Foucault About The Beginnings of The Hermeneutics of The Self

About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth
Author(s): Michel Foucault

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 198-227
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ABOUTTHEBEGINNINGOF THE
HERMENEUTICSOF THESELF
TwoLecturesat Dartmouth
MICHELFOUCAULT
NOTE
INTRODUCTORY
MARKBL4SIUS, City Universityof New York
In the fall of 1980, Michel Foucault visited a number of cities and

universitiesin the United States.He gave lecturesat DartmouthCollege, the
University of Californiaat Berkeley, and PrincetonUniversity and gave a
month-long seminarand a public lecture at New YorkUniversity.The two
lectures published here were delivered at Dartmouthon November 17 and
24, 1980 under the titles "Subjectivityand Truth"and "Christianityand
Confession."Foucaultdeliveredthe lectures from texts handwrittenin En-
glish. An earlier version of these lectures was transcribedand edited by
Thomas Keenan. I have re-edited them, but very lightly, to preserve their
spoken quality,using tapes providedby Dartmouth'sOffice of Instructional
Services and EducationalResearch: all the notes were added during the
editing process. Earlier,Foucaulthad given more or less the same papersas
the Howison Lectures at Berkeley on October20-21. I have added in the
notes some passages transcribedfrom the Howison Lecturesfor the sake of
filling out the lectures published here, and I thank Paul Rabinow for his
assistancein this. (Forinstance,at one point in Berkeley,Foucaultremarked
that "the title of these two lecturescould have been, and should have been,
in fact, 'About the Beginning of the Hermeneuticsof the Self,' " a wish I
have honoredhere.) On a few occasions, these lecturesoverlapslightly with
otherpublishedwork by Foucault,which I have markedin the notes.
These lecturesmarka transitionin Foucault'sworkfromstudyingsystems
of power relations (Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality,
Vol. 1) to studyingthe creationof ethical agency (The History of Sexuality,
Vols.2, 3, and 4). Indeed, with this transitionand from his earlierworks on
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 21 No. 2, May 1993 198-227
Transcript? 1993, MarkBlasius and ThomasKeenan.Used with permission.
198
Foucault/ HERMENEUTICSOF THE SELF 199
the historyof systems of thought(Madnessand Civilization,TheBirthof the

Clinic, The Orderof Things,and TheArchaeologyof Knowledge),Foucault
begins to complete the analysisof threeaxes of experience:truth,power,and
ethics. The lecturesthat follow hint at the themes that would appearlaterin
volumes 2 and3 of TheHistoryof Sexuality,workslargelyandundeservedly
overlooked by political theorists.However,Foucaultsaid in a late interview
upon their publication, when asked if he wrote these last books "for"
contemporaryliberationmovements,thathe wrote them not "for"them but
"'asa function of a present situation."He said of volume 2, The Use of
Pleasure, the volume most about"sex,"thatthe problemof recentliberation
movements was similar to the one he studied in this book about Ancient
Greece:to elaboratean ethics throughsex. The thirdvolume, The Careof the
Self, can be read (at least in part)as a perspectiveon how to adaptand direct
the power exercisedby medical,quasi-medical,andmoralexpertsin the time
of the AIDS epidemic. Finally, the fourth volume, The Confession of the
Flesh, completed but as yet unpublished,is about early Christiansexual
ethics. Its relevance to what concerns us today can be gleaned from a
discussion(recordedon the tapebutnot includedhere)betweenFoucaultand
a gay graduatestudent after one of the lectures printedhere. The student
questioned Foucault's endorsementof John Boswell's Christianity,Social
Tolerance,and Homosexuality(Chicago, 1980) becauseof the patenthostil-
ity of Catholicismtowardhomosexualityand sexuality generally.Foucault
counteredthat an antisexualJudeo-Christianmoralityis a dangerousmyth
that is not supportedby historicalevidence and has political implications.
Rather,said Foucault, what is significant for sexuality is that Christianity
inaugurateda new attitudeof people not so much towardsexual acts and the
code of sexual ethics, but towardthemselves, and this new relationshipof
people to themselves,the necessity to scrutinizeanddiscover the truthabout
oneself and then verbalize this truth to others, affected people's attitude
toward sexuality. Both Freudiandiscourse on sexuality as well as the dis-
course of self-disclosure as a talking cure are recognizable in the "small
origins"analyzedin these two lectures.
The significance for political theory of these lectures is indicated by
Foucault at the end of the second one: "one of the main political problems
would be nowadays . . . the politics of ourselves."The lectures trace the
genealogy of the self: its constitutionthrougha continuousanalysisof one's
thoughtsundera hermeneuticprincipleof makingsure they are really one's
own; and the self's iterationand social reinforcementthroughan ongoing
verbalizationof this self-deciphernent to others. Foucault elsewhere ana-
lyzed (The History of Sexuality,Vol. 1) how techniquesinheritedfrom the
Christianconfession allow for the self to be created and subjected within
200 POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1993
relationsof power thatconstitutemodem social institutions.A politics of our

selves would entail a recognition that if the self is "nothingelse than the
historical correlationof the technology"thathas come to create it, then the
aim would be to get rid of the "sacrificewhich is linked to those technolo-
gies." This sacrifice is twofold: it is the creationof a positive foundationfor
the self by means of proceduresthat at once makes us amenable to social
control and dependent upon it, as well as the production and then
marginalizationof entire categories of people who do not fit what the
foundationposits as "normal."We can ridourselvesof the imposed sacrifice
throughwhat Foucaultcalled a "criticalontology of ourselves."This is, he
wrote, "atone and the same time the historicalanalysis of the limits thatare
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond
them . . . in the care brought to the process of putting historico-critical
reflectionto the test of concretepractices"(TheFoucault Reader,p. 50).
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH
In a work consecratedto the moral treatmentof madness and published

in 1840, a Frenchpsychiatrist,Leuret,tells of the mannerin which he has
treatedone of his patients-treated and,as you can imagine,of course,cured.
One morningDr. Leurettakes Mr. A., his patient, into a shower room. He
makes him recountin detail his delirium.
"Well,all that,"says the doctor,"is nothingbut madness.Promiseme not
to believe in it anymore."
The patienthesitates,then promises.
"That'snot enough,"replies the doctor."Youhave alreadymade similar
promises,andyou haven'tkeptthem."And the doctorturnson a cold shower
above the patient'shead.
"Yes, yes! I am mad!"the patientcries.
The shower is turnedoff, and the interrogationis resumed.
"Yes,I recognizethatI am mad,"thepatientrepeats,adding,"Irecognize,
because you are forcing me to do so."
Anothershower.Anotherconfession. The interrogationis takenup again.
"I assure you, however,"says the patient,"thatI have heardvoices and
seen enemies aroundme."
Anothershower.
"Well,"says Mr.A., thepatient,"Iadmitit. I am mad;all thatwas madness."1
Foucault
/ HERMENEUTICS
OFTHESELF 201
To make someone sufferingfrommentalillness recognize thathe is mad

is a very ancientprocedure.Everybodyin the old medicine,beforethe middle
of the nineteenthcentury,everybody was convinced of the incompatibility
betweenmadnessandrecognitionof madness.And in the works,for instance,
of the seventeenthandof the eighteenthcenturies,one finds many examples
of what one might call truth-therapies.The mad would be cured if one
managedto show them thattheir deliriumis withoutany relationto reality.
But, as you see, the techniqueused by Leuretis altogetherdifferent.He
is not trying to persuadehis patientthat his ideas are false or unreasonable.
Whathappensin the head of Mr.A. is a matterof indifferencefor the doctor.
Leuretwishes to obtaina precise act: the explicit affirmation,"I am mad."It
is easy to recognize here the transpositionwithin psychiatric therapy of
procedureswhich have been used for a long time in judicial and religious
institutions.Todeclarealoudandintelligiblythetruthaboutoneself-I mean,
to confess-has in the Westernworld been consideredfor a long time either
as a condition for redemptionfor one's sins or as an essential item in the
condemnationof the guilty.The bizarretherapyof Leuretmay be readas an
episode in the progressive culpabilizationof madness. But, I would wish,
rather,to take it as a point of departurefor a more generalreflection on this
practice of confession, and on the postulate,which is generally accepted in
Westernsocieties, thatone needs for his own salvationto know as exactly as
possible who he is andalso, whichis somethingratherdifferent,thathe needs
to tell it as explicitly as possible to some otherpeople. The anecdoteof Leuret
is here only as an example of the strangeand complex relationshipsdevel-
oped in our societies between individuality,discourse,truth,and coercion.
In order to justify the attention I am giving to what is seemingly so
specialized a subject,let me take a step back for a moment.All that,afterall
is only for me a means that I will use to take on a much more general
theme-that is, the genealogy of the modernsubject.
In the years that preceded the second war, and even more so after the
second war,philosophyin Franceand,I think,in all continentalEurope,was
dominatedby the philosophyof the subject.I mean thatphilosophyset as its
taskpar excellence the foundationof all knowledge and the principleof all
signification as stemming from the meaningful subject. The importance
given to this question of the meaningful subject was of course due to the
impact of Husserl-only his Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis were
generally known in France2-but the centralityof the subject was also tied
to an institutionalcontext.For the Frenchuniversity,since philosophybegan
with Descartes, it could only advance in a Cartesianmanner.But we must
also take into accountthe political conjuncture.Given the absurdityof wars,

slaughters,and despotism,it seemed then to be up to the individualsubject
to give meaning to his existentialchoices.
Withthe leisureand distancethatcame afterthe war,this emphasison the
philosophicalsubjectno longerseemed so self-evident.Two hitherto-hidden
theoreticalparadoxescould no longer be avoided. The first one was thatthe
philosophyof consciousnesshad failed to found a philosophyof knowledge,
and especially scientific knowledge,andthe second was thatthis philosophy
of meaning paradoxically had failed to take into account the formative
mechanismsof significationand the structureof systems of meaning. I am
aware that anotherform of thoughtclaimed then to have gone beyond the
philosophy of the subject-this, of course, was Marxism. It goes without
saying-and it goes indeed betterif we say it-that neithermaterialismnor
the theoryof ideologies successfully constituteda theoryof objectivityor of
signification.Marxismputitself forwardas a humanisticdiscoursethatcould
replace the abstractsubject with an appeal to the real man, to the concrete
man. It should have been clear at the time that Marxism carriedwith it a
fundamentaltheoreticalandpracticalweakness:the humanisticdiscoursehid
the political reality thatthe Marxistsof this period nonethelesssupported.
With the all-to-easy clarity of hindsight-what you call, I think, the
"Mondaymorning quarterback"-let me say that there were two possible
paths that led beyond this philosophy of the subject. First, the theory of
objective knowledge and, two, an analysis of systems of meaning, or semi-
ology. The first of these was the path of logical positivism. The second was
that of a certainschool of linguistics,psychoanalysis,and anthropology,all
generally groupedunderthe rubricof structuralism.
These were not the directionsI took. Let me announceonce and for all
thatI am not a structuralist,and I confess with the appropriatechagrinthatI
am not an analytic philosopher-nobody is perfect. I have tried to explore
anotherdirection.I have tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject
througha genealogy of this subject,by studyingtheconstitutionof the subject
across historywhich has led us up to the modernconceptof the self. This has
not always been an easy task, since most historiansprefera historyof social
processes,3and most philosophersprefera subjectwithouthistory.This has
neither prevented me from using the same material that certain social
historians have used, nor from recognizing my theoretical debt to those
philosopherswho, like Nietzsche, have posed the questionof the historicity
of the subject.4
Up to the presentI have proceededwith this generalprojectin two ways.
I have dealt with the moderntheoreticalconstitutionsthat were concerned
with the subjectin general.I have triedto analyzein a previousbook theories
of the subjectas a speaking,living, workingbeing.' I have also dealt with the

more practical understandingformed in those institutions like hospitals,
asylums, and prisons, where certainsubjects became objects of knowledge
and at the same time objects of domination.6And now, I wish to study those
formsof understandingwhich the subjectcreatesabouthimself. Those forms
of self-understandingareimportantI thinkto analyzethe modem experience
of sexuality.7
But since I have startedwith this last type of projectI have been obliged
to change my mind on several importantpoints. Let me introducea kind of
autocritique.It seems, accordingto some suggestionsby Habermas,thatone
can distinguish three major types of techniques in human societies: the
techniqueswhich permitone to produce,to transform,to manipulatethings;
the techniques which permit one to use sign systems; and the techniques
which permitone to determinethe conductof individuals,to impose certain
wills on them, and to submit them to certainends or objectives. That is to
say, there are techniques of production, techniques of signification, and
techniquesof domination.8
Of course,if one wantsto studythe historyof naturalsciences, it is useful
if not necessaryto take into accounttechniquesof productionand semiotic
techniques.But since my projectwas concernedwith the knowledge of the
subject,I thoughtthatthe techniquesof dominationwere the most important,
withoutany exclusion of the rest. But, analyzingthe experienceof sexuality,
I became more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all
societies whatever they are, anothertype of techniques:techniques which
permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of
operationson their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts,
on their own conduct, and this in a mannerso as to transformthemselves,
modify themselves, and to attaina certainstate of perfection,of happiness,
of purity,of supernaturalpower,and so on. Let's call this kind of techniques
a techniquesor technology of the self.9
I thinkthatif one wantsto analyzethe genealogy of the subjectin Western
civilization, he has to take into account not only techniquesof domination
but also techniques of the self. Let's say: he has to take into account the
interactionbetween those two types of techniques-techniques of domina-
tion and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points
where the technologies of dominationof individualsover one anotherhave
recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And
conversely,he has to take into accountthe points wherethe techniquesof the
self are integratedinto structuresof coercion or domination.The contact
point, where the individuals are drivenl by others is tied to the way they
conductthemselves,'1is what we can call, I think,government."2 Governing
people, in the broadmeaningof the word,13governingpeople is not a way to

force people to do what the governorwants;it is always a versatileequilib-
rium, with complementarityand conflicts between techniqueswhich assure
coercion andprocesses throughwhich the self is constructedor modified by
himself.
When I was studyingasylums, prisons,and so on, I insisted, I think, too
much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is
somethingreally importantin these kindsof institutions,but it is only at one
aspect of the artof governingpeople in our society. We must not understand
the exercise of power as pure violence or strictcoercion. Power consists in
complex relations:these relationsinvolve a set of rationaltechniques,and
the efficiency of those techniquesis due to a subtle integrationof coercion-
technologies andself-technologies.I thinkthatwe have to get rid of the more
or less Freudianschema-you know it-the schemaof interiorizationof the
law by the self. Fortunately,from a theoreticalpoint of view, and maybe
unfortunatelyfrom a practicalpoint of view, things are much more compli-
cated thanthat.In short,having studiedthe field of governmentby takingas
my pointof departuretechniquesof domination,I wouldlike in yearsto come
to study government-especially in the field of sexuality-starting fromthe
techniquesof the self.4
Among those techniquesof the self in this field of the self-technology,I
think thatthe techniquesorientedtowardthe discovery and the formulation
of the truth concerning oneself are extremely important;and, if for the
governmentof people in oursocieties everyone hadnot only to obey but also
to produce and publish the truthabout oneself, then examinationof con-
science and confession are among the most importantof those procedures.
Of course, there is a very long and very complex history,from the Delphic
precept, gnothi seauton ("know yourself') to the strangetherapeuticspro-
moted by Leuret,aboutwhich I was speakingin the beginningof this lecture.
There is a very long way from one to the other,and I don't want, of course,
to give you even a survey this evening. I'd like only to underlinea transfor-
mationof those practices,a transformationwhich tookplace at the beginning
of the Christianera, of the Christianperiod, when the ancientobligation of
knowing oneself became the monastic precept "confess, to your spiritual
guide, each of your thoughts."This transformationis, I think, of some
importancein the genealogy of modernsubjectivity.Withthistransformation
startswhat we would call the hermeneuticsof the self. This evening I'll try
to outline the way confession andself-examinationwereconceived by pagan
philosophers,and next week I'll try to show you whatit became in the early
Christianity.
Foucault
/ HERMENEUTICS
OFTHESELF 205
It is well knownthatthe mainobjectiveof the Greekschools of philosophy

did not consist of the elaboration,the teaching, of theory.The goal of the
Greek schools of philosophy was the transformationof the individual.The
goal of the Greek philosophy was to give the individualthe quality which
would permithim to live differently,better,more happily,thanotherpeople.
Whatplace did the self-examinationandthe confession have in this?At first
glance, in all the ancient philosophicalpractices,the obligation to tell the
truth about oneself occupies a rather restrainedplace. And this for two
reasons, both of which remain valid throughoutthe whole Greek and
Hellenistic Antiquity. The first of those reasons is that the objective of
philosophical trainingwas to arm the individual with a certain numberof
precepts which permit him to conduct himself in all circumstancesof life
without his losing masteryof himself or withoutlosing tranquilityof spirit,
purity of body and soul. From this principle stems the importanceof the
master'sdiscourse.The master'sdiscoursehas to talk,to explain,to persuade;
he has to give the disciple a universal code for all his life, so that the
verbalizationtakes place on the side of the masterand not on the side of the
disciple.
There is also anotherreasonwhy the obligationto confess does not have
a lot of importancein the directionof the antiqueconscience. The tie with
the master was then circumstantialor, in any case, provisional. It was a
relationship between two wills, which does not imply a complete or a
definitive obedience. One solicits or one acceptsthe advice of a masteror of
a friend in orderto endurean ordeal, a bereavement,an exile, or a reversal
of fortune,and so on. Or again, one places oneself underthe directionof a
master for a certain time of one's life so as one day to be able to behave
autonomouslyand no longer have need of advice. Ancient direction tends
towardthe autonomyof the directed.In these conditions,one can understand
thatthe necessity for exploringoneself in exhaustivedepthdoes not present
itself. It is not indispensableto say everythingaboutoneself, to reveal one's
least secrets, so that the master may exert complete power over one. The
exhaustive and continualpresentationof oneself under the eyes of an all-
powerful directoris not an essential featurein this techniqueof direction.
But, despite this general orientationwhich has so little emphasis on
self-examinationand on confession, one finds well before Christianityal-
ready elaboratedtechniquesfor discoveringand formulatingthe truthabout
oneself. And theirrole, it would seem, becamemoreandmoreimportant.The
growing importanceof these techniquesis no doubttied to the development
of communallife in thephilosophicalschool, as with the Pythagoreansor the
Epicureans,and it is also tied to the value accordedto the medical model,

either in the Epicureanor the Stoician schools.
Since it is not possible in so short a time even to give a sketch of this
evolution of Greek and Hellenist civilization,I'll take only two passages of
a Roman philosopher, Seneca. They may be considered as rather good
witnesses on the practice of self-examinationand confession as it existed
with the Stoics of the Imperialperiod at the time of the birthof Christianity.
The first passage is to be found in the De Ira of Seneca. Here is the passage;
I'll read it to you:
Whatcould be morebeautifulthanto conductan inqueston one's day?Whatsleep better

thanthatwhich follows this review of one's actions?How calm it is, deep andfree, when
the soul has received its portionof praiseand blame, and has submitteditself to its own
examination,to its own censure.Secretly,it makesthe trialof its own conduct.I exercise
this authorityover myself, and each day I will myself as witness before myself. When
my light is loweredandmy wife at last is silent,I reasonwithmyself andtakethe measure
of my acts and of my words. I hide nothingfrom myself; I spare myself nothing.Why,
in effect, should I fear anythingat all from amongst my errorswhilst I can say: "Be
vigilant in not beginningit again;today I will forgive you. In a certaindiscussion you
spoke too aggressively or you did not correct the person you were reproaching,you
offended him, . . . " etc.15
There is somethingparadoxicalin seeing the Stoics, such as Seneca and

also Sextus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so on, according so much
importanceto the examinationof conscience whilst, accordingto the terms
of their doctrine,all faults were supposed equal. It should not thereforebe
necessary to interrogatethemselves on each one of them.
But, let's look at this text a little moreclosely. Firstof all, Seneca employs
a vocabulary which at first glance appears, above all, judicial. He uses
expressions like cognoscere de moribussuis, and me causam dico-all that
is typical judicial vocabulary.It seems, therefore,that the subject is, with
regard to himself, both the judge and the accused. In this examinationof
conscience it seems that the subject divides itself in two and organizes a
judicial scene, where it plays both roles at once. Seneca is like an accused
confessing his crimeto the judge, andthejudge is Seneca himself. But, if we
look more closely, we see thatthe vocabularyused by Seneca is much more
administrativethanjudicial. It is the vocabularyof the directionof goods or
territory.Seneca says, for instance,thathe is speculatorsui, thathe inspects
himself, that he examines with himself the past day, totum diem meum
scrutor;or thathe takesthe measureof thingssaid anddone;he uses the word
remetior.Withregardto himself, he is not a judge who has to punish;he is,
rather,an administratorwho, once the work has been done or the year's
business finished, does the accounts, takes stock of things, and sees if
everythinghas been done correctly.Seneca is a permanentadministratorof
himself, more than a judge of his own past."6
The examples of the faults committed by Seneca and with which he
reproacheshimself are significant from this point of view. He says and he
reproacheshimself for having criticized someone and instead of correcting
him has hurthim; or again, he says that he has discussed with people who
were in any case incapable of understandinghim. These faults, as he says
himself, are not really faults; they are mistakes. And why mistakes?Either
becausehe did nothave in his mindthe aimswhich the sage shouldset himself
or because he had not applied in the correctmannerthe rules of conduct to
be deducedfromthem. The faults aremistakesin thatsense thatthey arebad
adjustmentsbetween aims andmeans.Significantis also the fact thatSeneca
does not recall those faults in orderto punish himself; he has as a goal only
to memorizeexactly the rules which he had to apply.This memorizationhas
for an object a reactivationof fundamentalphilosophicalprinciplesand the
readjustmentof theirapplication.In the Christianconfession the penitenthas
to memorizethe law in orderto discoverhis own sins, butin this Stoic exercise
the sage has to memorizeactsin orderto reactivatethe fundamentalrules.
One can thereforecharacterizethis examinationin a few words.First,this
examination,it's not at all a question of discovering the truthhidden in the
subject.It is rathera questionof recalling the truthforgottenby the subject.
Two, what the subject forgets is not himself, nor his nature,nor his origin,
nor a supernaturalaffinity.Whatthe subjectforgetsis what he ought to have
done, thatis, a collection of rules of conduct thathe had learned.Three, the
recollection of errors committed during the day serves to measure the
distance which separateswhat has been done from what should have been
done. And four,the subjectwho practicesthis examinationon himself is not
the operatingground for a process more or less obscure which has to be
deciphered.He is the point whererulesof conductcome togetherandregister
themselves in the form of memories. He is at the same time the point of
departurefor actions more or less in conformitywith these rules. He consti-
tutes, the subject constitutes, the point of intersection between a set of
memorieswhich must be broughtinto the presentand acts which have to be
regulated.
This evening examinationhas its logical place among a set of other Stoic
exercises": continualreading,for instance,of the manualof precepts(that's
for the present);the examinationof the evils which could happenin life, the
well-knownpremeditatiomalorum(thatwas for the possible); the enumera-
tion each morningof the tasks to be accomplishedduringthe day (that was
for the future);and finally, the evening examinationof conscience (so much
THEORY
208 POLITICAL / May1993
for the past). As you see, the self in all those exercises is not consideredas a
field of subjective data which have to be interpreted.It submitsitself to the
trialof possible or real action.
Well, after this examinationof conscience, which constitutes a kind of
confession to one's self, I would like to speakaboutthe confession to others:
I mean to say the expose of one's soul which one makes to someone, who
may be a friend, an adviser,a guide. This was a practicenot very developed
in philosophical life, but it had been developed in some philosophical
schools, for instance among the Epicureanschools, and it was also a very
well known medicalpractice.The medicalliteratureis rich in such examples
of confession or expose of the self. Forinstance,the treatiseof Galen On the
Passions of the Soul"8 quotes an example like that; or Plutarch,in the De
Profectibus in Virtutewrites, "There are many sick people who accept
medicine and otherswho refuse them;the man who hides the shameof soul,
his desire, his unpleasantness,his avarice, his concupiscence, has little
chance of making progress. Indeed, to speak one's evil reveals one['s]
nastiness;to recognize it insteadof takingpleasurein hiding it. All this is a
sign of progress."19
Well, anothertext of Seneca might also serve us as an example here of
what was confession in the Late Antiquity. It is in the beginning of De
TranquillitateAnimi.20Serenus,a young friendof Seneca, comes to ask him
for advice. It is very explicitly a medical consultationon his own state of
soul. "Why,"says Serenus, "shouldI not confess to you the truth,as to a
doctor? . . . I do not feel altogetherill but nor do I feel entirely in good
health."Serenusfeels himself in a stateof malaise, ratheras he says, like on
a boat which does not advance,but is tossed aboutby the rolling of the ship.
And, he fears staying at sea in this condition,in view of firm land and of the
virtues which remain inaccessible. In order to escape this state, Serenus
thereforedecides to consult Seneca and to confess his state to Seneca. He
says thathe wants verumfateri,to tell the truth,to Seneca.21
Now whatis this truth,what is this verum,thathe wantsto confess? Does
he confess faults,secret thoughts,shamefuldesires,andthingslike that?Not
at all. The text of Serenusappearsas an accumulationof relativelyunimport-
ant, at least for us unimportant,details; for instance, Serenus confesses to
Seneca that he uses the earthenwareinheritedfrom his father,that he gets
easily carriedaway when he makes public speeches, and so on and so on.
But, it is easy, beneath this apparentdisorder,to recognize three distinct
domains for this confession: the domain of riches, the domain of political
life, and the domainof glory;to acquireriches,to participatein the affairsof
the city, to gain public opinion. These are-these were-the three types of
activitypossible for a free man, the threecommonplacemoralquestionsthat
Foucault
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areaskedby themajorphilosophical schoolsof theperiod.Theframework

of the exposeof Serenusis not thereforedefinedby the realcourseof his
existence;it is notdefinedby hisrealexperiences, norby a theoryof thesoul
orof itselements,butonlybya classification of thedifferenttypesof activity
whichone can exerciseandtheendswhichone canpursue.In eachone of
thesefields,Serenusrevealshis attitudeby enumerating thatwhichpleases
him andthatwhichdispleaseshim.Theexpression"itpleasesme"(placet
me) is the leadingthreadin his analysis.It pleaseshimto do favorsfor his
friends.Itpleaseshimto eatsimply,andto havenototherthanthatwhichhe
has inherited,but the spectacleof luxuryin otherspleaseshim. He takes
pleasurealsoin inflatinghis oratoricalstylewiththehopethatposteritywill
retainhis words.In thusexposingwhatpleaseshim,Serenusis notseeking
to revealwhatarehis profounddesires.His pleasuresarenotthe meansof
revealing what Christianslatercall concupiscensia. For him, it is a question
of his own stateandof addingsomethingto the knowledgeof the moral
precepts.Thisadditionto whatis alreadyknownis a force,theforcewhich
wouldbe ableto transform pureknowledgeandsimpleconsciousnessin a
realwayof living.Andthatis whatSenecatriesto do whenhe usesa set of
persuasivearguments, demonstrations,examples,in ordernotto discovera
still unknowntruthinsideandin thedepthof Serenus'ssoulbutin orderto
explain,if I may say, to whichextenttruthin generalis true.Seneca's
discoursehasforanobjectivenotto addto sometheoretical principlea force
of coercioncomingfromelsewherebutto transform themin a victorious
force.Senecahasto give a placeto truthas a force.
Hence,I think,severalconsequences. First,in thisgamebetweenSerenus's
confessionandSeneca'sconsultation, truth,as you see, is notdefinedby a
correspondence to realitybutas a forceinherentto principlesandwhichhas
to be developedin a discourse.Two,this truthis not somethingwhichis
hiddenbehindor underthe consciousnessin the deepestandmostobscure
partof the soul.It is somethingwhichis beforetheindividualas a pointof
a kindof magneticforcewhichattracts
attraction, himtowardsa goal.Three,
thistruthis notobtainedby ananalyticalexploration of whatis supposedto
be realin the individualbutby rhetoricalexplanation of whatis good for
anyonewhowantsto approach thelife of a sage.Four,theconfessionis not
orientedtowardan individualization of Serenusby the discoveryof some
personalcharacteristics buttowardstheconstitution of a self whichcouldbe
at the sametime andwithoutany discontinuity subjectof knowledgeand
subjectof will. Five,22we can see thatsuch a practiceof confessionand
consultationremains within the frameworkof what the Greeks for a long
time called the gnome. The term gnome designates the unity of will and
knowledge; it designatesalso a brief piece of discoursethroughwhich truth
210 POLITICAL
THEORY
/ May1993
appearedwith all its force and encrustsitself in the soul of people.3 Then,
we could say that even as late as the first centuryA.D., the type of subject
which is proposedas a model andas a targetin the Greek,orin the Hellenistic
or Roman,philosophy,is a gnomic self, where force of the truthis one with
the form of the will.
In this model of the gnomic self, we found severalconstitutiveelements:

the necessity of telling truthabout oneself, the role of the master and the
master's discourse, the long way that leads finally to the emergence of the
self. All those elements, we find them also in the Christiantechnologies of
the self, but with a very differentorganization.I should say, in sum, and I'll
conclude there, thatas far as we followed the practicesof self-examination
and confession in the Hellenistic or Romanphilosophy,you see thatthe self
is not something that has to be discovered or decipheredas a very obscure
text. You see that the task is not to put in the light what would be the most
obscurepartof our selves. The self has, on the contrary,not to be discovered
but to be constituted,to be constitutedthroughthe force of truth.This force
lies in24the rhetoricalquality of the master'sdiscourse, and this rhetorical
quality dependsfor a parton the expose of the disciple, who has to explain
how far he is in his way of living from the trueprinciplesthat he knows.25
And I think thatthis organizationof the self as a target,the organizationof
what I call the gnomic self, as the objective, the aim, towards which the
confession andthe self-examinationis oriented,is somethingdeeply different
of what we meet in the Christiantechnologies of the self. In the Christian
technologies of the self, the problemis to discover whatis hiddeninside the
self; the self is like a text or like a book that we have to decipher,and not
somethingwhich has to be constructedby the superposition,the superimpo-
sition, of the will andthe truth.This organization,this Christianorganization,
so differentfrom the paganone, is somethingwhich is I thinkquitedecisive
for the genealogy of the modernself, and that's the point I'll try to explain
next week when we meet again. Thankyou.
CHRISTIANITY AND CONFESSION
The theme of this lectureis the same as the theme of last week's lecture.26
The theme is: how was formedin our societies what I would like to call the
interpretiveanalysisof the self; or, how was formedthe hermeneuticsof the
Foucault OFTHESELF 211
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self in the modern,or at least in the Christianand the modern,societies? In

spite of the fact that we can find very early in the Greek,in the Hellenistic,
in the Latin cultures,techniquessuch as self-examinationand confession, I
thinkthatthereare very largedifferencesbetweenthe Latinand Greek-the
Classical-techniques of the self andthe techniquesdevelopedin Christian-
ity. And I'll try to show this evening thatthe modernhermeneuticsof the self
is rootedmuchmorein those Christiantechniquesthanin the Classicalones.
The gnothi seauton is, I think,much less influentialin our societies, in our
culture,than is supposedto be.
As everybodyknows, Christianityis a confession. ThatmeansthatChris-
tianitybelongs to a very special type of religion, the religions which impose
on those who practicethem obligationof truth.Such obligationsin Christi-
anityarenumerous;for instance,a Christianhas the obligationto hold as true
a set of propositionswhich constitutesa dogma;or, he has the obligationto
hold certainbooks as a permanentsourceof truth;or,27he has the obligation
to accept the decisions of certainauthoritiesin mattersof truth.28
ButChristianity requiresanotherformof truthobligationquitedifferentfrom
thoseI just mentioned.Everyone,everyChristian,has thedutyto knowwho he
is, whatis happeningin him.He hasto knowthefaultshe mayhavecommitted:
he hasto knowthetemptationsto whichhe is exposed.And,moreover,everyone
in Christianityis obligedto say thesethingsto otherpeople,to tell thesethings
to otherpeople, andhence,to bearwitnessagainsthimself.
A few remarks.These two ensemblesof obligations,those regardingthe
faith, the book, the dogma, and the obligationsregardingthe self, the soul,
the heart,are linkedtogether.A Christianis always supposedto be supported
by the light of faith if he wantsto explore himself, and,conversely,access to
the truthof the faith cannot be conceived of withoutthe purificationof the
soul. As Augustine said, in a Latin formulaI'm sure you'll understand,qui
facit veritatemvenit ad lucem. Thatmeans:facite veritatem,"to make truth
inside oneself," and venire ad lucem, "to get access to the light." Well, to
make truthinside of oneself, andto get access to the light of God, and so on,
those two processes are stronglyconnectedin the Christianexperience.But
those two relationshipsto truth,you can find themequallyconnected,as you
know, in Buddhism,and they were also connected in all the Gnostic move-
ments of the first centuries.But there,either in Buddhismor in the Gnostic
movements, those two relationshipsto truthwere connected in such a way
that they were almost identified. To discover the truth inside oneself, to
decipherthe real natureand the authenticorigin of the soul, was considered
by the Gnosticistsas one thing with coming throughto the light.29
On the contrary,one of the main characteristicsof orthodoxChristianity,
one of the main differencesbetween ChristianityandBuddhism,or between
212 THEORY
POLITICAL / May1993
Christianityand Gnosticism,one of the mainreasonsfor the mistrustof

towardmystics,andoneof themostconstanthistoricalfeatures
Christianity
is thatthosetwo systemsof obligation,of truthobligation-
of Christianity,
theoneconcernedwithaccessto lightandtheoneconcernedwiththemaking
of truth,the discoveringof truthinside oneself-those two systemsof
obligationhavealwaysmaintained a relativeautonomy.EvenafterLuther,
even in Protestantism,the secretsof the soulandthemysteriesof thefaith,
theself andthebook,arenotin Christianity by exactlythesame
enlightened
typeof light.Theydemanddifferentmethodsandputintooperationpartic-
ulartechniques.
Well,let'sputasidethelonghistoryof theircomplexandoftenconflictual
relationsbeforeand afterthe Reformation. I'd like this eveningto focus
attentionon the secondof thosetwo systemsof obligation.I'd like to focus
on the obligationimposedon everyChristianto manifestthe truthabout
himself.Whenonespeaksof confessionandself-examination inChristianity,
one of coursehas in mind the sacramentof penanceand the canonic
confessionof sins. But these are ratherlate innovationsin Christianity.
Christiansof the first centuriesknew completelydifferentformsfor the
showingforthof thetruthaboutthemselves,andyou'llfindtheseobligations
of manifestingthe truthaboutoneself in two differentinstitutions-in
penitentialrites andmonasticlife. And I wouldlike firstto examinethe
penitentialritesandtheobligationsof truth,thetruthobligationswhichare
related,whichareconnectedwiththosepenitentialrites.I will notenter,of
course,intothediscussionswhichhavetakenplaceandwhichcontinueuntil
now as to the progressivedevelopment of theserites.I wouldlike only to
underlineonefundamental fact:in thefirstcenturiesof Christianity, penance
was not an act.Penance,in the firstcenturiesof Christianity, penanceis a
status,whichpresentsseveralcharacteristics. Thefunctionof thisstatusis to
avoid the definitiveexpulsionfrom the churchof a Christianwho has
committedoneorseveralserioussins.As penitent,thisChristian is excluded
frommanyof the ceremoniesandcollectiverites,buthe does notceaseto
be a Christian,andby meansof thisstatushe canobtainhis reintegration.
Andthisstatusis thereforea long-termaffair.Thisstatusaffectsmostaspects
of hislife- fastingobligations,rulesaboutclothing,interdictions on sexual
relations-andtheindividualis markedto suchanextentby thisstatusthat
evenafterhisreconciliation,afterhisreintegration in thecommunity, he will
stillsufferfroma certainnumberof prohibitions (forinstance,he willnotbe
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able to become a priest). So penanceis not an act correspondingto a sin; it

is a status,a general statusin the existence.
Now, amongstthe elements of this status,the obligation to manifest the
truthis fundamental.I don't say that enunciationof sins is fundamental;I
employa muchmoreimpreciseandobscureexpression.I say thatmanifestation
of the truthis necessaryandis deeplyconnectedwiththis statusof penance.In
fact, to designatethe truthgames or the truthobligationsinherentto penitents,
the Greekfathersused a word,a very specificword(andveryenigmaticalso);
the wordexomologesis.Thiswordwas so specificthateven Latinwriters,Latin
fathers,oftenusedthe Greekwordwithouteven translatingit.30
Whatdoes thistermexomologesismean?In a verygeneralsense, the word
refers to the recognitionof an act, but more precisely,in the penitentialrite,
what was the exomologesis?Well, at the end of the penitentialprocedure,at
the end andnot at the beginning,at the end of the penitentialprocedure,when
the momentof the reintegrationcame, an episode took place which the texts
regularlycall exomologesis.Some descriptionsare very earlyand some very
late, but they are quite identical. Tertullian,for instance, at the end of the
second century,describesthe ceremonyin the following manner.He wrote,
"Thepenitentwears a hair shirtand ashes. He is wretchedlydressed. He is
taken by the hand and led into the church.He prostrateshimself before the
widows and the priest. He hangs on the skirts of their garments.He kisses
theirknees."3'And muchlaterafterthis, in the beginningof the fifth century,
Jerome describedin the same way the penitence of Fabiola. Fabiola was a
woman, a well-knownRomannoblewoman,who hadmarrieda second time
before the death of her first husband,which was something quite bad, and
she then was obliged to do penance.And Jeromedescribesthusthis penance:
"During the days which preceded Easter,"which was the moment of the
reconciliation,
duringthedayswhichprecededEaster,Fabiolawasto be foundamongtheranksof the

Thebishop,thepriests,andthepeopleweptwithher.Herhairdisheveled,
penitents. her
facepale,herhandsdirty,herheadcoveredin ashes,shechastened
hernakedbreastand
thefacewithwhichshehadseducedhersecondhusband. Sherevealedto allherwound,
andRome,in tears,contemplated thescarson heremaciatedbody.32
No doubtJeromeandTertullianwere liable to be rathercarriedaway by such

things;however,in Ambroseand in othersone finds indicationswhich show
clearly the existence of an episode of dramaticself-revelationat the moment
of the reconciliationof the penitent.Thatwas, specifically,the exomologesis.
But the term of exomologesis does not apply only to this final episode.
Frequentlythe word exomologesis is used to designate everythingthat the
penitentdoes to obtainhis reconciliationduringthe time in which he retains

the status of penitent. The acts by which he punishes himself must be
indissociable from the acts by which he reveals himself. The punishmentof
oneself and the voluntaryexpressionof oneself are boundtogether.
A correspondentof Cyprianin the middle of the thirdcenturywrites, for
instance, that those who wish to do penance must, I quote, "prove their
suffering, show their shame, make visible their humility, and exhibit their
modesty."33And, in the Paraenesis, Pacian says that the true penance is
accomplishednot in a nominalfashionbut finds its instrumentsin sackcloth,
ashes, fasting, affliction,andthe participationof a greatnumberof people in
prayers.In a few words, penancein the first Christiancenturiesis a way of
life acted out at all times out of an obligationto show oneself. And that is,
exactly, exomologesis.34
As you see, this exomologesis did not obey to a judicial principle of
correlation, of exact correlation,adjusting the punishmentto the crime.
Exomologesis obeyed a law of dramaticemphasisand of maximumtheatri-
cality.And, neitherdid this exomologesisobey a truthprincipleof correspon-
dence between verbalenunciationand reality.As you see, no descriptionin
this exomologesis is of a penance;no confession, no verbalenumerationof
sins, no analysis of the sins, but somatic expressionsand symbolic expres-
sions. Fabiola did not confess her fault, telling to somebody what she has
done, but she put under everybody's eyes the flesh, the body, which has
committedthe sin. And, paradoxically,the exomologesis is this time to rub
out the sin, restitutethe previous purity acquiredby baptism, and this by
showing the sinneras he is in his reality-dirty, defiled, sullied.35
Tertullianhas a wordto translatethe Greekwordexomologesis;he said it
was publicatio sui, the Christianhad to publish himself.36Publish oneself,
thatmeans thathe has two thingsto do. One has to show oneself as a sinner;
that means, as somebody who, choosing the path of the sin, preferred
filthinessto purity,earthanddustto heaven,spiritualpovertyto the treasures
of faith. In a word, he has to show himself as somebody who preferred
spiritualdeathto earthenlife. And thatwas the reasonwhy exomologesiswas
a kind of representationof death.It was the theatricalrepresentationof the
sinneras deador as dying.But thisexomologesiswas also a way for the sinner
to express his will to get free from this world, to get rid of his own body, to
destroyhis own flesh, andget access to a new spirituallife. It is the theatrical
representationof the sinner as willing his own death as a sinner.It is the
dramaticmanifestationof the renunciationto oneself.
Tojustify this exomologesis and this renunciationto oneself in manifest-
ing the truthaboutoneself, Christianfathershadrecourseto severalmodels.
The well-known medical model was very often used in pagan philosophy:
one has to show his wounds to the physiciansif he wants to be healed. They
also used thejudicial model: one always appeasesthe court when spontane-
ously confessing the faults.37But the most importantmodel to justify the
necessity of exomologesisis the model of martyrdom.The martyris he who
prefersto face deathratherthanto abandonhis faith.38The sinnerabandons
the faith in orderto keep the life of here below; he will be reinstatedonly if
in his turnhe exposes himself voluntarilyto a sortof martyrdomto which all
will be witnesses, andwhich is penance,or penanceas exomologesis.39 Such
a demonstrationdoes not thereforehave as its functionthe establishmentof
the personal identity. Rather, such a demonstrationserves to mark this
dramaticdemonstrationof what one is: the refusal of the self, the breaking
off from one's self. One recalls what was the objective of Stoic technology:
it was to superimpose,as I tried to explain to you last week, the subject of
knowledge and the subjectof will by means of the perpetualrememorizing
of the rules.The formulawhich is at the heartof exomologesisis, in contrary,
ego non sum ego. The exomologesis seeks, in opposition to the Stoic tech-
niques, to superimposeby an act of violent rupturethe truthabout oneself
and the renunciationof oneself. In the ostentatiousgestures of maceration,
self-revelationin exomologesisis, at the same time, self-destruction.
Well, if we turnto the confession in monasticinstitutions,it is of course

quitedifferentfromthis exomologesis.In the Christianinstitutionsof the first
centuriesanotherform of confession is to be found, very differentfrom this
one. It is the organizedconfession in the monasticcommunities.In a certain
way, this confession is close to the exercise practicedin the paganschools of
philosophy. There is nothing astonishing in this, since the monastic life
presenteditself as the trueformof philosophicallife, and the monasterywas
presentedas the school of philosophy.Thereis an obvious transferof several
technologies of the self in Christianspiritualityfrom practices of pagan
philosophy.
Concerningthis continuityI'll quote only one witness, JohnChrysostom,
who describes an examinationof conscience which has exactly the same
form, the same shape,the same administrativecharacter,as thatdescribedby
Seneca in the De Ira and which I spoke aboutlast week. John Chrysostom
says, andyou'll recognizeexactly (well, nearly)the samewordsas in Seneca.
Chrysostomwrites,
It is in the morningthatwe musttake accountof our expenses, then it is in the evening,

after our meal, when we have gone to bed and no one troublesus and disquietsus, that
216 THEORY/May1993
POLITICAL
we mustaskourselvesto renderaccountof ourconductto ourselves.Letus examine

whatis to ouradvantageandwhatis prejudicial.Letus ceasespendinginappropriately
andtryto set asideusefulfundsin the placeof harmfulexpenses,prayersin placeof
indiscretewords.40
You'll recognize exactly the same administrativeself-examinationyou could

find last week with Seneca. But these kinds of ancient practices were
modified under the influence of two fundamentalelements of Christian
spirituality:the principleof obedience, and the principleof contemplation.
First, the principleof obedience-we have seen that in the ancient schools
of philosophy the relationshipbetween the masterand the disciple was, if I
may say, instrumentaland provisory.The obedience of the disciple was
foundedon the capacityof the masterto lead him to a happyandautonomous
life. For a long series of reasonsthatI haven'ttime to discus here, obedience
has very differentfeaturesin the monasticlife and above all, of course,in the
cenobite communities.Obediencein the monasticinstitutionsmust bear on
all the aspects of life; there is an adage, very well known in the monastic
literature,which says, "everythingthat one does not do on orderof one's
director,or everythingthat one does without his permission, constitutes a
theft."Therefore,obedience is a permanentrelationship,and even when the
monk is old, even when he became, in his turn,a master,even then he has to
keep the spiritof obedience as a permanentsacrificeof his own will.
Anotherfeaturedistinguishesmonasticdiscipline from the philosophical
life. In the monastic life, the supremegood is not the mastershipof oneself;
the supreme good in the monastic life is the contemplationof God. The
obligationof the monkis continuouslyto turnhis thoughtsto thatsingle point
whichis God, andhis obligationis also to makesurethathis heart,his soul, and
the eye of his soul is pureenoughto see God andto receivelightfromhim.
Placed underthis principleof obedience, and orientedtowardsthe objec-
tive of contemplation,you understandthatthe technology of the self which
develops in Christianmonasticism presents peculiar characteristics.John
Cassian's Institutionesand Collationes give a rathersystematic and clear
expose of self-examinationand of the confession as they were practiced
among the Palestinianand Egyptianmonks.4'And I'll follow several of the
indications you can find in those two books, which were written in the
beginningof the fifth century.First,aboutthe self-examination,the firstpoint
about the self-examinationin the monasticlife is that the self-examination
in this kindof Christianexercise is muchmoreconcernedwith thoughtsthan
with actions. Since he has to turnhis thoughtcontinuouslytowardsGod, you
understandvery well thatthe monk has to take in handnot the course of his
actions, as the Stoic philosopher;he has to take in hand the course of his
Foucault
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OFTHESELF 217
thoughts.Not only the passions which might make vacillate the firmness of
his conduct;he has to take in handthe images which presentthemselves to
the spirit, the thoughts which come to interfere with contemplation, the
diverse suggestionswhichturnthe attentionof the spiritaway fromits object,
thatmeans away fromGod. So muchso thatthe primarymaterialfor scrutiny
and for the examinationof the self is an area anteriorto actions, of course,
anteriorto will also, even an area anteriorto the desires-a much more
tenaciousmaterialthanthe materialthe Stoic philosopherhad to examine in
himself. The monk has to examine a materialwhich the Greek fatherscall
(almost always pejoratively)the logismoi, that is in Latin, cogitationes, the
nearlyimperceptiblemovementsof the thoughts,the permanentmobility of
soul.42That's the materialwhich the monk has to continuouslyexamine in
order to maintainthe eye of his spirit always directed towards the unique
point which is God. But, when the monk scrutinizeshis own thoughts,what
is he concernedwith? Not of course with the relationbetween the idea and
the reality.He is not concernedwith this truthrelationwhich makes an idea
wrong or true.He is not interestedin the relationshipbetween his mind and
the externalworld. Whathe is concernedwith is the nature,the quality,the
substanceof his thoughts.
We must, I think,pause for a momenton this importantpoint. In orderto
make comprehensiblewhat this permanentexaminationconsists in, Cassian
uses three comparisons.He uses first the comparisonof the mill. Thought,
says Cassian, thoughtis like a millstone which grindsthe grains.The grains
are of course the ideas which presentcontinuouslythemselves in the mind.
And in the comparisonof the millstone, it is up to the miller to sort out
amongst the grainsthose which are bad and those which can be admittedto
the millstone because they are good. Cassian has recourse also to the
comparisonof the officer who has the soldiersfile past him and makes them
pass to the right or to the left, allotting to each his task according to his
capacities. And lastly, and that I think is the most important,the most
interesting, Cassian says that one must be with respect to oneself like a
moneychanger to whom one presents coins, and whose task consists in
examiningthem, verifyingtheirauthenticity,so as to acceptthose which are
authenticwhilst rejecting those which are not. Cassian develops this com-
parisonat length. When a moneychangerexamines a coin, says Cassian,the
moneychangerlooks at the effigy the money bears,he considersthe metal of
which it is made,to know whatit is andif it is pure.The moneychangerseeks
to know the workshopfrom which it comes, and he weighs it in his handin
order to know if it has been filed down or ill-used. In the same way, says
Cassian,one must verify the qualityof one's thoughts,one must know if they
really bear the effigy of God; that is to say, if they really permit us to
contemplatehim, if their surface brilliancedoes not hide the impurityof a

bad thought. What is their origin? Do they come from God, or from the
workshopof the demon?Finally,even if they are of good qualityandorigin,
have they not been whittledaway and rustedby evil sentiments?
I think that this form of examination is at the same time new and
historicallyimportant.PerhapsI have insisted a little too much with regard
to the Stoics on the fact that their examination,the Stoic examination,was
concernedwith acts andrules.One mustrecognize,however,the importance
of the questionof truthwith the Stoic, butthe questionwas presentedin terms
of true or false opinions favorable to forming good or bad actions. For
Cassian,the problemis not to know if thereis a conformitybetween the idea
and the orderof externalthings;it is a questionof examiningthe thoughtin
itself. Does it really show its true origin, is it as pure as it seems, have not
foreign elements insidiously mixed themselves with it? Altogether, the
question is not "Am I wrong to think such a thing?"but "Have I not been
deceived by the thoughtwhich has come to me?"Is the thoughtwhich comes
to me, and independentlyof the truthas to the things it represents,is there
not an illusion aboutmyself on my part?For instance,the idea comes to me
thatfastingis a good thing.The idea is certainlytrue,butmaybethis idea has
been suggested not by God but by Satan in orderto put me in competition
with other monks, and then bad feelings aboutthe otherones can be mixed
to the projectof fasting more than I do. So, the idea is true in regardto the
externalworld, or in regardto the rules, but the idea is impuresince from its
origin it is rooted in bad sentiments.And we have to decipherour thoughts
as subjectivedatawhich have to be interpreted,which have to be scrutinized,
in theirroots and in theirorigins.
It is impossible not to be struckby the similarityof this general theme,
and the similarityof this image of the moneychanger,and several texts of
Freudaboutcensorship.One could say thatFreudiancensorshipis both the
same thing and the reverse of Cassian'schanger;both the Cassian changer
and the Freudiancensorshiphave to control the access to consciousness-
they have to let some representationsin andto rejectthe others.But Cassian's
changerhas for a functionto decipherwhatis false or illusoryin whatpresents
itself to consciousness and then to let in only what is authentic.For that
purpose the Cassian moneychangeruses a specific aptitudethat the Latin
fatherscalled discretio.43The Freudiancensorshipis, comparedto the Cass-
ian changer,both more perverse and more naive. The Freudiancensorship
rejects that what presentsitself as it is, and the Freudiancensorshipaccepts
that what is sufficiently disguised. Cassian's changer is a truth-operator
throughdiscretio;Freudiancensorshipis a falsehood-operatorthroughsym-
bolization. But I don't want to go furtherin such a parallel; it's only an
indication,but I think that the relationsbetween Freudianpractice and the

Christiantechniquesof spiritualitycould be, if seriously done, a very inter-
esting field of research.44
But we have to go further,for the problemis, how is it possible to perform,
as Cassianwishes, how is it possible to performcontinuouslythis necessary
self-examination,this necessaryself-controlof the tiniest movementsin the
thoughts?How is it possible to performthis necessaryhermeneuticsof our
own thoughts? The answer given by Cassian and his inspiratorsis both
obvious and surprising.The answergiven by Cassianis, well, you interpret
your thoughtsby telling them to the masteror to your spiritualfather.You
interpretyour thoughtsby confessing not of course your acts, not confessing
your faults, but in confessing continuouslythe movementyou can notice in
yourthought.Why is this confession able to assumethis hermeneuticalrole?
One reasoncomes to the mind:in exposing the movementsof his heart,the
disciple permits his seigneur to know those movements and, thanks to his
greaterexperience, to his greaterwisdom, the seigneur, the spiritualfather,
can betterunderstandwhat's happening.His senioritypermitshim to distin-
guish between truthand illusion in the soul of the personhe directs.
But that is not the principalreason that Cassian invokes to explain the
necessity of confession. Thereis for Cassiana specific virtueof verification
in this act of verbalization.Amongst all the examples that Cassian quotes
there is one which is particularlyenlighteningon this point. Cassian quotes
the following anecdote:a young monk, Serapion,incapableof enduringthe
obligatoryfast, stole every evening a loaf of bread.But of course he did not
dareto confess it to his spiritualdirector,and one day this spiritualdirector,
who no doubt guessed all, gives a public sennon on the necessity of being
truthful.Convincedby this sermon,the young Serapiontakesout from under
his robe the bread that he has stolen and shows it to everyone. Then he
prostrateshimself andconfesses the secret of his daily meal, and then, not at
the momentwhen he showed the breadhe has stolen, but at the very moment
when he confesses, verbally confesses, the secret of his daily meal, at this
very moment of the confession, a light seems to tear itself away from his
body and cross the room, in spreadinga disgustingsmell of sulphur.
One sees that in this anecdotethe decisive element is not thatthe master
knows the truth.It is not even thatthe young monkrevealshis act andrestores
the object of his theft. It is the confession, the verbalact of confession, which
comes last and which makes appear,in a certainsense, by its own mechanics,
the truth,the reality of what has happened.The verbal act of confession is
the proof,is the manifestation,of truth.Why?Well, I thinkit is because what
marksthe differencebetween good and evil thoughts,following Cassian, is
that the evil ones cannot be referredto without difficulty.If one blushes in
recountingthem, if one seeks to hide his own thoughts,if even quite simply
one hesitatesto tell his thoughts,thatis the proof thatthose thoughtsare not
good as they may appear.Evil inhabitsthem. Thus verbalizationconstitutes
a way of sorting out thoughtswhich presentthemselves. One can test their
value accordingto whetherthey resistverbalizationor not. Cassiangives the
reason of this resistance:Satanas principleof evil is incompatiblewith the
light, and he resists when confession dragshim from the darkcavernsof the
conscience into the light of explicit discourse. I quote Cassian: "A bad
thoughtbroughtinto the lightof dayimmediatelyloses its veneer.Theterrible
serpentthat this confession has forced out of its subterraneanlair, to throw
it out into the light and make its shame a public spectacle,is quick to beat a
retreat."45 Does thatmean thatit would be sufficientfor the monk to tell his
thoughtsaloud even when alone?Of course not. The presenceof somebody,
even if he does not speak, even if it is a silent presence, this presence is
requestedfor this kind of confession, because the abbe, or the brother,or the
spiritualfather,who listens at this confession is the image of God. And the
verbalizationof thoughtsis a way to put underthe eyes of God all the ideas,
images, suggestions, as they come to consciousness, and underthis divine
light they show necessarilywhat they are.
From this, we can see (1) that verbalizationin itself has an interpretive
function. Verbalizationcontains in itself a power of discretio.46(2) This
verbalizationis not a kind of retrospectionabout past acts. Verbalization,
Cassianimposes to monks, this verbalizationhas to be a permanentactivity,
as contemporaneousas possible of the streamof thoughts.(3) This verbal-
ization must go as deep as possible in the depth of the thoughts. These,
whateverthey are,have an inapparentorigin,obscureroots, secretparts,and
the role of verbalizationis to excavate these origins and those secret parts.
(4) As verbalizationbrings to the externallight the deep movement of the
thought,it leads also and by the same processthe humansoul fromthe reign
of Satan to the law of God. That means that verbalizationis a way for the
conversion47(for the metanoia,said the Greekfathers),for the conversionto
develop itself and to take effect. Since underthe reign of Satanthe human
being was attachedto himself, verbalizationas a movementtowardGod is a
renunciation to Satan, and a renunciationto oneself. Verbalizationis a
self-sacrifice. To this permanent,exhaustive,and sacrificialverbalizationof
the thoughtswhich was obligatoryfor the monksin the monasticinstitution,
to this permanentverbalizationof the thoughts,the Greek fathersgave the
name of exagoreusis.'
Thus, as you see, in the Christianityof the first centuries,the obligation
to tell the truthaboutoneself was to take two majorforms,the exomologesis
and the exagoreusis,and as you see they are very differentfrom one another.
On the one hand,the exomologesis is a dramaticexpressionby the penitent

of his statusof sinner,and this in a kindof public manifestation.On the other
hand,the exagoreusis,we have an analyticalandcontinuousverbalizationof
the thoughts, and in this relation of complete obedience to the will of the
spiritualfather.But it must be remarkedthatthis verbalization,as I just told
you, is also a way of renouncingself and no longerwishing to be the subject
of the will. Thusthe rule of confession in exagoreusis,this rule of permanent
verbalization,finds its parallel in the model of martyrdomwhich haunts
exomologesis. The ascetic macerationexercised on the body and the rule of
permanentverbalizationappliedto the thoughts,the obligationto macerate
the body and the obligation of verbalizingthe thoughts-those things are
deeply andclosely related.They aresupposedto have the same goals andthe
same effect. So much that one can isolate as the common element to both
practices the following principle:the revelation of the truthabout oneself
cannot, in those two early Christianexperiences,the revelationof the truth
aboutoneself cannotbe dissociatedfrom the obligationto renounceoneself.
We have to sacrifice the self in orderto discover the truthaboutourself, and
we have to discoverthe truthaboutourselfin orderto sacrificeourself.Truth
and sacrifice, the truthaboutourself and the sacrifice of ourself, are deeply
and closely connected.And we have to understandthis sacrifice not only as
a radicalchange in the way of life but as the consequenceof a formulalike
this: you will become the subjectof the manifestationof truthwhen andonly
when you disappearor you destroy yourself as a real body or as a real
existence.
Let's stophere.I have beenbothtoo long andmuchtoo schematic.I would

like you to considerwhatI have saidonly as a pointof departure,one of those
small originsthatNietzsche likedto discoverat the beginningof greatthings.
The great things that those monastic practices announcedare numerous.I
will mention, just before I finish, a few of them. First, as you see, the
apparitionof a new kind of self, or at least a new kind of relationshipto our
selves. You rememberwhat I told you last week: the Greek technology, or
the philosophicaltechniques,of the self tendedto producea self which could
be, which should be, the permanentsuperpositionin the form of memory of
the subjectof knowledge and the subjectof the will.49
I think that in Christianitywe see the development of a much more
complex technology of the self. This technology of the self maintainsthe
difference between knowledge of being, knowledge of word, knowledge of
nature,and knowledgeof the self, andthis knowledgeof the self takes shape
in the constitutionof thoughtas a field of subjective data which are to be

interpreted.And, the role of interpreteris assumedby the work of a contin-
uous verbalizationof the most imperceptiblemovements of the thought-
that's the reason we could say that the Christianself which is correlatedto
this techniqueis a gnosiologic self.
And the second point which seems to me importantis this:you may notice
in early Christianityan oscillation between the truth-technologyof the self
oriented toward the manifestationof the sinner, the manifestationof the
being-what we would call the ontological temptationof Christianity,and
that is the exomologesis-and anothertruth-technologyorientedtowardthe
discursive and permanentanalysis of the thought-that is the exagoreusis,
and we could see therethe epistemologicaltemptationof Christianity.And,
as you know, after a lot of conflicts and fluctuation,the second form of
technology,this epistemologicaltechnologyof the self, or this technology of
the self oriented towardthe permanentverbalizationand discovery of the
most imperceptiblemovementsof ourself, this formbecamevictoriousafter
centuriesand centuries,and it is nowadaysdominating.
Even in these hermeneuticaltechniquesderivedfrom the exagoreusisthe
productionof truthcould not be met, you remember,without a very strict
condition:hermeneuticsof the self implies the sacrificeof the self. And that
is, I think, the deep contradiction,or, if you want, the great richness, of
Christiantechnologies of the self: no truthaboutthe self withouta sacrifice
of the self.50I think that one of the great problemsof Westernculture has
been to find the possibility of foundingthe hermeneuticsof the self not, as it
was the case in early Christianity,on the sacrifice of the self but, on the
contrary,on a positive, on the theoreticalandpractical,emergenceof the self.
Thatwas the aim of judicial institutions,thatwas the aim also of medicaland
psychiatricpractices,thatwas the aim of politicalandphilosophicaltheory-
to constitutethe groundof the subjectivityas the rootof a positive self, what
we could call the permanentanthropologismof Westernthought.And I think
thatthis anthropologismis linkedto the deep desire to substitutethe positive
figure of man for the sacrifice which for Christianitywas the condition for
the openingof the self as a field of indefiniteinterpretation."1
Duringthe last
two centuries,the problemhas been: what could be the positive foundation
for the technologiesof the self thatwe have been developingduringcenturies
and centuries?But the moment,maybe,is coming for us to ask, do we need,
really, this hermeneuticsof the self?52Maybe the problemof the self is not
to discover what it is in its positivity,maybe the problemis not to discover a
positive self or thepositive foundationof the self. Maybeourproblemis now
to discover that the self is nothingelse than the historicalcorrelationof the
technologybuiltin our history.Maybethe problemis to changethose technol-
ogies.53And in this case, one of the main political problems would be

nowadays,in the strictsense of the word, the politics of ourselves.
Well, I thankyou very much.
NOTES
1. See FrancoisLeuret,Du traitementmoralede lafolie (Paris:J. B. Bailliere, 1840), and

Foucault,Maladiementaleetpsychologie, 3rded. (Paris:PUF, 1966), 85-86; MentalIllness and
Psychology, translatedby Alan Sheridan(New York:Harper& Row, 1976), 72.
2. EdmundHusserl,MeditationsCartesiennes,translatedby GabriellePeifferandEmmanuel
Lewis (Paris:ArmanColin, 1931); CartesianMeditations:An Introductionto Phenomenology,
translatedby DorianCairns(The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 1973).
3. "wheresociety plays the role of subject"[Howison].
4. "So much for the generalproject.Now a few words on methodology.For this kind of
research, the history of science constitutes a privileged point of view. This might seem
paradoxical.After all, the genealogy of the self does not take place within a field of scientific
knowledge, as if we were nothingelse than that which rationalknowledge could tell us about
ourselves. While the history of science is without doubt an importanttesting ground for the
theory of knowledge, as well as for the analysis of meaningfulsystems, it is also fertile ground
for studyingthe genealogy of subject.Therearetwo reasonsfor this. All the practicesby which
the subject is defined and transformedare accompaniedby the formationof certaintypes of
knowledge, and in the West, for a variety of reasons,knowledge tends to be organizedaround
forms and norms that are more or less scientific. There is also anotherreason maybe more
fundamentaland more specific to our societies. I mean the fact that one of the main moral
obligations for any subjectis to know oneself, to tell the truthaboutoneself, and to constitute
oneself as an object of knowledge both for otherpeople and for oneself. The truthobligationfor
individualsanda scientificorganizationof knowledge;those arethe two reasonswhy the history
of knowledge constitutesa privileged point of view for the genealogy of the subject.
Hence, it follows that I am not tryingto do historyof sciences in general,but only of those
which soughtto constructa scientific knowledge of the subject.Anotherconsequence.I am not
trying to measure the objective value of these sciences, nor to know if they can become
universally valid. That is the task of an epistemological historian.Rather,I am working on a
historyof science thatis, to some extent,regressivehistorythatseeks to discoverthe discursive,
the institutional,and the social practices from which these sciences arose. This would be an
archaeologicalhistory.Finally,the thirdconsequence,this projectseeks to discoverthe point at
which these practices became coherentreflective techniques with definite goals, the point at
which a particulardiscourse emerged from those techniquesand came to be seen as true, the
point at which they are linked with the obligationof searchingfor the truthand telling the truth.
In sum, the aim of my project is to constructa genealogy of the subject. The method is an
archaeology of knowledge, and the precise domain of the analysis is what I should call
technologies. I mean the articulationof certaintechniquesand certainkinds of discourseabout
the subject.
I would like to add one final word aboutthe practicalsignificanceof this form of analysis.
For Heidegger,it was throughan increasingobsession with techne as the only way to arriveat
an understandingof objects, that the Westlost touch with Being. Let's turnthe questionaround
and ask which techniquesand practices form the Westernconcept of the subject, giving it its
characteristicsplit of truthanderror,freedomand constraint.I thinkthatit is herewhere we will
find the real possibility of constructinga historyof what we have done and, at the same time, a
diagnosis of what we are. This would be a theoreticalanalysis which has, at the same time, a
political dimension.By this word 'politicaldimension,'I mean an analysis thatrelatesto what
we are willing to accept in our world, to accept, to refuse, andto change, both in ourselves and
in our circumstances.In sum, it is a questionof searchingfor anotherkindof criticalphilosophy.
Not a critical philosophy that seeks to determinethe conditions and the limits of our possible
knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophythat seeks the conditionsand the indefinite
possibilities of transformingthe subject,of transformingourselves"[Howison].
5. Les Mots et les choses (Paris:Gallimard,1966); TheOrderof Things,translatedby Alan
Sheridan(New York:Pantheon,1970).
6. Naissance de la clinique(Paris:PressesUniversitairesde France,1963, 1972); TheBirth
of the Clinic, translatedby Alan Sheridan(New York:Pantheon,1973) and Surveilleret punir
(Paris: Gallimard, 1975); Discipline and Punish, translatedby Alan Sheridan (New York:
Pantheon,1977).
7. La Volonte'de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976); The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An
Introduction,translatedby RobertHurley (New York:Pantheon,1978); L'Usage des plaisirs
(Paris: Gallimard, 1984); The Use of Pleasure, translatedby Robert Hurley (New York:
Pantheon, 1985); Le Souci de soi (Paris:Gallimard,1984); The Care of the Self, translatedby
RobertHurley(New York:Pantheon,1986).
8. JuirgenHabermas,Erkenntnisund Interesse (Frankfurtam Main: SuhrkampVerlag,
1968) andappendixin TechnikundWissenschaftals "Ideologie" (FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1968);Knowledgeand HumanInterests,translatedby JeremyShapiro(Boston:Beacon,
1971), esp. "Appendix:Knowledge andHumanInterests,A GeneralPerspective,"313.
9. Technologiesof the Self: A SeminarwithMichel Foucault,edited by LutherH. Martin,
Huck Gutman,and PatrickH. Hutton(Amherst:Universityof MassachusettsPress, 1988).
10. "andknown"[Howison].
11. "andknow themselves"[Howison].
12. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,edited by GrahamBurchell et al.
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1991).
13. "asthey spoke of it in the sixteenthcentury,of governingchildren,or governingfamily,
or governingsouls" [Howison].
14. Resumede cours, 1970-1982 (Paris:Julliard,1989), 133-66; "Sexualityand Solitude,"
LondonReview of Books 3, no. 9 (May 21-June3, 1981): 3, 5-6.
15. Seneca, "On Anger,"Moral Essays, Volume1, translatedby John W. Basore, Loeb
Classical Library(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1958), 340-41.
16. Le Souci de soi, 77-79; The Care of the Self, 60-62; "L'ecriturede soi," Corpsicrit 5
(February1983): 21.
17. "all of them being a way to incorporatein a constant attitudea code of actions and
reactions,whateversituationmay occur"[Howison].
18. Galen,"Onthe DiagnosisandCureof the Soul's Passions,"in On thePassions andErrors
of the Soul, translatedby Paul W. Harkins(Ohio State UniversityPress, 1963).
19. Plutarch,"How a Man May Become Aware of His Progressin Virtue,"in Moralia,
Volume1, translatedby FrankCole Babbitt,Loeb ClassicalLibrary(New York:Putnam,1927),
400-57, esp. 436-57.
20. Seneca, "On Tranquilityof Mind,"in Moral Essays, Volume2, translatedby John W.
Basore, Loeb ClassicalLibrary(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1935), 202-85, esp.
202-13.
Foucault
/ HERMENEUTICS
OFTHESELF 225
21. "But,throughthisconfession,throughthisdescription of his ownstate,he asksSeneca

to tell himthe truthabouthis own state.Senecais at the sametimeconfessingthetruthand
lackingin truth"[Howison].
22. "Iftheroleof confessionandconsultation is to give placeto truthas a force,it is easy
to understand thatself-examination hasnearlythesamerole.Wehaveseenthatif Senecarecalls
everyeveninghismistakes,it is to memorizethemoralpreceptsof theconduct,andmemoryis
nothingelse thantheforceof thetruthwhenit is permanently presentandactivein thesoul.A
permanent memoryin theindividualandin his innerdiscourse,a persuasiverhetoricsin the
master'sadvice-those arethe aspectsof truthconsidered as a force.Thenwe mayconclude
self-examination andconfessionmaybe in ancientphilosophyconsidered as truth-game, and
important truth-game, buttheobjectiveof thistruth-game is nottodiscovera secretrealityinside
theindividual. Theobjectiveof thistruth-game is to makeof theindividual a placewheretruth
canappearandactasarealforcethrough thepresenceof memoryandtheefficiencyof discourse"
[Howison].
23. "Intheearliestformof Greekphilosophy, poetsanddivinementoldthetruthto ordinary
mortalsthroughthiskindof gnome.Gnomaiwereveryshort,veryimperative, andso deeply
illuminated by thepoeticallightthatit wasimpossible to forgetthemandto avoidtheirpower.
Well,I thinkyou cansee thatself-examination, confession,as you findthem,forinstance,in
Seneca,butalsoin MarcusAurelius,Epictetus, andso on,evenas lateas thefirstcenturyA.D.,
self-examination andconfessionwerestilla kindof development of thegnomni" [Howison].
24. "themnemonicaptitudeof theindividual and"[Howison].
25. "Thesedependinparton artsof memoryandactsof persuasion. So,technologies of the
self in the ancientworldare not linkedwithan artof interpretation, but with artssuch as
mnemotechnics and rhetoric.Self-observation, self-interpretation, self-hermeneutics won't
intervenein thetechnologies of theselfbeforeChristianity" [Howison].
26. [Atthebeginningof thesecondHowisonlecture,Foucaultsaidthefollowing:]"Well,
severalpersonsaskedmeto give a shortresumeof whatI saidlastnight.I willtryto do it as if
it werea goodTV series.So, whathappened in thefirstepisode?Veryfew important things.I
havetriedto explainwhyI wasinterested in thepracticeof self-examination andconfession.
Thosetwopractices seemtometobegoodwitnessesforamajorproblem, whichis thegenealogy
of the modemself. Thisgenealogyhasbeenmy obsessionforyearsbecauseit is one of the
possiblewaysto get ridof a traditional philosophy of thesubject.I wouldliketo outlinethis
genealogyfromthepointof viewof techniques, whatI calltechniques of theself.Amongthese
techniques of theself,themostimportant, in modemsocieties,is, I think,thatwhichdealswith
the interpretive analysisof the subject,with the hermeneutics of the self. How was the
hermeneutics of theselfformed?Thisis thethemeof thetwolectures.Yesterday night,I spoke
aboutGreekandRomantechniquesof the self, or at least abouttwo of thesetechniques,
confessionandself-examination. Itis a factthatwe meetconfessionandself-examination very
oftenin the late HellenisticandRomanphilosophies. Arethey the archetypesof Christian
confessionandself-examination? Aretheytheearlyformsof themodemhermeneutics of the
self?I havetriedto showthattheyarequitedifferentfromthat.Theiraimis not,I think,to
deciphera hiddentruthin thedepthof theindividual. Theiraimis something else. Itis to give
forceto truthin theindividual. Theiraimis to constitutetheself as theidealunityof thewill
andthetruth.Well,nowlet us turntowardChristianity as thecradleof Westernhermeneutics
of theself."
27. "atleastin theCatholicbranchof Christianity" [Howison].
28. "obligations notonlyto believein certainthingsbutalsoto showthatonebelievesin
them.EveryChristian is obligedto manifesthisfaith"[Howison].
29. "If the gnomic self of the Greekphilosophers,of which I spoke yesterdayevening, had
to be built as an identificationbetween the force of the truthand the formof the will, we could
say that there is a gnostic self. This is the gnostic self that we can find describedin Thomas
Evangiliumor the Manicheantexts. This gnostic self has to be discoveredinside the individual,
but as a part,as a forgottensparkleof the primitivelight" [Howison].
30. Technologiesof the Self, 39-43.
31. Tertullian,"On Repentance,"in TheAnte-Nicene Fathers, edited by A. Roberts and
J. Donaldson (GrandRapids, MI: Eerdmans,n.d., repr.1979), 657-68, esp. " Exomologesis,"
chaps. 9-12, 664-66.
32. Jerome,"LetterLXXVII, to Oceanus,"in ThePrincipal Worksof St. Jerome,translated
by W. H. Freemantle,vol. 6 in A Select Libraryof Nicene and Post-NiceneFathers (New York:
ChristianLiteratureCo., 1893), 157-62, esp. 159-60.
33. Cyprian, "LetterXXXVI, from the Priests and Deacons Abiding in Rome to Pope
Cyprian,"in Saint Cyprian:Letters(1-81), 90-94at 93, translatedby SisterRose BernardDonna,
C.S.J., vol. 51 in The Fathers of the Church(Washington,DC: CatholicUniversityof America
Press, 1964).
34. "This form,attestedto from the end of the second century,will subsistfor an extremely
long time in Christianity,since one finds its after-effectsin the ordersof penitentsso important
in the fifteenthand sixteenthcentury.One can see thatthe procedurefor showing forththe truth
are multipleand complex in it. Certainacts of exomologesistake place in privatebut most are
addressedto the public"[Howison].
35. "Thegreaterpartof the acts which constitutepenancehas the role not of telling the truth
about the sin; it has the role of showing the true being of the sinner,or the true sinful being of
the subject.The Tertullianexpression,publicatiosui, is not a way to say the sinnerhas to explain
his sins. The expressionmeanshe has to producehimself as a sinnerin his realityof sinner.And
now the question is why the showing forthof the sinnershould be efficient to efface the sins"
[Howison].
36. "OnRepentance,"chap. 10.
37. "Theday of judgment,the Devil himself will standup to accuse the sinner.If the sinner
has already anticipatedhim by accusing himself, the enemy will be obliged to remainquiet"
[Howison].
38. "Itmustnot be forgottenthatthe practiceand the theoryof penitencewere elaboratedto
a great extent aroundthe problemof the relapsed.... The relapsedabandonsthe faith in order
to keep the life of here below" [Howison].
39. "In brief, penance insofar as it is a reproductionof martyrdomis an affirmationof
change-of rupturewith one's self, with one's past metanoia,of a rupturewith the world, and
with all previouslife" [Howison].
40. See esp. St. John Chrysostom,"HomilyXLII,"on Matthew 12:33, in St. Chrysostom:
Homilies on the Gospel of St. Matthew,edited by Phillip Schaff, vol. 10 in A Select Libraryof
the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (GrandRapids,MI: Eerdmans,repr.1975), 271.
41. John Cassian,De InstitutionesCoenobiorumand CollationesPatrum,edited by Phillip
Schaff, in vol. 11 of A Select Libraryof Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (GrandRapids, MI:
Eerdmans,repr.1973).
42. "Thisis the soul thatCassiandescribedwith two Greekwords[undecipherable].Itmeans
that the soul is always moving and moving in all directions"[Howison].
43. "andthe Greekfatherscalled diacrisis" [Howison].
44. "WhatI would like to insist uponthis evening is somethingelse, or, at least, something
indirectly related to that. There is something really importantin the way Cassian poses the
problemof truthaboutthe thought.Firstof all, thoughts(not desires, not passions,not attitudes,
not acts) appearin Cassian'swork and in all the spiritualityit representsas a field of subjective
data which have to be consideredand analyzedas an object. And I thinkthat is the firsttime in
history that thoughtsare consideredas possible objects for an analysis. Second, thoughtshave
to be analyzednot in relationto theirobject, accordingto objectiveexperience,or accordingto
logical rules, they have to be suspectedsince they can be secretlyaltered,disguisedin theirown
substance.Third,what man needs if he does not want to be the victim of his own thoughtsis a
perpetualhermeneuticsinterpretation,a perpetualwork of hermeneutics.The functionof this
hermeneuticsis to discover the reality hidden inside the thought.Fourth,this reality which is
able to hide in my thoughtsis a power, a powerwhich is not of anothernaturethan my soul, as
is, for instance,the body. The power which hides inside my thoughts,this power is of the same
natureof my thoughtsand of my soul. It is the Devil. It is the presenceof somebodyelse in me.
This constitutionof the thoughtsas a field of subjectivedataneedingan interpretiveanalysis in
orderto discover the power of the other in me is, that is, I think, if we compareit to the Stoic
technologies of the self, a quite new mannerto organize the relationshipsbetween truthand
subjectivity.I think thathermeneuticsof the self begins there"[Howison].
45. JohnCassian,Second Conferenceof AbbotMoses, chap. 11, 312-13 at 312, in vol. 11of
A Select Libraryof Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the ChristianChurch,edited by Philip
Schaft and HenryWace (GrandRapids,MI: Eerdmans,1955).
46. "apower of diacrisis, of differences"[Howison].
47. "forthe ruptureof the self' [Howison].
48. Technologiesof the Self, 43-49.
49. ", what I call the gnomic self. In the beginningof the lecture,I indicatedthatthe Gnostic
movementswere a questionof constitutingan ontologicalunity,the knowledge of the soul and
the knowledge of the being. Then, what could be called the gnostic self could be constitutedin
Christianity"[Howison].
50. "Thecentralityof the confession of sins in Christianityfinds an explanationhere. The
verbalizationof the confession of sins is institutionalizedas a discursivetruth-game,which is a
sacrifice of the subject"[Howison].
51. "Inaddition,we can say thatone of the problemsof Westernculturewas: how could we
save the hermeneuticsof the self and get rid of the necessary sacrifice of the self which was
linked to this hermeneuticssince the beginningof Christianity"[Howison].
52. "whichwe have inheritedfromthe firstcenturiesof Christianity?Do we need a positive
man who serves as the foundationof this hermeneuticsof the self?" [Howison].
53. "ormaybe to get rid of those technologies, and then, to get rid of the sacrifice which is
linked to those technologies"[Howison].
MarkBlasius is AssistantProfessor of Political Science at the City Universityof New

York/LaGuardia. His research and publications are concerned with modern and
contemporarypolitical theoryand social thought,and his book A Politics of Sexuality
isforthcoming.Aportion of the argumentof this bookwaspublishedin PoliticalTheory,
Vol.20, No. 4 as"An Ethos of Lesbianand Gay Existence."

Foucault About The Beginnings of The Hermeneutics of The Self

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About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth

Author(s): Michel Foucault

MARKBL4SIUS, City Universityof New York

In the fall of 1980, Michel Foucault visited a number of cities and

the historyof systems of thought(Madnessand Civilization,TheBirthof the

relationsof power thatconstitutemodem social institutions.A politics of our

SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH

In a work consecratedto the moral treatmentof madness and published

To make someone sufferingfrommentalillness recognize thathe is mad

also take into accountthe political conjuncture.Given the absurdityof wars,

of the subjectas a speaking,living, workingbeing.' I have also dealt with the

people, in the broadmeaningof the word,13governingpeople is not a way to

It is well knownthatthe mainobjectiveof the Greekschools of philosophy

Epicureans,and it is also tied to the value accordedto the medical model,

Whatcould be morebeautifulthanto conductan inqueston one's day?Whatsleep better

There is somethingparadoxicalin seeing the Stoics, such as Seneca and

areaskedby themajorphilosophical schoolsof theperiod.Theframework

In this model of the gnomic self, we found severalconstitutiveelements:

CHRISTIANITY AND CONFESSION

self in the modern,or at least in the Christianand the modern,societies? In

Christianityand Gnosticism,one of the mainreasonsfor the mistrustof

able to become a priest). So penanceis not an act correspondingto a sin; it

duringthedayswhichprecededEaster,Fabiolawasto be foundamongtheranksof the

No doubtJeromeandTertullianwere liable to be rathercarriedaway by such

penitentdoes to obtainhis reconciliationduringthe time in which he retains

Well, if we turnto the confession in monasticinstitutions,it is of course

It is in the morningthatwe musttake accountof our expenses, then it is in the evening,

we mustaskourselvesto renderaccountof ourconductto ourselves.Letus examine

You'll recognize exactly the same administrativeself-examinationyou could

contemplatehim, if their surface brilliancedoes not hide the impurityof a

indication,but I think that the relationsbetween Freudianpractice and the

On the one hand,the exomologesis is a dramaticexpressionby the penitent

Let's stophere.I have beenbothtoo long andmuchtoo schematic.I would

in the constitutionof thoughtas a field of subjective data which are to be

ogies.53And in this case, one of the main political problems would be

1. See FrancoisLeuret,Du traitementmoralede lafolie (Paris:J. B. Bailliere, 1840), and

21. "But,throughthisconfession,throughthisdescription of his ownstate,he asksSeneca

MarkBlasius is AssistantProfessor of Political Science at the City Universityof New

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