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FIRST LEPANTO-TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION (now known as FLT PRIME INSURANCE CORPORATION), v. CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC.

(formerly known as CALTEX [PHILIPPINES], INC.), G.R. No. 177839 (January 18, 2012) Villarama, J. Bar Subject: Commercial Law Nature: Rule 45 Quick Facts: R Chevron Philippines sued P First Lepanto for the payment of unpaid oil and petroleum purchases made by its distributor, Fumitechniks. Fumitechniks had applied for and was issued a surety bond by First Lepanto for 15.7M this was in compliance with the requirement for the grant of a credit line with Chevron to guarantee payment of the cost of fuel. (Executed on Oct 15, 2001, will expire on Oct 15, 2002) Fumitechniks defaulted on its obligation because the check it issued was dishonored Chevron then notified First Lepanto of Fumitechniks unpaid purchases (15.08M) through a letter. Chevron also sent copies of invoices showing the deliveries of fuel as requested by First Lepanto. Simultaneously, a letter was sent to Fumitechniks demanding that it submit to First Lepanto 1)its comment on Chevrons notification letter, 2) copy of the agreement secured by the Bond plus the delivery receipts, etc 3) information on the particulars including terms and conditions. However Fumitechniks replied that it cannot submit the requested agreement since there was no such agreement executed between Fumitechniks and Chevron. However it enclosed a copy of another surety bond issued by CICI General Insurance Corporation in favor of Chevron to secure the obligation of Fumitechniks and/or Prime Asia Sales and Services in the amount of 15M. First Lepanto then advised Chevron of the non-existence of the principal agreement as confirmed by Fumitechniks. It explained that being an accessory contract, the bond cannot exist without a principal agreement as it is essential that the copy of the basic contract be submitted to the surety. Chevron then formally demanded from First Lepanto the payment of its claim under the surety bond. Because First Lepanto refused to pay, Chevron prayed for judgment ordering First Lepanto to pay the sum of 15,080,030.30 pesos plus interest, cost and attorneys fees RTC: dismissed the complaint. Terms and conditions of the oral credit line between Chevron and Fumitechniks have not been relayed to First Lepanto. Since the surety bond is a mere accessory contract, the RTC concluded that the bond cannot stand in the absence of the written agreement secured thereby. CA: reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of Chevron. First Lepanto is estopped from assailing the oral credit line agreement, having consented to the same upon presentation by Fumitechniks of the surety bond it issued. Considering that such oral contract between Fumitechniks and respondent has been partially executed, the CA ruled that the provisions of the Statute of Frauds do not apply. Issue/ Held/ Ratio: 1) Issue W/N a surety is liable to the creditor in the absence of a written contract with the principal YES Sec 175 of the Insurance Code defines suretyship as contract or agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third party, called the obligee. The extent of the suretys liability is determined by the language of the suretyship contract or bond itself. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract. Surety Bond used by First Lepanto states that Fumitechniks, as principal and First Lepanto as surety are firmly bound unto Chevron in the sum of 15.7M. The rider attached to the bond that the principal has applied for a credit line in the amount of 15.7M pesos First Lepanto argues that non-compliance with the submission of the written agreement, which by the express terms of the surety bond, should be attached and made part thereof, rendered the bond ineffective. Since all stipulations and provisions of the surety contract should be taken and interpreted together, in this case, the unmistakable intention of the parties was to secure only those terms and conditions of the written agreement. A reading of Surety Bond shows that it secures the payment of purchases on credit by Fumitechniks in accordance with the terms and conditions of the "agreement" it entered into with respondent. The word "agreement" has reference to the distributorship agreement, the principal contract and by implication included the credit agreement mentioned in the rider. However, it turned out that Chevron has executed written agreements only with its direct customers but not distributors like Fumitechniks and it also never relayed the terms and conditions of its distributorship agreement to the First Lepanto after the delivery of the bond. The law is clear that a surety contract should be read and interpreted together with the contract entered into between the creditor and the principal. Section 176 of the Insurance Code states:

Sec. 176. The liability of the surety or sureties shall be joint and several with the obligor and shall be limited to the amount of the bond. It is determined strictly by the terms of the contract of suretyship in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee. (Emphasis supplied.) A surety contract is merely a collateral one, its basis is the principal contract or undertaking which it secures. Necessarily, the stipulations in such principal agreement must at least be communicated or made known to the surety particularly in this case where the bond expressly guarantees the payment of respondents fuel products withdrawn by Fumitechniks in accordance with the terms and conditions of their agreement. The bond specifically makes reference to a written agreement. It is basic that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. Moreover, being an onerous undertaking, a surety agreement is strictly construed against the creditor, and every doubt is resolved in favor of the solidary debtor. Having accepted the bond, respondent as creditor must be held bound by the recital in the surety bond that the terms and conditions of its distributorship contract be reduced in writing or at the very least communicated in writing to the surety. Such non-compliance by the creditor (respondent) impacts not on the validity or legality of the surety contract but on the creditors right to demand performance. First Lepanto should have sent notice of the specified form of the agreement or at least the disclosure of basic terms and conditions of its distributorship and credit agreements with its client Fumitechniks after its acceptance of the bond delivered by the latter. However, it never made any effort to relay those terms and conditions of its contract with Fumitechniks upon the commencement of its transactions with said client, which obligations are covered by the surety bond issued by petitioner."

DR. RUBI LI, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN G.R. No. 165279 June 7, 2011 Villarama, J. Bar Subject: [Civil Case] Nature: petition for review on certiorari Quick Facts: The Solimans daughter, Angelica, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at St. Lukes. Results showed she had a high-grade cancer o the bone thus her right leg was amputated by Dr. Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. Chemotherapy was then suggested by Dr. Tamayo and referred Angelica to Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist at SLMC. 11 days after chemo, she died. Cause of death as per PNP Crime Lab autopsy was hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation." However, the certificate of death issued by SLMC eventually stated that the cause of death: osteosarcoma (immediate cause), above knee amputation (antecedent cause), status post chemotherapy (underlying cause) The parents filed a damage suit against Dr. Li, Dr. Marbella, Mr. Ledesma, Dr. Arriete and SLMC and charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemo drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to the hypovolemic shock that caused her death. It was also specifically averred that the doctor assured the parents that Agelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy. Side effects, according to her, were just slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Dr. Li denied having been negligent and explained how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer cells but also the patients normal body parts, and said that even when a tumor is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye, and that she did not give the parents any assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelicas cancer. During the chemotherapy, the parents noticed the reddish discoloration on Angelicas body but Dr. Li dismissed it as just the mere effect of the medicine. However, when Angelicas condition worsened as she was bleeding through her mouth and anus, the parents pleaded for the chemotherapy to be stopped. Dr. Balmaceda, their witness for the respondents said that it is the physicians duty to inform and explain to the patient or his relatives every known side effect of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be administered, before securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to such procedure or therapy. Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must be informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if such will aggravate the patients condition Dr. Tamayo, the surgeon who operated on Angelicas lower extremity testified for the parents saying that chemotherapy was imperative and that he referred them to Dr. Li because he believed that she was a competent oncologist. RTC: dismissed the complaint. Dr. Li observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts, said patient failed. Using the standard of negligence in Picart v Smith, Dr Li has taken the necessary precaution against the adverse effect of chemotherapy; a wrong decision is not by itself negligence CA: only Dr. Li is negligent; while there was no negligence in the administration of the chemotherapy, Dr. Li didnt divulge all of the side effects. Only three have been explained which led to the parents consenting right away. The parents were awarded damages. Issue/Held/Ratio: W/N Dr. Li was negligent in not explaining all the possible side effects of the chemo NO The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of "battery" (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. Schoendorff v Society of New York Hospital: informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise

his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits. Canterbury v. Spence: duty to disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the patients right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.57 The scope of disclosure is premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the medical sciences. It is also his duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information which the patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patients reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with armslength transactions. The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment.59 As to the issue of demonstrating what risks are considered material necessitating disclosure, it was held that experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patients decision on treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision. Such unrevealed risk that should have been made known must further materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is without legal consequence. And, as in malpractice actions generally, there must be a causal relationship between the physicians failure to divulge and damage to the patient. There are 4 essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it In this case, there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. The parents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knees. When petitioner informed the Dr. Li beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the parents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that Dr. Li told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapys success rate. Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary Dr. Balmaceda was not an oncologist, thus not an expert witness to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for chemotherapy treatment.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON P. JACINTO. G.R. No. 154622 August 3, 2010 Bar Subject: [Criminal Case] Nature: petition for review on certiorari Quick Facts: First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Landbank (400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement). As security, Jacinto, President of FWCC issued 9 Landbank postdated checks (465million) drawn against FWCCs account at PNB. Before the checks matured, Landbank and Jacinto executed a restructuring agreement changing the terms of the payment. However, FWCC still defaulted. Landbank presented payment to the drawee bank (PNB) the postdated checks but they were all dishonored. LandBank VP filed a complaint for violation of BP22. Jacinto denied the charges and averred that the complaint is baseless and utterly devoid of merit as the loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the Restructuing Agreement. FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement, thus the checks being issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their validity. Makati City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint as well as denied the reconsideration. Landbank elevated that matter to the DOJ for review. DOJ issued a resolution holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. CA: CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation. Also, the CA found merit in respondents assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of whether the original obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. W/N there exists a prejudicial question Held:NO A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is NOT determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondents JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation. There was no proof that he had been released from his obligation. The Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states that "This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security... 2. W/N there was probable cause to hold respondent liable for violation of BP 22 Held:YES The mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. What is punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.

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