SDI ‘08

Elections Impact – Iran

Obama Good – Iran
Obama Good – Iran.................................................................................................................................................................................... ..1
Iran 1NC........................................................................................................................................................................................ ..............2
Iran Internal – Obama Will Engage.......................................................................................................................................................... ....4
Iran Internal – Obama Will Engage.......................................................................................................................................................... ....5
Iran Internal – McCain will strike................................................................................................................................................... .............6
Strikes Bad - Afghanistan...................................................................................................................................................... ......................7
Strikes Bad – Economy/oil shocks....................................................................................................................................................... ........8
Strikes Bad - Nato.................................................................................................................................................................................. ......9
Strikes Bad - Russia........................................................................................................................................................................ ...........10
Strikes Bad – South Asia.................................................................................................................................................................... ........11
Strikes Bad – Succession....................................................................................................................................................... ....................12
Strikes Bad - Terrorism................................................................................................................................................................ ..............14
Strikes Fail 2NC......................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
A2: Israeli Strikes Worse.......................................................................................................................................................................... .16
Engagement Good – Iran Prolif........................................................................................................................................... ......................17
Ext – Iran Prolif Impact........................................................................................................................................................ .....................18
Engagement Good – Leadership.............................................................................................................................................. ..................19
Ext – Engagement Solves Leadership......................................................................................................................................... ...............20
Engagement Good – Democracy............................................................................................................................................................. ...21
Engagement Good – Iraq....................................................................................................................................................... ....................23
Ext – Engagement Good – Iraq...................................................................................................................................................... ............24
Engagement Good – Russia...................................................................................................................................................... .................25
A2: Engagement = Appeasement.............................................................................................................................................. ................27
A2: Engagement Incentivizes Prolif...................................................................................................................................................... ....28
A2: Engagement Empowers Hardliners................................................................................................................................... .................29
Iran Says Yes........................................................................................................................................................................................... ...30
A2: Say No – Ahmadinejad..................................................................................................................................................................... ..31
................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ......31

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Iran 1NC
McCain will strike Iran
Clemons, 08 (Steve, editor of Washington note, huffington report, www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-
clemons/john-mccain-maverick-man-_b_84951.html)
On Iran and its nuclear program, McCain has been so flippantly bellicose -- singing "Bomb bomb bomb bomb Iran" to the Beach Boys tune
-- that some conservatives have warned that a President McCain would take America to war with Iran.
McCain last Sunday said: "There's going to be other wars... I'm sorry to tell you, there's going to be other wars. We will never surrender but
there will be other wars."
Presumably, McCain was suggesting his view that a war with Iran was inevitable. When asked by Joe Scarborough about McCain's
statement, Pat Buchanan replied: "That is straight talk... You get John McCain in the White House, and I do believe we will be at war with
Iran." Buchanan said, "That's one of the things that makes me very nervous about him," adding, "There's no doubt John McCain is going to
be a war president... His whole career is wrapped up in the military, national security. He's in Putin's face, he's threatening the Iranians,
we're going to be in Iraq a hundred years."

Strikes cause Syria to retaliate against Israel with smallpox

Corsi ’07 (Jerome,- writer for Wordnet daily, citing Jill Bellamy-Dekker, director of the Public Health Preparedness
program for the European Homeland Security Association under the French High Committee for Civil Defense “Syria ready
with bio-terror if U.S. hits Iran” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54542)
An American biodefense analyst living in Europe says if the U.S. invades Iran to halt its nuclear ambitions, Syria is ready to
respond with weapons of mass destruction – specifically biological weapons.
"Syria is positioned to launch a biological attack on Israel or Europe should the U.S. attack Iran," Jill Bellamy-Dekker told WND.
"The Syrians are embedding their biological weapons program into their commercial pharmaceuticals business and their veterinary vaccine-
research facilities. The intelligence service oversees Syria's 'bio-farm' program and the Ministry of Defense is well interfaced into the effort."
Bellamy-Decker currently directs the Public Health Preparedness program for the European Homeland Security Association under the French
High Committee for Civil Defense.
She anticipates a variation of smallpox is the biological agent Syria would utilize.

The impact outweighs nuke war

Singer ’01 (Clifford,- is a professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament,
and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?”
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm)
In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go
back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future
for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the
human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant
civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of
nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by
an all-out nuclear war would cause a so-called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a
year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if
older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout
would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as "On the Beach," was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war
rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable
even a full scale nuclear
except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in
exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background
Nor is there any reason to
radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations.
believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used
technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the
past fifty thousand years.
There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human
survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most
fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to
smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while
the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other
complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and
vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in
unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology,
the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely
ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of
new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered
for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently
available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology
base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is
achieved.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran

3
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Iran Internal – Obama Will Engage
Obama Will engage Iran – Including security guarantees
Seale, 2/14/08 (Patrick, leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for
Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire,
alJazeera magazine, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/newsfull.php?newid=89966)
There are welcome signs of a coming thaw in America’s hostile and ice-bound relations with Iran -- if not in the remaining months of
George W. Bush’s presidency then under his successor. For the first time in many years, such a possibility is being actively debated and envisaged by American
policy-makers and influential think-tanks.
Washington sources report that leading politicians of both the Democratic and Republic parties are beginning to explore the possibility of a radical shift in American policy towards
the Islamic Republic, once a new Administration takes office in January 2009.
Barack Obama, a leading contender for the Democratic nomination, has said that, if elected President, he would seek to engage Iran in a wide-ranging
dialogue.
This is only one aspect -- although one of the most important -- of the break now in preparation with some key features of Bush’s foreign policy, notably his global war on terror,
which is widely credited with having increased rather than diminished the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies.
Driving the need for a change of direction is the growing realization that Bush’s foreign policy towards the Arab and Islamic world -- largely influenced by pro-Israeli neo-
conservatives -- has been a catastrophic failure. It has undermined America’s credibility around the world and aroused immense distrust.
Bush’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been -- and continue to be -- costly disasters. In addition, in spite of his call for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement before the end of his
mandate, Bush has not actually advanced the cause of peace by even the smallest degree. On the contrary, he has aroused Arab, Iranian and Muslim outrage by supporting Israel’s
two ill-conceived wars against Hizbullah and Hamas: The first led to massive destruction and loss of life in Lebanon, and the second to the cruel siege of the entire Gaza
population -- a continuing collective punishment in blatant violation of international law.
Another spectacular failure has been Bush’s effort to force Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. Quite the reverse, Iran has redoubled its enrichment efforts by
installing an advanced centrifuge at its Natanz nuclear complex. Meanwhile, American-led sanctions against Iran, its attempts to undermine the Iranian banking system and
economy, allied to the threat of military attack, have triggered a patriotic Iranian backlash, so that the nuclear programme has become a national cause.
Just this week, on the anniversary of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told a million-strong rally in Tehran: "They should know that the Iranian
nation will not retreat one iota from its nuclear rights." Standing up to the United Stated and Israel on the nuclear issue, as well as on Iraq and Palestinian, has greatly contributed to
enhancing Iran’s regional influence.
A crucial contribution to the debate over what to do about Iran will be a report by Muhammad al-Baradei, director of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, due
for publication on 20 February. It is expected to contain answers to questions by the IAEA about Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s.
Baradei’s report will be scrutinized to see whether it confirms or disputes America’s National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded last December that Iran had halted its military
nuclear programme in 2003.
Hawks in the U.S. Administration -- and in Israel -- fear that if the IAEA gives Iran a clean bill of health, the prospect will evaporate of imposing tougher sanctions on Iran by
means of a third UN Security Council resolution. China and Russia, as well as non-permanent members of the Council such as South Africa, have already indicated that they are
unlikely to assent to such a resolution.
As for the Arab world, it is already abundantly clear that American attempts to mobilize so-called ‘moderates’ in an anti-Iran coalition have also failed. Egypt, the Gulf States, and
Saudi Arabia have all made clear that they have no intention of participating in any such American-led campaign.
In an interview on 31 January with La Repubblica, Italy’s largest circulation daily, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt was asked, "Did Bush ask you to forge a common front
against Iran?"
Mubarak replied: "This is not the time for resorting to threats or to the use of force. That would serve solely to set the Gulf, the Middle East and the whole world on fire. What is
needed, rather, are dialogue and diplomacy.
"The U.S. Intelligence report on Iran’s nuclear ambitions lends itself to opposing interpretations, but in any case it paves the way for
diplomacy. Greater transparency is needed on Iran’s part and greater flexibility is needed on the part of the international community."
When asked whether Egypt was considering resuming diplomatic relations with Iran, broken off since the 1979 revolution, Mubarak relied: "There are various issues on the table,
but once they have been resolved, we are prepared to establish diplomatic relations once again."
Far from isolating Iran, Egypt is forging ties with it. This is a development of very considerable importance.
There is a good deal of latent distrust and antagonism between Shia Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a pillar of Sunni Islam. But from a cautious beginning in 1998, détente
has been flourishing between the two regional powers to the extent that something like a new spirit of coexistence has taken hold. The Kingdom has also made great efforts to draw
its own Shia minority, mainly located in the eastern province, into the national community.
As for the Gulf States, they are busy trading with Iran and are totally opposed to an American policy of confrontation and coercion. Speaking at a conference this month on Iran at
Washington’s Middle East Institute, Dr. Ibtisam al-Kitbi, a professor of political scene at the United Arab Emirates University, reminded her audience that about 10,000 Iranian
firms were operating in the Emirates, that Iranian assets in the UAE were estimated at $66 billion, and that Iran was the Gulf’s biggest trading partner.
It is against this background of American failure that voices are being raised in the United States in favour of a "grand bargain" with Iran,
beginning with unconditional comprehensive talks in order to resolve differences and normalize bilateral relations.
At the same MEI conference, Hillary Man Leverett, a former State Department and National Security Council official, outlined some of the
conditions for a strategic understanding between Washington and Tehran.
The United States would need to recognize the Islamic Republic and establish diplomatic relations with it; acknowledge Iran’s role in the
region; terminate Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism; lift U.S. unilateral sanctions; and commit not to use force to change
Iran’s form of government, but on the contrary agree to begin an ongoing strategic dialogue with Tehran.
In return, Iran would need to provide a "definitive resolution" of U.S. concerns about Iran’s possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or
biological. Iran would need to ratify and implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which provides for intrusive and unannounced inspections. It would need to help in
transforming Hizbullah into a purely political and social movement. It would need to work for a stable political order in Iraq. And it would need to declare that it was not opposed
to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Such a blueprint for a new relationship between the United States and Iran would require great courage and vision on both sides. It is a task
for the next American president. If implemented, it would transform America’s image in the world and make an immense contribution to
resolving conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, above all, that between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which is the most
poisonous and long-running conflict of them all.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Iran Internal – Obama Will Engage
Obama will engage Iran and give conditional security guarantee
Koogler ’07 (Jeb Koogler has worked at the Middle East Peace Project, the
New America Foundation's 'American Strategy Program', the Project on Middle
East Democracy, and the Watson Institute. Articles of his have been
published at The American Prospect Online, Die Welt (a German paper), and
Atlantic Community (a Berlin-based thinktank). Foreign Policy Watch –
November 2nd --
http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2007/11/logic-of-obama-plan.html)

The New York Times ran a front-page article today about Obama's plan to aggressively pursue diplomacy with Iran over the nuclear issue.
The approach that Obama detailed is quite logical: unconditional negotiations, better carrots, harsher punishment for non-compliance, and a
reduced American presence in the Persian Gulf. This is very much the type of common sense approach that we've called for here on this
blog; unfortunately, not everyone in the blogosphere had such a favorable opinion.
Ed Morrissey, a well-known conservative blogger who writes at Captain's Quarters, expressed his disapproval with the plan by suggesting
that it is nothing that hasn't been tried before:
...it's hard to believe that neither Obama nor Michael Gordon or Jeff Zeleny recall that the EU-3 and the US made precisely that offer to
Iran in the summer 2005 round of negotiations between the Europeans and Iran. The Bush administration even made the offer publicly in
support of the European peace initiative, and even talked openly of restoring diplomatic and trade relations with Iran.
Did it work? No, it did not. Iran had more interest in pursuing nuclear weapons than in WTO membershi ormalized relations -- because
Iran considers itself at war with the United States. It doesn't want normal trade; Iran wants regional hegemony over the Middle East, after
which it can demand trade on whatever terms it likes with the entire world.
Actually, Obama's plan is not a repeat of the 2005 proposal. Indeed, Morrissey's analysis failed to recognize one of the most important
elements of the Obama plan: security guarantees. Unlike the 2005 EU3 offer, which did not include a specific non-aggression pact from
Washington, Obama's approach would effectively eliminate many of the key security concerns of the Iranian regime. Dave Schuler, over at
the Glittering Eye blog, sensibly argues this same point:
With all due respect to Ed Morrissey, what Sen. Obama is proposing is not a rerun of offers made in 2005. The part that caught my eye in
the article in the NYT are the words “security assurance”. To the best of my knowledge that’s a dramatic departure from present U. S.
policy with respect to Iran.
Schuler's right - Obama's emphasis on security guarantees would represent a significant and important change in American policy. As The
Washington Post reported last year, the Bush administration has consistently refused to offer "a guarantee against attacking or undermining
Iran's hard-line government in exchange for having Tehran curtail its nuclear program." Condoleezza Rice, in May of 2006, affirmed this
point: "Iran is a troublemaker in the international system, a central banker of terrorism. Security assurances are not on the table."

Obama Will Engage

NYT, 11/2/07
Senator Barack Obama said he would “engage in aggressive personal diplomacy” with Iran if elected president, and would offer economic
inducements and a possible promise not to seek “regime change” if Iran stopped meddling in Iraq and cooperated on terrorism and nuclear
issues.
In an hourlong interview on Wednesday, Mr. Obama made clear that forging a new relationship with Iran would be a major element of what
he pledged would be a broad effort to stabilize Iraq as he executed a speedy timetable for the withdrawal of American combat troops.
Mr. Obama said that Iran had been “acting irresponsibly” by supporting Shiite militant groups in Iraq. He also emphasized that Iran’s
suspected nuclear weapons program and its support for “terrorist activities” were serious concerns.
But he asserted that Iran’s support for militant groups in Iraq reflected its anxiety over the Bush administration’s policies in the region,
including talk of a possible American military strike on Iranian nuclear installations.
Making clear that he planned to talk to Iran without preconditions, Mr. Obama emphasized further that “changes in behavior” by Iran could
possibly be rewarded with membership in the World Trade Organization, other economic benefits and security guarantees.
“We are willing to talk about certain assurances in the context of them showing some good faith,” he said in the interview at his campaign
headquarters here. “I think it is important for us to send a signal that we are not hellbent on regime change, just for the sake of regime
change, but expect changes in behavior. And there are both carrots and there are sticks available to them for those changes in behavior.”

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Iran Internal – McCain will strike
McCain makes attack likely
Guardian, 6/22/08
But there is another, very different side to John McCain. Away from the headlines and the stirring speeches, a less familiar figure lurks. It is
a McCain who plans to fight on in Iraq for years to come and who might launch military action against Iran. This is the McCain whose
campaign and career has been riddled with lobbyists and special interests. It is a McCain who has sided with religious and political
extremists who believe Islam is evil and gays are immoral. It is a McCain who wants to appoint extreme conservatives to the Supreme
Court and see abortion banned. This McCain has a notoriously volatile temper that has scared some senior members of his own party. If
McCain becomes the most powerful man in the world it would be wise to know what lies behind his public mask, to look at the dark side of
John McCain.
John McCain is an American hero in an age of war and terrorism. As young Americans return in bodybags from Iraq and Iranian mullahs
cook up uranium, an old soldier like McCain seems a natural choice in a dangerous world. He is the son and grandson of warriors. Both his
father and grandfather were four-star admirals. He was even born on a military base, on 29 August 1936, in Panama. And his life story
reads like a movie script. The young, rascally McCain, nicknamed 'McNasty' by his classmates, attended the elite United States Naval
Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. He became a navy pilot, long before Tom Cruise made 'Top Guns' famous, and began his first combat
duty in Vietnam in 1966, carrying out countless missions. Then came disaster. He was shot down and held prisoner for five years by brutal
North Vietnamese captors. In his stiff gait and damaged arms, he still bears the scars of their tortures. His CV for the White House is
written in his suffering as much as in his career as a senator.
That military legacy has made John McCain a legend. But it has not turned him into a peacemaker, at a time when most Americans
desperately want the war to end. Anyone hoping for a new president who will quickly bring America's troops home from Iraq had better
look elsewhere. McCain has always supported the invasion of Iraq and he wants to support it until at least 2013, or perhaps for many years
beyond. He believes withdrawal would be a surrender to terrorists.
That warlike spirit was on full display in Denver when McCain's speech was interrupted repeatedly by anti-war protesters. They stood up,
unfurling banners and shouting for a withdrawal from Iraq. When it happened a third time, McCain had had enough. In a voice suddenly
filled with steely resolve, McCain broke from his carefully scripted speech and gripped the lectern. He looked out at the audience and
spoke slowly. 'I will never surrender in Iraq,' he rasped. 'Our American troops will come home with victory and with honour.' The crowd
cheered and chanted: 'John McCain! John McCain!' It was a perfect moment for unrepentant supporters of the Iraq invasion and a McCain
who still smarts from defeat in Vietnam. No retreat. No surrender. This time America will win.
McCain believes in projecting American military power abroad. So it is no wonder that the neoconservatives who pushed for war in Iraq
have now regrouped around him. McCain's main foreign policy adviser is Randy Scheunemann, who was executive director of the
shadowy Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. Other leading neocons on board include John Bolton, America's belligerent former UN
ambassador, Bill Kristol, editor of the Neocon bible the Weekly Standard, and Max Boot, who has pushed for a US version of the old
British Colonial Office. Another close McCain adviser is former CIA director James Woolsey, who has openly advocated bombing Syria.
Such a group of warlike counsellors has raised fears that McCain may strike Iran to stop its suspected quest for a nuclear weapon,
triggering a fresh war in the Middle East. The Republican candidate has openly joked about bombing Tehran. It was just over a year ago, in
the tiny borough of Murrells Inlet in South Carolina, and McCain faced a small crowd in one of his characteristic town hall meetings. As
McCain stood on the stage, one man asked him about the 'real problem' in the Middle East. 'When are we going to send an airmail message
to Tehran?' the man pleaded. McCain laughed and - to the tune of the Beach Boys' classic 'Barbara Ann' - began to sing: 'Bomb bomb
bomb, bomb bomb Iran.' But some think McCain's joke may well become policy. 'I think a McCain presidency would be very likely to
strike Iran,' says Cliff Schecter, author of a new book, The Real McCain

6
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad - Afghanistan
Iran will destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan
Brookes ’06 (Peter,- Senior fellow @ Heritage 1-23 “Iran: Our Military Options”
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed012306a.cfm)
But it's unlikely to be that simple. After an assault, Iran might lash out with a vengeance. We'd have to be
fully prepared for some nasty blowback.
Tehran and its terrorist toadies can brew up some serious trouble for both America and Israel — or anyone else that
supported an attack on the fundamentalist Islamic state.
The Iranian regime is already up to its neck in the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could
certainly increase its financial/material support to the Sunni insurgents, Shia militants, al Qaeda, and the
Taliban to destabilize the new Baghdad and Kabul governments — and kill Coalition forces.

Afghanistan goes nuclear

Kavanagh 07 [Trevor, esteemed Journalist and Political Editor @ the Sun Times, “We need to win hearts and minds at home too,” Jan 22, ln]
The headlines focus on brutality in Baghdad, but the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are better off than ever before. In Afghanistan, two out of three are
building a new life and hope the Taliban will never return. They don't want the burka back. But these fragile improvements are an affront to mullahs,
who lose power once people develop a mind of their own. If we allow them to fail, the price will be incalculable. A return to Taliban rule in
Afghanistan would almost certainly put the skids under Pakistan's "moderate" President Musharraf.
That could set the stage for the first nuclear war -between Pakistan and India - dragging in China
and the USA. We are at a dangerous crossroads. Western security services are under no illusion that fanatics
are radicalising young men at an alarming pace. At home and abroad we are competing for the hearts and minds of sensible,
decent Muslims who are being bullied and intimidated in the name of extreme Islam. In many ways we are in their hands.
Only they can stand in the way of a virulent spread of terror.

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 SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad – Economy/oil shocks
Strikes powerbomb the economy and cause oil shocks
Lang and Johnson ’06 (Patrick,- former head of Middle East Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency Larry C,-
served in the CIA and the State Department 3-1 “Contemplating the Ifs”
http://nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=12186)
If Iran were attacked, Iran could halt its oil exports and thereby immediately impact the global price. It
Iran can also play the oil card.
would be unwise to hope that Iran, as part of its national security plan, is not willing to shut down Persian Gulf oil exports. Iran is well equipped to
shower Persian Gulf states and oil fields with missiles, or to shut down exports with a variety of other military, terrorist
or political methods. At a minimum, a U.S. military air campaign, even if successful in wrecking the Iranian nuclear program, would severely
disrupt oil markets for at least six months. Such a disruption would hurt the world economy, not just that of the United States. In addition,
there are countries sympathetic to Iran, such as Venezuela, that have indicated they are more than willing to cut off their oil
supply to the United States. The United States could find itself facing a 20-30 percent shortfall in oil imports (and that estimate assumes that the
Saudi fields are untouched and that oil imports continue to flow unimpeded).

Nuclear war
Mead, 92 (Walter Russell, fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New perspectives quarterly, summer pp. 28)
But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period
of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - these countries with their
billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and
Japan did in the '30s.

8
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad - Nato
Iran strikes end NATO, US-EU relations and EU Unity
Tisdall, 2007 (Simon, writer for The Guardian 2-7 “Merkel goes in search of a new German miracle” lexis)
"The common glue of the cold war has gone. The fight against terrorism has not replaced it. As for Iran, of course we are
worried. Nobody wants a nuclear Iran. But our American friends have made major mistakes . . . We oppose military
action. During the cold war, we talked to the communists. Now we must talk to the Iranians."
All Ms Merkel's efforts to make Europe an equal partner with the US could be destroyed in a moment by a US military
attack on Iran, Prof Sandschneider said. EU unity would also shatter. "It would be the end of Nato. It would be the end of
the US-European consensus on how to deal with security threats. It would be disastrous."

The impact is global war

Binnendijk and Kugler ’03 (Hans,- Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and
Richard L,- Distinguished Research Professor at CTNSP “Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance”
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH35/DH35.htm)
The biggest loser would be not the United States but Europe. NATO collapse would result in a major U.S. political and
military withdrawal from the continent. The United States might retain a foothold through bilateral ties with Britain and other countries, but it no
longer would play a multilateral leadership role. Along with this withdrawal would come removal of the many valuable strategic roles that the United States plays
behind the scene. The United States continues to provide extended nuclear deterrence coverage over virtually all of Europe, a still-vital protection in this era of
nuclear powers and proliferation. As shown in the Kosovo war, U.S. conventional forces provide about three-quarters of NATO military power-projection assets for
crises and wars on Europe's periphery. These nuclear and conventional contributions, moreover, enable Europe to defend itself with annual defense budgets that are
$100-150 billion smaller than otherwise would be the case. In effect, the United States is helping fund the European Union, because these savings equal the EU
budget.
Perhaps the Europeans could fund a big defense buildup to compensate for loss of American military guarantees, but the price could be quite high, because a
European buildup absent NATO would be costlier than a buildup under its auspices; NATO offers many economies of scale and opportunities to avoid redundancy
through integrated planning. In addition, a European military buildup would be controversial. How would Europe erect an umbrella of nuclear deterrence? How would it
prepare for crisis operations on its periphery? What would be the European reaction if Germany were compelled to build nuclear forces and a large mobile military?
A European military buildup, however, seems unlikely. Is there any reason to believe that European parliaments would surmount their current anti-military attitudes to
fund bigger defense budgets? Their reaction might be to slash budgets further on the premise that the collapse of NATO made defense strength less necessary and
that Europe could avoid war through diplomacy. As a result, Europe might withdraw into a disengaged foreign policy. Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming,
European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be
left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD
attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and
the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from
logistic support. Overall,
terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.
In addition to these adverse military consequences, American political contributions to European unity, peace, and
prosperity would decline precipitously. For the past fifty years, America's constant presence has assured small
European countries that they will not be dominated by powerful neighbors. It also has helped guarantee that the
continent will not slide back into the competitive geopolitical dynamics that produced two world wars in the
20th Century. The U.S. presence helped Germany find a welcome role in an integrating Europe and permitted leadership by
the so-called "Quad" (the United States, Britain, Germany, and France) in a manner that gained the support of other NATO
members. Recently, the United States has been a leading advocate of NATO enlargement and European unification. In the
absence of NATO, the European Union itself might be weakened, especially if the United States decided to selectively seek
allies among EU members. Nor would EU influence on world affairs be likely to increase. Indeed, the opposite could be the
case.
A NATO that can project power and purpose outside Europe will greatly enhance the odds of preserving world
peace while advancing democratic values. The simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global
problems of the contemporary era alone, and neither can Europe. Together, however, they can succeed. This is a
main reason for keeping NATO alive and healthy, and for transforming it in the ways needed to perform new missions. The
challenge facing the Atlantic Alliance is to pursue these goals in an effective manner that both the United States and Europe
will support.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad - Russia
Strikes cause war with Russia
Tarpley ’05 (Webster Griffin,- activist and historian, 8/29/
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=743)
Competent US military commanders dread the prospect of war with Iran. Iran is four times the area of Iraq, and has three times the population.
Its infrastructure was not destroyed during the Kuwait war in the way that Iraq's was, and Iran has not been subjected to 13 years of crippling
UN sanctions on everything, including food and medicine. The Iranian military forces are intact. In case of war, Iran could be expected to use
all means ranging from ballistic missile attacks on US and Israeli bases to asymmetrical warfare. The situation of the US forces already in Iraq
could quickly become extraordinarily critical. Shamkhani alluded to this prospect when he said that "The U.S. military presence will not
become an element of strength at our expense. The opposite is true because their forces would turn into a hostage." Just as Chinese entry into
the Korean conflict in late November 1950 created a wholly new and wider war, Iranian entry into the US-Iraq war would have similarly
incalculable consequences. The choices might quickly narrow to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons or defeat for the current US hollow
army of just 10 divisions. ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS WORLD WAR III In the case of Iran, the use of nuclear weapons by the US would have a
dangerous complication: Iran is an important neighbor and trading partner of the Russian Federation, which is helping with
Iran’s nuclear power reactor program.
The threatened US/Israeli raid on Iran might kill Russian citizens as well. Such a US attack on
might prod the Russian government into drawing its own line in the sand, rather than sitting idle as the tide of US
Iran
aggression swept closer and closer to Russia’s borders, as one country after another in central Asia was occupied. In other words,
a US attack on Iran bids fair to be the opening of World War III, making explicit was already implicit in the invasion of Iraq. The
Iran war project of the neocons is the very midsummer of madness, and it must be stopped.

Extinction
Bostrom ‘02
(Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford U., Existential Risks,
http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the
USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There
was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a
nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently
destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in
a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may
one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between
India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities
most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or
asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

10
 SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad – South Asia
Strikes cause nuke war in South Asia
Hallinan ‘07(Conn, foreign policy analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus 1-17
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hallinan.php?articleid=10337)
But the long-term impact of a nuclear strike on Iran is likely to be catastrophic, and not only because it would enrage Shi'ites in Iraq. Parry suggests that local
U.S.-backed dictators might find themselves facing unrest as well. If Hezbollah rocketed Israel, Tel Aviv might decide to invade Syria, igniting a full-
scale regional war. It is even possible that Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf might fall, says Parry, "conceivably giving Islamic terrorists
control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal." In that event, India would almost certainly intervene, which could spark a
nuclear war in South Asia. India and Pakistan came perilously close to such an exchange in 1999.

Extinction
Caldicott, 2002, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility
[Helen, The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex, p. X]
The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could
respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the
subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either
accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

11
 SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad – Succession
Iran strike causes violent Kurdish secession triggering massive instability – specifically in
central asia
Stanton ’06 (John,- writer for Global Research “Strike Iran, Watch Pakistan and Turkey Fall”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=STA20060422&articleId=2319)
So, as the bombs fly over Iran, the Kurds would be likely to seize the day and fight for the recognition of a Kurdish
state that deletes portions of present-day Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq from the map. This is no idle dream. The American
based KNC openly advocates a United Free Kurdistan. One day, there will be a Kurdish state. That could be done in a non-violent
fashion rather than as a consequence of a misguided military adventure against Iran. Finally, an invasion of that country
would likely involve Turkish assets of some kind. As a member of NATO, Turkey houses tactical nuclear weapons and, as
reported by Ramin Jahanbegloo in the Daily Star, “Participation by Turkey in a US/Israeli military operation is also a factor
[concerning Iran], following an agreement reached between the Turks and Israelis.” Central Asia and the Middle East would
become a bloodbath one minute after an attack on Iran.

The impact is nuclear conflict

Blank ‘2K (Expert on the post-Soviet world at the Strategic Studies Institute, 2000 Stephen J., “US Military Engagement with
Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” June, http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/Russia-2000-assessment-SSI.pdf)
In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish
treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for
conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many
Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often
feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes
since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not
as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993
when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO
ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared
nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the
Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else.

Independently Violent Kurdish secession ends the US-Turkey alliance – the impact is Trade, Hegemony, Terrorism, Iraqi
and Energy instability and Middle East war
Menon and Wimbush ’07 (Rajan,- Adjunct Fellow at Hudson Institute Enders,- Director of Hudson Institute's Center for Future Security
Strategies “The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance?”
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779309405&fulltext=713240928)If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the
United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States,
arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. It
abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether allies and friends, adversaries, or
loci of instability.Turkey's critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with unpredictable effects rippling
across its neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East.Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the
Mediterranean, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets.Turkey's Mediterranean
port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of
Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia's energy pipelines.Turkey's substantial economic and political ties with Georgia
and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of
power. Georgia is a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with
the Russian-supported secessionist statelets Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also a fellow Turkic country,
whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war, just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider
conflagration drawing in Turkey (Azerbaijan's ally) and Russia (Armenia's patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk.Turkey is a
democratic and secular Muslim state, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can
maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries - that America does not oppose Islam per se, but rather the violent extremists who
invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is
not to be seen by the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself.Turkey's
cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq's Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of
a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated southeast. The fragmentation
of Iraq could therefore prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps
even culminating in Turkey's exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatist guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991
Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1,500 Turkish troops entered this region; and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) Turkey's
disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy away from the United States, the European Union and
NATO, and toward a new strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts
to bluff and bluster may prove short sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new
partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand strategy need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving
it is an anti-Western nationalism.Turkey and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey's cooperation is essential to any truly effective
American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor for militant Islamists to

12
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Elections Impact – Iran
infiltrate Iraq and Turkey's other neighbours.Turkey's participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a military
coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and
enabling economic development in war-torn countries, although Turkey's military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the central
theatre of the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of other contributors to the force). Turkey is a member of NATO, and
the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik but also Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya and Mus, remain important to the United States. The value of Turkish
airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-fly zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's military
machine. Moreover, despite Washington's inability to open a second front from Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were
permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

13
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Bad - Terrorism
Strikes end cooperation with Muslims on the war on terror
Larrabee ’06 (Stephen,- Corporate Chair in European Security @ RAND 3-9 “Defusing the Iranian Crisis”
http://www.rand.org/commentary/030906OCR.html)
Moreover, the political costs would be very high. A military
strike would unleash a wave of nationalism and
unite the Iranian population behind the current regime, ending any prospect of internal change in the
near future and ensuring decades of enmity from the Iranian middle class and youth, who are largely
opposed to the current regime. It would also provoke outrage in the Muslim world, probably making any
attempt to obtain the support of moderate Muslims in the war on terror impossible.

That’s the vital internal link to solving terrorism

AFP ’05 (http://www.terradaily.com/2005/050603134817.rjtw3m11.html)
The United States must use its "soft power" to gain the trust and confidence of Muslims worldwide if
it is to "prevail over terrorism", Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said Friday. Opening an international
security conference, Lee said one reason why many moderate Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown religious
extremists was the "wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world". He said the large-scale US assistance to
Indonesia, the world's biggest Muslim nation, in the aftermath of the December 26 tsunami disaster had not completely
erased the resentment many Muslims feel toward the United States. "The sources of this Muslim anger are historical and
complex, but they have been accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and hostility to
the faith," Lee told the audience, which included US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Lee cited a survey that found that
in 2000 three quarters of Indonesians said they were "attracted" to the United States but that by 2003 the number had fallen
to just 15 percent. Lee said US help to bring relief assistance to the tsunami victims in Indonesia had touched the hearts of
many Indonesians. "But this singular event has not eliminated the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US," he
said. He cited demonstrations worldwide, including in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, following a report by the US magazine
Newsweek that US interrogators at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre had flushed a copy of the Koran down the toilet.
Newsweek later withdrew the report, saying they could not confirm the story with their source. "The US needs to make
more use of its 'soft power' to win over international opinion, correct misperceptions and build trust
and credibility, especially in the Muslim world," Lee said. "In the long term this is vital if the US is to
prevail over terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership."

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Strikes Fail 2NC

Iran already has the required uranium hidden and Iran will prolif after strikes
Fitzpatrick ‘07 (Mark,- senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies “Can Iran’s Nuclear Capability
be Kept Latent?” Survival, March, InformaWorld Online)
At best, air strikes will only delay the programme a few years, and probably not at all, unless the United States or Israel were prepared to
extensively widen the bombing campaign and to repeat it in a few short years - in effect, to launch an interminable war against a Middle East foe stronger,
larger and more cohesive than Saddam's Iraq. America's disastrous experience in Iraq after Saddam should make such a scenario unacceptable. Iran's
nuclear facilities are more dispersed than were Iraq's in 1981, the time of Israel's pre-emptive air strike, popularly credited with having significantly set
back an Iraqi nuclear-weapons programme. In any case, as Richard Betts convincingly argues, the Israeli 1981 example is a fallacy: destroying the nuclear
reactor at Osirak did not delay Iraq's nuclear programme and probably accelerated it.17 After the bombing, Saddam increased the budget and number of
scientists dedicated to the programme twentyfold.18 Without accurate intelligence about Iran's dispersed nuclear facilities and hidden equipment,
air strikes that only target the known facilities will not cripple the nuclear programme. An unnamed senior US official said on 7 November 2006:
'We do not have enough information about the Iranian nuclear program to be confident that you could destroy it in a single attack. The worst thing you could
do is try and not succeed.'19 The uranium-conversion plant at Esfahan is vulnerable, but Iran may no longer need it for a small weapons programme,
having already produced enough UF6 for at least 30 bombs. According to a knowledgeable Western official, the UF6 produced to date is of
sufficient purity for Iran's initial purposes and is stored in dispersed locations safe from air strikes.20 Iran could also build smaller uranium-
conversion facilities elsewhere, if it has not already done so. The above-ground pilot enrichment plant at Natanz, with its 360 installed centrifuges, is also
vulnerable. Bombing Natanz, however, would not destroy Iran's other centrifuges and centrifuge components. Iran may already have up to
2,000 centrifuges stockpiled in unknown locations.21 By accelerating to round-the-clock production, Iran could conceivably triple the 70-100
per month centrifuge production rate at which it was known to have operated two years ago, and replace the 360 centrifuges at Natanz within two
months. Iran would also have to build a new facility and equip it with replacements for the autoclaves, piping and other equipment in the Natanz
plant, but it is prudent to assume that Iran already has a replacement facility being readied. Above all, short of commando operations to target
scientists and engineers, bombing would not destroy the knowledge in nuclear and related sciences and engineering skills that Iran has
amassed to date.

Strikes can’t solve prolif – 3 reasons

-Wont destroy human capital or tech
-Cause public support for nukes and the regime
-Makes enforcing non-prolif standards unpopular
Ochmanek ’07 (David,- senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation . March, “Coping with Iran”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF237.pdf)
Second, even a highly effective attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will not destroy the human capital
and the technology base needed to reconstruct the program. Like the Iraqis after Israel’s attack on the reactor
complex at Osirak, the Iranians should be expected to rebuild their program postattack in a more
dispersed, covert, and survivable form. Third, popular support for the program within Iran would
probably be high. Historically, short bombing campaigns have typically prompted citizens of the
victimized country to rally around their government, and the majority of Iranians should be expect
to do just that. The regime would point to the U.S. attack as an example of the sort of thing a
nuclear capability is intended to deter. Of course, reactions to an attack on Iran would spread far beyond Iran and
the gulf. Jihadist elements worldwide would characterize the attack——the United States’ third on a Muslim country since
2001——as further evidence that the United States is engaged in an all-out “war on Islam.” As such, the attack would be
expected to boost support for radical Islamist groups. Notwithstanding the concerns that countries of the GCC have about
Iranian power, opinion among the gulf Arabs would be overwhelmingly against the United States. This would make it
more difficult for these governments to cooperate openly with Washington on a variety of issues.
And, to the extent that the U.S. attack would be seen as legitimating Iran’s claims that it needs
stronger deterrent capabilities, it might make it harder to enforce restrictions on Iran’s access to
technologies related to nuclear, missile, and other weapons.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
A2: Israeli Strikes Worse

Multiple reasons Israel won’t strike without the US

-Alliance with the US -Flyover permission
-Implications for US assets
Levy ’07 (Daniel,- Senior Fellow and Director of the Prospects for Peace Initiative at The Century Foundation and a Senior
Fellow and Director of the Middle East Initiative at the New America Foundation “Op-Ed on Iran,” Originally appeared in
Haaretz, October 19, http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/)
Most senior U.S. military are known to be actively opposed. The option of independent Israeli action against
Iran
is largely a myth. The long-standing "no surprises" commitment, the likely need for U.S. flyover
permission, and almost certain targeting of U.S. assets in retaliation, makes any Israeli military
calculation very much a joint affair. No military plan guarantees success, and the almost certain
devastating consequences make the idea very ill-advised. An attack would likely provoke a military response
in the region and beyond, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, wreak havoc on oil supplies, enrage the Muslim (including Sunni)
world, be a gift to jihadi recruitment, create new enemies and harden hatreds. Israel would face a particularly fierce
backlash, conceivably for generations.

[Don’t read if you’re reading Israel strikes in the 1AC]

Israel will opt for diplomacy or deterrence

Indyk ’07 (Martin http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF237.pdf
If it has no other choice, the United States can live with an Iran armed with nuclear weapons (for example, it lives with a
nuclear China, Pakistan, North Korea, and India). For Israel, however, this is an existential dilemma. Even Rafsanjani stated
that Iran does not have to worry about Israel, that only one weapon would be needed to destroy it. Having to live with the
threat of nuclear destruction can have a very negative psychological effect on Israel. However, the Israeli prime
minister stated recently that the Iranians have exaggerated how far along they are and that there is
still time for economic sanctions and pressure to work. Israel is interested in seeing the diplomatic
strategy succeed and is thinking about whether MAD is indeed an option, particularly under a U.S.
security umbrella. Therefore, while this is a serious dilemma, it does not mean that Israel will use force to
preempt the Iranian program.

You’re evidence is just rhetoric

Porter, historian and national security policy analyst, 07
(Gareth, “Israeli Realism on Iran Belies Threat Rhetoric,” January 30, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36369)
WASHINGTON, Jan 30 (IPS) - When Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared last week at the Herzliya conference that
Israel could not risk another "existential threat" such as the Nazi holocaust, he was repeating what
has become the dominant theme in Israel's campaign against Iran -- that it cannot tolerate an Iran with the
technology that could be used to make nuclear weapons, because Iran is fanatically committed to the physical destruction of
Israel. The internal assessment by the Israeli national security apparatus of the Iranian threat,
however, is more realistic than the government's public rhetoric would indicate. Since Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in August 2005, Israel has effectively exploited his image as someone who is
particularly fanatical about destroying Israel to develop the theme of Iran's threat of a "second holocaust" by using nuclear
weapons. But such alarmist statements do not accurately reflect the strategic thinking of the Israeli
national security officials. In fact, Israelis began in the early 1990s to use the argument that Iran is
irrational about Israel and could not be deterred from a nuclear attack if it ever acquired nuclear weapons,
according to an account by independent analyst Trita Parsi on Iranian-Israeli strategic relations to be published in March.
Meanwhile, the internal Israeli view of Iran, Parsi told IPS in an interview, "is completely different."
Parsi, who interviewed many Israeli national security officials for his book, says, "The Israelis know that Iran is a
rational regime, and they have acted on that presumption." His primary evidence of such an Israeli
assessment is that the Israelis purchased Dolphin submarines from Germany in 1999 and 2004 which have been reported to
be capable of carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

16
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Engagement Good – Iran Prolif
Engagement and security guarantee solves Iran prolif
Perthes and Wegner, Director and Post-Doc Scholar, both at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
06
(Volker and Eva, “Enriching the Options: Europe, the United States, and Iran,” Discussion paper for the 4th Annual GMF
Think Tank Symposiums in Vienna, June 11-12, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3019)
Second - and perhaps most importantly - there needs to a more serious contribution from the United States. Negotiations with Iran will not
come to any sustainable result unless the United States comes in directly or indirectly on the security question. Primarily, Washington will
have to make clear that its goal in the process is indeed the same as that of the Europeans, the IAEA, and the rest of the international community:
limiting the proliferation of WMD and maintaining the non-proliferation regime, not regime change in Tehran. The prospect of some form
of explicit or implicit American security guarantees would arguably help a lot to bring a new round of negotiations to a successful
conclusion. In the words of a prominent member of the "realist" group in Tehran: "If major powers gave us security assurances this would
help us to give you guarantees that all nuclear issues are peaceful [...] and there would not even be a theoretical need to divert the
programme for military purpose”21. Obviously, these major powers are not the EU-3. Washington would not be asked to promise or guarantee more
than it did in regard to North Korea which was assured in writing in September 2005 that the US "had no intention to attack or invade the D.P.R.K. with
nuclear or conventional weapons"22. Certainly, the regime in Tehran is not more of a rogue than that in Pyong Yang.

Iran Prolif Causes Rapid Regional Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

McInnis, ’05 (Kathleen, Coordinator Project on Nuclear Issues @ CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Summer)
The emergence of a nuclear Iran would undoubtedly send shockwaves through the region that could result in a nuclear domino effect.
Therein lies the crux of the problem: If Saudi Arabia were to follow Iran's proliferation route, that would again change the calculations of
every other state in the region in a cumulative and potentially dangerous manner. Continuing with Egypt, and with other dominos such as
Turkey and Syria poised to fall, the proliferation challenge in the Middle East is uniquely daunting. Perhaps most worrisome is that the United
States is left, at present, with few good options in the region to thwart this dangerous trajectory Unlike in Asia, where the U.S. deterrent umbrella is more
credible, in the Middle East the Iranian proliferation problem presents a different set of challenges. Not only do Iranian connections with terrorist
organizations significantly raise fears of nuclear terrorism, but state-based proliferation is more dangerous in this already volatile region.
Both concerns present significant, long-term challenges to U.S. security and involvement in the region, especially as extended deterrence may not
succeed in assuring regional allies.

Nuclear War
Rosen, Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, 2006
(Stephen Peter, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85502/stephen-
peter-rosen/after-proliferation-what-to-do-if-more-states-go-nuclear.html gjm)
Nuclear-armed countries in the Middle East would be unlikely to display such restraint. Iran and Iraq would be much too suspicious of each
other, as would Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey and Iraq, and so forth. And then there is Israel. Wariness would create the classic conditions
for a multipolar arms race, with Israel arming against all possible enemies and the Islamic states arming against Israel and one another.
Historical evidence suggests that arms races sometimes precipitate wars because governments come to see conflict as preferable to
financial exhaustion or believe they can gain a temporary military advantage through war. Arguably, a nuclear war would be so destructive
that its prospect might well dissuade states from escalating conflicts. But energetic arms races would still produce larger arsenals, making it
harder to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

17
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Ext – Iran Prolif Impact
Iranian nuclearization will cause global proliferation and nuclear war – none of the normal
deterrence arguments apply.
Wimbush, 2007 (S. Enders,- senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of its Center for Future Security Strategies, “The End of Deterrence: A
nuclear Iran will change everything”, January 11th, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/154auoqp.asp?pg=1)

Iran is fast building its position as the Middle East's political and military hegemon, a position that will be
largely unchallengeable once it acquires nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran will change all of the critical strategic
dynamics of this volatile region in ways that threaten the interests of virtually everyone else. The outlines of some of these
negative trends are already visible, as other actors adjust their strategies to accommodate what increasingly appears to be the emerging reality of an unpredictable,
unstable nuclear power. Iran needn't test a device to shift these dangerous dynamics into high gear; that is already happening. By the time Iran tests, the landscape will
have changed dramatically because everyone will have seen it coming. The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran far exceed the prospect of using them to
win a military conflict. Nuclear weapons will empower strategies of coercion, intimidation, and denial that go far beyond purely military considerations. Acquiring the
bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran's mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them. With nuclear weapons,
Iran will have gained the ability to deter any direct American threats, as well as the leverage to keep the United States
at a distance and to discourage it from helping Iran's regional opponents. Would the United States be in Iraq if Saddam had had a few nuclear weapons and the ability to
deliver them on target to much of Europe and all of Israel? Would it even have gone to war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression? Unlikely. Yet Iran is
rapidly acquiring just such a capability. If it succeeds, a relatively small nuclear outcast will be able to deter a mature nuclear
power. Iran will become a billboard advertising nuclear weapons as the logical asymmetric weapon of
choice for nations that wish to confront the United States. It should surprise no one that quiet discussions have already
begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East about the desirability of developing national
nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran's anticipated advantage and to offset the perceived decline in America's protective
power. This is just the beginning. We should anticipate that proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift,
creating nightmarish challenges. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming impossible to
impede. Advanced computation and simulation techniques will eventually make testing unnecessary for some actors,
thereby expanding the possibilities for unwelcome surprises and rapid shifts in the security environment. Leakage of
nuclear knowledge and technologies from weak states will become commonplace, and new covert supply networks will
emerge to fill the gap left by the neutralization of Pakistani proliferator A. Q. Khan. Non-proliferation treaties, never effective in
blocking the ambitions of rogues like Iran and North Korea, will be meaningless. Intentional proliferation to state and non-state actors is virtually
certain, as newly capable states seek to empower their friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its well known support of Hezbollah,
is a particularly good candidate to proliferate nuclear capabilities beyond the control of any state
as a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear politics. Arsenals will be small, which sounds reassuring, but in
fact it heightens the dangers and risk. New players with just a few weapons, including Iran, will be especially dangerous.
Cold War deterrence was based on the belief that an initial strike by an attacker could not destroy all an opponent's nuclear weapons, leaving the adversary
with the capacity to strike back in a devastating retaliatory blow. Because it is likely to appear easier to destroy them in a single blow , small
arsenals will increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis. Small, emerging nuclear forces could
also raise the risk of preventive war, as leaders are tempted to attack before enemy arsenals grow bigger and
more secure. Some of the new nuclear actors are less interested in deterrence than in using nuclear weapons
to annihilate their enemies. Iran's leadership has spoken of its willingness--in their words--to "martyr"
the entire Iranian nation, and it has even expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate an
inevitable, apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West that will result in Islam's final worldwide
triumph. Wiping Israel off the map--one of Iran's frequently expressed strategic objectives--even if it results in an Israeli
nuclear strike on Iran, may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off. Ideological actors of this kind may be very different
from today's nuclear powers who employ nuclear weapons as a deterrent to annihilation. Indeed, some of the new actors may seek to
annihilate others and be annihilated, gloriously, in return. What constitutes deterrence in this world? Proponents of new non-
proliferation treaties and many European strategists speak of "managing" a nuclear Iran, as if Iran and the new nuclear actors that will emerge in Iran's wake
can be easily deterred by getting them to sign documents and by talking nicely to them. This is a lethal naiveté. We have no idea how to deter
ideological actors who may even welcome their own annihilation. We do not know what they hold dear enough to be
deterred by the threat of its destruction. Our own nuclear arsenal is robust, but it may have no deterrent effect on a
nuclear-armed ideological adversary. This is the world Iran is dragging us into . Can they be talked out of it? Maybe. But it is
getting very late to slow or reverse the momentum propelling us into this nuclear no-man's land. We should be under no illusion that talk
alone--"engagement"--is a solution. Nuclear Iran will prompt the emergence of a world in which nuclear
deterrence may evaporate, the likelihood of nuclear use will grow, and where deterrence, once
broken, cannot be restored.

18
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Engagement Good – Leadership
Engagement with Iran Key to US Leadership
Ackerman, Representative from New York, 07, Gender paraphrased
(Gary, Federal News Service, January 31, Lexis)

Although our military options are dismal, the Bush administration seems intent on charging full speed ahead towards
confrontation. If we had a credible diplomatic alternative that we were pushing the Iranians towards, such gambling might make sense. Without a
diplomatic backstop, however, it is merely reckless. Without question, face-to-face dialogue, as the chairman has suggested, with the Iranians would be
difficult, unpleasant, and I believe also likely to fail. However, if there are no talks, a negotiated resolution of either the Iranian nuclear
problem or the instability and violence in Iraq is essentially impossible. I would add here that this administration's incessant
practice of subcontracting to other countries the most vital question of our national security represents one of the most
egregious and shameful failures in the history of American foreign policy. Achieving success in negotiations with Iran may
not be possible. But without making the attempt, without demonstrating that America is doing its utmost to resolve these
regional crises -- apart from applying more and more force -- our ability to attract and hold allies will be greatly diminished.
Other nations expect us to lead, not to lecture. Painful as it may be for some to acknowledge, the United States has a credibility
problem. There once was a Republican president who warned us to "speak softly, but carry a big stick." Instead of blustering
about Iran while hollowing out our military in Iraq, we need to get serious about achieving some of the very simple but
difficult goals: first, bringing our catastrophic adventure in Iraq to a conclusion that will not turn Iraq's civil war into a regional war; second, restoring the
strength and credibility of our already overextended armed forces; and, third, engaging our European allies in a strategic plan to convince Iran that its best
interests require a satisfactory resolution to the nuclear issue. Anyone who believes we can achieve any of this agenda without engaging
the Iranians ourselves on the fundamental questions of regional security is fooling themself [himself].

The impact is global nuclear war.

Khalilzad 95
(Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, p. 84)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the
indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in
which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to
American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's
major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally , U.S. leadership would
help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all
the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a
bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

19
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Ext – Engagement Solves Leadership
Engagement with Iran is key to shore up US hegemony.
Leverett, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, ’06
(Flynt, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options Toward Iran,” American Century Foundation Report,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett_diplomatic.pdf)

This argument is best understood in historical perspective. Iran’s location, the size of its population, and a comparatively strong national identity
make it, under virtually any circumstances, an important player in the regional balance of power. Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in
1979, Iran has used its strategic energies and resources in ways that have worked against American interests in a number of fronts. As a result,
American administrations have sought to contain Iran in various ways.13 At the same time, Iran’s undeniable importance in the regional balance of
power has always made the U.S. strategy of containing and isolating the Islamic Republic seem a somewhat “unnatural” posture. For this
reason, as was noted above, the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations—and, as will be discussed below, the current Bush Administration
—all sought to explore possibilities for some kind of opening to Iran, either through limited (and frequently secret) tactical cooperation on specific issues of
mutual interest or by testing the waters publicly. But, U.S. policymakers consistently allowed domestic political considerations and other foreign policy
interests to undermine their diplomatic initiatives toward Iran.14 More so than in the past, diplomatic stasis between the United States and Iran under
current conditions in the Gulf, and in the Middle East more broadly , is doing real damage to important American interests. Today, Iran is clearly
“on a roll” in the region. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are only one factor in its ascendance. U.S. military action in the post–September 11
period eliminated the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, two of the Islamic Republic’s most ardent enemies, thereby
improving Iran’s strategic position; moreover, the failures of U.S efforts at post-conflict stabilization in both countries created vacuums that
Iran has moved adroitly to fill. The tightening of global energy markets and the sharp rise in energy prices since 2003 have increased the
economic resources available to the Iranian leadership and given Tehran diplomatic options (for example, vis-à-vis China) that were previously
much less significant. And, particularly since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iranian public diplomacy has increased
the Islamic Republic’s appeal to the Arab street—including in Sunni-dominated states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia . This makes it harder
for Arab states to cooperate with the United States against Iranian interests, even at a time when these states feel increasingly threatened by
Iran’s ascendance. In a regional context, how Washington responds to Iran’s rise largely will determine whether the U nited States
keeps its position as the leading power working to shape a more benign security environment for the Persian Gulf and for the Middle East
more generally. If Washington cannot contain the threat posed by Iran’s ongoing nuclear development through diplomacy, or uses military
force against that threat counterproductively, the efficacy of American leadership again will be called into serious question by regional
elites and publics.

Comprehensive Engagement Strategy with Iran is the Vital Internal Link to Hegemony
Leverret, ’06 (Flynt, Senior Fellow New American Foundation, American Century Foundation Report,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett_diplomatic.pdf)
It is necessary to take a comprehensive approach to U.S. diplomacy toward Iran
in order to preserve and enhance America’s strategic position in the Persian
Gulf and in the Middle East more broadly. Frankly put, as a consequence of
changes in the relative standing of the United States and Iran since September
11, the United States at this point probably cannot realize its most important
strategic objectives in the Middle East or the war on terror without a significant
rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Iran is clearly a rising power; how the
United States handles Iran’s rise over the next few years will be the most critical
test of America’s ability to act effectively in the most strategically important
region of the world, with enormous impact on U.S. standing, both regionally
and internationally. In a pre–September 11 environment, a diplomatic opening
to Iran was seen by successive U.S. administrations as falling in the “nice to
have” category. In a post–September 11 environment, a diplomatic opening to
Iran falls ever more clearly in the “need to have” category for American foreign
policy.

20
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Engagement Good – Democracy
Offering a new grand bargain is key to Iranian democratization
Diamond, McFaul, and Milani 2007
(Larry, Michael, and Abbas are fellows and coordinators of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University. McFaul is a member of The Washington Quarterly’s editorial board. “A Win-Win U.S. Strategy for Dealing with
Iran” The Washington Quarterly. 30:1 pp. 121–138.)
The trigger for democratization will come from within Iran. Nonetheless, the United States could make an important contribution by helping
to create a more favorable environment. A new kind of diplomatic relationship with Tehran would not be a concession to the
mullahs but a step toward opening, liberalizing, and ultimately democratizing Iran. The end of the current sanctions coupled
with a U.S. diplomatic presence in Tehran would allow much greater contact between U.S. and Iranian businesspeople, civic
leaders, academics, and elected officials committed to democratic change. A more secure Iran would create better conditions
for the reemergence of a pro-Western, peaceful, democratic movement inside the country. The specter of armed conflict with
the United States only helps Ahmadinejad consolidate his power. The United States loses nothing in trying to pursue a
comprehensive agreement.

Iranian democratization is key to the entire region – solves democracy, extremism, and terrorism.
Milani, Research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, 07
(Abbas, “Understanding the Iran Crisis,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 31,
http://www.hoover.org/research/iran/essays/5947546.html)
Such negotiations, if they take place, are ultimately temporary cures for the problem of Iran and its nuclear adventurism. The regime in Tehran might in fact
negotiate but it is sure to break its promise—as it has done so often in the past—and proceed with its nuclear program even more covertly. Only with the
advent of democracy in Iran can a strategic solution to Iran’s nuclear problem be found. Democracy in Iran is also likely to
have a democratic domino effect in the region. In Iran, an often silent majority wants democracy, normalized relations with
the world, and avoid nuclear adventurism. Any policy that curtails the contributes to the continuous silence of this majority, derails or delays their
democratic aspirations is detrimental to the long term interests of both the US and Iran. Moreover, if it is true that the war in Iraq and the confrontation with
Iran are both parts of the international war on terror, and if it is true, that Iran is a bellwether state for the entire Muslim Middle East, then it is
also true that US policy on Iran will have serious ramifications for that war and for the entire region. The war on terror, like
Iran’s nuclear problem, does not have a military solution. Both require military might and the credible resolution to use it, but both
ultimately have a political solution. Only a large, active coalition of Muslim moderates, Shiite and Sunni —who in spite of recent
bloodshed amongst them have for centuries shown they can live together in relative harmony and amity--can defeat radical Islam and its Jihadist
terrorist arm. The battle for the soul of Islam is less between reviving Shiite and a frightened Sunnis, but between the hitherto
silent majority of Muslims, keen on a spiritual reading of Islam and Jihadists who want to turn Islam into an ideology for terror. That
silent majority, in Iran as well as the rest of the Muslim world, is the natural ally of America and of the West, and a foe of the
kind of dogma, intransigence and nuclear adventurism Ahmadinejad and his allies promote. Prudent American policy must
strengthen the position of these majorities. Dogs of war with Iran, or even the howls of such dogs helps the likes of Ahmadinejad, and in spite of
what results such tactics might bear in the short run, they will in the long run reap nothing but calamity and a nuclear, entrenched and despotic Iran.

( ) Democracy checks extinction

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the
1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist
aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates
Nuclear, chemical, and
that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly
endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern
themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors
to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one
another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form
more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to
protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes
it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the
rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

21
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran

22
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Engagement Good – Iraq
US security guarantee is key to gain Iranian help in Iraq – key to stability.
Dunn, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham,
07
(David Hastings, “ ‘Real Men Want to go to Tehran’: Bush, Pre-emption, and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” International Affairs,
January, pp.35-36)

Recognizing and addressing Iranian security concerns is another policy area where Washington could take the initiative. The two main
areas of US policy concern relating to Iran, nuclear proliferation and Iraq, are directly linked to Tehran’s threat perception of the United
States. Iran is highly unlikely to relinquish its apparent quest for a nuclear weapons capability while it believes that this is the only means of
ensuring regime survival against an American threat. While Tehran’s nuclear policy is partly motivated by prestige, the legacy of the Iran–
Iraq war has also left a very real desire to deter outside threats, which for the present means the threat from the United States.57 Similarly, part of
its motivation for its current subversive involvement in Iraq is to embroil the ‘imperialist’ America in bloody conflict there and thus prevent
it from targeting Iran. Tehran cannot be expected to help bring stability to Iraq while it believes America is trying to destabilize Iran. If it
can be convinced that America has no hostile intent against it and no plans for permanent bases in Iraq, but does have a commitment to the future
stability of the region, then its positive involvement in bringing stability to Iraq may be secured. If Iran could be persuaded that America’s
intentions in the Middle East are benign and that working with Washington could be beneficial to its own security and regional stability, then the
basis for progress on a range of issues would be possible. At present the Bush administration has offered security assurances to North Korea
but not to Iran. In 2004 it ‘affirmed it has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK’ and that ‘the DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each
other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalise their relations’.58 As Mark Fitzpatrick argues, ‘If the United States can do this for
North Korea, surely it can do it for Iran.’59 And yet Washington refuses to do this, because of Iran’s support for terrorism and Bush’s wish to keep open the
threat of military force. Such an approach is counterproductive to the goal of changing Iranian policy in these two key areas. While Washington
should make clear that any security guarantee would be nullified if Iran directly threatened or attacked its neighbours or exported nuclear weapons or
materials, it would be in the US interest to take the first steps in this process by announcing its commitment to promote democracy in Iran by peaceful means
only. Ironically, the weakened US position in the region as a consequence of its embroilment in Iraq makes such assurances more credible.
With the hubris and the apparent capability to effect change gone, the opportunity for a less tense relationship could prove fruitful.

23
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Ext – Engagement Good – Iraq
Engagement With Iran is the Vital Internal Link to Stabilizing Iraq
Takeyh, Iran Expert @ Council on Foreign Relations, 4/14/07
(Ray, BBC, by Iranian newspaper Hamshahri on 5 April, Lexis)
I believe that today the dominant view in Iran is that America's military presence in Iraq is a great obstacle to any sort of political progress in Iraq, and that
the only way to restore stability in this neighbouring country is the gradual withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq. Anyway, regardless of Tehran’s
motives and intentions about Iraq, what cannot be denied is that Iran's help is key to rebuilding Iraq. Even though Tehran has
sometimes and in some cases acted against Washington's wishes, the fact of the matter is that Tehran and Washington have many
common aims and interests in Iraq. Just like America, Iran does not at all support the eruption of civil war in Iraq. Iran also
considers election as the best way to choose Iraq's political leaders, because it is confident that the Shi'i majority allied with
Tehran would come to power in its neighbouring country. Another point that Tehran and Washington have in common in Iraq is
that they both believe the establishment of an efficient government in Iraq would automatically reduce the insurgencies and
accelerate the withdrawal of American troops from that country. I believe that America, instead of trying to reduce Iran's influence
in Iraq, should find a way to manage this power. By recognizing Iran's power in Iraq and harmonizing the policies of the two
countries (Iran and America), it would be much easier for America to pursue its demands through Iran. For example, it would be
much easier for America to restrain the sectarian conflicts in Iraq by using Iran's influence among the Shi'i groups. In the end,
the sooner the White House officials realize that Tehran can play a constructive role in Iraq, the sooner they will be able to
prevent the disintegration of Iraq and further instability in the Middle East.

Security Guarantee Spurs US- Iran Cooperation on Iraq

Rubin, Editorial Board Member @ Philadelphia Enquirer, 07
(Trudy, Star Ledger, 5/9)

Third, Washington's interests in Iraq coincide more with Tehran's than with those of any other Middle Eastern country. Iran's
Shi'as back the elected Shi'a-led Iraqi government; Sunni Arab states in the region yearn for the return to power of Iraq's
Sunni minority. Iran is making trouble for U.S. soldiers in Iraq because the United States has called for regime change in
Tehran. We and the Iranians are playing tit-for-tat. We're still holding five Iranians we arrested in Erbil (which may be why
Iran's foreign minister snubbed Rice). If the Tehran regime believed Washington no longer sought its ouster, we could work
together to stabilize Iraq.

Iran Support Key to Iraq Stability

ISG, ’06
(Iraq Study Group, James Baker, Lee Hamilton, A Ton of Total Badasses, http://download.npr.org/anon.npr-
www/documents/2006/dec/isg_full.pdf)

iran. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many
of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite
militias within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive
devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents— that attack U.S. forces. The Iranian border with Iraq is porous, and
millions of Iranians travel to Iraq each year to visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian meddling, and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One
leading Sunni politician told us, “If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, you will find Iran underneath .” U.S., Iraqi, and international
officials also commented on the range of tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism, Iran’s
influence in Lebanon and the region, and Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S.
options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and the United States about the
situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official told us: “Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad.”

24
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Engagement Good – Russia
US Iran Rapproachement Key to Check Russian Expansionism
Walsh, ’98 (David, Hinkley Journal of Politics, Autumn, www.lib.utah.edu/epubs/hinckley/v1/walsh.html

A policy of containment is needed toward Iran, due to its military buildup and its view of itself as the hegemonic power in the Gulf.
However, this policy should be moderated. There exists a historical precedent for such a change. During the Cold War in the early 1970s,
the Nixon Administration, recognizing that U.S. containment policy had to change, initiated a period of detente with the Soviet Union. This
preserved containment while allowing the United States to avoid some of its costs, such as military intervention in developing nations. A
similar approach toward Iran should occur. Containment today aims to shut Iran off from the rest of the world and to force change through
total isolation. As we have seen, the policy has not accomplished these goals. Indeed, Iran now enjoys significant trade relations with many
of its neighbors and with a number of the United States's closest allies. Secondary boycott legislation, such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, has alienated American allies and strained relations between them and Washington. A rapprochement with Teheran is needed. Such an
effort must be based on the understanding that both the United States and Iran share certain goals in the Persian Gulf, some of them long-
term. As Jahangir Amuzegar writes:
Both countries have a vital interest in the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the avoidance of maritime incidents. Both need each
other geopolitically, as the twin pillars of a regional counterbalance to Russia's potentially expansionist aspirations within the
Commonwealth of Independent States and toward the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. And, finally, both countries can fruitfully cooperate
in developing and transporting the energy resources of the Central Asian states and the Caucasus, reducing those nations' dependence on
Russia (1997, 40).

Russian Expansionism Causes Multiple Scenarios for Nuclear War

Cohen ‘96
(Ariel, PhD and Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage, Heritage Foundation Reports, 1-25, Lexis)
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom
Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone
has cost Russia $ 6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover,
it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to
restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for
peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS,
these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios
including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a
reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and
throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies
in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.
n15 n15 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, mouthpiece for the most irredentist elements in the Russian security and military services, constantly
articulates this threat. Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle
East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port
on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan
will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian
armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make
Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic
development in the early 21 st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable,
or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern
NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modem market economies and free
societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be
created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies. In order to
protect U.S. and Western interests in Eurasia and ensure free and fair access to the oil reserves of
the region, the United States should: * Strive to preserve the independence and economic viability of the New
Independent States in the region. In cooperation with Britain, Germany, and France, the U.S. should prevent the reconstitution of
Moscow's sphere of influence in the southern CIS. The West should not grant Moscow carte blanche in the "near abroad" in exchange
for cooperation in Bosnia. The U.S. should lead other Western countries in implementing programs that support independent
statehood, free-market development, and the rule of law in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Central Asian states. Training for the civil
and security services of these countries should be stepped up, and economic reforms, including privatization of industries and
agriculture, should be continued. Moreover, sanctions on technical and humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan, imposed at the height
of the Karabakh conflict, should be lifted to increase Washington's leverage in settling the conflict there. * Ensure that Russia
is not a dominant, but rather an equal partner in developing the oil resources of the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Russian oil companies should be assured of equitable access to the development of oil resources and pipeline projects. The
strategic goal of the West should be the creation of a level playing field that allows Russian and Western corporations to participate
in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equal footing

25
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran

26
SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
A2: Engagement = Appeasement
Engagement and Conditional Security Guarantees are Distinct from appeasement – the plan also
creates pressure from the international community and Iranian public
Haas, ’06 (Richard, President Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=294)
The least undesirable of the options is diplomacy, that is, trying to negotiate an acceptable outcome. Not only does it avoid some of the
negatives of the other paths, but also if the United States is ever going to have to move to more confrontational options, it must be seen to
have made every effort at diplomacy. A parallel example would be Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, where the George H.W. Bush
administration embraced sanctions, not necessarily because it thought these would work, but because sanctions were a necessary tool of
domestic and international political management.
The United States needs to be willing to deal with the Iranians directly. The United States should never be afraid to talk unconditionally
with a country like Iran. Diplomacy is not a gift given to others; diplomacy is a tool to advance American national security interests. This
also means that the United States should be responding to things like Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad’s letter. Using the Cuban
missile crisis as an analogy, there are multiple letters to respond to, and the response should be not to the letter received but to the letter the
United States wishes it had received. It is counterproductive and unnecessary to allow Ahmadinezhad to pose as someone who is more
interested in communication and diplomacy than the United States. Because the confrontation is being played out largely in the public
domain, Washington needs to appeal to American public opinion, to the international community, and to the Iranian public. This Iranian
regime at the end of the day is a minority regime. The United States should design its diplomacy to make clear to the Iranian people the
benefits that would accrue to them if their government were to take a responsible stance on the nuclear question, and the penalties that will
come their way if their government persists in taking an irresponsible stance.
The United States must ask itself what it is prepared to live with. The uranium enrichment program is not a black or white affair; there are
many shades of gray, in terms of size and transparency. The Iranians talk about their rights. If that is going to be an essential element of any
diplomatic package, then an interesting question is how to define that right in a way that is enough for the Iranians and not too much for the
West.
It is very important to make the distinction between giving a conditional security guarantee and giving a regime guarantee. It is not up to
the United States to guarantee the Iranian regime, or any other regime; history will take care of that. Instead, the United States should be
talking about the evolution of Iranian society. What the United States can offer is a conditional security guarantee of the form, “If Iran does
not attack the United States, the United States will not attack Iran. ” Just because Iran receives such a security assurance, that will not make
it exempt from this administration’s general call for movement in the direction of markets and more democratic societies, respect for the
rule of law, human rights, and the like.

Engagement with Iran is Distinct From Appeasement

Rubin, 5/9/07 (Trudy, Editorial Board Member @ Philadelphia Enquirer, Star Ledger, 5/9)
First, neither talks nor diplomacy means capitulation. I get e-mail equating dialogue with Iran to Neville Chamberlain's pact at Munich.
Nonsense. Ronald Reagan talked to the Kremlin, and Richard Nixon went to China. Talks mean both sides put their interests on the table
and discuss them directly. They may or may not reach agreement. Talks don't mean America endorses the nature of Iran's regime or its
human rights violations against students, women or workers.
Iran has rebuffed U.S. efforts in the past for direct contacts, and we have done likewise. But the issues at hand - Iran's nuclear program, its
role in the region and Iraq's future - require us to try again.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
A2: Engagement Incentivizes Prolif
Their link arguments are empirically denied – only serious negotiations will get others on board to
deal with Iran.
Biden, US Senator from Delaware, 06
(Joseph, “Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and US Policy Options,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, May 17 and 18, p.6)

Talking to Iran would not reward bad behavior or legitimize the regime. Talking is something we have done virtually with
every other country on Earth, including the former Soviet Union during the cold war, which possessed, in fact, an existential threat to
us, and the unsavory regimes like the ones in North Korea and in Libya. And demonstrating that we made a serious attempt at
diplomacy is also the best way to keep others on board—the point of your statement, one of the points in your statement for tougher actions
if Iran fails to respond. It seems to me that we have been outsmarted by not very smart people in their ham-handed use of diplomacy, by us
refusing to engage in imaginative diplomacy. There’s more than one purpose to a meeting, one of which is to keep the rest of
the world on our side. I think it would be a wise course of action for any administration, but for the Bush administration, with
it’s blemished record on Iraq, it is not simply a wise choice; I think it’s a requirement. The threshold of trust is much, much, much, much
higher for this administration at this point with regard to Iran. If the administration wants to convince our allies and others to place serious
pressure on Iran over the long haul, it seems to me it makes sense for us to walk the extra diplomatic mile. I hope we can proceed
with the wisdom that the matter requires. How the Iranian crisis is handled will help determine international security for a generation, if not longer.

US prolif credibility is shot now.

Kucinich, US Representative from Ohio, 06
(Dennis, Federal News Service, September 26, Lexis)

The U. S. finds itself lacking credibility in nuclear weapons proliferation. The Administration has promoted new nuclear
weapons for the United States in the form of bunker busters and new weapon's research. The U.S. negotiated a favorable
nuclear agreement with India despite India's refusal to join the NPT and their acquisition of nuclear weapons. The U. S.
supports the dictatorship in Pakistan despite their refusal to join the Nonproliferation Treaty and despite their acquisition and
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Engaging Iran is key to fix this decline.

Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Nonproliferation Project at Carnegie, 02
(Jon B., International Herald Tribune, December 21, http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/12/21/edjon_ed3__0.php)
There have been no attempts to develop alternative ways to engage Iran or redirect its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons for what it asserts are
legitimate security concerns. U.S. attempts to control sensitive exports to Iran and reduce its access to illicit nuclear technology would garner
greater sympathy if they were combined with a more concerted policy to engage Iran. U.S. credibility on proliferation issues has also been
greatly undercut by recent decisions to wink at Pakistan's illegal and dangerous transfers of uranium enrichment to North Korea and give all
but official approval to North Korean missile sales to Yemen. These decisions demonstrate to the rest of the world that the U.S. war on
terrorism — in which Pakistan and Yemen are key American allies — takes precedence over the fight against proliferation. As a result, states bent on
acquiring weapons of mass destruction may be in a position to play this preference to their advantage, as has Pakistan. With 2003 likely to bring increased
tensions between India and Pakistan, which both possess nuclear weapons, the Bush administration has little time to get an effective set of
nonproliferation policies in place before it is forced to back up its own rhetoric on military preemption of proliferation threats in hot spots
around the globe. What is needed is a new direction from the White House, one that accepts and uses all available nonproliferation tools —
not just tough talk and saber rattling. Foremost among the effective tools is direct diplomacy backed by international coordination. As difficult
and distasteful as the Bush administration may find negotiating with North Korea, such talks could yield quick and positive results that would advance U.S.
security interests. Likewise, a new approach with America's European allies and Russia to engage Iran could yield useful results, or at least provide
fresh ideas on how to redirect Iranian security efforts away from nuclear weapons.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
A2: Engagement Empowers Hardliners
Iranian Nationalists Rapidly Losing Power Struggle – Only Playing off Fears about US Attack can
keep them in power
Milani, ’07 (Abbas, Director Democracy Project Hoover Institute Stanford University, CQ
Congressional Testimony)
But there is yet another key fact about the Iranian regime: It is not a monolith but instead riven by sometimes serious rifts between different
factions. Everything from turf wars over a bigger share of the oil money to matters of ideology, tactics and personal rancor account for
these rifts. The new more muscular approach by the Bush administration--sending new ships to and a much publicized presidential order to
kill or arrests the regime's agents and operatives in Iraq--come at a crucial moment in Iranian politics when the balance of forces between
different factions is rapidly changing. Ironically, the commendable success of the Bush administration in hitherto marshalling an
international coalition against the regime's nuclear ambitions has exacerbated these tensions. The threat of war, and even more an act of
war, is certain to reverse this process, lessen the factional feuds, solidify the regime and help the warmongers in Tehran increase their
power.

Engagement Empowers Moderates

Takeyh, 4/14/07 (Ray, Iran Expert @ Council on Foreign Relations, BBC)
[Hamidi] In fact, what you are saying is that America's past policies in terms of Iran have failed, and so you believe those policies need to
change.
[Takeyh] Exactly. Following the victory of the Iranian revolution in year 57 [ 1979], the United States adopted inconsistent and inexpedient
policies against Iran, policies which were planned and practiced with the intention of causing problems for Tehran and were aimed at
overthrowing the central government in Iran. And in some cases, they even went as far as making threats to launch a military invasion. All
of those policies were generally carried out in order to instigate conflicts with Iran and, of course, to curb this country's influence in the
region by means of strategies such as restriction that even today are still at the top of America's policies, though they have never proven
effective.
[Hamidi] Is this really the time to reconcile with Iran?
[Takeyh] Yes, if America wants to control Iran, trying to isolate this country cannot be an appropriate strategy for this purpose. In fact, the
United States has to revise its policy towards Iran at a basic level. The White House authorities need to admit that the Islamic Republic
system cannot be toppled, and nor can this country's power and influence in the region be contained. Instead, Washington should focus on
the objective of pursuing a new policy of rapprochement with Tehran, and in line with that policy it must entirely rule out the option of
resorting to any military action against Iran, change its arrogant view about holding conditional talks with Iran and forget the policy of
restriction as well.
In general, through normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran, Washington must provide an opportunity for the
Iranian pragmatists to turn the balance of forces in the country to their own advantage.
The sooner this realistic idea develops in Washington with regard to this Middle Eastern rival, the better it will be.
[Hamidi] What is the most effective way for the United States to reconcile with Iran?
[Takeyh] Without a doubt, the most efficient way for the United States to overcome the present indecision about this country's policy
towards Iran would be to practice more diplomacy. Achieving this important goal takes more than just a change in policy; it also requires a
change in vision. In other words, based on the idea of restricting, the American politicians thought for a very long time that normalization
of relations with Tehran would be the ultimate result of a lengthy process of negotiations, whereas the new idea considers cooperation and
normalization of relations as the starting point of bilateral talks.
In fact, this normalization of relations could later in the process facilitate negotiations over important issues such as terrorism or Iran's
nuclear programme. In my opinion, a strategy that accelerates the process of making a set of economic and security arrangements on the
part of the two countries will, no doubt, give the West the greatest chance of acquiring Iran's support in the region.
[Hamidi] What is the first step that Washington would have to take in this process?
[Takeyh] To achieve this change, it would be necessary for the United States to lift the sanctions and resume its diplomatic relations with
Iran in order to untie the hands of the pragmatists in Tehran, who favour resumption of relations or at least avoiding any confrontation with
Washington. The result of this move is that it would put the pragmatists, as opposed to the extremists in Iran, in a position of power.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
Iran Says Yes
Iran says yes – larger package deal strengthens the hands of moderates – allows normalized
relations and solves prolif and terrorism.
Takeyh, Senior Fellow on Council for Foreign Relations, 07
(Ray, “Time for Détente with Iran,” Foreign Affairs, March/April. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86202-p40/ray-
takeyh/time-for-detente-with-iran.html)

The most effective way for Washington to resolve this uncertainty in its favor would be to practice more imaginative diplomacy. That would require more
than a policy shift; it would require a paradigm shift. Guided by the notion of containment, U.S. policymakers have long seen the normalization of
relations as the end result of a long process of negotiations. But with a new policy of engagement, normalization would have to be the
starting point of talks; it would then facilitate discussions on issues such as nuclear weapons and terrorism. A strategy that seeks to create a
web of mutually reinforcing security and economic arrangements has the best chance of tying Iran to the status quo in the region. In essence,
a new situation would be created in which Tehran's relationship with Washington would be more valuable to the regime than either its
ties to Hezbollah or its pursuit of nuclear arms. To provoke such a change, Washington must strengthen the hands of the pragmatists in
Tehran by offering Iran relief from sanctions and diplomatic relations. Washington's recognition of Iran's regional status and deepened
economic ties with the West might finally enable the pragmatists to push Khamenei to marginalize the radicals who insist that only
confrontation with the United States can allow Iran to achieve its national objectives.

Iran Says Yes

Porter, ’06 (Gareth, Foreign Policy In Focus Scholar, 11/17,
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/11/17/a_grand_bargain_with_iran.php)
It is also argued that Iran is now so overconfident, because of the U.S. debacle in Iraq, it is no longer afraid of U.S. attack and therefore has
no motivation to reach a broad compromise with the United States. But that objection assumes that the only Iranian reason for offering
concessions to the United States is fear of attack. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opposed negotiations with the United States in the
1990s because he felt that Iran was too weak to defend its interests adequately in such negotiations.
Since 2003, the dramatic political changes in the region, including the coming to power of friendly Shiite regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the growing strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas regime in Palestine have convinced Tehran that this is a good time to bargain
with the United States. Khamenei’s top foreign affairs adviser, Ali Akbar Velatyati, told a seminar last May, “Now we have the power to
haggle, why do we not haggle?”
Iran’s leadership is motivated to “haggle” with the United States not primarily because it is afraid of the United States, but because it needs
the United States help to fulfill two ambitions: to be integrated fully into the global economic system, and to take it place as a legitimate
regional power in the Middle East. That gives the United States strong bargaining leverage with Iran, but it is not the power to compel Iran
to do something that it believes is not in its interests.

Iran Says Yes – They Offered the Plan in Late 2006

Katzman, 5/1/07 (Kenneth, Congressional Research Service, CRS Reports)
On August 22, 2006, Iran submitted a 21-page formal response to the June 6 offer by the six powers, to the ambassadors of those
countries in Tehran. The text of Iran's response was not disclosed, but it reportedly offered negotiations on a broader roadmap of
engagement with the West--and sought provision of guarantees that the United States would not seek to change Iran's regime--in
exchange for acceptance of the international demands on the nuclear program. Iran did not offer to suspend uranium enrichment in
advance of negotiations.

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SDI ‘08
Elections Impact – Iran
A2: Say No – Ahmadinejad
Ahmadinejad arguments are wrong – he doesn’t make the final call.
Rubin, Editorial Board Member @ Philadelphia Enquirer, 07
(Trudy, Star Ledger, 5/9)

Fourth,
despite the flaming rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there is reason to think the time is ripe for talks. In
2001, Iran provided U.S. forces with crucial cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan. In 2003, Iran transmitted a proposal for a
"grand bargain" to the State Department. The proposal agreed to consider ending aid to Palestinian opposition groups and acting to limit Hezbollah to
politics. Iran was also willing to discuss accepting the Saudi-Arab League proposal that called for recognition of Israel alongside a Palestinian state. In
return, Iran wanted to discuss its desire for "full access to peaceful nuclear technology" and wanted to be dropped from the "axis of evil." That proposal got
short shrift from the Bush team. We will never know whether it had the full backing of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In 2003, the United
States had a much stronger hand in the Middle East. The ouster of Iran's archenemy, Saddam, and the mess in Iraq have made Iran far more powerful. No
one can be certain a "grand bargain" is possible today. But there is an open struggle going on inside Iran between pragmatists who want
to bargain and hard-line radicals led by Ahmadinejad. "There is a new discourse between those who want normalization (with the West and the
United States) and those who want to retain tension and revolutionary fervor," says Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor at Rutgers who
played a key role in back-channel discussions that laid the ground for the Iranian proposals of 2003. In the Iranian system, Ahmadinejad is not
the key foreign policy maker - that is Ayatollah Khamenei. This is a moment when America needs to explore Iran's intentions to see
whether Iran is finally ready to play by accepted international rules. That would require the White House to stop dreaming of regime change and
put all issues on the table. It would require a whole new U.S. strategic approach to the region.

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