Understanding the Cosmic Self

Introduction Psychology, like so many other academic disciplines, has been heavily influenced by the intellectual dominance of Western European modernist ideology that has guided the advancement of science since the beginning of the Enlightenment. Before proceeding with a consideration of psychological analysis, therefore, it would be extremely helpful if we briefly review the influences of modernist ideology on scholarly pursuits and the subsequent developments in language use that can be attributed to an adherence to its fundamental tenets. My objective, then, is to arrive at a position that will allow for the consideration of psychological analysis free of our society's presuppositions regarding language and how it impacts upon our understanding of consciousness. Some will read a portion of what I have to say and immediately conclude that I espouse a theory that is derived from Gestalt Psychology. Such an assumption would be supported by my apparent agreement with the tenet that psychological, physiological, and behavioral phenomena simply cannot be reduced to experiential constructs or derived from perceptual elements such as sensation and response. The problem with this assumption is that it may still revere the tenets of scientific discourse inherent in moderist ideology and merely seek to operate on the basis of linguistic trace elements that point to the causes of these psychological, physiological, and behavioral phenomena, as supplements. However, these trace elements are part and parcel of the Western European world view with which I take exception. Speaking strictly from an epistemological perspective, it may be argued that I have obviously deviated from any possibility of rendering a scientific approach and will eventually state a series of axioms that will serve as a basis from which we will then be able to deduce my overall position. Again, such a conclusion is not entirely correct. The problem that I have with both of these assumptions, which I have admittedly contrived for the purpose of illustrating my point, stems from a fundamental ontological difference. In other words, I will agree with Gestalt psychology that psychological, physiological, and behavioral phenomena simply cannot be reduced to experiential constructs or derived from perceptual elements. I will also agree with epistemologists that I will eventually state a series of axiom like contentions that will serve as a basis from which we will be able to deduce my overall position. However, I will not agree with these notions on the basis of the Western European ideological presuppositions within which they are generally defined and understood. Instead, I choose to posit a different way of looking at the world. My position is the result of a radical

reorientation as to what shall serve to constitute the world in which we live and the consciousness that perceives it. This reorientation leads to a fundamental shift in what we take to be the objectives of psychological analysis and treatment. In the essay to follow I will address four philosophical aspects of language and epistemology in order to contextualize the approach to psychological analysis that I espouse: Modernist Ideology While I cannot say that I have analyzed or considered every single psychological theory or methodology, of the many that I have had the opportunity to examine, the one thing that they all have in common is a reverence for the modernist ideology that serves to validate their respective scientific objectivity. My main purpose in this section is to review the intellectual developments that have served to produce the false impression that the Western European way of understanding the world is the only true and legitimate way to see the world. This assumption is at the heart of intellectual domination and has served to exclude other options from a self-professed position of intellectual superiority that has long since proven to be false. The Dichotomy of Language Use Given the failed dominance of modernist ideology, it is nevertheless the case that in Western European societies language still functions in the service of science and intellectual legitimation is still conferred upon those theories and methods that adhere to its outdated tenets. It is my purpose in this section to illustrate the significance of reversing our position on language use as revealed in the philosophical work of Ludwig Wittgenstein which shifted from Logical Atomism to Ordinary Language philosophy as part of a paradigm shift in Western European societies resulting from the advent of quantum mechanics. In other words, this shift is based on the fundamental breakdown of modernist ideology and the need to reorient the way in which we view the role of language and how meaning is communicated. My position will be more readily understood once we are able to grasp how language use influences our ability to determine meaning. A Question of Methodology: Science and the Fabricated Polarity of Consciousness I cannot stress enough the importance of understanding how the natural processes of the human mind have taken a back seat to the manner in which we analyze those very same processes. Essentially, we have come to believe that the only way we can understand those processes is if we devise a structural mechanism that is shown to be scientifically derived

from the processes themselves so that we can then use this mechanism to lend meaning to the inner workings of the mind. The fatal flaw in this approach is that we must then come to understand the human mind as a mechanism. The fabricated polarity of consciousness to which I refer is between viewing the mind as a mechanism or as dynamic processes that must be interpreted in context. Analysis as Interpretation Psychological analysis most often lends itself to a variation of what is considered a well defined scientific methodology. There are those, however, that would espouse more of an interpretive approach. In this context, then, it becomes possible to construct our own interpretive matrix against which to understand and to make sense of an individual's psychological, physiological, and behavioral phenomena. This, then, shall serve as the context within which our understanding of the Cosmic Self shall be posited.

The Language of Consciousness Consciousness, to be sure, has a language of its own through which it can be studied and understood in terms of its relationship to the world in which we live and the behavior in which we engage; of this there can be no doubt. However, we immediately run into problems when we begin to consider our findings in scientific terms as if the correlation between our physical existence and consciousness were necessary in the same manner as a claim of logical identity (A=A). I would like to begin our consideration of the Cosmic Self with a brief overview of Modernist ideology. We will then proceed to a more meaningfully overview of language use and how it might impact what we know about consciousness or the way we understand the objectives of psychological analysis and treatment. The third aspect of our considerations will focus on the issue of methodology. Finally, we will conclude with an overview of psychological analysis as a form of interpretation and it is in this context that we will come to understand the notion of the Cosmic Self. Modernist Ideology The best way to understand the significance of modernist ideology is by way of contrast with the religious doctrines and belief systems from which Enlightenment scholars most desperately sought to distinguish themselves. In this context we can begin with a brief consideration of "The Dark Ages". We should keep in mind that it is virtually impossible to discuss the period of the Dark Ages as if we possessed true knowledge. The term itself has been used in different ways by different individuals for hundreds of years. While there do

appear to be some more common elements regarding the use of the term, we must make no mistake about it, the term is ambiguous. By way of contrast, I believe that the Age of Enlightenment entails the modernist ideology. For this reason it is important that we have an idea of what Enlightenment scholars felt about earlier intellectual sensibilities such as those of the Dark Ages that had not "evolved" to their point of sophistication. In broad strokes, we can begin by considering the contrast between superstition and reason. For scholars of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century such as Immanuel Kant and Voltaire for example, the Dark Ages served to refer to an age in human development that was shrouded in mystery and superstition and at the very least antithetical to reason. This is the theme that I wish to build upon. The Dark Ages can be thought of as a period in human evolution marked by systems of thought that are based on faith and religious doctrine. The terms, "Age of Enlightenment" and "Age of Reason" can be used interchangeably and both of these terms can be said to take as their starting point the beginning of the seventeenth century with the publication of Novum Organum in 1620 by Sir Francis Bacon. This is the book that receives the credit for being the first publication to explicitly lay out the fundamental tenets of scientific methodology. The question that we must now answer is; "How does this book fit into the historical mosaic of forces that have served to dominate and oppress those who would not subordinate their way of thinking to its dogma?" There are two vantage points that I believe would be helpful for us to consider: First, we really need to get a feeling for the sense of historical pivoting that thinkers like Kant and Voltaire were experiencing, and; Secondly, we need to consider the impact experienced by those that willfully and voluntarily choose to be subsumed under the tenets of scientific dogma. Once we have gained insight into these two vantage points we will be better able to understand how the text "Novum Organum" is more appropriately viewed as a trigger for an historical impact that transcends its scope and reach exponentially. Let us unpack this notion of historical pivoting that I have attributed to thinkers of what has been called the "Age of Reason". We can begin by considering in greater detail the life and work of Immanuel Kant. For those that are not aware of the history of philosophy, Kant has sometimes been referred to as the synthesizer of rationalist and empiricist ideologies. Rationalism, as a system of thought, gave emphasis to the role of reason in obtaining knowledge. The rationalists trace their origins back to the work of Rene Descartes and his famous dictum, "Cogito Ergo Sum" or, "I think, therefore, I am". The leading proponents of

rationalism were Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716). The period of greatest influence for the rationalists extends from the middle of the seventeenth century to the early eighteenth century. Empiricism, as a system of thought, gave emphasis to the role of experience of the senses in obtaining knowledge. Empiricism finds its origin in the work of John Locke in his text, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The leading proponents of empiricism were John Locke (1632-1704) Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) and David Hume (1711-1776). The period of greatest influence for the empiricists extends from the early eighteenth century to the late eighteenth century. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) came into prominence in the late eighteenth century and exerted an influence that lasted well into the twentieth century. Let us consider the philosophical influences with which he was presented. On the one hand he was presented with the rationalists that were advancing the role of reason and on the other the empiricists that were advancing the role of experience of the senses. In his most influential work, The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant posits the notion of a Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA) that served as a dialectical synthesis between reason and experience. My interest here is not in attempting to explain his thinking. Instead, I am interested in bringing to light the kinds of intellectual forces that were at play when he sought to distinguish the Dark Ages from his own Age of Reason. Within the context of what was actually taking place in the development of Western European philosophy by the middle of the eighteenth century, Kant viewed the intellectual quest for human knowledge in an ontological sense that was completely devoid of any considerations of culture. One way to describe the drive and impetus that was Immanuel Kant is to say that he was looking backwards at the historical development of philosophy and creating a system of thought that would overcome the limitations of both the rationalists and the empiricists. For Kant, the pivot point in history was the creation of the dialectic. The analytic philosophy to which Kant gave birth was to be understood from its inception as true for all human beings regardless of their culturally informed systems of belief. In this context Kant was able to describe the Age of Darkness in Western European history as being shrouded in mystery and superstition. Alternatively, Voltaire (1694-1778) takes his historical pivot point in Western European history to be the advent of scientific methodology. Voltaire was a leading member of a group of writers during the eighteenth century that were referred to as the "Encyclopedists". While these writers did not necessarily share their views and ideologies and often opposed each other, they did have in common a shared document entitled "Discours Preliminaire"

written by d'Alembert that sought to provide a context for all future contributions to the "Encyclopedie". The philosophical basis for this foundation document was derived from two main ideas: First, the developing theory of empiricism based in the sensationalism espoused by John Locke, and; secondly, by the scientific methodology developed and described by Sir Francis Bacon. In short, the Encyclopedists served as a central nervous system for the propagation of modernist ideology. It was in this context that Voltaire was able to describe the Age of Darkness in Western European history as being shrouded in mystery and superstition. It is also in this context that we are better able to understand how "Novum Organum" is more appropriately viewed as a trigger for an historical impact that transcends its scope and reach exponentially. With the victory of the Age of Reason over the Dark Ages, the proliferation and entrenchment of modernist ideology proceeded to expand its influence throughout Western European societies until a virtually complete intellectual dominance had been achieved. This dominance lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century and the advent of quantum mechanics. It is in this context that we can now look at the significance of language use and how it can be said to affect our understanding of the world in which we live and the psychological processes that perceive it.

The Dichotomy of Language Use Let us now distinguish between two diametrically opposed forms of language use. To illustrate the historical pivot point between the dominant use of language in the service of science and ordinary language, I will draw from the life work and experiences of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Let us begin with reference to a book that was published at the turn of the nineteenth century written by Alfred Whitehead and Bertrand Russell entitled, Principia Mathematica*. Logical Positivism was the name of the school of thought headed by Russell and Whitehead and its fundamental appeal was based on the primary objective of serving the needs of science. This was, to be sure, at the very heart of the industrial revolution and found favor among many individuals that were responsible for the flood of developments and creations that produced what we have come to know as the modern era. Its major intellectual accomplishment, at least in the eyes of its followers, was the chastisement of idealism for its "flight from reality" and abandonment of the goals and objectives of science. Ludwig Wittgenstein, as the most highly regarded student of Russell and Whitehead, pushed Logical

Positivism to its philosophical extreme and sought to give rise to a subsequent school of thought referred to as Logical Atomism. Wittgenstein went on to publish his major work entitled, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, which was taken as the fulfillment of Russell's ambition for the creation of a Logical Atomist movement. The primary objective of the movement was to create what could be referred to as a "picture perfect" language that would be capable of producing a precise correspondence between language and reality. To fully understand the basis for Wittgenstein's 180 degree reversal of beliefs, his abandonment of the fundamental tenets of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the subsequent creation of the new movement referred to as "Ordinary Language" philosophy, it is important that we consider what was taking place in the field of science proper: Quantum theory, introduced by Max Planck (1858-1947) in 1900, was the first serious scientific departure from Newtonian mechanics. It involved supposing that certain physical quantities can only assume discrete values. In the following two decades it was applied successfully to different physical problems by Einstein and the Danish physicist Neils Bohr (1885-1962). It was superseded by quantum mechanics in the years following 1924, when the French physicist Louis de Broglie (1892-1987) introduced the idea that a particle may also be regarded as a wave. The Schrdinger wave equation relates the energy of a system to a wave function: the square of the amplitude of the wave is proportional to the probability of a particle being found in a specified position. The wave function expresses the lack of possibility of defining both the position and momentum of a particle (see Heisenberg uncertainty principle).
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Copyright 1994, 1996, 2005 by Oxford University Press.

Quantum Mechanics is that ... branch of mathematical physics that deals with atomic and subatomic systems. It is concerned with phenomena that are so small-scale that they cannot be described in classical terms, and it is formulated entirely in terms of statistical probabilities. Considered one of the great ideas of the 20th century, quantum mechanics was developed mainly by Neils Bohr, Erwin Schrdinger, Werner Heisenberg, and Max Born and led to a drastic reappraisal of the concept of objective reality.
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. 2006 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. All rights reserved.

What is important about these developments for our purposes is to fully grasp the significance of what it means for the field of science to discover that it is no longer able to pinpoint reality. That is, matter is now understood to be in a constraint state of movement and therefore, when we attempt to identify it, it is no longer there. This is why it led to a "drastic reappraisal of the concept of objective reality". In more long term ramifications it means that all of the so-called scientific conclusions of the past, such as the racial

superiority of one group over another, are all undermined. Our views of the world and of human nature must all be re-evaluated. The field of science itself went from being based on established facts and truths in an absolute sense worthy of a picture perfect language, to being relativistic. Scientific methodology went from the principles of certainty to Karl Popper's notion of "falsifiability". Falsifiability is... the test that a theory is scientific, according to the influential views of Karl Popper. Especially in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Popper argued that science can never prove things to be true, but it can prove them to be false.
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Copyright 1994, 1996, 2005 by Oxford University Press.

It was shortly after the advent of quantum mechanics that Ludwig Wittgenstein retreated into his own isolated environment where he ceased virtually all contact with friends and relatives except for an occasional visit from G.E. Moore. Many changes occurred during the forty years between the advent of quantum mechanics and Karl Popper's theory of falsifiability. By the time that Ludwig Wittgenstein emerged from his isolation he began laying the foundation for the philosophical school of thought known as "Ordinary Language" philosophy. The fundamental premise of this school of thought is that meaning is derived from language through its context and use. Earlier notions of a picture perfect language were, therefore, completely undermined.

A Question of Methodology: Science and the Fabricated Polarity of Consciousness Let us consider how language is able to impact on our understanding of human consciousness. To begin with, is there such a thing as having more than one basic form of consciousness? That is, how exactly is it that we can deny such a thing as a male and a female form of consciousness? The simple answer is that such a duality is negated by drawing a distinction between the processes of consciousness and its content. Thus, these processes are posited to be identical for all human beings regardless of content. Our next question becomes, "how can we discover the true functionality of processes that serve to represent human consciousness in all of its dynamic and fluid nature"? This is where the situation becomes complicated. For epistemologists this can be seen as the problem of the hermeneutic circle or the interpretive act of reification. Hermeneutic Circle: A model of the process of interpretation, which begins from the problem of relating a work's parts to the work as a whole: since the

parts cannot be understood without some preliminary understanding of the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without comprehending its parts, our understanding of a work must involve an anticipation of the whole that informs our view of the parts while simultaneously being modified by them.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms Copyright Chris Baldick 2001, 2004. All rights reserved

Reification: The process of misunderstanding an abstraction as a concrete entity. Scholars have stressed the importance of understanding reification as a social category which indicates the way in which consciousness is determined. The emphasis on reification becomes not simply a relation between men that appears as a relation between things, but rather a relation between men that appears in the form of a property of a thing.
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy Copyright 1994, 1996, 2005by Oxford University Press.

Identifying a method by which to better understand the processes of human consciousness is inherently problematic. However, the problem is more insidious than that. It is not simply a problem of identifying an appropriate methodology. Rather, language itself, or the manner in which it is used, can be just as vital and important to our understanding. There are two diverse ways of viewing the processes of human consciousness with which I am currently interested in considering. In the dominant view of the status quo, some semblance of scientific objectivity is required if one expects their work to be legitimized. However, such prevailing sensibilities are based on the very axioms that have been undermined by the failure of the modernist ideology. That is, we now know that science, in the words of Karl Popper, "cannot prove anything to be true". Furthermore, we have also come to realize that language itself cannot achieve a picture perfect status and must allow for meaning to be related to use in context. It is my contention, therefore, that human consciousness is poetic in nature and that any view to the contrary is established upon a fabricated abstraction that is based on a scientistic belief system that has long since run its course.

Psychological Analysis as Interpretation Thus there appears to be a polarity of language use in the world that produces two fundamentally different ways of looking at the world; the scientistic and the poetic. While human comprehension is capable of using and understanding both, they maintain two distinct objectives in the world. I would now like to turn our considerations to the view that psychological analysis, as a discipline, is a form of interpretation. To accomplish this I will turn my attention to the work of Jacques Derrida in, Of Grammatology*.

Let us begin by examining the origins of deconstructionist thought through the works of Jacques Derrida within the philosophical context of post-structuralism. That is, the most significant aspect of Derrida's deconstructionist thought surrounds the notion of decentering. In his article, "Structure, Sign and Play," included in the text, Writing and Difference*, Derrida observes: ... The structurality of structure ... has always been neutralized or reduced ... by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure ... but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form (p. 278). Derrida believes that the history of Western philosophy can be seen as a continuous replacement of one center by another. For example, consider classical orthodox Marxism. In this view or philosophy, a methodological reliance on the relations of production served to fulfill the function of the center. As an organizing principle, we can easily understand how the Marxist reliance on the relations of production served to limit the play of the structure. Thus, such a philosophy would require the subordination of ideology to the material relations of production rather than vice versa. It was, in fact, this limiting feature that became a point of emphasis for Marxists. That is, Marxists took philosophical pride, if you will, in the fact that they were able to chastise idealism both for its flight from "reality" and for its role in the socio-economic oppression of the masses. By establishing the primacy of the relations of production as its center or point of origin, classical orthodox Marxism was able to orient the coherence of its system. Let us contrast this Marxist philosophy with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. That is, let us replace the Marxist center with the point of origin or center of structuralism. In this philosophy we learn that the sign is constituted by a signifier and a signified which have no meaning outside their relation within the sign. Furthermore, the signifier and the signified are linked by a social fixity which, in turn, leads to a system of signification based on the differences between signs. Thus, the signifier and the signified are understood as constituted in a process of differentiation from each other. In the words of Coward and Ellis*:

... This structure is itself only comprehensible as a totality of relations; it is constituted by oppositions between terms, and undergoes transformations and substitutions. This structure is englobed by the human mind, which constitutes the play of the structure, yet remains outside it (Language and Materialism, p. 21). We see, then, that in structuralism, the point of origin or center is taken to be the human mind. As the center of the system, the human mind serves not only to orient, balance and organize the structure, but it also limits the play of the structure. In other words, the human mind functions as an "imminent structure" which conceives of structure itself as a totality of relations which can be expressed in terms of a spatial diagram. The structure is englobed by the human mind which remains outside it. Thus, it is precisely in this way that structuralism is able to limit the play of its structure and orient the coherence of its system. Now that we have very briefly considered two different systems of philosophy and their manner of centering, let us shift focus to the notion of decentering. In this way, it will be easier to place Derrida within the philosophical context of post-structuralism. Decentering is best understood as the absence of a center or point of origin. In other words, we no longer have a central or transcendental signified which can be understood as absolutely present outside a system of differences. Thus, the relations of production in Marxist philosophy, and the human mind in structuralist philosophy, are no longer seen as existing outside the system of differences expressed in the language through which their function as centers were constituted. If we view philosophical systems as expressing the structurality of structure, we would, in effect, decenter their points of origin, their centers, by virtue of their inclusion within the system of differences through which they are constituted. By identifying the centers of both these philosophical systems we have exposed the way in which they come to represent a point of origin in the structurality of their respective structures. It is the very point of deconstructionist thought that these centers are never really centers: they are never really on the outside as their functional differences within their systems would seem to suggest. From this perspective, then, these systems become decentered. What, then, is the status of these systems, and how are they understood by

deconstructionists? The moment of decentering carries with it the trace of nontotalization. The field of language is seen as a field of free-play. It is precisely because of the lack or absence of a point of origin or center that we have this free-play. In this context, the sign, constituted within a system of differences, takes the center's place in its absence. Thus, the

sign that replaces the center and yet cannot exhaust totalization is understood to be a supplement. This view of structures, and the free play of language within a system of differences, is the result of decentering. The shift between structuralism and poststructuralism can best be characterized by the notion of decentering. Derrida took particular interest in the philosophy of Levi-Strauss precisely because the self-presence of the human subject could also be seen as contingent upon the structure and its transformations. That is, we can see that the human subject has been portrayed differently within the various Western European structures in direct relation to the different centers or points of origin which guarantee their coherence. Thus, for Derrida the significance of decentering the structuralism of Levi-Strauss is that as a result of its deconstruction a relation is revealed between the human subject and the sign. The radical potentiality in Levi-Strauss' conceptualization of the sign is that, by taking the center's place in its absence, it is seen as constituted in a system of differences within the free play of language. In the same way, we can see that the human subject is equally constituted within a system of differences within the free play of language and can now be understood as always in the process of becoming. Rather than realizing such a radical potentiality, Levi-Strauss ultimately chooses to posit the human mind as a transcendent center or point of origin with which to orient the coherence of the structuralist system. It is in the transition between the logocentrism of centered systems and the free play of language, with all of its significance for the sign and the human subject, that Derrida's notion of decentering marks the transition between structuralism and post-structuralism. The field of psychology and psychological analysis has yet to fully accept the transition between structuralism and post-structuralism. In the philosophical universe of the Cosmic Self we come to understand that poetic consciousness entails the view that the human subject is constituted within a system of differences within the free play of language and can now be understood as always in the process of becoming. The natural language of consciousness is poetic in nature and this is appropriately understood as an ontological contention. That is, everything we know about our own existence in our post-quantum mechanics era supports the belief that all life is constituted by energy waves of differing frequencies and densities. In the indigenous beliefs of our ancient Indio ancestors of the Southwestern region of the United States, it is believed that the true legacy of the mestizo that inhabits the region is encoded into the collective memory of their DNA*. In order to properly understand the objective of psychological analysis and treatment when dealing

with American Hispanics, one must develop their interpretive matrix in relation to an understanding of the Cosmic Self.

1. Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica, 3 vols, Cambridge University Press, 1910, 1912, and 1913. Second edition, 1925 (Vol. 1), 1927 (Vols 2, 3). Abridged as Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge University Press, 1962. C. K. Odgen (1922), prepared with assistance from G. E. Moore, F. P. Ramsey, and Wittgenstein himself. Routledge & Kegan Paul, parallel edition including the German text on the facing page to the English text: 1981 printing: ISBN 0-415-05186-X.
2.

3. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) (hardcover: ISBN 0-8018-1841-9, paperback: ISBN 0-8018-1879-6, corrected edition: ISBN 0-8018-5830-5). 4. Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London & New York: Routledge, 1978). 5. Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject; by Rosalind Coward and John Ellis (Jun 1977). 6. El Arco Y La Lira (1956) - The Bow and the Lyre (1973) tr. by Ruth L.G. Simms.