February 15, 2007

DRAFT/WORKING DOCUMENT

Darfur: What Can Be Done?

By Alok Bhardwaj

Summary of Conclusions

Long-term, the key to peace in Sudan is a peace agreement that provides for an equitable
distribution of resources and political voice to the East, West, South and North (home of
Khartoum and the government) respectively. Peace agreements between the North and
South (2003) and the North and East (2006) have been achieved and seem to be sticking.
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the North and the West was signed in 2006
but has failed. Much progress has been made with peace in the South and in the East, and
the ailed agreement for the West could be a starting point for a new peace agreement.

Short-term, there are many options for ameliorating the situation in Darfur through
private efforts. The most viable is investing (with strict auditing controls) in the African
Union (AU), particularly funding its operations, buying equipment for them, enabling
them to hire more peacekeepers, and hiring private firms to train troops and supervise
operations. The presence of AU peacekeepers is at present not objectionable for
Khartoum (the capital of Sudan in which its government is located), and the AU also at
present obtains logistical support from the UN and Western firms. There would thus be
little need for any political maneuvering to execute such a plan. This plan’s success,
however, lies in its ability to protect the people of Darfur and to date the AU troops’
efforts have been weak. They need training and a lot of equipment which realistically
may require more time than Darfur has to spare at the moment.

Another potentially viable, politically and efficaciously, solution is involving Mid-East

troops. Private individuals could spur this through anonymously investing in Red
Crescent organizations (Muslim nations’ equivalent of the Red Cross) in Iran and or in
Saudi Arabia for the purpose of expanding their respective humanitarian work in Darfur.
An expanded Iranian or Saudi Red Crescent presence would (have to) be contingent upon
its government sending in peacekeeping forces to protect them. The Arab League’s
request to send in troops was denied by Khartoum in 11/06 though discussions continue.
There are, however, various reasons to believe this would be a politically acceptable
solution and Iranian and Saudi troops should be far better trained than AU troops.

Neither option is without considerable difficulties to execute but they represent the two
most viable efforts for private citizens to act to end the current crisis—and probably the
two best efforts to secure a short-term and long-term peace for Darfur/Western Sudan.

These two short-term solutions probably have a greater likelihood of fostering an

environment in which long-term peace can be negotiated than the popular solution of
sending UN peacekeepers to Darfur. Calls for UN peacekeepers antagonize Khartoum
and may well ameliorate the current violence but upon their departure, violence would
likely begin again quickly. The AU and Mid-East troops proposals don’t antagonize
Khartoum and leave space for a politically negotiated peace agreement which is
absolutely critical for long-term peace in the region. When the AU or Mid-East troops
leave, then, they may leave a country with a stable and peaceful political organization.

Khartoum has as of late 12/06 agreed to two parts of a three-part UN program. There are
many disadvantages as already mentioned to the UN program and Khartoum’s
commitment to it is tenuous at best.

What follows is a summary of the situation, and a discussion of necessary and possible
long and short term solutions.

List of Organization Abbreviations

AU: African Union (a sort of UN for Africa that is responsible for/attempting

peacekeeping in Darfur)
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement (a rebel organization in Western Sudan/Darfur)
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army (a rebel organization in Western Sudan/Darfur)
SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army (a rebel organization in Southern Sudan)
UN: United Nations

Timeline/Summary of Events (History of Conflict in Sudan)

1881 - Revolt against the Turco-Egyptian administration.

1899-1955 Sudan is under joint British-Egyptian rule.

1956 - Sudan becomes an independent country.

1958 - General Abbud leads a military coup against the civilian government elected
earlier in the year.

1962 - Civil war begins in the south, led by the Anya Nya movement.
1964 - The "October Revolution" overthrows Abbud and a national government is
established
1969 - Jafar Numayri leads the "May Revolution" military coup.
1971 - Sudanese Communist Party leaders executed after short-lived coup against
Numayri.
1972 – Christian/Animist South gets autonomy from Muslim North. Under the Addis
Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya the south becomes a
self-governing region.
1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan. The oil becomes an important factor
in the strife between North and South.

1983 - Civil war breaks out again in the south involving government forces and the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang.
1983 - Islamic law imposed. Numieri introduces Islamic Sharia law to Sudan leading to a
new breakout of the civil war in the Christian south. In the south, the forces are led by
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) under command by John Garang.
1985 - After widespread popular unrest Numayri is deposed by a group of officers and a
Transitional Military Council is set up to rule the country.
1986 - Coalition government formed after general elections, with Sadiq al-Mahdi as
prime minister.
1988 - Coalition partner the Democratic Unionist Party drafts cease-fire agreement with
the SPLA, but it is not implemented.
1989 - National Salvation Revolution takes over in a military coup.
1993 - Revolution Command Council dissolved after Omar al-Bashir is appointed
president.
1998 - New constitution endorsed by over 96% of voters in referendum.
1999 - President Bashir dissolves the National Assembly and declares a state of
emergency following a power struggle with parliamentary speaker, Hassan al-Turabi.
1999 - Sudan begins to export oil.
2000 December - Bashir re-elected for another five years in elections boycotted by main
opposition parties.
2001 March - UN's World Food Programme struggles to raise funds to feed 3 million
facing famine.
2001 April – More violence in the South. SPLA rebels threaten to attack international oil
workers brought in to help exploit vast new oil reserves. Government troops accused of
trying to drive civilians and rebels from oilfields.
2001 April-May - Police continue arrests of members of Turabi's Popular National
Congress party (PNC).
2001 June - Failure of Nairobi peace talks attended by President al-Bashir and SPLA
rebel leader John Garang.
2001 July - Government says it accepts a Libyan/Egyptian initiative to end the civil war.
The plan includes a national reconciliation conference and reforms.
2001 December - More than 14,500 slaves - mainly blacks from the south - are said freed
over past six months following campaigning by rights activists.
2002 20 July - Tentative Peace in the South. The government and the SPLA sign
landmark ceasefire agreement providing for six-month renewable ceasefire in central
Nuba Mountains - a key rebel stronghold. After talks in Kenya, government and SPLA
sign Machakos Protocol on ending 19-year civil war. Government accepts right of south
to seek self-determination after six-year interim period. Southern rebels accept
application of Shariah law in north.

2003 February - Emergence of SLA and JEM rebel movements in Darfur, who begin to
campaign against the marginalisation of the region. These groups rise up against the
government, claiming the region is being neglected by Khartoum.
2003 March - April - SLA launch surprise attacks on towns in northern Darfur which
surprises Khartoum by their success in attacking government facilities which is greater
than almost anything achieved by the SPLA.
2003 April - Refugees begin arriving in eastern Chad to escape the conflict. Large
numbers of civilians flee their homes.
2003 September - The SLA and the Government reach a fragile ceasefire agreement
hosted in Chad.
2003 December - Ceasefire agreement completely breaks down.
2004 January - Army moves to quell rebel uprising in western region of Darfur; hundreds
of thousands of refugees flee to neighboring Chad.
2004 March - UN official says pro-government Arab "Janjaweed" militias are carrying
out systematic killings of African villagers in Darfur.
2004 May - Senior UN officials describe the Darfur situation as one of the worst
humanitarian crises in the world. The number of displaced is now estimated to be more
than one million
2004 September - UN says Sudan has not met targets for disarming pro-government
Darfur militias and must accept outside help to protect civilians. US Secretary of State
Colin Powell describes Darfur killings as genocide.
2004 October 25 - Formal peace negotiations between the warring parties begin in the
Nigerian capital, Abuja.
2005 January - Government and southern rebels sign a peace deal. The agreement
includes a permanent ceasefire and accords on wealth and power sharing.
2005 March - UN Security Council authorizes sanctions against those who violate
ceasefire in Darfur. Council also votes to refer those accused of war crimes in Darfur to
International Criminal Court.
2005 March 15 - United Nations Security Council agrees to send 10,000 peacekeeping
soldiers to Southern Sudan. Again the decision/deployment does not cover the Darfur
region.
2005 April - International donors pledge $4.5bn (£2.38bn) in recovery aid for southern
Sudan.
2005 July 9 - Southern autonomy. Former southern rebel leader John Garang is sworn in
as first vice president. A constitution which gives a large degree of autonomy to the south
is signed.
2005 September - Power-sharing government is formed in Khartoum.
2005 October - Autonomous government is formed in the south, in line with the January
agreements. The administration is dominated by former rebels.
2006 May – Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed. The Khartoum government and the
main rebel faction in Darfur, the SLA (the Sudan Liberation Movement), sign a peace
accord. Two smaller rebel groups reject the deal. Fighting continues. The Agreement
eventually is regarded as a failure.
2006 August - Sudan rejects a United Nations resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping
force in Darfur, saying it would compromise Sudanese sovereignty.
2006 September - Sudan says African Union troops must quit Darfur when their mandate
expires at the end of the month, raising fears that the region would descend into full-
blown war.
2006 September - Activists rally in major cities around the world calling on Sudan to
allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur.
2006 October - Jan Pronk, the UN's top official in Sudan, is expelled.

2006 October 21 – Peace in Eastern Sudan. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was
signed by Khartoum and various rebel organizations of the East enumerating many
freedoms and rights as well as containing arrangements for sharing power and wealth.
The agreement seems to have been accepted by all parties and shows preliminary signs of
sticking.

2006 November – the AU (African Union) extends the mandate of its peacekeeping force
in Darfur for another six months.
2006 November 13 - The United Nations pledges about $77 million in personnel and
equipment to the African Union force in Darfur. The package includes military and police
advisers, communications equipment and tools like night-vision goggles.
2006 December - Sudan agrees in principle to accept the deployment of UN troops in
Darfur as part of an expanded peacekeeping force.

[Timeline based on data from the following sources: http://www.islamic-relief.com; http://www.cbc.ca;

http://www.bbc.co.uk; http://crawfurd.dk/africa/sudan_timeline.html; http://www.janpronk.nl/]

Politicization of “Genocide”

Issues of justice are politicized, often in racist ways, that make action in such a
framework unsavory. The term “genocide” is bantered about particularly for non-western
countries often…and rarely for others. To the extent that there’s a “genocide” going on in
Darfur, there has to most certainly be one in Iraq…estimates of excess deaths in Darfur
having a floor at 200,000 and in Iraq at 400,000 (both countries have numerically similar
populations). In the media, except the far far left, one will never hear “genocide” in the
same sentence as Iraq. The present situation of both countries also warrants an analogy--
in both situations, the person(s) in power wish to retain power (the Bashir administration
in one and the Bush administration of the U.S. in the other) and are massacring to do so.
Whole villages are widely reported being burned in Darfur, but that tens of thousands of
buildings were destroyed in the assault on Fallujah, for example, was not widely reported.
Of course, one never hears “genocide” in the same sentence as “indian” in any U.S.
history books—maybe demicide and that’s rare. Despite vast rapes, destructions of 100s
or 1000s of villages and the murder of 1 to 2 million civilians, one hears of the “Vietnam
Conflict”…never the “Vietnam Genocide,” sometimes it’s described as a “mistake” (the
mistake being 50,000 American lives were “paid” for a “lost” war).

Iraq is an instructive case. It’s very similar to Sudan in that both countries have various
opposed ethnic/religious groups with geographical divisions and contentiousness about
divvying up oil revenues—this has implications for later consideration. The extent of
politicization and demonization of Darfur as genocide while Iraq is not considered as
such—when both are basically similarly motivated and destructive—makes it important
not to demonize prejudicially or participate to further racism and demagoguery.
Moreover, any action based on prejudice is based on ignorance and stupidity and stupid
actions are almost certainly doomed to failure. Nevertheless, there is in Darfur
incalculable suffering which demands honest thought and action.

Incalculable Suffering
There is no doubt that both tragedy and courage are in extraordinary supply in Darfur…
more than anywhere else in the world at this present moment. Here is a reporter to the
region from the New York Times on the incomprehensible stories one can bear witness to
in a few moments in a single view:
“On one of the first of my five visits to Darfur, I came across an oasis along the
Chad border where several tens of thousands of people were sheltering under
trees after being driven from their home villages by the Arab Janjaweed militia….
Under the first tree, I found a man who had been shot in the neck and the jaw; his
brother, shot only in the foot, had carried him for forty-nine days to get to this
oasis. Under the next tree was a widow whose parents had been killed and stuffed
in the village well to poison the local water supply; then the Janjaweed had
tracked down the rest of her family and killed her husband. Under the third tree
was a four-year-old orphan girl carrying her one-year-old baby sister on her
back; their parents had been killed. Under the fourth tree was a woman whose
husband and children had been killed in front of her, and then she was gang-
raped and left naked and mutilated in the desert.”

Ultimate Causes

The ultimate causes of both the Darfur and Iraqi conflicts are probably the same in both
cases—the arbitrary boundaries and divisions from colonialism for these countries as
well as political oppression and unjust minority rule. Sudan’s civil war is an easier
conflict to resolve than Iraq’s in that the demands of the warring parties in Sudan are
relatively clear—resource distribution, religious freedom, and power-sharing.

There are in Sudan many, many ethnic and religious groups spread throughout the
country (including the Fur of Darfur who are one of many groups in that region). Sudan
politically can be divided into North, South, East and West. There was a twenty-year
civil war between the Christian/Animist South and the Muslim North which has only
recently ended. The African East has also been discontent with the government of the
Arab North and has its host of revolts and violent justice-seeking organizations which
may have ended with a peace agreement signed in late 2006. The current conflict in
Darfur is between the Arab North and the African (Fur and many other ethnic groups)
West (both the North and West are primarily Muslim). Both Western and Eastern Sudan
cite as their primary grievance that resources and infrastructure development in their
regions are not adequate and unfair, as opposed to religious differences and control of oil
which motivated much of the North/South conflict.

Conflict in Darfur or Western Sudan began in fact as the civil war between the North (or
Khartoum) and the South ended. Until 2003, Khartoum had been for decades locked in a
civil war against the oil-rich and rebellious South. After Western Sudan saw the gains the
South obtained from fighting for their rights, various groups decided to do the same.
Khartoum tried to put down the Western rebellion (Darfur rebellion), particularly after a
spectacular success by a rebel group in 2003. If peace in Darfur includes political gains
for the West substantially different than those the East and South won, there will likely be
clamoring in the East and South for similar concessions (with probable violence if those
demands are not met)—just as the peace accord with the South motivated the West to
rebel.

Beyond North, South, East and West, various ethnic Sudanese groups extend into
neighboring countries. Much of what is called the Darfur region, for instance, is in Chad
as well as in other neighboring countries. The non-existent cultural and social borders
leads to easy flows of citizens and rebels from country to country. Sudan accuses Chad’s
Darfur region of sponsoring rebel groups in its country and Chad accuses Sudan of the
same. Similarly, attempts to give some political voice and autonomy to Sudanese Darfur
Citizens should ideally have a Chad counterpart or there could be further instability
similar to the present exodus of Sudanese Darfur residents into Chad. To the extent there
is stability and fairness in the Sudan part of Darfur, there will be more clamor for similar
treatment by Chad’s Darfur residents and thus Sudan could inadvertently be host to rebel
groups hoping to overthrow the Chad government (which wouldn’t necessarily be a bad
thing but it would be bad for regional stability). The possibility, however, of large-scale
political change in Sudan is slim enough, to see it realized in Chad and Sudan at the same
time is very difficult to see.

Fundamentally, long-term peace will be predicated on intra-Sudan political solutions

which give each group and part of the country a political voice. Splitting Sudan into
separate countries is probably not an ideal option for engendering peace. Redrawing
boundaries for the states into smaller entities may assuage conflict or may heighten the
desire for more radical boundary redrawing. For Sudan, a large degree of regional
autonomy for its four parts, more equitable commitments to infrastructure develoopment
and adequate political representation would likely be sufficient.

Moreover, agreements must be generous and sincere in order to attract all rebel groups—
the May 2006 Darfur Peace Accord was rejected by multiple rebel groups and has been a
failure. Agreements must be negotiated between all parties and address all issues
including freedom, investment and power-sharing. Any agreement between Khartoum
and the West (Darfur) should also mimic the agreements with the South and the East—if
peace is reached in Darfur with concessions superior to those achieved by the East or the
South, then the East or the South may demand amendments to their agreements or rebel.

Cowboy-type military actions are, thus, not going to sustain a lasting peace, and they are
unlikely to inspire even an ephemeral one. There fundamentally needs to be a political
situation intra-Sudan—not simply more violence. Though there are tremendous racist
and malicious elements involved in the violence in Darfur, it’s important to realize that
the conflict has a substantial political motivation.

While negotiations and a political solution may seem boring compared to an ultra-violent
battle of good and evil as the media portrayed solution, the latter is doomed to ultimate
failure. There is a massive dearth of discourse in the media of a political solution for
Sudan…it doesn’t sell newspapers like Western indignation and dead babies and raped
women…there is a lurid fixation on the immediate suffering which while infuriating
could very well be exacerbated by certain measures…again, consider the actions in Iraq
and the results.

How to broker a political solution?

The DPA or Darfur Peace Agreement was a good start and is perhaps a place to begin
negotiations again. Also, representatives from the South and the East should be present at
negotiations and any agreement with Darfur should mimic their respective agreements—
in fact, some of the power-sharing guarantees in the Southern agreement that were
missing in the DPA led rebel groups not to sign it.

Sudan seems to be at present (end of 2006) responding to threats of sanctions by acceding

to many parts of the UN plan to secure Darfur. While UN peacekeepers certainly would
ameliorate the current situation, Khartoum feels that it has been bullied and demonized so
the likelihood of a sustainable peace given immediate UN peacekeeper deployment
probably significantly diminishes. To broker a more lasting peace, there needs to be joint
negotiations between all parties perhaps beginning from scratch, from the Southern or
Eastern Peace Agreement or from the DPA. There could be additional “carrots” in the
form of investments and lifting sanctions and other things by nations to expedite
negotiations as part of a transition to a fairer and peaceful power-sharing and revenue-
sharing arrangement.

UN Peacekeepers and the Short-Term Defense of Darfur

There is suffering in Darfur and many activities there are unacceptable and contrary to
any fair waging of war. They should cease immediately. As of late December 2006,
Khartoum had agreed to two parts of a UN program for the protection and defense of
Darfur. The third stage, the most crucial part, which calls for a large UN troop
deployment and longer term stabilization efforts is still in debate—though there is some
indication that Khartoum has in theory accepted the presence of some UN peacekeeping
forces. It is again not clear that the presence of UN peacekeeping forces is in the current
long-term interest of Sudan and Darfur.

The first two stages of the current UN program would represent much-needed aid to the
beleaguered African Union forces currently protecting the area. There is reason to be
cautious. Khartoum has stated in the past explicitly that a large-scale deployment UN
troops would be considered an occupation of Sudan and is unacceptable—he has also
pulled out of previous plans as well.

Options for Private Action towards the Immediate Defense of Darfur

1. Large Private Army.

This option is likely prohibitively expensive and politically unworkable. On the order of
twenty thousand troops would be necessary to protect Darfur which would likely
represent a cost of at least two billion dollars a year. Private armies also have a poor
reputation particularly in Africa. Such an action would certainly be construed as an
invasion of the country and raise the ire of Muslims and probably Africans. Khartoum
would step up its military efforts and destruction as well. It is also likely illegal and
could be construed as “terrorism” by Western nations.

2. Small Private Army.

It is perhaps feasible to imagine small, expert teams who could defend particular villages.
This also could fall below the radar of government notice and thus not draw much
attention. This plan would not avert the large part of the tragedy, though it could help
individuals and individual villages.

3. UN.
Sudan has said that it opposes large-scale deployment of UN forces. Recent threats of
sanctions seem to have moved Sudan to accept some UN forces and UN logistical
support for the African Union troops currently in Sudan (who Khartoum wanted out
earlier as well). UN forces are supposed to take over the protection of Darfur from the
AU troops in the summer of 2007. Sudan presently construes the presence of the UN,
and any western forces as an occupation/invasion as does Al Qaeda which used to be
based there. Other nations particularly Iran and China have vocally objected to UN troop
deployments in Sudan. It is not clear what the scale the current UN plan would be as the
third and crucial component is in discussion, though some UN troop deployment is
expected. It should be noted Khartoum has backed out of many plans before so the
outcome is still uncertain despite his present, vocal support of much of the UN plan. At
present, the United Nations has some 10,000 peacekeepers in the south to monitor the
agreement and help train police and human rights workers and provide other services;
U.N. peacekeepers are not permitted in Darfur at present.

4. Strengthen the African Union Forces.

Strengthening the AU forces has a distinct advantage of being an African solution for an
African problem. It is also a plan that needs a lot of luck to work. To date, most
observers think the AU has been hopelessly incompetent. The people (Darfur citizens)
whom the AU peacekeepers are supposed to protect have repeatedly kidnapped
peacekeepers out of fury for not protecting them (indicating an incompetence in
protecting both themselves as well as the Sudanese). Others feel the AU peacekeepers
have done a good job given that they’re irregularly paid and have inadequate arms and
equipment (due to haphazard payments on promises by foreign nations). Moreover, there
are too few peacekeepers—the size of the AU force is at most a third of what it should be
t to be appropriate for securing the area.

Khartoum has accepted the AU presence, and there is no better way to make the AU more
competent than by providing their peacekeepers with proper arms and training. Western
governments have been slightly reluctant to fund the AU due to concerns over funds
reaching the intended end as increased funding has reportedly had little effect on the
safety in Darfur (though I have not investigated nor seen any thorough investigation of
AU financial malfeasance (though funds go through AU headquarters in Addis Ababa
which has been a place of abuses of aid in recent history)). There are also dangers of
African troops/arms being abused later and of inciting more war in Africa (which has had
more than enough of it in past decades). There is also on the bright side, a hope that a
competent AU would prevent and control future wars on the continent effectively.

Any funding of the AU should include a stringent auditing system/personnel as well as

specific requirements for outside supervision of troop training and arms by competent
parties. Sudan seems at present open to increased logistical and other support of the AU
by the UN and thus presumably by other western nations who could be further incited to
invest in the AU when private parties get some basic plan in place which has a hope of
success. Politically, this is the most feasible and least controversial plan by far.
Ideologically, it is a preferred solution as Africans solve African problems to a larger
degree here.

5. AU + Private Army.
This is essentially funding the AU with funds earmarked for training/supervision by a
private contractor and or outside competent auditing/training parties. This is likely the
better approach (than just funding the AU) as the AU at present lacks a great, great deal
of basic training/knowledge of how to conduct peacekeeping. It would also have
precedent in that U.S. and Canadian firms presently operate supply lines (food and
shelter) for the AU forces.

6. Supporting Neighboring Countries Armies.

Neighboring countries have taken in tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees as well
as trade accusations with Sudan of training/hosting various rebel forces. Many of
Sudan’s neighbors are much poorer than Sudan and are sympathetic to the situation in
Darfur. The conflict in Darfur is destabilizing their respective countries and they’d like to
see peace in the region. They are likely open to various potential solutions including
military intervention, particularly within their own borders which would be particularly
appropriate for say Chad which has to protect hundreds of thousands of Sudanese
refugees. These countries would probably be open to “carrots” that are not “too
provocative” (i.e. don’t foment a full-blown war with Sudan). Involvement of these
countries in negotiating peace agreements is probably critical—the presence of non-
African international observers and negotiators during the Darfur peace negotiations is
considered one of the reasons for the Darfur Peace Agreement’s failure, and the absence
of international observers during the negotiation for the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
was thought to have helped give space to the parties to come up with what seems to be a
successful agreement.

Chad. Deby, the President, has controlled the country for fifteen years and won a
mock-election in 2006—not a great government to be associated with but that
doesn’t stop France which has about 1,000 troops there (France colonized that
area and protects Deby’s government from rebel groups to some extent). Chad’s
relations with Sudan are acrimonious and Chad has semi-officially declared war
 against Sudan. Both countries accuse each other of supporting rebel groups
aiming to overthrow the respective governments. Chad has taken in hundreds of
thousands of displaced persons from Sudan who are often not safe in Chad (with
their pursuers following them there). Chad would likely be interested in
supporting operations that would safeguard the Darfur region, return displaced
persons and bring some peace to the region. That being said, such efforts would
have to be extremely delicate so as not to provoke a larger war with Sudan (or to
be interpreted as such). Moreover, Chad would can participate in/broker a
political solution in Khartoum. It’s not clear Chad has the clout with rebel groups
necessary to do this, though they may be able to win some support and start a
dialogue between the rebels and Khartoum. Chad needs armies to protect the
refugees from Darfur within its borders as well as its own Darfur region. Chad is
economically poor relative to Sudan and could likely be enticed by carrots of
foreign investment as well as French influence—again it depends heavily on
French support.

Central African Republic. CAR was a democracy until a military coup in 2003.
The coup’s leader was, however, elected in what’s considered a relatively fair
election. Since then the country’s situation has been mixed: the government has
a fair amount of civilian support but is violent in its repression of rebel groups.
CAR is angry at Sudan, claiming that Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
(UFDC) rebels have attacked/captured some towns in CAR and that Sudan is
supporting the UFDC.

Eritrea. Ertirea’s government is a one-party system that is highly repressive. For

a decade until 2005, Eritrea did not have diplomatic relations with Sudan over
disputes of an Islamic group invading Eritrea from Sudan. Eritrea also
entertained, so to speak, opposition leaders to Bashir. Eritrea is considered to
have been a strong hand in some of the diplomatic efforts/agreements in regards
to Darfur.

7. Non-Governmental Diplomatic Negotiations.

There are very unique opportunities for non-government groups to negotiate other
solutions. This is partly because agreeing to Western or African country proposals would
lead Sudan to “lose face” in some respects. Moreover, certain countries which could be
helpful such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are not usual participants in Western government
dialogue.

8. Mid-East Force Coalition.

This is a politically feasible and practical solution that would require non-governmental
diplomatic negotiations. Bashir, who considers his country as Arab and Muslim, would
be far more open at present to considering armed peacekeepers from Muslim countries
than from the UN or Western forces. Muslim nations can leverage Sudan’s recent desire
to join OPEC into allowing an Arab presence/peace in Darfur. The Arab League in
November 2006 proposed sending peacekeeping troops to Darfur. Khartoum rejected the
proposal but added that it would continue discussions with the Arab League.
Getting Muslim peacekeepers into Darfur would require private efforts in diplomacy to
get troops from Iran and other countries as Western countries prefer to have a monopoly
on leading military efforts. Iran has a massive military in terms of forces though they may
not be as well-trained or equipped as is ideal—they should, though, be much better
trained than the AU forces at present. Iran has also indicated that it supports a Middle
Eastern/African solution for Darfur and opposes Western intervention. Saudi Arabia has
what is likely a better trained and equipped military than Iran and a large one as well.
Either Iran or Saudi Arabia should without much difficulty be able to deploy 20,000
troops to Darfur (or some smaller number depending on what Khartoum will assent to).
Saudi Arabia has been accused by Chad of funding/supporting certain rebel groups and it
has not insignificant investments in Sudan. Both the Iranian and Saudi Red Crescents are
active in Sudan. The Saudi Red Crescent has probably the largest presence of any Red
Crescent in Sudan and its efforts were apparently curtailed to some extent because of
difficulty wiring funds (because of new stricter rules designed to curb funding to
potentially violent non-governmental organizations).

9. Private groups could anonymously invest in either or both the Saudi Red Crescent
and the Iranian Red Crescent for support of their respective humanitarian efforts in
Darfur. For either humanitarian organization to expand their efforts in Sudan, there
would have to be forces there to protect their aid workers. Other Islamic humanitarian
organizations could be considered as participants too such as Islamic Relief, though the
Red Crescents likely have better infrastructure as well as a greater likelihood of political
currency. Any investment to support expanded efforts in Darfur would thus have to be
predicated on deployment of troops by its government to support expansion of Red
Crescent activity. This is politically a difficult solution to realize—it depends on
persuading first the Red Crescent group and then the government (by the Red Crescent or
in conjunction with them). It has an advantage of representing a Muslim solution for a
problem in a Muslim country and it would require no capitulation to the West or the UN
by Khartoum. Muslim troops, particularly Saudi troops who speak Arabic, will likely be
culturally better equipped and trained than Western peacekeepers to operate in Sudan.

10. China.
China has the largest foreign investments in Sudan of any country. They have repeatedly
supported Sudan’s right to settle its own problems and its right to put down any rebellion.
It’s going to be very difficult to move the Chinese—this is obvious given Chinese
governmental indifference to criticism of its own human rights violations—though they
have given in to pressure for approval of sanctions against Iran which they were initially
against for economic reasons as well. Pressure (carrots and stick) may be able to get
China to participate in a force as well as to encourage Sudan (through their investments
in Sudan) to be more open to foreign peacekeepers as well as to be more open to having a
fairer, more responsive government.

11. Economic Pressure from Western Countries.

Western countries (such as Canada’s Talisman energy, reputedly the single biggest
foreign investor in Sudan) could pressure Sudan to accept other/larger peacekeeping
forces. This pressure should be “quiet” since overt pressure from the West or Western
firms would make Sudan lose face, further antagonize Khartoum as well as anger
Muslims in general.