NATO Knowledge Development Handbook

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE
NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP/EU/MNE
Bi-Strategic Command Knowledge Development

(Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, Final Draft 18 Nov 2010)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE

Distribution Action:
SHAPE HQ SACT JFC Brunssum JFC Naples JFC Lisbon JWC JALLC JFTC
Information
IFC NATO HQ, IMS
REFERENCES: A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. SG (2005) 0918 AS 1 Rev 1 - Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), dated 7 February 2006 SACEUR Letter - ACO Way Ahead-Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), dated 24 May 2006 MC 0550 MC Guidance for the military implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, dated 24 May 2006 MCM-0041-2010 - MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations, dated 20 July 2010 SACEUR Letter Effects Based Approach to Operations - Update on Developments and Further Guidance on ACO Way Ahead, dated 20 March 2007 C-M(2007)0118, NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP), dated 11 December 2007 BI-Strategic Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (Effects Based Approach to Operations), dated 4 December 2007 BI-SC IKM Vision and Strategic Concept, dated 30 November 2007 MCM-0054-2007, MC Position on Military Support to Stabilisation Activities and Reconstruction Efforts, dated 13 November 2007 C-M(2008)0029-COR1, Proposal on a Way Ahead on Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, dated 2 April 2008 Bi-SC Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) Directive, dated 15 Sep 2008 Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept, dated 12 August 2008
M. Terms Of Reference For The Knowledge Development Project Team (KDPT), dated, 15 February 2008 N. O. P. Q. NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), AC/237-D(2009)0001, dated 21 April 2009 MC 133/3, NATOs Operational Planning System with Corrigenda 1, 2 and 3 (Final), dated 12 August 2005 ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Trial version), dated February 2010 ACO Directive 65-11 - ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management, dated 12 July 2010
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Assessment Handbook, Version 0.86, dated 18 June 2010
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FOREWORD Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-making. The problem is that this information or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, deconflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner nor is it often available in an electronically retrievable format. Therefore, there is a need to connect or fuse existing information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is presented with a clear holistic understanding, as early as possible in the decision making process. This is the purpose of Knowledge Development. We are therefore proud to be able to present the first edition of The Knowledge Development Handbook, further enabling Knowledge Development as a key contribution to NATOs contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. While its emphasis is on Knowledge Development in support of the NATO Crisis Response Planning, we believe this guide is also an invaluable resource for any analyst, military or civilian, working in NATO, our member Nations or beyond. Each new edition of the Knowledge Development Handbook will incorporate the latest experience and expertise of our staffs. This edition sets out to establish a common baseline for understanding the Knowledge Development process.
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things; for the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from the incredulity of mankind who does not truly believe in anything new until they actually have experience of it - Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince
Table of Contents
REFERENCES: ...................................................................................................................... iii FOREWORD............................................................................................................................. v Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... vi Figures......................................................................................................................................vii EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................. viii CHAPTER 1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
Aim of Handbook ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Development of the Handbook.................................................................................................................. 1 Use of Handbook ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Way Ahead - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) & Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs) ........... 1 Background ............................................................................................................................................... 1 Relationship between Intelligence and Knowledge Development ............................................................ 3
CHAPTER 2 The Knowledge Development Process .......................................................... 1

Overview ................................................................................................................................................... 1 Initiating the ACO KD Process ................................................................................................................. 1 Generic Process Characteristics ................................................................................................................ 2 COLLECTION .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Retrieval of Existing Knowledge .............................................................................................................. 4 External Information Search ..................................................................................................................... 4 Identification of potential PMESII sources ............................................................................................... 5 (1) (2) (3) Information Content Factors: ........................................................................................................... 5 Operational Factors:......................................................................................................................... 6 Security Factors: .............................................................................................................................. 6
Resource Evaluation and Validation ......................................................................................................... 7 Information/Information Overload ............................................................................................................ 7 Integration of External Information........................................................................................................... 8 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................... 8 Systems Analysis....................................................................................................................................... 9 Analysis Process ...................................................................................................................................... 10 Quantification and Simulation................................................................................................................. 12 ACCESS .................................................................................................................................................. 12 Knowledge Transfer ................................................................................................................................ 13
CHAPTER 3 - Knowledge Development in Support of Crisis Management and the Planning Process ..................................................................................................................... 14
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Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 14 Initial Analysis and KD Focus ................................................................................................................ 14 Subsequent Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 14 KD Contribution to the Planning Process ............................................................................................... 14
CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES ....................................................... 19

KD Impacts on Organisational Structures ............................................................................................... 19 KD Integration within the NATO Command Structure .......................................................................... 19 Knowledge Management Centre ............................................................................................................. 20 Knowledge Development Centre ............................................................................................................ 21 Knowledge Centres at the Operational Level .......................................................................................... 21 Knowledge Development Entities ........................................................................................................... 23 In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities .......................................................................................... 23
CHAPTER 5 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT & TOOL SUPPORT .......................... 26

Knowledge Base Capability .................................................................................................................... 26 Source Access ......................................................................................................................................... 27 Disclosure Support and Access Control .................................................................................................. 27 Collaboration Support to KD .................................................................................................................. 28 Simulation Support to KD ....................................................................................................................... 28 Tools Support to KD ............................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 6 - TRAINING .................................................................................................... 29

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Figures
Figure 1: Knowledge Development Overview ...................................................................................................... ix Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview ................................................................................... 1 Figure 3: Generic Knowledge Development Process ............................................................................................. 2 Figure 4: A Systems Understanding ....................................................................................................................... 9 Figure 5: Example of an Influence Diagram......................................................................................................... 12 Figure 7: Operations Planning Process at Strategic and Operational Levels ........................................................ 15 Figure 8: Integration of KD in Current NATO Command Structure .................................................................... 20 Figure 9: Knowledge Centre Integration in a JFC (illustrative structure)............................................................. 22 Figure 10: Proposed In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities ...................................................................... 23 Figure 11: In-Theatre and Reach-Back Knowledge Development Process .......................................................... 24 Figure 12: The Knowledge Development/Knowledge Management Relationship............................................... 26
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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
1. Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-making. The problem is that this information or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, deconflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner nor is it often available in an electronically retrievable format. Therefore, there is a need to connect or fuse existing information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is presented with a clear holistic understanding, as early as possible in the decision making process. 2. Knowledge Development (KD) is a proactive process that covers the collection, analysis, storage and distribution of information that helps to contribute to a common and shared understanding of the operational environment. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space. This approach enables the Commander and staff to understand better the possible effects of Military, Political, Economic and Civil actions on different systems and actors within the engagement space. Within the different phases of NATOs Crisis Management Process, the three key functions, Planning, Execution, and Assessment, all rely on KD. Switching from the current traditional reactive approach to a proactive KD approach would reduce extensive duplication of work in the NATO Command Structure and provide a more coherent understanding at all levels of command. 3. The primary purpose of KD is to support subsequent decision making in response to indications and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning, execution and assessment of operations. The challenge is to make the relevant information available in a form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a level of shared understanding that supports timely and effective decision making. 4. Two parts to any KD solution are: a. b. The adaptation of processes and staff structures to break down traditional barriers and stovepipe organisations. Technical solutions that support a collaborative exchange and ease of access of information.
5. Relationship between KD and Intelligence. NATO and national intelligence assets are critical to the KD process and will continue to collect information regarding potential risks and threats to the Alliance. While there are many similarities between military intelligence process efforts and KD, there are two significant differences: a. Firstly, NATO and national intelligence activities are focused primarily on actual or potential adversaries within a specific country or region. However, the ability for NATO to act effectively within a Comprehensive Approach requires information and knowledge regarding the capabilities, interaction and influences of all key actors across a much broader operational environment. Secondly, KD encompasses the deliberate use of non-military sources beyond the scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of information and knowledge from IOs, NGOs, private and commercial organisations as well as the full range of Governmental Organisations (GOs) and agencies.
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b.
6. An essential aspect of KD is therefore the fusion of intelligence with information from other sources in order to produce a comprehensive picture of the operational environment.
Figure 1: Knowledge Development Overview
7. The KD Process. An iterative process that supports planning, execution, and assessment, the Bi-SC KD concept identifies three key steps in the KD process: a. Collection. This involves the acquisition of information by various staffs. KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas of strategic interest prior to a crisis or by CCIRs in established areas of operation. Analysis. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then draw conclusions, deductions or implications. Analysis is required to provide products for assessment, planning and execution. Analysis in support of a requirement can be accomplished by a variety of techniques or approaches, such as: Event Analysis based on single event or report; Topic Analysis on special subjects of concern; Gap Analysis, based on requirements and existing knowledge; Capability and Force/Ratio Analysis; Generic Pattern Analysis; Course of Action Analysis; Effects Analysis; and Systems Analysis. Access. Once knowledge has been developed it must be transferred to decision makers and users in a timely manner. This will require tools and procedures to either push knowledge to the user, or allow the user to pull knowledge depending on the situation and operational requirement to ensure appropriate knowledge transfer.
b.
c.
8. Introduced and developed as part of KD, systems analysis is an integral part of the KD process. To summarise, Systems Analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, nonaligned, and friendly nations or entities. Systems Analysis integrates the analyses of study areas, such as the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) domains.1 Systems Analysis is a continuous, iterative and collaborative process that should be conducted in close
The PMESII domains are described in the Glossary.
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co-operation with internal/external Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), GOs, NGOs, and Centres of Excellence (COEs), as required. It is successfully utilised in both the civilian and military communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analysing and understanding problems in complex operational environments. 9. The KD process is underpinned by the Information / Knowledge Management (IKM) process which supports the Information Intelligence and KD requirements of the entire organisation. KD not only uses IKM for the development of knowledge, it also is critical to the third KD step of making knowledge accessible. It is important to note, however, that KD and IKM are not the same. KD is the process that develops knowledge to support decision making whereas IKM manages the provision of that knowledge across an organisation. 10. Conclusion. Elements of KD and Systems Analysis thinking are already supporting existing operations and missions, with positive feedback to indicate these decision-support capabilities should be implemented in a more formal and coherent manner. While considered the key enabler for the Operations Planning Process and with the importance of KD to the execution and assessment of NATO operations, the implementation of KD, including Systems Analysis capabilities, could also be considered a critical stand-alone capability.
Information is not knowledge - Albert Einstein
CHAPTER 1 Introduction
Aim of Handbook 1-1. The aim of this handbook is to provide the information needed by commanders and their staffs to gain a basic understanding of Knowledge Development (KD) a Bi-SC agreed concept, and how it can be implemented in their respective Headquarters. This handbook covers the fundamental KD principles, KeyTerm procedures and techniques that are evolving within NATO, the main aspects SituationalAwareness(SA)thehumanperceptionofall of which may eventually be developed availableelementsofinformationinrelationtoaspecific into NATO doctrine. The handbook situation that allows for further comprehensive and demonstrates how KD continuously informedcognitiveinterpretationofreality. supports and underpins situation awareness and understanding, planning, execution and assessment of operations within the context of NATOs Crisis Management Process (Reference N). 1-2. This handbook must be viewed purely as a PRE-DOCTRINAL document for informing commanders and staff officers on the current understanding of what KD is and how it may be applied in NATO. Development of the Handbook 1-3. This handbook has been produced through the collaborative efforts of the Bi-SC KD sub-working group and the KD Project Team (KDPT), the Terms of Reference of which are at Reference M. References A-J provide the chronological step-by-step evolution of the integration of the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations within NATO and within the overall framework of the development of the Comprehensive Approach. Use of Handbook 1-4. This handbook is designed to be used by all staffs across different functional areas within strategic, operational and tactical level HQs in NATO but is targeted mainly at those staff elements directly engaged in KD. The handbook has been drafted with the intention of further developing practices that are already evolving in current operations. The handbook is not intended to be prescriptive, but to offer advice and to highlight the experiences gained to date through experimentation and ongoing operations. Way Ahead - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) & Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs) 1-5. This handbook, in conjunction with the Knowledge Development Concept, lays out the fundamental principle requirements for the successful implementation of KD in support of the NATOs Crisis Management Process. This pre-doctrinal handbook forms the basis for all further development of future KD related SOPs and SOIs, which provide the detailed processes and instruction required for the practical implementation of the KD Concept. Background 1-6. KD is described in the KD Concept Paper (Reference L) as the integration of
NATOUNCLASSIFIEDRELEASABLEtoPfP/EU/MNE
isolated data into a useable body of information and relationships.2 In simple terms, it is the process that covers the acquisition, analysis and distribution of information that helps to contribute to a common and shared understanding of the operational environment. This handbook explains how KD will support the operations planning process as articulated in the ACO Comprehensive Operations KeyTerms Planning Directive (COPD). The COPD should be referenced for Operational Environment A system of systems in which details supporting the different actors interact within the operational environment in corresponding terms, processes and pursuitoftheirinterests. concepts used in this handbook. 1-7. KD is an evolution, not a relevanttoaparticularcrisisinwhichtheAlliancemaydecide,or revolution in thinking. Processes and information already exist has decided, to engage. This will include the related air, land, within NATO that support sea,spaceenvironments,andassociatedadversary,friendly,and decision-making. The problem is neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, that this information or isolated informationalandinfrastructure PMESII). knowledge often resides in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, de-conflicted or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner. Often, the end user or decision maker, usually a commander, is left to search for and integrate applicable knowledge in order to make a timely decision. 1-8. Knowledge Development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space. These systems may include but are not limited to the PMESII domains. This approach enables the Commander and staff KeyTerms to understand better the possible effects of Military, Political, System A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related Economic and Civil (MPEC) group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements formingaunifiedwhole. actions on different systems and actors within the engagement System Element Specific physical, functional, or behavioural space. This enhanced level of entities within each system. System elements can be people, facilities,forces,information,orothercomponentsofthesystem. understanding supports decision making throughout the different ActorApersonorotherhumanentity,includingstateandnon phases of NATOs Crisis stateentities,withintheinternationalsystemthatusesitspower toinfluenceothersinpursuitofitsinterestsandobjectives. Management Process including:: a. b.
2
Engagement Space That part of the strategic environment
Phase 1 Indications and warning (I&W) of a potential or actual crisis. Phase 2 - Assessment of the developing, or reassessment of an ongoing Crisis
And it further it states: KD supports planning, execution, and assessment by providing a holistic view of the engagement space. Systems Analysis is a specialized portion of KD which attempts to provide the Commander and staff with a comprehensive understanding of the engagement space, such as the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) elements in EBAO and how these elements interact as a system of systems. This understanding enables the Commander and staff to identify the most effective Political, Military, Civil and Economic instruments (reference chapter 1, Para 3 of BI-Strategic Pre-Doctrinal Handbook -- Effects Based Approach to Operations, dated 4 December 2007) available to achieve the desired effects. KD is a continuous, adaptive, and networked activity that relies on trained and experienced experts.
Situation and of its potential or actual implications for Alliance security. c. d. e. f. Phase 3 - Development of recommended response options to support NAC decision-making throughout the cycle of a crisis. Phase 4 - Planning. Phase 5 - Execution (including Assessment) of NAC decisions and directives. Phase 6 - Transition and termination of NATOs crisis management role.
1-9. The complex nature of contemporary security environments presents a range of potential risks and threats to Alliance interests that cannot be resolved by military means alone. Among the complex problems confronting the Alliance today are WMD proliferation, international terrorism, instability from failed/failing states, environmental and humanitarian disasters, threats to energy security, trans-national crime, and the possibility of armed aggression. NATOs evolving development of a comprehensive approach recognises that dealing effectively with such complex security problems will likely require the integrated use of political, economic and civil instruments in concert with military means based upon a greater understanding and appreciation of the operational environment. KD addresses the critical requirement to develop a greater understanding of complex problems by exploiting information and knowledge from a wide range of sources. This process helps to determine the most appropriate responses and enables the effective use of both military and non-military means. 1-10. In order to develop an improved understanding of such complex problems, KD includes a systems approach to analysis that complements other established methods of analysis. A systems analysis approach contributes to a more holistic and dynamic view of situation and focuses on collecting and KeyTerm analysing information about the various systems and subsystems within the SubsystemAsystemthatispartofalargersystem. operational environment. In addition, it examines the relationships between different subsystems and system elements in order to develop the knowledge required to support decisions regarding the most appropriate response. Relationship between Intelligence and Knowledge Development 1-11. NATO and national intelligence assets are critical to the KD process and will continue to collect information regarding potential risks and threats to the Alliance. This includes the possible intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries based on the different NATO Intelligence Disciplines. 1-12. While there are many similarities between military intelligence process efforts and KD, there are two significant differences. Firstly, NATO and national intelligence activities are focused primarily on actual or potential adversaries within a specific country or region. However, the ability for NATO to act effectively, especially within a comprehensive approach, requires information and knowledge regarding the capabilities, interaction and influences of all key actors across a much broader operational environment. A KD approach therefore utilises subject matter experts to analyse the different actors and systems in all the relevant PMESII domains, as well as the specific aspects of the region and operational environment, in order to develop a much broader and more comprehensive understanding of the engagement space.
1-13. Secondly, KD encompasses the deliberate use of non-military sources beyond the scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of information and knowledge from International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private and commercial organisations as well as the full range of governmental organisations (GOs) and agencies. Collaboration with non-NATO entities is therefore an essential aspect of KD, facilitating the fusion of intelligence with information from other sources to produce a comprehensive picture of the operational environment.
CHAPTER 2 The Knowledge Development Process

Overview 2-1. Iterative in nature, Knowledge Development is defined as a process that includes collecting and analysing, and integrating isolated data into useable bodies of knowledge, and making that knowledge available so that it can be shared3. A simple overview of the KD process is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview
2-2. KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas of strategic interest prior to a crisis KeyTerm or by CCIRs in established areas of operation. The primary purpose of KnowledgeRequirementAspecificneedforunderstanding KD is to support subsequent decision aboutasituationinordertomakeadecision. making in response to indications and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning, execution and assessment of operations. The challenge is to make the relevant information available in a form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a level of shared understanding that supports timely and effective decision making. Initiating the ACO KD Process 2-3. The ACO KD Process supports decision-making at all levels during each phase of the NATO Crisis Management Process and related processes. The initiation and level of effort of the KD process may derive from the following: 1. SACEUR nominates an Area of Interest (AOI) and allocates a priority of Monitoring, Interest or Concern in accordance with Reference Q. In this case, The ACO KD level of effort ranges from being broad but not particularly deep for a Monitoring AOI to being very detailed for a Concern AOI.
Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept dated 12 Aug 2008.
2. SACEUR designates JFCs as responsible HQs for specific areas of potential future NATO operations. As concerns increase over the potential for a crisis in a particular area, SACEUR will increase the priority of the AOI, which would in turn trigger intensified KD efforts, with increased focus and depth in support of a preliminary planning process. It is during the planning process that CCIRs are generated which then drive the prioritisation of information and intelligence collection. 3. KD activities will increase to support development of SACEURs assessment and potential military response options. NAC Initiating Directives will require a substantial intensification of the KD effort in support of an ongoing planning process. 2-4. In the event of an unforeseen crisis to which NATO responds at short notice, the ACO KD requirement will focus on the specific AOI and the data and information relevant to the AOI will be collected and verified. This is likely to require considerable allocation of analytical effort to rapidly generate knowledge capable of supporting short notice intensive crisis planning. Generic Process Characteristics 2-5. The KD process is an iterative process that relies on the interaction and continuous adjustment of information acquisition and analysis, including modelling and simulation activities, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Generic Knowledge Development Process
2-6. The generic KD process consists of a number of steps that enable the process to operate effectively. These steps are described as follows: 1. The Knowledge Request: Is simply a requirement for knowledge that is identified by the staff. This may come directly from CCIRs or a Request for Information (RFI) raised by the staffs. The knowledge request may have been generated from a previous iteration of the KD process that caused the decision maker to re-evaluate his knowledge requirement and either focus or broaden his previous knowledge request. It is therefore essential that KD staff are proactive in their approach to knowledge requests, ensuring that they fully understand the question and the end-users true knowledge requirements. 2. The Information Request: This initiates the collection process that provides the basic information and data from which the required knowledge can be developed. Key elements of this step of the process are the roles of the Knowledge Broker and the KD Collection Manager. a. Knowledge Broker - Is responsible for identifying and developing sources of information and facilitating the appropriate information exchanges with external organisations. This may include the establishment, validation and maintenance of relationships that facilitate a timely exchange of information often on a quid pro quo basis. b. KD Collection Manager - Is responsible for managing intelligence requirements whose answers are already available within NATO and/or partner unit/nations databases. The Collection Manager coordinates all subordinate unit intelligence collection plans, as well as establishing and coordinating a collection prioritisation scheme for all HQ operations. This includes coordination and prioritisation of PMESII information requirements that have been identified as being available from external agencies, IOs, NGOs, etc. However, the contribution of these external sources cannot be tasked in the same way as conventional military assets. 3. Knowledge Generation: Is the sum of activities that are employed by the KD staff in order to generate actionable knowledge -- knowledge that the human mind can use in a causal manner. These activities include various analytical, modelling and simulation techniques. 4. Product Access and Knowledge Transfer: Inside the KD Process all information, independent of its reliability, will be processed and taken into consideration. It is important, however, that only evaluated and reliable knowledge is provided in a timely manner to the end-user for use in decision making. Due to the sensitivity of NATO operational information and OPSEC procedures, knowledge products may be limited to a one-way (source to NATO) exchange. It is the role of the disclosure officer to apply the appropriate disclosure policies and ensure that actionable knowledge is disseminated to the widest possible audience. 2-7. Timely and adaptable feedback loops between the different components of the KD process are therefore essential in providing valuable support to the decision making process. This feedback is achieved through appropriate
3 KeyTerm Knowledge Base The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, expertise and establishedcontacts.
technical means, e.g. a shared knowledge base4 and collaborative analytical support, but also through appropriate organisational structures and synchronisation with the established battle rhythm. 2-8. Depending on the following parameters, establishment of an effective KD Process may require anything from a number of days to many weeks/months: Availability of knowledge base content, i.e. source access, search effort, transfer/releasability effort, compatibility with existing content. Required analysis fidelity and scope, i.e. level of detail, time frame to be observed, validation effort. Complexity of the operational environment, i.e. set of relevant, interrelated environmental variables and inherent dynamics to be captured/re-iterated due to scenario characteristics. Size of the KD team and coordination effort with other staff sections, i.e. communication and harmonisation effort.
COLLECTION 2-9. The first stage of the KD process is Information Acquisition, which involves the acquisition of information and the collection and collation of intelligence for later processing into actionable knowledge. 2-10. The KD Process depends heavily on the quality of the external information collection resources and relationships. The sources of information for different types of operations may differ greatly and will likely include traditional intelligence sources, data repositories of designed information proponents and a broad spectrum of open Internet sources. Each source will require different mechanisms for establishing reliability and the credibility of the information collected. Retrieval of Existing Knowledge 2-11. The quality of the initial knowledge retrieval has tremendous impact on the efficiency and focus of further collection efforts and therefore should be supported by effective navigation and retrieval functionalities. Experience shows that well designed search engines, accessible to operational planners and other end users, reduce the number of unnecessary requests for existing information or analysis products. External Information Search 2-12. External relationships are a fundamental basis for the collection of quality information. Sources range from classic intelligence or other agencies repositories to open sources. Access to these sources requires different levels of validation, verification and potentially the exchange of own products. For this reason the knowledge brokerage function with these external organisations has to be considered as an essential part of a dedicated Knowledge Management5 function. 2-13. The knowledge brokerage function might rely on formal information requests and
4 The working definition of knowledge base is: the collection of data, information, expertise and established contacts possessed by ACO. 5 The working definition of Knowledge Management is: the ability to gather, synthesize and analyze information about potential engagement spaces across the military, political, economic and social systems as a precursor to successful systemic analysis.
workflow mechanisms in order to manage external information flows and to separate the analysis activities from these Knowledge Management functions. For the responsiveness and accuracy of analysis, it remains essential that the analysis function has direct access to information sources for validation, in-depth research, knowledge mining and modelling feedback. This should be facilitated and in no way restricted, by the knowledge brokerage function. Identification of potential PMESII sources 2-14. Holistic analysis of the engagement space requires an array of information, including not only that provided by intelligence sources and traditional Intelligence collection means, but also information from other non-intelligence/military sources. Open sources available through the World Wide Web reflect an endless supply of information, although the sources are mostly unevaluated and of undetermined reliability. Civil governmental authorities from the international to local level, and NGOs might be able to provide reliable information. However, each of the aforementioned groups may have competing agendas and may provide information with the aim of influencing NATO operations to benefit their group. Those sources of information are out of NATO control and categorized according to AJP-2.16 as uncontrolled or casual sources. Therefore, mechanisms must be established to identify, evaluate and access potential resources of PMESII information. PMESII collection is to be conducted in a fully disclosed manner, with no attempt to disguise or hide NATO affiliations. If such disclosure is ill-advised or problematic, consider utilizing other avenues, to include traditional intelligence disciplines, to obtain the necessary information. 2-15. The challenge is to obtain access to the right information, provided at the right time, by a reliable resource that is willing to share. The following principles provide guidance and describe the factors that should be considered before the authorized NATO element contacts a source7: a. b. The process described is not inter-connected to or a replacement for HUMINT activity; it will enhance and widen the collection/information acquisition efforts. To identify a valuable resource for PMESII information, the following questions need to be raised and considered before8 the intended information exchange: (1) Information Content Factors: (a) Does the resource have a proper knowledge about the subject, country or culture? (b) Were past publications/studies issued on the subject by the potential resource? Were conferences provided on that subject? (c) Is the resource in close contact with the subject of interest (in place or liaison element)?
AJP-2.1(A), Intelligence Procedures, September 2005. Authorized NATO Element in this context, is the element either being tasked by SACEUR, SHAPE or the HQs COM to establish contact with this source of information. The authority to contact is dynamic based on context and political sensitivity, and therefore cannot be proscribed en toto here. 8 The Operational Factors in sub-para (2) may be impossible to determine prior to initial contact, but it is recommended to assess the likely answers to the degree possible as part of the resource assessment process.
7 6
(2)
Operational Factors: (a) Is the resource NATO friendly, neutral, impartial or adversarial? (b) Has the resource cooperated with NATO/Allies before? If yes, what is the resources reputation? (c) Are the resources interests and aims in line with, independent of or contradictory to NATOs interests and goals? To what degree? (d) Is the information seen as reliable and is this assessment confirmed by other resources? (e) Is the resource willing to share information? (f) Is the resource willing to provide one way information, without getting information back from NATO? (g) Can a non-information exchange be arranged through which NATO barters goods or services for information (i.e., food, fuel, water, medicine, or other support activities)? (h) Can/will the resource provide information in a timely and reliable manner? (i) What assessed risk does the potential resource assume by virtue of the proposed cooperation? (j) Are there any arrangements or memoranda of agreement ((MOU) already in place or possible to formalize information exchange expectations?
(3)
Security Factors: (a) Can the resource be evaluated/validated by Counter-Intelligence & Security (CI&Sy)? (b) Ensure that the resource has no ties (social, financial, economical and political) to opponent forces in the AOI (as assessed and validated by CI&Sy). (c) Assess the potential resources motivations for cooperation.
2-16. Samples of potential information resources are: a. IOs and NGOs: United Nations or European Union agencies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and affiliated organisations; international or national governmental or non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, OXFAM, Care and many others. Organized Crime issues: EUROPOL and INTERPOL. Major Civil actors: Foreign industrial elements working in-Theatre, country experts, cultural centres, academies, think tanks, research centres, media publication companies (i.e., Janes), subject matter experts, and Centres of Excellence.
b. c.
d.
Governments: Host nation, Alliance nations, AOI neighbouring nations and their intelligence organisations or embassies, and national law enforcements agencies.
Resource Evaluation and Validation 2-17. It is critical to handle and evaluate the PMESII resource information the same way that information from traditional intelligence sources is evaluated to ensure decision makers and planners receive reliable and accurate information. Source evaluation/validation is an assessment of how reliable the source is and how likely the information that comes from it is to be true and free of biases. Incoming information cannot be taken at face value. 2-18. There are many reasons why information may not be reliable or entirely accurate, not the least of which is deception. A description how a resource and its information can be categorized is available from NATO human intelligence governing directives. The advantage of this categorization method will be: It provides a universally understood and standardized shorthand assessment of information; and, Over time, it gives an indication of the capabilities of various resources and agencies and aids the selection of those best suited for particular tasks.
2-19. Before relying on a resources information, a proper background check/screening by the appropriate CI&Sy elements must be conducted. After the evaluation/validation process, information provided by a resource must be classified through approved NATO procedures. 2-20. It should be clearly understood that through the Knowledge Development process all information, independent of its reliability, will be processed and considered. It is vital that only evaluated and reliable information and intelligence be used in external planning, operations or assessments and to inform decision makers. Information/Information Overload 2-21. Information is useless if it cannot be processed in a timely manner. Therefore, unnecessary duplication, collection and processing needs to be avoided. At the first stage, the requirements for information must be clearly identified. This will be done by comparing already existing and available information (in databases/files) and operational information requirements by the appropriate analyst. Research and analysis tools need to be used to find the already evaluated information for operational use. In this process, the value of the information must be assessed against operational requirements with respect to: Age of information. Reliability/accuracy. Scope on subject. Detail/depth of information.
2-22. A request for information should be submitted and processed by knowledge brokers only after ensuring existing information will not satisfy the information requested. Information requested or acquisitioned should be limited and focused to AOI-supporting information, based on functional area RFIs, CCIRs or Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). By using this approach, information can be developed into actionable intelligence or knowledge. This new knowledge will itself be stored in a knowledge database to make it
available for later analysis or to support other requirements. Integration of External Information 2-23. The integration of newly received information or derived produced knowledge into an existing knowledge repository or knowledge base -- which is both an information acquisition and knowledge development function -- requires: Establishing structural relations between distinguishable components of new information/knowledge and the knowledge base data structure (Collation).9 A clear understanding of process flow from each element or individual that enters data into the knowledge repository. Usage of a Master-data-format to ensure external data can be easily provided and integrated into existing knowledge base data structures. Deducting implied consequences/changes to existing context on all affected levels of aggregation, which might be supported by an automated reasoning mechanism. Capturing contextually significant change history of new content to ensure traceability and validation of changes. Indicating tolerated contradictions with existing context from an analytic perspective, if deviating perspectives are to be reflected. Sanitising content, if necessary, and determining level of classification/disclosure.
2-24. These functions are closely related to the analysis process and may involve corresponding data tagging in the knowledge base. Depending on volume and required skill level, they may be distributed to specialized functions, e.g. a dedicated disclosure process and knowledge broking process, but still need to be closely coordinated with analysis. Due to this distribution of work, the KD process requires continuous coordination of products and updated knowledge base content. Therefore, a well structured knowledge base is considered an indispensable means of collective situational awareness and work coordination throughout the whole KD process. ANALYSIS 2-25. Analysis is defined as the study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions10. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then draw conclusions, deductions or implications. Analysis is required to provide knowledge for assessment, planning and execution. Analysis in support of a requirement can be accomplished by a variety of techniques or approaches, such as:
9
Event Analysis, based on single event or report. Topic Analysis, on special subjects of concern. Gap Analysis, based on requirements and existing knowledge.
Collation: Is defined in AJP 2-1(A) as A step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which the grouping together of related items of information or intelligence provides a record of events and facilitates further processing. Collation is an integral part of the Intelligence Cycle that bridges Collection and Production or Processing. It employs both human and IT (Information Technologies) resources, to maximize the information collected. 10 AAP-6(2010).
Capability and Force/Ratio Analysis. Generic Pattern Analysis. Course of Action Analysis. Effects Analysis. Systems Analysis.
2-26. Whilst many well-established analysis techniques can be used to support KD, it is the systems perspective of an engagement space that is critical in achieving KDs overall aim of providing a holistic understanding. It is therefore the emerging systems analysis methodology that is core to the overall KD process and which is explained in detail in the paragraphs that follow. Systems Analysis 2-27. Systems Analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, non-aligned and cooperative nations or entities. It considers the operational environment as a set of complex adaptive systems in order to identify behaviours, structures and interrelationships, and to assess strengths, weaknesses or vulnerabilities. It is successfully utilised in both the civilian and military communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analysing and understanding problems in complex operational environments.
Figure 4: A Systems Understanding
2-28. Systems Analysis aims to identify a network of systems and system elements, to identify the relationships and interactions between these system elements, and to create actionable knowledge to achieve a desired effect. This actionable knowledge can be used to target actions in order to attempt to affect capabilities, behaviour, or interaction and influence of key actors and entities within the operational environment. 2-29. Systems Analysis integrates the analyses from work done on specific independent
systems, such as the PMESII domains. Systems Analysis is a continuous, iterative and collaborative process that should be conducted in close co-operation with internal/external Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations and Centres of Excellence (COEs), as required. 2-30. Systems Analysis supports the planning, execution, and assessment processes at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the engagement space in varying degrees of complexity commensurate with the respective current level of NATO interest and is directly dependent on the analytical requirements. For example, a tactical view of a particular area within the engagement space will likely require more detailed study than a strategic view of the same area. The resulting in-depth understanding of the engagement space allows the Commander to determine what actions will produce changes in the behaviour of critical actors in a way that will ultimately lead to the achievement of mission objectives. 2-31. The overall goal of Systems Analysis is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics, capabilities, behaviour and interaction of the various systems (and their related subsystems) within the engagement space. As these elements evolve or change in time and space, Systems Analysis assists in providing a contextual assessment of the objectives, capabilities, likely actions and possible effects of each of these systems. Analysis Process 2-32. During initial analysis the preliminary focus of KD is usually only broadly specified, e.g. a geographical region or AOI. The initial information acquisition and analysis process relies on a balanced effort across the entire operational environment and is not influenced by operational objectives. Such analysis permits the formulation of a preliminary understanding of how the major actors, systems and components interact within the operational environment. Once the mission has been established, this understanding will then form the basis of more detailed analysis and will help identify gaps in existing knowledge and areas requiring further study. 2-33. As the depth of analysis is further developed, the identification of specific focus areas and operational objectives may either be derived from the analysis or given by external guidance. The focus areas are driven by the CCIRs with the initial information requirements being formulated by his planning staff. In the later stages of KD, focus areas may evolve further due to changes in the situation, results of the ongoing analysis process, or due to emerging current or future planning requirements. In most cases, the true complexity of the operational environment, and the options for influencing the achievement of operational objectives with desired effects only emerges as a result of the in depth iterative analysis process. Continuous review and adjustment of the analysis is required and can only be achieved through coordination of the KD Process and the planning, execution and assessment processes. 2-34. The iterative Systems Analysis process generally includes the following activities: a. Systems breakdown, in which subsystems, system elements and components are identified and where system boundaries, structures, and general relationships are determined. Interaction analysis, which explores inherent system dynamics in order to understand the underlying behaviour of the system over time and highlighting
b.
10
the cause and effect relationships between elements of the system. c. Model synthesis, which re-combines the systems elements to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the behaviour of the system as a whole. This helps to identify similarities, interfaces, patterns, key factors, and feedback loops within the system in order to understand its comprehensive behaviour.
2-35. The Systems Analysis process consists of the following activities and, as it is not a linear process, they may be re-iterated non-sequentially: Identify actors and their attributes, such as objectives, intentions, capabilities, relationships and interactions. Identify real world objects (e.g. a bridge) and abstract objects (e.g. a political power gap), processes and logical dependencies (e.g. bridge on Main Supply Route also provides access route for local trade and communal worship). Identify normative behaviour and apply, where possible, available conceptual patterns.11 Identify potential knowledge gaps. Identify leverage points. Identify possible undesired effects from potential actions.
KeyTerm LeveragePointapointofpressureor influence that can cause a change to thestateofthesystem.
2-36. To assist in the understanding of how a particular system operates, Systems Analysis frequently uses Influence Diagrams to help visualise how key actors (individuals, groups and organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly important. Influence Diagrams can be used to show where critical requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities exist and where the behaviour of system elements can be influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. These diagrams can also depict Objectives, Criteria for Success and Decisive Points. An example of such a diagram is shown in Figure 5.
11
Conceptual Patterns generically capture a normative behaviour or functional characteristic of individual actors, organisations, functional elements, processes, activities or events. Conceptual Patterns can be derived from earlier observed behaviour based on generic knowledge, e.g. conceptual theories, lessons learned from comparable cases and scenarios that can be applied to similar scenarios. Conceptual Patterns can serve as templates for focused knowledge search/guidance to actionable knowledge.
11
Figure 5: Example of an Influence Diagram
Quantification and Simulation 2-37. The lack of availability of simulation tools and analysis time may significantly limit this phase of the analysis and thus restrict analysis of the dynamic aspects of the engagement space. The effort to develop a system analysis model could vary significantly depending on the method used, the time available and the desired level of fidelity/accuracy. In some cases, a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC drill) or war-gaming might adequately serve the purpose. For longer-term analysis, a number of simulation runs or a complete empirical study might be more appropriate. ACCESS 2-38. Actionable knowledge is only of value if it is understandable and usable by the target audience or decision maker. Knowledge can be provided by Subject Matter Experts or by other specialists and needs to be evaluated within the context of a specific mission environment or AOI. Knowledge can be either provided as a reactive response to specific knowledge requests or by proactively distributing knowledge to try to meet all user requirements. Good KD practice maximises knowledge distribution without overloading staff with unnecessary and superfluous information. To make todays complex interrelationships between entities understandable to non-experts, new ways and methodologies need to be found to make knowledge accessible to the target audience.
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Knowledge Transfer 2-39. Like all steps in the KD process knowledge transfer must be considered as part of a spiral process and not an independent final step. Continuous end-user interaction is not possible or even desirable throughout all phases of the KD process, however, consultation and feedback should be sought periodically to ensure suitability and acceptance of the final product. This promotes a better situation understanding of the problem by the end user and can lead to a refinement or change to the original information request. Validation of analysis products is essential in achieving user acceptance during this phase and can be achieved by the inclusion of referenced source data. 2-40. It is essential to transfer analysis results into a format and the required depth of detail that satisfies the end users specific knowledge requirements (e.g. operational planning process, COMs Decision Brief). This step has to ensure that relevant complexity of the operational environment is not over-simplified in favour of simplicity/swiftness of product development and acceptance. Tool support must be tailored to enhance visualisation and understanding of complex analysis products. 2-41. The knowledge transfer step should be facilitated by robust communication mechanisms, user-friendly navigation systems and search engines that permit easy access to the knowledge base. Due to the nature of some analysis products, continuous personal contact with the end user/consumer in order to explain and, if necessary, re-model and refine analysis products, can be beneficial.
Knowledge is not knowledge until someone else knows that one knows - Lucilius, 1st Century BC
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CHAPTER 3 - Knowledge Development in Support of Crisis Management and the Planning Process
Overview 3-1. KD supports the entire Operations Planning Process (OPP) including the planning, execution and assessment of operations. In general, planning and analysis of the environment are closely related. The contribution of Systems Analysis to the planning process is critical and includes: the identification of key system elements that can be acted upon in order to achieve desired effects; and exposure of both intended and unintended consequences. In some cases, the assessed system reaction to some actions(s) may show that certain military objectives, effects and Courses of Action (COAs) are not feasible and might require adjustment. Initial Analysis and KD Focus 3-2. In the early stages of planning, the initial general analysis and KD concerning a given AOI will not be limited by a specific focus or driven by specific goals (end state, objectives, desired effects, etc.). This encourages a holistic and unbiased KD on the AOI and should start well in advance of an operation. As a situation develops, potential scenarios play an increasing part in research and analysis. Subsequent Analysis 3-3. During COA development, potential leverage points, critical requirements, critical capabilities, critical vulnerabilities, and indicators for determining success should all be identified12. During COA analysis and war gaming, dynamic system models allow for simulation/research of the potential impact of applied tasks/actions on the operational environment and any resulting consequences to the objectives and/or desired effects. Specifically, in complex scenarios, this facilitates the identification of undesired effects. 3-4. Although KD is capable of supporting the planning, execution and assessment of operations at all levels, it is likely that the greatest contribution will tend to be at the operational and strategic levels. KD Contribution to the Planning Process 3-5. Figure 6 on the next page illustrates the relationships between the political-military and the strategic crisis response and operations planning processes. 3-6. Figure 7 depicts a summary of the Operations Planning Process (OPP) at the Strategic and Operational Levels and includes the key products that the process steps produce. Readers requiring full details of the OPP should consult the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Reference O).
12
See Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix at Para 4-19 of the COPD.
14
Figure 6: Political-Military Strategic Interface
Figure 7: Operations Planning Process at Strategic and Operational Levels
15
3-7. There are particular elements of the planning process at the strategic and operational level to which KD will make a significant contribution. A selection of these is detailed below with some practical examples to show how KD expressly adds value to the process. The products and processes are marked with letters that correspond to Figure 7.
A. Situation Awareness
3-8. Situation Awareness is significantly enhanced by the identification of key systems, subsystems, components and actors that affect the potential engagement space/operational environment and by the highlighting of key influences and relationships. Such analysis will also assist in defining CCIRs above. System Summary is a specific systems analysis product that provides a multi-dimensional dynamic overview of the operational environment based on a cross-domain system analysis. These summaries can also include identification of system components (i.e. strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities) that may have potential for exploitation. These types of summaries can either be specific to each PMESII domain (e.g. Political Summary of an AOI, Military Summary of an AOI, etc.) or can provide an overall overview of the operational environment (e.g. AOI daily/weekly Summary) to include a condensed review of all of the PMESII domains. Summaries may also be created at several levels to include National, Regional, Provincial, and potentially District/City.
B. Strategic Assessment
3-9. The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to develop and coordinate a comprehensive strategic assessment of an emerging or potential crisis and strategic military response options for NAC consideration in support of their Political-Military Estimate (PME) process. It establishes the essential strategic conditions required to plan and conduct military operations as part of a comprehensive approach to achieve clearly defined NATO objectives and endstate conditions. Systems summaries can be used to support the development of these strategic objectives and help to define the end state conditions. 3-10. SACEURs Strategic Assessment (SSA) provides an assessment of the crisis in support of the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) Phase 2. 3-11. Examples of KD contributions to the development of the SSA are: KD will provide updates to the dynamics of the situation and highlight the assessed aims of the key actors (individuals and organisations) and elements (networks, ethnic groups and their Diaspora). KD will enhance the Factor-Deduction-Conclusion analysis by contributing an understanding of the dynamics operating within the engagement space and exposing different influences and interrelationships.
3-12. KD will support the identification of desired Strategic Effects by highlighting potential interactions and the dynamics that could result from the actions selected to achieve a desired effect.
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C. Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options

3-13. The primary purpose of Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options is to validate the effectiveness of the execution of military operations, guiding the commander in making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. At the operational level, the assessment process is based on the overall analysis of metrics measuring progress of planned actions and achievement of planned effects and objectives for the whole military mission. At the tactical level, the focus is not on measuring effects but is on measuring the achievement of planned actions for each particular component. For example, a KD product might be the analysis and evaluation of the impact in the political arena and in the local population after the assassination of a moderate political key leader by actors within the engagement space. As another example, an insurgent group analysis goes beyond simple military capabilities to include sources of manpower, relations with and support from local communities, religious and other motivations, funding, etc.
D. Operational Orientation
3-14. Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis. CoG analysis is enhanced by KD based systems analysis, which assists in identifying the Critical Capabilities (CCs) required to support the CoG, the Critical cross-domain requirements needed to underpin these CCs and the Critical Vulnerabilities of key actors within the Operational Environment, that may be exploited. For example, a CoG analysis could identify the support of the local population as the CoG of an insurgent group, but a KD based systems analysis could additionally expose the underlying reasons for that support in the form of financial assistance for reconstruction, provision of medical and educational facilities and micro-financing for small business start ups. 3-15. Operational Design. Systems Analysis can provide a thorough understanding of the behaviour of the systems that make up the engagement space and assist in identifying genuine Decisive Points and appropriate Lines of Operation. Additionally, established Decisive Points and desired effects will provide focus for refined KD.
E. Strategic/Operational CONOPS Development

3-16. Development of the CONOPS includes an assessment of opposing forces most likely and most dangerous Courses of Action based largely on military capability and these are used to war-game Own Courses of Action. In the future, the operational concept should also include a wider understanding of the potential actions of relevant actors, in response to Alliance operations; and the full spectrum of cross-domain relationships. For instance, war gaming has to include, beside RED and BLUE information, the representation of GREEN and WHITE actors and include non-military reactions to, and impact of, Alliance activities. For example, a KD supported war-game can highlight the undesired effects of a proposed action such as the bombing of a bridge or broadcasting facility.
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F. Strategic/Operational OPLAN Development

3-17. Traditionally, threat assessments concentrated mainly on the military threat to own forces. KD supports and enhances this assessment by considering the full impact of the presence of Alliance forces in theatre on the regional and local society and structures, in order to identify all possible issues that may have an impact on the mission. It thus represents a more comprehensive assessment drawing on a wider range of sources with a shift in emphasis from the threat to own forces to the threat to the overall mission and achievement of the end state. In particular, a systems analysis that imparts a thorough understanding of the behaviour of a system in response to specific actions has the potential to offer a unique appreciation of potential future behaviour of the actors within the system and to illuminate the range of potential outcomes, both predictable and capricious, which could ensue. For example, regional criminal elements may react adversely to any impact on their activities stemming from Alliance security operations. Thoughtless use of rare local resources may trigger a withdrawal of cooperation or cause an increase in support for extremist groups by the local population. Hiring of locals to build up new security forces might result in unexpected bomb attempts against volunteers and destabilise the desired objective of a Safe and Secure Environment. 3-18. KD requires the collection of a very broad range of information and knowledge, which must be accomplished systematically and in accordance with a plan; which, inter alia, fulfils the needs of the CCIRs, PIRs, EEFIs and FFIRs. 3-19. Functional area annexes to the OPLANs must be developed from a knowledge driven perspective.
G. Strategic/Operational Assessment and OPLAN Reviews

3-20. During the CONOPS Development phase of planning, at all levels of command, Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are specified which allow measurement of progress towards the creation of an effect (i.e. demonstration of a change in system state). Knowledge based systems analysis is a powerful methodology to highlight the valid elements that are fundamental causes and not symptoms of a particular problem. Continued analysis of these elements and the resultant changes in the behaviour of the system provide a vital contribution to the assessment process. Additionally KD may assist in developing appropriate measures of performance (MOP) for assessing mission efficiency.13
13 See current version of the NATO Assessment Handbook for additional information on assessment, measurement of progress and MoEs.
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CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

KD Impacts on Organisational Structures 4-1. Structural implementation of KD within a staff structure addresses the inherently compartmentalised, stove piped perspective of the problem space. The compartmentalised approach leads to limited situation awareness, which can only partly be mitigated by traditional means of information management. Complex and dynamic scenarios require greater levels of staff specialisation and a better in-depth understanding of increasingly detailed focal areas. At the same time the operating environments of these complex and dynamic scenarios have an increased need for an overarching and coordinated staff perception, which is hard to achieve in existing static staff structures. 4-2. In the past, staff elements have developed specialised, and thereby different, methods of gathering, developing, analysing and processing knowledge. As the levels of maturity, proficiency and detail vary between these methods they frequently are not interoperable. Coordination between them is often ad-hoc and sub-optimal for generating a consistent holistic and dynamic image of the operational environment. 4-3. KD is a method to capture and analyse the operational problem space and is applicable to various multidimensional operational scenarios. Seen as an overarching methodology it does not replace, but is intended to unify and enhance, existing techniques individually represented in the traditional staff elements. A unified KD process that encompasses all staff structures: Provides a more comprehensive and adaptive perspective of a currently compartmentalised and highly dynamic problem space. Enhances and unifies existing, non-coherent KD techniques in various organisational subunits. Transforms and captures implicit knowledge in more systematic and explicit knowledge representations. Makes knowledge interoperable between subunits using unified information formats. Makes knowledge persistent beyond temporarily available expertise due to personnel fluctuation/exchange/limited access to SMEs.
KD Integration within the NATO Command Structure 4-4. The organisational structure required for successful integration of KD should be flexible enough to allow for individual HQ requirements and will therefore vary accordingly. Until NATO develops sufficient training capacity and suitable courses to train sufficient numbers of staff in KD, the Alliance will have to rely on ad-hoc expertise to underpin KD. Nonetheless, the primary responsibility for KD should reside within a core expert group of personnel within the NATO Command Structure, with this group forming a KD community of interest.
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4-5. There are three levels of KD organisational structures currently envisioned: Knowledge Management Centre (KMC); Knowledge Development Centre (KDC); and Knowledge Centre (KC).
Figure 8: Integration of KD in Current NATO Command Structure
4-6. Increases in the magnitude of the information requirements and the complexities of information gathering from organisations outside NATOs span of control require that a network of knowledge must be organised and managed in such a way that KD can be performed effectively, as shown in Figure 8. This management function should be located within the NATO Command Structure in order to have appropriate tasking authority. Furthermore, it will receive guidance/direction from SACEUR to begin research in a specific area of interest and then would reach out to the various knowledge entities and task them appropriately. Knowledge Management Centre 4-7. The ACO Knowledge Management Centre establishes a centralised knowledge base that contains, at a minimum, all data required to support NATO threats and types of NATO operations. For all data elements there is a requirement to know what information is required, where the information resides, in what format the information is held, who is responsible for maintaining and updating the information, and how this information can be exchanged. The Knowledge Management Centre staff should have a deep understanding of the KD process and tools, including the systems analysis process and should work in close collaboration with the ACO Knowledge Development Centre and JFC Knowledge Centres. 4-8. a. The KMC, envisioned to reside at SHAPE, will: Coordinate, prioritise and manage knowledge requirements of end-users and decision-makers in support of current and possible future operations. Establish and manage knowledge networks, sources and custodians, including collaborative relationships among communities of interest and external knowledge sources.
b.
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c.
Coordinate and monitor tasks and responsibilities for collection, analysis and production in support for prioritised knowledge requirements. Establish policy guidance, ontology, rules and procedures for developing and sharing knowledge based on common standards for metadata, information exchanges and information assurance. Oversee the establishment and maintenance of the knowledge base and networking information infrastructure as required to organise, store, discover, access, retrieve and exploit information and knowledge.
d.
e.
Knowledge Development Centre 4-9. A Knowledge Development Centre (KDC) providing a cross-cutting view across all domains of the operational environment would utilise unrefined information accessed from all available sources, both from within and external to the NATO Command Structure. 4-10. The strategic level KDC, as tasked by KMC, will: a. Collaborate with experts across the knowledge network to fulfil collection and analysis requirements in support of prioritised knowledge requirements, including reach back support to JFCs and deployed HQs. Collate, validate and integrate data, information, intelligence and knowledge acquired through knowledge networks; initiate action to fill gaps. Conduct collaborative analysis, modelling and simulations to understand complex situations and assess a range of potential effects Develop and coordinate products to enhance dynamic situation awareness with end-users and decision makers, including visualisation. Ensure the transfer of knowledge to end-users via the most effective and efficient means as well as storage in and access to the knowledge base.14
b.
c.
d.
e.
Knowledge Centres at the Operational Level 4-11. In addition to the strategic level Knowledge Development Centre within the NATO Command Structure, operational level Knowledge Centres should be established within each JFC. These JFC Knowledge Centres will exchange information and knowledge with the ACO Knowledge Development Centre and will provide knowledge in support of the planning/decision making process at the operational level. JFC Knowledge Centres should be focused on specific regions and/or topics, as directed by SACEUR. Each centre should include a Systems Analysis team, with expertise in specific regional areas. These analysts will be able to draw on the wider network of knowledge available through NATO and the wider international community by utilising the KD management function provided by the
14
Further described later in Chapter 5.
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Knowledge Management Centre at SHAPE.

COM COS
KDA KDA
Permanently attached KD Analysis KD Process coordination temporary allocation Knowledge/Information Exchange
SPECIAL STAFF
Higher Level KD Reach-Back (e.g. IFC)
Adjacent KD Centre
LEGAD MEDAD POLAD PAO
KDA KDA JOINT temporary Boards/WG
KNOWLEDGE CENTRE
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE KDA JOINT KDA EFFECTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH KDA KDA JOINT SYNCHRONI SATION & EXECUTION BRANCH
RESOURCES DIRECTORATE
In-Theatre KNOWLEDGE Cell (deployed)
Information Acquisition & Collection (Knowledge Brokering) Knowledge Development & Analysis
KDA JOINT KDA PLANS BRANCH
LOGISTICS BRANCH
CIS BRANCH
External Sources
KDA KDA JOINT ASSESSMENT BRANCH
FINANCIAL RESOURCES BRANCH
ENGINEER BRANCH
Knowledge Management Support
KDA KDA SITCEN/JOC
HUMAN RESOURCES BRANCH
Figure 9: Knowledge Centre Integration in a JFC (illustrative structure)
4-12. A KC would be situated at each operational command level (JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples and JFC Lisbon). The KC would: a. Collect, prioritise and coordinate the knowledge requirements of the Commander, including deployed and deployable HQs, with the KMC. Coordinate and monitor tasks and responsibilities for collection, analysis and production in support for prioritised knowledge requirements. Collate, validate and integrate data, information, intelligence and knowledge acquired through knowledge networks; initiate action to fill gaps. Collaborate with experts across the knowledge network to fulfil collection and analysis requirements in support of prioritised knowledge requirements, including reach back support for deployed HQs. Conduct collaborative analysis, modelling and simulations to understand complex situations and assess a range of potential effects. Use, develop and coordinate products to enhance dynamic situation awareness with end-users and decision makers, including visualisation. Ensure the transfer of knowledge to end-users via the most effective and
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
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efficient means as well as storage in, and access, to the knowledge base. Knowledge Development Entities 4-13. Other parts of the NATO Command Structure and non-NATO bodies may not have formal KD entities or dedicated KD staff. This does not mean that they are not integral elements of the KD structure who act as either key information / knowledge providers or as interfaces to decision makers and other knowledge customers. These informal Knowledge Development entities must be identified and considered during the development and implementation of the KD process. Examples of these KD entities would be the Theatre Engagement Cell at the Forward Element and HQ IS Civil Emergency Planning. In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities 4-14. Although not mandatory, it has proven beneficial at the operational level to have both an In-theatre and Reach-Back KD capability.
DCOM COS Main
+ Special Staff Exercises & Prep
MAIN
Structure: Main/DJSE/JLSG Linkages: how & where they connect Center of gravity of effort
KM Directorate
FWD DJSE
JPALL Knowledge Centre Situation Centre Joint Effects
Situation Cell
Operations Directorate
COM
Joint Plans Joint Assessments SYNC & EX LOG Resources Finance
+ Personal staff and others as required
Joint Coord Centre
COS DJSE
Theatre Engagement Centre
Processes Products Tools
JLSG
Resource Directorate
HR Engineer COM and IS
Figure 10: Proposed In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities
4-15. Both In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD capabilities: Perform similar functions, but with different sources and level of analysis granularity. Are tailored to the existing conditions at each location -- closeness to end-user, technical equipment, structural implementation, availability of expertise, etc. Contribute to and share a common knowledge base. Demand close cooperation, synchronisation, and connection, both with each other and with other staff components within the headquarters.
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4-16. The In-Theatre KD capability, as illustrated at Figure 11, has a direct connection to the In-Theatre end-users and decision making process, and is essential in closing any communication gap that may be created by knowledge being generated from outside of the theatre. As such, in-theatre analysts are better able to explain products to the users; including any assumptions or limitations of the analysis.
Process Flow Information Flow Collaboration
KD Process In Theatre -
Knowledge Broker/ KD Collection Manager

Knowledge Request
In Theatre Sources
Links to SMEs Agency Reps LNOs etc.
Customer End-user
Information Request
Product Access & Knowledge Transfer
Focus Area Specification/ Specification/A Adjustment djustment
CCIRM/ Collection Management
Apply Disclosure Policy
KD Analyst
Knowledge Retrieval/ Review of Relevant Content
SENSORS
Initial Analysis & Model Refinement Knowledge Reach Back / Collaboration (Distributed) Knowledge Base
Rapid Simulation of (System) Analysis Results
KD Process Reach Back

Extensive Knowledge Structuring/ Integration
Repository Replication
Sources accessible by Reach-Back Reach Back

Unstructured Content (Documents)
(Distributed) Knowledge Base
Apply Disclosure Policy
Knowledge Retrieval/ Comprehensive Navigation
Structured Content (DBs)
Disclosure Officer
Extensive Simulation of (System) Analysis Results Extensive Analysis and Modelling (Background Knowledge Generation)
Reach Back Analysts
Centres of Excellence
Figure 11: In-Theatre and Reach-Back Knowledge Development Process
4-17. The In-Theatre KD Capability utilises the same analysis methodology as the ReachBack KD Capability. However, it capitalizes on coordination with the end-user in order to tailor/focus the analysis process and products to meet the end-users needs. It accesses in
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theatre information sources using established HQ information acquisition processes, develops local liaisons and merges the products into a global knowledge base. Integration of the KD Capability in the staff structures, synchronisation with the staffs battle rhythm and full and unfiltered access to information sources in theatre are essential for the success of the InTheatre capability. To achieve this, manning and equipment have to be balanced with the footprint limitations in theatre. Frequently, the In-Theatre process will focus on quickresponse products and the refinement of pre-modelled products provided by the Reach-Back KD Capability. 4-18. The Reach-Back KD capability conducts a more in-depth, comprehensive analysis, in a broader spectrum of information and with greater level of detail. It has the capacity to scan through extensive external databases, other organisations reporting systems, the internet, and established long-term liaisons to different organisations and communities to support continuous and validated access to such sources. The analysis process may rely on personal contact to Centres of Excellence and Subject Matter Expert networks, with dedicated liaison elements, knowledge exchange and consulting functions in order to facilitate the analysis process. The common knowledge base coupled with collaborative tool support allow for close coordination and synchronisation with the In-Theatre KD capability.
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CHAPTER 5 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT & TOOL SUPPORT

5-1. The KD process is underpinned by the Information / Knowledge Management (IKM) process, which supports the Information Intelligence and KD requirements of the entire organisation. KD not only uses IKM for the development of knowledge, it also is critical to the third KD step of making knowledge accessible. It is important to note, however, that KD and IKM are not the same. KD is the process that develops knowledge to support decision making whereas IKM manages the provision of that knowledge across an organisation.
Figure 12: The Knowledge Development/Knowledge Management Relationship
5-2. A well-defined and established Knowledge Management (KM) process will be required to address the complex issues arising from the implementation of KD and the requirement for KD products. It can be generally assumed that the challenges facing KM will be similar in nature to those associated with Information Management as illustrated in Figure 12. Knowledge Base Capability 5-3. The ability to retrieve existing knowledge significantly impacts the efficiency of the KD process. Many electronic storage mechanisms and databases exist across NATO, many of which are poorly maintained and are not interconnected. There is currently a virtual barrier between operational and administrative information. A lot of data is still present in non exchangeable formats and, even worse, in a lot of cases as cognitive data in the minds of SMEs that is often lost when rotations take place. A thorough analysis of the PMESII domains for a given operation requires information well beyond the military centric information normally resident in NATO/ACO databases. To realise the full potential of KD, there is a need to manage these multiple information sources, internal and external, structured and unstructured. 5-4. The collection of data, information, expertise and established contacts possessed by ACO is defined as the knowledge base. Mechanisms to manage this knowledge base,
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efficiently and effectively, will have to be found, while guarding against information overload. For electronic information, the image of a federation of databases is evoked where common data standards, efficient pan-knowledge base search functions, collaborative tools, and controlled data access/transfer exist. Oversight of this knowledge base will require some central management functions, which would see synergies if twinned with existing IKM roles. Locating opportunities and facilitating solutions for interaction between existing and emerging systems will facilitate development of knowledge for current and future NATO operations. The better current information is managed, the more efficiency will be realised through reduction of duplication of effort. Source Access 5-5. Access to information sources must be provided by established means and utilise Information Management best practices. This should include the specification of technical interfaces as well as inter-personnel networking relationships, e.g. headquarters staff, civilian partners, COEs, SMEs, and Regional Advisors (RA) who might represent other agencies (GOs, NGOs). To provide harmonised knowledge across other staff functions, comprehensive access to all internal staff owned information products is equally essential. 5-6. In order to live up to its ambitions of holistic and dynamic understanding, the KD process needs unrestricted access to open sources such as the internet and the possibility to transfer data from these sources onto NATO networks and vice versa. Essential information that is locked up within these repositories may not be searchable with the current search engine or with the existing user rights and free access may need to be brokered with the respective institutions/organisations for key NATO personnel to have access to this information and differing points of view. 5-7. For longer-term knowledge development, formal agreements and information exchange policies with external organisations may ensure a more responsive and validated information gathering process. This can be facilitated by dedicated Knowledge Brokering and Knowledge Disclosure functions embedded in the KD Process. Disclosure Support and Access Control 5-8. The Knowledge Disclosure personnel15 within the KD process can be supported by dedicated automated functionality. As a first step, all data/information that is available for disclosure must be identified. The classification level of individual elements or paragraphs of information will allow the cross-flow of information across different networks while not compromising the security or security requirements of the source of the information. A similar functionality may be used to support the control of access to classified knowledge throughout real time knowledge exploration. 5-9.
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To support a distributed knowledge base with users of differing levels of security
These personnel would be responsible for ensuring the confidentiality (of information). Information confidentiality is defined as the property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. [C-M(2007)0118, The NATO Information Management Policy, 28 Jan 08]
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access, each document in the system must have classification markings for each paragraph, graph and other data components. For example, this would allow search engines configured with individual user credentials to access appropriately classified parts of the knowledge base. Based on formal knowledge requests, sanitised content, such as indexes/excerpts of classified content, could then be disclosed on demand. Collaboration Support to KD 5-10. The existence of a collaboration support network is critical for the KD process. The use of this collaborative network throughout the process allows for the establishment of collaborative relationships among communities of interest and external knowledge sources and is essential to introduce different fields of expertise and different perspectives to the overall analysis. 5-11. The foundation of any form of collaboration support is the knowledge base itself, as it allows for sharing of information and knowledge. Therefore it is necessary that the knowledge base: Is updated across all domains on a regular basis to ensure consistency and validity of data. Is able to capture all stages, types, and/or formats of knowledge being produced throughout the entire KD process.
Simulation Support to KD 5-12. Simulation support to the KD Process can utilise a wide range of available simulation types. Currently, stock-and-flow simulation of system analysis products and agent-based simulation to reflect certain actor/system element behaviour have been proven effective in experimentation. Not all content is equally suitable for all simulation types. Specifically, in support to planning purposes war gaming and COA analysis simulation support can be considered useful, but not yet fully proven. Tools Support to KD 5-13. Tools to enhance the way staff conduct KD can save time and increase effectiveness. These tools can improve the manner in which staff work, collaborate and share information. One tool that enhances the KD process is TOPFAS, Systems Analysis Tool (SAT). The venue and format of steady state TOPFAS training is still to be decided and will be the subject of a training needs analysis.
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CHAPTER 6 - TRAINING
6-1. Training is critical to successful KD and while some ad hoc training capabilities currently exist for various KD components (i.e. Systems Analysis methodology training through ACT and prototype tool training through NC3A), a comprehensive training plan must be developed through a formal Training Needs Analysis. 6-2. Training must include KD methodology, KD product KD support tool training and because KD reaches across all staff and echelon levels, training must be scalable and tailored to address multiple audiences. For instance, KD training must include: Ad-hoc capability gap training Individual training (i.e. systems analysts, commanders) Collective training (i.e. operational staff) Technical training (i.e. support tools) Train-the-trainer training
6-3. In addition to the above, it is important to recognise that training is a key factor to maintaining a proper relationship between Knowledge Management (KM) and KD. Therefore, KD and KM training requirements should be developed in cooperation with each other. The KD Training Plan 6-4. The KD Training Plan should be designed in order to provide NATO and possible national users (moving in and out of NATO billets, both Peacetime Establishment (PE) and Crisis Establishment (CE) with all levels of KD training. The training provisions require sufficient capacity to support the normal NATO rotation plan, as well as the planned rotations for NATO operations. Training should be included in existing training facilities like the NATO School Oberammergau, the JWC and where possible with existing national schoolhouses, in order to provide the required annual capacity. It should address, amongst other things, the following requirements and factors: a. b. c. d. e. Course length and facility requirements Course materials, including audio/visual aids, manuals, tutorials Course lesson plan/modules of instruction that are aligned as logical training blocks Standard content of each course and intended outcome Expected student level of knowledge when starting the course
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GLOSSARY
While many of the definitions listed below will be found in other reference publications, it was considered useful to bring together the terms derived from the NATO Crisis Management and Operational Planning Processes, as well as those from the evolving integration of the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations as articulated in the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and terms commonly used in the analytical processes that support KD. ACTION - The process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) ACTOR - A person or organisation, including state and non-state entities, within the international system with the capability or desire to influence others in pursuit of its interests and objectives. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) AREA OF INTEREST (AOI) - The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. 13 Dec 1999 (AAP-6(2010)) CONCEPTUAL PATTERN - Conceptual Patterns generically capture a normative behaviour or functional characteristic of individual actors, organisations, functional elements, processes, activities or events. Conceptual Patterns can be derived from earlier observed behaviour based on generic knowledge, e.g. conceptual theories, lessons learned from comparable cases and scenarios that can be applied to similar scenarios. Conceptual Patterns can serve as templates for focused knowledge search/guidance to actionable knowledge. They can help narrow down research issues and implications based on initially limited existing knowledge on the operational environment. They provide insights into known mechanisms of comparable systems (e.g. typical mechanisms of a warlord organisation) and thereby indicate known leverage points and indicators. (Proposed definition to be ratified) CONSTRAINT - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action. (COPD) CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS - Conditions that must exist for an objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist. (COPD) EFFECT - A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) END-STATE - The NAC-approved set of required conditions within the engagement space that defines an acceptable concluding situation to be attained at the end of a strategic engagement. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) ENGAGEMENT SPACE - That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. This will include the
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related air, land, sea, space environments, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure PMESII). (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) - A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or missionspecific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. 17 Jan 2005 (AAP-6(2010)) KNOWLEDGE BASE - The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, expertise and established contacts. (Proposed definition to be ratified) KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT (KD) - A process that collects and analyses information, integrates isolated data into a useable body of information based on an understanding of systems, and makes it available so it can be shared. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010) KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (KM) - Knowledge Management (KM) The ability to gather, synthesize and analyze information about potential engagement spaces across the military, political, economic and social systems as a precursor to successful systemic analysis. (Proposed definition to be ratified) KNOWLEDGE REQUEST - Requirement for knowledge that is identified by the staff. (Proposed definition to be ratified) KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT (KR) - A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order make a decision. (COPD) LEVERAGE POINT a point of pressure or influence that can cause a change to the state of the system. (Proposed definition to be ratified) LINE OF OPERATIONS (LOO) - In a campaign or operation, a logical line linking effects and decisive conditions in time and purpose to an objective. (COPD) MISSION - A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 01 Aug 1982 (AAP-6(2010)) MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK - A task that the commander designates as essential to Mission accomplishment A task the commander designates as essential to mission accomplishment. (CPOD) ONTOLOGY - is a formal representation of a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships between those concepts. Ontology is used as a form of knowledge representation about the world or some part of it. Common components of Ontology include: a. System b. Subsystem/system elements
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c. Actors d. Events (Instances) e. Objects f. Classes (Object Types) g. Attributes (Characteristics) h. Relations (Proposed definition to be ratified) OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT - A system of systems in which different actors interact within the operational environment in pursuit of their interests. (COPD) OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE - A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved by a campaign or operation that will contribute decisively to desired end state. (COPD) PMESII Systems - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure.
Political Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organisation through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society. The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organisational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country. Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth. The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc. The entire infrastructure; organisation, personnel, and components that. collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media. The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010)
Military
Economic
Social
Information
Infrastructure
RESTRAINT - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action. (COPD) STRATEGIC LEVEL - The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. 15 Jan 2008 (AAP-6(2010))
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STRATEGIC LINE OF ENGAGEMENT - A logical line that connects diplomatic, military, economic and civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end-state. (COPD) STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE - Strategic objectives establish the strategic purpose for military and non-military actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. They describe the goals that must be achieved to establish conditions required to attain the desired end state. (COPD). SUBSYSTEM A system that is part of a larger system. (Proposed definition to be ratified) SYSTEM - A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (COPD) SYSTEM ELEMENT Specific physical, functional, or behavioural entities within each system. System elements can be people, facilities, forces, information, or other components of the system. (Proposed definition to be ratified) TAXONOMY - The formal organisation of data or information into categories and subcategories. (Proposed definition to be ratified) THEATRE OF OPERATIONS (TOO) - An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations area. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE

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Bi-Strategic Command Knowledge Development

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IFC NATO HQ, IMS

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Assessment Handbook, Version 0.86, dated 18 June 2010

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CHAPTER 2 The Knowledge Development Process .......................................................... 1

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CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES ....................................................... 19

CHAPTER 5 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT & TOOL SUPPORT .......................... 26

CHAPTER 6 - TRAINING .................................................................................................... 29

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Figure 1: Knowledge Development Overview

The PMESII domains are described in the Glossary.

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Information is not knowledge - Albert Einstein

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Engagement Space That part of the strategic environment

CHAPTER 2 The Knowledge Development Process

Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview

Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept dated 12 Aug 2008.

Figure 3: Generic Knowledge Development Process

Figure 4: A Systems Understanding

Figure 5: Example of an Influence Diagram

See Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix at Para 4-19 of the COPD.

Figure 6: Political-Military Strategic Interface

Figure 7: Operations Planning Process at Strategic and Operational Levels

C. Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options

E. Strategic/Operational CONOPS Development

F. Strategic/Operational OPLAN Development

G. Strategic/Operational Assessment and OPLAN Reviews

CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

Figure 8: Integration of KD in Current NATO Command Structure

Further described later in Chapter 5.

Knowledge Management Centre at SHAPE.

Permanently attached KD Analysis KD Process coordination temporary allocation Knowledge/Information Exchange

Higher Level KD Reach-Back (e.g. IFC)

LEGAD MEDAD POLAD PAO

KDA KDA JOINT temporary Boards/WG

In-Theatre KNOWLEDGE Cell (deployed)

KDA JOINT KDA PLANS BRANCH

KDA KDA JOINT ASSESSMENT BRANCH

FINANCIAL RESOURCES BRANCH

Knowledge Management Support

KDA KDA SITCEN/JOC

HUMAN RESOURCES BRANCH

Figure 9: Knowledge Centre Integration in a JFC (illustrative structure)

JPALL Knowledge Centre Situation Centre Joint Effects

+ Personal staff and others as required