Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON

Nicholas Edwards

Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

Introduction
This study will be looking the basic aspects of Zero-Sum game theory and see how it has been applied in the design of the game DEFCON (Introversion Software, 2006), and in what ways it can be utilised in developing a balance in gameplay

DEFCON will provide a good video game contrast as the game theme is similar to a popular culture view of the Cold War (Peckham, 2006), in terms of gameplay and style. The period itself is one that many associate with the development of commonly used game theory (Bennett, 1995, p.19) and may lead to a good comparison to how the application of these theories differed.

Literature Review
Game Theory is a mathematical process that can be used to understand the logical choices of a person or organisations and their patterns of behaviour which, rather than an attempt to predict future behaviour, aims to investigate the concepts behind these choices and find which may be the best option for each scenario (Rubinstein, 1991, p.909). Militarily this process can be used by a military planner to understand the effect of strategic decisions and can be of great use due to its ability depict a situation where two competitive opponents are able to choose and adjust their strategy as according to these outputs. By knowing how an intelligent opponent may react to current moves can help a commander prepare for what this may entail (RAND Corporation, 2004) and has become a standard part of much militarypolitical strategic analysis (Snidel, 1985, p.25).

One method of game theory used is the Zero-Sum Game which is an exchange between two or more actors who, when paired against each other, try and make their decisions in a way that will maximise the gains that they can expect to earn against the other (Heylighen, 1993). This is often represented by a payoff matrix where a grid will show each players
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

strategic choices and the output of each compared within the cell numerically (Friedman, 1990, p.335).

The Zero-Sum variant is a purely competitive game (Binmore, 2007, p.4) where the payoff will always be equal to zero, in such that the gains between the sides will always be fixed (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p.15). Another way to put this would be that wealth is neither created nor destroyed, what one side gains has been equally lost by another side and viceversa (McKinsey, 1952, p.5). An example of this would be Chess where only one player can win and only one other can lose, the win and loss equal each other out and so would a stalemate (Heylighen, 1993).

The concept was first developed by John von Neumann and seen by some during the Cold War as a theory advocating a first-strike response due to the pure conflict that it was seen to present. However, the point of the theory was to show conflict or cooperation in a singular fashion in order for the scenario to be studied in an isolated environment (Binmore, 2007, p.4-5).

The outcomes for a game of Chess, here the gains or losses are always equal, resulting in some stalemates (Heylighen, 1993).

Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

The other side to this though is the Non-Zero-Sum game where the payoff is not going to equal zero and the factors of conflict and cooperation start to interweave with each other and influence player strategy (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p.24-25). Here the different choices available to the player may involve far more mixed motivations (Binmore, 2007, p.10-11) and the conflict between these becomes central to the nature of the game (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p.11). Here wealth may be created or destroyed and both sides can win or lose simultaneously, in varying degrees each way (McKinsey, 1952, p.5).

The dilemma that is introduced is a situation where the optimal choice for one player to make may be the best for the other to take as well, but the choice that is best for both as whole could be the opposite (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p.25). As a result the cooperation angle is placed alongside the conflict in this game as both players can work together to achieve what is in their joint interests (Binmore, 2007, p.10-11). Individual and collective rationality are at cross-purposes here as the game has to move towards this cooperation and collective rationality for universal benefits (Rapoport, 1974, p.24).

Thomas Schelling felt that this model is far more relevant for the modelling of real-world conflict due to this angle of conflict and cooperation (Rapoport, 1974, p.23) and a common example of this its use in the game of Chicken, where two drivers are speeding towards each other, hoping to convince the other to serve and be labelled the chicken. Their two options being either to speed or to swerve, or in other words defect or cooperate. One player will win outright if they get the other to swerve, however if both continue to speed then they are killed, despite it being the best option for the individual in order to win. The best option for both would be to swerve, sharing the loss and keeping their lives (Binmore, 2007, p.10-11). The prominent example of this would be the options of the two Superpowers in the Cold War, if the USA and the USSR both cooperate then they both maintain the status quo, however if one managed to initiate a defect scenario while the other stayed in cooperation they would win massively. The issue is that this is individually
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

best for both; the outcome would logically end in both defecting and both losing through Mutually Assured Destruction and is the key reason for the stalemate that continued throughout (Berejikian, 2002, p.168).

The outcomes of the Chicken scenario. Here a higher value representing a better result for the actor (Berejikian, 2002, p.168).

Materials and Methods

The use of this theory for looking into Cold War strategic options leads to good comparison to the game DEFCON (Introversion Software, 2006), where players act out a thermonuclear conflict as one of five continental powers. Each has one-hundred million civilians laid out over a number cities across their landmass and a host of nuclear weapons to use; either land, sea or air-borne, with the majority on land. These land-based weapons are launched from a silo that doubles as anti-air defence against any missiles launched at you from other players, but can only be in one mode at a time with a long period of inactivity while switching (Introversion Software, 2006, p.18). This change in modes is one of the main player decisions in the game (Introversion Software, 2006, p.22).

However, the game revolves around three different scoring modes depending on the type of game being played. The players options between focusing on a defence-based approach, where they leave their silos on anti-air for the most part and try and avoid the effect of
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

defection upon their cities, or offence-based where they leave their silos on launch-mode for the most port and go for the gains of wiping out a large proportion of their opponents civilian population. Here the principles of the Zero-Sum game can be compared to player reactions to gameplay and it may have affected the design of the game.

The first mode is Default where the winning player is the one who ends the game with the highest point total. Each player starts with zero points and earns two points for each megadeath(one million civilians killed) inflicted upon an opponent, and one point lost for each mega-death inflicted upon yourself (Introversion Software, 2006, p.6). The effect of this is that a non-zero-sum game has been created where both sides have more to gain from focusing on attack; the end result of an all-out attack will push the two sides ahead, while maintaining the status quo between them.

By using this as the default scoring mode the developers have created a scenario that avoids the inactivity that occurred in this form of conflict in reality and that is the prime issue of the Chicken scenario. Focusing on offence or defence has the same equality to each other, but the positives of the offence lead players towards this strategy eventually, the bigger game being to catch your opponent during a period where they have fallen back to their defences. Both players win individually in the same as Chicken, but the consequences of this joint decision have been removed.

Non-Zero-Sum for Default mode

Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

The next mode offered is Survivor mode. In this mode the player no longer will receive any points for killing enemy civilians, but will continue to lose one point for every mega-death they are dealt by their adversary, furthermore each side will start with one-hundred points and the one with the most left at the end wins.

By using the Survivor scoring mode the Non-Zero-Sum example of Chicken that was used to describe the brinkmanship of the Cold War can recreated in DEFCON as this results in a similar stalemate in game as there was in reality. Players find themselves in a scenario where if they provoke an enemy, they may be able to inflict damages on them and push them down in rank, they ultimately can only expect the same response and the same damages back. The result is a long drawn-out game where each player waits for the other to launch, preferring to battle using their conventional naval forces. Nuclear weapons become a last resort as players conform to the results of Mutually Assured Destruction.

Non-Zero-Sum for Survivor mode

The final mode, and at the other extreme end of Survivor, is Genocide mode, where the player will earn one point for each mega-death they cause upon their opponent, but will no longer lose any points for those that their rivals inflict upon them. Here the Non-Zero-Sum skews the results towards a scenario where they have nothing to gain unless they go on the
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

attack, defence will only serve to minimise your adversarys gains and striking first becomes the only way to win the most. These factors cause a very quick game as players aim to maximise their point totals as rapidly as possible with no need to care for defence, unless they aim to stump the opponents gains, this though having a lesser affect than going on the attack.

Non-Zero-Sum for Genocide mode

Conclusion
What these different scoring modes have shown is that the theories behind Non-Zero-Sum game theory have been understood fairly well by the developers of DEFCON. The outputs for the Survivor and Genocide modes show how the balancing that was placed for the Default scoring mode, which most players would encounter, was developed.

This Default mode has taken the outputs of the Chicken example of the Cold War and moved this into a space where players could still find good outcomes in defence, but similarly so in offence. The game required a balance of offence and defence for this mode to avoid the stalemate of reality and game theory has enabled a way to see how this was produced. The two other modes showcase this by their outweighed scoring systems, which encourage a singular play-style, and prove the overall balance of Default, but also how these singular styles have been imposed for the type of game the mode aims for. Overall
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

game theory has been of great use in confirming these player outcomes for each mode and for a developer that the scoring system for each would cause the gameplay they wished.

Further Research
This study could be furthered by looking into other games from the Real-Time Strategy genre and see how similar concepts of game theory have been used to avoid overly offensive or defensive gameplay or enforce either, if so required, and if these correlate with the findings from a game on the scale of DEFCON.

Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

Bibliography
Bennett, P.G. (1995). Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond. Mershon International Studies Review. 39 (1 April 1995) p. 19-52 Berejikian, J.D. (2002). A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence. Journal of Peace Research. 39 (2) p. 165-183 Binmore, K. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press Friedman, D.D. (1990). Price Theory: An Intermediate Text. Nashville, TN: South-Western Publishing Co. Heylighen, F. (1993): Zero Sum Games, in: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. Turchin (editors): Principia Cybernetica Web (Principia Cybernetica, Brussels), URL: http://pcp.lanl.gov/ZESUGAM.html.

Introversion Software. (2006). DEFCON. [DISC] PC. Cambridge: Introversion Software (2006). If The Bomb Drops! DEFCON: A Nuclear Survival Guide [pdf] Available at: <http://cdn.steampowered.com/Manuals/1520/DEFCON%20manual.pdf> [Accessed: 03 December 2011]. McKinsey, J.C.C. (1952). Introduction to the Theory of Games. London: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc. Peckham, M. (2006) Review DEFCON [Online]. Available from: http://www.1up.com/reviews/defcon [Accessed: 24 November 2011] RAND Corporation. (2004). Using Game Theory to Analyze Operations Against Time-Critical Targets. [pdf] Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Available at: <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2005/RB108.pdf> [Accessed: 03 September 2012].
Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

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Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A.(1965). Prisoners Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press Rapoport, A. (1974). Prisoners Dilemma Recollections and Observations. In: Rapoport, A. (eds). Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company Rubinstein, A. (1991). Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory. Econometrica. 59 (4 July 1991) p. 909-924 Snidel, D. (1985). The Game Theory of International Politics. World Politics. 38 (1 October 1985) p. 25-57

Zero-Sum Game Theory and How it Has Been Applied to the Video Game DEFCON Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk

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