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Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 20052016

Specics of RBMK core cooling in beyond design basis accidents

A. Kaliatka , E. Upuras s
Lithuanian Energy Institute, Laboratory of Nuclear Installation Safety, Breslaujos g. 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania Received 23 April 2007; received in revised form 25 October 2007; accepted 25 October 2007

Abstract The most dangerous beyond design basis accidents for RBMK reactors, leading to the worst consequences, are related to the loss of long-term heat removal from the core. Due to a specic design of RBMK, there are a few possibilities for heat removal from reactor core by non-regular means: removal of heat from graphite stack by reactor gas circuit, removal of heat from reactor core using control rods cooling circuit, depressurisation of reactor cooling system, supply of water into cooling system from low pressure water sources, etc. This paper presents the analysis of such heat removal by employing RELAP5, RELAP5-3D and RELAP/SCDAPSIM codes. The analysis was performed for Ignalina nuclear power plant with RBMK-1500 reactor. The analysis of result shows that the restoration of water supply into control rod channels enables to remove 1030 MW of the generated heat from the reactor core. This amount of removed heat is comparable with reactor decay heat in long-term period and allows to slowdown the core heat-up process. However, the injection of water to reactor cooling system is considered as main strategy, which should be considered in RBMK-1500 accident management procedure. 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 1.1. Specicity of RBMK-type reactors Reactor RBMK-1500 of Ignalina NPP is boiling, graphite moderated, channel-type, light water reactor. The RBMK-1500 (Russian abbreviation for Large-power channel-type reactor) has 1661 fuel channels as 1661 small reactor cores. Due to such a separation of reactor core the failure of fuel in one fuel channel, e.g. as a result of loss of coolant, is not so dangerous as the degradation of total reactor core in vessel-type reactors. Comparing the RBMK with the vessel-type (BWR) reactors it is seen that these reactor types are quite similar in power per fuel quantity or fuel rod length, but big differences appear when comparing reactor power per core volume (Almenas et al., 1998). The specic power per core volume of the RBMK reactors is somewhat less, while the core heat capacity in RBMK due to a large amount of graphite is high. These parameters have a certain impact on the operation of the reactor during accidents. The location of the reactor core and its main components are shown in Fig. 1. Reactor cooling system of RBMK-1500

Corresponding author. Tel.: +370 37 401903; fax: +370 37 351271. E-mail address: algis@mail.lei.lt (A. Kaliatka).

has two loops, which are interconnected via the steamlines and do not have a connection on the water part, which differs from the vessel type reactors. The water is supplied to fuel channels where it is heated to saturation and partially evaporates. The steam and water mixture then ows to the drum separators (16, see Fig. 1) of both loops, where the steam is separated from water and directed to the turbines. The water from the drum separators ows via downcomers to the main circulation pumps suction header (11) and then by the pumps (7) is supplied to the main circulation pumps pressure header (9), which is connected to 20 group distribution headers (4). There are totally 40 group distribution headers (20 headers in each reactor cooling system loop). Each group distribution header provides water to 4143 fuel channels (2). The fuel channels are made of zirconium and niobium alloy similar to the one used for the fuel claddings. The steam after passing turbines is directed to the condensers where it is condensed. The condensate is supplied to the deaerators from where it is directed back to reactor cooling system by the main feedwater pumps. The fuel channels in RBMK-1500 are placed in graphite stack, which consists of 2488 graphite columns with the vertical bore openings. These openings are used for positioning of the channels, which in turn are used for placing fuel assemblies, control rods and several types of instruments into the core. The graphite stack (1, see Fig. 1) is located in hermetically sealed

0029-5493/$ see front matter 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.nucengdes.2007.10.029

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Fig. 1. General view of NPP with RBMK reactor: 1, graphite stack; 2, fuel channel; 3, lower water piping; 4, group distribution header; 5, emergency core cooling pipes; 6, main circulation pump pressure pipes; 7, main circulation pump; 8, main circulation pump suction pipes; 9, pressure header; 10, bypass pipes; 11, suction header; 12, downcomers; 13, steam and water pipes; 14, steamlines; 15, refuelling machine; 16, drum separator.

cavity, which is lled with a helium and nitrogen mixture, to prevent the oxidation of the graphite (Almenas et al., 1998). Control rods perform the reactor core reactivity keeping during normal operation and reactor scram in a case of emergency. The specicity of RBMK is that the control rods are placed in the individual channels. These channels are lled with water supplied by the low-pressure system totally independent from the reactor cooling system. As it was already mentioned, the fuel channel of RBMK reactor according to its function and location corresponds to a pressure vessel of vessel-type reactors. Thus, the fuel channels are the most important element in reactor cooling system. However, in case of beyond design basis accidents with loss heat removal from the core the integrity of fuel channels could be challenged as they are not so strong as the pressure vessel. The fuel channels are placed in the holes in the graphite bricks in such way that there is approximately 1.5 mm gap between the outer fuel channel tube wall and the graphite bricks. This gap is comprised of the contact gap between the fuel channel and the graphite ring and the ringblock gap as shown in Fig. 2. If the fuel channel heats up while the internal pressure is elevated, the deformation of fuel channels starts. The process of fuel channel deformation from the accident heating to the moment of rupture can be subdivided into three stages (Novoselsky and Filinov, 1996): Axialsymmetric ballooning of the fuel channel up to the moment of closing all the gaps in the system fuel channel slit graphite rings graphite blocks. Joint deformation of the fuel channel tube, rings and blocks and fuel channel material pouring into the slits of graphite rings. As a result, one or several radial cracks appear on the internal surface of the graphite blocks.

Fuel channel deformation in contact with fragments of the graphite rings and blocks and under conditions of the surrounding fuel channel and graphite columns resistance up to the channel rupture. The load, which can be supported by the graphite block, was found to average at 4 MPa. At nominal pressure in fuel channel (78 MPa) the temperature of fuel channel failure is not less than 650 C (Novoselsky and Filinov, 1996). Also the oxidation of fuel channels due to steamzirconium reaction (the same mechanism as for fuel rod claddings) could lead to failure of fuel channels. This exothermic reaction becomes very rapid at tem-

Fig. 2. Fuel channel and graphite column interaction zone: 1, fuel channel tube; 2, split graphite; 3, gap; 4, graphite block.

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perature higher than 1200 C. Recent experiments performed in Russia showed that rupture of a single channel is not expected to cause a consequential rupture of other fuel channels (Medvedeva et al., 2004). It should be noted that rupture of a single fuel channel is a design basis accident for RBMK-1500 reactor (rupture of 80 mm diameter pipe) and in terminology of LWR it would correspond to a small leak in a reactor pressure vessel. This specicity of RBMK-type reactors should be taken into account, when consequences of beyond design basis accident are discussed. The most dangerous beyond design basis accidents for RBMK reactors, leading to the worst consequences, are related with loss of long-term heat removal from the core. Due to specic design of RBMK there are a few possibilities for heat removal from reactor core by non-regular means: removal of heat from graphite stack by reactor gas circuit, removal of heat from reactor core using control and protection system rods cooling circuit, depressurisation of reactor cooling system and supply of water into cooling system from low pressure water sources, etc. All these possibilities are analysed using system thermalhydraulic codes. 2. Modelling of processes in reactor cooling system and heat transfer between fuel channels and control rod channels For the analysis of thermalhydraulic processes in reactor cooling system of Ignalina NPP with RBMK-1500 reactors the RELAP5, RELAP5-3D and RELAP/SCDAPSIM codes are used. The original RELAP5 computer code has been developed by Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for PWR and BWR reactors. This is a one-dimensional non-equilibrium two-phase thermalhydraulic system code. In the Lithuanian Energy Institute this code has been successfully adapted to simulate the RBMK type reactors, and it has been used for Ignalina NPP licensing since 1995. The general nodalisation scheme of the RBMK-1500 model, developed by employing RELAP5 code, is presented in Fig. 3. The model of reactor cooling system consists of two loops, each of which corresponds to one loop of the actual circuit. Two steam drum separators in each reactor cooling system loop are modelled by generalised separator element (1). All downcomers are represented by a single equivalent pipe (2), further subdivided into a number of control volumes. The pump suction header (3) and the pump pressure header (8) are represented as RELAP5 (Fletcher et al., 1992) branch elements. Three operating main circulation pumps are represented by one equivalent pump element (5) with check and throttling-regulating valves. The throttling-regulating valves are used for coolant owrate regulation through the core. These valves are modelled by employing servo valve elements. The normalised ow area versus normalised stem position is described in the RELAP5 model. The bypass line (7) between the pump suction header and the pump pressure header is modelled with the manual valves closed. This is in agreement with a modication performed at the Ignalina NPP. All fuel channels of the left core pass are represented by a few equivalent channels (13) operating at specic power and

coolant ow. The group of 20 group distribution headers (9) with connecting pipelines is modelled by RELAP5 branch component. The pipelines of the water communications (11) are connected to each fuel channel. Each of these components represents the quantity of pipes appropriate to the number of elements in the corresponding fuel channels in the core. The vertical parts of the fuel channel (14) above the reactor core are represented by RELAP5 components pipes. The pipelines of the steamwater communications (15) are connecting the fuel channels with drum separators. Compared to the model for the left loop, in the right loop, the main circulation pumps system is modelled with three equivalent pumps. The steam separated in the separators is directed to turbines via steam lines (16). Two turbine control valves organise steam supply to the turbines. The control of these valves was modelled by servo valve elements based on algorithm of steam pressure regulators used at Ignalina NPP. There are four steam relief valves in each loop of the reactor cooling system to direct the steam to the condensers of the turbines. The pressure of the steam is also controlled, and peaks of pressure are eliminated by 14 steam relief valves to pressure suppression pools of the accident localisation system. All models of steam relief valves are connected to the time dependent elements, which dene boundary conditions in turbine condensers or accident localisation system pressure suppression pools. The feedwater injection into the drum separators is simulated explicitly using RELAP5 pipe, junction, volume and pump elements (not presented in this paper). The valve element (17) is used for the modelling of breaks in pipelines of reactor cooling system. This valve is connected to the volume (18), which represents the compartments covered reactor cooling system pipelines. More detailed description of model is presented in papers (Kaliatka and Uspuras, 2000, 2002; Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004). For the modelling of processes during severe accidents up to fuel melting in the RBMK-1500 the RELAP/SCDAPSIM code was used. The RELAP/SCDAPSIM code (Allison and Wagner, 2001) is an integrated, mechanistic computer code that models the progression of severe accidents in lightwater-reactor nuclear power plants. The entire spectrum of in-vessel severe accident phenomena, including reactor-coolantsystem thermalhydraulic response, core heat-up, degradation and relocation, and lower-head thermal loads, is treated in this code in a unied framework for both boiling water reactors and pressurised water reactors. The application of RELAP5/SCDAPSIM code for RBMK reactor is not straightforward, because RELAP/SCDAPSIM includes limitation that only one reactor core can be dened. Considering that each fuel channel of RBMK corresponds to pressure vessel it is not possible to simulate multiple fuel channels in detail. Considering these code limitations it was decided to develop a simplied RELAP5/SCDAPSIM model where a single equivalent fuel channel is simulated employing SCDAPSIM elements with pressure difference and changing coolant ow rate in this channel dened as boundary conditions. These boundary conditions are obtained from the calculations with RELAP5 code using the detailed model of RBMK-1500 (see Fig. 3). Eventually, in case of accident without water injection both reactor

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Fig. 3. Full model of Ignalina NPP for thermalhydraulic analysis of processes in reactor cooling system (for RELAP5 code): 1, drum separators; 2, downcomers; 3, main circulation pumps suction header; 4, main circulation pump suction piping; 5, main circulation pumps; 6, main circulation pump pressure piping; 7, bypass line; 8, main circulation pumps pressure header; 9, group distribution headers; 10, injection of water from emergency cor cooling system; 11, bottom water pipeline; 12, reactor core inlet piping; 13, fuel channels; 14, reactor core outlet piping; 15, steam and water piping; 16, steamlines; 17, valve for break modeling; 18, model of compartments which surround the reactor cooling system pipelines.

cooling system loops will be voided and the whole reactor core would heat up. Therefore the results of SCDAPSIM analysis for one single fuel channel can be extrapolated to all 1661 fuel channels in the reactor. The simplied RBMK-1500 model with single fuel channel, developed by employing RELAP/SCDAPSIM code, is presented in Fig. 4. In order to perform the analysis of long-term accident scenario, the following boundary conditions should be known:

pressure and water temperature in the group distribution header (3); pressure in the drum separators (1); coolant ow rate through the fuel channel with average power (2). The more detail information about simplied RBMK-1500 model with single fuel channel, where the steamzirconium reaction processes, fuel rods damage and other severe accident phenomena were modelled, is presented in paper (Urbonavicius et al., 2006). For the simulation of heat transfer between fuel channels and control and protection system channels the RELAP5-3D code (RELAP5-3D Team, 2001) was used. The nodalisation scheme of the developed model is presented in Fig. 5. The one single control rod channel (3) with surrounding graphite column is modelled by pipe element with heat structure. The water in this channel is supplied from water tank of additional hold-down system (1) through pipeline (2) and bottom distribution header (4). The tank of additional hold-down system is elevated 30 m up to bottom of reactor core. The steam from the control rod channel is removed in to top distribution header (5). The pressure in this header is atmospheric. The eight fuel channels (8), placed in the graphite columns, surrounding this single control rod channel. These channels are feed by water from volume (12), which models water supply from main circulation pumps pressure header. Water from group distribution header, which is modelled by branch element (11), is supplied into bottom water pipeline (9) and later into fuel channels (8). The water ow through fuel channel is regulated using individual control valve (10). The steamwater mixture is directed to the drum separator and steam line model (6), through steamwater pipeline (7). The volumes (1, 5, 12 and 6) are modelled by time

Fig. 4. Simplied model of Ignalina NPP for analysis of processes during severe accidents (for RELAP/SCDAPSIM code): 1, drum separators and steamlines; 2, fuel channel; 3, group distribution header.

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Fig. 6. Reactor power behaviour after actuation of scram system.

Fig. 5. Simplied model of Ignalina NPP for analysis of heat transfer between fuel channels and control rod channels (for RELAP5-3D code): 1, water tank of additional hold-down system; 2, pipeline; 3, control rod channel; 4, bottom distribution header; 5, top distribution header; 6, model of drum separators and steam lines; 7, steamwater pipeline; 8, eight fuel channels; 9, bottom water pipeline; 10, individual control valve; 11, group distribution header; 12, water supply from main circulation pumps pressure header.

depended elements with specied boundary conditions. The heat transfer from hot fuel channels to cooled control rod channel through graphite column and gas gap in radial direction is modelled by special multidimensional heat conduction model of RELAP5-3D. As it was demonstrated by Paik (1999), this model is applied to calculation of heat transfer through the gas gap between the RBMK reactor core graphite blocks. 3. Station blackout scenario in RBMK-1500 The results of the Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP has shown that in topography of the risk, transients dominate above the loss-of-coolant accidents and the failures of the core long-term cooling are the main contributors to core damage frequency. The most likely initiating event, which probably leads to the loss of long-term cooling accident, is station blackout. Such event, which in case of no operator intervention is developing into severe accident, serves as an example for discussion of beyond design basis accident scenario in RBMK-1500 reactor. The station blackout is the loss of normal electrical power supply for local needs with an additional failure to start-up of all six diesel generators. In the case of loss of electrical power supply main circulation pumps, the pumps of the service water system and feedwater supply pumps are switched-off. Due to failure of diesel generators the long-term subsystem of emergency core cooling system is unavailable, i.e., it is impossible to inject water to reactor cooling system using the design measures. The water reserve, available in the reactor cooling system, will be evaporated and after some time the heat-up process of core components starts. This process is very depended from decay heat generated in the core. The present analysis was performed using RELAP5 and RELAP/SCDAPSIM codes, and reactor decay heat was calculated using RELAP5 point kinetic mod-

ule. The behaviour of reactor power after actuation of scram system is presented in Fig. 6. In the analysis it was assumed that before accident the reactor operates at power 4200 MWth (i.e. at maximal allowed power). The results of station blackout analysis (Afremov and Solovjev, 2001; Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004) showed that 1.5 h after the beginning of the accident the heat-up of fuel rods and fuel channels starts. Fig. 7 shows the behaviour of fuel, claddings, fuel channels, and graphite stack temperatures, calculated using simplied RBMK-1500 model, developed using RELAP5/SCDAPSIM code (see Fig. 4), in case of RBMK-1500 reactor blackout. Approximately, 3 h after the beginning of the accident the failure of fuel channels is expected, because the pressure in reactor cooling system is nominal, and the acceptance criterion for fuel channel wall 650 C (Novoselsky and Filinov, 1996) will be reached (Fig. 7). In the present analysis the opening of one steam relief valve at time moment 3.8 h after the accident beginning by an operator to discharge steam was assumed. Due to pressure decrease after valve opening the rest of coolant in pipelines below reactor core starts to boil and steam cools down the core for a short period of time. However, at time moment 4.3 h the second (repeated) heating-up of core elements starts. After operator starts depressurisation (in station blackout case), the accident scenario would continue at low pressure. When the fuel cladding temperatures increase to more than 900 C (after approximately 7 h), the failure of fuel claddings due to ballooning occurs. The ballooning occurs because at that time the pressure in reactor cooling system (outside fuel

Fig. 7. Temperature of fuel, fuel cladding, fuel channel and graphite. Main consequences in case of station blackout.

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Fig. 8. Effective oxide thickness on fuel cladding in intact average loaded.

rods) is close to atmospheric and the pressure inside fuel rods is high. After the temperature of fuel cladding exceeds 700 C, the cladding oxidation starts. But the fast oxidation process starts only after start of reactor cooling system depressurisation. It can be explained by the fact that after depressurisation the coolant remaining in cooling system starts boiling. The generated steam will be in contact with hot surfaces of fuel claddings and fuel channels, which makes favourable conditions for oxidation. The oxidation and hydrogen generation processes terminated after the pressure in reactor cooling system decreases down to atmospheric (Figs. 8 and 9). This indicates that there is no steam ow in fuel channels, thus the steamzirconium reaction is impossible. The conditions for fast oxidation of claddings and fuel channels, made from zirconiumniobium alloy, are reached after the fuel cladding and fuel channel temperatures exceed 10001200 C (1015 h after the beginning of the accident). But the oxidation process is slow due to absence of steam ow in fuel channels. Within these rst 1015 h the water supply to the fuel channels is required for reactor cooldown. The supply of water in later phases could lead to fast steamzirconium reaction and it could accelerate the core damage process. When the fuel claddings and fuel channels temperatures reach 1450 C, the melting of stainless steel grids starts (Fig. 7). Probably, at the same time the fuel channels will be failed. Due to station blackout the cooling of control and protection system channels fails as well and it leads to heat-up control rods. At temperature 19302050 and 2330 C the melting of aluminium oxide (control rods claddings) and boron-carbide (control rod elements) starts. The formation of ceramic (U, Zr, ZrO2 ) starts at temperature 2600 C. The analysis performed

using RELAP5/SCDAPSIM code shows that the fuel (ZrO2 and UO2 ) melting process starts at low pressure 55 h after the beginning of the accident at temperatures 2690 and 2850 C, respectively (Fig. 7). The released melt is likely to have a signicant superheat and will be able to ow to a lower part of the fuel bundle, while losing heat to the underlying clad by conduction and convection and to its surroundings principally by radiation. After some distance the material will be immobilised and re-freeze. While the more volatile ssion products are likely to have been released prior to melt relocation, the molten fuel will carry the major part of the ssion products and thus the heat source. It may be anticipated that at some point the remaining ZrO2 shells (and any undissolved UO2 ) would collapse forming a high temperature corium. Core heat up process in RBMK-type reactors is rather slow due to two factors: (1) high thermal inertia of graphite stack (there is 1700 t of graphite in the reactor), (2) the specic power per core volume of RBMK reactors is 10 times lower compared to PWR and BWR reactors. The reactor cavity is surrounded by the cylindrical water tanks, which play a role of biological shielding. In such severe accident case these tanks will accumulate a heat from the core. Thus, although the fuel melting process in reactor core starts, the metal structures, which form the reactor cavity, remain intact for a long time due to heat dissipation. 4. Reactor cooldown strategies in case of station blackout As it was mentioned in the case of station blackout, there are no possibilities to supply the water into reactor cooling circuit using design equipment: the failure of 6 diesel generators, which maintain the power for 6 auxiliary feedwater pumps and 6 pumps of emergency core cooling system, is assumed in the analysis. Only non-regular means for reactor core cooling should be analysed in this case: Direct water supply into reactor cavity; Ventilation of drum separator compartments; Heat removal using reactor cavity gas supply system; Restoration of water supply into control and protection system rods cooling circuit; Depressurisation of reactor cooling system and water supply from non-regular means (low pressure sources). The rst two measures for reactor core cooling have been discussed in the paper (Uspuras et al., 2006). Because in the longterm the biggest part of the residual heat is accumulated in the graphite bricks and the pressure in the reactor cavity is close to the atmospheric, the direct water supply into reactor cavity looks a very sensible measure. Unfortunately, the performed analysis (Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004) showed that the gaps between graphite columns in the graphite stack are very small, graphite is hot and supplied water does not reach deep lines of the graphite blocks. Thus, this measure does not allow to cooldown the centre of the reactor core.

Fig. 9. Hydrogen generation rate in one intact average loaded.

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Fig. 10. Distribution of fuel channels, CPS channels and graphite reector cooling channels in the reactor core. Heat transfer from FCs to cooled CPS channel.

Equipment and piping in the drum separator compartments have a rather large surface area: drum separators, steam header, part of the steam lines, part of the downcomers, steamwater piping and part of the channels, which are above the core. During the normal operation the maximum air temperature in drum separator compartments is 270 C. However, the ventilation of these compartments by air is not effective enough. The performed analysis (Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004) shows that heat removal capacity in this case is 68 MW. These gures are small compared to the reactor decay heat. As it was mentioned, the stack of graphite columns is hermetically sealed in the reactor cavity. This cavity is lled with a circulating heliumnitrogen mixture at a pressure of 0.491.96 kPa. During the normal operation the reactor cavity is lled with gas mixture (40% of He and 60% of N2 by volume fraction). The main function of reactor cavity gas system is to prevent the oxidation of graphite (graphite temperature is 500700 C), and to play a role of heat conductor when heat is transferred between graphite bricks and from graphite bricks to fuel channels. The gases in reactor cavity also remove a small amount of heat from reactor. Unfortunately, the heat removal using reactor cavity gas supply system is impossible in case of station blackout, due to loss of power supply to gas compressors. On the other hand, the specic heat of the gases (mixture of nitrogen and helium) is low, thus, the amount of heat, removed using gases, is insignicant, comparing to the reactor decay heat. The control boron carbide (B4 C) rods, which are used for reactor power control and shutdown, are placed in special channels lled with water supplied by the low-pressure system totally independent from the reactor cooling system. As it is shown in Fig. 10, 211 control rod channels are distributed evenly in the

reactor core (Almenas et al., 1998). The proportion between channels with fuel assemblies and channels with control rods is 1661/211 = 7.87. Thus, we can assume that one control rod channel is environed by 8 fuel channels. The heat from fuel channels, where heat is generated, through graphite bricks is transferred in radial direction to cooled control rod channels (see Fig. 10). The graphite columns are separated by a small (1 mm) gap. The heat transfer coefcient through gas gap between graphite bricks with overheated fuel channels and cooled control rod channels is approximately 100 W/m2 K (Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004). In case of station blackout the water supply in the control rods cooling channels is interrupted, due to loss of power to pumps. However there is a possibility to ll the tank of additional holddown system by artesian water. This tank, which is elevated 30 m up to the bottom of reactor core, can be connected to the bottom distribution header of control and protection system for water supply in to control rod channels. The supplied water starts to boil and vapour will escape from pipelines, connected to the top part of channels. Such approach allows to remove some amount of removed heat, which is small in comparison to reactor decay heat, but allows to slowdown the core heat-up process. In the paper (Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004) it was shown that the depressurisation of reactor cooling system and the following water supply from non-regular means (low pressure sources) to the group distribution headers in the case of loss of long-term cooling gives considerably better results compared with others measures. It was recommended to use as water source the hydroaccumulators, deaerators and artesian water supply, which has independent power supply from plant. This way of reactor core cooling in emergency cases is recommended to be included in the RBMK-1500 accident management program. However, in the

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Fig. 11. Behaviour of core components temperatures at the elevation 1.75 m from core bottom.

paper (Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2004) only rather early operator actions (no later than 8090 min from the beginning of the accidents) with fuel cladding temperatures below 700 C and fuel channel temperatures below 650 C were considered. For preparation of severe accidents management guidelines the reactor behaviour should be estimated also in high temperature region up to fuel melting, and core heat up possibilities in this high temperature region should be evaluated. Thus, the necessity for additional investigation arises. 5. Analysis of possibility to cool-down reactor core by the heat transfer between fuel channels and control rod channels In case of station blackout the heat exchangers, which cool the control and protection system water and pumps, are unavailable. The control rods will be cooled the rst 10 min by water ow from the top distribution tank of control and protection system, because of water resource in this tank. After emptying of this tank the temperature of control rod channels is increasing (see Fig. 11). The decrease of temperatures starts again after lling by artesian water and connection of additional hold-down system tank, with the bottom distribution header of control and protection system for water supply in to control rod channels. The analysis of possibility to remove heat from reactor core in case of station blackout by employing cooling of control rod channels was performed using RELAP5-3D model, shown in Fig. 5. It was assumed during the modelling that the tank of additional hold-down system is connected to control rod channels 1 h after the beginning of the accident. It takes 10 additional minutes, when water enters the bottom part of control rod channels. The supplied water starts to boil and vapour will escape through pipelines, connected to the top part of channels. At the time moment, when the water supply in to control rod channels starts, the control rods and theirs channels are already hot (400 C). It is because these channels received heat from hot graphite stack. The temperature of fuel channels is lower (300 C), because the rest of water from reactor cooling system cools fuel channels at this moment. After start of water supply, the bottom part of control rod channels will be cooled. Temperature of control rod channels is approximately 100 C, which means boiling of water

in channels. The water in control rod channels removes the heat from graphite bricks, thus temperature of graphite of control rod channel is below the temperature of graphite of fuel channels (Fig. 11). The part of heat from fuel channels is transferred in radial direction through graphite columns and gaps between graphite columns in to cooled control rod channels. However, the ow rate of water from additional hold-down system tank is insufcient for the effective cooling of control rod channels. As it is presented in Fig. 12, the temperature of control rod channels in the top part is much higher. 17 h after the beginning of the accident peak control rod channel wall temperature reaches 1000 C. To prevent generation of huge amount of hydrogen, the operator should stop the water supply into control rod channels at this moment. As it is shown in Fig. 12, the maximum capacity of heat removal in such way is equal to 15 MW (the water is supplied in to 211 control rod channels). The decay heat, generated in the reactor, decreases down to such power level only approximately 100 h after the beginning of the accident (see Fig. 6). Thus, the water supply from additional hold-down system tank in to control rod channels in case of station blackout is not effective enough and cannot remove all heat from reactor core, but such restoration of water supply into control rod channels allows to slowdown the core heat-up process and may be used in complex with other measures. 6. Analysis of cooling of overheated core using bleed and feed strategy The most effective measure for cooling of overheated reactor core is the depressurisation of reactor cooling system and water supply from non-regular low-pressure sources (so called bleed and feed strategy). Unfortunately, when the components of reactor core are overheated (fuel cladding temperatures are near to 700 C and fuel channel wall temperatures650 C) this measure can lead to challenges. The challenges, which are met when water is injected into overheated fuel channels (steamzirconium reaction, pressure increase in fuel channels due to fast steam generation process) are evaluated below. The rst challenge, which is met in case of start of water supply into overheated reactor core, is the steamzirconium

Fig. 12. Behaviour of core components temperatures at the elevation 5.25 m from core bottom. Capacity of heat removal from the core by control and protection system cooling circuit.

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Fig. 13. Behaviour of peak fuel cladding temperature in case of water supply with different ow rates into single fuel channel at initial temperature 1000 C.

Fig. 15. Minimum amount of supplied water ow rate for reactor cooling in respect to steamzirconium reaction.

reaction. The signicant oxidation of zirconium starts at temperature 1000 C and it reaches dangerous level at temperatures higher 1200 C. The steamzirconium reaction is exothermic and at temperatures above 1200 C would accelerate the core degradation process. The specicity of RBMK is that not only fuel assemblies, but also the fuel channels are made from zirconiumniobium alloy. Thus, the mass of components, which react with steam at high temperature, is signicantly higher in RBMK-type reactors, comparing to vessel-type reactors. To evaluate the possibilities to cooldown the overheated reactor core the simplied, single fuel channel model (see Fig. 4), created using RELAP/SCDAPSIM code (Allison and Wagner, 2001), was employed. It was assumed in the present analysis that pressure in fuel channel is near to atmospheric. Also the steam removal from the fuel channel was modelled without any restrictions. The possibilities to cooldown the overheated reactor core were evaluated by injecting different amount of cold water into the fuel channel at different initial fuel cladding and fuel channel wall temperatures. The previous analysis shows that in long-term accident conditions with loss of cooling the temperatures of all core components (fuel, fuel claddings, fuel channels, graphite) are very similar. The behaviour of peak fuel cladding temperature in case of water supply with different ow rates starting at initial temperatures 1000 and 1200 C is presented in Figs. 13 and 14. As it is shown in Fig. 13, the water ow rate 0.0167 kg/s into single fuel channel at initial temperature 1000 C allows cool down the fuel assemblies and fuel channels. The decreased

Fig. 14. Behaviour of peak fuel cladding temperature in case of water supply with different ow rates into single fuel channel at initial temperature 1200 C.

water supply with ow rate 0.00835 kg/s into fuel channel leads to temperature increase and generation of high amount of hydrogen. In this case the peak temperature of 1750 C is reached. Thus, the water supply with ow rate 0.00835 kg/s into fuel channel leads to deterioration of situation (in this situation it is better not to supply the water, instead of supply of very small amount of water). If the water supply is started laterwhen the initial fuel cladding and channel wall temperature is 1200 C (Fig. 14), the amount of supplied water should be higher. As it is shown in presented gures, in case of supply of water with ow rate 0.1674 kg/s the peak fuel cladding and fuel channel temperatures start to decrease straightaway after start of water supply. This means that such amount of water allows to stop the steamzirconium reaction and to cooldown fuel assemblies and fuel channels. If smaller amount of water is supplied, the peak cladding and channel wall temperatures initially increase, later stabilizing at temperature level 10001100 C for 1015 min before starting to decrease (Fig. 14). The more detailed analysis shows that the top part of fuel rods is overheated due to exothermal steamzirconium reaction. The heat from top part of rod is transferred to bottom partthis leads to fuel temperature stabilisation just over 10001100 C. The temperature increase in top part of fuel channel up to 1750 C leads to fuel claddings damage, fragmentation of fuel and ow blockage. Thus, to cooldown the fuel assemblies and fuel channels at overheated conditions (t > 1200 C) a huge amount of supplied water should be used. In opposite case the supply of water with low ow rates this will only speed-up of core degradation process. The analysis, performed using RELAP/SCDAPSIM code, shows that if initial cladding and fuel channel wall temperature is higher than 1250 C, supply of water with any ow rate is not recommended, because it leads to uncontrolled steamzirconium reaction and damage of reactor core components. Based on this analysis, the minimum amount of supplied water ow rate into reactor (1661 fuel channels) for fuel cooling in respect to steamzirconium reaction was created (Fig. 15). The amount of supplied water was calculated assuming that there are totally 1661 fuel channels in the reactor core of RBMK1500. As it is shown in gure, if the fuel cladding temperature is below 1000 C, the supply of water is not limited. The recommended water ow rate is 100 m3 /h. The supply of water with

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Fig. 16. Temperatures of fuel, fuel rod cladding, fuel channel and graphite. Comparison of variants with closed gap between fuel channel and graphite columns and at presence of the gap.

Fig. 17. The water ow rate into the reactor and the ow rate of the steam discharged through steam relief valves. Comparison of variants with the closed gap between fuel channel and graphite columns and at presence of the gap.

lower ow rate enables to decrease the reactor-overheating rate. In the temperature interval 10001250 C, the ow rate of supplied water should be 1001000 m3 /h (according to the gure). The supply of water with lower as prescribed ow rate leads to generation of hydrogen, temperature increase and is not recommended. At temperature above 1250 C, when steamzirconium reaction is fast, the supply of water is not recommended. These recommendations for supply of water in the overheated RBMK reactor core differ from the ones used in vessel-type reactors. In these reactors, due to comparable smaller amount of zirconium, the supply of water is recommended irrespective of fuel cladding temperature, because the positive effect due to cooling prevailing negative effect due to additional heat and hydrogen generation in this type reactors. The second challenge, which is met in case of start of water supply into overheated fuel channels, is the sharp pressure increase. The supply of water (especially when the fuel cladding temperature is 1000 C or higher) leads to generation of huge amount of steam. There are long paths for steam evacuation from reactor core through the steam relief valves, and due to fast steam generation, the pressure increases in fuel channels. It was mentioned that the fuel channels in RBMK are not as strong as the pressure vessel. The fuel channels can fail due to pressure increase at high channel wall temperature. Thus, the pressure increase in fuel channels should not exceed 4 MPa, because such pressure can be supported by the graphite block (Novoselsky and Filinov, 1996). The pressure peaks can be controlled by opening steam relief valves and removing of generated steam. The steam generation and pressure increase in fuel channels due to water injection was modelled using reactor cooling system model of RBMK-1500 (see Fig. 3), developed employing RELAP5 code. The generation of additional heat due exothermic steamzirconium reaction was taken into account in this model. The example of reactor core cooling due to depressurisation of reactor cooling system and start of water supply at fuel cladding temperature 1000 C is presented in Figs. 1618. As it is shown in Fig. 16, the heat up of the core components in case of station blackout in RBMK-1500 starts after 1.5 h. Within this time span the pressure in reactor cooling system is maintained by automatic operation of steam relief valves (Fig. 17). 3.9 h after the reactor shutdown, when the calculated peak fuel cladding temperature in fuel channel with average

initial power reaches 700 C, the action of the operator (manual opening of one steam relief valve with capacity 720 t/h) is assumed. After this action the pressure decrease in reactor cooling system starts. It leads to short-term decrease of temperatures. However in 50 min after valve opening, repeated heat up of the core components starts (Fig. 16). It was assumed in the modelling that at time moment t = 6.5 h the operator closes the steam relief valve to maintain the excess pressure in reactor cooling system 0.235 MPa (Fig. 18). When the peak fuel cladding temperature reaches 1000 C the injection of water into fuel channels through group distribution headers with total capacity 1000 m3 /h (0.1674 kg/s of water into each fuel channel) was assumed. As it is shown in Fig. 15, the minimum amount of supplied water should be not less 100 m3 /h (0.0167 kg/s into each fuel channel). At the same time two steam relief valves with steam ow rate capacity of 720 t/h, through each valve at nominal pressure 7 MPa, were opened. As it is shown in Fig. 17, the amount of generated steam in the core initially almost coincides with the ow rate of injected water. Further the generation of steam decreases because the bottom part of core components is already cooled (the bottom part of fuel channels is occupied by water). Due to water injection the pressure in fuel channels starts to increase repeatedly and reaches 3.6 MPa in this case (Fig. 18). It was assumed in the presented analysis that the gas gap between fuel channel and bore openings in graphite remains constant (open).

Fig. 18. Pressure inside fuel channel. Comparison of variants with the closed gap between fuel channel and graphite columns and at presence of the gap.

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2015

The ow rate of water should not be less than required for negotiation of steamzirconium reaction. The specied restrictions must be followed in case of loss of long-term cooling if reactor cooling system integrity is maintained. If pressure in fuel channel does not increase at water supply into the channels (in case of large breaks of reactor cooling system elements at not isolated leak) the ow rate of supplied water can be more than specied in Fig. 19. In this case Fig. 15 should be used. 7. Conclusion
Fig. 19. Water injection ow rate to reactor cooling system depending on the fuel cladding temperature and number of open steam relief valves (7005800 t/hsteam ow rate through steam relief valves at nominal pressure in drum separators).

When the fuel channel tube is heated up at high pressure in reactor cooling system, it can be deformed in a radial direction (i.e. to be ballooned) up to contact with the graphite block. The additional calculation was performed assuming that plastic deformations of fuel channels start 4 h after the beginning of the accident because of high pressure in fuel channels and high temperature of fuel channel walls. Walls of fuel channels are ballooned, the gas gaps between channel pipe and bore openings in graphite blocks are closed. After closure of the gas gap the temperature of channels comes close to graphite temperature (Fig. 16). Therefore, fuel channels temperature decreases more slowly after water injection. In this case more heat is transferred from graphite through fuel channel to the coolant, thus more steam is generated after the water injection, in comparison with a case when the gas gap between fuel channel and graphite is open (Fig. 17). Therefore, if the gas gap between fuel channel and graphite is closed, water injection into superheated fuel channel leads to signicant increase of pressure in channelup to 6 MPa (Fig. 18). The fuel channels will be ruptured at this high pressure. For maintaining of fuel channels integrity, it is necessary to inject less water or to start water supply earlier when the temperature of the core components is lower. Developing accident management program for RBMK-1500 it is necessary to take into account that operators do not have a possibility to determine presence of the gap between fuel channel and graphite, therefore the analysis was performed with the conservative precondition, that the gas gap is closed. Based on the described analysis, the dependency of water injection into reactor cooling system rate on the fuel cladding temperature and number of open steam relief valves was developed (Fig. 19). There is no danger for fuel channel break if the wall temperature is less than 650 C (fuel cladding temperature <700 C), thus in this temperature region the supply of water is without any restrictions. As it is seen from Fig. 19, in the temperature region 7001250 C, it is necessary to pay attention to two conditions: The ow rate of water should be such that increase of pressure in fuel channel would not lead to break of channels (pressure in reactor cooling system should not exceed 4 MPa);

The paper presents the analysis of different possibilities to cooldown the core of RBMK-1500 reactor in case of beyond design basis accidents. The station blackout case was used as the example, because the probability of such accident is one of the highest from beyond design basis accident list. There are a few possibilities: direct water supply into reactor cavity; ventilation of drum separator compartments; heat removal using reactor cavity gas supply system; restoration of water supply into control and protection system rods cooling circuit; depressurisation of reactor cooling system and water supply from non-regular means. The performed analysis showed that the rst three possibilities are not effective enough. The restoration of water supply in to control rod channels employing additional holddown system tank in case of station blackout is not sufcient and cannot remove all heat from reactor core, however it allows to slowdown the core heat-up process and may be used in complex with other measures. The most effective is the last measuredepressurisation of reactor cooling system and water supply from non-regular low-pressure sources (so called bleed and feed strategy). The challenges, which are met when injecting water to overheated core (steamzirconium reaction, pressure increase in fuel channels due to fast steam generation process) were evaluated. The developed analysis allows create the dependency of water injection rate into reactor cooling system on the fuel cladding temperature and number of open steam relief valves. The results of such analysis were used during the development of reactor cooldown strategies in case of beyond design basis accidents. Acknowledgments This analysis was performed in the frames of the project C-35/205 sponsored by the Lithuanian State Science and Studies Foundation and project Development of Manual on Management of Beyond Design Basis Accidents at Ignalina NPP coordinated by the consortium Jacobsen Engineering Ltd. (UK) and Scientec (USA) and sponsored by the UK Department of Trading and Industry. The authors of the paper would like to

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A. Kaliatka, E. Upuras / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 20052016 s of RBMK-1000 in Case of Single Technological Channel Rupture: Annual Report. Elektrogorsk Research Centre on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, Elektrogorsk. Novoselsky, O.Yu., Filinov, V.N., 1996. Computational assessment of RBMK pressure tube rupture at accident heating. In: Proceedings of the International Exchange Forum Analytical Methods and Computational Tools for NPP Safety Assessment, Obninsk, pp. 110. Paik, S., 1999. RELAP5-3D multidimensional heat conduction enclosure model for RBMK reactor application. Nucl. Technol. 128, 87102. The RELAP5-3D Code Development Team, 2001. RELAP5-3D Code Manual, vol. 1, Code Structure, System Models and Solution Methods, Rev. 1.3a, INEEL-EXT-98-00834. Uspuras, E., Kaliatka, A., Vileiniskis, V., 2006. Development of accident management measures for RBMK-1500 in the case of loss of long-term core cooling. Nucl. Eng. Des. 236, 4756. Uspuras, E., Kaliatka, A., 2004. Evaluation of Weak Heat Conduction Mechanism model for long-term LOCAs in RBMK-1500. In: Proceedings of the International Meeting on Updates in Best Estimate Methods in Nuclear Installation Safety Analysis, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 331 335. Urbonavicius, E., Uspuras, E., Rimkevicius, S., Kaliatka, A., 2006. Application of RELAP/SCDAPSIM and COCOSYS codes for severe accident analysis in RBMK-1500 reactor. In: Proceedings of the International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants ICAPP06, Reno, NV USA, pp. 19.

express their gratitude to the sponsors, coordinators and Ignalina NPP for support of the performed analysis. References
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