MACALINTAL v. COMELEC G.R. No.

157013, July 10, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution is valid HELD: YES. For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. MOSALE v. NICO G.R. No. L-2539, May 28, 1949 FACTS: This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant elected municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947. It appears that the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The commission on Election, however, rules on November 8 thatthe protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected. ISSUE: Whether or not a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such certificate. HELD: In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and requested the Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has never been filed at all." There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-on days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of facts the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao we duly notified of his letter to the Commission on Election dated November 6, 1947, which subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election. The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.

The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the case Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court sustained the ruling of said commission upon similar facts that "by own voluntary act and deed petitioner has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the light of the election laws such certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence nonexisting." MIRANDA v. ABAYA G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999 FACTS: Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Miranda, which the COMELEC granted. After the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose Pempe Miranda. During the May 11, 1998 elections, Joel Miranda won by only 1,666 votes against Antonio Abaya. Abaya filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution of Joel Miranda as he sought nullification of Mirandas certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been canceled and denied due course. The COMELEC thereafter nullified the substitution of Joel Miranda of his father as mayoralty candidate. ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution is valid HELD: No. While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code. More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy (p.13). A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. CAYAT v. COMELEC FACTS: Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet for the May 2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for Mayor filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the ground that Cayat has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty three days before the election, Cayats disqualification became final and executory. He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral protest contending that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor intervened and contended that he should succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified because Palileng was only a second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as the winner. ISSUE: Whether or not Palileng should be declared as the winner. HELD: Palileng should be proclaimed as the winner on the following grounds:

First, the COMELECs Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayats certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days before the election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a secondplacer but the only placer. Consequently, Palilengs proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.

MITMUG v. COMELEC There can be a failure of election only when the will of the electorate in a local governmental unit cannot be ascertained and has been defied. REYES v. RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO GEMENTIZA v. COMELEC READ: RA9189 (ABSENTEE VOTING) RA 9006 RA 6646 RA 7166