lntroduction

On August 10, 1978, a Ford Pinto was hit from behind on a highwav in Indiana. The impact of the collision caused the
Pinto'.s iuel tank to rupture and burst into flames, leading to

SECTIONS
I

the de:rths of three teenage girls riding in the car. This was
not the first time that a Pinto had caught on fire as the result
seven years since the introduc-

, 1.2 Why Study Engineering Ethics? I .3 Personol vs. Business Ethics

&

.l

Bockground ldeos

1.4
'l

*
a

.l.5

ofa rear-end collision. In the

.6
.7

iion of the Pinto, there had been some 50 lawsuits related to

rear-end collisions. However, this tirne Ford was charged in
a criminal court fbr the deaths of the passengers.

The Origins of Ethicol Thought Ethics ond the Low Ethics Problems Are Like Design Problems

Cose Studies

This case was a significant departure from the norm

and had important implications fbr the Ford engineers and rnanagers.

Oe.JEcnvrs Aher reoding this chopter, you will

oble to:

be

A civil larvsuit could only result in Ford being

required to pay damages to the victirn's estates. A criminal proceeding, on the other hand, would indicate that Ford
was grossly negligent

*
u

in the deaths of the

passengers and

Know why it is. importoht to study engineering ethics. Understond the distinction between business ond personol ethics. See.how.ethicol.problem.so.lving ond engrneenng deslgn ore slmllor.

could result in jail terms for the Ford engineers or lnanagers rvho u'orked on the Pinto.

The case against Ford hinged on charges that it

knou,n that the gas-tank design was farve4 and was

was

!g!-!l

1"" *t,tt """"pt"4

ds, even though it

did meet applicable i'ederal safety standards at the time. During the trial, it was deterniined that Ford engineers
were

?ygggllbgdre.of

this design, but management,

concerned with getting the Pinto to narket rapiclh at r,L pdce conrpetitive with subcompact cars already introduced or planr.recl lx other trriruttf;tctttrels. hacl constrained the engineers to use this design. Th.-dllgrc faced by the design engineers .r-ho ri'orkecl on the Pinto rvas to bal-

@howouldbericlirlgirlthec;ir.i4iJJJ|t1ierleedtoproduce
the Pinto at
a

price that would be competitile in the urirrket. Tlier h,icl to trtternpt to bal-

ance their drrty to tlre fuhliri.-against their

dulr to their
r\ rnents

er.r+.1o,-r'er.

Ultimately, the

attemptbyFo'd!q'el"n&-!9]]4I'-'nt.trtrtltllalctrtritrgcosts.r@s4itureof
to r it
!1t

rr:. O l- r'ortt se. iltere were

Lilso

nl

Ford did not engineer its products to be safe'

I.1

BACKGROUND IDEAS
The Pirrto case is just one example of the ethical problems {'aced by engitreers in the course of their professional practice. trthical cases can go far beyond issues ofpg![c s.feh und mav involve briber"y, l'raud, enrirontrlcnlal protet'lion. fairncss- lronestl in research_dd let!nq. and conflic'ts gI intoqll . During their rrnderqraduaie edut'alion. engineers receive training in basic and engineering sciences, problem-solving rnethodology, and engineering design, but generally receive little trair-ring in business practices,
safety, and ethics.

"rl.rrr", board for undergraduate engineering programs, has mand:rted that ethics topics be incorporated into undergraduate engineering curricula. Tl're purpose ofthis book is to provide -a text and u ,"ronr"" for the study of engineering ethics and io help future engirieers be prepared for confronting and resolving ethical dilernmas, such as the design of an unsafe product like the Pinto, that they might encounter during their pro{'essional careers. A good place to start a discussion of ethics in engineering is with definitions of ethics an-d engineering ethics. P_tllics U !t lt"dy_gl l!9__ch?11ct9ri.l!l-91 ol T9r1l9 Ethics " ;;a?rlip;i;o" in his or lieilelationship al t 6i?u"t" tltese dllfini of tn" choices an individual makes in life, including those made while t"-itt ti;"r
pracl icing en gincering.

This problem has partly been corrected, as rranv engineering education programs in whatk called "engineering ethics"; incleed, ABET, the accreditation nor",,have

"pply

Foi our puryoses, the definition of ethics can be narror.ved a little. Elgilg_".tlLg
ethics is the ruies and standards governing the conduct ofengineers in therr role as proldl."CtrEngineeiing*eiliics ?;-*p"*;s IIie moie. geneT;I-denniiion of ethics, but opplio it rr"re specifically to situations involving engineers in_their professional lives. that engineers Tlius, e-+girrgerrng etl{qs !g e bo-df should cqg-dugt thenrselves in their. prof'ess191grJ
-gl-p,i-li1-orypby-_l1-dt"",+!!+gjltg -*oys
9-11r-19itl

1.2

WHY STUDY ENGINEERING ETHICS?

\\/hv is it irnportant for engineering students to study engineering ethics? Several notorious crrses tlat have received a great deal of media attention in tlie past few years have
lecl enqineers to gain an increased sense of their professional resPonsibilities. These c,rses [rr. e led to an awareness of the importance of ethics within the engineering pro-

1.3

Section I

.3

Personol vs. Business Ei-

:.

j ii)-

[]ted
:
r

lr.rl:-tce
r',.r1-

[:

:he
Ol

fession as engineers realize how their technical work has far-reaching impacts on soc.ety. The *,rik of enplineers can affect:pqblic health and safety and can influenc. busirress prae-tiqes a,n-d gyeq politics. One result of this increase in awareness is that nearly every major c-o-ry.o-r4lion ttos' has an "ethics office" that has the responsibility to ensure that ernplws have the abilitr to express their concerns about issges g_ug! as salety and corporate business Practices in Ethics Its and won't a way that rvill yi offi"". ul* try io i"ster an ethical culture that will help to head off ethical problems in a

1' :f :l 1t1t

I :je
u: -rc

coryoration before theY start. The goal of thls book and courses in engineering ethics is to sensitize you to inportalt ethical issues before you have to confront them. You will study important fro- the past so that you will know what situations otlier engir-ieers have faced and "ur", ll,ill knorv nrhaito do when similar situations arise in your professional career. Finally, you will learn techniques for analyzing and resolving ethic:il problems wlien tlley arise. Our goal is frequently summed up using the term ,qfqPl aUtqqo=my-." |Ioralautonomy L the altllity.to thi* critically-eff *ff.-&ff:fd""!]l-the$,:rurel-r5:g-"ld-*
_

!-lu"-l " !!t t9 q 1' " -" I p"pf g 1o-ryr"]-gl g i nFffifF""t".". TiG $ffii"Tfiirf..[JF;. i; to foster the moral aulonoml of
!b

L rt. [. .l-

'-' ^ tuture englneers.

l-

;l-

-\-

f-:15

lr-

11

Ir-- l'-

r--.le

i.t

S --r'e

!,::,

l.,t

The question asked at the beginning of this section can also be asked in a slightly clifferent r*y. Why should a future engineer bother studying ethics at all? Afier all, at this point in your ll{'e, yon'te already either a good person or a bad person. Good people olr""dy know the righi thing to do, and bad people aren't going to do the right thing no training they receive. The ansr,ver to this question lies in the matter hor,v much ".ihi""l nature of the etliical problems that are often encountered by an engineer. In most situ:rtions, the correct ."rpor.r" is very obvious. For example, it is cle:rr that to knowingll' equip the pinto with wheel lugs made from substandard, rveak steel that is susceptible to br"uki"g is unethical and *ior.g. This action could iead to the loss of a wheel while driving ani could c_4usq qurneroPs accldqllt, ur]d p-14 !14!yilt'"_Lglli'Sk. Of course, sucl.r a design decision would also be a cotltrllercial rlisaster for Ford' I{o*",r"r, many tirnes, the ethictrl problerrrs encountered in engineering practice For exilmple, the engineers are very cotnplex u"d i a u"ry cl"ar dilernma..Trade-of1s rvere made rvorking on tfie Pir.to rr@*t"d,o'ith so thatihe pinto could beiuccessfully marketed at a reasonable price. One of these trade-offs involved the placement of the gas tank, which led to the accident in Indiana. (This case will be pr"."r.t"d in more depth in a later section of this book on safety.) So. for the Ford engiieers and managers, the question became the following: Wlere does affordability and, sirnultrran engineeri,.g i"urr', slrike the balance between tjl$d to sell the car and rnake a profit. neouslv. the abilitv of the t'6"." ,i"1[". qp"r Urlt rations that we rvili discuss in this book. The goal, then. rs not to train you to ao in" right thing when the ethical choice is obvious and you alre,rd' knorv the rlght thing to do. Rather, the goal is to train you to analyze complex problerls ancl learn to resolv-e these problems in the rqq-,s,t ethipal manner'

D[ ,-

I.3

PERSONAL VS. BUSINESS ETHICS

In discussing engineering ethics, it is important to make a distinction behleerl

tsra

llr:: I -:

li

,-

ethics and plofeisional, or business, ethics, although there isn't always a cle,rr L--'i''--r. - '*

between the tlvo. Personal ethics deals u'itir liori s-e treirt othels in our dar-to-dav lives. Many of these principles are ,ipplicrrble to ethicrrl situirtions thtrt occur ir business and engineering. Hor.r'ever, professional ethics often intohes choices on an organizational level rather than a personal level. Nl:rnr of the problerrrs uill seen'r cliffelent because they involve relationships between tt'o corporations. bets'ei'n rr corporation and the governrnent, or between corporations and qroups of rncliricluals Frecpentlr-, tliese twes ofrelationships pose problerns that are not encounterecl in personal ethics.

I.4 THE ORIGINS OF ETHICAL THOUGHT

Be{bre proceeding, it is irnportant to acknonlcclqc in ir gener,il s av tlic origins of t}re ethical phiiosopliies that u'e rvill be discussing in ihi: book. The \\-estc'nr ethic:rl thought that is discussed here originatecl in the philosopln ot'tlie rurciert f'reeks zrnd their predecessors. It has been der.eloped tlirougli subsecprent centr-rries lrv ttL,tttr. thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Interestingly, non-\\-estern cultrile-. h,ir.e inclependently cleveloped similar ethical principles. Although {br rn:rny individuals, personal ethics arc' rootecl in reliqious belie{'s, this is not true for everyone. Certainly, there are manl- ethic:rl people n ho ztre not religious, and tliere are numerous examples of nominally religious people' n'lto zrre lot etl:rical. So r,vhile the ethicai principles that we il.ill discuss conre to us filtelecl through a religious tradition, these principles are now cultural norms in the \\ est- l,rtrcl as srrch, they are widely accepted regarclless of their origin. We lvon't rreecl to refer erplicitlr to religion in order to discuss ethics in the engineering profession.

1.5

ETHICS AND THE LAW

We should also nrention the role of larv in engineering ethlcs. The przrctice ol engineering and business is governed bv many laws on the intemation,rl. feclerirl. state, and local levels. Many of these laws are based on ethical principles, trlthough lrilny are purely of a practical, rather than a philosophical, nature. There is also tr distinction betu'een rvhat is legaL and what is ethical. Many things that are legal could be considered unetiric:rl. For exari'iple, designing a process that releases a knou'n toric, but unregulated, substance into the environment is probably unethical, although it is legal. Conversely, just because something is illegal doesn't mean that it is rrriethical. For exarnple, there might be substances th:rt rvere once thought to be harmful, but have ,"rorr b""r shown to be safe, that you r,vish to incorporate into a product. If the law has not caught up lr.ith the latest scientific findings, it might be illegal to rele:rse these substances into the environment, even though there is no ethical problern rvith doing so. As an engineer, you are alrvays minirnally safe if you follow the requirements ot' tlie applicable laws. But in engineering ethics, we seek to go beyond the dictates of the lnt. Oir. interest is in areas r,r'here etliical principles conflict and there is no legal guicl:rnce ibr hor'v to resolve the conflict.

I.6
i

ETHICS PROBLEMS ARE LIKE DESIGN PROBLEMS

At first, many engineering students find the tlpes o{ problems and discrrssions that take place in an engineering ethics class a little aiien. The problerns are more open ended irr.d ,.." not as susceptible to formulaic answers as are problems tlpically assigned in

other engineering classes. Ethics problerns rarely h:rve a "correct" answer that u'ill be

Section

LZ

Cose Stuc

_-\'es.

r.
:

.rnd

.: , )llal
t ,!LlSe

r-l the

'rPes

: thc: ,'iglrt
: r)fe::: t1]e
i.--ntly
,l

i
l(

this
)11S,

i.,. So
'Jtous

'. .tfe
.,

rtl in

arrived at by everyone in the class. Surprisingly, however, the tlpes of problem-sohing technicues that we will use in this book and the nature of the ansr'vers that result bear .i strikirig resemblance to the most {undamental engineering activiW: engineering deslgn. The essence ofengineering practice is the design ofproducts, structures, and processes. The clesign problem is stated in terms of specifications: A device must be designed tli:rt meets criteria for perforrnance, aesthetics, and price. Within the limits of these specifications, there are rnany "correct" solutions. There will, of course, be sorne solutions that are better than others in terms of higher performance or lower cost. Frequently, there will be hvo (or rnore) designs that are very different, yet perform identically. For example, cornpeting automobile manuf'acturers may design a car to meet the same rnarket niche, yet each manufacturer's solution to the problern will be somewhat dif{'erent. In firct, u'e r,vill see later that although the Pinto rvas'susceptible to explosion after rear-end impact, other similar subcompact autornobiles u'ere not. In engineering design, there is no unique correct ansrver! Etliicnl problem solving shares these attributes with engineering design. Although there r,vill be no unique correct solution to most of the problerls we will exarnine, there rvill be a range of solutions that are clearly right, some of which are better than others. There will also be a range of solutions that are clearly wrong. There are other similarities betrveen engineering ethics and engineering design. Both apply a large body of knor,vledge to the solution of a problem, and both involve the use of analyical skills. So although the nature of the solutions to tlie problems in ethics rvili be different from those in most engineering classes, approaches to the problerns trnd the ultimate solution will be very sirnilar to those in engineering plectice.

I.7 CASE STUDIES

t.tr('1'l,

rr'al

, ,r1'a
r.rt is

For
rllC
C

For
1.,.r'e

'lrrlS s,.b.

Before starting to learn the theoretical ideas regarding engineering ethics and before looking at some interestlng real-life cases that u.ill illustrate these ideas, iets begin by looking at a very rvell-known engineering ethics case: the space shuttle Challenger accident. Thls case is presemted in depth follos.ing this cliapter, but at this point we will look at a brief synopsis of the case to further illustrate the tlpes of ethical issues and questions that arise in the course of engineering practice. Many re:rders are already familiar with some aspects of this case. The space shutile Challenger was launched in extremeiy cold u'eather. During the launch, an Oring on or." of th. solid-propellant boosters, made more brittle by the cold, failed' This during liftoff.*Elg3eerq u'ho had designed this booster had faillure led to the "rplori,ot concerns about launching under the.. co]if coilitions and recommended that the launch be delayed, but they *"."Jy"t..t1"4!yjbq!Il,Tl,gjPgt (some of whom rvere

Ls :

ot

trainedas"ngi'."",s),rvho-didn,tT@atosupport.adeIayin
the launch. The shuttle was launched, resulting in the well-documented accident. On the surface, there appear to be no engineedng ethical issues here to discuss. Rather, it seetns to simply be an accident. The engineers properly recommended that there be no launch, but they were overruled by management. In the strictest sense this can be ccrrrsidered an accident-no one u'anted the Challenger to explode-but there are still many interesting questions that should be asked. When there are safetr-concerns. what is the engineert responsibility before the launch decision is made? After the

:rre

-,.,cl-

*1.^ i.INE ided

<1

|aunchd...l;ffiuaITilrr..h.Vhar_dugdoesTl'eettqitlethave?

If the decision doesn't go the engineer's

in

li be

q{"aqa.!@lem Qi[]!is dicurred. *hut or

way, should she complain to uPper rtldrrto the attention of the press? Atglbg:gt-

tbe duties and respor-rsibilities of the engineers: It'::--

Chopter

nlroduclion

1rrunch\\.erc]suCCeSs{ul,blrtth@thi:O-rirrghai11iLilecliindan acgldcltt]ud \tclI.:leady-ac u d.s-vhatruorJd.lee-rhe-e*gi'reerl* ,eslrousil)ilitv? Even if sh,rrld hs-!gpoute-"!g1ll99!t1tg:{191-_l_l!{!.lgc'; an,elgineer rrovesj
rner-rt decisions?

These twes of questions will be the subject oirtiiis bool<. Irr srrbsc'rpc'nt ch:rpters, ideas :ibout the nature of the engirieering profession. etlrical tlir:orlc's. iincl the :rppiicatiori of these theories to situations thtrt are likc'lv to occur in pro{ession:rl prtrctice x'ill bcr presented. Manl'other real-lile c:rses ttrken {rorn ner.,'spapet ttccounts ancl books rvill bc' discussecl to exarnitre u,hat cngineers shoulcl clo.r,hen corrfrorttecl u'itl. e+l.ir".ll'' r" bling situations. Most of these cases s'i1l bc 1, ,tlvo rr,'ill involve :rnalt'sis of situtrtlons in lr,lrich clististcr' \\ irs ir\ r r rc !. inclir-iduais involvecl nracle ethic:rll-v sound clioices ancl cooper:rtecl to s,,1. t .r 1,r , ,i A u'ortl of u'arnirrg is necessrrn'befole thc'se crrses aie'stucliecl. lfhc'clichi' U siglit is 20/20" u.ili seer-n ven'true as rve exantine man), of tliese ctrses. \\'heri strirl., case sever:rl -ve:rrs after thc fact and knou,ing the ultirri:rte orLtcone, it is e:rsv to see u'hat the right clecision sJ:rould have been. Obr.iouslv. hacl NASA ou,necl u t'rtst.rl brrll ancl been :rble to predict the iirture, the Challenger rvoulcl never have beeu i:runched. Had Ford knou.n ther nurrber of people u'ho u'oulcl be killccl as a result of gas-tiurk firilurcs irt the Pinto ancl tlie srrbsequent financial losses in liur-suits iurcl clirrrnal cirses. it s'orrlcl
'

hi*'erfounclabettersolutiontotheproblernofqtrs-t:rrkpl rrr:rL,rrl II,,.,11.rr'.st'rarelv

1",,t:e_lUclt S1eA. -the outcorne r,r'ill be.

It rvill be irnportirnt in studrirLg ir-:: --;i - 'r'. i. r-,.1 l,t'rc to tt'r, to lool< at thern frorn ihe point of'r'ieu'of tlie inclivichriLl: rilro \,,r.r.1'-rr"oirtrl at tlie tlmc, using tlieir best judgrnerrt aborrt hou' to proceed. :rncl rot to jrrdqe the cases solelv basc'd
orr the outcorne.

pt"di"

;ir---.:1re:s<tl

u'htrt

:a,:::::::::::,::,'.a..:::

Tlre erplosion of the space shuitle Challenger is perhaps the most widelr-*,ritten about case in engineering c'thics Lrecause o{ the ertensir.'e rnedia coverage at the tirne of the :rccident irncl rrlso because of the n-rany available government reports and transcripts of congrcssional hearirrss resirrdirrq tLe e.lrlosion. The case illustrates rnilny '''tr'' " b" in,portant ethical issues that engineers facc: \Vhat- is the ,,f tlre lrin.er r,,lri s,jkj jssy, _properrole ggrd tt!ro!'o4:L l'l'e the ultlmate decision-rnaking

sphere. Tlie solid rocket 'Loosters are only used early in the flight and are jcttisoned soon alter t:rkeof parachute back to earth, and are recovered from the ocean. They are subsequently repacked u'ith fuel and are

:@

uui!
laurrchbqag:elrgaresag r}r-a
case has alreaclr., been

sion? Tiris
u.i11

presertecl briefl-v, and rve

nou'

take a more in-depth 1ook.

Background
The space shuttle rv:rs designec'l to bc a reusable launch vehiclc. The vehicle consists of irn orbiter, n'hich looks mucli llke a rnecliurn-sizecl airliner (ndrius the engines!), tn'o solid-propell:rnt boosters, and a single liquid-propellant booster. At takeo{f, a1l of t}'re boosters are isnited and hft the orbiter out of the earth's atmo-

reused. The iiquid-propell:rnt booster is used to finish lifting the shuttle inio orbit, at rvhich point the booster is jettisonecl and burns up during reentry The liquid booster is tlie onlv part of the shuttle vel-ricle that is not reusable. After completion o{'t}ie rnissiori, the orbiter uses its limited thrust capabilities to reenter the atrnosphere and glides to a lancling. The acciclent on lanuary 28, 1986 u'as blarned on a f:rilure of one of the solid rocket boosters. Solid rockct boosters l-rave the advantage that thery dcliver {ar rrrore

thrust per pound of fuel tharr do their iiquid-fireled counterp:rrts, but harre the disadr.antage that oncc the fuel is lit, tliere is no \\rav to turn tlic booster of1 or even to control ther amount o{'thmst produced. In contrast, a liquid-fucl rocket can be controlled b1'throttling tbe supply of iuel to the combustion charnher or can be
shut off by stopping tlie flow of fuel entireir'.

Seciion

l Z Cose Studies

ld utt

en

if

lNge--

,z ,/
Tang ------------

PuftV

,t a,'PuttY
Tang --------*
O-rings O-rings
r

hets,

It"n-

Fb"

Ib" Fouj,

but

I t]re

I|.
h"a

Clevis

he.
frh"t
I

-->

Clevis

--->

and

Fod
Fs 1n

Duld

beiv
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Pin

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lnside of booster
i:
t,utl

in

to

it:l
,.]]ii

j:"?tff"t:::t"}"'sir#"fl)ttr,ftn"if,;j.*:'

"fed-up which had been used successfully for many

Administration(NASA)awardedthecontracttodesign@ lrom a. g?e ot sl'rt-rings l'he O-rings are made from a type of synand build tle solid rocket boosters for the shuttle to "."gpi!g' rubber and so. are not particularly heat,resisMorton Tbfrlclj. The design that was submitted by thetic Titan missile, tant. To,Prevent the hot gases fronr darrragrng the Ooe"rsio-n--of fm _tLe
stacked shuttle to provide .an extra margin .of safety in"ontopoftheothertoformih"L*pl*t"d-booster. unlike the Titan,Jhis booster wou-ld be used for a
pieces that are fiUed with solid propellant and

InlgT4.tleNational AeronauticsandSpace .u.,

if#i,.JJ.*:j:#;Jffiffif:tr,:ffi:ifr:H.Ht,'l: ',
,. r,r
r!r,__-__r

',u*;::iffi ]TJii":'ff ,ffi :r;:J:.T#,tHJTnill#ift'di{#t'J#i**{ii,.''f;: since.

The assembly ol" the propelJant-fiIled-cylinders was manned space craft' perlormed at Thiokol's.plant in Utah. The^cylinders Ear6t probl,ems oithth,e Sokd were then shipped to the Kenned.v_Space Center in Ractnt Boosters

o'"n0t''u:;#lt;llf;il.ti::"*,H*

*r"., ;;;;l'"
*

0"u,.'t

where the i'"air.ia"a c/inders come tofether, lrrro*o

nized long before the launch

"t

design had been recost{. Chonn"g,er Whgn

ff"*"f .'nl*T:-1x'ffiff

a field ioint. This-pressure causes,the joint to open slightly: ^,""ondu*'apfocesscalled.jointrotati,on,.'i1lustratedinFigrrre1b.

pins. The joint-s are sealed by two O-,""gr, a prinury and

tr[gJ"ltT?'T"f;*:,1;;*'.;Hhff *Tn$fl ffi1x,a:'::fi :

lntrod ucf ion

The joint \\rirs desiglled so that the intemal Pressure

The Political Climate

To

pushcs on the put6.', displacing the prirrrary O-ring into ihir qnp, helping to seal it. DCg11g-tglllg..of'ther boosters

1977, Thiokol becatne ilugtg-lhat this joint-rot:rtiou problem \viis more se,vere than on the Titan and dis-

in

i,,rr".l lt u'ith

NASA. Design change! r'vere made' iricluding nn increase in tlie thicklress of the O-ting' to
try to control this Problem. Eurther testiq&revr::i1ed problerlls with tlie secondary seal, and rnore char.igqs u'ere ililialg-cl !o-!g::rqct that ,,rioble,'rr. tn No"e.tnbei of lsst' atter the second shuttle booster field join* @ht, a postlatrnc'h extrmirration of the inllcateil that ihe O-rings lr'ere being eroded by hot gases the rluringtlie launch. @of

joint, there rt'as some

and Thiokol lqqkellg$gthe use of different hpesof putty and alt,'rnat ire m"il rot ls for, rpplyl ng i i I o sgh c-th+rcblem

corl@n,

@mateiylait

o{ the sh*ttle

fliglrts be{bre rtte ChaLleiger acciderit had elperisngecl r"-"-1"g""" of O-ring erosion. Of course, this $pe of testilg Cd redesign is not umrsual in engineering: S :-i#;#
often It shouldbe pointed out tbat erosion of the O-rings is not necessarih atad thing. Since the solid rocket boosters are only used for the first feu' uiinutes of the fllght, it ilight be+e&etly-asg9!!+-to design a joint in which As long as the OO-rings

understand and analyze the <lecision inaking that tool< pince leading to ther fatal laurich' it is irlporlant also to &scuss tlie politic:rl enr'irotrment urrder u'hich NASA r,vas oper:rting at the tirne. N,ASAs [c]g9.!.Il?"f-jl9!9rmineil blQglgfesq, rvhich w:x becoming iricreasinglv irqbapp:t-rrth del.rys in t]'re shuttle project and shuttle perfor-att"".s4iich)1'A$l:1"J!S--q1i,qg-illi!41-prorni5-es NASA had bilhd the shuttle irs a reliable, inerpcnsivciaunch vehicle {br ir varich- of scientific and contnercial prll-poses. irrt lutlirrg 1lr,' lurrnclring of c'ornnrert'ial rLnd ,rlllit"ry satellites. It hacl becn promised that the shuttle li,ould be capablc of frequent flights (several per ye:rr) and auick trr*aro.,,,ds ancl n'ould be conrpetitively priced- with more tltiditional nonreusable lnunch veliicles. NASA-wa1 leqllng tq:ll-rtg qrgency in the proglarn because the Europet,l Space Agencl' "r'qrs dev-elopigg lvhat.seetned to be ar chc'aperl alteniative to the shuttle' which coulcl potenti:rllv put the sliuttle ortt of busiuess' TheseJresgusded NASA to 5c'liedulq ii rgcord -Urudr"f-9fugiSta1lS

fu\

"'orrd

rr:gr:L-fu4-

for 1986 to provc

'

the prograrn \\ias on track. Launching ciaf1, irnportant in jarrual,w 1986, since the prerious lrission haibeen delayed numerous tirnes lly both u'eather and mechanicid Lrilures. NASA also felt pressure to get tlte Cha[langar launched on time so tbat t]ie next s]iuttie Iaunch, r,r,|iih nas to can1. 1grobe to examine Halle1't

a mission wils espe-

-to -Congre

ss. tl

urt

@tter' r.i,'q.'do;l;tlltl't"l) brtn tht"rgh

boosk'rs ,-,,r't sliould be fine, Hotvever, this was not the way tlie space shuttle rvas designed, ald O-ring erosiott rr-us one of the
problerns that the Tl-riokol engineers u'ere :rddressing'

beforc the solicl n.,f of tirel and are jettlsoned, this design

iffiiGFrt"le-ot'-the-union

comet, would be launched befbre a Russilrn probe clesigned to do the san're thing. Tliere llas additional pd[c'al presiure to launch the C]iallenger,before -the
acldress. irr rvhiclr Plesiderrl ni,,gun lL,p"d to mention-rhe slrtrttle arrd ir speciirl :'rstro_

The first docurnented ioirit failure ciune after the launch on J:rnuzrry 24, 1985, whicli occur:red during very cold r.veatller. Tlie postflight- erarninrrtion o1' thi l.,oosters revealed black soot and grease on the outsicle of the booster, u'hich indicated that hot grrses frorn the booster }rad bloi,r'n by the O-ring se:Lls' This obsen-ati,lr gale rise to- concern- aboYt .the resitielctoT-T'lu" O-iirrg tnitterials ut reduccd telnperatures'

,.n ,i-tll" ?tst teacher in space' Christa the context of his c'orrrrrrents orr cdut'rrtiorr'

McAuliffe-in

The Datts Before the I'uunch

Even before the acciclent, tb.e Challenger launch didn't

to fiIl the joints and found that thev l'ere "or,lpr.r, inacliquate. In july of 1985, Thiokol engineers redesignecl the fi;ld joints rvithout O-rings' Inste:rd,
they uied steel billets, u'liich should have been better abll t,t withsLrncl the hot gases' Unfortunately, the nerv design u,as not readv in time for the Challenger

so off witliout a iritcli, as NASA hacl hoped' The first iu.rr"h date had to be abandoned due to :r cold fiont expected to rnove tlirougir the,area.'The iront stalled, ur-r,l th" launch could have taken place on schedule' But tlie launch had alread-l' been postponed in defer-

ence

to Vice President George Bush, rn'ho was to

attencl. NASA didn't u'ant to :rntagonize Bush, a strong

inclemeniiveather a{ler he had arrived' Launch of the

NASA supporter, by postponing tlie- latnch duc to

fli{lrI in earh 1986. IElliot. l99ll

lurtlier delayed b)i a defective rnicroswitcL in the liatch-iocking mechanism. When this problem
shrLttle rvas

Secton

l Z Cose S',r

TABLE I
c -lr'rt r'__"
r:
-,1so

Spoce Shuttle Chollenger Accident: Who's Who

ORGAN]ZATIONS

NASA
Marshall sprrce FLight

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, responsible for space exploration. The space shuttle is onr.
N

\5As programs.
Llrc

{ \SA
I -^.. lc -rt-

A N {SA liLcilify thrt \\ irs in ( harge oI

A

solitl rot kci boostcr deveJopnrenl fol tlre shull

le.

Center

+.,t]r', h':rtle
t.:ses. llrSl\ e erc i:rl

\'lorton Thiokol

priiale cornpan) thrL rrorr tlre conlract from NAS

PEOPLE

fol buildirrg the solid ruckel Lrrrrrters lor the slrrrltlc.

NASA Lerry Mrllor

Solid Rocket lSooster Project manager at Marshall

I
l-Lr

and

Morton Thiokol
-rioqer

rtile ,,..rr)
'.

-t

norslolv

I
J

Engineers who rvorked on the Solid Rocket Booster De\.eloprrent Progrlm

itir ely

Arnie Johnson
JOe -Lrrmlnsref

chilj'.1m
!-rlind

Engineering managel' on the Solitl ilocket Booster Development Program. Director ofthe
SoLid Rocket Booster Project.

Alan McDon.ild Boli Lund leralcl N{ason

Vice plesident for en{irrecring. Cenerrrl manager.

liritle,
ess.

l.i}-!1
s th.$
r'S|lcs ilris- rl-^* t-i,flcl

was resolved, the front had clianged course and was now moving through the area. The front was expected to bring extrelnely cold weather to the launch site, u'ith

expected launch time the follorving lnorning was pr.dicted to be 29"F, far belorv the ternperature at rr'L,::. NASA had prer.'ious experience. After the engine.:'
,

hr get
h'.rttle

| ilLl(j-_\, 5
,'_.

temperatures predicted to be in the lorv 20s ('F) by tlre new Iaunch tinre. Given the expected cold ternperatures, NASA checked wiilr all o['tlre slru't1le ('ontra('1ors to determine

pfoire
itional e the
siclent
iL\11U.

if they forcsa\v iiny problerns with launc'hing thc shuttle in cold temperatures. Nan McDonald, the director o1' Tliiokols Solid Rocket Motor Project, was concerned
about the cold weather problerns that liad been experienced wilh the solid roc'kct hoosters. Tlre evening before the rescheduled laurrt'h, u ieleconferen('c \\lrs

presentation, Bob Lund, the vice president fbl t-.:neering at Morton Thiokol, presented his reconir:,- dations. He reasonetl that sint'e there had prei i, been severe O-ring erosion at 53'F and the i:.r. lvould take place at significantiy beloiv this terr :- ' ture r,vhere no data and no eruerience were avi.-NASA sliould delay the l:runch ultil the O-lir. : perature could be al least 53oF. Interestingh
. .

ie-in

arrangcd behveen ('nginccrs

rnd mirnilgement fronl

clidn't

e first

iront
t;Jled,

the Kennerl; Space Cenler. NASAs Nlarshall Space Fliglrt Cenier in llunlsville. Alabama. arrd Tlriokol in Utah to discuss tlre possible effects of cold temperatures on tlre perforrrrrLnt'e oI tlre solid ro(ket booslers. During this teieconference, Roger Boisjoly and Amie
Thompson, two Thiokol engineers r'vho had u,orked on the solid-propellant booster design, gave an hour-long presentation on how the cold weather $'ould increase the problen'rs of joint rotation and sealing of the joint hy the O-rings. Their point was that the lor'vest temperatrrre at

should operate properly dorr-n to an outside tr r ture of 3l'F. Larry Mulloy, the Solitl Rocket Booster i man:rger at Marshall and a NASA emplc'',' rectly pointed out that the datir rvere int

original design,

it

was specified that

thi'

.,

and disagreed u,ith the Thiokoi engine. sonre discussiorr. \lrrllov asked Joe Kil' .engineering nlan:rger rvorking orl the prorr,:
.

idrile. clrler;.1S tO
(i -"
t-r rn O '-b

opinion. Kihuinster backed up the r-ecolrLl of his fellor,v engineers. Others ilor, expressed their disagreernent r,vitli the T:' neer's recornrnendation, which prompteri 1,.

'.

lue to
ot ttre

r,\itch
rblem

rvhich the shuttle had previously been launched was 53"F, on January 24, 1985, w'hen there was bior,v-by of the O-rings. The O-ririg ternperature atChallenger's

to ask to take the discussion off line i,::' utes. Boisjoll'and other engineels t'eir. ' --' milnilgenlent that the original clecisiorr :. uirs Ilrc correct one.

lnkoduclion

A kev fact that ultimatelv swayed the decision was that in the a.,ailable data, ih"." i""*.d to be no
correlation between temperature and the degree to
which blow-by gasses had eroded the O-rings in previ.fhut, it could be concluded tJrat there ous launchesrvas really no trend in the data indicating that launch at the expected temperature would necessarily be unsale. After much discussion. ]erald Mason, a senior manager with Thiokol, turned to Lund and said, "Take offyour engineering h"t u!_{ ry!r"_Yo* me lamouS in iiscussions. Lund reversed his previous decision and recommended that the launch proceed. The new recommendation included an indication that there was a safety concern due to the cold weather, but that the data was inconclusive and the launch was recommended. McDonald. who was in Florjda, was sulprised by this recommendation and attempted to convince
rua.SR to delay the launch, but to no avail.

that rvere temlnrarih'seattng tre ffFldFid tered by the stlesses caused b^" tile wint Stru. joint was norv opened again and hc qrc from the solid booster. Sime the boffiffi to,,,the large liquid-fuel boocter- dre firrm'ffim solid-fuel booster blorv-trv quiJdr- hffiEcd

external tank. The liquid propelhnt the shuttle exploded.

$.u rymil*d

euCbru d

The Aftermath
As a result of the erplosion, the shuttle pmgrm,m grounded as a thlrough review of shuttk rgffirtr

ffi

conducted. Thiokol formed

January

fi

3l:TgE6-Tffi

The Launch
Contrary to the weather predictions. the overnight temperature was 8nF, coldei than the shuttle had ever experienced before. In [act, there was a significant accumulation of ice on the launchpad from safety showers and fire hoses that had been left on to prevent the pipes from freezing. It has been estimated that the aft fi.ld ioint of the rigf,t-hand booster was at 28'F. XISA routinely documents as many aspects of Iaunches as possible. One parl of this monitoring is the
extensive uJ" of cameras

its chair. The-eommjsslq! consi

scientists and ensineers who were asked to lool in of the accident and to recon]merxl cbryrr [h"

"*..

One of the commission members *zs Ri:hd Felmman, a Nobel prize winner in phrsics- tnto il$ demonstrated to the countty what lrad gone sru6,national news prograrns. he denronstrated the prd lem with the O-rings by taking a sample of the Gri4 material and bending it. The flexlbili4'- of the nrgh-

In a demonstration that w-as repeatedlr

shosn

f*ur.d

on critical

ul""t of

the launch vehicle. One of these cameras, looking at the right booster, recorded puffs of smoke coming
from the aft field ioint immediately after the boosters were ignited. Tlris smoke is thought to have been caused by tle steel cylinder of this segmeni of the booster e*punding outward and causing the field joint to rotate. But, due to the extremely cold temperature, the O-ring didn't seat properly. The heat-resistant
putty was also so cold that it didnl protect the O-rings, and hot gases burned past both O-rings. It was later determin"ed that this bl-ow-bv occurred over 70o of arc
around the O-rings.

rial at room

field loint was sealed again by byproducts of the solid rocket-propellant combustion, *hi"h 1'o.ln"d a glassy oxide on the joint. This oxide lormalion rtright have averted the disaster had it not been lor a very strong wind shear that the shuttle
encountered almost one minute into the flight'

--- v;;q;rcra"y *"

fie

oxides

immersed it in ice water. when Fel'nman again bm the O-ring, it was very clear that the resiliencr-of tb material was severely reduced. a very clear derrmstration of what happened'to the O-rings on the colil Iaunch date in Florida. As part of the commission hearings, Boisjoh ad other Thiokol engineers were asked to testi-R- Boisi+ handed over to the cornrnission copies of interud Thiokol memos and reporls detailing the desiqn pre cess and the problems that had already been encun' tered. Naturally. Thiokol was trying to put the be* possible spin on the situation. and Boisjolr's actim; -hurt thls Jffott. A""o.ding to Boisjoly, aftev tlris actin he was isolated within the company, his responsibilitier for the redesign of the joint were taken ar.'ar: and be was subtly harassed by thlokol management [Boisjoh: t991. and Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellicam, 19Sgl

temperature was evident.

He tln

Section

l /

Cose Sluc

:,

I]

i.,l-

T'e :td
il 'I r't
I

:t
:,C
,.r,11

:1.rS
' i. -rS

i-, ,rt

:.te i--:s

.'
i
I

=l*-**,. |,.l ii: f

.t

ll,-,,
-a-'\

, ..-.1

rih
1' 1

il l--

[-: ]1 f:: it l,
:1-

Erplosion of the space shuttle C/rallcngtr soorl ,ifier lift-off in January 1986.

':-.,: - '.1 lr -Lt

,,1

Eventually, tlie atrnospliere becilrne intolerable

{br Boisjoly, trnd he took extendecl sick leave frorn }ris position at Thiokol. The joint wils reclcrslgned, and the

shutile lias since florvn nurnerous success{ul missions. Hou'ever, the ambitious l:runch schedule originally intended bv NASA irns never been met.

il
r

n--J
li. ib,t st

ir

,s

ts.,1

Lrs

., I -r

i.

r.

l2 SUMMARY
Engineering ethics is the study-of.uUakleSjllulthat must be made by engineers in the course of engineering practice. It is important for engineering students to study ethics so that they will be prepared to respond appropriately to ethical challenges during their careers. Often, the correct answer to an ethical problem will not be obvious and will require some analysis using ethical theories. The tlpes of problems that we will in studying engineering ethics are very similar to the design problems that "n"orrri", work on every day. As in design, there will not be a single correct answer. engineers naiher, engineering ethics problems will have multiple correct solutions, with some solutions being better than others.
Rocnn Bors;or,v, "The Challenger Disaster: Moral Responsibllity and the Worhng Engineer," in Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical lssues in Engineering, Prentice Hall, 1991, pp. 6-14' Nonenn-1 ELLI9T, Enrc Kerz, and Roennr Lyxcn, "The Challenger Tragedy: A Case Study in
Organizational Communication and Professional Ethics," Business and Professional Ethics

REFERENCES

Journal, vol. 12, 1990, PP.9f-108. "Managements Hat Trick: Misuse of 'Engineering Judgment' in the ChalJosEpH R. Hnmnnr, lenger Incident," Journal ofBusiness Ethics,volr.10, 1991, pp. 617-620. Pernrcre H. WnnneNn, "Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the Chailenger Incident," Joum,al of Bu'siness Ethics,vol. 10, f991, pp. 605-16. Rocnn P BorsJor-y, ELr-sN Fosrsn Cunrrs, and Eucexn Mnlr-rceN, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions,"/otntal of Business Ethics, vol. B, 1989, pp.
217-230.

Section

LZ

Cose Studie.

t3

frs ln h ethi riir.1nB

us and
;-e

Problems
1.

How di{I'erent are personal ethics ancl business ethics? Is tlris di{I'erence tme for,r'ou personalh

n'ill
that
2

t-.

\\'hat are the roots ofyour personal ethics?

Engineering design generally inr oh es fir'e steps: clereloping ir stnternent of the problem ancV or a set of specifications, gathering infbnnrrtion pertinert to the problem, designing several alternatives that meet the specificaiiorrs. anah'zing the rrlternatives and selectlng the best one, and testing and implernenting the best clesign. Hos'is ethic'rrl problern solving like this? Space Shuttle Challenger

n5\\'er. sorne

Fer. ln
hich-in Etltics
1 -l ! t,ltat-

Tlre astronauts on the Challenger rnission \\-ere a\\'ale of the dirngerous nature of riding a cornplex machine such as the space shrrttle. so they can be thought of trs havlng given infbrmed consent to participating in a clanqelous enterprise. \\'hat role did informed consent play in this case? Do y-ou think that tlre :rstronauts had enough information to gir.e
informed consent to launch the shuttle thtrt dru-?

r Incind the i9 pp.

6.

Can an englneer who has become a maniigel truh' ever take off her engineer's liat?
Shoulcl she?
Sorne say that the shuttle rvas reallv designed br Congress rrtther th:ur NASA. What does this stiitement mean? What are the ramifications if this is tnre?

Abotrrd the shuttle for this flight was the first teircher in space. Slauld clUlians lle a1lo\'ve4 on lvhat is basictrl\' an experlmental laqnch vehicle? At the time, rnanv felt that the placement of a teacher on the shuttie was for purely political purposes. Presiclent Reagan rvas rvidelv seeD as doing nothing u'hile the Arnerican educirtlonal svsteln clecal'ed. C1'nlcs f'elt that the teacher-in-space idea r.r'as cooked up z1s a inethod of divertinq irttention from this problem and lr,as to be seen as Reagant doing sourething for educartion s'hile he realll- u.asn't doing anlthing. What are the ethical implicrrtions if this scenario is true?

n'ay should

tl

"

d""iri,,n

eo?

Dru'ing the attermath of the accident, Thiokol and NASA mvestigated cxp]oslon. Boisjoll' accused Thiokol and NASA of i

poss

Iftrue, rvhat

are the ethical

irnplications of this qpe of investigation?

10. It miglrl

he assumed that the managemeni det isiorr lo larrnch *rt lry,ll$S[.13d+r,l cerns f,or ihe health oltlre compan) irnd tlre spuce prograrn as a whole. Cir-en tlre pt'l:t',..1

c]imateatthetimeofthe1aunch,i@rr1tinatelrb.r miehth @or\1S\b'rdeets

Clearly, this scenario could have lead to the loss of many.iobs at Thiokol arnd might these considerations etliicall-v be factored into the decision?

\-\S\
tl,.

l,:.-l
H-'.',

11.

Engineering codes of ethics require engineers to protect the safety and health oi in the course oftheir duties. Do the astronauts count as "public" in this corltert!

::

14

Chopter

Introduction

t2.

What should NASA management have done differently? What should T!tlq\ol-*uttug"-e"t have done differently?
Wb"t-qlqg could Boisjoly and the other

_t,J.

trom occurnngr

:-

er-rg!ry!.!$9f,o1 lqYlloneloireven'Lthe Iqmch

Lt

rh

he

rel

air

Til

c10l

re(
dn'

nu(

a
be

peo
\\'as

and
maD

aske

outc
replr

tion

replz