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This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions and Matrix Press, Inc. 2001 may not alter, You November 13, modify, merge, reproduce, and/or Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President Southern California Edison Co. create derivative works from the contents San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 of this CD-ROM without written San Clemente, California 92674-0128 SUBJECT: SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC permission from ARS. TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 50-361/01-15;
50-362/01-15 Dear Mr. Ray: On October 5, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 5, 2001, with Mr. D. E. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services, and other members of your staff. A formal inspection exit was held via teleconference on November 9, 2001, with Mr. N. Quigley, Manager, Maintenance Engineering, and other members of your staff. In this inspection, the NRC evaluated the effectiveness of activities conducted under your license as they related to implementation of your NRC-approved Fire Protection Program. Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC did not identify any findings. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you. Sincerely, /RA/ Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-361; 50-362 Licenses: NPF-10; NPF-15

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-2This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, 50-361/01-15; 50-362/01-15 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or cc w/enclosure: Chairman, Board of create DiegoSupervisors works from the contents derivative County of San 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335 San Diego, of this CD-ROM without written California 92101 Alan R. Watts, Esq. permission from ARS. Southern California Edison Co. Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart 701 S. Parker St. Suite 7000 Orange, California 92868-4720 Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Manager Public Utilities Department City of Riverside 3900 Main Street Riverside, California 92522 R. W. Krieger, Vice President Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674-0128 David Spath, Chief Division of Drinking Water and Environmental Management P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234-7320 Michael R. Olson Sr. Energy Administrator San Diego Gas & Electric Company P.O. Box 1831 San Diego, California 92112-4150 Ed Bailey, Radiation Program Director Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178) Sacramento, California 94327-7320

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-3This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94327-7320 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or Mayor create derivative works from the contents City of San Clemente 100 Avenida Presidio of this CD-ROM without written San Clemente, California 92672 Truman Burns/Robert permission from ARS. Kinosian Southern California Edison Co. California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102 Robert A. Laurie, Commissioner California Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street (MS 31) Sacramento, California 95814 Douglas K. Porter Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Dwight E. Nunn, Vice President Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674-0128

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-4This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV: Regional Administrator (EWM) and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, DRP Director (KEB) DRS Director (ATH) Senior Resident Inspector (CCO1) modify, merge, reproduce, and/or Branch Chief, DRP/C (KMK) Senior Project derivative create Engineer, DRP/C (WCS)works from the contents Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH) RITS Coordinatorthis CD-ROM without written of (NBH) Scott Morris (SAM1) NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS) permission from ARS. SONGS Site Secretary (SFN1) Southern California Edison Co.

R:\_so23\2001\so2001-15RP-rln.wpd RLNease/lmb /RA/ 11/5/01 C:EMB CSMarschall /RA/ 11/6/01 RPMullikin /RA/ 11/5/01 C:PBB KMKennedy /RA/ 11/7/01 WCSifre /RA/ 11/6/01 JLTaylor /RA/ 11/5/01 ELHorace /RA/ 11/6/01

C:EMB CSMarschall /RA/ 11/13/01 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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ENCLOSURE 1 This document is from a CD-ROM U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY distributed courtesyREGION IV COMMISSION R Solutions of Appendix and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, Dockets: 50-361; 50-362 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or Licenses: NPF-10; NPF-15 Report No.: 50-361/01-15; 50-362/01-15 create derivative works from the contents Licensee: Southern California of this Onofre NuclearEdisonwithout written CD-ROM Co. Station, Units 2 and 3 Facility: San Generating permission from ARS. Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hwy. San Clemente, California Dates: Team Leader Inspectors: October 1 - 5, 2001 R. L. Nease, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch R. P. Mullikin, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch W. C. Sifre, Project Engineer Project Branch C Accompanying Personnel: J. L. Taylor, Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch E. L. Horace, Student Engineer Technical Support Staff J. L. LaChance, Contractor Sandia National Laboratories Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch

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-2This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions SUMMARY OF FINDINGS and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, IR 05000361-01-15, IR 05000362-01-15; on 10/01/2001-10/05/2001; Southern California Edison; San Onofre Nuclearmerge, reproduce,Fire Protection modify, Generating Station, Units 2 & 3; Triennial and/or Inspection create derivative works from thecontractor, and two contents The inspection was conducted by a team of three regional inspectors, one accompanying NRC Region IV personnel. Based on the results of the inspection, no findings of significanceof this CD-ROM without written were identified. permission from ARS. Cornerstone: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems No findings of significance were identified

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Report This document isDetails from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions 1. REACTOR SAFETY and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, 1R05 Fire Protection The purpose of this inspection was to reproduce, and/or Station modify, merge, review the San Onofre Nuclear Generating fire protection program for selected risk significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the create derivative works safe shutdownfire protection features from the contents provided for ensuring that at least one post-fire success path is maintained free of fire damage. The inspection was performed in accordance with the of this CD-ROM without written new Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reactor oversight process using a riskinformed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team permission from ARS. used the licensee's "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3," to choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire areas chosen for review during this inspection were: 2-AC-50-35, Unit 2 Switchgear Room 2B; 2-AC-50-29, Unit 2 Lobby/Motor Control Room; 2-PE-45-3A, Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room (45 foot elevation); 2-PE-63-3B, Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room (63 foot elevation); and 2-TK-30-161A, Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room.

For each of the selected fire areas, the team focused the inspection on the fire protection features and on the systems and equipment necessary for the licensee to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in those fire zones. .1 a. Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Inspection Scope The team reviewed the licensees piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment list, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Appendix R safe shutdown design basis document, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify whether the licensees shutdown methodology had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for equipment in the fire areas selected for review. The team focused on the following functions that must be ensured to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions: (1) reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions, (2) reactor coolant makeup capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level within the level indication in the pressurizer, (3) reactor heat removal capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal, (4) supporting systems capable of providing all other services necessary to permit extended operation of equipment necessary to achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, and (5) process monitoring capable of providing direct readings to perform and control the above functions.

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-2This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions b. Findings No findings of significance were Inc. and Matrix Press,identified. You may not alter, .2 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, Fire Protection Systems, Features, and modify, merge, reproduce, and/or Equipment create derivative works from the contents a. Inspection Scope The of verified that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was free of fire team this CD-ROM without written damage in the event of a fire in the selected fire areas. Specifically, the team examined the separation permissionequipment, and components within the same of safe shutdown cables, from ARS. fire areas, and reviewed the licensee's methodology for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. In addition, the team reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, licensee 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R submittals, and deviations from NRC regulations to verify that the licensee met license commitments. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .3 a. Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis Inspection Scope On a sample basis, the team verified that cables for equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire areas had been properly identified and either adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. During the inspection a sample of redundant components associated with systems required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions were selected for review. The sample included components associated with the auxiliary feedwater, safety injection, reactor coolant system makeup, component cooling water, salt water cooling systems and reactor head and pressurizer head vent valves. From this list of components, the team reviewed cable routing data depicting the routing of power and control cables associated with each of the selected components. Additionally, the team verified, on a sample basis, that circuit breaker coordination and fuse protection were acceptable as a means of protecting the power sources of the designated safe shutdown equipment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

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-3This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions .4 Alternative Safe Shutdown Capability a. Inspection Scope and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, The team reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative safe modify, merge, reproduce, and/or shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions from stations createthan the control room. Theworks fromadequacy contents derivative team also evaluated the the of the systems to other perform reactor pressure control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process of this CD-ROM monitoring, and support system functions.without written permission from ARS. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .5 a. Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capability Inspection Scope The team performed a walkdown of the actions defined in Procedure SO23-13-2, Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Revision 6. This procedure documented the method for performing an alternative shutdown of the plant from outside the control room by manipulating certain equipment located in various areas of the plant. The team evaluated the ability of the operators to perform the procedural actions within applicable plant shutdown time requirements and verified that equipment labeling was consistent with the procedure. The team reviewed the training program and interviewed several licensed and nonlicensed personnel to verify their training included the alternative safe shutdown capability. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .6 a. Communications Inspection Scope The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire department duties. The team verified that communications via the use of plant radios, plant paging and public address system, and sound-powered phone communication systems would be available. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

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-4This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions .7 Emergency Lighting a. Inspection Scope and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown activities modify, merge, reproduce, and/or in the selected fire areas to verify it would provide for adequate access to perform manual actions required to achieve and maintain create derivative works forhot shutdownegresscontents fromand conditions. The team the routes and for evaluated the adequacy of emergency lighting access performing actions required in Procedure SO23-XIII-22, Revison 7-1, Emergency of this CD-ROM without written Lighting System Test, at control stations and plant monitoring locations. The team reviewed repetitive tasks for testing and test data trending to verify that the individual permission from ARS. battery operated units were capable of supplying sufficient illumination. The team reviewed vendor data to verify operability under maximum ambient temperatures and to verify that the battery powered supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity. The team reviewed routine preventive maintenance to ensure that the 8-hour battery powered lights were being maintained as required. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .8 a. Cold Shutdown Repairs Inspection Scope The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that the repair material was available onsite. The team verified that the licensee had pre-staged equipment necessary to perform the repairs in lockers as required by procedure. The team also reviewed monthly audit records for the maintenance of the lockers and their contents. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .9 a. Fire Protection Systems, Features, and Equipment For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire protection features, such as fire suppression and detection systems, fire area barriers, penetration seals, and fire doors. To do this, the team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems, fire barriers, and construction details and supporting fire tests for the installed fire barriers. In addition, the team reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and National Fire Protection Association code to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

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-5This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions b. Findings No findings of significance were Inc. and Matrix Press,identified. You may not alter, .10 Compensatory Measures modify, merge, reproduce, and/or a. Inspection Scope create derivative works from the contents The team verified, by sampling, that adequate compensatory measures were put in of this CD-ROM without written place by the licensee for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and postfire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features (e.g., detection and suppression permission systems, or passive fire barrier features). from ARS. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of condition reports to verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, including Exit On, October 5, 2001, at the conclusion of the teams onsite inspection, the team leader debriefed Mr. D. E. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services, and other licensee staff members on the preliminary inspection results. On November 9, 2001, a teleconference exit meeting was held with Mr. N. Quigley, Manager, Maintenance Engineering, and other licensee staff members, during which the team leader characterized the results of the inspection. The licensee was asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT This document is from a CD-ROM KEY POINTS distributed courtesy ofOF CONTACT Appendix R Solutions Licensee and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, D. Arai, System Design Engineer M. Jones, Operations Assistant Superintendent modify, merge, reproduce, and/or J. Kim, Senior Electrical Engineer J. McGaw, Senior Nuclear Engineer create derivative works from the contents A. Melikian, System Design Engineer R. Morales, Fire Protection Specialist of this CD-ROM without written N. El-Akily, Engineer, Systems and Analysis Group D. Niebruegge, Manager, Maintenance Engineering Support permission from ARS. D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering R. Richter, Supervisor, Fire Protection Engineering E. Torres, Design Engineer NRC J. Kramer, Resident Inspector, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station C. Osterholtz, Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P. Qualls, Fire Protection Specialist, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection. CALCULATIONS Number E4C-098 E4C-099 E4C-112 90035AH 90035BS M-DSC-378 M-0074-019 M-74-06 Title 4KV Switchgear Protective Relay Setting Calculation SR 480V Power Circuit Breaker Settings Class 1E 480V MCC Protection Calculation Safe Shutdown Component Evaluation Calculation Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis Hydrodynamic Torque Calculation for 2/3HV6200, 6201, 6202, 6203, 6500, & 6501 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Room Thermal Response, No Fans Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Room Heat Load Calculation Revision 1 1 0 6 3 0 0 1

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-2This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy Maximum Temperature - No HVAC Solutions of Appendix R M-75-73 CCW Pump Room 0 and Matrix Press, Inc. You may not alter, M-73-64 ESF Battery Rooms - Hydrogen Buildup 1 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or ENGINEERING REPORTS create derivative works from the contents Number Title Revision 01-0310-1579 this CD-ROM Time and Manpower Study of SONGS 2/3 Appendix R without written 1 90035A SONGS 2/3 Appendix R 1 permissionCompliance Assessment from ARS. Manual Action Feasibility 90035B1 SONGS 2/3 Time Line Calculations for Manual Actions 1

DRAWINGS Drawing Number 30216 30219 30226 30229 30256 30258 30259 30260 30261 30269 Title Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elec Aux - 4.16 KV Bus 2A04 Tie Brkr (3A04) Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elec Aux - 4.16 KV Bus 2A04 Feeder Brkr (2B04) Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elec Aux - 4.16 KV Bus 2A06 Tie Brkr (3A06) Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elec Aux - 4.16 KV Bus 2A06 Feeder Brkr (2B06) Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Electrical Auxiliaries - Bus 2B04 Supply Breaker Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B04 MCC 2BD Feeder Breaker Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B04 MCC 2BY Feeder Breaker Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B04 MCC 2BE Feeder Breaker Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B04 MCC BQ Feeder Breaker Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Electrical Auxiliaries - Bus 2B06 Supply Breaker Revision 17 10 18 7 10 7 7 6 8 10

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-3This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions Title Revision Drawing Number and Matrix Press, Inc. Elect Aux - Bus 2B64MCC 2BH alter, 30271 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - You may not 8 Feeder Breaker modify, merge, reproduce, and/or 5 30272 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B06 MCC 2BJ Feeder Breaker create derivative works from the contents 30273 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Elect Aux - Bus 2B06 MCC 2BZ 8 Feeder Breaker of this CD-ROM without written 30582 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor - Reactor Head & 7 permission from ARS. Sheets 1 & 2 Pressurizer Head Vent Valves 30583 Sheets 1& 2 30715 30716 30717 30723 30724 30725 30747 Sheet 1 30747 Sheet 2 30748 30749 30758 30759 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor - Reactor Head & Pressurizer Head Vent Valves Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Charging Pump P191 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Aux - CCW Surge tank HV6225 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Aux - CCW Surge tank HV6505 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Salt Water Clg Pump P112 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Salt Water Clg Pump P113 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Salt Water Clg Pump P114 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Charging Pump P190 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Charging Pump P190, P 191 & P192 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Charging Pump P191 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Charging Pump P192 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Boric Acid Makeup Pump P174 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Boric Acid Makeup Pump P175 8 19 6 8 24 21 23 16 5 20 20 11 13

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-4This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions Title Revision Drawing Number and Matrix Press, Inc. Reac Aux - BA Makeup Tank to alter, 30760 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - You may not 13 Charging Pump Suct HV9235 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or 14 30761 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Reac Aux - BA Makeup Tank to Charging Pump create derivativeSuct HV9240 from the contents works 31080 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Plant Auxiliaries - 480V Mot 9 Encl CD-ROM of this Htrs (MCC 2BY) without written 31494 Elementary Diagram Unit 2 - Annunciator and Tripping Bus 15 permission from ARS. 2A04 32723 36602 Sheet 1 36602 Sheet 12 36602 Sheet 13 36602 Sheet 26 2PE04 2PE05 2TK11 23AC23 Elementary Diagram Unit 3 - Reactor Auxiliaries - Salt Water Clg Pump P112 Fire Protection Zones Legend & Index Unit 2/3 Fire Zones Penetration & Fuel Bldg. Unit 2 Elevation 45'-0" Fire Zones Penetration & Fuel Bldg. Unit 2 Elevation 63'-6" Fire Zones Control Bldg. Unit 2/3 Elevation 50'-0" Unit 2: Penetration and Fuel Handling Elevation 45'-0" Unit 2: Penetration and Fuel Handling Elevation 63'-6" Unit 2: AFW - Pump Room, Pipe Tunnel, Refueling Water& Condensate Storage Tanks Elevation (-)2'-6" to 30'-6" Unit 2/3: Auxiliary Control Elevation 50'-0" 17 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3

PROCEDURES Number SO23-13-2 SO23-13-21 SO23-3-2.6 SO23-3-2.6.1 Title Shutdown From Outside the Control Room Fire Shutdown Cooling System Operation CS/SDC/SFP Cooling Crosstie Operation Revision 6 6 17 4

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-5This document is from a CD-ROM distributed courtesy of Appendix R Solutions CABLE ROUTING DATA Component Component and Matrix Press, Inc. Component mayComponent You not alter, 2FY-9253 2HV-0296A 2HV-0296B 2HV-0297A 2HV-0297B 2HV-0298 2HV-0299 2HV-4712 modify, merge, reproduce, and/or 2HV-4713 2HV-4715 2HV-4730 2HV-6225 2HV-6495 2HV-6497 2HV-6505 create derivative works from the2HV-8150 contents 2HV-8151 2HV-8152 2HV-8153 2HV-9201 2HV-9235 2HV-9336 2HV-9337 2HV-9339 of 2HV-9240 this CD-ROM without written 2HV-9367 2HV-9368 2HV-9378 2HV-9379 2HY-4714-2 2HY-4731-1 permission from ARS.2HY-6201 2HY-6203 2HY-9200 2HY-9205 2LV-0227B 2LV-0227C 2P-025 2P-114B 2P-190 2TV-9267 ACTION REQUESTS AR-SONGS-980800768 AR-SONGS-980800844 AR-SONGS-980801287 AR-SONGS-980801522 AR-SONGS-980900375 AR-SONGS-980900897 AR-SONGS-980900938 AR-SONGS-980901567 AR-SONGS-980901953 AR-SONGS-980902043 AR-SONGS-981000543 AR-SONGS-981100518 AR-SONGS-981200728 AR-SONGS-981201309 AR-SONGS-001000777 AR-SONGS-011000021 AR-SONGS-011000232 AR-SONGS-011000230 AR-SONGS-001000916 AR-SONGS-001001370 AR-SONGS-001001441 AR-SONGS-001001685 AR-SONGS-001001894 AR-SONGS-001001983 AR-SONGS-001002005 AR-SONGS-001002544 AR-SONGS-001100013 AR-SONGS-001101540 AR-SONGS-001101556 AR-SONGS-001101590 AR-SONGS-001101598 AR-SONGS-001101639 AR-SONGS-001001370 AR-SONGS-011000226 AR-SONGS-011000228 AR-SONGS-001201243 AR-SONGS-010100006 AR-SONGS-010100935 AR-SONGS-010101533 AR-SONGS-010102074 AR-SONGS-010200259 AR-SONGS-010200353 AR-SONGS-010400095 AR-SONGS-010400311 AR-SONGS-010400674 AR-SONGS-010401358 AR-SONGS-010500552 AR-SONGS-010501339 AR-SONGS-010800584 AR-SONGS-011000229 AR-SONGS-011000130 AR-SONGS-011000023 2P-015 2P-026 2P-141 2P-191 2P-016 2P-112A 2P-174 2P-192 2P-024 2P-113B 2P-175 2P-307A

FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION SYSTEM - IMPAIRMENT FORMS 01010045-00 01090028-00 01060059-05 01090030-00 01080036-00 01090045-00 01080105-03

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-6This document is from a CD-ROM distributedDOCUMENTS MISCELLANEOUS courtesy of Appendix R Solutions "Individual Plant Examination of External Inc. You Nuclear Generating Station, and Matrix Press, Events for San Onofre may not alter, Units 2 & 3," dated December 1995. modify, merge, reproduce, and/or DCN # ABG-17707, Design Change Notice for Saltwater Cooling System Design Basis Document, DBD-SO23-410, Revision works from the contents create derivative 5, SCE, 05/04/01. DBD-SO23-TR-AR, "Appendix R Safe Shutdown Topical DBD, Revision 9. of this CD-ROM without written DBD-S023-390, Chemical & Volume Control System, Revision 6. permission from ARS. Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 2001. Licensee Event Report, LER No. 2000-006-01, May 26, 2000. Unresolved Item 50-361/88-22-01, Requirement to Provide Cooling to Reactor Coolant Pump Seals, IR 90-01, February 16, 1990. NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated June, 29, 1988. Letter from George W. Knighton, NRC to Kenneth P. Baskin, Southern California Edison (SCE), and James C. Holcombe (SDGE), Issuance of Amendment No. 43 to Facility Operating License NPF-10 and Amendment No. 32 to Facility Operating License NPF-15 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, N4002858, March 27, 1986. Letter from M.O. Medford, SCE, to the NRC, Appendix R Audit Open Items, December 1, 1988. Letter from M.O. Medford, SCE to the NRC, Appendix R Deviation Request And Open Items, November 21, 1988. Letter from R.M. Rosenblum, SCE to NRC, Reactor Coolant Pump Seals, Requested Information, December 27, 1989. NRC memorandum from Ashok Thadani to William Travers, Closeout of Generic Safety Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure, November 8, 1999.