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CITIZENSHIP Mercado vs Manzano 307 SCRA 630 MAY 26, 1999 Mendoza, J: when as a result of concurrent application of different laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national of both states. It is an involuntary act which results by reason of the conflicting laws. In contrast, there is dual allegiance whe a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states. Furthermore, dual allegiance requires a strict process for the termination of such status, while in dual citizenship the filing of certificate of candidacy, and electing Philippine citizenship, terminates such status considering that their condition is an unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Therefore, when the petitioner declared in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen, not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country, and swore to defend and support the Constitution and bear true faith and allegiance, he effectively repudiated his US citizenship. Considering the oath and the fact that the petitioner spent his youth, adulthood and practiced his profession as an artist in the Philippines and took part in past elections, leaves no doubt of Manzanos election of Philippine citizenship. Thus, the petition is granted.

Facts: Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for the position of Vice Mayor for the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano obtained 103,853 votes, while Mercado came in second obtaining 100,894 votes. However, the proclamation of Manzano was suspended pending a petition for disqualification in accordance with Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC, which disqualifies elective officials who have dual citizenship; the petition asserts that Manzano is a US citizen an therefore disqualified for the position of Vice Governor. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California of Filipino parents, therefore according to the law of the US which follows the principle of jus soli, Manzano is an American citizen. However, since Philippine law follows the principle of jus sangguinis, Manzano is also a Filipino citizen. Comelec granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he was a dual citizen disqualified under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC. However, Manzano claims that he has renounced his US citizenship when he was 37 years old, by registering himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. Therefore, the petitioner contends that he is qualified to run for and hold the lective office of Vice Mayor of the City of Makati.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections (GR 151434, 3 March 2004) Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR 161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151824] En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1 on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official leave, 3 dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley

Issue: W/N Manzano is eligible for the office of Vice Mayor despite his dual citizenship? Held: Yes. Disqualification under Sec. 40(d) of the LGC refers to dual allegiance which is different from dual citizenship. There exists dual citizenship

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Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Frivaldo vs Comelec 257 SCARA 727 June 28, 1996 Panganiban, J:

Facts: On March 20, 1995 Juan G. Frivaldo filed for Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Governor of Sorsogon for the May, 8 1995 elections. On March rd 23 , petitioner Raul Lee, who was also seeking the same position, filed a petition with Comelec to disqualify Frivaldo from seeking and holding public office by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. Consequently, Comelec declared Frivaldo disqualified. However, Frivaldo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was not acted upon; thus his candidacy continued and was voted for the governor position in the May 8 elections. Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes, while petitioner Lee came in second place. On June 9, Lee filed with Comelec a petition praying for his proclamation as duly elected governor. The Comelec decided in favor of Lee, and

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directed the provincial board of canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of declaring Lee as winner. Lee was proclaimed the winner at 8:30PM of June 30. As a result, Frivaldo filed with Comelec praying for the annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee based on the grounds that he (Frivaldo) was repatriated under P.D. 725, by taking his oath of allegiance on 2pm of June 30 (the same day). Thus, Frivaldo holds that he possesses the citizenship requirement to hold the position of governor. However, Lee contends that citizenship of an electoral candidate must exist on the day of filing the certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the elections. Lee rationalizes his argument by stating that citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a voter, because the law apart from the citizenship qualification requires candidates to be a registered voter, and a voter must be a citizen of the Philippines. Furthermore, Lee contends that the Resolution of the Comelec on May 1, 1995 disqualifying Frivaldo due to lack of citienzship, and 2 previous rulings of the Supreme Court declaring Frivaldo an alien were final and executory which disqualifies his running for or holding public office. Issue: (1) W/N Frivaldos repatriation only on June 30 complies with Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, which requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for local elective officials? (2) W/N Frivaldo complied with the registered voter qualification? (3) W/N the Resolution of the Comelec, and the 2 decisions of the Supreme Court declaring Frivaldo an alien is a continuing disqualification? Held: (1) Yes. The law doesnt specify the particular day when a candidate must possess citizenship, unlike residency which must be possessed by the candidate 1 year preceding the day of elections. The official begins to govern or discharge his functions on the day he is proclaimed and when the law mandates his term of th office to begin. In the case at bar, Frivaldo re-assumed citizenship on June 30 , the very day the term of governor began; thus he is qualified to hold office. DISSENTING OPINION Davide, Jr., J I. Frivaldo was never a registered voter The 2 prior rulings of the SC voided Frivaldos election as Governor in 1988 and 1992 for not being a citizen of the Philippines. Even if he was actually allowed to vote in those prior elections, he was never considered a registered Furthermore, Sec. 39 of the LGC speaks of qualification of elective officials, not candidates. Another reason why citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation is because is Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code (petition for quo warranto), which gives any voter the opportunity to question the eligibility of the candidate. Such quo warranto proceeding can be availed of 10 days AFTER PROCLAMATION. Thus, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of. Therefore, repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of application for candidacy. The court emphasized that citizenship requirement of Sec. 39 of the LGC should be possessed by the elected official at the latest: the time he is proclaimed and the start of the term of office. (2) Yes. The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter. The purpose of the registered voter requirement it to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else. Frivaldo was actually allowed to vote in a number of previous elections. (3) No. The 2 prior rulings of the SC were relevant to the 1988 and 1992 elections, an not the election at the case at bar. Furthermore, in the assailed Resolution of the Comelec, such order was granted on the basis of the prior SC decisions. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. A person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under the modes recognized by law.

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voter, it was in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification- it did not make him a Filipino citizen. To sanction Frivaldos registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form and abet the Comelecs incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldos registration and allowing him to vote.

II. Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate for public office The Omnibus Election Code (Sec. 74) allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground of material representation contained therein is false. Such petition may be filed at any tome not later than 25 days from the filing of certificate of candidacy. III. Frivaldos repatriation should not be given retroactive effect PD 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Philippines, it is only then that the person reacquires citizenship. There are 3 steps in reacquisition: (1) filing of application, (2) action by the committee, and (3) taking the oath of allegiance. If the decree had intended taking the oath to retroact to the date of filing it should have explicitly provided otherwise.