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Naval Operations In The Indian Ocean 1942

By Simon Stokes Introduction


After the Japanese successes at Pearl Harbour, Singapore and Java, in April 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy headed West into the Indian Ocean. At the time the Allies believed that this was a pre-cursor to a full scale invasion of India, and made every endeavour to pull together an appropriately sized force with which to oppose the move. Indeed Winston Churchill described it as "the most 5 dangerous moment of the war" . Thus it was that for the first time since the attack on Pearl Harbour, the main Japanese carrier fleet was opposed by another carrier fleet, and an almost entirely British fleet at that. In the event the two carrier fleets never engaged, though the Japanese made strenuous efforts to search out the British fleet, mounting several air raids on Ceylon and sinking some isolated British naval units and a large number of mercantile ships before withdrawing. This article aims to describe the historical events that took place during the period, and suggest some wargaming scenarios based upon these historical events.

Opposing Forces
British and Dominion Forces

Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville Force A Battleship: Warspite Fleet Carriers : Indomitable (800 sqdn : 12 Fulmars, 880 sqdn : 9 Sea Hurricanes, 827 sqdn : 12 Albacores, 831 sqdn : 12 Albacores), Formidable (818 sqdn : 9 Albacores, 820 sqdn : 12 Albacores, 888 sqdn : 12 Martlets) Heavy Cruisers : Dorsetshire, Cornwall Light Cruisers : Enterprise, Emerald Destroyers : Napier, Nestor, Paladin, Panther, Hotspur, Foxhound Force B (Acting Vice Admiral Algernon V. Willis) rd 3 Battle Squadron : Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, Revenge Light Carrier : Hermes (814 sqdn : 15 Swordfish) Light Cruisers : Caledon, Dragon AA Cruisers : Heemskerck (RNN) Destroyers : Griffin, Arrow, Decoy, Scout, Norman, Vampire, Fortune, Isaac Sweers (RNN), Tenedos Land Based RAF/FAA Squadrons in Ceylon Colombo 11 Squadron RAF with 11 Blenheim 30 Squadron RAF with 22 Hurricane 258 Squadron RAF with 14 Hurricane 803 Squadron FAA with 6 Fulmar 806 Squadron FAA with 6 Fulmar Trincomalee 202 Squadron RAF with 1 Catalina 205 Squadron RAF with 1 Catalina 240 Squadron RAF with 3 Catalina 261 Squadron RAF with 19 Hurricane 273 Squadron RAF with 6 Fulmar, 3 Martlet, 1 Seal 413 Squadron RAF with 3 Catalina 788 Squadron FAA with 6 Swordfish

Japanese Forces
Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo

Carrier Striking Force (Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo) Fleet Carriers : Akagi (Air Unit Fuchida with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers), Soryu (Air Unit Egusa with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers), Hiryu (Air Unit Tomonaga with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers), Zuikaku (Air Unit Shimazaki with 18 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 27 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 27 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers), Shokaku (Air Unit Takahashi with 18 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 27 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 27 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers) Battle Squadron (Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa) Battleships : Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna Heavy Cruisers : Tone, Chikuma Light Cruisers : Abukuma st 1 Destroyer Flotilla : Isokaze, Hamakaze, Kagero, Tanikaze, Shiranuhi, Arare, Urakaze, Kasumi, Akigumo Malaya Force (Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa) Light Carrier : Ryujo (Air Unit Yamagami with 16 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers) Heavy Cruisers : Chokai, Kumano, Suzuya, Mogami, Mikuma Light Cruisers : Yura Destroyers : Fubuki, Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, Murakumo th Replacement Destroyers from 4 April : Amagiri, Asagiri, Shirakumo, Yugiri

Historical Events
On 26 March 1942 Admiral Sir James Somerville formally assumed command of the British Eastern Fleet. Up to this point allied forces had suffered a string of disasters in the Far East at the hands of the Japanese. Starting with Pearl Harbour the run of Japanese successes included the sinking of Force Z, the fall of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Philipines, Borneo, Wake Island, Rabaul and Java, the destruction of the Dutch led ABDA striking force in the Java Sea and the raid on Darwin in Northern Australia. All this was achieved without the loss of a single major unit of the Imperial Japanese Navy. To stem the tide of Japanese successes westward into the Indian Ocean urgent reinforcements were required just at a time when the Royal Navy was least able to provide them. Both Ark Royal and Barham had just been lost in the Mediteranean and Valiant and Queen Elizabeth put out of commission by a daring Italian torpedoman raid as the two battleships lay at anchor in Alexandria. On paper the new British fleet (see lists above) looked impressive, and its arrival, with the envious reputation of the fighting Admiral himself, gave a much needed boost to morale in the region. The reality was rather different. Somerville summed up is new command in a signal to Admiral Nimitz : My fleet consists for the greater part of ships that have been employed almost exclusively on independent duties or are newly commissioned. I am engaged in giving them intensive fleet training and hope before long to report them as fit for offensive operations. Churchill, as ever, expressed his own concerns in unequivocal fashion A fleet considerable in numbers but consisting of slow, obsolescent or unmodernised ships that can neither fight a fleet action with the Japanese nor act as a deterrent to modern, fast raiders acting singly or in pairs, will leave themselves and their convoys easy th prey. The Rs in particular will be floating coffins. On 28 March Somerville received notice of Nagumos intended attack on Ceylon, the same day as he sent his signal to Admiral Nimitz. Time had run out, hed have to fight the coming campaign with the fleet as it stood.
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Indomitable

The Ceylon Raids ("C" Operation)


On 9 March Admirals Kondo and Nagumo had received orders to prepare plans for an attack on the British naval bases in Ceylon and to seek out and destroy the British Eastern fleet. A simultaneous and subsidiary operation was given to Admiral Ozawa and his Malaya force was to enter the Bay of Bengal and disrupt British sea communications in the area and launch air raids on Indian ports. The prime objective though was the neutralisation of British naval and air forces so safeguarding Japans operations in Burma, it was never intended as a prelude to invasion, though the British had no way of knowing this of course. The Japanese carrier striking force rounded the southern tip of Sumatra on 2 April. Nagumos plan was to strike at the port and installations of Colombo on a Sunday, hoping (as at Pearl Harbour) to th catch the port and ships at a Sunday routine, especially as Sunday 5 April 1942 was Easter Sunday. Thus at one stroke he would deal a knock out blow to the British Eastern Fleet just as he had done to the US Pacific Fleet a mere five months previous. Nagumos plan was thwarted by two factors. The th first was that at 16:00 on 4 April an RCAF Catalina piloted by Squadron Leader Leonard J. Birchall sighted and reported Nagumos position 360 miles South East of Dondra Head before the Catalina was shot from the skies by the six patrolling fighters from Hiryu. The second was that unbeknownst to the Japanese the British had set up a base at Addu Atoll, which lies some distance South West of Ceylon, and Somerville had already moved the Eastern Fleet there. Somerville was now in a quandary. Rarely can a fleet commander have been caught so helplessly on the hop. He had just arrived for the first time at Addu. Its blistering tropical heat, glaring sun and barrenness numbed the senses. Somerville reviewed his situation: he was 600 miles from the enemy, far from a position from which he could defend Ceylon. Force A could be got underway almost immediately (except for the cruisers Enterprise and Emerald who would not be ready till midnight). Cornwall and Dorsetshire were far away heading for Colombo where they were to undergo a refit. The slower Force B would not complete topping up empty fuel tanks until the following day so its departure would have to be delayed. Hermes and Vampire were at Trincomalee where they were being prepared for the forthcoming operations against Madagasscar. Tenedos was already at Colombo undergoing a refit. Force A was ordered to depart as soon as Enterprise and Emerald were ready. Cornwall and Dorsetshire were ordered to alter course and rendezvous with the rest of Force A South West of Ceylon. Admiral Willis was ordered to sail Force B in support of Force A as soon as it was ready. Hermes and Vampire were ordered to get clear of Trincomalee and keep to the North East. What Somerville had in mind was not to engage Nagumo in a daylight action, the outcome of which he had no illusions about, but rather to strike with his surface forces by night as the Japanese retired from launching their attack on Colombo, possibly following it up with an air strike the following morning to finish off any ships damaged the previous night. Its worth noting that at this stage in the war the British were unaware of either the range of the Japanese carrier borne aircraft (almost twice that of the British equivalents) nor the efficiency of the Japanese Navy in fighting night actions, which were amply demonstrated later that year during the Solomon Islands campaign. Colombo therefore had to rely entirely on the defenses that Admiral Layton had managed to put in place. The harbour was cleared of all shipping that could be, leaving only 21 merchant ships, 8 fleet auxiliaries and 5 naval vessels including Tenedos and the armed merchant cruiser Hector. The main defence for Colombo were the fighter squadrons detailed earlier. There were two airfields, the main one at Ratmalana and a hastily constructed airstrip at Colombos racecourse which was home to 258 squadron. The Japanese strike force was led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who had led the attack on Pearl Harbour, and consisted of 36 zero fighters escorting 91 bombers. The Japanese strike force arrived over Colombo at 07:40 and despite the advance warning given to the British, they still managed to achieve an element of surprise (the British had wrongly assumed that the Japanese attack would come during the moonlight early hours rather than at dawn and had stood down their fighter squadrons at 03:00). The first casualties of the day were the six Swordfish of 788 squadron who were flying into Ratmalana on being ordered to transfer there from Trincomalee. The Japanese fighters fell on them and shot all six out of the sky almost before they were aware of what was happening. The Japanese bombers then peeled off to attack their allotted targets of harbour installations, shipping and the airfield at Ratmalana. The British fighters at Ratmalana were quickly scrambled and in the air, but were soon engaged in unequal dogfights with the Japanese fighters (the FAA Fulmars were particularly outclassed and Ceylon proved to be the last time they were used in a front line role). The Hurricanes of 258 squadron fared better and managed to get in amongst the Japanese bombers before being engaged by the Japanese fighter escorts. Losses were heavy though: 4 Fulmars and 14 Hurricanes. Japanese losses amounted to 1 fighter and 6 bombers with a further 9 bombers damaged. Damage inflicted on Colombo itself was severe and included railway
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workshops, harbour quays and workshops, piers, Government buildings, repair shops and hangars. In the harbour the merchant ship Benledi was set ablaze and both Hector and Tenedos were sunk and the submarine depot ship Lucia struck and seriously damaged by a bomb.

Dorsetshire and Cornwall were already at sea when they received Somervilles signal to rendezvous and at 07:00 they altered course to comply. At 08:00 they received a signal warning of heavy enemy forces about 150 miles to the east of their position, so they increased to Cornwalls maximum of 27 knots. At 11:30 Dorsetshires radar picked up a Japanese float plane, that had been launched earlier that morning from the cruiser Tone, the plane spotted the two cruisers and proceeded to shadow them. Alerted to the presence of the two British cruisers Nagumo decided to divert the entire second strike force (127 planes), that were to have gone in and finish off any remaining targets in Colombo, against this new target of opportunity that had presented itself. With weather conditions clear and little or no wind, the two cruisers fates were effectively sealed. The Japanese strike force, led by Lieutenant Commander Egusa, easily located their target and in a frighteningly clinical display of dive bombing sank both within 6 minutes. A total of 1129 weary survivors were eventually picked up by Enterprise, Paladin and Panther the following day. A total of 424 men had been lost. At daylight on the 6 April, Force B joined Force A and the assembled fleet set course to the eastward. There followed a period of naval operations marked by two powerful fleets manoeuvring a few hundred miles apart, one fleet seeking a daylight battle where its vast superiority in carrier bomber aircraft would prove decisive and the other fleet prepared to engage only in a night battle where its superiority in gunfire (40x15 guns against 24x14 guns) might give it victory. This groping around th continued until 8 April during which time there were a considerable number of misleading signals and aircraft sightings all of which came to nought. Nagumo for his part kept his force beyond a 500 mile th circle from Dondra Head. Somerville returned to Addu Atoll at 11:00 on 8 April, where he held a conference of his flag and commanding officers aboard Warspite. The result of the conference, subsequently approved by the admiralty and cabinet, was that Force B which lacked speed, endurance and AA firepower, was dispatched to Kilindini in East Africa to assume convoy protection duties, whilst he would retire with Force A to Bombay as a deterrent against Japanese raids into the Western Indian Ocean. As Somervilles force was withdrawing from the operational area, Nagumo was preparing a second th strike against Ceylon. On the morning of 9 April the Japanese strike force of 91 dive bombers and 38 fighters was launched against Trincomalee. The strike had been anticipated by the British and again all shipping that could had cleared the harbour. The British tracked the Japanese strike force on their
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radar screens and scrambled all their available fighters in good time to meet the attack. The dogfights that ensued saw Japanese superiority in machines, sheer numbers and training result in the loss of eight Hurricanes and one Fulmar. Fuchida, leading the strike force, directed his bombers against what shipping still remained in the harbour, where the monitor Erebus was damaged and the merchant ship Sagaing was set ablaze but successfully beached. Fuchida finally called off the attack and headed his planes back to rendezvous with Nagumos carriers. A repetition of the incident a few days earlier, invloving Cornwall and Dorsetshire, now occurred. A float plane from Haruna spotted Hermes and Vampire heading south close inshore, and once again Egusas second attack wave was launched to attack this new target. After Egusa's force had taken of and whilst the first strike force were re-arming upon being recovered, there occurred an event that was to give Nagumo great cause for concern. No 11 squadron RAF had been despatched, unescorted, to seek out and attack the Japanese carriers. By great good fortune they had not only managed to locate the Japanese carriers but had somehow managed to escape the notice of the patrolling Japanese fighters. The first that was known of their presence was a series of explosions in the water around Akagi, as bombs bracketed the Japanese flag ship. Such a brave attack executed in the face of overwhelming odds deserved better results, but no hits were scored and 5 of the 9 Blenheim bombers that made the attack were shot down by the now fully alerted Japanese fighters. No ships captain can feel quite so naked and vulnerable as that of an aircraft carrier devoid of aircraft when under threat of impending air attack, yet this was precisely the situation that captain Richard F J Onslow found himself in as he stood on the bridge of Hermes. All his serviceable aircraft had been disembarked at Trincomalee. He was aware that he had been spotted and, still in company with Vampire, had reversed course heading back to Trincomalee at full speed, requesting fighter cover. It never arrived, instead Egusa with a strike force of 80 bombers and 9 fighters found Hermes and sank her in 20 minutes, inflicting an estimated 40 direct hits from 250 Kg bombs which at one point were landing at the rate of one every 2-3 seconds. Hermes was the only British carrier to be lost to enemy air attack during the course of world war 2. Vampire took a little longer to succumb to the attentions of Egusas remaining bombers, but a direct hit in boiler room A brought her to a standstill. Soon her bow section fell away as the result of a series of direct hits, and finally the still floating stern section was blown apart when her magazine exploded. As luck would have it a hospital ship, the Vita, was on hand to witness the attacks, and unmolested by the Japanese planes was quickly on the scene to rescue survivors. She collected 590 survivors from both ships, but Captain Onslow with 18 officers and 288 ratings were lost. Nagumos carrier planes scoured the seas around Trincomalee and accounted for a number of other British ships including the corvette Holyhock. Simultaneously Vice Admiral Ozawa had entered the Bay of Bengal with his Malaya force where, with similarly ruthless efficiency, he sank 18 merchant ships. Another 5 merchant ships were sunk by Japanese submarines, also operating in the bay of th Bengal. These were however the closing moves of C operation for the Japanese, as on 10 April both Nagumos and Ozawas forces were heading East and away from the Indian Ocean, content with the havoc they had wrought. They were never to return, and with them went the imminent threat of invasion for India.

Operation Ironclad
The Admiralty had grave apprehensions about the vulnerability of the vital supply route to Egypt via the Cape of Good Hope throughout 1942. The allies had only week naval and air forces in South and East Africa, and no naval base at all between Simonstown and Kilindini. The British therefore decided that they needed to sieze key points on the Vichy French controlled island of Madagascar, and in particular the excellent harbour at Diego Suarez. The assault force left England in March for Durban. It's composition is detailed below, the majority of the supporting warships being supplied by Force H from Gibraltar. Rear Admiral E.N. Syfret, who had taken over command of Force H from Somerville, was also appointed "Combined Commander" of the expedition. The plan was to assault Diego Suarez by landing at it's back door on the west coast of the island, thus taking the main defences in the rear. British Naval Forces: Battleship: Ramillies Aircraft Carriers: Illustrious (881 Sqdn - 12 Martletts, 882 Sqdn - 8 Martletts & 1 Fulmar, 810 & 829 Sqdn - 20 Swordfish) Indomitable (800 Sqdn - 8 Fulmars, 806 Sqdn - 4 Fulmars, 880 Sqdn - 6 Hurricanes, 827 & 831 Sqdn - 24 Albacores) Cruiser: Devonshire

Destroyers: Active, Anthony, Duncan, Inconstant, Javelin, Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Pakenham, Paladin, Panther Corvettes: Freesia, Auricula, Nigella, Fritillary, Genista, Cyclamen, Thyme, Jasmine Minesweepers: Cromer, Poole, Romney, Cromarty Assault transports: Winchester Castle, Royal Ulsterman, Keren, Karanja, Sobieksi, "Special" ships: Derwentdale (for motor landing craft and tanks), Bachaquero (tank landing ship) Troop ships: Oronsay, Duchess of Atholl, Franconia Stores and MT ships: Empire Kingsley, Thalatta, Mahout, City of Hong Kong, Mairnbank, Martand British ground forces: 29
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independent Infantry Brigade nd 2 South Lancashire Regiment nd 2 East Lancashire Regiment st 1 Royal Scots Fusiliers nd 2 Royal Welch Fusiliers th 455 Light Battery - Royal Artillery (4x3.7" Howitzers, 2x25pdr, 4x40mm Bofors) MG company B Special Service Tank Squadron (SHQ 2xValentine II, 4 troops of 1xValentine II & 2xTetrarch) No. 5 Commando (Lt-Colonel Sanguinetti) Infantry Brigade Group (of 5 Division): nd 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers nd 2 Northamptonshire Regiment th 6 Seaforth Highlanders th 9 Field Regiment - Royal Artillery (2 troops of 4x25pdr) Infantry Brigade (of 5 Division): nd 2 Cameronians nd 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers nd 2 Wiltshire Regiment
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French Forces : French defences consisted of eight coastal batteries, "forts" (typically garrisoned by a company), an extensive trench system, various naval vessels and approximately 18 Morane-Saulnier 406 fighters, 11 Potez 63 bombers, 1,500 - 3,000 troops in the Diego Suarez area, about 8,000 troops on the island as a whole (approx 75% native). Native troops formed the Rgiments Mixtes Malgaches (RMM), of which there were several battalions. Other troops included "European" colonial troops, marines, AA and artillery units and obsolescent FT-18 light tanks. In the very early hours of 5 May, after minesweepers had cleared the approaches and aircraft from Indomitable and Illustrious had neutralised the French airfields and subdued the warships in the main harbour, the assault troops were successfully put ashore. The French resisted stubbornly on the narrow neck of land which separates Diego Suarez from the bays on the west coast where the British landed. A detachment of marines were carried round at night by the destroyer Anthony and penetrated the harbour via the main entrance, taking the defenders by surprise.
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Resistance soon collapsed and by the evening of 7 May, only 60 hours after the first landings, Admiral Syfret was able to lead the main body of his fleet safely into the strongly fortified harbour. The British contented themselves with securing their gains. They offered an armistice to the Vichy French th who still controlled the bulk of Madagascar. The French rejected the British armistice on 18

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September and a further landing was therefore mounted aimed at Tananrive. Tananrive was entered rd on the 23 September and there was little further resistance in the south of the island thereafter. th Resistance finally ceased on 5 November.

Japanese submarines and surface raiders off Madagascar


Longitude 70 degrees east had been set by the Axis as the boundary between German and Japanese th naval operations in the Indian Ocean. On 14 March Admiral Raeder informed Hitler, not altogether accurately, that Japan planned to occupy Ceylon and then establish bases on Madagascar. The Japanese would require approval from their German allies however, since Madagascar lay on the German side of the boundary line, and from Vichy France who controlled and defended the colony. The Allies for their part were only too aware of such strategic possibilities. Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt: "A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez would paralyse our whole convoy route both to the Middle East and to the Far East....". They feared that the Japanese might use bases on the island in an advance against the African mainland in the same manner that they had recently used bases in Indo-China in their advance against Burma, Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies. Indeed it was Japanese bombers based in Vichy controlled Indo China that had sunk Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. De Gaulle wished to make a Free French landing on Madagascar, but his failure at Dakar meant that his plans found no support from the British and open hostility from the Americans. The German naval staff requested that the th Japanese launch operations against Allied convoys in the Indian Ocean. On 8 April the Japanese formally agreed to despatch submarines to the east coast of Africa. The 1 Division of the 8 Submarine Flotilla was withdrawn from its base at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands and arrived at Penang in north western Malaya at the end of April 1942. Commanded by Rear Admiral Ishizaki, the division was made up of fleet submarines I-10, I-16, I-18, I-20, and I-30. Three of them carried a midget sub apiece and two carried an aircraft. The submarines were supported by a pair of auxiliary cruisers come supply ships, Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Maru, both armed with 5.5" guns and torpedoes. I-30 was first to depart Penang on 20 April, sending her scout plane over Aden's harbor on 7 May and then working southward with further reconnaissance at Djibouti, Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam, and Zanzibar. The main body took a more southerly course toward Durban where it also undertook reconnaissance. As many as 40 Allied cargo ships lay in Durban, but the undetected Japanese submarines, seeking warships, were not yet ready to show their hand, and no attacks were launched. Instead, the subs concentrated off Diego Suarez and one of their planes discovered the British th battleship Ramillies berthed there on 29 May. Although the scout plane was spotted, and Ramillies th left its berth, it was believed to be a Vichy aircraft from Madagascar. On the night of the 29 I-16, I-18, and I-20 were ordered to launch their midget subs. I-18's midget sub had engine trouble, but at least th one of the other two penetrated the harbour. At 20:25 on 30 May Ramillies was hit by a torpedo and, while British corvettes dropped depth charges, at 21:20 the tanker British Loyalty took at least one torpedo and sank. The I-20's midget sub then grounded on a reef while attempting to retire from the nd harbour. On 2 June her two-man crew was shot and killed by an Allied patrol near Amponkarana Bay and their documents recovered. The wrecked midget was later sighted by British air reconnaissance. Prior to discovering the true source of the attack, Allied aircraft flew a retaliatory raid against the Vichy airfield at Tananarive and claimed to have destroyed three aircraft. Ramillies th emerged from Diego Suarez on 9 June and limped to Durban for repairs. Allied vessels en-route to the Middle East via the Cape of Good Hope passed through the Mozambique channel between Madagascar and the African mainland. By the summer of 1942 this shipping remained for the most part without escort or air cover, and it was to prove a happy hunting ground for Ishizaki. Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Maru were also active, sinking the Elysia 370 miles th ENE of Durban on 5 June. On the same day Ishizaki's boats sank 3 Allied merchantmen, 2 more were accounted for the following day and an additional 5 vessels went down in the next few days. By th 10 June, the local Allied naval commander ordered convoys and fast unescorted shipping to detour to the east of Madagascar to avoid the Mozambique channel. The only advice he could give to other shipping was to hug the shoreline. Shortly thereafter the Japanese submarines sailed to rendezvous with their supply ships south east of Madagascar for refuelling and replenishing. By the end of the month they were back in the channel and had resumed operations against Allied shipping. One st vessel was sunk on each of the last three days of the month, and three on 1 July.
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In mid-July the Japanese force, having damaged a British battleship and accounted for some 25 ships totalling over 120,000 tons, began withdrawing from African shores and returned to Penang in August. Admiral Ishizaki suffered no loss other than his midget sub at Diego Suarez. In the final analysis damage done to Allied interests in this part of the world was of much more immediate benefit to Germany than Japan, and the IJN was unwilling to devote its precious resources in going to the assistance of its Axis partner. Whilst the Japanese submarines never returned to the Indian Ocean, Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Maru th did. On 11 November at 11:58 in the morning, the naval authorities in Fremantle received an S.O.S.signal sent out by the corvette Bengal, reporting that she and the tanker Ondina were under attack by two enemy raiders, identified as Japanese, in position 19.45 S - 92.40 E. The battle started when a o lookout aboard Ondina sighted an unknown vessel at about 11,000 yards away, bearing 270 , followed by another ship of similar size. As no allied ships were reported in the vicinity, they could only assume they were hostile and for some time these ships were even identified as Japanese o carriers. On the Bengal, the lookouts saw the two warships a few minutes later, bearing 290 . The o ships both made a quick 90 turn to starboard away from the enemy to a NNW course. Bengal then turned to engage, thus hoping to buy enough time for the Ondina to escape. She opened fire at 12:12 from 3000 yards, soon followed by the Ondina 7000 yards away. The sensible thing to do for the Ondina to do was to follow the order to escape, but the captain decided to stay. His ship, armed with a 4" gun, still carried a heavier punch than her smaller companion. In addition, the Ondina could only sustain a speed of 12 knots versus 21 knots of the Japanese ships.

Aikoku Maru

The Aikoku Maru (Captain Oishi Tamotsu) and Hokoku Maru (Captain Imazato Hiroshi) commenced firing at 12:12, and soon straddled the Ondina with their 5.5" armament. The first hit on Ondina ripped off a part of the main mast, leaving only a stump standing. The Ondina herself had her answer ready: the third shell fired was a hit in the superstructure of Hokoku Maru, but apparently did little to effect her speed or fighting capacity. Content with the hit, the officer in charge then ordered the gunners to concentrate their fire on the stern. Only a few moments later, a lucky hit on the starboard torpedo mount turned the Hokoku Maru in a ball of red and yellow flames, and as the ship emerged from the smoke, she was listing heavily to starboard, and simultaneously started to settle by the stern. The explosion ripped off the stern and threw her two floatplanes overboard, while massive fires raged in the superstructure. Hokoku Maru was not built as a warship, and therefore didn't have a sufficient number of watertight bulkheads. Shells fell from their lockers as a result of the increasing list and threw sailors overboard. Reports came in indicating large fires in the engine-room and the loss of all electricity. There was little hope of salvaging the Hokoku Maru, and Captain Imazato could do little else than to order "abandon ship". The raider finally sank in a massive explosion at 13:12. Meanwhile, the Aikoku Maru hotly engaged the Bengal and Ondina, scoring several hits on the latter. Fortunately, shells and torpedoes have little effect on empty tankers, as the large number of watertight tanks keeps them afloat under the most difficult circumstances. Aikoku Maru also fired at the Bengal, which had shortened the distance to about 2000 yards. One shell hit her in the forecastle at 12:20, luckily doing little damage. After smoke floats failed to work and the supply of ammunition had almost been depleted, the Bengal turned away at 12:40 and made smoke. During her retreat, the Bengal was hit in her stern at 12:41, which caused a fire in the officers' baggage room. The last that the Bengal saw of the Ondina, she was trying to evade the shells that continuously straddled her from the Aikoku Maru. A shell was seen hitting her aft of the bridge at 13:08. By 13.45, the sea was empty.

After Bengal had disappeared over the horizon, Ondina was still steaming around at full speed. Not built as a warship, she had only a small stock of ammunition and her rate of fire had slackened significantly. Aikoku Maru closed the range to 3000 yards, and scored several hits in the following minutes. A last attempt to escape by dumping smoke-buoys overboard failed, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon ship to avoid further bloodshed. The engines were stopped, the lifeboats lowered and a white flag was hoisted, all under continuous fire from the Aikoku Maru. A few moments later, Captain Horsman was killed by a piece of shrapnel from a shell hitting the bridge. Aikoku Maru approached Ondina to about 400 yards, and fired two torpedoes to finish her off. Both blew large holes in the starboard side, but did little to sink the ship itself. These tanks had been empty o and the ship remained afloat on the other undamaged fuel tanks, despite a 30 list. Then Aikoku Maru st changed course and the Japanese gunners opened fire on the drifting lifeboats, killing the 1 engineer and three Chinese stokers. Satisfied with the results, Aikoku Maru then steamed away to pick up survivors from Hokoku Maru. Later, the Aikoku Maru came back one more time, firing a torpedo which missed the tanker. She paid little attention to the survivors and steamed away, convinced the Ondina was doomed. Meanwhile Rehwinkel, the first officer, managed to assemble a small skeleton crew and returned to the ship, where counter flooding reduced the list. Inspection revealed that her engines were also still intact. The small fires were extinguished and the last crewmembers in the lifeboats were taken aboard, after they had been convinced there was no danger of her sinking. Now the long leg back to Fremantle began. After two days the first officer was forced to send out an uncoded signal for help. Uncoded, because the code books had all been thrown overboard when "abandon ship" was ordered. This unexpected signal caused a shock in Colombo, as the Ondina had been reported sunk by the Ondina herself and logically, the British thought the Japanese were playing a trick on them. A signal went out from Fremantle for Ondina to report her position. Expecting a Japanese trap, the Ondina naturally didn't reply. Therefore without any form of assistance the Ondina steamed slowly towards th Fremantle. Fortunately on the 17 an Australian Catalina flying boat was sighted, when she was about 200 miles north west of Fremantle. The lookouts had reported a ship some time earlier, and the Catalina was asked if that ship could provide the much needed medical help. The unknown ship th proved to be a hospital ship. On 18 November, the Ondina entered Fremantle. The corvette Bengal had entered Diego Garcia the day before.

Wargaming Options
In the following sections are some ideas for naval wargames based upon the previously described historical events.

Ceylon Raids as a Campaign


A board game entitled "White Ensign/Red Sun" from Moments in History was released a few years back that covers the Ceylon raids, and would still seem to be obtainable, however the reviews I've read were rather mixed. The essential problem is that the British are no match for the Japanese in a full on daylight carrier battle, and in fact did everything they could to avoid such an action. The goal is therefore one of preserving the fog of war by hidden movement and providing an in-built mechanism for the possibility of inaccurate or misleading sighting reports from scout planes. One board game that does reflect this is 3W's "Scratch one Flattop" double blind game about the Battle of the Coral Sea (see AGB 108 from May 2003), and a game using this system but adapted to the "White Ensign/Red Sun" counters and map would seem the best compromise. It does make it rather expensive however as you'd need to purchase 2 games! Whether the campaign is run as a map and tabletop wargame or a board game, the British player has to believe that a Japanese invasion force could appear at any moment. It's this fear of an invasion of India or Ceylon that kept the British fleet in the operational area beyond the point when logic indicated that they should retire. One way of achieving this is to make the arrival of a Japanese invasion a possibility. For a board game this might be done by means of counters placed face down representing the invasion force, which are only turned right way up when attacked or when they arrive at their target. For a wargame, the Japanese player can roll 1D10 to see what his main objective for the game is; 1-4=Elimination of British Eastern Fleet, 5-7=Commerce raiding, 8-9=Invasion of Ceylon, 10=Elimination of British base at Addu Atoll. Correspondingly the Japanese player should not know or at least should not be sure about the location of the British Eastern Fleet's secret base unless they roll a 10 on their objective roll.

Operation Ironclad
The campaign offers a number of possible small unit actions: 1. A "take and hold" British mission against a coastal fort or gun battery from the landward side to free up additional beaches for subsequent waves. 2. A night attack on the main harbour defences at Diego Suarez by a detachment of marines supported by a destroyer. th 3. An opposed landing by 29 Brigade on a "coastal" table using LCMs as transport, and destroyers as fire support. Both British and French air support would also be included.

Jap Subs off Madagascar


This presents an interesting alternative submarine / convoy game, this time with Japanese submarines instead of German ones athwart the only convoy route from the UK to British forces in the Middle East. A one off "what if" game is also possible based on the premise of how much more damage could Ishizaki have done if, instead of hunting Allied warships, at the end of May he had charged into the unsuspecting Allied shipping anchored off Durban.

Set Piece Actions


Luckily for the British there was no large fleet action that took place, but the following historical recreations and "what-if" encounters would seem to make for some entertaining games: 1. The Ondina and Bengal's battle against Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Maru is one of the classic defiant surface actions at sea of world war 2, and makes for an entertaining if rather one sided game. 2. The obvious "what-if" game is Somerville's desired night attack on the Japanese fleet. A number of variables can be introduced in this game, the first being the inclusion of Force B, the second the inclusion of Dorsetshire and Cornwall with Force A and lastly the possible inclusion of Prince of Wales and Repulse to Somerville's force. This last variable is on the assumption that the Admiralty's belated order to Tom Phillips to withdraw his ships to the Indian Ocean had been sent earlier than it in fact had been back in December 1941. Phillips might then have acted upon it and withdrawn Force Z rather than sailing it into the South China Sea where the Japanese sank it. 3. The full on daylight carrier battle between the British and Japanese carrier forces is a possible game, but would almost certainly be rather one sided unless the Japanese forces are put at some disadvantage. Possibilities for this are that the British find the Japanese carriers and launch their strike during the Colombo or Trincomalee raids when half the Japanese planes are absent, that th the Blenheim raid on 9 April had had better luck and the Akagi is out of action or simply that one or more of the Japanese carriers are absent due to mechanical failure. This actually happened to the Kaga which had originally been part of Nagumo's force.

References
1. Dull, Paul S, A Battle History Of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, 1989 2. Fuchida, Mitsuo & Okumiya, Masatake, Miidway - The Japanese Story, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2002 3. Roskill, Captain Stephen W, The Navy At War 1939-1945, Wordsworth Editions, 1998 4. Thomas, David A, Japan's War At Sea : Pearl Harbour to the Coral Sea, Andre Deutsch, 1978 5. Tomlinson, Michael, The Most Dangerous Moment, Mayflower Granada Publishing, 1979 6. http://leden.tref.nl/~jviss000/battle_ondina.html 7. http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/history/mozam.shtml 8. http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/history/madagascar.shtml 9. http://www.fepow-

community.org.uk/research/Malaya_and_Singapore/Leading_Figures/Admiral_Sir_Geoffrey_Layton/body_inde x.htm 10. http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org11-2.htm 11. http://www.combinedops.com/No%205%20Commando.htm 12. http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Article.asp?ArticleID=123

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