A Constructivists Perspective Functional Contextualism

David H. Jonassen

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Keywords: functional contextualism, constructivism, behavior analysis

CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS

I agree with Foxs premise that functional contextualism has implications for designing instruction. However, I have concerns about many of the justifications that Fox uses as evidence to support his premise. Fox argues that functional contextualism is an alternative to constructivism because construc- tivism has not empirically demonstrated its effectiveness, so functional contextualism ought to replace it. I find this justification troubling for several reasons. First, the effects of constructivism are not as obvious because constructivism is not a theory of learning. Nor is it a model for designing instruction. Rather, it is fundamentally an epistemology that has affected the way that edu- cators in the past decade conceive of learning. As an ontology, it has signifi- cantly affected the fields of art and sociology for more than 60 years. More than a decade ago, I tried to articulate constructivist models of design, but I soon discovered that such a concept is oxymoronic. One can argue that it is impossible to directly and empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of con- structivism. That was not its intention, despite the claims of many designers who claim to be constructivist. Second, even though constructivism is not a design method, there are numerous reports that empirically validate the ability of innovations based on a constructivist epistemology, such as anchored instruction, problem-based learning, microworlds, cognitive tools, and simulations, to engage and sup- port meaningful learning. Third, if empirical validation were a truth criterion for all theories of learn- ing and models of instruction, most would fail. Merrill and his colleagues (1996) claimed that instructional design should be built on the rock of science. However, that rock is not nearly as solid as most of us want to believe. A few
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exceptions exist. For instance, principles of concept learning and memoriza- tion, models such as mastery learning and different kinds of programmed instruction, and research on feedback have produced fairly consistent results. The empirical basis for functional contextualism is Skinners work on behav- ioral analysis which was also very consistent. Fourth, there are other theories that may accomplish the goals of functional contextualism as well as or better than functional contextualism. I believe that activity theory (Jonassen, 2000) is a much richer, contextually dominated view of the world. To be sure, activity theory is not a theory of learning from which instructional prescriptions can be reasonably drawn. Activity theory provides a variety of social, historical, community, and artifactual lenses through which to view acts, not just behaviors. As a neo-behavioral theory, functional contextualism examines the interrelationship of acts and context but does not pro- vide analytical tools for describing context. I also believe that the unit-of-analysis in functional contextualism, acts-in-context, can also be explained by scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Finally, knowledge, according to functional contextualism, is experiential. Meaning is determined by the con- sequences of the experience. Case-based reasoning (Jonassen & Hernandez- Serrano, 2002) also provides very prescriptive methods for supporting learning and behavior. In order to be maximally effective to instructional design, functional contextualism should be viewed as another analytical lens through which to view human activitynot as a replacement for any other lenses. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, there is no best model of instruction or theory of learning. Foxs view that objectivism is antithetical to constructiv- ism is an impoverished view of constructivism. Designers who claim that con- structivist solutions should replace behaviorist methods (too often showing an ignorance of behaviorism) are lousy constructivists. The reality is that very little of the knowledge that learners construct can be predicted by any model of instruction or theory of learning. Polemicizing any discussion of theoretical assumptions or instructional methods dooms us to dualistic reasoning. I hope that, as a field, we are more epistemologically mature than that.
ISSUESW ITHFUNCTIONALCONTEXTUALISM

Functional contextualism does provide a useful, neo-behaviorist view of the world. However, I do have some concerns with it and any other theory.

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It Is Just Theory

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There are more than 100 theories that may be used to describe learning (Jonassen, 2003). Functional contextualism, as it happens, is one of 14 different theories of behaviorism (ODonahue & Kitchener, 1999). The behavioral sci- ences are suffused with theories, most of which presume that they offer unique perspectives on whatever phenomena they describe. The reality is that each theory, like the next, is just a theory. Academics ascribe too much truth-value to theories. Each is a conceptualization of how the world works according to its theorist, and each to some extent, accurately describes worldly phenomena. The many theories of learning all provide some insights into the learning pro- cess, yet each fails to comprehend the complexity of learning. The overvalu- ation of theories is our fault. Textbooks and faculty members teach students about theories but seldom require them to apply theories. So students are unable to critically analyze theories. Rather, they believe that because the the- ory is in the textbook, it must be true.
Theories Descriptive Are

Reigeluth (1983) distinguished between descriptive and prescriptive theories. I have always maintained that theories are necessarily descriptive. From them, we may construct prescriptive models or methods, but they are not theories. Without reprising that dialectic, I simply want to point out that functional con- textualism is a descriptive theory. Whereas the goal of functional contextual- ism is to predict and influence behavior and cultural practices with precision, scope, and depth (Biglan, 1995), any models of instruction that are inferred from it are not theories.
Small Bandwagon

Fox describes functional contextualism as if it were a major movement. In real- ity, only four scholars (Steven Hayes, Jennifer Gregg, Elizabeth Gifford, Anthony Biglan) from diverse fields including psychotherapy and communi- cations, have produced almost all of the literature on it, which consists of a half dozen papers and a self-published textbook. It is an interesting theory worthy of consideration, but it is not a major neo-behaviorist movement.
Wheres Knowledge? the

An important construct that functional contextualism does not account for is knowledge states. While the absence of knowledge states is internally consis- tent with functional contextualism and behaviorism, it would be very prob- lematic to implement, because of the importance of assessing knowledge states at all levels of formal education. While knowledge states may be mani-

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fest through behaviors (acts-in-context), as a cognitive psychologist, I have a hard time accepting that they dont exist, or that they can be adequately described as behaviors
Round Round and

Fox claims that functional contextualists believe that the truth criterion of any analysis is determined by its goal. If the analysis fulfills its goal, then it is true. While that is a functional and utilitarian criterion, it has the potential to become tautological.
Is That All There Is?

The emphasis in functional contextualism on the functions of behavior pro- vides a new perspective to behaviorism that appears to be an attempt to infer some agency to behaviors. Although functional relationships among behav- iors and other phenomena are important, meaningful learning requires so much more. Jonassen (under review) argues that humans know what they know in multiple ways. They construct declarative, structural, conceptual, procedural, situational, strategic, compiled, tacit, sociocultural, and experien- tial knowledge that represents ontological, epistemological, and phenomeno- logical states of knowledge. A functional analysis of behavior cannot accommodate the kinds of knowing that distinguish humans from other ani- mals. In my personal theory of learning, intentionality is both a root metaphor and truth criterion. Intentionality is problematic in all forms of behaviorism.
RECOMMENDATIONS

I completely agree with Fox that functional contextualism has obvious impli- cations for designing instruction. It is a neobehaviorist theory that Gifford and Hayes (1999) situated in the pragmatic camp of philosophy, associating it perhaps too closely with Deweyan pragmatism. However, in order to make a more cogent argument, I would encourage him to develop and empirically test methods for applying functional contextualism to instruction rather than ret- rofitting functional contextualism to historical models of instruction, such as the personalized system of instruction and direct instruction. Although these instructional models fulfill some assumptions of behaviorism, they were not developed as contextualist models. I would encourage him to articulate instructional models based on functional contextualism and to empirically test them. Empirical validation is an obligation of any form of behaviorism. How- ever, I do not believe that a functional contextualist model can provide the one true model of instructional design, but it may provide a useful one in certain

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contexts based on functional relationships between the predicted behaviors and context. Finally, I encourage Fox and other critical theorists to choose less politically charged language when making their cases. For those of us who enjoy wallow- ing in the bog of relativism, there can be no absolutist beliefs.
David Jonassen [Jonassen@missouri.edu] is Distinguished Professor in the Learning Technologies and Educational Psychology Department at the University of Missouri.

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REFERENCES
Biglan, A. (1995). Changing cultural practices: A contextualist framework for intervention research. Reno, NV: Context Press. Gifford, E. V., & Hayes, S. C. (1999). Functional contextualism: A pragmatic philosophy for behavioral science. In W. ODonahue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of behavior- ism. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Jonassen, D. H. (2000). Revisiting activity theory as a framework for designing student- centered learning environments. In D. H. Jonassen & S. M. Land (Eds.), Theoretical foundations of learning environments (pp. 89121). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Jonassen, D. H. (2003). The vain quest for a unified theory of learning. Educational Tech- nology, 43(4), 58. Jonassen, D. H. (2005). Accommodating ways of human knowing in the design of infor- mation and instruction. Manuscript submitted for publication. Jonassen, D. H., & Hernandez-Serrano, J. (2002). Case-based reasoning and instruc- tional design: Using stories to support problem solving. Educational Technology Research and Design 50(2), 6577. Merrill, M. D., Drake, L., Lacy, M. J., Pratt, J. A., & ID2 Research Group at Utah State University. (1996). Reclaiming instructional design. Educational Technology, 36(5), 57. et al. (????). AUTHOR: Need reference. Please provide. Thank you. ODonahue, W., & Kitchener, R. (1999). Handbook of behaviorism. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Reigeluth, C. M. (1983). Instructional design: What is it and why is it? In C. M. Reigeluth (Ed.), Instructional-design theories and models: An overview of their current status (pp. 336). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts, plans, and Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.