on your warning us in time,for in that case also we should change our intentions too. It seemsto me that in answering such a communication you would in no way detractfrom your dignity by informing us that you do not intend to go into the Baltic.*9

I observed Lord Palmerston to that, asregards question the

of dignity, my government was the solejudge, but that the answerwe should makewould dependin part on the tone of the English note, as that kind of document was in general
graph, and the whole of the next three, are also new.

* This fact is not mentionedin Palmerston's version. The rest of this para-






dry, imperious and little calculated to evoke a friendly answer. I did not know whether my government would give a formal engagement,but I could assuremy interlocutor that we were far from sharing the opinion that England had decided to avoid a contest at all costs. We knew perfectly well her superiority at sea and consequently, whatever we determined to do, we should take it into account especially after what he had just said to me. He [Palmerston] might well consider that we were not attracted by running the risk of having our ships fired on by the British fleet, or of being obliged to retraceour stepsat the summons of a British admiral. This argument, based on common sense,seemedto offer a stronger guarantee of our intentions, than all the written declarations that could be demanded. The English [i.e. Palmerston's] move seemedto me alsoinopportune, on the eve of the time when hostilities would probably be suspended land and sea.* Besides, by I

mustsaythat Denmarkhad takenthe initiative in a maritime

war and had thus obliged us to take in hand the defence of our commercial interests. It was therefore unjust to accuseus of extending a war which, on the contrary, we wished to
confine within the narrowest limits.

[Lord Palmerstonthen askedApponyi what he thought of the prospectsof the conference.Apponyi dwelt at length on the strength of national feeling in Germany.] "For Germans", added I, "this question is as much one of right as of nationality. You will never make a German understand that a dozen plenipotentiaries have the right to sit round a green table and disposeof the fate of a million of their compatriotscontrary to pre-existingrights of succession and without consulting the estatesof the Duchies or of the German Diet [Bund]. Hence the unanimous sentiment with which the German Governments are obliged to reckon, and with which we ourselvesdare not wholly break, though trying to restrain it within the bounds of moderation.".. .If I went so far, it is because wished to prepare Lord Palmerston I
* The paragraph so far is similar to Palmerston's version. All the rest of the
report is new.




for the worst and see what he would say. But I found the
same indifference with him that struck me in the case of

Lord Russell. He made no objections nor interruptions, and abstainedfrom speaking of the casus belli if the Treaty of London [of 1852]werenot kept. This reserveis explainedif it is true that Clarendon only got five words out of Paris. The alarmingvagueness which veils Napoleon'spolicy, to a certain extent, givesthe key to the hesitation of the British Ministers.



[The British plan of settlement (Doc. 93) was drawn up by Russell on 5 May 1864.The memorandum was prepared by one British Foreign Minister and subjected to the criticisms of two
other Ministers who had held this office. There is considerable

interest in Russell's declaring that every nation has a right to

regulateits own internal affairs, but cannot allow "a free choice
of the form of government to every part of its dominions". Clarendon contested this, and Palmerston supported Russell,

arguing that Holstein wasdisturbedby foreign adventurers. This was rather sophistical, for the foreign adventurerswere received with a great deal of enthusiasmin the Duchies. Palmerston, in fact, useda much better argument to the Queen. "Your Majesty saysthat the peopleof Holsteinand Schleswig werenot consulted about the succession. Have they formally remonstratedduring the ten years which have elapsedsince the Treaty?53*These speculationsby Victorians as to what we should call "selfdetermination" are really interesting.

Russell'sactual plan seems have beenbasedon the untenable to

idea that the Danewerke was still a military barrier. It corre-

spondedto no racial line and was thereforecontrary to ethnic justice. It violated all the canonsof historical and genealogical right. It was therefore a political compromise,only likely to be accepted whenboth sides werecool-headed. the Danessaved But Bismarck all trouble by refusing to acceptthis scheme.They also refused every project which protected Schleswig and Holstein
from interference by Denmark or would have substituted a

personalunion with the Danish Crown for the one that existed.
Bismarck and Austria therefore went out from the Conference.

The day that it broke up Russellformulated the British policy anew in a Cabinet minute (Doc. 95) making clear England would not fight about Schleswig-Holsteinalone.]
* Palmerstonto Queen Victoria, 4 January 1863,Lettersof Queen Victoria,
2nd Ser., [1926], i, 140.





Document 93. The compromise scheme Lord John Russell, of 5 May 1864*

In considering terms of a solid and permanent arrangethe ment of the dispute long continued between Germany and Denmark, we must take into account the principles we have maintained, the force we can use, and the allies upon whose co-operation we can reckon. The matter of principle is not a simple one. On the one side is the principle of undoubted justice of allowing every nation to regulate its own internal
affairs according to its own views and opinions. This is the

principle which has guided us in regard to the affairs of Italy. But in the application of this principle we are soon met by another equally valid, namely that a Nation cannot allow this free choice of its form of government to every part
of its dominions without hazard to its own existence. Thus

when the direct line of succession from William and Mary, and from the PrincessAnne failed the Parliament of England settled the Crown upon the Electress Sophia and her descendants, without consulting the people of Ireland, who would in all probability have decided by a great majority in
favour of a Prince of the House of Stuart. Thus at the end of

the war of the Spanish succession the Catalans a brave and spirited race would have preferred an Austrian Archduke to a French Prince, but Spain could not allow a rich maritime province to be torn from her side. Thus when in 1793the French Nation adopted a Republican form of government, it is clear that Toulon and La Vendee [sic] would have given a popular vote in favour of Monarchy, but the Republic could not allow such a dismemberment,and establishedby force the integrity of France. Austria has lately acted on the same principle in regard to Hungary. Such being the principles involved let us seehow they can be applied to the casebefore us. Holstein is a German Duchy; it has a Diet of its own, and
* G. & D. 22/27,PieRussell Papers. Memorandumon the German questionof 5 May 1864.The memorandum markedfor circulation to ViscountPalmerston, is Earl of Clarendon,Dukeof Somerset, Granville, Chancellor theExchequer. Earl of




Germany has long maintained that it should have the right of voting its own laws, and its own taxes. Its possession Denmarkis usefulfor the maintenance by of the balance of power, but not essentialto the existenceof

It is otherwise with Sleswig-Sleswig contained in 1860 according to the calculations of the Almanach de Gotha founded on an estimate made in 1849by Adam de Biernatzki of Altona-of personsspeaking
Low German Danish 146,500 135,000

Frisian German and Danish

33>ooo 85,000

Thus of 400,000 inhabitants only 146,000 spoke German only-and 135,000 might be reckoned as Danish-and the remaining 118,000as much Danish as German. But apart from any detailed calculation which is always liable to dispute, it may be safelysaid that if South Sleswigis German, North Sleswig is decidedly Danish. But if it is a hardshipto place Germansunder a Danish administration it is equally a hardship to place Danes under a German administration. It cannot be assumed that the Danes are all

wolves, and the Germans all lambs.

But besidesthis consideration, it may be safely affirmed that the separation of South Sleswigfrom Denmark whether under the title of Personal Union, or the bolder scheme of Dynastic Separation,would be incompatible with the safety of Denmark--Jutland and the Islandswould form too strong a temptation for the Duke of Sleswig-Holstein backed and supported by Germany. Thus a permanent peacewould not be obtained. If we passfrom theseconsiderations justice and general of policy to the urgent practical questionsof the force of which we can dispose,and the Allies upon whom we can count, it must be observed-That we can act only by sea,and that

only in the Summertime. It would not be safeto shut up a





British Fleet in the ice of Copenhagen harbour during the winter.-That France who could aid us by land shewsa positive and persistentdetermination not to useforce to save the Danish MonarchyThat Russia is divided between her wish to save Denmark,

and her unwillingness break with the conservative to Monarchies of Austria and Prussia.

It seemsto me that a tolerable arrangement in these circumstanceswould be, i. To add to Holstein the Southern part of Sleswig as far
as the Slie and the Dannewerke.

2. To give to the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg thus augmented a power of self-government embracing legislative and administrative independence, and providing that no Danish or German troops in the service of other German Statesshould ever enterit exceptwith thejoint consentof the
German Confederation

and of Denmark.

3. The rest of Sleswigto bejoined to Denmark, and to be representedin the Danish Parliament for general affairs, and in a SleswigDiet to be chosen the peopleat large, for local by

4. The Holstein troops to be commanded by the Lieutenant of the King in Holstein-The Lieutenant to be selected by the King out of three namesto be presentedto him by the Diet of Holstein. The Lieutenant in the absenceof the Kong to have a Conseil of Administration chosenfrom among the
members of the Diet. ..,

MAY 5 1864. R[USSELLJ.

o<? -nr

Document 94. Clarendon's comment, May 1864* 5 It can hardly be said that the principle w[hic]h guided us in regard to the affairs of Italy has been observedwith respect to Holstein as the views and opinions of the people of that Duchy were not consideredwhen the order of succession was altered and settled, and if they are now disregarded,after the eventsof the last four months, no form of arrangement will be peaceful or lasting.
* G. & D. 22/27, pte Russell Papers.



Undoubtedly a nation cannot allow every part of it's dominions to chooseit's own form of Gov[ernmen]t, but the supreme Gov[ernmen]t must be able to assertit's own authority, as was the case in Ireland Catalonia and La Vendee and dismemberment was thus prevented. Without foreign aid the K[ing] of Denmark w[oul]d be unable to establish or to maintain his authority in Holstein.... MAY 5/64. C[LARENDON].
Document 95. The British Cabinet's decision at the

conclusion the Conference, June 1864* of 25

We do not proposeto engage a war for the settlementof in the present dispute, so far as the duchies of Holstein and Sleswigare concerned: but if the war should assumeanother character and the safety of Copenhagen or the existence of Denmark as an independent Kingdom should be menaced, sucha changeof circumstances would require a new decision on the part of the [British] Government.
Document 96. Palmerston's comment, May 1864! 6
There is one additional Circumstance and Element in the

Condition of those Things which is not mentioned in L[or]d Russells Memorandum], and that is, that all the Powersnow called upon to Settle these Matters are bound by Treaty Engagement, to respect and Maintain the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy including Holstein Lauenbourg and Sleswig.This may not compel those Parties to go to war for the Integrity of Denmark, but it surely is a Bar shutting out any of the Powers from proposing in Conferencea Dismemberment.

As to the schemeof asking the Duchies who they would like to belong to, none of the Precedents of former Cases apply. The Duchieswerequiet and orderly till foreign Forces

* G. & D. 22/27, Russell P& Papers. Minute in Russell's hand,25June 1864.

are several drafts.

Memorandum,6 May 1864,

t G. & D. 22/27,PteResellPapers. Palmerston Lord John Russell's on





cameviolently in, put down the legal authority and made a


In the Italian and other Cases as of Greece for Instance,

Insurrections were spontaneous and immediately connected with the Flight of the reigning Sovereign-and when it is said that Holstein if restoredto Denmark could not be kept without Foreign aid I should rather say that it could not be wrested from her without Foreign aid, but it must be admitted that in the presentexcitedStateof Germany,volunteer Bandsw[oul]d not be wanting to back up a Holstein Insurrection.

As to a Plan for a permanent Settlement I intirely Concur with L[or]d Russell, and I think the Schemehe has Sketched out is the one which we ought to aim at in Conference and except from Prussia and the Diet I should not expect much objection to it. The only modification which might be suggestedis that The King Duke should have the Choice of his own Holstein Lieutenant instead of having three names presented to him. Of course he ought to chuse a Holsteiner or a German Sleswiger or a Lauenburger. There would be reasonable objection to Establishing foreign Garrisons at Rendsburg and at Kiel under the Pretence of making them
federal Fortresses.

P[ALMERSTON]. 6/5-64.
34. THE AFTERMATH, 1864-5

[With the conclusion of the Conference England's share in events practically ended. The Prussian seizure of Diippel, which had caused such grief to the Prince of Wales, had already determined the issue. Hostilities were resumed and the isle of Alsen

was quickly seized. Denmark, thus isolated and helpless, was forced to terms. There was an Armistice on 18July, and prelimi-

naries of peacewere signed at Vienna on i August, the definitive peacebeing signed on 30 October. To this treaty only Denmark, Prussiaand Austria were parties. Thus not only was Europe, but
the German Bund itself, excluded from the settlement. Schleswig
and Holstein were ceded to Austria and to Prussia, without

mention of self-government or special treatment of Danish minorities. Apart from Lauenburg, Schleswigand Holstein, the

integrity of Denmark was preserved,and with it "the safety of

the Duchies.


Copenhagen". But Austria and Prussia had a condominium in England does not seemto have divined whither this arrangement would lead. In his memorandum of 5 May 1864 Russell plainly feared that the Duke of Augustenburg would become
ruler of Schleswig-Holstein. Palmerston feared rather the ab-

sorption of a dismembered Denmark into Sweden and that English interestswould be endangeredby the keys of the Baltic
being in the hands " of one Power [Sweden] and that Power ruled

by a Sovereignby race and descenta Frenchman"* (22 February

1864). The danger was German not French. In the end Prussia

got both Schleswigand Holstein and the Kiel Canal as well, and
ultimately expelled Augustenburg and Austria and the German
Bund, as well as Denmark, from all share in either.

It has been very well said by a Danish writer (cited by Mr

Cruttwell) that the conflict was "one between the historical and dynastic rights of the Danish crown and the assertion of the idea of

nationality; b oth of which ", Mr Cruttwell adds., "were inextricably

interwoven with international threads.

Finally, these international threads were cut and a solution imposed which swept away Danish sovereignty and compromised
those claims of nationality, which had been the ostensible cause of armed intervention. This result, which so much alarmed and dis-

gusted European diplomacy, was due to the fact that Bismarck

alone of all the actors engaged saw clearly both the end and the means by which it must be secured,"f Palmerston and Russell were greatly shaken by the course of events. When the great debate ended on 9 July 1864 in a narrow victory for the Government, Apponyi reported Palmerston and

Russell as "jubilant".

He compared Palmerston to Kaunitz,

another statesman who had won victories at eighty. Palmerston

won a victory by making an immensedraft on his old popularity,

and by tactics worthy of an old parliamentary hand. After

perfunctory references Denmark he dwelt on the thriving state to

of the finances. Everyone knew that this result was due to Glad-

stone'seconomies which Palmerstonwas generally (and rightly) thought to have opposed. All men listened, hardly believing
their ears, and by their confusion Palmerston made sure of their

votes. But he could not soprevail in Europe. There the fall of his J
and of England's prestige was almost total. What completed the discredit of Palmerston was the Conven-

tion of Gastein, signed between Austria and Prussia on 14 August 1865.The settlementof 1864held out a faint hope that the
* The King of Sweden was a Bernadotte.

t G. R. Cruttwell, History,xvin, [April 1933], 69. J V. Sir A. W. Ward3Germany, 1815-1890, [1917],n, 182,and n. He was an



arrangements of that year would be temporary. The Gastein Convention settled everything on a permanent basis. Austria sold the Duchy of Lauenburg outright to Prussia, Schleswig was handed over to Prussia and Holstein to Austria for permanent administration. England was thus disregarded, and, for all her boasts,had been completely impotent to influence the issue.The Queen and Russell exhausted their vocabulary of invective against Bismarck and Kong William. Russell's protest was
expressedin a circular to British diplomats which is remarkable

for its violence. "The dominion of Force is the sole power acknowledged and regarded" (^September 1865).* Palmerston's views hardly differed from those he had expressed the Queen to early in 1864."There cannot be a principle more dangerousto the
maintenance of peace, or more fatal to the independence of the weaker Powers, than that it should be lawful for a stronger Power, whenever it has a demand upon a feebler neighbour, to seizehold of part of its territory by force of arms, instead of seeking redress in the usual way of negotiation53 (8 January 1864).! In

fact he felt the shock to European public law as much as Russell.

But he set aside all querulous complaints, and viewed the question in a large way, with an eye on the future. This, almost the last of

his many incisive letters, shewsa view of foreign policy as clear as

of old. Even humiliation cannot blind him to reality or prevent his view from being statesmanlike. He seesthat a strong Prussia
will balance a Franco-Russian alliance. In the moment of defeat

Palmerston, unlike the Queen or Russell, shews a certain greatness.]

Document 97. Palmerston Russell,13 September to 1865^ ... It was dishonest and unjust to deprive Denmark of Sleswig and Holstein. It is another Question how those two Duchies, when separatedfrom Denmark, can be disposedof best for the interests of Europe. I should say that, with that view, it is better that they should go to increase the power of Prussia than that they should form another little state to be added to the cluster of small bodies politic which encumber Germany, and render it of lessForce than it ought to be in the general Balance of Power in the world. Prussiais too weak as she now is, ever to be honest or independent in her action,
* Hertslet, Map, [1875], m, 1645-6. f Lettersof Queen Victoria,2nd Ser., [19126],I, 146. J G. & D. 22/15, Pte RussellPapers.The letter is printed in Ashley, Life, [1876], n, 270-1. For the first part of this letter^ not printed here, see G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,[1925], n3 314-15.





and, with a view to the Future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate,should be strong, in order to controul those Two ambitious and aggressivepowers, France and Russia, that pressupon her west and east. As to France, we know how restlessand aggressive is, and how ready to break she loose for Belgium, for the Rhine, for anything she would be likely to get without too great an Exertion. As to Russia, she will, in due Time, become a Power almost as great as the old Roman Empire. Shecan becomeMistressof all Asia, except British India, whenever she chuses to take it, and when enlightened arrangementsshall have made her Revenueproportioned to her Territory, and Railwaysshall have abridged distances,her Command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means gigantic, and her power of transporting armies jyver great distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression,and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength. Therefore, though I heartily condemnthe Whole of the Troceedingsof Austria and Prussia about the Duchies, I own that I should rather see them incorporated with Prussia than converted into an additional asteroid in the systemof Europe.








[Palmerston came to his last period of office with thirty years of diplomatic triumph behind him. He had never had such popularity before. Russell, one of his most formidable political rivals, was now his friend, colleagueand supporter. Yet a few years of partnership between the old rivals destroyed the reputation of both. Palmerston's death came at the time that his foreign policy was deeply discredited. Russell, who succeededhim as Premier, could not keep either the Cabinet or the new Foreign
Minister in the old ways. His failure shewed that Palmerston's

death had ended an epoch in foreign policy. This singular pair were thus criticized by Count Apponyi, the
Austrian Minister. He thought "reserve inherent in his [Russell's]

nature and perhaps in the tradition of the Foreign Office*3."The difficulty of getting an answerfrom Lord Russellis proverbial in
the diplomatic corps." For the rest, he was "indolent and guided by agents".* Towards Palmerston he was more favourable. Russell was unwilling to state his opinion at once, Palmerston

was quick, open, decisive and frank. Few Prime Ministers have
ever had as much direct concern with the Foreign Office as Palmerston had on this occasion. Russell sent him not only foreign diplomats, but draft dispatches, in profuse abundance. Both benefited by their contact with the higher authority. Palmerston not only cut and altered drafts galore, but exercised

great freedom of criticism. "I have great Doubts as to the expediencyof sucha Despatchasthis. It would make a good leading article in an irresponsiblenewspaper, is hardly of the character but of a governmentDespatch."! Thus the octogenarianto the septuagenarian, and the reproof seemsin no way to have disturbed
their friendly relations. The criticism applied to both of them. For

it was the irresponsibility of theseold men which betrayed them.

* W.S.A. vm/73., Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 27 B of March 1861; No. 36A of 23 April 1861; No. 18 of 10 May 1861.

f G. & D. 22/22,PteRussell Papers. Palmerstonto Russell,13September1863.





Palmerston's diplomatic experience was immense. Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, Latin America and France hid few secrets from him. In one respectalone was Russellsuperior. His wife's influence and her extensive knowledgeof political refugees proved
a better source of information to him about Italy than any official dispatches. And in Italy, curiously enough, the one undisputed successof the period was won. Russell, with much less

of Palmerston'sknowledge, had most of his defects. He had the samelove of sharp retorts, the samepropensity to lecture, the same irritating air of superiority. He had a little lesscourage but an even more restlessand interfering disposition. He had none of his occasionalbreadth of view and largenessof mind. Palmerston
actually encouraged Russell to become a kind of living caricature

of himself. For he was quite blind to his own defectswhen they appearedin another.
Both men were living in a new age and handling weapons they

did not understand.Their physical vigour was still great, but their
mental arteries had hardened. Each of them had once been the

master of England's, perhaps even of Europe's, policy. They were

now no longer masters even in their own Cabinet, but they took long to understand that bitter truth. Palmerston was not always effective as a Premier. No one had brought admeasure before Peel's Cabinet without consulting him beforehand; "nobody thought of consulting Palmerston first".* Palmerston complained
to Russell that the Cabinet was different from those of old. Had

men such as Hardinge, Goulburn or Westmorland composed it,

"you and I might have our way on most things".

Cabinet was one of "All the Talents",

But the

with men of intellectual

calibre like Gladstone, Lewis and Westbury, or of culture and distinction like Granville and Clarendon. They cared little for the

eloquenceof Russell or for the popularity of Palmerston, needing

hard argument or harder facts. Palmerston said the others are "often too busy..,to follow up foreign questions so as to be fully master of them, and their conclusions are generally on the timid side." | Russell and Palmerston sometimes prevailed. Over

Italy, for instance,they won by springing a seriesof surpriseson

Cabinet and Queen. But the Cabinet soon learned the lesson,

" Our old men (two) are unhappily our youngest", said Gladstone, and the Cabinet curtailed their pranks in future. The Cabinet asa whole decidedagainstrecognizing the ConfederateStates,against interfering in Poland, and against protecting Denmark in the possession Schleswig-Holstein. And they decided thus against of the will of its two most important members.
* Phillimore, 12 August 1860. Morley, Life of Gladstone^ [1903], n, Bk v,
Chap, n, 35.

t Palmerston to Russell, 11 September 1864, Ashley, Life, [1876], n,


Such old hands as Palmerston and Russell

knew the Cabinet

could be influenced from without. But the majority in Parliament was seldom stable or secure,and was apt to turn against Palmerston in a fury of petulant independence. It did so over Brazil (v. p. 300). It failed him at the crisis over Poland and over Denmark. The opposition might have been a resource but did not

prove so in this case. Disraeli had spent over thirty years in coining sarcasms about Palmerston and Russell, and could not abandon his habit. Derby was always "on the timid side55,more so than even the greatest intellectual in the Cabinet. Victoria thought Palmerston and Russell "two dreadful old men", and the Prince Consort held them in deep suspicion. At the Danish

crisis the Queen found ways of influencing the opposition both in

Cabinet and Parliament, unknown to Palmerston and Russell.

It was a new experience for them both.

Europe, as well as England, provided other experiences this for

aged pair. Palmerston had successfully rebuked or defied a generation of Continental Kings and statesmen. He did not admit that another generation had arisen. Yet Franz Joseph had more capacity than Ferdinand; Alexander II was cooler than Nicholas; Napoleon more powerful than Louis Philippe. The world had not

only new rulers, but new forces were controlling it. Neither Palmerston not Russell overlooked the dynamic strength of
nationalism. But they did not understand that Piedmont and

Prussiawere directing it for their own ends. In his prime Palmerston had baffled Metternich,
He was not to baffle Cavour

Thiers, Guizot, Nesselrode, Buol.

and Bismarck.

Palmerston and Russell were in fact misled by the one political theory in which they really believed. They thought that nationalism was no danger to Europe but a blessing, provided always that
nationalism was associated with constitutionalism. Their creed

has been summed up in four propositions. "First, that a people with Nationalist aspirations will, once theseare gratified, becomea Liberal constitutional state. Second, that a country with a con-

stitutional governmentwill pursuea peaceful,and not an aggressive, foreign policy. Third, that a Nationalist government will favour
Nationalism in other countries. Fourth, that a British Government

should be friendly to the progress of the National and Liberal

parties abroad.55* These were in substance their aims. Freescope

to constitutionalism would promote the rule of law in Europe;

free scopeto nationalism would produce stability. The fallacies of this conception are obvious. Clarendon said sarcastically:" A his [Palmerston's]great

panacea all evilseverywhere."! Constitutionalism neither for was a universal movement,nor a universal type in Europe. It worked
* A. A. W. Ramsay, IdealismandForeignPolicy} [1925], 25. f Pte Wellesley Papers,Clarendon to Cowley, I January 1856.



so differently in different countries that Hammond, the Permanent

Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, declared publicly that he did

not know what constitutionalism meant.* This utterance was not

due to prejudice, for Hammond was an advanced liberal. It was a simple statement of fact. For constitutional monarchy, despite

Palmerston's efforts, had been a decided failure in Portugal, in Spain, in Brazil and in Greece. In Belgium and Piedmont it was
successful, but the constitutionalism
restrain nationalist excesses. Above

of Piedmont did little

all in Prussia Bismarck


forging a new weapon. Constitutionalism was to be overthrown by national autocracy. Palmerston thought otherwise. Prussia he considered a Mazeppa, whirled away on the mad horse of
Bismarck's ambition. At the very moment that Palmerston thought

her destruction certain, Bismarck was dispatching Prussiaon that

triumphant march, which began when her cavalry crossed the Holstein frontier and ended when they rode beneath the Arc de Triomphe at Paris. Defence and armaments were not neglected by either of these
ardent constitutionalists. Palmerston's ideas were somewhat

crude and original.

He believed that other governments,. and

particularly Napoleon's, would be peaceful in proportion as

England's forces were strong. Neither Russell nor Palmerston favoured a European standpoint, nor resort to arbitration. Sir Ernest Satow, who spoke with unrivalled authority on the East, thought Palmerston's treatment of China and Japan indefensible.

In respectto Brazil their record (as shewn in Docs. 111-113) is

not much to their credit. But it must be remembered that Brazil,

like Spain, was peculiarly obnoxious to Palmerston becauseof its connivance at the Slave Trade. Against that traffic both men
fought like crusaders. It would be wrong to overlook the strong
humanitarian strain in both men. The cheeks of these old men

flush and their hearts burn as they write of the cruelties done in Naples or of the agonies suffered by Poland. They had not the

calm judgment of Castlereaghorthe intellectual power of Canning.

But they were valiant warriors in the cause of freedom.

The gravestdefect of the pair was not their lack of discretion. Nor was it even their irresponsibility. It was their failure to find
contact with reality. The great days of Palmerston were when he

solved the Syrian question and flung Mehemet AH back on Egypt. His policy had been a mixture of bravado, audacity, and
common sense. It had succeeded because the elements were

carefully mixed. He could afford to be resolute,for he shrewdly guessed that the enemy did not want to fight. Now in the 'sixtiesRussiaand Prussia were determined fight if England to went too far. Yet England went very far, and Palmerston was
vn, 382, p. 342, 542-3-

* Select Committee onDiplomatic Consular and Services, [1870], A. & P., [1870], in



reckless enough to tempt Austria with the offer of a Habsburg Archduke on the throne of an independent Poland (supra, Doc. 75). Even this rash suggestion was less culpable than his conduct over Schleswig-Holstein. Russell's dark hints of inter-

ference by force were as futile as Palmerston's attempt to make

Austria give a written pledge not to send a fleet to the Baltic (supra^Doc. 92). There is a wildness in these schemes which

shewedthat Palmerstonfailed to distinguish between speechand

action, between realities and dreams.

Palmerston and Russell during this period persistently applied all the rules to other nations and claimed all the exceptions for England. They were most insistent that Russia and Austria should respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire. But, when the Austrian Minister pointed out that England had annexed Perim and Aden, they found nothing to say. Palmerston invoked the principle of non-intervention to prevent all foreign powers from interfering in Italy. But when Spain proposed to do so Palmerston declared he would prevent her by force. This action would involve

a departure from non-intervention indeed, but it was an exception

made by England and therefore not worth mentioning. The claim that England should always have the plums was one which the new world would not admit. This aged u enfant terrible" was checked by the unsentimental majority in the Cabinet, or by contact with new realities in Europe. The cause of failure was always the same in these later years.
Palmerston had been a true realist at his best. He had under-

stood how to play on the moods of the public and bring these to bear on his colleagues in the Cabinet or on the sovereigns of Europe. His whole policy depended on that success. He took up a cause when the public pressed him to do so, as he did that of Poland. He was equally ready to abandon a cause,if the public wanted it. There was nothing in which he believed more than the

support of the Ottoman Empire. Yet he confessed private to in

Russell, "our Power" of maintaining the Turkish Empire "depends on Public Opinion in this Country and that public opinion would not support us unless the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t exerts itself to make Reforms ".* The master speaks no longer with the

old confidenceand pride. He has lost his sureness touch and his of
instinct for driving the popular wishes. So he ceased to be the leader, and became the victim, of public opinion. Long ago Metternich had said that Canning was wrong in

relying on public opinion, for that was a force inconstant, unstable and impossibleto drive or to direct. Canning had understood well enough how to do it; so had Palmerston for thirty years.
* G. & D. 22/21, Pte RussellPapers. Palmerston to Russell, 13 December 1860; and on the Suez Canal, G. & D. 22/15. Palmerston to Russell, 8 July





Now he failed because he had forgotten how to trim his sails to

the moods and gustsof public opinion. He moved a little too soon or a little too late; he mistook a light breezefor a strong wind, or a public meeting for the voice of the nation. "If we look at the questionsrelating to Poland, and Italy, and Denmark," said an English diplomat bitterly, "what really happenedwas that a sort of strong and violent public sympathy, expressingitself in public
meetings, and articles in the press, and so forth, reacted upon the

imagination of foreignersand the people concerned,so as to make them believe that what a public meeting with a popular chairman, in England, decided, would be ratified by Parliament....

We forget altogether,or we do not sufficiently considerthat what a great free people like the people of England expresses vociferously at a public meeting, people abroad take for good coin."* Russell
and Palmerston trafficked in this dubious currency. First the

British Cabinet, and finally all Europe, found out that the coinage was debased. They turned upon Palmerstonand Russelland held
them up to obloquy as the utterers of false coin. It was forgotten that Greece and Switzerland had been strengthened, Italy helped on the road to unity, and Turkey twice saved from destruction. It was remembered that Prussia had united Germany in the teeth of British opposition. It was remembered that China, Brazil and Japan complained of being oppressed, Poland and Denmark of being betrayed, by England.]


98. Palmerston the natureof Alliances and a on

possible breach France, December with 14 1856!

[The great fault of Palmerstonand Russellin their last ministry
was the breach with France over her annexation of Savoy. During the next five years France and England were never really
friends, and the results were seen in their failures over Poland

and Schleswig-Holstein. It is quite plain that a strong FrancoBritish combination might have held Prussia and Russia in

check. It is, moreover, curious that in an inspired moment in

1856 Palmerston anticipated the end of the Franco-British

alliance and laid down the principles governing the continuation of successful alliancesin a private letter full of shrewd and homely

As to the altered feelingsof the French Court towards us I

lookuponthat change calmness composure. isin the with and It natureof thingsand might havebeenexpected sooneror later.
* Mr (afterwardsSir) R. B. Morier, Select Committee Diplomatic Consular on and

Services, [1870],in A. & P.3[1870],vn3382,p. 621,4395. t PteWellesley Papers. Palmerston Clarendon, December to 14 1856. (Copy enclosed Clarendon Cowleyof 15December in to 1856.)


Unaccountable circumstances


have made us for the last

two years the compliant followers of France, What she determined to do we did, what she disliked doing we agreed not to do. This state of things could not longer outlive the war. It is quite necessary that we should resumeour independent action and position and it was inevitable that the Emperor shouldbe annoyedat the change. Moreoverduring the war all the separateinterests and feelings of the two Governmentsand countrieswere forgotten in their common exertionsfor a common and paramount object. That object attained, the separateinterestsand feelingsagain come into play, just as the starsbecomevisible when the moon ceases to shine. The conflict of opinion first made itself felt on the occasionof eventsin Spain which led the Emperor to think of marching acrossthe Pyrenees.Then besidesother smaller matters came the present difference about the Treaty of Paris, and when that is over something elsewill spring up. We shall long continue to be at peacewith France,because it is the interest of Franceaswell asof Englandthat peace should
continue between the two Countries, but intimate Alliances

cannot long subsist between equal Powers. These Relations can be lasting only between a stronger and a weaker state, when the weaker allows itself to be guided by the stronger.
The close Alliance between Austria Prussia and Russia lasted

long becauseAustria and Prussia allowed themselvesto be ruled by Russia. That alliance continues as to Prussia, because she is still subservient, but has ceased as to Austria,
because she has become selfwilled.

It would not answerfor us to be sacrificing real interests or important points under the idea of thereby maintaining the French Alliance, for if that alliance is to be maintained only by such means, the British Nation would soon feel it to be a yoke, which ought to be shakenoff. I take it that the Emperor and the English Government are much about in the relations of Pompey and Caesar of whom Lucan says: nee jam ferre potest Caesare priorem Pompeiusne parem. We like Caesar, will not submit to a superior. The Emperor like Pompey, doesnot like an equal.





Document 99. Clarendon's comment, December 15 1856.* I am not prepared to abandon the French alliance as lightly as Palmerstonseems be. We cannot of coursego on to in peace wehavedonein war for evenif divergentinterests as did not interfere the tortuous ways resorted to by the French Government and which are not distasteful to the Emperor would makeit impossiblefor the two Countriesto march hand in hand together 3 but I want to keep up something of the prestigeof the Alliance and at all eventsto avoid a public separation because know how much our difficultieswith the I U[nited] S[tates] would be increasedif we were thought to
be ill with France and moreover several Governments in

Europe in order to shewtheir hostility to England would be offering the incense to the Emperor which they know he relishesand there might in the courseof a little time spring up
a sort of League against us.




[No aspectof Palmerston's foreign policy was more important

than that of armaments and defence. He had been in the War

Office for nearly twenty years (1808-28) and knew by experience the military situation. He wasalsowell acquaintedwith the naval
one. After the war of 1815the army was cut down to the narrowest

Emits by the economycampaign. Indeed, the only way of preservingit at all was to do what Wellington did, and hide the army in garrisonsoverseas.As a result seventythousand redcoatswere scatteredall over the globe, while the heart of the Empire was thinly guarded by a few poor thousands. Lord Wolseleysaysthat London musthavefallen if the French had landed in England in 1837.It wasassumed, however, that the British navy wassupreme, and assuredEngland's safety. But the rapid developmentof
steam communication (more readily promoted in the French

navy than in the British) destroyedmuch of our immunity. On

9 January 1847Wellington wrote his famousletter to Sir John Burgoyne, declaringthat steampropulsionhad renderedEngland "assailable3' all timesfrom the seaand that the military forces at
were insufficient for defence. " If it be true that the exertions of

the fleet are not sufficient to provide for our defence, we are not
* Pie Wellesley Papers, Clarendon Cowley,15 December to 1856.



safefor a week after the declarationof War." He avowedquite openly that the danger and the enemy came from France. The publication of Wellington's letter in the presscaused an immense sensation. His concreteproposal to raise a new force of one hundred and fifty thousand men as a militia was ultimately adopted within six years. And this success was due to the special
urgency of Palmerston. It was finally made law in 1852 under the

Derby-Malmesbury Ministry. Thereby was provided a reinforcement without which the British force in the Crimean War could

not have been kept up to strength. It was a measure due to panic and believed to be essential to save us from France. It was concurred in by all parties. Aberdeen, in most alarmist tones, had

admitted the danger to the RussianAmbassador. c:If he [Napoleon III} thinks us divided, he will fall on us.... We should begin by being beaten even with equal numbers. Fifty thousand Frenchmen would beat fifty thousand Englishmen; and we have not so much to oppose to a sudden invasion." He claimed that Lords

Derby and Lansdowne,and Lord John Russell,thought as he did.

He declared: "These considerations make us doubly feel the need of strengthening our ties with the Continent.35 Tsar Nicholas,

when he heard of theseviews, could not conceal his contempt and

he spoke of the ^cowardice" of the British Government.* But the alarm in England was ultimately due not so much to Palmerston's insistence on the smallnessof the British force, nor to Wellington's insistence on the changes in naval warfare introduced by steam. It was due to the fact that France's steam fleet was increasing almost as rapidly as the British. In 1859 the total British fleet was 95 sail of the line to 51 French, and 96 frigates to

97 French ones. But many of the British big shipswere old sailers
rand not considered of much fighting value. England and France had each over 30 screw battleships of the line. Measures were

being taken whereby the British in this classwould soon number fifty to forty, j" In this class there was no longer any question of a two-power superiority. England's naval supremacy might
be considered as seriously challenged. The naval competition of
* Report of Brunnow of 29 November 1852. Aberdeenwas just about to
become Prime Minister; the Derby Government fell on 24 December 1852. Zaionckovski, Vostochnaid Voina, etc., St Petersburg, [1908-13], I, 277-8, The

whole question is discussedat length between an economist and a man experiencedin war in Guedalla's invaluable Gladstone Palmerston..,Correand spondence [1928]; v. esp. 113-18, 123, 142-3, 157-64, 172-4, 181-7, 293...,

308,310-15. Practically all the arguments both sides givenhere in a on are


t Thesestatistics takenfrom H. Busk,Names the Worldt are of [1859],App. pp. 51, 88, 108-9. He had visitedeverydockyardin France and considered his
information more exact than the British Government's. The naval competition

was consideredso seriousthat even the Austrian Ambassadorproduced elaborate

statistics;u. W.S.A. vm/52, BerichteausEngland. From CountApponyi, No.

i8E of 4 March 1859.




France with England had been strenuousfor a decade and was palpably increasing. Moreover, Napoleon himself admitted it.

Malmesbury declared the Emperor said to him at Cherbourg: "' In 1860I reckon to have fifty shipsof the line of one thousand horse power.' And, added he, striking me [Malmesbury] on the shoulder, 'I promise you I'll double them'."* Palmerstonwas not the man to suffer such policies or utterances
without counter measures at a time when public opinion was

ready to support him. The measurestaken were first a costly system of coast defenceand fortification. Then (1859) came the creation of the Volunteers or riflemen, a voluntary organization providing a secondline of defence to the Regulars, the already
existent militia being the first. "Form, form, riflemen, form!" is the title of one of Tennyson's

poemsof this era. It wasagainstthe French they were to form and against Napoleon, "such an ally that only the devil can tell what
he means". The .responsewas one hundred and seventy thousand
civilians exercised in arms. The last measure was to increase the

race in naval armaments, and to cause great opposition from Gladstone at the Exchequer. But the measure soon told on

Napoleon. A cartoon in Punch 23 March 1861representedthe of Emperor asplaying his last card at "Beggar my neighbour" with
Palmerston looking firmly at him, a straw as always in a corner of his mouth; Palmerston had just laid down "The Warrior" as a

riposte Napoleon's" Gloire". This year was the culminating one to of naval expenditure, and thereafter the naval competition died down. Sir George Lewis's effort to increase army expenditure,

pushedduring 1861-2,actuallyfailed in the latter year. Gladstone

estimated naval and military expenditure at over thirty millions

during 1860-1 (of which four millions was due to the Chinese War), at 26,345,000during 1863-4, and almost at the same amount during 1864-5. In 1866it was twenty-four millions. By 1863 the danger point of naval competition with France was passed,but that there had been a real peril does not seemto be opento question. It wasnot a questionof a two-power standard of safetybut whether France would not actually surpassEngland in iron ships.| Palmerston insistedthroughout, as againstGladstone, that England's rate of shipbuilding must vary with that of France. Palmerston's attitude towards naval matters generally is interesting. Russiawasonly lessdangerous than France asa naval power. That is why it wasimportant to prevent her from pressing Turkey and forcing the Dardanelles, and from pressing on Denmark and forcing the Sound. That is why the British fleet
* W.SA. vra/55, Berichte aus England. From Count Apponyi, 19January
1859,f. 166. Reporting a conversation of Malmesbury.

t Gladstone Palmerston.. and .Correspondence.,., Guedalla, [1928], 181-7, ed.





entered the Black Seain the autumn of 1856to enforce the execution of the Treaty of Paris. In the Mediterranean France was watched with great jealousy. Palmerston's own belief was that

smaller naval powers like Naples and Sicily or Greece were

comparatively innocuous because likely to side with England as the bigger naval power in the case of a Franco-British war. But at times he doubted whether he should enlarge their territory or power in casethey fell victims to stronger states. As has been seen

(p. 215) he hesitatedas to whether to support the incorporation of Naples and Sicily into Italy. For he fearedthe enlargedPiedmont,
being contiguous to, might be dependent on, France. However, he ultimately came down on the side of the Union of Italy. In a somewhat similar way he at the time thought of retaining Corfu

as a naval base for England, though he ultimately added it and

the other Ionian Isles to Greece.

Doc, 100 gives the Austrian Count Rechberg's views on the effect Palmerston's arrival to power would have on the naval and military preponderance of France. In Doc. 101 Lord John Russell expressesthe tradition of the British navy. In Doc. 102

and 103 Palmerston sums up his philosophy of naval defence

with his usual vigour. It is quite in accordance with his airy dismissal of Cob&en's scheme of an agreement between England and France "about the number of ships of war which each of
the two countries should maintain". He answered: "It would

be very delightful if your Utopia could be realized.... But unfortunately man is a fighting...animal" (8 January 1862).* When the argument was used that it would be better to rely on accumulating wealth instead of arms he said: "That would only be offering to the butcher a well-fatted calf instead of a wellarmed bull's head." It is worth remembering that even he believed that moral forces sometimes outweighed material ones. "Opinions are stronger than armies. Opinions, if...founded in truth and justice, will in the end prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the fire of artillery, and the charges of cavalry" (21 July 1849).f Also presumably against the big guns of any navy.]

Document 100. CountRechberg Palmerston the naval on and and militarypowerof France,30 June 1859^ .. . England in particular seemsto me to a still superior degree and more immediately interested that the power of Austria should remain intact and strong enough to form in
* Ashley, Life, [1876], n, 221. Private letter to Richard Cobden. Cobden's
scheme is in App. V, 335-41.

| Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., cvn, 813. J W.S.A. vin/55, Varia. Mission en Angleterre et a Paris de., .P[rinc]e Esterhazy. To Esterhazy, 30 June 1859, Private.




the East the counterpoisenecessary the ambitious views of to Russia and the intrigues of France. So I cannot share the apprehensionsof those who, inspired with the memory of 1848,, deplore the reentry into power of Lord Palmerstonin the complications of the moment. On the contrary I think that we have-instead-to congratulate ourselves,for if the policy of this statesman has not always been convenient to us3 we must do him the justice that he has never had any aim save the great interests of his Nation which he not only recognizes with remarkable accuracy but makes them prevail by his uncommon energy. Lord Palmerston is a guarantee to us that he will not lend a hand to establish the preponderanceof France in the concert of Europe, already so much to be feared by its military power and the quite extraordinary development of its marine in the last years....
Document 101. Lord John Russellon theneed maintaining of England'snavalstrength, ?December 1859* H[er] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t find it impossible to reconcile the wish expressedby Baron Schleinitz for the continuance of the preponderance of the naval power of Great Britain with the favour he is disposed shewto the views of to the U[nited] S[tates]. It is obvious that if theseviews were to prevail a State with two men of war would be as strong as one with two hundred. Naval preponderancewould be an empty Name, entailing a very real burden. Transport ships full of sailors might hover on the coastsof an enemy, and could not be captured, or interfered with. But a week after

they might come back full of troops,who might land in a

commercial town, and levy such contributions as the French levied in Hamburg in 1812-13. All this too in the name of a respectfor private property!

Not only the power,and the greatness, the very safety but and independence GreatBritain depend her maritime of on strength. It is a matter of greatconcern H[er] M[ajesty's] to
Gov[ernmen]t to find that Prussia listens to these insidious



* Rough Noteby Russell Bloomfield, December for ? 1859, F.O,96/26.




Document 102. Paimerston forceas a Peacemaker, on 23 October 1864*

... As long asweare strongand prosperous may reckon we upon a goodunderstanding with Franceupon all matterson which they may not find it easyto deceiveus, as they have done about Tunis. Murchison gave me the other day a Buffalo Hide Whip from Africa called in thoseRegionsa
Peace Maker and used as such in The Households of Chief-

tains. Our Peace Makers are our Armstrongs and Whitworths and our Engineers...[It is perhaps fair to add two other brief quotations. "Peace and good understandingbetween France and England are most likely to be permanent when France has no Naval Superiority over England" j and "The Mole, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo and St. Helena are Records which Frenchmen would gladly seize fair opportunity of counterbalancing."]
Document 103. Palmer on war, 8 January 1865^ ston I return you this with Thanks. I daresayBulwer is right as to some Designs of France about the Islands he mentions. The standing Policy of France is to make the Mediterranean a French Lake, and they steadily pursue it on every favourable occasion. If we maintain our Superiority at Sea which we mustdo in spite of Economists and Radicals, we should probably be able, in the Event of War to drive them out of most of the Positions they might acquire; but to do so would cost us great efforts, many lives and much money and
therefore Prevention is better than Cure. Our Business

consequently ought to be to unravel their Plots,to see through their Intrigues, and to defeat their schemesby Counteraction steadily and Systematically applied; and as the French
* B.M. Add. MSS. 38,990,PteLayardPapers, 328. Palmerston Layard, f. to Private, 23 October 1864. Part of this hasbeenquoted in Guedalla,Palmerston,
[1926], 451.

t Gladstone Palmerston.. and .Correspondence..., Guedalla,[1928], 187. ed. J B.M. Add. MSS. 38,991,PteLayardPapers, 3-5. Palmerstonto Layard, ft. Private, 8 January 1865. Bulwer's letter has not beenfound.





Gov[ernmen]t though bent upon Encroachment and acquisition will always wish to avoid a Rupture with England unlessit be unavoidably forced upon them, will generally give way if firmly resisted, and if we shew them we are not disposed to shrink frotn Thwarting them. They also know, and have learnt by experience, that when England and
France are at variance Austria Russia and Prussia are much

more disposed join with us than with France,and what the to French wish most to avoid is a European Coalition against

I do not understand the "Victoria"


Passage Bulwer's in





[This has been the subject of infinite discussionmost of which

has now been fairly settled. But here is some interesting un-

published material which adds a little to the story. One letter of

Palmerston's shews how he feared that Mexico would be absorbed

by the United Statesin 1855 (Doc. 104), and another (Doc. 106) shewsthat he anticipated Lincoln in thinking of proclaiming the

emancipationof the slavesas a war-measure against the South. But this was before the Civil War began. The main data in the
situation after war broke out are these. During the middle of 1862

the South, under the leadershipof Lee, had not only repelled the
North from Richmond but was invading Northern territory.

Napoleon III had made unofficial suggestions to recognition of as

the South, and there was a large body of opinion in England in favour of it owing to the desire to import cotton from the South.
Russell was much more favourable to action than Palmerston*

The latter hit off the situation thus (13June 1862): "I may say
that no Intention at present exists to offer Mediation, In Fact it

would be like offering to make it up betweenSayersand Heenan [two famouspugilists] after the Third Round."* In June therefore Palmerstonwas thus not prepared for anything until the fighting had proved more decisive. At the same time (as Doc. 105 shews)he was by no means friendly to the North and saw the

advantages Englandfrom a divisionbetween and the South.] to it

* G. & D. 22/22,PieRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell,13June 1862. to





Document 104. Palmerston the on future of Mexico, i November 1855*

I think we may assumeits [Mexico's] annexation is written in the Book of Fate, for England and Francewould
not go to war to prevent it [from being annexed to the

United States]and would scarcelybe able to prevent it if

they did go to war. Document 105. Palmerston the advantages Monarchy on of in Mexicoandan independent South,19 Januaryi86st ... As to the Monarchy Scheme[in Mexico], if it could be carried out it would be a great Blessing for Mexico and a Godsend for all Countries having anything to do with Mexico, as far at least, as their Relations with Mexico are

It would afeo stop the North Americans whether of the Federal or Confederate States in their projected absorption of Mexico. If the North and South are definitely disunited,
and if at the same Time Mexico could be turned into a

prosperous Monarchy I do not know any arrangement that would be more advantageousfor us.... Document 106. Palmerston Slavery theSouth% on and

The Ufnited] S[tates] Gov[ernmen]t cannot by their

constitution make war without the consent of the Senate and

Congress doesnot meet till December. But I take it that they are mere swaggeringBullies. If moreover they should push matters to extremities we should be quite able to meet them. I cannot think that their own people would allow it. We have a deeply piercing blow to strike at their Southern
States if ever we should be at war with in the South would shake the Union them.

Freedom to the Slavesproclaimed by a British force landed

to its Base. * Pie Clarendon Papers.Palmerstonto Clarendon, i November 1855.
f G. & D. 22/22, Pte Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, 19January 1862.

J PteClarendon Papers.In Palrnerston's hand, but unsignedand apparently

of the year 1855.


PALMERSTONAND RUSSELL Document 107. Gladstone an independent on Southern Confederacy, ?July 1896*

... I was not one of those who on the ground of British interestsdesired a division of the American Union. My view was

distinctly opposite. I thought that while the Union continued it never could exercise any dangerous pressureupon Canada to estrangeit from the empire-our honour, as I

thought, rather than our interest forbidding its surrender. But were the Union split, the North, no longer checkedby the jealousies slave-power, of would seeka partial compensation for its loss in annexing, or trying to annex, British North
America. Lord Palmerston desired the severance as a diminu-

tion of a dangerouspower, but prudently his tongue.... held


[Palmerston may be accusedof a Machiavellian calculation in desiring severancebetween North and South, but his realism was to be of considerable advantage to the North in the end. Russell

suggested Palmerstonon 6 August that "we should make some to

move in October ".f It was finally arranged to hold a Cabinet to settle the matter on 23 October. In mid-September Russell started to sound Napoleon on the subject but found him at the moment unexpectedly cool. Thouvenel emphasized "the serious

consequences3' France of recognition, and, though Napoleon to was capable of overruling him, this was a momentary obstacle.
Palmerston, however, declared that Russia must also be consulted.

That imposeddelay. Then on 16 Septemberthe battle of Antietam

was fought in which Lee was severely checked and had to retreat

from Northern territory. On 23 September Palmerston was in

favourofimmediatemediationonly " if the Federals sustaina great defeat'5. Next day Palmerstonwrote to Gladstone that he and Russell agreed an offer of mediationbut that "no actualstep on would be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet", i.e. until
23 October. This intimation set Gladstone off on a course of his

Gladstone a strongpredilection the South and, great had for orator as he was, could not resist the opportunity of a master81-2. The italics at the end are the Editors'.

* Noteby Gladstone Morley, of Gladstone, in Life [1903], Bk v, Chap,v, n, t E. D. Adams, Great Britainand American War,[1925],n, 32. See the Civil

Chap,xi, passim, other detailsgivenbelow. for






stroke. On 7 October at Newcastle he uttered the fateful words:

" We may have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leadersof the South have made an army; they are making,
it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either,
they have made a nation."*
because Gladstone

This utterance was an indiscretion

Minister and thus seemed to be

was a Cabinet

giving notice of the Government'sintentions to accord recognition to the South. As he had been told by Palmerston that such intention depended on a Cabinet decision, his action was unwarranted. On 12 October Palmerston wrote to Russell: "We must

I think hear somethingof a decisivecharacter beforeour Cabinet

on the 23rd, but it is clear that Gladstone was not far wrong in

pronouncing by anticipation the National Independence of the South."')' Russell, doubtlessencouragedby the Prime Minister,
circulated a Memorandum to the Cabinet on the I3th. He urged that the Great Powers should consider whether they ought not to propose a "suspension of arms" between North and South, for

the purpose of "weighing calmly the advantagesof peace".

It seemed that the battle was won. Russell and Gladstone, each

with a strong hold on the public, were for something active.

Palmerston^ witn*a strongerhold than either, had hitherto shewn

more caution. Now he seemed at last to have come down on their

side. But on 14 October Sir George Lewis, a minor member of

the Cabinet with a strong grasp of international law, made a public speech. He said that the South had not established a de facto independence, and was therefore not entitled to recognition. This utterance seemsto have been made independently, but it was naturally taken to mean that the Cabinet had as yet made no
decision. J Palmerston no sooner heard of it than he asked Claren-

don to consult Derby, the leader of the Opposition. Derby shewed himself opposed to any action. Lewis, who was Clarendon's brother-in-law and closefriend, was probably cognizant of these
facts when he circulated a most able counter memorandum to

that of Russell of the 13th. He summed up the technical objections to an armistice and advised against all immediate action. On 22 October, the day before the fateful Cabinet, Palmerston expressedhis views on the two documents. He was " much inclined to agreewith Lewis.... I am therefore inclined to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am very much come back to our original view of the matter, that we must continue merely to be
* These words are differently reported, but the above is the version of
Morley, Life of Gladstone, [1903], n, Bk v. Chap, v, 79.

t G. & D. 122/22, Russell Pte Papers.Palmerstonto Russell,12 October 1862.

J It was wrongly assumedthat Palmerston had put Lewis up to make the speech. V. E. D. Adams, GreatBritain andtheAmerican Civil War, [1925], n, 50-1.



till the war shall have taken a more decided turn.35*

It might now be the seventh or eighth round but it was not yet time to make it up betweenSayersand Heenan.
Palmerston's action, or inaction, was decisive. The Cabinet of

23 October was postponed. Palmerstonwasnot there himself, but a few members turned up for an informal discussion. Russell found himself opposedby Lewis and the majority of thosepresent,f A fiasco like this was enough to decide most questions and to silence most men. But Russell and Gladstone persisted in trying to reopen the question. Each circulated a memorandum to the

Cabinet. Thesemight haveproducedno result but NapoleonIII, having replaced Thouvenel by Drouyn de Lhuys, suddenly proposed intervention to securean armistice and a suspension of the Northern blockade of the South. This could only have been procured by armed naval force executedby England and France
combined. This overture was made at the end of October and

Palmerston, who still wavered a little, summoned the Cabinet for 11 November. Lewis, valiant as ever, circulated a second
memorandum which was even more effective than the first. The . Palmerston

Cabinet declined the French proposalof joint interventionwhen

it met on 11 November. " Russell rather turned tail..

gave...afeebleand halfheartedsupport" noteoT Gladstone his in diary. The decisionwas immediatelymade public. As it proved,
that ended the whole matter.

Doc. 108 is Argyll's recollection of the Cabinet discussionon

intervention. He appearsto be referring to Lewis's second

memorandum and the full Cabinet of 11 November 1862. Other

accounts of this Cabinet support his view,J but the poignant

details are his own. It seemsclear that, at the last, Palmerston was not very strong for intervention.]

Document 108. ArgyWsrecollection theCabinet of decision of 11 November 1862 againstintervention, April i887 7 My recollectionis distinct and painful upon that subject. i. That the French Emperor wished and tempted us (in some form or other) to "recognize" the South. I don't
recollect how the communication was made-whether as a

paragraph] on the [Gladstone's]speech not. or

* G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,[1925], n, 327-8.

t V. E. D. Adams, Great Britain andtheAmerican Civil War, [1925], n, 55-7.

Gladstone's Memorandum of 25 October is in Gladstone and Palmerston...

Correspondence..., Guedalla, [1928], 239-47. There were, ultimately, two ed. memorandafrom Russelland Lewis, respectively, and one from Gladstone. J QuotedmE.I).A<^ins,GreatBntainandtkeAmericanCivilWari[ig2^],U,62-^. G. & D. 29/29, Pie Granmlle Papers. Argyll to Granville, 7 April 1887.





2. That severalmembersof our Cabinet were Ayes and inclined only too much to assent, 3. That Gladstone was one of these. I have a mild recollection of a conversation with him culminating in the Dark~Passage from the Park to Downing Street in which he expressedhis strong feeling that the Recognition must come

4. That the Ayes party were smashedup by a very able paper from Cornewall Lewisafter which it wasno more heard of. 5. It never came to a division in the Cabinet. Of this I feel very sure.

Document 109. Palmerston Russellstill think war possible and between Englandand theNorth, 25 April 1863* [It will be seenfrom this document that neither Palmerston nor Russell thought the question decided on October 1862.] In my late interviews with Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston,| in order to try the ground I observed to them that a war between England and America seemed to be more probable than a war with Russia. Both completely agreed
but the Prime Minister added, that he could not believe that

the Federals, whose position is already critical, would out of lightness of heart engagein addition in a war with England. I do not however doubt that Lord Palmerston seriously contemplatessuch a war as possible,and this suppositionis the key to the language he held the other day on the question of Poland. In saying that England reserved her liberty of action, and would take counsel of circumstances and events,
whether to remain neutral or to be allied with France, he

doubtlessthought of the possibility of an American war. It is thus also that I explain the indifference with which the Prime Minister contemplated an isolated war of France against
Russia and a demonstration on the Rhine which, in other

circumstances, he would not have regarded so lightly. Were

* W.S.A. vm/66j f. 358, Berichte axisEngland. From Apponyi, No. 29B of
25 April 1863.

t 21-2 April 1863. V. supratpp. 240-1.





she once engagedin America, England would no longer be able to prevent anything happening in Europe and that is one of the dangers of the situation and a grave consideration for the [Austrian] Imperial Cabinet.

[In regard to Brazil Russell and Palmerston are usually admitted to have been in the wrong in the disputes that arose in 1862. These disputes concerned two points. First there was the

caseof a British ship wrecked on a solitary part of the Brazilian

coast, in which four seamenwere found under suspicion of being

murdered. But the crime was "not proven" and no criminal was
ever found. It was followed by a case in which three naval officers of H.M.S. Forte, ashore in civil costume, were locked up in gaol after a hilarious dinner at a country inn. Russell and

Palmerston demanded compensation and punishment of the officials concerned. When Brazil resisted,British ships blockaded
Rio. But when the matter came before Parliament both Houses

criticized these proceedings severely. Brazil finally paid com-

pensationfor the lost ship and Palmerstonand Russellreferred the

other case to arbitration. They did this under pressure from Parliament. The matter has been touched by the vitriolic pen of

Salisbury;* his account is by no means friendly but his facts cannot be substantially impugned. The documents here given on arbitration shew Palmerston's attitude towards it in 1849,^ut ^ should not be forgotten that he
suggesteda treaty of arbitration with the United States in 1848.^

Further, in agreeing to the famous Declaration of Paris in 1856,

Palmerston shewed considerable friendliness to the United

States,and a desirefor pacific solutionsof difficulties with them, which was not sharedby all his colleagues.Palmerston'shostility to Arbitration is not likely to have been assuaged "the Brazil by Award". The Alabama Arbitration took place after his death, but
it was believed that it was one to which he would not have as-

sented. Certainly Russell, in later years, shewed dissatisfaction

with it. J]
* Lord Salisbury,Essays Foreign on Politics,[1905], 158-69. Palmerstonto Russell,20January 1848. Ashley,Life, [1876], i, 59-60. V. Russell,Recollections Suggestions, and 1813-73, [1875], Chap. xn.




Document 110. The inapplicabilityof theprinciple of arbitrationto England, 12 June 1849* ...I confessalso that I consider it [arbitration] would be a very dangerous coursefor this country itself to take, because there is no country which, from its political and commercial circumstances, from its maritime interests, and from its colonial possessions, excitesmore envious and jealous feelings in different quarters than England does; and there is no country that would find it more difficult to discoverreally disinterested and impartial arbiters. There is also no country that would be more likely than England to suffer in its important commercial interests from submitting its case to arbiters not disinterested, not impartial, and not acting with a due senseof their responsibility... Document 111. Palmerston compares Brazil to a BillingsgateFiskwoman, February1863! 6 The Conduct of the Brazilian Gov[ernmen]t resembles that of a Billingsgate Fishwoman Seized by a Policeman for
some misdeeds. She scolds and kicks and swears and Raves

and call [sic] on the Mob to help her and vows shewont go to the Lockup House but will soonerdie on the spot: but when shefeelsthe strong grip of the Policeman and finds he is really in Earnest she goes as quiet as a Lamb though still using foul mouthed Languageat the Corner of eachstreet. P[ALMERSTON] 63. 6/2.
Document 112. Palmerston Brazil's demand on for compensation,May 1863^ 4

I suppose note from Moreira which you sent me with the other Letters to be forwarded to the Queen relates to the answeryou are preparing to his Demand for Compensation and apology for our Reprisals. I hope that you will be firm
* HansardDeb.) 3rd Ser., cvi, 90. Speechby Palmerston of 12June 1849.

"f B.M. Add. MSS. 38,989,Pte LayardPapers, 43. Note by Palmerston, f.

6 February 1863.

J G. & D. 22/22,PteRussell Papers. Palmerston Russell, May 1863. to 4





with him and that you will properly maintain the Dignity and guard the Interestsof the Country. It is all very right to use civil Language in your Communication to him but the

Reprisals were deliberatelyorderedby us and were very

forbearingly carried into Execution by Christie, and there is nothing connected with the Transaction for which the slightest Regret can be expressedunless it be that the Brazilians shouldby a pertinaciousDenial ofJustice, have compelledus to resort to Force. As to any Demand for Compensation that is too preposterousto be seriouslydealt with. The real way to deal with Moreira, if we did only what he and his Government deserve, would be to say to him as I once said to Bourqueneywho cameto complain of a French officer having beenput under arrest at the Mauritius for breaking the Rules of the Port, "my good Fellow put your Despatch in your Pocket and go Home with it and let us hear no more about the
matter," and that advice was taken.

It would not be amissto take this opportunity of reminding the Brazilian Gov[ernmen]t who say they want to reestablish friendly understanding with us, of their habitual and Systematic Discourtesytowards England by neglecting to

give answersto Representations made to them by our Representatives Rio, and you might exemplify that, by at enumeratingthe Datesof the many unanswered applications
made to them "for Information about the Condition of the

Negroes Emancipated by Decreesof the Mixed Courts at Rio, and still held in Slaveryafter the Lapse of many years.
It would also be well to remind the Brazilians that we

have unsatisfiedClaims of long standing amounting if I

mistake not to between 3 and 200,000.

It is a little too Much for the offendingParty to pretendto

be the offended one, and we must not allow ourselves to be

worked upon by the various Influences which the Brazilians setto work to play upon us, to induce us to take towards these

Brazilians Attitude not worthy of our Country. an If Moreirais to gounless do that whichit is unbecoming we for us to do, let him go, and wish him a goodvoyage.



Document 113. TheArbitrationAward by Leopold King of theBelgians,18 June 1863*

. . . We are of opinion that in the mode in which the laws of Brazil have been applied towards the English officers there was neither offence, nor premeditation of offence, to the British navy. 18th day ofJune 1863. [Signed] Leopold I. 40. THE SLAVE TRADE

[In the debate on arbitration of 12June 1849Palmerston took

care to dispel the impression that ec England is not ready, as she is ever, to repel aggression and resent injury, and that she will

never be found acting aggressively againstany power". There is a

bad side to this, but there was a good side, too, in the sensethat

England was ready to redresswrong not wrought against herself

and to denounce cruelty and oppression. The noblest and most

sincereside of Palmerston and Russell is their hatred of cruelty, and in particular of what John Wesley called long before "that
execrable sum of all villainies, the Slave Trade53. It was because

Brazil, more deeply than most nations, had aided and abetted it that Russell and Palmerston were so moved against her.]


114. Palmerston theAberdeen on Act,

31 July 1862 [i863]f Denman my Colleague at Tiverton has sent me the accompanying Letter from Livingstone giving an account not very clearindeed, of the Portuguese Doingsin SlaveTrade on
the East Coast of Africa.

When the Brazilians ask us to repeal the Aberdeen act which produced in 1851and 52 the Miraculous Conversion from Slave Trade of a Nation which up to that Time had committed that Crime to the greatest Extent of any Nation, and in Spite of the Strongest Remonstranceswhich the English Language could convey, and when they tell us to accepta SlaveTrade Treaty asa sufficient Substitutefor our act, it is impossiblenot to reflect that the SlaveTrade Treaty with Spain doesnot prevent some15 or 20,000Negroesand perhaps more from being every year imported into Cuba;
* V. B.F.S.P.?(1862-3), L"* 150-1t G. & D. 22/22, Pie Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, 31 July 1862,

[1863]. Partly printed in H. G. F. Bell, Lord Palmerston, [1936], n, 4.11-12.




That our SlaveTrade Treaty with Portugal doesnot prevent an extensiveExportation of Slavesfrom the Portuguese
Possessions Africa East and West, and that the abolition of in

SlaveTrade and of Slaveryitself by Francehasnot prevented

the Rizis Contract which was real Slave Trade, and that

even the abolition of that Contract does not prevent a considerableExport of Slaves from the EastCoastof Africa to the Island of Reunion. If we were to repeal the Aberdeenact the Slave Deluge would again inundate Brazil. Document 115. The execution theAberdeen of Act, his greatest achievement, February1864* 17 ... There are no two men in England more determined enemiesof the slave trade than Lord Russell and myself, and certainly we are neither of us bigoted enthusiastsnor West Indian proprietors, but we have both laboured assiduously and with much success the extirpation of that for
abominable crime.

During the many years that I was at the Foreign Office, there was no subject that more constantly or more intensely occupiedmy thoughts, or constitutedthe aim of my labours. ... The achievementwhich I look back to with the greatest and purest pleasurewas the forcing the Brazilians to give up their slavetrade, by bringing into operationthe AberdeenAct of 1845.The result, moreover,hasbeengreatly advantageous

to the Brazilians,not only by freeingthem from a grievous crime,but by very muchimprovingtheir generalcondition...
Document 116. Palmerstorts utterance theSlaveTrade, last on 29 January 1865!

OneEvil arisingfrom the annexation the Uruguayor of any Part of it to Brazil, would be, that Slaverywould be introduced Territoryin whichat present is forbidden. into it
P[ALMERSTON] 29/1/65.
n, 263-4.

* Palmerston SirJohnCrampton, February to 17 1864. Ashley, Life,[1876],

t B.M.Add.MSS. 38,991, Layard Pte Papers,32. Rough f. noteby Palmerston, There a letterby Palmerston27December in B.M.Add.MSS. is of 1864,
38,990, on the Slave Trade in Brazil.










[Russell became Prime Minister on Palmerston's death with

Clarendon as Foreign Secretary (3 November 1865). Even

Russell was conscious of the discredit caused by the restlessand meddling policy of the past and Clarendon soon shewedhis hand.
He failed to avert the war between Prussia and Austria which

began early in June 1866. He was asked by Vitzthum von Eckstaedt what England would do if Prussia invaded Saxony which was guaranteed by England under the Treaty of Vienna of 1815. He replied, correctly but cautiously, that only a part of Saxony was thus guaranteed.* Here was an obvious reaction from Palmerston's system. It became more pronounced when Russell's Ministry fell and a Conservative Government took

Stanley took office in the new Government as Foreign Secretary on 6 July 1866, and remained there till December 1868. Disraeli, its most brilliant member, was almost wholly occupied

with "dishing the Whigs" over Parliamentary Reform. Foreign policy was shared between father and son, between Derby as Prime Minister and Stanley as Foreign Secretary. When Derby
retired in February 1868 Disraeli became Prime Minister, but the

control of foreign policy was hardly altered. In fact, also, the critical decisions over the Austro-Prussian War and Luxemburg question had already been made. The father and son worked in general accord over foreign policy, but for somewhat different reasons. On the face of it their first utterances were reasonable enough. Derby put the matter thus in the House of Lords over the Austro-Prussian War:ec though not wishing to adopt non-interference in an absolute manner, we

[England] would yet abstain from armed intervention". Stanley

said: *el am not a supporter of the system of advising foreign

governments. I think this right has not only beenusedbut abused

of late and that we have lost not gained by it."f Stanley viewed
the matter with a radicalism which he owed to Cobden's theory of
* W.S.A. vm/74, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 453 of 22 June 1866. f W.SA. vm/74, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 51B of 24 July



non-intervention and with a cynicism which he owed to himself.

When the Cretan revolt broke out in 1867, Stanley professed "neither sympathy nor specialinterest for the Turks. If they dis-

appeared from Europehe would not be inconsolable, difficulty the is to know what to put in their place." Derby, though anything but radical or cynical, wasvery timid in the face of public opinion. He "did not conceal the fact that he is struck by seeingseveral newspapers, principallyi The Times' give the Party the advice and
to give up Crete, and he avows casseznaivement3 that, if the

public opinion of the country pronounceditself for such a solution, he could only yield to its pressure Thus both men were willing, ".* though for different reasons,to abandon even such a cherished Palmerstonian dogma as the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The same motives led Stanley to regard the obligations of the
Vienna Treaty in reference to Poland as outworn, and to view

all the guarantees that instrument asobsolete(v. Doc. 118 (a)). of The way was thus prepared for the Stanley-Derby interpretation
of the Luxemburg guarantee.]


117. An Austrian view of Stanleyand the

principle of non-intervention,July i866| 3 Lord Stanley is the only one [of the Cabinet] whosenomination has been welcomed in England with general satisfaction ... no one contests his honest and honourable character

and talents. [He] belongs to that school of statesmen(still few, but enjoying all the sympathiesof the British public) who make a dogma of the most complete non-intervention
and the most absolute abstention of Great Britain from the

affairs and quarrels of Europe. According to Lord Stanley the only great interest of this country consists the pacific in development of its prosperity and its colonial and commercial power, and asEngland could not attain this goal and at the same time interfere actively and influentially in the affairs of Europe she ought not to hesitate between the two courses, but choose that which best assures her riches and

prosperity. Consequently foreignaffairs shouldonly have a

* W.S.A. vni/75, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 69 of 25 September 1867,ff. 46&-9 reportingStanley.W.S.A.xn/87, Weisungen nach Turkei. Beustto Prokesch-Osten, enclosing report of Kalnoky in January a
1867 n Derby's views.

t W.S.A. vm/74,Berichte England.From Apponyi,No. 48 of 3 July aus





secondaryplace in English policy, and the true interestsof the country being engagedin none of the different questions agitating the Continent it is better to abstain from all advice
or interference when one has decided that no result can

follow and to retire into completepassivityand neutrality. ... [He said recently to a friend of mine] that "the post did not suit him at all, he understoodnothing of diplomacy and would have to make seriousstudies...". [He possesses] a serious and reflective mind; a complete and upright character; very strong convictions, his opinions are a mixture of Toryism and Radicalism.
Document 118. Stanley appliestheprincipleof non-intervention in the case of the war between Prussia and Austria, JulyAugust1866; to Italy in 1867 and to Polandin 1868. (a) To Austria.* [The Austrian Ambassador, Count Apponyi, said a strong power in North Germany involved a future risk of war with France and Russia.]...! [Stanley] thought, on the contrary, that the danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe lay in the weakness rather than in the strength of Germany. An allusion having then been made to the Treaties of 1815, I did not hesitate to express belief that in the actual state my of Europe, it was useless appeal to those Treaties as being to still binding.... (b) To Russia. [Baron Brunnow (the Russian Ambassador) in relation to the Treaty of Vienna submitted that the Preliminaries of Peace]...would involve a departure from the Treaties which had been signed by Great Britain and Russia. By right, no Treaty could be modified without the participation of all the Contracting Parties. The Imperial Cabinet of Russia held to this principle;
and he. Baron Brunnow, was instructed to inform his Court
whether the British Government had the same intention as

Russia, in order to maintain and to reserve its right to take

* Stanley to Lord Bloomfield, No. 12, 21 July 1866, P.O. 7/702.



part, as a signing party to the Treatieswhich it is proposed to modify,* [Stanley in reply deprecated any proposal to adhereto the Treatiesof 1815,and refusedto join in a declaration to that effect. When asked in 1868 by Apponyi whether he considered obligationsof the Treaty of Vienna the

binding as to Poland he answered]He [Stanley] could not deny a certainvalue to the argumentof Baron de Brunnow, accordingto which Polandhaving beentwice conquered by Russianarmies sincethe Treaty of Vienna, these treatieselsewhereonly a historic dream for Europe-were virtually abrogated Russia. [Apponyi commented]The theory of for the right of the strongest and of the absorption of small nationalities by great, has always a certain attraction for the eminently practical and positive mind of Lord Stanley, f
(c) To France.^ [Lord Cowley was instructed] That Her Majesty's Government will not join in any such declaration as may have the appearanceof a Protest against what is passingin Germany: That they reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the future.

And that while on the one hand they are not responsible for the stepsthat Prussiahas taken to increaseher Power at the cost of other States, they have, on the other hand, no causeto object to such increase of Power on her part. (d) re Italy. [Austria had been informed that we could not use our good offices to induce Italy to abandon her claims to the Trentino. When in 1867Prussiainformed Stanleythat shecould not

see"with indifference" Italy attackedby France,and asked for a statement England'sintention, Stanleydeclinedto of
commit himself beforehand.! * Stanley Buchanan, 29, 6 August,P.O.65/696. to No. t W.S.A. vm/77, Berichte aus England. From Apponyi, No. 25B of

7 April 1868.

Stanley Cowley, 123, August1866, to No. 9 P.O.27/1608. Stanley Loftus, 233,23 October to No. 1867, P.O.64/616.

J Stanleyto Cowley,No. 118,8 August1866, F.O. 27/1608.








[The Luxemburg question proved the crucial test for Derby

and Stanley. By it they became celebrated, or at least known,

in diplomatic history, for they laid down an original doctrine. Clarendon said that the I4th Earl of Derby "understands nothing
about them [foreign affairs] and never thinks or cares about the

effect which his speeches may produce on foreign countries".* This is a judgment from an opponent and it would probably be
unfair to include Derby's son Stanley in the condemnation. For he

was a genuine non-interventionist-on grounds of principle and

not from indifference to foreigners.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, on the settlement of 1839,

had remained subject to the King of the Netherlands. But it had

a dual capacity. Though Dutch, it was garrisoned by Prussian

troops; like Holstein it was a member of the German Bund, But the Bund had been destroyed by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and thus the right of the Prussians to garrison the citadel was legally ended. Napoleon, in consequence,showed unmistakable signs of desiring to annex Luxemburg to France. Finally he proposed to buy4t from the King of the Netherlands. Bismarck was aware of these designsand made a most able speech on the subject to the North German Reichstag. This was on i April 1867, Bismarck's birthday. It was not the day on which he was
befooled. He declared that the new North German Bund did

not wish to include Luxemburg as a member, and that the Prussian right of garrisoning the citadel had expired. He wished

good relations with France but, while discrediting the designson

Luxemburg attributed to her, he said that a settlement could only be achieved by agreement between the signatory powers of the

Treaty of 1839. And he intimated that Luxemburg, if evacuated,

would be neutralized under a European guarantee. There was some danger of war as German national feeling was much excited against French aggression. It was allayed by the

expedient of a Conferencemeeting in London which endorsed

Bismarck's idea of guarantee. Recent unpublished German documents throw a new light on the affair. | They prove that in

April Stanley informed Bernstorff that England did not regard Luxemburg ason a par with Belgium and that no British Foreign Minister could get England to fight for the former (D.A.A.P., vin, No. 410). The report of 30 April (Doc. 119) shewsexactly
what Stanley's views were before the Conference met. It proves

that he wished to avoid mention of a guarantee altogether. It

* Pte Wellesley Papers. Clarendon to Gowley, 21 April 1857.

f V. Die Auswartige -PolitikPreussens, vm, von Herbert Michaelis,[OldenBd, burg, 1934].The references the text are cited asD.A.A.P. with the number of in
the volume and of the document following.





seemsto be pretty clear therefore (and this is a revelation from the German documents) that Bismarck knew the guarantee
meant little, but wished England to give it for purposes of

assuagingGerman public feeling and reconciling it to Prussia's

evacuation of Luxemburg.]

Document 119. Stanley theobligations Luxemburg on to before Conference 30 April 1867* the met,

. . . His Lordship [Stanley] was less reassuring in his answerswhen I askedhim if it was understood that England would take her part in guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg. He told me I should know how unpopular any obligation of that kind was in England and what strong objections a new guarantee would consequently encounter from public opinion. For these reasons, and considering himself personally the " Trustee" of British interests he could not take the engagement to defend Luxemburg by armed force, if such was the interpretation given to the word guarantee. But he thought that this word might be avoided and that an engagement taken by the Great Powers to respect neutrality of Luxemburg the would suffice. That would then be a moralguarantee which England is ready to share and which would attain the same goal, since it would protect neutralisation from all attempts on it. Even if it did not what would England's forty or fifty thousand men avail against
Powers who had four or five hundred thousand? We had

never, went on Lord Stanley,claimed to play the part of a military power on the Continent. We are a maritime State, we have great commercial and political interests to defend in Belgium,which explainsthe guaranteetaken up in regard to this Kingdom which, in our eyes, summedup in the position is of Antwerp. But Luxemburghasnot the sameimportancefor us, and that is why, we should wish to limit ourselvesin this business the minimum of engagementindispensableto to assure maintenanceof peace. the I observedto Lord Stanley that M. de Bismarck had made
April 1867.

* W.S.A. vm/75, Berichteaus England. From Apponyi, No. 330 of 30




a neutralisationguaranteed thePowers condition of the by a

[Prussian] evacuation, and that it was to be feared the reser-

vation madeby Englandwould not solvethe difficulty. His [Stanley's]answerwasthat he understood perfectly that, if Prussia not to be trustedin her pacific intentions, was she could make use of this pretext; but he flattered himself
that things would not turn out thus, and that there would be no opportunity to discuss this delicate question, as to which England could hardly make concessions.






[On 4 May, before the Conferencemet, Bernstorff reported Stanley astelling him that the British Parliament "would give no
guarantee containing a pledgewhich might ultimately lead to war (D.A.A.P., vni, No. 577). At the Conference itself, contrary to

Stanley'sdesire,Bismarckpressed hard on the subjectof guarantee.

He wishedclearlyto havesomething, which appeared be real to

and effective, before consentingto evacuatethe Prussiangarrison and demilitarizing the fortressof Luxemburg, and this wasclearly
reasonable. Stanley tried to evade the issue by proposing the following text for Article II of the proposed Treaty: "Le Grand Duche de Luxemburg, dans les lirnites determinees par TActe annexe aux Traites du 19 avril 1839sousla garantie des Gours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de

Russie, formeradesormais fitat perpetuellement un neutre.

II sera tenu d'observer cette meme neutralite envers tous les

autres fitats.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent a respecter le

principe de neutralite stipule par le presentArticle.'3 Count Bernstorffj the Prussianrepresentative,then said that a

Europeanguarantee Luxemburgwasthe basison which Prussia of had accepted invitation to the Congress. therefore the He pressed
for an amendment as follows: "le principe [de neutralite] est et

demeure place sous la sanction de la garantie collective (ou commune) desPuissances signatairesdu presentTraite, a I5 excepresisted the amendment,but he was outvoted by the majority of
the members. He then referred the matter to the British Cabinet.

tion de la Belgique, estelle-meme fitat neutre". Stanley qui un

On the gth hereturned the Conference thenews to with that they had accepted amendment, the which wasaccordingly inserted in the Treaty signedat London on 11 May* by Austria, Belgium,
* English text in Hertslet, Map, [1875], ra>1801-5.




France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Prussiaand Russia. It is

the main Article of the Treaty.

It will thus be seen that Stanley and the British Cabinet were

negotiated, even pressed,against their will, into a guarantee. But Stanley's previous private explanations to Bernstorff shew clearly that a British guarantee of Luxemburg meant little and
would differ from the Belgian one.* The matter came up and was
debated on several occasions in the Lords and Commons, when

both Derby and Stanley spoke. Stanley, when asked by Count Bernstorff officially for an interpretation, discredited the report of his father's speech,and indeed the authority of all parliamentary speeches.But in private he gave an authoritative explanation of his own speech(v. Doc. 121). This utterance, hitherto unpublished (and not the speeches frequently quoted by jurists and by so historians), is the really binding document. He did in substance
adopt the view that a collective guarantee means nothing, be-

cause it disappearswhen any signatory power violates it. This is much the same as the Derby doctrine, and as the explanation given by Stanley to the Commons on 14 June.f But it differs from the latter in being much more explicit as to the true reason for whittling away the force of the collective guarantee. He saysthat it would be wrong to regard the guarantee as "purely illusory", but that you cannot, in fact, bind the British Parliament in advance to a question involving peace or war. In other words Stanley hoped the guarantee would be honoured but would not
bind himself to such a view. The German revelations, above

alluded to, threw a new light on the question. Instead of perfide Albion deceiving Bismarck, it would be more true to say that Bismarck and Stanley agreed on a formula which, in effect, deceived the German public.^]

Document 120. Derby'sinterpretation theguarantee, of 13 May i86y

[In answer to a question] The guarantee is not a joint and separateguarantee,but is a collective guarantee, and doesnot imposeupon this country any specialand separate duty of enforcingits provisions. It is a collectiveguaranteeof all the Powersof Europe...
were prior to the Conference.

* V. esp.D.A.A.P.,vm, Nos.410,577.Thesediscussions April and May of

t Hans.Deb.3 Ser., CLXXXVH, 3rd 1921-3, 14June 1867. J For the older view v. Sir E. Satow, 'Pacta Sunt Servanda', Camb. Hist.

Joum.i. No. 3, [October 1925],306-18;for the modernview v. Temperleyin Eng.Hist. Rev.L, [October 1935],730-1; and D.A.A.P., vm, Nos. 385, 391,
409-10, 473, 577.

Lord Derbyon 13May 1867, Hans. Deb., Ser.,CLXXXVU, 3rd 379.




Document 121. Stanleysauthoritative interpretation of theguarantee, June 1867* 25

[After Count Bernstorff had referred to the reply of Lord Derby to a question in the Lords (v. Doc. 120)] I told
Count Bernstorff that discussions in the House of Lords

were, from the difficulty of hearing, often imperfectly reported; and that I could not undertake to defend words attributed to Lord Derby, without knowing whether they had been really used or not; but that I would explain to him my idea of the obligations involved in a Collective Guarantee. I said that it was absurdto suppose that eachof the Powers that had signed such a guarantee could be made singly and separately responsiblefor its being enforced. Supposing (to take an extreme case) that France and Prussia came to an understanding involving a violation of the territory of Luxemburg that the King Grand Duke appealed to the Guaranteeing Powers, that Austria, Russia and Italy held aloof, would it be contendedthat England, single-handed,was bound, on that account to go to war with France and Prussia combined? It seemed me, I said,impossibleto definewith to legal strictnessthe amount of obligation really incurred; but whatever that might be, I could not see that the binding force of the engagementwhich we had signed, was in any degree lessenedby comments made in debate upon it, even by its authors. The construction to be placed upon an international document was to be inferred from the words em-

ployed, and from the general usage of Europe. Once it was signed, the individual opinion of the Ministers signing was of no more weight than that of any other person. In a country like ours, no absolutely valid engagement could be entered into as to the courseto be adopted at a future period, and
under circumstances not now foreseen.

Questionsof war or peacemust be decided by the Parliament of the day.

* Stanley to Loftus, No. 200, 25June 1867. Draft corrected and initialled by Lord Stanley and endorsed "seen by Lord Derby and the Queen". F.O. 64/615.





I would however add, as I had stated in the House of

Commons, that if I had regarded the Guarantee which we had given as purely illusory,, neither I nor my colleagues would have had anything to do with it. With these explanations Count BernstorfF appeared partly satisfied: he however expressed satisfaction that the his questionwas to be raised again in the Houseof Lords, where he hoped that a full and clear explanation would be given.

Document 122. Count Bernstorff'refusedfurther explanations, 12 July 1867*

[Count BernstorfFreferred to the discussions Parliament in ashaving "caused somesurpriseand evensomeanxiety to the Cabinet of Berlin ".] The PrussianGovernment do not accept the interpretation given by the Earl of Derby of a collective guarantee, which would amount to this, that if anyone of the guaranteeingPowersbroke the Compact,no other could be required to enforceit. Such an interpretation would in their opinion weaken the force of Public Law, and relax international obligations."}"


can follow.







necessary continuethe discussion present,asno practical to at I told Count Bernstorffthat the questionhad already been argued between us more than once, and that I agreed with his Governmentin thinking further discussion upon it useless.

* Stanley to Loftus, No. 209, 12 July 1867. The draft is corrected in Stanley'sown hand and endorsed "seen by Lord Derby and the Queen". F.O.

t This interpretation is not quite a fair one. Stanley, in his authoritative interpretation, saysthat he hopes British Parliament of the day would uphold the the guarantee but that he could not pledge it in advance. This is very different

from signing a treaty with no intention of keeping it and deceiving other

signatories accordingly; it is, in fact, a warning to other signatories that Great Britain may be unable to keep it.



[The "Derby doctrine" of collective guaranteewould be more
correctly called the "Stanley doctrine". For his statement of the

case,endorsed by Derby and the Queen, is alone authoritative. What is more he appealed to the word "collective'5 as being interpreted according to "the general usage of Europe", not according to the whim of an "individual" Minister or by "comments in debate". Unfortunately, Stanley and Derby have been able to find few jurists to support them. They sought to apply their "collective" doctrine retrospectivelyto the guaranteein the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and this was certainly not the view of Cowley, who drafted the article in question.* Further, the idea
that "collective" responsibility excluded "individual" responsibility is flatly contradicted by the use of the word "solidairement"

in the guarantee article of the Triple Alliance Treaty of 1856. The authorized English rendering of "solidairement" is there
given as "jointly and severally". The terms are technical ones in both French and English law. It is almost certain that both mean

collective and individual responsibility. It is certain that they do

not mean'* collective responsibility'J in Derby's sense. '' Collective guarantee" is not a technical law term at all in English. Derby's statements in debate that the Treaties of 1831 and 1839 embody "several and individual" guarantees, and not collective ones, were inaccurate. Until Derby tried to draw the distinction, the

Powersplainly had regarded the Treaty of Luxemburg as implying pledges of exactly the same nature as those given in 1831,

1839and 1856.1The argument from the Treaty of 1856,or from the "general usage" of the past, is therefore all against the Derby

Derby's almost meaninglessinterpretation of the "collective guarantee" was contestedby three great authorities at the time, by Earls Russell and Granville and the Duke of Argyll. It was supported by Lord Clarendon. It has generally been rejected by

jurists sinceits proclamation.J Bismarck at a later date (1885) complained that "the Ministerof theday [Derby] ... hadexplained
* H. Temperley, 'Treaty of Paris 1856*, Journalof Modern History, No. 4, rv, [December 1932],526-7, and notes. "f V. Sir E. Satow, 'Pacta Sunt Servanda*,in Comb. Hist. Journ.> No. 3, i,
[1925^ 309 n-3 312 n.a 316.

J V, A. D. McNair, ed., Oppenheirn, International 4th ed., [London, Law> 1928],is 772-3;Hall, 8th ed. [1924],400-2; Dr G. Quabbe, Volkerrechtliche Die Garantit, [Breslau,1911], 159; G. P. Sangerand H. T. J, Norton, England's
Guarantee BelgiumandLuxemburg, to [1915], 87-90.



away [the Luxemburg Treaty] almost as soon as it was signed".*

Yet it must be said that Bismarck, in view of the new evidence

here brought forward, could hardly have been deceived at the time, though he dared not enlighten the German public. This explains why the Derby-Stanley doctrine as regards Luxemburg
became an accepted canon of the British, and of no other,

Foreign Office. When in 1914Germany violated both the territory of Belgium and of Luxemburg, France forwarded protestsin both cases;England confined her protest to Belgium. On 2 August
Monsieur Cambon asked Sir Edward Grey what attitude the
British Government meant to assume about the German violation

of Luxemburg.


told him",

said Sir Edward, "the doctrine

on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867."! Grey is reported by Gambon as saying "that the Convention [sic] of 1867,referring to Grand Duchy [of Luxemburg], differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observanceof this latter Convention without the assistanceof the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert".]: The influence of Stanley and Derby

reached Owingto the doctrine far. laid downby themin 1867,

England did not protest about Luxemburg in 1914 and went to
war for Belgium alone.]
* Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Salisbury,[1931], in, 259. "f Gooch and Temper ley, British Documents the Origins of the War, [1926], on xi, 275, No. 487. t Collected Diplomatic Documents, [1915], French Yellow Book, 235, No. 137,

Gambon to Viviani, 2 August 1914,in A. & P., [1914-16], LXXXIII,[Cd. 7860], 33-601, cp. alsothe text in Documents] D\iplomatiques\ F[ranfais'])mme Ser., xi,
469, No. 612.






[The Gladstone administration, which came into office at the

closeof 1868,is more associated with the enunciation of principles for the conduct of foreign affairs than with specificachievements.

During the first eighteenmonths Clarendonwas at the Foreign Office, and the Queen had expressed suspicions about his appointment and his views as to British obligations. " Shewould deeply
regret", the Queen wrote to Clarendon, "to think that either Portugal or Belgium should be led to imagine that they must not look to England for support in case of need. If it were to be

generally understoodthat we could not any longer be relied upon, except for moral support, England would soon lose her position
in Europe.53* Clarendon's explanations partly removed the Queen's anxieties, but at her direction the correspondence was sent to Gladstone, and he replied with an important and characteristic exposition of policy (Doc. 123).
Most of the ideas which Gladstone enumerated in this letter

were illustrated by the events of the ensuing period. Granville, like Clarendon, was called upon to define his attitude to the Portuguese treaties; Gladstone and Granville together worked out a scheme for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality; the use of "firm but moderate language" to deter the strong was tried more than once in connexion with Prussia, and the attempt to develop

a public opinion in Europe and to forward the interests of international justice was the keynote of the Gladstonian policy.]

Document 123. Gladstone expounds principlesof policy his in replyto criticisms theQueen, April 1869! by 17 ... I do not believe that England ever will or can be unfaithful to her great tradition, or can forswearher interest in the common transactions and the general interests of Europe. But her credit and her power form a fund, which
* Letters Queen of Victoria,2nd Ser.:[i 926]31,589.Queen to Clarendon, 15April

| Gladstone General to Grey,17April 1869.Morley,Lifeof Gladstone, [ 1903],

n, Bk vi3 Chap, rv, 317-18.



in order that they may be made the most of, should be thriftily used.... .. .As I understand Lord Clarendon's ideas, they are fairly representedby his very important diplomatic communications since he has taken office. They proceed upon such grounds as these:-That England should keep entire in her own hands the meansof estimating her own obligations upon the various statesof facts as they arise; that she should not forecloseand narrow her own liberty of choiceby declarationsmade to other Powers,in their real or supposed interests, of which they would claim to be at least joint interpreters;that it is dangerous her to assume for alone an advanced, and therefore an isolated position., in regard to Europeancontroversies;that, comewhat may, it is better for her to promise too little than too much; that sheshould not encourage the weak by giving expectationsof aid to resist the strong, but should rather seekto deter the strong by firm but moderate language, from aggressions the'weak; that she on should seek to develop and mature the action of a common, or public, or Europeanopinion, asthe beststandingbulwark againstwrong,but shouldbewareof seeming lay downthe to law of that opinion by her own authority, and thus running the risk of setting against her, and against right and justice, that general sentiment which ought to be, and generally would be, arrayed in their favour.... 46. CLARENDON



[Clarendon's abortive attempt to persuadeBismarck to reduce

his " monster armaments *Jis now well known. * France had vainly askedStanley, when he wasForeign Secretary, to take the initiative

in the matter. Clarendon wasalready interestedin the idea before he came into power and, after conversationsat Berlin and Paris in the autumn of 1869, he approached Prussiain the following January. The overture wasa secretone, recordedin private letters

and unknownto Lord Sanderson, who was then in chargeof the

* Cp. Morley, Life ofGladstone, [ 1903], Bkvi, Chap,iv, 321-3; Letters Queen H, of Victoria, and Ser., [1926], n, 8-9; H. Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik KaiserNapoleons III..., [1926],m, 299n.; Newton,LordLyons, [i913], 1,246-79;A. A. W.Ramsay,

Idealism Foreign and Policy, [1925],277-9;P. Knaplund,Gladstone's Foreign Policy,

[1935], 44-5-





German Department at the Foreign Office. He wrote privately: "Lord Clarendon'sendeavour the spring of 1870to promotea in
mutual reduction of armaments by France and Prussia was conducted by private letters, and was entirely unknown to me until the publication of Lord Newton's Life of Lord Lyons" * In fact all

communicationswith Bismarck on the subject remained personal

in character. When this issueseemed doubtful, the French Minister

for Foreign Affairs, Daru, suggested that Clarendon should correspond officially with Prussia. Bismarck might, he thought, be more ready to listen if the possibility that the dispatches might
be laid before Parliament were present in his mind. Clarendon, however, was not ready to use this weapon, and the final communication to Bismarck on 9 March was made privately like the rest (Doc. 124). It had no better fortune than its predecessors. Bismarck suggestedthat England was acting the part of a "cool friend "; the overture utterly failed to lessen tension in Europe.] the

Document 124. Clarendon makes final effort his with Prussia., March iSyof 9 I have delayed writing to request that you would convey to C[oun]t Bisnlarck my cordial thanks for the courtesy and frankness with wh[ich] in a private letter dated Feb[ruary] gth and communicated to me by C[oun]t Bernstorff he answered my letter to you on the subject of partial disarmament.

This delay has been occasioned by my endeavour to ascertain correctly the relative forces of the great Military Powers and I hope that C[oun]t Bismarck will not consider that I trespass unduly on his time and his confidenceif I again resort to a subjectwh[ich] more than any other I have at heart and wh[ich] an Eng[lis]h Minister may have some claim to discuss without suspicion of his motives because

Eng[lan]d is not a military Powerbut is deeplyinterested in

the maintenance of peaceand the progressand prosperity of
the Continent.

I am as convincedas C[oun]t Bismarck himself can be that no German Gov[ernmen]t w[oul]d wish to impose upon its

People maintenance an armyin excess thatproportion the of of for wh[ich] the requirementsof its safetyimperatively calls
* Pte letter. Lord Sandersonto Dr Temperley, 11 August 1922.

f Clarendonto Loftus, Private,9 March 1870. PteClarendon Papers, F.O. 361/1;Newton,LordLyons, [ig^sL *, 267-70.






and I w[oul]d not desirethe reduction of a singleregimentif I thought it w[oul]d impair the independ[en]ce and the powerof Prussia maintenance wh[ich] in their plenitude the of I regard as essentially beneficialto Europe. But can it be correctly affirmed that the power and independ[en]ceof Prussiaare menacedfrom any quarter and if not surely the military force of Prussia is excessive and entails upon other Countries the unquestionableevil of maintaining armies beyond the requirementsof their safety. The only Countriesfrom wh[ich], owing to her geographical position,Prussia c[oul]d anticipatedangerareRussia, Austria and France and can it be said that from either there is any real causefor apprehension? In the conversation I had with C[oun]t Bernstorff when he commun[icate]d to me the letter of C[oun]t Bismarck he dwelt at some length upon the ill will of Russia towards Germany wh[ich] might take an active form on the death of the present Emp[ero]r and for wh[ich] Prussiaought to be prepared, but C[oun]t Bismarck must know better than myself that Russiahaslong sinceand wisely ceased aim at to influence in Germany or intervention in German affairs and that all her energies are now directed Eastward with a view of extending her territory and her commercein Asia. Whatever sentiments may be suggestedin other quarters by a rapid development the presentpolicy of Russiawh[ich] of has the entire support of public opinion in that Country it appearscertain that Germany can have no danger to guard ag[ain]st from Russiawhatever may be the personalfeelings or opinionsof the reigning sovereign. On paper, and only on paper, Austria has an army of 800,000 but she c[oul]d not even on the most pressing emergency bring 250,000 men into the field-her finances are dilapidated and her internal disorganizationaffordsjust cause of alarm-danger to Prussia from Austria must for
many years to come be a chimera.

The military peaceestablish [men]t of Franceis nominally greaterthan that of Prussiathe former being 400,000and the latter being 300,000but the number of troops stationedin





the costly and unproductive Colony of Algiers is not and cannot ever be lessthan 60,000 men. Other Colonial possessions require military protection and the garrisons Lyons in and other great townsnecessary the maintenanceof order for have not lessthan 40,000 men. The establishmentsof the two Countries are as nearly as possibleupon an equality. Can this state of things in France be regarded as a menaceor a danger to Prussia? I am greatly mistakenif any Pruss[ia]n Statesmanor General w[oul]d answer this enquiry in the

The question then to my mind appearsquite simple. The

military forces of the first Continental Powers have a certain

proportion to each other-in order to maintain that proportion very heavy burdens were imposed upon each Country but if by common agreement each reduces its army by a certain number of men the same proportions will be maintained while the burthenswhpch] arefast becomingintolerable will be alleviated and this w[oul]d in no way weaken the important declaration made by the King in His M[ajesty]5s speech on opening the Federal Parl[iamen]t viz that the legitimate purpose of the military force of the country is to guard its own and not to endanger the independ[en]ce of
other Nations.

C[oun]t Bismarck however thinks that if the question of diminishing the military strength of Prussia is entertained it will be necessarycarefully to enquire what guarantees can be given by neighbouring Military Powers in compensation to Germany for a decrease the amount of security wh[ich] in
she has hitherto owed to her armies.

Upon this I w[oul]d respectfully beg to observethat a minute discussionof guaranteesw[oul]d be endlessand dangerous-the legitimaterights and precautionarymeasures of independentGov[ernmen]tsw[oul]d be analyzedin a spirit possiblyof unfriendly criticism and if agreements were arrived at constant vigilance over their faithful fulfilment w[oul]d be necessary this might possiblygiverise to the and quarrels that the agreements were intended to avert and wh[ich] w[oul]d at onceput an end to the compacts.






It is upon a dispassionate consideration of the probable course of events that the question of partial disarmament sh[oul]d in my opinion be decidedand in France (the only country with wh[ich] we need concern ourselves)what do we find? a nation resolutely pacific-a Gov[ernmen]t depending on popular support and therefore equally pacifica responsible Min[iste]r declaring that France will not interfere with the affairs of her neighboursand the Sovereign willingly assentingto a diminution of i/ioth of the annual conscription without asking for reciprocity on the part of Germany and thereby showing his confidence in the King's

I venture to think that the present stateof opinion in France founded as it is upon a true estimate of French interests is a more solid guarantee than any that the respective Gov[ernmen]ts of Fr[anc]e and Germany c[oul]d effect for their own security. C[oun]t Bismarck will admit, and I am sure .that a Statesmanso liberal and far sighted will admit without regret that the people every where are claiming and must obtain a larger share in the administration of their own affairs and that in proportion as they do so the chances causeless of wars will diminish. The people well understand the horrors of war and that they and not their rulers are the real sufferers-they equally understand and will daily become more impatient of the taxation for thosecostly preparationsfor war wh[ich] in themselvesendanger peace and I believe that there is at this moment no surer road to solid popularity for Gov[ernmen]ts than attending to the wants and wishesof the people on the subject of armaments.
I have reason to know that the reduction in the French

army w[oul]d have beencarried further if the Gov[ernmen]t c[oul]d havehopedthat the example w[oul]d be followedby Prussia-sooner later howeverthis reason or will be publicly assigned and then upon Prussiawill rest the responsibility not only of maintaining so large a force herself but of compelling other Countriesreluctantly to do the same. It w[oul]d be to me a matter of most sincerepleasureto





think that no such responsibility will rest on Prussiabut I should hardly have presumedto recur to the subjectif I had not gatheredfrom the private letter of C[oun]t Bfismarck] that further discussion was not absolutely precluded and I had not thereforebeen encouraged hope that he might to think properto makemy suggestions knownto his Sovereign.
47. THE




[Prussia's intention to annex Alsace and Lorraine was made

known to England by a circular, dated 13 September 1870 and

communicated on the 22nd. Gladstone was greatly shocked at

the idea of annexing a people against their will, and he clung

as long as he could to the thought of action, though in fact he did not wish to act alone. In his view there were only two courses open to Britain-to protest on the ground of "the senseof the
inhabitants35; or to consider the communication non avenu. The

paper here printed (Doc. 125) was sent to Granville for Hs personal information, and was greeted with polite disagreement.* Goschen supported Gladstone at the Cabinet on the 3Oth; but Granville won * after the longestfight I everhad against Gladstone'3.
Granville tried to console the Premier: "Palmerston", he said,

"wasted the strength derived by England from the great war by his brag, I am afraid of our wasting that which we at present

derive from moral causes laying down generalprinciples, when by

nobody will attend to them.35 The cue was quickly taken. *cln moral forces, and in their growing effect upon European politics," wrote Gladstone, "I have a great faith: possibly on that very account, I am free to confess,sometimesa misleading one." | But
he found the Cabinet decision "rather indigestible5', and feared

that <camost mischievouswrong will have been done and will be

beyond recall, without a word from anybody".J Even then he was not finally convinced. In October he wrote an article in the
Edinburgh Review which he stated publicly, though anonymously, in

his objection to forcible annexation. "To wrench a million and a quarter of a peoplefrom the country to which they have belonged
* Gp. P. Knaplund, Gladstones ForeignPolicy, [1935], 55-8, where an extract from Gladstone's memorandum is printed, and his correspondence with Granville on the subject cited. Professor Knaplund points out (ibid. 56 n.) that in

Morley, Life of Gladstone, [1903], n, Bk vi, Chap, v, 345, there is a confusion

between this memorandum and Gladstone's article in the EdinburghReview, cxxxn, 564-93, October 1870.

f Fitzmaurice,Life of Granville, [1905], n, 62-3; cp. Morley, Life of Gladstone, [1903], n, Bk vi, Chap, v, 346-8; G. & D. 29/58,PteGranville Papers. Gladstone
to Granville, 8 October 1870.

J G. & D. 29/58, Granville Pte Papers. Gladstone Granville,4 October1870. to






for some two centuries, and carry them over to another country of which they have been the almost hereditary enemies, is a

proceedingnot to be justified in the eyes of the world and of posterity by any mere assertion of power, without even the attempt to showthat security cannot be had by any other process."
And a little later in the article he asks: "Can Germany afford, and does she mean, to set herself up above European opinion?"

and finally he closeswith his favourite doctrine: "Certain it is

that a new law of nations is gradually taking hold of the mind,

and coming to sway the practice, of the world; a law which recognisesindependence, which frowns upon aggression,which favours the pacific, not the bloody settlement of disputes,which aims at permanent and not temporary adjustments; above all,
which recognises,asa tribunal of paramount authority, the general

judgment of civilised mankind."* In November Gladstonewrote a secondmemorandum, but failed to get the necessarysupport
in the Cabinet.f
issue-a marked

His attitude was wholly without effect on this

contrast to the effectiveness of his action for the

defence of Belgium and his establishmentof the principle of the

sanctity of treaties in the Black Sea question.]

The Chancellor

125. Gladstone discourses annexations', on 25 September 1870]:

of the North German Confederation

announces,in his memorandum of the th [sic] current, the intention of the Confederation to demand from France, as a condition of peace,the cession Alsace and a portion of of Lorraine, countries inhabited by more than ij million of

In signifying this intention as matter of fact, he likewise states the ground on which the demand is to be enforced. It is not to befor the mereaugmentationof GermanTerritory : nor is it to be for the purposeof improving the facilities for an attack by Germany upon France. It is to be a defensive acquisitionexclusively, and is simply to makeit more difficult for France to attack Germany.
* Edinburgh Review, cxxxn, 554-93^ October1870.Reprintedin Gleanings of PastTears, 197-257. rv, The passages above on pp. 241,242and256. cited are
t Gp. P. Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy, [1935], 59-61. The memorandum is printed in full, pp. 270-9, App. I.
J G. & D. 29/58, Pte GranvillePapers.The first memorandum enclosed in

a letter from Gladstone Granville, 24 September to 1870. Part printed in

Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy, 55-6.



Avoidingall collateral and secondary matters, British the Government feelsitself required,by the communication it hasreceived,to consider briefly
i. Who it is that makes the demand 2. What it is that is demanded

3. Why it is that the demand is made. As respectsthe first.

The demandof a belligerentpeople,expressed its by constitutedorgan,mustbe taken asthe authenticexpression

of its will.

But this expression vary greatlyin moral weight and may authority, accordingasit may in given cases express free the
and ascertainedsentiment of the nation, or on the other hand only the sentimentof thosewho, thinking in accordance with the governingpower, are allowed to speaktheir minds, while others who differ are put to silence by the action of the

In order that we may give to the demand announced by the Chancellor of the Confederation its full moral weight, we must absolutely assumethat the formation and expression of opinion upon that demand in Germany are free: that the public enunciation of the opinion opposite to that of the Government, besidesencountering no hindrances, entails no legal penalties to person property or otherwise, more than that of an opinion coinciding with that of the Government.
Otherwise we could not tell whether this condition is one

really desired by the German nation, or whether it only represents opinion which is held by persons authority, the in and is supportedby the greatestdegreeof physicalforce. 2. The thing that is demanded is, that a country with its inhabitants shall be transferred from France to Germany. More than a million and a quarter of men who, with their ancestors for several generations, have known France for their country, are henceforthto be severed from France,and to take Germanyfor their country in its stead. The transfer of the allegianceand citizenship, of no small

part of theheartandlife,of humanbeings fromonesovereignty to another, without any referenceto their own consent,has



been a great reproach to someformer transactionsin Europe; has led to many wars and disturbances;is hard to reconcile with considerations equity; and is repulsive to the sense of of
modern civilization.

All theseconsiderations would apply with enhancedforce, if there were any sort of foundation for a rumour, which has gained somecurrency, that it was intended to constitute and govern the territory of Alsaceand Lorraine after cession, not for itself, nor upon terms of perfect equality (whether incorporated or not) with the rest of Germany, but, in some special and artificial manner, on behalf of Germany as a whole, and in a state of qualified civil or political inferiority. The British Government must therefore presume it to be
a sous-entendu the memorandum of Count Bismarck, that in

the transfer of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine to Germany is only to take place upon its being ascertainedto be conformable to the wishesof the population of those districts. 3. Thirdly and lastly, with reference to the reason, for which, and for which alone according to the Chancellor's memorandum, the transfer is to take place. It needs argumentto shewthat accordingto the common no opinion a river is a bad strategicfrontier, and that Metz and Strasburgafford to the French great facilities for the invasion of Germany,

It is however


to ask whether

were the fortresses of

Alsace and Lorraine in the hands of Germany, they might not afford considerablefacilities for the invasion of France by

It is difficult to carry the conviction to mankind in general, that any one country, whatever it may be called, is by a special charter of Nature exempt under all circumstances from all temptationto political excess; howeverfreelyit may be admitted on the other hand, that Germany is entitled to take ample securitiesagainst France, and that this cannot be

donewithout materiallyimpairingher rightsand powers. It would appear, however,that no greater harm ought
now to be inflicted upon France, than is sufficient to meet

the demand Germany amplesecurity. of for


If then there is a methodof proceedingwhich, with less of injury, and of future danger,to France,would give to Germanyin substance sameguarantees the againstFrance as the appropriation of French territory, it would seemthat that much ought to be preferredto suchappropriation. It seems beworthwhileto consider, to whether military the neutralization of the territory in question,and the destruction of all its fortresses, would not, without its being withdrawn from French allegianceattain the object of giving security
to Germany.

The baseof any military operations be effected to against Germanymust then lie in Francewestof the proposed frontier,
just as much as if the territory were transferred to Germany.
The exercise of civil Government from Paris in Alsace and

Lorraine could not it is apprehended, be made to subserve the purposesof military aggression. The disadvantagesto France would be great. It may be
uncertain whether she would submit to them. But the

question now is why should the German demand extend beyond the condition of a military neutralization, of an interposition betweenthe two countries of a spacestrategically void and exempt, and this wholly at the expenseof France. There may be other more eligible methods of proceeding: or there may be a perfect answerto the question which has been put. But as at present advised the demand of the Chancellor seems have been pushed, and if so then into advertently without doubt, beyond the scopeof the argument on which it is founded, and within the true limits of which they cannot doubt it would if necessary accordingto reason,
be reduced.



[Gladstone'sapplicationof principle to the conductof foreign affairs was put to the severest in the matter of the Alabama test Arbitration. The details of the case were fully represented Blue in Books at the time,* and they fall outside the scopeof the present volume. An extract only is given herefrom Gladstone's speech in the debateon the Address February 1873,after the award had in
* V. Temperley Penson, and Century Diplomatic Books, of Blue 241-3,246-8.



beenpublished. His defence its acceptance of was couched in

terms similar to those which he used in connexion with the Black
the establishment of a rule of law in international relations.

Sea Conference,and here again the keynote of his utterance was It is noteworthy that Gladstone in the earlier stagesof the arbitration was doubtful of its desirability. But the experiment,

despiteits unpopularity in England, seemsto have convinced him. Someyearslater, in his secondministry, when France and Italy were disputing about AssabBay, he wrote that " the question of territorial right in this case onefor arbitration", and proposed is that Britain ought "decidedly to recommend to both parties to hold their handswith a view to a settlementof that kind53.*] Document 126. Gladstone argues defence arbitration, in of 6 February1873!

... Sir, aswasto be expected,the interest.. . of the evening's discussion, has turned chiefly upon that paragraph of the Speech which refersto the Arbitration at Geneva.... I am bound to say that, in my opinion, if we ha4 unhappily the same circumstances again before us, it would be our duty
to meet them in the same manner.... It is not as an alternative

for the independentcommunicationof independentcountries that arbitration is to be preferred. The serious question is, whether arbitration is not a comparative blessing when, being resortedto without the slightestsacrificeof honour, it
becomes the means by which worse, far worse, results are to

be avoided? And by those far worse results I do not only refer to the contingency war,.., but I refer to the planting of of habitual and perpetual discord between countries that every

consideration interest duty oughtto leadinto the closest of and

alliance... .Arbitration is not a novel invention. Arbitration

hasundoubtedlyits own graveand serious and characteristic difficulties;but what I think we arejustified in saying-not wishing to make either too much or too little of the matter-

isthis.Theremayhave been particularquestions whichhave

previouslybeen made the subjectof referenceto arbitration

between independent countries asgreatconsequenceany of as

August 1881.

* G. & D. 29/124, Granville Pte Papers. Gladstone Granville, Private,30 to t Hans, Deb.,3rd Ser.,ccxrv, 103-15, passim.





one of the questions which remained unsettled between ourselvesand America. But this, I think remainsindisputablethat when so far a step in advancehas been made, there has been no instance in which such a group of controversies, reaching over so wide a surface,descending far into detail, so and involving in certain cases such seriousissues, have, by the joint and single act of two great countries, been thus brought to a peaceful termination.... If a strict doctrine has been laid down, and if the first consequence that is that we are called of upon to pay money which under a doctrine more relaxed we should not have had to pay, the fact of such a strict doctrine having been laid down is an important fact in the history and in the gradual formation of international law.... I must say I think it is a question not of legislating as we legislate here by an Act of Parliament, which we can passto-day and undo tomorrow, but we are legislating for the international concerns of the world, and establishing a general consent of nations, which no one or no two of them, once they are established, will be able to undo.... It is not particularly agreeable to have to pay money to a foreign Power, even though certain results may be obtained which are not unfavourable to our own permanent interests. The good sense the country has, of however, I think, at once passed by all these secondary

makers,some which are scarcely of worthy of consideration;

and, looking to the large interestsof humanity and civilization involved in this mode of dealing with international disputes, ... has arrived at the conclusion that if it be not in every respect precisely what we could wish, yet it is a thing to be heartily welcomed and embraced on account of the principle
which it tends to consecrate and establish, and the evils

which it may operate to remove.









[The British attitude towards the abrogation of the Black Sea clausesof the Treaty of Paris reveals with peculiar clarity a distinctive trait of Gladstone's policy. It was founded on his dominant desire to preservethe rule of law in diplomacy. The actual issueraised by the Russian circular of denunciation seems

to havebeen viewedsomewhat differently Gladstone by by and

Granville. The latter expressed himself forcibly to his old friend Apponyi, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador," and roused hopes that Britain would take the lead in opposingRussia. But the final word lay with Gladstone, and when the British reply camebased as we know on a private memorandum drafted by himApponyi looked in vain for the "protestation 6nergique" which Granville's conversation had promised.* Gladstone objected to
the form, rather than to the substance, of the Russian action. It is, perhaps, well to remember that Gladstone had opposed the

inclusion of the Black Seaclausesin 1856,and he was the more

inclined therefore to treat Russialeniently now becausehe believed

these clausesto have been wrong in the first instance. It is not,

however, true to say, as Gladstone did, that the Black Sea clauses were not a central feature of the Treaty of 1856. Granville's dispatch-as he wrote privately to Buchanan-gave

"a small hole out of which to creep, if they are not prepared to
remain on their high horse".f And Odo Russell was sent on a special mission to the Prussian headquarters at Versailles to try
to secure common action between Britain and Prussia. Meanwhile


and Granville



Russia the assurancd*that

her Ambassadorwould present Russian views at a Conference "without mentioning the Declaration of His Excellency's Circular of the 3ist of October". At the end of November they accepted Bismarck's invitation to a Conference at London, "upon the understandingthat it is assembled without any foregoneconclusion as to its results". The question of compensationwas difficult to settle. Turkey-who had never wanted a Congress-raised difficultieswhen it was proposedthat the Sultan should have restored to him his freedom to open or closethe Straits at will. Bismarck,

who would haveagreedto this, refusedcategoricallyGranville's second proposal, that Germany, with Italy, should join the Tripartite guaranteeof 15 April 1856. In the course of the discussions this subject Gladstone, a private letter to on in Granville,laid down an important principle with reference to
* W.S.A. vui/8i, Varia. Apponyi to Beust,Private, 17 November 1870.

| G. & D. 29/114,Pte Granville Papers.Granville to Buchanan,Private,

ii November 1870.








guarantees-that they "presuppose capacityof anyguaranteed the State to fight for herself" (Doc. 129), a point of some interest in view of the later discussions the guarantee to Belgium. of The final settlement was only reached after much experiment. The Black Seaclauses were abrogated, the Rule of the Straits was modified, and denunciation formally repudiated. The Tripartite Treaty, despite Granville's unwillingness,remained unchanged. Austria-Hungary failed to secure the acceptance of her more vigorous proposals,which would have resulted in the establishment of a port on the Black Sea open to foreign ships of war. None the less,Gladstonemanaged to securethe essentialpoint, by the general admission that the rule of law must be strictly
preserved in international affairs. Russia, indeed, abrogated a part of the Treaty, and the result of the Conference was to confirm a

fait accompli. it would be incorrect to describe the Conference Yet

as a farce, or to assert that Russia emerged unscathed from the

struggle. In return for a particular concession the moment she at

promised to support in the future a new and general interpretation

of European public law. The pledge was underwritten by all the other Great Powers. A multilateral European treaty was not in future to be abrogated by one power alone; the consent of the other signatory powers was required for either abrogation or revision of such a treaty "in whole or in part. It may be said that this principle-embodying the Gladstonian idea that force should
be controlled by law-was in substance maintained until the

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908.* It representedan important advance in international law and morality.]

Document 127. Gladstone points out theprinciplesinvolved

in the Russian Circular ofq .November i87ot
>j "/ /i

The dispatchesof Prince Gortschakoff dated gth November 1870declareon the part of Russiathat the Treaty of 1856has been infringed in various respectsto the prejudice of Russia and in one casethat of the Principalities against the explicit protest of her Representative: and that in consequence of theseinfractions Russiais entitled to renounce thosestipulations of the Treaty which directly touch her interests. It is
* The caseof Batoum is not in fact an exception to the rule (v. infra, pp. 436-

41); Russiahere contended,and with somejustification, that no violation of

the Treaty had taken place.

t G. & D. 29/58, Pte Granville Papers. Memorandum by Gladstone. The memorandum is undated, but it is endorsed: "Mr. Gladstone. Recd Nov. 10,




there announcedthat she will no longer be bound by the covenants which restrict her rights of Sovereigntyin the
Black Sea.

Wehaveherean allegation that certainfactshaveoccurred whichin thejudgmentof Russia at variance are with certain stipulationsof the Treaty: and the assumption madethat is Russia,upon the strength of her own judgment as to the character of those facts, is entitled to releaseherself from certain other stipulations of that instrument. This assumption limited in its practical application to is someof the provisions the Treaty: but as everyTreaty in of point of obligationis oneand indivisible,the assumption of a title to renounceany one of its termsis ipso facto an assumption of a title to renounce the whole.

The statement which has been made is wholly independent

of the reasonableness or unreasonableness on its own merits of the desire of Russia to be released from the observation of

the stipulations the Treaty of 1856respecting Black of the


But the question now raised is, in whosehands lies the powerof giving a release from all or any of these stipulations? It has commonly been supposedthat that Power belongs only to the Powers who have been parties to the original

The dispatchesof Prince Gortschakoffappear to proceed upon a different principle. They imply that someone of the Powerswho have signed the engagement may allegethat occurrences have takenplace at variance with the provisionsof the Treaty, and upon that allegation, although it be one not shared nor admitted, by the CosignatoryPowers,may found not a request to those Powersfor the equitable considerationof the case,but an announcement them that it hasemancipated to itself or holds itself emancipated from any stipulations the Treaty which of it thinks fit to disapprove. It is quite evident that the effect of such doctrine and of such proceedingwhich with or without avowal is founded upon it is to bring the entire authority and efficacyof all








Treaties whatever under the discretionary control of each one of the Powers who may have signed them. That is to say the result obtained is the entire denunciation of Treaties in their essence.For whereas their whole object is to bind Powers to one another, and for this purpose each one of the parties places a portion of his free agency in abeyance as regards himself and under the control of others, by the doctrine and proceeding now in question one of the Parties in its separate and individual capacity brings back the entire subject into its own control, and remains bound only to itself Accordingly Prince Gortschakoff has thought proper to announce in these dispatches the intention of Russia to continue to observe certain of the provisions of the Treaty. However satisfactory this might be in itself it is obviously an expressionof the free will of that Power which it might at any time alter or withdraw, and in this which is the true point of view it is equally unsatisfactorywith the other portions of his communication becauseit implies the title of Russia to cancel the treaty on the ground of allegationsof which sheappoints herself as the only judge. The question therefore arisesnot whether any desire expressed Russiaought to be carefully examinedin a friendly by spirit by the cosignatory Powers, but whether they are to accept from her an announcement that by her own act, without any consentfrom them, she has releasedherself from
a solemn covenant.

Document 128. Granvillereflects the Tripartite on Treaty0/1856, 10 December 1870*

I presume programme which Russia, a to Prussia, Italy and Turkey and probably Austria and France would agreewould be restorationto the Emperor of Russiaof his Sovereignrights
in the Black Sea, ditto to the Sultan in the manner most

agreableto him and a reaffirmation of all the remainder of

the Treaty.
* G. & D, 29/58, Pte GranvillePapers. Granville to Gladstone, Private,
10 December 1870.




What further can we do. Possibly some declaration of the constructionto beput on the clause forbidding ForeignPowers meddling with internal administration of Turkey. But what sticks in my gizzard is the Tripartite Treaty.* How very foolish it was of us to have concocted it. But there it is, with obligations as binding as were ever contracted. If Prussia who says she was never asked to join it, would consentto do so now, it would rather weaken than strengthen the obligations of England, and would act as a powerful check against Russia trying to put them in force, and be a real equivalent for the concessionmade to her in the Black Sea. But Prussiais almost certain to decline, and although shewill declare as strongly aswe like her sense obligation under the of Treaty of March 1856,yet the fact will remain, that while six powers are bound by that Treaty, two of them are not bound by the much stronger Treaty of April. If Odo [Russell] ascertainsthat Prussia will not accedeto the Tripartite Treaty, how would it do to *ask her whether she would do so, if we made the same offer to Russia. There would be something of the Belgian Treaty of last year in the principle. It would have a deterring effect upon Russiaand yet would
rather release us.

If Russiadenounced remainderof the Treaty of 1856, the

and acted upon the denunciation, England, France, Austria and Prussia would be too strong for her.

If Prussia playedfalseto us,it would diminishthe necessity of our putting ourselves forward alone, or with only half the
other cosignatories. What do you think of this. There is also a question whether when the conference is over we should invite Spain to make a declaration in favour of the Treaty of 1856.
* V. supra,pp. 330-1.








Document 129. Gladstone defines implicationsof the a Guarantee, December 12 1870*

I quite agree that it is difficult to justify the Tripartite Treaty but as a practical question I am inclined to suggest looking at it from another point of view. I incline to think that any action in regard to it, as for example the asking Prussia to accede, would tend to rivet it upon us, and enhance our obligation.
On the other hand, stringent as it is in its terms, it does not

appear to me to have much force as a covenant at present, when Turkey declares her own incapacity to fight except with virtually our money. Guarantees as such seem to me to presuppose capacity of any guaranteed State to fight for the herself; and then to supply a further auxiliary defence. At leastI think it mustbe soin the case wherenothingis expressed to give a different construction to the guarantee. I am not sure*thatI know what you mean by making the
same offer to Russia but I fear it would be futile to ask her to

accedeto the Tripartite Treaty. For my own part, I do not seethat the Straits may not supply a sufficient compensation for the Black Sea changes: but I would urge the Turk to meditate as he smokeshis pipe, and let us know what occurs to him in the way of compensations.... I am rather against makingSpaina partyjust yet: but things might look different a short time hence.

[It might be argued that Gladstone compromised his general

principles in the questionof Belgian neutrality at the opening of the Franco-Prussian War, and that he obtained a practical
advantage by doing so. A careful study of the whole incident

suggests, however, another explanation. Gladstone's private correspondencewith Granville shewshow greatly he desired to

make a specialengagement with the belligerent powersto respect Belgian neutrality. It is equally clear that he did not regard his
action as injuring the sanctity of the 1839 Treaty.
12 December 1870.

In order to

* G. & D. 29/58, Pte Granville Papers. Gladstone to Granville, Private,



understand his attitude it is necessaryto remember in the first

place the publicity attachedto the revelationof the Benedetti documentin July 1870.* If two of the signatoriesto the 1839 Treaty could contemplate a secret agreementfor a possible
violation of Belgium, some immediate action was necessaryto

make the position clear. Napoleon III wrote a private letter of assurance the King of the Belgians. But this was not enough to
in Gladstone's view, and he feared the result of a general declara-

tion by Great Britain. As he said in the House of Commons on 8 August, "much danger might arise from such a declaration... we might inadvertently