Racial Equality Struggles For Columbia University Employees (RESCUE) Ad Hoc Committee

(Mr. Randy S. Raghavendra., M.E.,M.B.A., Founder) P.O. Box 7066, Hicksville, NY 11802-7066
Phone: (646) 229-9971 E-Mail: RSRaghavendra@Yahoo.Com

May 23, 2012 To: Honorable Henry B. Pitman Magistrate Judge United States District Court 500 Pearl Street, Room 750 New York, NY 10007-1312

Re: 06 CV 6841/08-CV-8120/09-CV-0019 (PAC)(HBP): Raghavendra v. Columbia University, Bollinger, et al. Letter Motion to IMMEDIATELY ENFORCE the Payment Obligations of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement, Dismiss All Attorney Fee Claims, and Remand All Other Claims to Plaintiffs 11-CV-9251(NY State Supreme Court Index# 11/600002) Action Plaintiffs New Major (Multi-Million Dollar) Lawsuit Against Proskauer Rose, LLP & Columbia President Lee C. Bollinger in New York State Supreme Court For Abuse of Judicial Process, Legal Malpractice, Gross Negligence, Collusion, Concealment/Fraud, Misrepresentations, and Aiding & Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Fired(1) Attorney Stober Firm and CONTINUING Illegal Discrimination & Retaliation Against Plaintiff (by NOT Hiring Him) Even After July 30, 2009 Dear Honorable Judge Pitman:
I. Letter Motion to IMMEDIATELY ENFORCE the PAYMENT Obligations of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement WITHOUT Prejudice to Plaintiffs Other (Multi-Million Dollar) Claims _____________________________________________________________ (1) Mr. Louis D. Stober, Jr. and his law firm were Fired / discharged for cause (based on Breach of Attorney Services Contract, Fraudulent Inducement, and other Legal Malpractice) some 6-Weeks PRIOR to the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement 1 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 2 of 10 Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant this letter Motion to IMMEDIATELY ENFORCE the Payment Obligations of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement (with 9% prejudgment annual interest), dismiss all attorney fee claims, and remand all other claims to Plaintiffs 11-CV-9251 (New York State Supreme Court Index# 11/600002) action. Given the total destruction of the 51-years old Plaintiffs livelihood, professional career, and the continuing irreparable harm and unbelievable pain and suffering being caused to him and his family during the past NINE years by the continuing reckless disregard for the law by defendant Columbia President Lee C. Bollinger, this could be considered as an Order to Show cause Motion for the immediate release of the Settlement Proceeds. If necessary, Plaintiff will be filing a more formal motion and supporting 25-pages Memorandum of Law within the next few days. A district court has the power to enforce summarily, on motion, a settlement agreement reached in a case that was pending before it. Meetings & Expositions, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir. 1974); accord Garibaldi v. Anixter, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2005)(affirming decision of district court to enter [] judgment in accordance with the terms of [a] Settlement Agreement). The law of New York is to the same effect. See First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 454 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1972)(construing New York Law). Further, under New York Law, ..ambiguous language should be construed against the interest of the drafting party. Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Intl Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2003.) (citation and quotation omitted). Also, the November 2011 Mandate of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals incorporates the terms of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement and thereby gives the district court jurisdiction to enforce the immediate payment of the Settlement Amount. E.g. Ermenegildo Zegna Corp. v. Lanificio Mario Zegna S.P.S., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, 1996 WL 721079 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Torres v. Costich, 935 F.Supp. 232, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). This is such a case. The parties have submitted to the court a copy of the (Limited) Settlement Agreement sought to be enforced. Clearly, the agreement has been so ordered by the Second Circuit after appropriately vacating and remanding any (bogus) attorney fee claims which can be either summarily dismissed by this court or be remanded to Plaintiffs 11-CV-9251(removed State Supreme Court) action. In situations such as this ..the breach of a settlement agreement... may suffice as an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). Grossman v. Local 1118 of Communications Workers of America, 232 Fed. Appx. 70, 71, 2007 WL 2389765 2 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 3 of 10 (2d Cir. 2007) (Summary Order). Here, the third party Private Mediator simply does NOT have any authority or jurisdiction to alter the terms of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement not only because of the overriding Second Circuit Mandate but also because the Mediator himself was HOODWINKED by the attorney malpractice, gross negligence, concealment/fraud, collusion, aiding & abetting breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentations in drafting of the (Limited) Settlement Agreement. Clearly, the Mediator would have NEVER even conducted the so-called Private mediation if he was not deceived, lied to, and or made to FALSELY believe by the defendants that the Pro Se Plaintiff had attorney representation when, in fact, they deliberately CONCEALED the fact that the Pro Se Plaintiff did NOT have any attorney representation whatsoever in four of his five actions including his most important (multi-million dollar) 08-CV-8120 and 09-CV-0019 actions (removed 2003 and 2006 State Court actions.) The related LIES and PERJURY of Fired attorney(1) Stober are obvious because New York State Law specifically PROHIBITS any (bogus or fake) attorney representation claims without a Written letter of engagement especially when he is making attorney fee claims exceeding $3,000. See N. Y. Comp. Codes R & Reg. Tit. 22, 1215. 1-2, 2. Judicial Estoppel & Second Circuit Mandate also demands IMMEDIATE Payment of the Settlement Amount, as Defendants CANNOT be on Both Sides of the Unambiguous & Enforceable Settlement Contract argument by FIRST opposing a $500/Day Late Payment Penalty and BREACHING their own immediate Payment Obligations and LATER also opposing the setting aside of that (Limited) Settlement Agreement. In other words, Defendant Bollinger should be ordered to immediately comply and pay the Settlement Amount as per the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement because he cannot be allowed to have it both ways; He cannot withhold the payment for over the past 3-years on one hand while asserting that it is a 100% enforceable Agreement on the other hand. It is black-letter law that one cannot simultaneously rescind and enforce a compromise. Langford v. Bogart, 14 Misc.2d 398, 401, 179 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1958); 22A N.Y. Jur. 2d Contracts 489. Clearly, the law also PROHIBITS Defendant Bollinger from continuing to enjoy all the benefits of the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement, without paying the plaintiff a single penny during the past three years. By first HOODWINKING the Pro Se Plaintiff into the (Limited) Settlement Agreement and later grossly abusing that same Agreement, Defendant Bollinger has been able to avoid a $200 Million Dollar Civil Rights Class Action (similar to those 3 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 4 of 10 filed and settled at TEXACO and Coca Cola) solely at the expense of Plaintiffs continued pain and suffering and total destruction of his livelihood, professional career, and financial creditworthiness during the past 9 years. The overriding general policy, as Justice Holmes put it, of preventing people from getting other peoples property for nothing when they purport to be buying it. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520-21, 79 S. Ct. 429, 3 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1959) (quoting Contl Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 271, 29 S. Ct. 280, 53 L. Ed. 486, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 665 (1909). As a court of equity, this Court may exercise its equitable powers to ensure that substantial justice is achieved. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939). Further, the law also requires IMMEDIATE Enforcement of Payment Obligations of Defendant Bollinger to PREVENT further infliction of devastating IRREPARABLE HARM and ABUSE of JUDICIAL PROCESS, after he had already abused the process to DEPRIVE Plaintiff his most deserving preliminary injunctive relief and Reinstatement and his Right to lawfully organize an anti-discrimination Minority Employees Association and a potentially $200 Million Dollar Civil Rights Class Action during the past 3-1/2 Years. The abuse of process is, therefore, very obvious. See Lieberman v. Pobiner, London, Bashian & Buonamici, 190 A.D. 2d 716, 593 N.Y.S. 2d 321 (2d Dept 1993); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F. 3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994). Clearly, the Columbia defendants and the attorneys at Prokauer Rose, LLP abused the process, in collusion with Fired attorney(1) Stober firm, and misused the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement only as a tool to prevent the Plaintiffs from getting his most deserving reinstatement in July 2009 by a district court order or Second Circuit Appeal. (See Leonard Jeffries v. Bernard Harleston (President of City University of New York), et al . 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.1994) for Reinstatement Law) It is also well established law that A court may not rewrite into a contract conditions the parties did not insert. Marine Assoc., Inc. V. New Suffolk Devt Corp., 125 A.D.2d 649, 510 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (2d Dept 1986). It is also black-letter law that an unambiguous private contracts terms must be enforced irrespective of the parties subjective intent). See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2197, 2206, 2200, 174 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2009). Also, [C]ourts should be extremely reluctant to interpret an agreement as impliedly stating something which the parties have neglected to specifically include. Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 538 Madison Realty Co., 1 N.Y.3d 470, 475, 807 N.E.2d 876, 775 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2004) (quoting Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 72, 385 N.E.2d 4 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 5 of 10 566, 412 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1978)). Further, Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used. (quoting Wind v. Eli Lilly & Co., 210 A.D.2d 220, 220-21, 619 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The defendants simply CANNOT REVISE or ADD any new totally unacceptable terms to the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement now because even Courts are not permitted to add or excise terms to a contract, nor are they permitted to distort the meaning of those used. Thereby creating a new contract than that originally intended by the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing. Vermont Teddy Bear, 1 N.Y.3d at 475 (citation omitted). [T]he best evidence of what the parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing. Henrich v. Phazar Antenna Corp., 33 A.D.3d 864, 817 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (2d Dept 2006) (quoting Greenfield v. Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569, 780 N.E. 2d 166, 750 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2002)). Also, Under New York Law, prejudgment interest is normally recoverable as a matter of right in an action at law for breach of contract. Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Adams v. Lindblad Travel Inc., 730 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1994)) See also N.Y.C.P.L.R 5001(b). The earliest possible date in contract actions arises when the alleged breach occurred, regardless of the parties state of mind or subsequent discussions. McNally Wellman Co., a Div. of Bolden Allis, Inc., v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1200 (2d Cir. 1995) citing Sobiech v. Intl Staple & Mach., 867 F.2d 778, 781 (2d cir. 1989)). Here the breach occurred when Plaintiff did not receive the full payment by September 8, 2009 as due under the July 30, 2009 settlement agreement. The court should award Plaintiff prejudgment interest accruing from September 8, 2009 date, and continuing to the date of entry of this judgment at the rate of at least nine percent per annum. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. 5004 (awarding nine percent simple interest under New York Law). The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for this amount.

II. New Major (Multi-Million Dollar) Lawsuit Against Proskauer Rose, LLP and Columbia President Bollinger in the New York State Supreme Court
To remedy the multi-million dollar damages suffered by the Plaintiff by the almost unbelievable abuse of the judicial process and continuing illegal discrimination and retaliation, he will also be filing a new (multi-million dollar) lawsuit against Proskauer Rose, LLP and defendant Columbia President Bollinger in the New York State Supreme Court. The new causes of action against these (new) defendants will include but will not be limited to Abuse of 5 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman

May 23, 2012 Page 6 of 10 Process, Negligence, Misrepresentations, Legal Malpractice, Collusion, Concealment/Fraud, Violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, Aiding & Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty & Malpractice, and continuing illegal employment discrimination & retaliation. There is overwhelming evidence that Defendant Bollinger and his attorneys at Proskauer Rose, LLP not only abused the judicial process but also colluded with the Fired attorney(1) Stober firm and the Private Mediator paid by them to intentionally or negligently misrepresent to the Pro Se Plaintiff that by signing the July 30, 2009 Settlement Agreement, he (Plaintiff) will be paid the full settlement amount by September 8, 2009 to RESCUE him from defaulting on his over $100,000 credit card loans. Further, the attorneys lied to the Plaintiff that he will be paid regardless of the (already pending breach of contract, legal malpractice and other multi-million dollar claims) dispute between him (Plaintiff) and the Fired attorney(1) Stober firm. In other words, Plaintiff would have NEVER signed even that (Limited) Settlement Agreement if the attorneys had not breached their DUTY to PROPERLY ADVISE him (Pro Se Plaintiff) and or did not misrepresent the fact that the Columbia defendants would NOT immediately pay any of the settlement amount and or would indefinitely DELAY payment because of the Fired attorney(1) Stobers own SELF-SERVING actions, in collusion with the attorneys at Proskauer Rose, LLP. Most shockingly, in an obvious effort to hoodwink the Pro Se Plaintiff, the attorneys breached even the most IMPORTANT PAYMENT terms of the Settlement Agreement even though it was drafted by themselves. All the attorneys colluded against the Civil Rights Plaintiff to abuse the judicial process and by violating even the most obvious payment terms of the Settlement Agreement. They sought the supplemental jurisdiction of the district court in their devious efforts to legitimize their (bogus) attorney fee claims and to (illegally) prejudice the refund of the $10,000 Retainer fee and the Plaintiffs (multi-million dollar) claims for breach of attorney contract, legal malpractice, and aiding & abetting malpractice. Clearly, the Pro Se Plaintiff was never advised by the attorneys that even the 08-CV-8120 and 09-CV-0019 actions were included in that July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement. This kind of Gross Negligence or Willful Withholding of information material to the clients decision and or to wrongfully induce the Plaintiff to sign the Settlement document is a breach of the duty of due care. See e.g. Ayala v. Fischman, 1998 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 16094, 1998 WL 726005, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 15, 1998); DuPont v. Brady, 646 F. Supp. at 1076 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (finding attorney hired to advise client, regarding tax shelter, was negligent for failing to

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Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 7 of 10 advise client of tax risks), revd on other grounds 828 F 2d 75 (2d Cir. 1987); See also Hart v. Carro, Spanbock, Kastner & Cuiffo, 211 A.D. 2d 617, 620 N.Y.S. 2d 847, 849 (1995) (attorneys failure to advise his client as to the enforceability of a pledge agreement constituted negligence.) If the attorney breaches this duty, he is liable for any losses suffered by the client as a result of making a decision without the benefit of this information. DuPont, 645 F. Supp. at 1976 citing Spector v. Mermeisten, 361 F. Supp. 30, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972.)) The Columbia-hired attorneys at Proskauer Rose, LLP are also guilty of legal malpractice because While privity of contract is generally necessary to state a cause of action for attorney malpractice, liability is extended to third parties, not in privity, for harm caused by professional negligence in the presence of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances. Good Old Days Tavern v Zwirn, 259 AD2d 300, 300, 686 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dept. 1999). Therefore, even though plaintiff may not have a direct attorneyclient relationship with the attorneys of Proskauer Rose, LLP, the facts and evidence show that the Columbia-hired attorneys colluded with the Fired attorney(1) Stober firm to hoodwink the plaintiff into the totally unacceptable July 30, 2009 (Limited) settlement agreement. These facts fall within the narrow exception of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances under which the Proskauer Rose attorneys can be prosecuted for attorney malpractice absent a showing of actual or near privity (See AG Capital Funding Partners. L.P. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 595, 842 NE2d 471, 808 NYS2d 573 [2005], quoting Estate of Spivery v Pulley, 138 AD2d 563, 526 NYS2d 145 [1988]; cf. Fredriksen v Fredriksen, 30 AD3d 370, 372, 817 NYS2d 320 [2006]; Griffith v Medical Quadrangle, 5 AD 3d 151, 772 NYS2d 513 [2004]; Aranki v Goldman & Assoc., LLP, 34 AD3d 512, 825 N.Y.S.2d 97 [2006]. Previously, in 2003, Proskauer Rose, LLP had also used the most unethical direct intimidation tactics against the former Head of Equal Opportunity at Columbia University, Ms. Zenobia White-Farrell, to FORCE a settlement when she attempted to bring a major Civil Rights Class Action for institutionalized racial discrimination at the 250-years old Columbia University, It was specifically and unambiguously agreed in the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement that the Columbia defendants would IMMEDIATELY PAY the full Settlement Amount directly to the Pro Se Plaintiff by September 8, 2009 and WITHOUT PREJUDICING his already pending (multi-million Dollar) claims against Fired attorney(1) Stober firm including but not limited to breach of attorney contract, fraudulent inducement, gross negligence, and legal malpractice. The law also prohibited Proskauer Rose, 7 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 8 of 10 LLP and Defendant Bollinger from abusing the judicial process and or aiding & abetting the breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice of Fired attorney(1) Stober firm and to NOT use any EXCUSE for withholding the immediate payment of the Settlement Amount to the Plaintiff. Clearly, by (illegally & aggressively) pursuing the supplemental jurisdiction argument for legitimizing the BOGUS attorney fees claims and even representing (pro bono) Fired attorney(1) Stober firm in Plaintiffs Second Circuit Appeal, Proskauer Rose, LLP has not only abused the judicial process but has also been aiding and abetting their (Stober firms) legal malpractice. After all, Defendant Bollinger and his attorneys already knew that the Plaintiff had fired the Stober firm some six weeks before the (Limited) Settlement Agreement. It is, therefore, obvious that Defendant Bollinger and his attorneys wanted to ILLEGALLY HIJACK the Pro Se Plaintiffs 9-years old, multi-action (over10,000 Pro Se Litigation hours), multi-million dollar civil rights action by exploiting the GREED and the QUICK & EASY moneymaking ambitions of Fired attorney(1) Stober firm who barely knew any thing about the Plaintiffs precedent-setting litigation after having put in a mere 30 to 50 billable hours before getting fired. Therefore, the defendants liability for negligence, intentional misrepresentations, and concealment/fraud in entrapping the Pro Se Plaintiff into the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement cannot be any more obvious. See Allen v WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 954 F. Supp 682, 689 [SDNY 1997]; Coolite Corp. v American Cynamide Co., 52 Ad2d 486, 488, 384 N.Y.S.2d 808 [1st Dept 1976] [false statements, recklessly made, without knowing whether they are true or false will support a fraud action. 24 NY Jur, Fraud and Deceit, s 150.] The facts and evidence clearly show that the Defendants aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty by Fired attorney Stober firm. See Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 119-125, 760 N.Y.S.2d 157 [1st Dept 2003]; see also Widewaters Herkimer Co., LLC v Aiello, 28 AD3d 1107, 817 NYS2d 790 [2006]; Operative Cake Corp. v. Nassour, 21 AD3d 1020, 1021, 801 NYS2d 358 [2005]; Sahagen v Ke`lley Drye & Warren, 292 AD2d 298, 740 NYS2d 303 [2002]). The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not require wrongful intent by the third party, but only that the third party knew of the breach of duty and participated in it. S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816, F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1987). Judiciary Law # 487 (1) permits injured third parties to recover TREBLE damages when an attorney engages in any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party.

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Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 9 of 10 Further, Defendant Columbia President Bollinger has been continuing to illegally discriminate and retaliate against the Civil Rights Plaintiff by not hiring him to any of the over 100 positions he had applied for and continues to apply for after the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement. Therefore, in enforcing the (Limited) Settlement Agreement, the Court should make sure that it is NOT made to be an illegal contract. See Civil Serv. Employees Assn, Inc. v. State Univ. of Stony Brook, 82 Misc. 2d 334, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 927, 930 (Sup 1974). ([a]n agreement which violates a provision of the constitution is illegal and void and the law will not presume that the parties intended to make an illegal contract.); Venzilos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970) (A construction that will sustain an instrument will be preferred to one that will defeat it; if an agreement is fairly capable of a construction that will make it valid and enforceable, that construction will be given it.) (internal citations omitted); Friedman v. State, 242 A.D. 314, 317, 275 N.Y.S. 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (The Court does not assume an intention to violate the law, nor will an agreement be adjudged to be illegal, where it is capable of a construction which will uphold it, and make it valid.); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 203(a) (1981). ([A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect). Any agreement that purports to release Columbia President Bollinger from misconduct yet to be committed such as retaliation in violation of the relevant anti-discrimination statutes would contravene Public Policy and could not be enforced. See Westmoreland Asbestoes Co. v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 39 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Since any subjective and unexpressed intentions of the defendants about the July 30, 2009 (Limited) Settlement Agreement could never be considered even if the terms of the agreement were deemed ambiguous and parol evidence were to be admitted, see Wells v. Shearson Lehman/ Am.Express, 72 N.Y. 2d 11, 24, 526 N.E.2d 517, 524 (1988) , rearg, denied 72 N.Y.2d 953, 533N.Y,2d 953, 533 N.Y,S,2d 60, 529 N.E.2d 428 (1988) defendants conclusory statements about what they would have found acceptable could never be considered by the Court. Further, A promise to comply with a preexisting legal duty is not adequate consideration upon which a valid contract may be based. Fatoutis v. Lyons, 149 A.D.2d 565, 540 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (2d Dept 1989). Therefore, under no circumstances should the Court allow Defendant Bollinger to get any immunity from prosecution for his continuing illegal discrimination and retaliation against the Plaintiff to illegally prevent him from being re-hired and lawfully organizing an anti-discrimination Minority Employees Association and a Civil Rights Class Action at the 250-years old Columbia University. 9 of 10

Hon. Henry B. Pitman May 23, 2012 Page 10 of 10 Based on the above compelling facts and well-supported legal arguments, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant this letter motion for immediate payment of the Settlement Amount (with 9% prejudgment interest) without prejudice to Plaintiffs other (multi-million dollar) claims and or to order the docketing of this 10-Page Letter Motion. Thank you very much for your consideration. Very Respectfully Submitted, Sd/Randy S. Raghavendra, M.E., M.B.A. Pro Se** Plaintiff (** Until Legal Malpractice Attorney is retained ASAP) CC: Mr. Lee C. Bollinger, President, Columbia University Mr. Robert Kasdin, Senior EVP, Columbia University Ms. Jane E. Booth, General Counsel, Columbia University Mr. Joseph M. Leccese, Chairman, Prokauer Rose, LLP Mr. Edward Brill, Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP Ms. Susan Friedfel, Attorney, Proskauer Rose, LLP.
RSR/yr:

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