119 KO Proliferation and Terrorism Impacts

Proliferation/Terrorism
William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Wewt
Wewt............................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Prolif Now – Kinshasa.................................................................................................................................................................................3
Prolif Bad Frontline.....................................................................................................................................................................................4
Prolif Bad Frontline...................................................................................................................................................................................10
Prolif Bad Frontline...................................................................................................................................................................................11
Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable...................................................................................................................................................................12
Ext. Military  Pre-emption.....................................................................................................................................................................15
AT: Small Arms Races...............................................................................................................................................................................16
Safety Problems….....................................................................................................................................................................................17
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................18
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................19
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................20
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................21
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................22
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................23
Safety Problems.........................................................................................................................................................................................24
Prolif Good Frontline.................................................................................................................................................................................25
Ext. Deterrence..........................................................................................................................................................................................34
Ext. Deterrence..........................................................................................................................................................................................35
AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States....................................................................................................................................................36
AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States....................................................................................................................................................37
AT: Small States Reckless..........................................................................................................................................................................38
AT: Small States Reckless..........................................................................................................................................................................39
AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque.............................................................................................................................................................40
AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque.............................................................................................................................................................41
AT: Preemption..........................................................................................................................................................................................42
AT: Preemption..........................................................................................................................................................................................43
AT: Time to learn.......................................................................................................................................................................................44
AT: Prolif  Arms Races..........................................................................................................................................................................45
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................49
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................50
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................51
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................53
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................54
AT: Crazy Leaders.....................................................................................................................................................................................55
AT: Military Control Bad...........................................................................................................................................................................56
AT: Military Control Bad...........................................................................................................................................................................57
AT: Blackmail............................................................................................................................................................................................58
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation..................................................................................................................................................59
AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation..................................................................................................................................................60
AT: Nuclear Multipolarity bad / Hostile Pairs...........................................................................................................................................62
AT: Terrorists Steal.....................................................................................................................................................................................63
AT: Terrorists Steal.....................................................................................................................................................................................65
AT: Just Waltz Advocates...........................................................................................................................................................................66
Flawed Logic.............................................................................................................................................................................................67
Terrorism Frontline....................................................................................................................................................................................68
Ext. No Nukes............................................................................................................................................................................................72
Ext. No Attack – Self-interest....................................................................................................................................................................73
Ext. No Attack – Self-interest....................................................................................................................................................................74
AT: Russia..................................................................................................................................................................................................75
AT: Other Explanations..............................................................................................................................................................................76
WOOT! PROLIF GOOD!

Notes: The terrorism good frontline is sweet and also can be used to answer their “prolif leads to terrorism”
args – and vice versa, I didn’t want to reproduce the cards twice.
The frontlines are good but show definitely be highlighted down.
KILL TURNER!
Prolif good – only way to solve east asian nuclear war
Layne 98 – search Charles Olney’s cites
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Prolif Now – Kinshasa

The Kinshasa reactor is leaking nukes, making terrorist smuggling inevitable.
Peter Crail, Research Assistant at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Johan Bergenas, Research
Assistant at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2007, "Uranium Smuggling Allegations Raise Questions
Concerning Nuclear Security In The Democratic Republic Of Congo," WMD Insights, April,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/wmdi070403a.htm
Given the details that have unfolded thus far regarding the current allegations of uranium smuggling from the DRC, there is reason to
question whether the arrested individuals were, in fact, involved in illicit uranium procurement activities. However, these cases do call
attention to the continued risk posed by imperfect controls over nuclear material in the DRC. The fact that Congolese officials could
not readily determine whether uranium fuel rods were missing from the Kinshasa Center for Nuclear Studies suggests that nuclear
accounting measures at the site are less than optimal. Although it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the theft from the facility
of uranium fuel enriched to less than 20 percent might contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon, irradiated spent fuel is a
radioactive material potentially usable in a dirty bomb. The illicit acquisition of uranium ore could also provide countries seeking
nuclear weapons that are subject to monitoring by the IAEA with a source of uranium that might elude the agency’s inspection system.
Previous uranium procurement activities, however, have been focused on the acquisition of milled uranium, rather than natural
uranium ore. [17]
Although IAEA assistance has facilitated improvements in nuclear safety and security in the DRC since the end of the country’s civil
war in 2003, the DRC is facing the dual challenge of needing new capacity to meet internationally recognized nuclear security
standards, at a time when further development of its nuclear regulatory infrastructure is receiving a low priority domestically. Given
the nature of the agreements with Brinkley Mining, it appears that the British firm may be in a position to assist in building that
capacity. In addition, continued participation in IAEA initiatives, cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy with regard to the
return of spent fuel, and obtaining international assistance to help Kinshasa implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540
(requiring all states to adopt effective measures to protect nuclear materials) are all steps that can help alleviate some of the recurring
concerns regarding the security of the DRC’s nuclear resources. [18]
Terrorists are already going in to steal uranium from the Kinshasa reactor.
Reuters, 3/08/07, Joe Bavier, "Congo scientist planned to export uranium-minister,"
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0845529.htm
A government minister in Congo on Thursday accused the country's top nuclear research official, arrested earlier this week, of
belonging to an international network set up to mine and export uranium illegally.
Professor Fortunat Lumu, Commissioner General for Atomic Energy in Democratic Republic of Congo, was arrested this week with
another official after a Kinshasa newspaper reported that uranium had gone missing from an atomic institute in the city.
Minister of Scientific Research Sylvanus Mushi, who was recently appointed to Congo's new government, said Lumu and a colleague
had illegally negotiated partnership deals with foreign companies without proper government authorisation.
"It was a group of people coming from all over the world, from Europe, from South Africa, from the Seychelles, who completely
ignored Congolese authority and law with the goal of getting their hands on very sensitive material: uranium and other radioactive
minerals," he told reporters.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Prolif Bad Frontline

Proliferations causes extinction – nuclear arms races and miscalculated nuclear war.
Utgoff, 2002 (Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense
Analyses, Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2,
Summer)
First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain
nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider
preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their
opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still
be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete
proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that
the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely
increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out
hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons.
And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is
actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear
capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero .3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war
that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different
cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes
instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their
common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely
states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even
though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had
nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war
also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to
choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat
4 And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be
destroyed like a beautiful flower?'5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be
likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons
is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced
people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of
view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-
moving crises between nuclear-armed states.' Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret
the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an
inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. (con’t)Thus, both history and
human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the
threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear
weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The
pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be
the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be: seen as, justification for visiting the most devastating
punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In
the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the
1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated
in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of
violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.
Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence
are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that
such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless
nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations
wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather
on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney

Proliferation leads to terrorists obtaining nukes.
Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Proliferation
and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism” 2004 http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/Statements/2004/
ebsp2004n013.html
Today, our focus is on nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism in Asia and the Pacific — and I am pleased at
the opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the challenges we face, and how the IAEA is working to strengthen nuclear
security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. But I would emphasize at the outset that, while much of our work must begin
locally and regionally, we must not forget to think globally, because ultimately the existence of a nuclear threat anywhere is a threat
everywhere, and as a global community, we will win or lose this battle together.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and current. Some experts share the view of the Director General of the United Kingdom
Security Service, who said in August 2003: "It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a [chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear] attack is launched at a major Western city." To date, the IAEA’s own database on illicit trafficking has
recorded, since 1993, approximately 630 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material. Sixty incidents
were reported in 2003, and it is clear that the total for this year will be even higher.
WMD terrorism against the U.S. ends the world – It collapses the economy and triggers nuclear war with
Russia, China and North Korea
Jerome Corsi, PhD from Harvard, 2005, Atomic Iran, 176-178
The
In the span of less than one hour, the nation's largest city will have been virtually wiped off the map. Removal of debris will take several years, and recovery may never fully happen.
damage to the nation's economy will be measured in the trillions of dollars, and the loss of the country's major financial and business
center may reduce America immediately to a second-class status. The resulting psychological impact will bring paralysis throughout the land for an indefinite period
of time. The president may not be able to communicate with the nation for days, even weeks, as television and radio systems struggle to come back on line. No natural or man-made
disaster in history will compare with the magnitude of damage that has been done to New York City in this one horrible day. The United States retaliates:
'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for
the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will
have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones
telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists
detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized
instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large
will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to
destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and
Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel
attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we
would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory
that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of
American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation
would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our
newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the
Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese
might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few
missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States
could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our
supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America. Many of the great egos in
Europe have never fully recovered from the disgrace of World War II, when in the last century the Americans a second time in just over two decades had been
forced to come to their rescue. If the French did not start launching nuclear weapons themselves, they might be happy to fan the diplomatic fire
beginning to burn under the Russians and the Chinese. Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on
Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to
the world calculation. Muslims around the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had no positive proof that
the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be
unacceptable to the American people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would be
the question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
politician. The political party in power at the time of the attack would be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike against
somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney

It destroys heg
Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear
Weapons," Survival, v36 n4, Winter, 1994
The situation, however, is more complicated and more paradoxical than this suggests. Rather than reinforce power politics as usual,
nuclear weapons in fact confirm a tendency towards the fragmentation of the international system in which the erstwhile great powers
play a reduced role. While their credibility in extremis may be as dubious as ever, nuclear guarantees show a remarkable resilience
within an established alliance framework. Outside such a framework, however, they have at most a fleeting half-life, especially at a
time when the nuclear powers are taking care to limit their general liabilities when addressing the security concerns of others. Nuclear
powers are reluctant to transfer nuclear capabilities to vulnerable states to enable them to help themselves, although they have no
difficulties in justifying conventional arms transfers on this basis. As nuclear arsenals spread, despite the non-proliferation regime,
more parts of the world move beyond the effective influence of the former great powers, while, at the same time, the possibility of
some dreadful nuclear mishap or deliberate employment increases. Given the uncertain distribution of the effects of any nuclear
detonations, this prospect should encourage a broad view of vital interests. It argues not only for efforts to support the nonproliferation
regime, but also, and as important, that the great powers should get involved before areas of conflict begin to acquire a nuclear
dimension.
Prolif will happen in the Middle East and Asia.

Nuclear proliferation is most likely to occur where external guarantees have come to be doubted, as in the Middle East, or barely exist,
as in South Asia. Acquiring a nuclear capability is a statement of a lack of confidence in all alternative security arrangements. At the
same time, it adds to the security problems of others in the region, in a form that jeopardises the chances of external support. In this
way, it establishes the limits to any collective security system.34 While most acts of proliferation are a response to an established
nuclear threat - Pakistan reacted to India, which had reacted to China, which had reacted to the United States - the consequences for
external intervention are also part of the calculation. Israel and Pakistan, for example, do not wish to disrupt totally their security
relationships with the United States, including access to conventional weaponry and other forms of assistance, even though they have
decided that they must make provision to confront the most drastic security threats on their own. They therefore attempt to sustain
some ambiguity about their precise nuclear status so as not to cause a rupture with Washington. Ukraine has seen its nuclear legacy
from the old Soviet Union in part as a hedge against Russia, but also as one of its few available bargaining cards in attracting notice
and favours from the West. However, for others, such as Iraq before 1991, North Korea now and eventually, perhaps, Iran, one of the
advantages of a nuclear arsenal may be its role in discouraging Western involvement in local conflicts, thereby hastening Western
disengagement from the security arrangements in many parts of the world. One only needs to contemplate the impact of a completed
Iraqi nuclear programme on Western calculations during the Gulf crisis to appreciate the importance of such a step.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Asian rearm causes accidental war that draws in India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia, triggering global
nuclear conflict
Joseph Cirincione, director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2K
“Nuclear Chain Reaction” Foreign Affairs

Escalation is rational – nationalism and values warp the rational decision calculus.
Chris Gagné, Research Associate, Confidence-Building Measures project, "Nuclear Risk Reduction In South
Asia: Building on Common Ground," The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship
in South Asia, Report No. 38, June, 2001, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMGagne.pdf
Waltz and Hagerty argue that nuclear weapons will serve to keep conflicts limited, even if they do not prevent them, because no
rational actor would risk crossing the nuclear threshold. However, Robert Jervis suggests that escalation could conceivably be a
rational choice in some instances, motivated by “national honor, the desire to harm and weaken those who represent abhorred values,
and the belief that the other will retreat rather than pay the price which can be exacted for victory.”8 Furthermore, Jervis points out that
conflicts can take on a dynamic of their own which makes escalation difficult to predict or control:
Although undesired escalation obviously does not occur all the time, the danger is always present. The room for misunderstanding, the
pressure to act before the other side has seized the initiative, the role of unexpected defeats or unanticipated opportunities, all are
sufficiently great—and interacting—so that it is rare that decision makers can confidently predict the end-point of the trajectory which
an initial resort to violence starts.9 In the Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Jervis acknowledges that nuclear deterrence may
prevent wars, but he asserts that conflicts between nuclear powers will resemble the game of “chicken” where each side will be
tempted to test the other’s resolve. Should this game lead to military activities, there is a danger that the situation will get out of
control because “the workings of machines and the reaction of humans in times of stress cannot be predicted with high confidence.”10
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Sagan uses organizational theory to reinforce this position by demonstrating the failures of both man and machine in Cold War crises
that could have inadvertently caused a nuclear war.11
Miscalculation is inevitable – organizations aren’t omniscient and focuses on political goals.

Scott Sagan, professor of political science at Stanford University and co-director of Stanford's Center for
International Security and Cooperation, won three teaching awards for his undergraduate lecture courses
at Stanford, 2003, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney

Militarization DA – other proliferants have military-oriented governments, promoting nuclear preemption
over diplomatic solutions.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable

Miscalculation is inevitable – competing interests ensures
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Ext. Military  Pre-emption

Militarily controlled organizations cause nuclear preemption because of the structure of the armed forces.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
AT: Small Arms Races

No limited prolif – they want weapons but not second strike capabilities.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems…
Many safety problems…underline it yourself
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Safety Problems
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Prolif Good Frontline

Turn – a proliferation is crucial to preventing future conflicts and global wars.
Dean Haggerty, lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, The Consequences of Nuclear
Proliferation: Lessons of South Asia. 1998.
Twenty five years have now passed since the last Indo-Pakistani war. During that period, both New Delhi and Islamabad have moved
steadily down the path opaque nuclear weaponization. South Asia’s long transition to nuclear weapons has seen two crises and several
additional instances of serious tension between India and Pakistan. A quarter-century of peaks and valleys in one of the contemporary
world’s most volatile relationships is enough time to begin drawing some meaningful conclusions about the effects of nuclear
proliferation South Asia, and about how well this empirical evidence matches the two logics that I surveyed and analyzed in Chapter
1. As I noted in this chapter's introduction, the Indo-Pakistani experience with nuclear weapon capabilities lends more support to the
logic of nuclear deterrence than to its competitor, the logic of non-proliferation. All but a handful of proliferation analysts would
expect that South Asia's small, crude nuclear forces; intense, high-stakes political conflicts, history of warfare, and possibly irrational
decision making should add up to a formula for nuclear disaster on the subcontinent. Indeed, for those analysts persuaded by the logic of
nonproliferation, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear security competition could serve as a paradigm for every conceivable calamity that might ensue from the spread of nuclear
weapons to Third World countries. However, contrary to these grim expectations, nuclear weapons evidently deter war in South Asia, much as they did between the
United Slates, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War. As in the U.S. Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Sino-Soviet cases, preventative nuclear strikes were early on
considered and rejected, first-strike uncertainty has dampened the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," and loose nuke fears have gone unrealized.
Furthermore, Indian and Pakistani decision makers appear to be no less deterrable than their U.S., Russian, and Chinese counterparts
These two -and-a-half decades of sub continental peace stand in stark contrast to the first twenty-five years of Indo-Pakistani relations,
which saw war erupt on three different occasions over Kashmir.
2. Nuclear umbrella fails in Asia – other powers doubt the US’s security commitment, causing them to test
its resolve which escalates to nuclear war.
Christopher Layne, fellow of the Center For Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "Minimal Realism
in East Asia," The National Interest, Spring, 1996
Extended nuclear deterrence has always been a difficult strategy to implement successfully because deterring an attack on one's allies
is harder than deterring an attack on oneself. This is doubly true when the potential aggressor is a nuclear power because, as Charles
de Gaulle reasoned well, rational states will not risk suicide to save their allies. For both protector and protected, extended nuclear
deterrence raises constant and ultimately insoluble dilemmas of credibility and reassurance.
The conditions that contributed to successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not exist in post-Cold War East Asia.
Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990 -- which was fundamentally stable and static -- East Asia is a
volatile region in which all the major players -- Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam -- are candidates to become involved in large-
scale war. There is no clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and
may well become more so as Chinese and Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number and unpredictability of
regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly
Islands, and the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of the flash-points that could ignite a great
power war in East Asia. Washington will clearly exercise far less control over the policies of East Asian powers than it exercised over
America's European allies during the Cold War. Hence, the risk of being chain-ganged into a nuclear conflict are much higher for the
United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it maintains or extends nuclear guarantees to any of the region's major states.
Even more important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of strategic importance to the United States as
did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the Spratlys, or Senkaku?
Knowing that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union did, future revisionist East
Asian powers would probably be more willing to discount America's credibility and test its resolve. The presence of American forces
in the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while simultaneously ensuring the United States would
be drawn automatically into a future East Asian war. They could constitute the wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than deterring
them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, the United States should encourage East Asian states -- including Japan -- to
resolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means acquiring great power, including nuclear, military capabilities.
Reconfiguring American security policies anywhere in the world in ways that, in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen
as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the case. Nuclear proliferation and extended deterrence are generally believed to be
flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to discourage the former. Nearly all maximalists are
simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security implications) and extended nuclear
deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence "works"). But this formulation comes apart from both ends in East
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Asia: Potential nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is of
uncertain credibility in post-Cold War circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese
relationship are manifest.

Prolif stops gigantic conventional wars
David Karl, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California, "Proliferation Pessimism
and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security, Winter, 1996/1997, JSTOR
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These would trump the effects of a nuclear war and make World War II look minuscule.
Andrew Hanam, International Relations Department at San Francisco State University, Armed Forces
Society, vol 23 Issue 1, Fall 1996
A zero-nuclear weapons world would tend to level the military playing field. It could also reinvite a series of large conventional wars
with enhanced killing power, relying on today's conventional technologies that might dwarf World War II levels since the pacee of
wars may suddenly seem more palatable to some. The one or two nuclear events that destroy a location are indeed a holocaust but
constitute a smaller scale phenomenon more likely to create peace rather than further war in its aftermath. The nuclear “demonstration
effect,” as Paula Fleming has shown, is a self-limiting character, and will serve to remind states to probe cautiously in foreign affairs
and quickly retreat when in doubt. Certain geographical locations may be sacrificed in the nuclear age, but general war would be
avoided. The key difference is that limited use of nuclear weapons will not destroy the prevailing distribution of war across the
international system. General conventional war in a nuclear-free world could successively award global hegemonic leadership to the
bold, the vigilant, the desperate, the prepared and most determined. It would raise the temperature of the international security
thermometer just as nuclear weapons have cooled them. Japan, and the entire West, have benefited from the presence of American
nuclear power held in reserve.
Prolif is inevitable.
Channing Lukhefar, Associate Defense Analyst, CATO institute. 7/14/91. CATO Foreign Policy Briefs.
More than 20 years of experience with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has demonstrated that the international arms market win
find a way to circumvent even the most elaborate controls and restrictions. Moreover. A fundamental shift in the world arms trade is
gradually taking place. The Soviet Union and the United States are slowly but inexorably being eclipsed by China and other nations as
the primary purveyors of basic missile technology. That shift makes the market even less sensitive to the types of penalties any formal
or informal international control regime can impose. Barring the emergence of “new world despotism," no international agency or
coalition will be effective in baiting the spread of nuclear and missile technology.
Such a conclusion will surely be unpalatable to those officials and policy experts who long for the creation of a New World Order
presided over by a revitalized United Nations. But ballistic missile proliferation is and will continue to be a such a troublesome reality.
In such a threatening international environment, the responsibility for protecting the American people from missile attacks rests with
the US government. The virtual inevitability of proliferation also demands that the United States seriously pursue the development and
deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems.
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William Huang
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Their huge nuclear war scenarios ARE the link – states wouldn’t use nukes for fear of total destruction –
even small nuke wars are out of question.
Whenever there is a possibility of a nuclear detonation, a vital interest is created. Whatever the prior security commitments or stakes in
a particular conflict, few events would rock national, regional or global society more than even one nuclear detonation. While a war
involving small nuclear powers need not necessarily raise such apocalyptical scenarios as those developed for a superpower war, with
the spectre of a true end to history, the concept of a 'small' nuclear war has yet to be developed. Any nuclear use still moves us into the
area of unimaginable catastrophe. Nuclear fallout does not recognise international borders. Chernobyl still bears eloquent testimony to
the vulnerability of innocent locations to nuclear detonations. The disproportionate character of nuclear explosions guarantees some
deterrent effect whenever there is the slightest chance of the employment of nuclear weapons. For this reason, the presence of nuclear
weapons has been considered beneficial in consolidating a territorial status quo. Nuclear weapons provide an ultimate guarantee of
security against external aggression and thus, in principle, can potentially protect the most vital interests in the most hostile
environments, while avoiding dependence upon allies.
Prolif promotes alliances.

Thus, a non-nuclear power that is concerned about the intentions of a nuclear power and is unable to rely on international disarmament
or a weapons programme of its own is put in a dilemma. It must seek accommodation either in the form of appeasement - an attempt
to respect the vital interests of the potentially hostile nuclear power without compromising its own interests - or alliance - an attempt
to convince a potentially friendly nuclear power of a coincidence of vital interests.
The more restrictive the prevailing definitions of vital interests the more tolerable appeasement becomes, for there should be fewer
occasions when there are substantial conflicts. Alliance, however, becomes more difficult when the definition of vital interests
narrows, for alliance is more likely to be seen by the nuclear power as extending vital interests unnecessarily. The two approaches can
be pursued simultaneously. Thus, Western Europe was anxious to convince the Americans of the need for NATO, while at the same
time trying to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. The degree to which non-nuclear states have followed appeasement strategies has
been influenced by the credibility of nuclear threats and their vulnerability to alternative forms of economic and military pressure. The
most interesting example of appeasement to an undeclared nuclear power is probably that of the Arab states to Israel. There is some
evidence that the policies of Arab states have been steadily modified out of recognition of Israel's capacity to use its nuclear weapons
if faced with a threat to its existence.8
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Posses are necessary to prevent regional wars from escalating.
Richard Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Fall, 1995 (Foreign Policy by Posse. The
National Interest. Lexis)
There are, however, important advantages. The United States has the inherent capacity to create posses where and when it chooses.
They do not require much in the way of prior investment. Coalitions of the willing bring with them some of the advantages that derive
from collective effort (resources, specialization, diplomatic co-support) without the need for consensus or prearranged authority. They
also enjoy some measure of international legitimacy. More than anything else, though, posses or coalitions of the willing (and able)
constitute an approach to international engagement that reflects the basic personality and characteristics of the post-Cold War world.
This is a time in history when there are: multiple great powers involved in relationships that resist clear definition and range from the
cooperative to the competitive; a growing number of small and medium, sovereign entities; proliferating regional and international
bodies, as well as non-governmental organizations; an increasing diffusion of power in all forms; and new sorts of problems (or old
problems on a new scale) for which institutions do not yet exist. What is needed as a result is an approach to foreign policy that is
inherently flexible, one able to respond to unforeseen situations in unprecedented ways. The posse approach thus offers a valuable
supplement to a world in which regional and international institutions are limited to what they can usefully contribute. Moreover,
posses come with the further advantage that they can become more structured and institutionalized if the need and consensus to move
in that direction exists. The supplier groups already mentioned reflect this potential, as does the G-7, which over the years has evolved
into a quasi-institution for helping to manage a diverse set of political and military, as well as economic, challenges. It may prove
possible to adapt or expand the role of other regional or international institutions. Until then, posses can selectively draw on the
available assets and resources of such organizations.
Allies are critical to winning the war on terror.

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Winter, 2002 (The Threat of Terrorism. International Security. Lexis)
Allies are essential for success in the war on terrorism, which helps to explain the determination of President George W. Bush and
his administration to build a broad coalition. Bin Laden had training camps and bases in Afghanistan, but in other countries al-Qaeda's
presence has been more shadowy. Wherever this organization takes root, it must be fought. But it will not always be necessary or
possible for the United States to do the fighting. Allied military and police forces are more appropriate instruments to apprehend
terrorists operating within their national borders than are U.S. forces. They have information that the United States may not have, and
they know the territory and people better. The odds of finding the adversary and avoiding collateral damage increase to the extent that
the "host" nation-state does the hard work. Moreover, host states can deal better politically with any collateral damage -- that is,
accidental destruction of civilian life and property. Much of the war will look a lot like conventional law enforcement by the
governments of cooperative countries. Efforts must also be made to weaken terrorist organizations by attacking their infrastructure;
both cooperative and clandestine methods can be used to deny these groups access to funds and materiel.
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WMD terrorism against the U.S. ends the world – It collapses the economy and triggers nuclear war with
Russia, China and North Korea
Jerome Corsi, PhD from Harvard, 2005, Atomic Iran, 176-178
The
In the span of less than one hour, the nation's largest city will have been virtually wiped off the map. Removal of debris will take several years, and recovery may never fully happen.
damage to the nation's economy will be measured in the trillions of dollars, and the loss of the country's major financial and business
center may reduce America immediately to a second-class status. The resulting psychological impact will bring paralysis throughout the land for an indefinite period
of time. The president may not be able to communicate with the nation for days, even weeks, as television and radio systems struggle to come back on line. No natural or man-made
disaster in history will compare with the magnitude of damage that has been done to New York City in this one horrible day. The United States retaliates:
'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for
the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will
have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones
telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists
detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized
instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large
will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to
destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and
Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel
attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we
would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory
that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of
American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation
would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our
newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the
Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese
might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few
missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States
could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our
supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America. Many of the great egos in
Europe have never fully recovered from the disgrace of World War II, when in the last century the Americans a second time in just over two decades had been
forced to come to their rescue. If the French did not start launching nuclear weapons themselves, they might be happy to fan the diplomatic fire
beginning to burn under the Russians and the Chinese. Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on
Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to
the world calculation. Muslims around the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had no positive proof that
the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be
unacceptable to the American people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would be
the question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a
politician. The
political party in power at the time of the attack would be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike against
somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.
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Prolif is key to basing.
The unnatural character of a nuclear guarantee, with its suicidal implications, has provided a central theme for all debates on nuclear
strategy. This has made it extremely difficult to prescribe any nuclear use as a rational act of policy, at least once decisive and truly
disarming first strikes were no longer judged to be feasible. Attempts to get round this involved designing nuclear strikes that were
sufficiently precise in their effects to shock or disable the enemy without provoking a full-scale retaliation. Those with confidence in
deterrence tended to get impatient with these debates because policy-makers in Moscow or Washington did not seem disposed to
discount the smallest risk of a nuclear catastrophe. This analysis culminated in the notion of 'existential deterrence'.27
While these issues excited considerable controversy in elite and academic circles, questions of deployment sparked the most
substantial political controversies - even in domestic debate. As noted above, there is an association between overseas bases and vital
interests. This association became even closer in the nuclear age, as fundamental questions were raised over the processes through
which a war might spread geographically, over who might be involved and in what circumstances. A superpower nuclear base
conveyed to the host country that it was one for which ultimate risks might just be run. Within the host country, deployment was
controversial because of the degree of accommodation of the guarantor's interests that was required and the nature of the political
control to be exercised over the use of the nuclear weapons. In NATO, the readiness to accept such weapons came, over time, to be
seen as a crucial test of a willingness to bear the responsibilities of alliance. Those whose presumed hostile intent or menacing
capabilities provided the pretext for forward basing were indignant at the aspersions thus cast, as well as the new threat that they faced
as a result.
Forward basing in Japan key to logistical support for key military operations throughout the Pacific and
reassures all allies.
Global Security, 2005 (U.S. Army in Japan. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarj.htm)
The strategic geographic location of Japan provides the U.S. an excellent location for forward-basing, enabling power projection
forces in the event of contingencies. Combined with the current agreements the U.S. has with Japan for basing rights for both air and
sea forces, the U.S. Army in Japan is capable of a greatly expanded logistical support role throughout the Pacific theater. Japan
occupies a key strategic location in the Pacific, which is vitally important to the U.S. both economically and militarily. U.S. forward
presence in Japan is vital to ensuring access to this strategic location. The U.S. Army's forward presence in Japan enables it to meet
U.S. bilateral engagement responsibilities under the Mutual Security Treaty and the Defense Guidelines to defend Japan from outside
aggression in wartime, and to provide deterrence and stability in peacetime. It also demonstrates the U.S. commitment to other allies
and friends in the Pacific. Being in Japan, approximately 5,000 nautical miles closer to potential trouble spots than the West Coast of
the U.S., means USARJ & 9th TSC can respond to crises and support regional contingencies as a strategically located base and staging
area.
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Asian rearm causes accidental war that draws in India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia, triggering global
nuclear conflict
Joseph Cirincione, director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2K
“Nuclear Chain Reaction” Foreign Affairs
For all these reasons, nuclear non-proliferation remains an important
Western policy objective. The spread of nuclear weapons, in terms of political
control as much as absolute numbers, encourages strategic disengagement
and thus a loss of influence in regions where important, if not quite
vital, interests are involved. More seriously, if nuclear weapons are detonated,
through accident or design, then the consequences will be profound
and more than enough to be considered a vital interest. Thus, proliferation
feeds on and then reinforces an existing tendency to reduce the security links
between the declared nuclear powers and those parts of their 'far abroads'
that are not covered by a well-established alliance. Yet as this process
continues, and simply because of the impossibility of containing the effects
of nuclear detonations, the overall stake in the prevention of conflicts grows
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to the point where a vital interest is created that is as substantial as any
which went before, even though it is a very different kind of vital interest.
It has been argued that the declared nuclear powers can use their residual
nuclear capability to underpin their general efforts to promote a more orderly
world, but this may be too optimistic about regional patterns and Western
influence.39 A case can in principle be made for a concert of established
nuclear powers enforcing basic international law, but this is a theoretical
construct and not a practical one given the ambiguity of many breaches of
international law, the differential interests of and the remaining divisions
between the nuclear powers and the sheer irrelevance of external nuclear
arsenals to many localised conflicts.40 Unless a clear link can be forged
between threats to international peace and security and possible nuclear
responses, there are likely to be few pay-offs for international order.
Prolif would be slow but inevitable.

Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar
at Columbia University, past President of the American Political Science Association, and a Fellow of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”
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Ext. Deterrence
Prolif deters war – the incentive is too low, states act with more care, and nukes provide adequate security.
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Ext. Deterrence
Prolif is crucial to deterring possibilities of war.
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AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States

Small states can deter big ones – even “minimal” damage from nukes is unacceptable.
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AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States

Small states are safe – closer concerns are preserved by each side.
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AT: Small States Reckless

States with less nuclear weapons have less incentive to use nukes – personally threatens their survival.
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AT: Small States Reckless
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AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque

1. The opacity of new proliferants will prevent accidents because of small and closely help arsenals, as
proven by India, Pakistan, and Israel.
Devin Haggerty, Lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, 1998. The Consequences of
Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, pg. 9.
OPACITY AND LOOSE NUKES. Regarding the domestic control of nuclear force, opacitv is a safety enhancer. One of its chief
characteristics is the limited circle of decision-makers and the tight control thev exercise over nuclear forces and planning The
obsessive secrecy with which the Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani nuclear establishments oversee their respective nuclear weapons
programs should logically reduce the chances of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. There is no reason to believe that
wider decision-making circles or more open debate would improve an opaque nuclear proliferant's ability to devise the command and
control arrangements necessary to prevent accidental nuclear detonations, Opaque nuclear-scientific establishments are composed of
the best and the brightest scientists available. They are well aware of the dangers of accidents and have the same, if not better, access
to information on accident -proofing as would any larger indigenous, group of technical personnel. Indeed, accidents should be less
likely where nuclear forces are small, especially where the weapons remain unassembled or stored separately from their delivery
systems As regards unauthorized nuclear use, it is also logical to expect that under nuclear opacity renegade military officers or
terrorists would be hamstrung, not assisted by their limited access to nuclear plans and programs and that a wider decision-making
circle would increase the risk of weapons failing into the wrong hands. Here, too, the maintenance of small or unassembled nuclear
weapon svstems would likely thwart, rather than promote, the designs of unauthorized users.
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AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque

2. Empirically, new proliferants choose to be opaque.
Why do second generation proliferants maintain opaque instead of overt nuclear postures? It is easy to understand why a country at
the beginning stages of nuclear research and development would want its program shrouded in secrecy. Such countries are typically
embroiled in acute security competitions; in which there may be a premium on being the first to master nuclear weapon technology.
Openly advertising that one is seeking nuclear capabilities might spur the other side to do the same, thereby negating any strategic
advantage, Conversely, if a country were lagging behind an adversary, the first steps toward nuclear capabilities, if taken too openly,
might promote a preventive strike against its nascent nuclear facilities, like the one launched by Israel against Iraq in 1981 It is harder
to understand why a nuclear weapon-capable country would continue to conceal its nuclear status. One would think that, having
achieved a certain proficiency, countries would then go openly nuclear so as to receive the full benefits of deterrence. This is not the
case, though; every new nuclear nation since the 1960’s has chosen to maintain its opacity long after developing nuclear capabilities.
The most important reason for this pattern is the steady legitimating of the global nonproliferation norm since the signing of the NPT
in 1968. When China went nuclear in 1964, the only obstacle it faced was the possibility of preventive strikes or sabotage by its
nuclear armed adversaries. When Pakistan took the same course from the mid-1970s on, it too faced the possibility of absorbing a
preventive strike, but also, and perhaps more daunting, Islamabad ran up against a variety of international norms and national laws
intended to inhibit more countries from going nuclear. These included the NPT itself and an array of U.S. laws that threatened an aid
cutoff if Pakistan persisted in its attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
3. New proliferants will be opaque – many reasons.

Other sources of opacity. Several other factors may influence the evolution of opaque rather than transparent nuclear postures. Opacity
is a way to signal a country’s nuclear capabilities and flex some deterrent muscle without antagonizing adversaries into like response
and spurring a destabilizing and expensive nuclear arms race. In this context, India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion,” followed by its
refusal to deploy nuclear weapons, may have been meant to send a message of rough nuclear equivalence to China without driving
Pakistan into its own pursuit of nuclear weapons. If this was in fact New Delhi’s strategy, it obviously failed. In addition, opacity is
much less expensive than a transparent nuclear posture. Which for the first generation nuclear weapon states involved developing
redundant and diverse nuclear forces to ensure the survivability of second-strike weapons. Finally, opacity preserves the flexibility that
future policymakers may need to denuclearize if security conditions changed, without losing face or suffering domestic discontent
owing to the popularity of an open nuclear stance. Whatever the relative influence of these factors- and it differs across cases- the most
compelling reason for opacity seems to be the belief that it provides deterrent security while avoiding the steep international costs of
deployments.
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AT: Preemption
1. No risk- uncertainty prevents a preemptive attack due to fear of a second strike.
Bradley Thayer, Fellow for the Center of Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, 1995 [Security
Studies, Autumn]
The system level. Concerning the first of the three dangers captured by the systemic level of analysis, the incentive for preventive war
may be mitigated by two factors. First, there is a tradeoff between knowledge of the program and the threat that it poses. When the
program is most vulnerable, knowledge about it is likely to be ambiguous. As time passes, knowledge grows, but becomes less
vulnerable to preventative war because the risk of retaliation for a preventive attack increases. Philip Zelikow notes, 'As a state's
nuclear...capability becomes more threatening, it becomes less vulnerable to military action by an outside power.” Second, the
uncertainty of the success of either counterforce or counter control attack dampens the incentives for a preventive attack. Waltz is right
to argue that “uncertainty about the course that a nuclear war might follow, along with certainty that destruction could be immense,
strong inhibits the use of nuclear weapons” (Spread, 108). The attacking state could never be certain that it would escape unacceptable
damage in retaliation. The defender must manipulate the attacker’s fear that some the defender’s arsenal will survive into order to
deter a premeditated attack until the defender’s arsenal grows and becomes survivable.
2. Pre-emption fails – occupation is the only way to permanently prevent prolif and no one wants to occupy.
3. Intelligence for preemptive strikes is not available to new proliferators.

Lavoy, assistant professor of national security @ Naval Post Grad School, 1995 [summer, Security Studies]
Consider the inability of the United States to detect, much less destroy with conventional armaments, the bulk of Iraq's SCUD missile
force and the majority of Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities. As the official U.S. Gulf War Air Power Survey revealed, "the air campaign
no more than inconvenienced" Iraqi efforts to develop nuclear weapons; key Iraqi nuclear facilities remained undisturbed after 1,000
hours of coalition air strikes. A lesson of Desert Storm is that even when air superiority is secured, intelligence limitations can
confound the success of preemptive or preventive military strategies. Why should we expect emerging nuclear states, or their non-
nuclear adversaries, to enjoy better success at military preemption? After all, developing states are not likely to possess advanced
intelligence and reconnaissance strike capabilities. As Desert Storm demonstrated, even today’s state-of-the-art equipment is
imperfect. For these reasons, nuclear preemption is unlikely to succeed. Therefore, preemption is unlikely to be attempted, except in
instances of exceptional desperation.
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AT: Preemption
4. Preemptive attacks are empirically disproven.
The Preventitive War Argument. Analysts persuaded by the logic of nonproliferation worry that Third World states will be subject to
preventative strikes, either conventional or nuclear – during their precarious transition to nuclear weapons. Those convinced by the
logic of nuclear deterrence believe that preventative strikes, especially nuclear ones, will be a highly unlikely feature of new nuclear
rivalries. Here again, the South Asian experience provides compelling support for the 1ogic of nuclear deterrence Throughout the early
1980s, media reports suggested that India was seriously considering launching a preventive attack against Pakistan's nascent uranium
enrichment plant at Kahuta. Short flight time would have made such an operation fairly easy, especially before the delivery of US
F16s to Pakistan in 1983. Still, Indian leaders refrained from ordering preventive strikes for the reasons described in Chapter 3, the
most important of which was the ease with which Islamabad could have retaliated against India's own nuclear installations. Later, in
1986-87, New Delhi could well have used the Brasstacks crisis as an excuse to destroy Kahuta and other Pakistani nuclear facilities;
again, though, India chose no such course. All in all, then, the subcontinent’s nuclear history buttresses the logic of nuclear deterrence
in the area of preventative imperatives.
5. Preemption Not Plausible- one nuke is too destructive.

Dean Haggerty, lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, International Security Winder
1995.
The logic of nuclear deterrence downplays the likelihood of preemptive war between new nuclear states. For Kenneth N. Waltz,
preemption is viable only if the would-be attacker knows that the intended victim's warheads are few in number, knows their exact
number and locations, and knows that they will not be moved or fired before they are struck. To know all of these things. and to know
that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult. Also, because nuclear weapons are easy to hide and move, creating uncertainty
for the attacker does not require advanced technology. John I Weltman generally agrees, but admits that there are “some regions
where short distances combine with economic and industrial constraints to suggest that local powers will never be able to achieve
levels of survivability relative to one another approaching those achieved by superpowers”. He adds, however, that "'high population
densities in small areas” also characterizes these regions. “Failure to eliminate even a single deliverable weapon would thus be to risk
catastrophe and short distances mean that no great sophistication in means of delivery is required for a successful countervalue
response.
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AT: Time to learn

1. The time to learn has happened – every state understands the destructive potential of nuclear weapons
and understanding pissing people off is bad.
2. Empirically denied – the US and Russia learned really fast – they avoided direct conflict with one another
and tried to smooth out relations during crises.
3. Small force size encourages tight control.
David Karl, Ph.D. IR, USC. International Security, Winter 1996. P. 109.
Constraints on force development will also help to alleviate concerns about the adequacy of command and control arrangements
fashioned by new nuclear states. The small size of their arsenals, as well as the low operational readiness, mandates a tight exercise of
control. The last three states to achieve a nuclear arsenal of some kind – South Africa, India, and Pakistan - were "opaque"
proliferators opting to maintain unassembled arsenals rather than integrate fully-assembled weapons into their armed forces. Unlike
the superpowers during the Cold War, they do not maintain force postures in which ready-to-use nuclear weapons and their associated
delivery vehicles are co-located, or that emphasize the rapid launch of nuclear weapons even in peacetime conditions.
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AT: Prolif  Arms Races

1. Turn- new nuclear states will decrease arms races- deterrent strategies make them pointless.
Kenneth Waltz, professor of political science at the University of California. The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May be Better. 1981
From previous points it follows that nuclear weapons are likely to decrease arms racing and reduce military costs for lesser nuclear
states in two ways: Conventional arms races will wither if countries shift emphasis from conventional defense to nuclear deterrence.
For Pakistan for example; acquiring nuclear weapons is an alternative to running ruinous conventional race with India. And deterrent
strategies 'make nuclear arms races pointless. Finally, arms races in their ultimate form the fighting of offensive wars designed to
increase national security - also become pointless. The success of a deterrent strategy does not depend on the extent of territory a state
holds, a point made earlier. It merits repeating because of its unusual importance for states whose geographic limits lead them to
obsessive concern for their security in a world of ever more destructive conventional weapons.
2. Arms races are irrelevant – deterrence is not about the number of weapons but just the policy – our 1NC
evidence provides specific reasons why even a couple nukes constitute unacceptable losses.
3. Prolif slows down arms races between unstable states, and they can’t make nukes anyway.
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4. Huge nuclear arms races are illogical and wasteful, especially for smaller proliferators.
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Kernoff/Olney
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William Huang
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Kernoff/Olney
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William Huang
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Crazy Leaders

1. Rogue states aren’t crazy – dictators still engage in rational behavior, especially when their state is
weaker.
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AT: Crazy Leaders
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AT: Crazy Leaders

“Third-world” states won’t use nukes – they’re rational and your args are biased by ethnocentric views.
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AT: Crazy Leaders
3. India and Pakistan prove this argument is wrong.

THE UNDETERRABLES ARGUMENT: According to the logic of nonproliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons increases the
likelihood that they will one day fall into the hands of leaders whose insanity or radical political agendas will make them immune to
any constraints on using the weapons. The logic of nuclear deterrence rebuts this viewpoint, arguing instead that even allegedly
irrational rulers will be subject to the powerful influence of the nuclear shadow. The Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms competition provides
no confirmation at all of the logic of nonproliferation's worst fears in this area. South Asian leaders seem to be no less rational in their
decision making than their nuclear predecessors In fact, if the subcontinental approach to nuclear deterrence is any guide, lndian and
Pakistani leaders have accepted the fundamental principle, of the nuclear revolution more readily-and thus more rationally-than did
U.S- and Soviet leaders during the Cold War. The superpower competition generated an intense arms race, in which Washington and
Moscow strove to develop technologies and doctrines that could somehow make nuclear weapons militarily usable. According to some
accounts, the ultimate outcome of this competition was that two sophisticated, tightly coupled nuclear command and control systems
brought the United States and the Soviet Union closer to unintended nuclear war than most people suspected at the time." Indian and
Pakistani officials are more respectful of the notion that nuclear weapons have great political, but hardly any military, utility. As
George Perkovich writes, "wisdom may lie beneath the surface of casual nuclear discussions in South Asia- By intuition, calculation,
or penury, military specialists in India and Pakistan appear to reject the hyper-elaborate intellectual and technical apparatus of the U.S-
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Soviet nuclear competition." As one Pakistani general said regarding the "requirements" for survivable second-strike nuclear forces,
"this is not our issue. It is your concern.-"
AT: Crazy Leaders

4. Prolif slows down arms races between crazy leaders, and they can’t make nukes in the first place.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Crazy Leaders
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Military Control Bad

1. The military is even less inclined to use nukes – they want to fight wars with certainty.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Military Control Bad

2. Fears of military launch are based on flawed stereotypes.
~WESTERN STRATEGIC THOUGHT: BREAK THE MOLD IF NECESSARY
These points have further implications for security studies in general. In the post-Cold War era, prudent analysts will judiciously
merge useful strategic concepts from the social sciences with their extensive knowledge of different regions of the world. The
decades-old debate about the efficacy of social science methodologies versus area studies expertise is pointless; it stands to reason that
selectively fusing the two is the most useful way to analyze security (or any other social) issues. Unfortunately, many U.S- strategic
analysts continue to view the rest of the world through the prism of U.S -Soviet relations, which raises the possibility that we may
profoundly misunderstand regional security dynamics. Instead, US analysts should be prepared to question, modify, or even jettison
the strategic concepts they have inherited from their Cold War predecessors. As one illustration, many US scholars would likely agree
with Steve Fetter’s assertion that “military organizations are more likely to favor offensive operations such as preventive and
preemptive attacks". In a Western political-military context, this may be a useful assumption, but in other contexts it may not be. In
South Asia none of the three Indo-Pakistani wars was instigated by military leaders whose enthusiasm for the offensive exceeded that
of their civilian colleagues. In 1947-48, India's and Pakistan's senior military leadership was still composed of British officers whose
main concern was to keep the two new states out of war. Blame for the 1965 conflict can be placed squarely on the shoulders of
Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian, who goaded President Ayub Khan into a reckless preventive war against
India. Similarly, responsibility for the 1971 Bangladesh war belongs mainly to three civilians-Bhutto, Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, and Bengali nationalist Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
To extend this example, Pakistan was far less disposed to challenge India under the leadership of General Zia ul-Haq from 1977 to
1988, in part because he had been a firsthand witness to defeat at the hands of superior Indian forces and realized that provoking India
into war was good for neither the Pakistan Army nor the country at large. Indeed, many Indian leaders have quietly admitted that
dealing with Pakistan under Zia's firm control was less vexing than managing relations with their neighbor’s unpredictable civilian
rulers. In short, civil-military relations may have very different dynamics in less developed countries than in industrialized, liberal
democracies. In many Third World states, military officers are the best and the brightest, and the army is the most developed
institution in the entire polity. Under such circumstances, it is not unusual to discover the populace hoping that the military will keep
the civilian politicians in line, rather than vice-versa. Thus, even if it were true that "civilian control over the military is likely to be
weaker in proliferant countries (another common US assumption about the Indian and Israeli cases), this will not necessarily "tend to
increase the risk of nuclear use”. When repeated time and again without sufficient scrutiny, theoretical assumptions become dogma.
Like concepts, models, hypotheses, laws, and theories themselves, assumptions are tools meant to help us apply scientific or near-
scientific standards to the analysis of social life - When they instead assume the status of theological tenets, their value is diminished.
Simply put some of the old assumptions about nuclear dynamic, need to be converted into hypotheses and tested.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Blackmail
1. Empirically denied – many proliferating countries prove that blackmail has empirically failed – includes
numerous countries that hate each other.
2. There is no secret launch or blackmailing – identification is easy and nuclear threats are ridiculous.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation

1. No escalation – leaders would never run the risk because they know that the impacts are too huge and
not totally predictable – that’s 1NC ______ evidence
2. Miscalculation is impossible – states know that extinction is the only outcome.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation
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3. International powers check regional escalation.
Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, Prof of political economy, center for international and
strategic affairs, 1983, Strategies for managing nuclear proliferation.
The first nuclear nation in the region may be tempted to use its regional nuclear monopoly, for example, against a regional rival,
particularly if it perceives that the rival is also in the process of developing nuclear capabilities. AN example is the Israeli surgical
strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981. The probability of a war between regional rivals is however, considerably lower
than the probability of such a war between global rivals. In the case of the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the strike was
conducted with conventional weapons and did not lead to even a local war with conventional weapons. The presence of major powers
with nuclear weapons and with justified fears of escalation of nuclear war from the regional to the global level means that they could
not remain bystanders to a nuclear war at the regional level. They would become involved, not as belligerents but as active mediators
or negotiators, or, if this role failed, as restraining parties. An example of the type of actions that could be taken by the major powers
was those of the United States and USSR during the Suez crisis of 1956. Thus, although the acquisition of nuclear weapons at the
regional level increases the probability of nuclear war, the overall level of this probability is low because of the potential moderating
and restraining influence of the major powers.
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AT: Nuclear Multipolarity bad / Hostile Pairs

1. Turn- nuclear multipolarity increases deterrence by complicating calculations.
Kenneth Waltz, professor of political science at the University of California. Strategies for Managing Nuclear
Proliferation. 1983.
Fourth, although some worry about nuclear states coming into hostile pairs, others worry that the bipolar pattern will not be
reproduced regionally in a world populated by larger numbers of nuclear states. The simplicity of relations that obtains when one party
has to concentrate its worry on only one other, and the ease of calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost.
The structure of international politics, however, will remain bipolar as long as no third state is able to compete militarily with the great
powers. Moreover, the USSR now has to worry lest a move made in Europe cause France and Britain to retaliate thus possibly setting
off U.S. forces. Such worries at once complicate calculations and strengthen deterrence
2. Empirically denied – Cold War politics and Indo/Pak conflict prove – hostile pairs are fully deterred from
launching because they would gain only minimal benefits.
3. Multipolarity prevents first use of nuclear weapons.
Kenneth Waltz, professor of political science at the University of California. Strategies for Managing Nuclear
Proliferation. 1983.
In the old days, weaker powers could improve their positions through alliance by adding the strength of foreign armies to their own.
Cannot some of the middle states do together what they are unable to do alone? For two decisive reasons, the answer is no. First,
nuclear forces do not add up. The technology of warheads, of delivery vehicles, of detection and surveillance devices, of command
control systems, count more than the size of forces. Combining separate national forces is not much help. Second, to reach top
technological levels would require full collaboration by say, several European states. To achieve this has proved politically impossible.
As de Gaulle has often said, nuclear weapons make alliances obsolete. At the strategic level he was right. States fear dividing their
strategic labors fully- from research and development through production, planning, and deployment. This is less because one of them
in the future might be at war with another, and more because anyone’s decision to use the weapons against third parties might be fatal
to all of them. Decisions to sue the nuclear weapons may be decisions to commit suicide. Only a national authority can be entrusted
with the decision, again as de Gaulle always claimed. Only by merging and losing their political identities can middle states become
great powers.
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Terrorists Steal

1. Terrorists won’t get weapons from “rogue” states, potential US backlash ensures these nations will keep
their weapons away from terrorists.
Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute in
Oakland, California, 1/28/04, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Overrated as a Threat to America”
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1256
No one would argue that nuclear weapons are incapable of causing mass destruction. But building nuclear weapons requires a large
infrastructure, scientists, engineers and strictly controlled fissile material (plutonium or enriched uranium). Terrorists are probably not
capable of building even a crude nuclear weapon. Many countries aren’t either. Iraq and Libya both failed to get such weapons.
But some clearly undesirable governments—for example, North Korea—eventually may get nuclear weapons and the long-range
missiles to deliver them to the United States. North Korea always has been a bigger WMD threat than Iraq. But the United States
could rely on its world dominant nuclear arsenal to deter attacks from the small arsenals of nascent nuclear powers, rather than
conducting unnecessary preventative invasions. The United States took this route when the totalitarian Soviet Union and the even
more radical Maoist China were developing nuclear weapons. Deterrence has worked in the past and will most likely work in the
future because the remaining destitute “rogue” states have home addresses that could be wiped off the map—albeit with massive
casualties—with thousands of U.S. nuclear warheads. Moreover, even though those nations disagree with intrusive U.S. foreign policy
in their regions, they have no incentive to give such costly weapons to unpredictable terrorist groups. If such assistance were
discovered, the superpower might be motivated to incinerate their countries. Before the war, the president’s own CIA reported that
Iraq would be unlikely to use WMD or give them to terrorists unless the United States invaded.
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Kernoff/Olney
2. Terrorists would never use nuclear weapons
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Terrorists Steal
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Kernoff/Olney
AT: Just Waltz Advocates

It’s not just Waltz who advocates prolif good
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Flawed Logic
Your ev is based on flawed logic – depends on deductive logic and can’t be applied in other contexts.
David Karl, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California, "Proliferation Pessimism
and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security, Winter, 1996/1997, JSTOR
Your ev is biased – counterprolif “experts” are biased to avoid inquiries into their favors.
William Arkin, Policy Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government in the Carr Centre for Human Rights
Policy, Harvard University, has served as an independent consultant and held positions at the Institute for
Policy Studies, Center for Defense Information, Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council and
Human Rights Watch, "The sky-is-still-falling profession," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April, 1994,
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1994/ma94/ma94Arkin.html, EBSCO
Continued nuclear dangers "prove" that nuclear weapons are still needed and must be modernized, that force is crucial, that
conventional war strategies should be embellished. That's what the "counterproliferation" warriors now argue. Without Iraq, and
Korea, and Iran, and Libya, they would face surer declines in budgets, deeper inquiries into their futures. To diplomats, the same
dangers prove that arms control efforts, verification schemes, more treaties, and more negotiations are crucial. To the anti-nuclear
crowd, the same problem proves the need for more absolute controls on testing and nuclear materials, and for complete nuclear
disarmament—even the elimination of nuclear power. The crisis atmosphere advances a set of vastly different agendas. Everyone wins
when the sky is falling. Everyone in the profession, that is.
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Kernoff/Olney
Terrorism Frontline
1. Terror attacks will only be small—not huge
Brad Roberts, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Michael Moodie,
president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, July 2002, “Biological Weapons: Toward a
Threat Reduction Strategy, Defense Horizons, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH15/DH15.htm
The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of
killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive.
They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive
because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian
Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass
casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent.
Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when."
The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to
exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication
that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had
intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab
street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the
most lethal.
But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as
many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without
creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries
want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner
from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--
and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.
2. Terrorist attacks increase US soft power and global hegemony

People’s Daily, September 13, 2002 English People Daily
Diplomatic Gains after "September 11": Taking advantage of the unprecedented moral support extended to the United States by the
international community, America has successfully organized an international counter-terrorist alliance, and has gained political
dominant power; it has strengthened its relations with its allies, at the same time it has pushed forward its ties with other big powers,
particularly US-Russian relations; US troops have entered Central Asia, gone deep into South Asia and returned to Southeast Asia, and
further enhanced the superiority of its global strategy. In the anti-terrorist war, it has put into practice its theory of military revolution,
and displayed and consolidated its military superiority. Generally speaking, the US status as the superpower has become more.
The loss of leadership results in nuclear war.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Senior Defense Policy Analyst at RAND, Spring, 1995 (Losing the Moment? Washington
Quarterly. Lexis | SWON)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for
the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United
States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free
markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such
as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude
the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global
nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Terrorism Frontline
Soft power solves multiple scenarios for conflict
Harold Koh, Yale University, 2004, The Center for International and Comparative Law,
http://law.ubalt.edu/asil/koh.html,
The death penalty, which obviously has been an irritant in the relationship between the United States and European Union in the war
against terrorism. Each of these areas of conflict arose from the fact that, where the Clinton Administration pursued what Strobe
Talbot calls strategic multilateralism and tactical unilateralism, the Bush Administration shifted to a strategy of strategic unilateralism
and tactical multilateralism. This has been self-defeating in two ways. First, the United States has demonstrated a loss of rectitude,
which has led to at least a loss of its soft power, its persuasive, diplomatic power. This power is the only way the United States is
going to, first, rebuild Iraq, second, rebuild Afghanistan, third, fight al Qaeda in a multilateral effort, fourth, address the North Korean
diplomatic crisis, and finally, engage the Middle East peace process—the source of the terrorism problem in the first place.
<<< Koh continues >>>
We never have had a situation in the United States where there is a greater disparity between our hard power and our soft power. Even
as we started bombing Baghdad with unprecedented technological skill, we could not get Mexico and Chile to vote a favorable
Security Council resolution. As the administration was railing against violations of Geneva Conventions against our own soldiers, it
seemed oblivious to the fact that most of the world thinks that we are violating those conventions with regard to detainees at
Guantánamo. President Bush is calling for prosecution of Iraqi war criminals while insisting on opposing the ICC. U.S. officials who
said we do not need the United Nations to launch the attack are saying that the United Nations should help to rebuild Iraq. My point is
this: The United States is taking a Jekyll and Hyde approach. On the one hand it pursues coercive theories of power-based
internationalism, but on the other hand it recognizes the need for norm-based theories of international-law-based internationalism. I
believe that as a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to inalienable rights, the United States has a very strong impulse not just to
use power but to combine power with principle. We, as lawyers and scholars and activists who care, should do what we can to use
transnational legal process to prod this country to follow the better angels of its national nature.
Middle East war bad – extinction.

Bahig Nassar, Arab Co-ordinating Centre of Non-Governmental Organizations, and Afro-Asian People’s
Solidary Organization, 11/25/02, keynote paper for Cordoba Dialogue on Peace and Human Rights in
Europe and the Middle East, http://www.inesglobal.org/BahigNassar.htm
Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had
prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the possession of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars. Instead of eliminating weapons of mass
destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on
maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But the production, proliferation and threat or use of weapons
of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the
extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character of former wars, the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global
problems and escalate their dangers instead of solving them.
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Terrorism Frontline
3. Only developed nations are capable of creating a nuclear device, any terrorist attempts would be easily
detectable and large enough amounts of uranium are impossible to obtain.
NIDS, Norwegian International Defence Seminar, 10/13/04, “Can terrorists make nuclear weapons?”,
http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=85820
Large quantities needed
Today, it is mostly ultracentrifuge plants that are used to enrich uranium. However, they are expensive to develop, build and operate. A
small plant costs hundreds of millions of USD, and the need for natural uranium as a feed material is about 10 tons per nuclear
weapon. Such plants consume vast amounts of electricity, and they require great technological expertise to operate. Such activities
would be easy to detect. Consequently, only developed countries can hope to build and operate such plants successfully.
Selling uranium
So, if the terrorists can’t make nuclear materials, they can steal it, right? Ølgaard thinks not. Most research reactors have converted to
20% enriched uranium. A much higher grade of enriched uranium is required for nuclear weapons than for power reactors. However,
in the military field, highly enriched uranium is used for both nuclear weapons and to fuel nuclear ships. Thus there is a risk that
nuclear material can inadvertently fall into the hands of our enemies. Ølgaard pointed to the fact that there have been a number of
cases where people with connections to the East have tried to sell fissile material in Western Europe. However, in all of these cases,
the amounts were too small to be of relevance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
4. Doublebind – the terrorists either don’t care or are too stupid to attack.
John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, September/October 2006, Foreign
Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-
threat.html
But if it is so easy to pull off an attack and if terrorists are so demonically competent, why have they not done it? Why have they not
been sniping at people in shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains,
blowing up oil pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security
experts, could so easily be exploited?
One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike
from abroad. But this explanation is rarely offered.
HUFFING AND PUFFING
Instead, Americans are told -- often by the same people who had once predicted imminent attacks -- that the absence of international
terrorist strikes in the United States is owed to the protective measures so hastily and expensively put in place after 9/11. But there is a
problem with this argument. True, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United States in the last five years. But nor were there
any in the five years before the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the United States was doing much less to protect itself. It would take only
one or two guys with a gun or an explosive to terrorize vast numbers of people, as the sniper attacks around Washington, D.C.,
demonstrated in 2002. Accordingly, the government's protective measures would have to be nearly perfect to thwart all such plans.
Given the monumental imperfection of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and the debacle of FBI and National Security
Agency programs to upgrade their computers to better coordinate intelligence information, that explanation seems far-fetched.
Moreover, Israel still experiences terrorism even with a far more extensive security apparatus.
It may well have become more difficult for terrorists to get into the country, but, as thousands demonstrate each day, it is far from
impossible. Immigration procedures have been substantially tightened (at considerable cost), and suspicious U.S. border guards have
turned away a few likely bad apples. But visitors and immigrants continue to flood the country. There are over 300 million legal
entries by foreigners each year, and illegal crossings number between 1,000 and 4,000 a day -- to say nothing of the generous
quantities of forbidden substances that the government has been unable to intercept or even detect despite decades of a strenuous and
well-funded "war on drugs." Every year, a number of people from Muslim countries -- perhaps hundreds -- are apprehended among
the illegal flow from Mexico, and many more probably make it through. Terrorism does not require a large force. And the 9/11
planners, assuming Middle Eastern males would have problems entering the United States legally after the attack, put into motion
plans to rely thereafter on non-Arabs with passports from Europe and Southeast Asia.
If al Qaeda operatives are as determined and inventive as assumed, they should be here by now. If they are not yet here, they must not
be trying very hard or must be far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common image would suggest.
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Kernoff/Olney
Terrorism Frontline
5. Terrorism is crucial to establishing a new world order that solves extinction.
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/04,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ 2004/705/op5.htm
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of
the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped
up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It
would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to
survive.
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William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Ext. No Nukes
Terrorists don’t have the capabilities to successfully build a nuclear device.
NIDS, Norwegian International Defence Seminar, 10/13/04, “Can terrorists make nuclear weapons?”,
http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=85820
Here are some of the reasons terrorist use of nuclear weapons should not be among your major concerns, according to Professor Povl
L. Ølgaard, at Olgard Consult: The manufacture of nuclear weapons requires an enormous infrastructure.
-This infrastructure is not easily accessible to terrorists, said Professor Povl L. Ølgaard, at Olgard Consult. Terrorists don’t have access
to the facilities needed to enrich uranium. Nor do they possess the pure quality of materials required for the correct timing of the chain
reaction. This timing is critical to achieving the explosion.
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Kernoff/Olney
Ext. No Attack – Self-interest

Terrorists don’t want to attack – increases concerns about terrorism because of its dramatic nature.
threat.html
One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction
itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might
disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya,
Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The
FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been
rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement.
Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic --
the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods.
When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of
thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist
regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle
of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to
be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated.
The post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on international terrorists has been much reinforced and amplified
by subsequent, if scattered, terrorist activity outside the United States. Thus, a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the
Indonesian government into action. Extensive arrests and convictions -- including of leaders who had previously enjoyed some degree
of local fame and political popularity -- seem to have severely degraded the capacity of the chief jihadist group in Indonesia, Jemaah
Islamiyah. After terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, that country, very much for self-interested reasons, became
considerably more serious about dealing with domestic terrorism; it soon clamped down on radical clerics and preachers. Some rather
inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similarly determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. And the 2005
bombing in Jordan of a wedding at a hotel (an unbelievably stupid target for the terrorists) succeeded mainly in outraging the
Jordanians: according to a Pew poll, the percentage of the population expressing a lot of confidence in bin Laden to "do the right
thing" dropped from 25 percent to less than one percent after the attack.
Terrorists won’t use nuclear weapons, it would destroy their political base and countries would no longer
supply them for fear of US backlash.
Hillel W Cohen, Assistant professor, Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Abert Einstein
College of Medicine and Montefiore Medical Center, New York, Victor W Sidel, Professor, Department of
Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Albert Einstein College of Medicine and Montefiore Medical Center, and
Robert M. Gould, President, SF-Bay area Chapter, Physicians for Social Responsibility,
http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/articles/other/biotb_13/, 2002
It has been suggested that political terrorists would not be motivated to use catastrophic weaponry since such actions would bring
universal condemnation even from those who might otherwise sympathize with their cause. Even if so motivated, it would be difficult
for terrorist organizations, working in secret and without government support, to develop capacities that only a limited number of
states have had the resources to acquire. Any government's putative desire to allow allied political organizations access to such
weaponry would be constrained by reasonable fears of retaliation from targeted states in possession of robust military power.
- 73 -
William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
Ext. No Attack – Self-interest

Terrorists won’t use WMD it would be counter-productive to their political aims and rally support against
them.
Ehud Sprinzak, professor of political science at Hebrew University of Jerusalem . This article was written
under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,”
http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/super-1.html, 1998
There is, however, a problem with this two-part logic. Although the capabilities proposition is largely valid--albeit for the limited
number of terrorists who can overcome production and handling risks and develop an efficient means of dispersal--the chaos
proposition is utterly false. Despite the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is hardly
inevitable. It is not even likely. Thirty years of field research have taught observers of terrorism a most important lesson: Terrorists
wish to convince us that they are capable of striking from anywhere at anytime, but there really is no chaos. In fact, terrorism involves
predictable behavior, and the vast majority of terrorist organizations can be identified well in advance.
Most terrorists possess political objectives, whether Basque independence, Kashmiri separatism, or Palestinian Marxism. Neither
crazy nor stupid, they strive to gain sympathy from a large audience and wish to live after carrying out any terrorist act to benefit from
it politically. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins has remarked, terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead.
Furthermore, no terrorist becomes a terrorist overnight. A lengthy trajectory of radicalization and low-level violence precedes the
killing of civilians. A terrorist becomes mentally ready to use lethal weapons against civilians only over time and only after he or she
has managed to dehumanize the enemy. From the Baader - Meinhoff group in Germany and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to Hamas
and Hizballah in the Middle East, these features are universal.
- 74 -
William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
AT: Russia
Russian “loose nukes” pose no threat, even if terrorists obtained them lack of maintenance prevents their
usage.
CASR, Canadian American Strategic Review, Canadian Defense Policy, An Assessment of the Threat of
Nuclear Terrorism:
Beg, Borrow or Steal: 'Suitcase' Bombs & Rogue States http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-frost4.htm, October 2003
The results of the audit does not automatically mean that unaccounted-for weapons have fallen into the 'wrong' hands. Given the
current state of Russian controls on nuclear material, Lebed may be revealing more about record-keeping and storage procedures than
about the weapons themselves. However, even if terrorists could have obtained such weapons, there would have been significant
obstacles to their using them.
Sokov quotes Igor Valynkin, chief of the 12th GUMO (the Main Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with handling
all nuclear weapons) as saying that the devices would have had very short maintenance schedules – possibly as little as six months. If
certain crucial components, such as tritium boosters, were not replaced at regular intervals the bombs would go 'stale' and their nuclear
yield could drop to close to zero. Any weapons diverted in the 'bad old days' of the early 1990s would, by now, have missed twenty or
more scheduled services and be at the end of their useful lives.
- 75 -
William Huang
DDI ‘08
Kernoff/Olney
AT: Other Explanations

Al-Qaeda’s still alive, they aren’t too busy in Iraq, it isn’t the local community, and they’re not biding their
time <underline to answer their explanation>.
threat.html
Another popular explanation for the fact that there have been no more attacks asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,
although it never managed to snag bin Laden, severely disrupted al Qaeda and its operations. But this claim is similarly unconvincing.
The 2004 train bombings in Madrid were carried out by a tiny group of men who had never been to Afghanistan, much less to any of
al Qaeda's training camps. They pulled off a coordinated nonsuicidal attack with 13 remote-controlled bombs, ten of which went off
on schedule, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,800. The experience with that attack, as well as with the London bombings of 2005,
suggests that, as the former U.S. counterterrorism officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, for a terrorist attack to
succeed, "all that is necessary are the most portable, least detectable tools of the terrorist trade: ideas."
It is also sometimes suggested that the terrorists are now too busy killing Americans and others in Iraq to devote the time, manpower,
or energy necessary to pull off similar deeds in the United States. But terrorists with al Qaeda sympathies or sensibilities have
managed to carry out attacks in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the past
three years; not every single potential bomb thrower has joined the fray in Iraq.
Perhaps, some argue, terrorists are unable to mount attacks in the United States because the Muslim community there, unlike in many
countries in Europe, has been well integrated into society. But the same could be said about the United Kingdom, which experienced a
significant terrorist attack in 2005. And European countries with less well-integrated Muslim communities, such as Germany, France,
and Norway, have yet to experience al Qaeda terrorism. Indeed, if terrorists are smart, they will avoid Muslim communities because
that is the lamppost under which policing agencies are most intensely searching for them. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were
ordered generally to stay away from mosques and American Muslims. That and the Madrid plot show that tiny terrorist conspiracies
hardly need a wider support network to carry out their schemes.
Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks took only about two years to
prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 were conceived,
planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off less than two months after the conspirators
purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took
less than a year to plan.) Given the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one would think that terrorists might be
inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just
around the corner? It was in 2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey) but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those attacks were
tragic, but their sparseness could be taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and
puffing.
- 76 -

119 KO Proliferation and Terrorism Impacts

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119 KO Proliferation and Terrorism Impacts

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Proliferation/Terrorism

WOOT! PROLIF GOOD!

Prolif Now – Kinshasa

Prolif Bad Frontline

Prolif Bad Frontline

Prolif Bad Frontline

Prolif will happen in the Middle East and Asia.

Prolif Bad Frontline

Miscalculation is inevitable – organizations aren’t omniscient and focuses on political goals.

Prolif Bad Frontline

Prolif Bad Frontline

Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable

Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable

Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable

Ext. Military  Pre-emption

AT: Small Arms Races

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif promotes alliances.

Prolif Good Frontline

Allies are critical to winning the war on terror.

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif Good Frontline

Prolif would be slow but inevitable.

AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States

AT: Small States Can’t Deter Big States

AT: Small States Reckless

AT: Small States Reckless

AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque

AT: New Prolif Won’t Be Opaque

3. New proliferants will be opaque – many reasons.

3. Intelligence for preemptive strikes is not available to new proliferators.

5. Preemption Not Plausible- one nuke is too destructive.

AT: Time to learn

AT: Prolif  Arms Races

AT: Prolif  Arms Races

AT: Prolif  Arms Races

AT: Prolif  Arms Races

AT: Crazy Leaders

AT: Crazy Leaders

AT: Crazy Leaders

AT: Crazy Leaders

3. India and Pakistan prove this argument is wrong.

AT: Crazy Leaders

AT: Crazy Leaders

AT: Military Control Bad

AT: Military Control Bad

AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation

AT: Prolif  Escalation / Miscalculation

AT: Nuclear Multipolarity bad / Hostile Pairs

AT: Terrorists Steal

AT: Terrorists Steal

AT: Just Waltz Advocates

2. Terrorist attacks increase US soft power and global hegemony

Middle East war bad – extinction.

Ext. No Attack – Self-interest

Ext. No Attack – Self-interest

AT: Other Explanations

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