Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 8, No.

1, 1984

Determinants of Emotion Attributions: A Unifying View

Steven R. Truax 1

University of Illinois

Two cognitive approaches, introduced by Schachter and Singer (1962) and by Valins (1966), have dominated the experimental study o f emotion attributions, However, subsequent results using these approaches have not appeared to be very consistent, and this view is not consistent with more physiologically oriented theory. Research significant in the development of theory from these approaches was examined. Inconsistent findings using the Schachter and Singer paradigm were attributed to the difficulty o f producing completely ambiguous physiological cues. The existence o f active search in determining the cause o f arousal was established and found central to production of Valins's false feedback effect. Postulated mediation by selfpersuasion was found to provide the best fit to the existing data. The generality of these studies was described in terms of a more comprehensive theory based on the finding that the relative ambiguity o f situational and physiological cues seems to provide the fundamental control over the emotion attribution process. This synthesis eliminates the deficiencies in previous hypotheses by more completely encompassing potential cue combinations.

With the differing views of James (1884) and Cannon (1929) often serving as traditional extreme perspectives, debate and research have long focused on how the essential factors in emotion are assimilated to produce an emotional experience. Most researchers interested in the basis of emotional behavior affirm the importance of both psychological and physiological factors in the generation of an emotion. However, contemporary in~Address all correspondence to Steven R. Truax, Institute for Child Behavior and Development, 105 Children's Research Center, 51 Gcrty Drive, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820.
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0146-7239/84/0300-0033503.50/0 1984 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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vestigators continue to distribute widely their emphasis between these two basic classes of variables when describing how emotions are experienced. The current review, focusing on two m a j o r experimental paradigms, provides a systematic perspective for viewing the effects of situational and physiological cues on emotions. One theoretical perspective, initiated by Schachter and Singer (1962) and extended by Valins (1966) and others, asserts that the cognitive processing of psychological and physiological cues relies on situational cues for the definition of discrete emotional experiences. Schachter and Singer (1962) have been cited frequently as providing the theoretical basis of contemporary social psychological views on how emotions are experienced. They proposed three main hypotheses in order to explain how situational and physiological cues combine to produce discrete emotional experiences. 1. Givena state of physiologicalarousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will "label" this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. (p. 381) 2. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate appropriate explanation ... the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available. (p. 381) 3. Giventhe same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physicological arousal. (p. 382) Schachter and Singer noted the necessity for cues o f physiological arousal in emotional experiences (an almost definitional requirement). They stated further that arousal without an explanation initiates a search for a label for that arousal. More simply, the recognition o f an effect will result in a search for the cause. Finally, they suggested that when cause and effect are known and compatible, no further cause will be sought. Their statements do predict some o f the possible conditions that arise in emotion attributions. However, as Harris and Katkin (1975) have pointed out, they do not predict any circumstances where the character o f the physiological cues (except by presence or absence) contributes to the nature of the emotion experienced. This is a fundamental deficit since a role for physiological arousal in the qualitative definition of an experienced emotion is strongly supported by others (cf. Ax, 1953; Funkenstein, I956; J. Schachter, 1957; Gellhorn, 1968; Averill, 1969; Brady, 1970; Fehr & Stern, 1970; Mason, 1975). In addition, their hypotheses have not consistently predicted the findings of research even within their own experimental approach. In their well-known experiment, Schachter and Singer (1962) attempted to demonstrate the prominence of situational contributions to the

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"cognitions available" in defining emotion by producing unexplained arousal and simultaneously manipulating situational cues. -The experiment was presented to the subjects as an experiment to test the effect of a vitamin supplement on vision. The physiological arousal was an epinephrine injection given under the guise of a vitamin shot. Subjects were then escorted to another room along with a confederate of the experimenter who was presented as another subject. They were asked to fill out forms while waiting for the experiment to begin. Situational cues of anger were produced by dramatic reactions of the confederate to a questionnaire that asked increasingly personal and objectionable questions. In euphoric condition, situational cues were produced by increasingly playful and excited activity of the confederate. These situational cues were timed to coincide with the development of the effects of the mild dose of epinephrine. Control groups were informed of the real source of their arousal. Later ratings of self-appraised state showed less "happiness" during the anger manipulation than during the euphoria manipulation. After considerable added internal analyses, they interpreted their results as indicating that subjects experienced an unexplained arousal as euphoria in the presence of a euphoric confederate, or as anger in the presence of an angry stooge. Their experiment has been criticized repeatedly, both methodologically and interpretively (Lazarus, 1968; Leventhal, 1974; Maslach, 1979a; Plutchik & Ax, 1967), and these criticisms have not been persuasively countered. The empirical bases of these interpretations have recently been reexamined (Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979b), following a long period that yielded little additional experimentation using the original paradigm. A study by Erdmann and Janke (1976) has been the only replication reported until 1979 and provided the only data that seemed to show the effect. While more recent results (Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979b) are also somewhat controversial, they suggested strongly that a general, sympathetic-like arousal may be perceived as qualitatively negative, at least at some levels of arousal, and thus can contribute to the qualitative character of the emotion experienced. Marshall and Zimbardo replicated the euphoria conditions of the original experiment and Maslach used hypnosis to simulate the physiological sensations experienced during epinephrine arousal. Their findings showed that appropriate situational cues could cause such unexplained arousal to be experienced as negative but n o t as positive emotion. At the very least, these studies suggest that, regardless of the theoretical significance of Schachter and Singer's hypotheses, their phenomenon is not

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robust. More pointedly, they show the inadequacy of their early characterization of emotion attribution processes. Focusing on the initial premise stated by Schachter and Singer,Valins elaborated on their perspective. He suggested: Once it is granted that internal events can function as cues or stimuli then these events can now be considered as a source of cognitive information.., an internal event can be nonveridical; a particular reaction can fail to register or can be misperceived, and a nonexistent reaction can be represented cognitively. (pp. 400~401). Thus, Valins promoted physiological cues to the status of interpretable cues at the same time he relegated them to the functional status of cognitions and suggested that such cognitions could be completely independent of actual arousal. In essence, he proposed what may be termed a two-cognition theory o f emotional experience. All o f these propositions, taken collectively, suggest that a cognition of arousal and a cognition about the cause of that arousal are sufficient, regardless of actual circumstances, to define a specific emotional experience. The false feedback paradigm introduced by Valins (1966) may be the main reliable source of experimental evidence on aspects of emotion attribution. The paradigm has been employed by many researchers and the essential results have been replicated repeatedly. Unfortunately, the research results obtained using the false feedback paradigm also have appeared to be theoretically inconsistent. Detweiler and Zanna (1976) pointed out that even the mechanism by which the results are obtained has not been established. Therefore, it seems necessary to examine closely this body of evidence to determine the utility of this approach and to produce a more unified theoretical perspective.

ORIGINAL FALSE FEEDBACK P A R A D I G M

While several variants of the paradigm have been used with apparent success (e.g., Barefoot & Straub, 1971; Goldstein, Fink, & Mettee, 1972; White & Wilkins, 1973), the original form (Valins, 1966) still appears to be superior in detail and completeness. Therefore, the rationale and procedures will be described in some detail. To demonstrate the extreme case for "two-cognition" theory, Valins chose to provide completely nonveridical cues to the subject concerning the state o f his physiological arousal, along with a suitable situational stimulus to which the subject could plausibly attribute the arousal. Ten slides of at-

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tractive female nudes were presented to subjects. Half of the slides were associated with audible "beeps," which changed noticeably in rate (change feedback), and half were associated with relatively constant feedback (nochange feedback). The subjects were informed that the feedback was their actual heart rate made audible by an incidental aspect of the data-recording process. The assumption was that cues about internal events, when made available to the subject, would be a salient source of information, even when subjects were admonished to ignore them. Valins produced two changing heart rate conditions for independent groups of subjects: one in which feedback increased and one in which feedback decreased in apparent response to the onset of half of the slides. For each of the two heart rate feedback conditions there was an "extraneous sound" control condition. The direction of change matched each heart rate condition. Dependent measures were converging indices of subject preferences. At the end of two presentations of the slides associated with the change and no-change feedback, subjects were asked to rate the attractiveness of each slide. In addition, subjects were allowed to choose five prints of the slides (represented as payment for their time). Finally, subjects rated the same nudes 3 weeks later under the guise of another study. Conditions were compared using rating-difference scores, calculated by subtracting the mean of the ratings, of slides associated with changing feedback from the mean of the no-change slide ratings for each subject. There were no significant differences in ratings for increasing or decreasing extraneous sound control conditions. Comparisons were made between heart rate increasing, heart rate decreasing, and the pooled extraneous sound conditions. Difference scores for both heart rate conditions were significantly larger than the differences for the control conditions, with the heart rate decreasing condition significantly less effective than the heart rate increasing condition. Differences were observed between heart rate and extraneous sound conditions in the ratings of slides associated with both change and no-change feedback. Also, in the heart rate decreasing condition, most of the difference was due to lower no-change ratings. The mean for no-change ratings for the heart rate increasing condition was nearly as far below the control group meaning rating as the mean for change ratings was above it. The major factor in the smaller change versus no-change difference for decreasing heart rate feedback was the lack of lower no-change ratings. Frequency data on the number of subjects who rated change slides higher than no-change slides also supported the significant effects of feed-

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back in the heart rate conditions. The two opportunities to choose preferred photographs provided additional indications of preferences for slides associated with changing heart rate feedback. In each case, subjects were significantly more likely to select slides associated with changing heart rate feedback than no-change extraneous sound feedback, though decreasing feedback was still less effective than increasing feedback. Since the predicted effects were beasically achieved, Valins (1966) concluded: "The mechanism operating to produce these effects is presumably the same regardless of the veridicality of the feedback" (p. 407). He noted that while subjects were surprised at the nature of the feedback in the heart rate decreasing condition and the incongruity with their appraisal of the stimuli, they adjusted their expectancies to fit the nature of the feedback information. Subjects found differential stimulus characteristics to explain the differential arousal. Additionally, subjects occasionally suggested that they attributed the cause of their arousal to sources other than the slide when their appraisal of it did not match the arousal indicated by the feedback. Valins suggested that subjects appeared to pursue active selfpersuasion (that the slide was attractive) when slides were associated with change feedback. Finally, he concluded that it was unlikely that false feedback produced actual arousal and that, in fact, feedback seemed to operat e to distract subjects from any actual arousal.

Subsequent Research
Quite a number of studies have been conducted that examine the character and consequences of the false feedback paradigm. Several important questions under four general topics have been addressed by these studies. Interpretation of these studies will be summarized under each of these questions and categories. Some of these studies appear to provide conflicting results. However, a consistent perspective is possible and is presented in the discussion.

Existence and Character of Active Search

1. Do "evaluative needs" caused by the perception of the physiological arousal give rise to an active search of the stimulus for causal characteristics? Research clearly suggests the existence of active search for the stimulus characteristics responsible for the perceived state of arousal (Valins, 1966, 1967; Barefoot & Straub, 1971; Misovich & Charis, 1974; Kerber & Coles, 1978; Truax, 1983). Schachter and Singer's (1962) first hypothesis is supported.

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However, Kerber and Coles (1978) have presented two significant qualifications to the active search hypothesis. First, they showed that the degree of false feedback effect is increased markedly by the exclusion of a priori slide preferences in the rating process. That is, subjects have previous preferences concerning the attractiveness o f females that influence their final evaluation. This may be described as resistance to reappraisal, in terms of the effect on ratings. Since eliminating such preferences increases the ambiguity of the slides' emotional content, stimulus ambiguity must be seen as an important factor in the attribution process in this paradigm. Carver and Blaney (1977) have provided supporting evidence by showing that feedback was effective only when there was ambiguity in terms of the action to be taken. A second qualification comes from the research of Kerber and Coles (1978), in which they showed that feedback, in addition to directing an active search, has information value about affective reactions. The two factors taken together point to a substantive role of arousal cues in the attribution process, especially in the face of ambiguity of the situational cues. The diminished effectiveness of decreasing change feedback (Valins, 1966) can be seen in this light. 2. If an active stimulus search occurs, will restriction of search times eliminate the change versus no-change difference? It would be supportive of the active search hypothesis if differential ratings could be eliminated by curtailment of time for the search to take place. Barefoot and Straub (1971) found exactly that. Truax (1983) has shown that differences in ratings may result without differences in rating times for negative stimuli. If this is correct, it may be appropriate to construe the search process in a less literal way, as something that can take place internally as well as externally. It may also be true that if reliance on the nature o f the physiological cue for defining the emotion occurs, active search may become unnecessary. All that is required is that the causal nature o f the situational cue be assumed by the attributor. Negative stimuli may promote such an ass.umption to avoid additional exposure. Also, as will be discussed later, active search only occurs when physiological cues are somewhat inconsistent with situational cues. 3. If active search occurs, are no-change cues as informative and influential as change cues? Nisbett and Valins (1972) suggested that change and no-change cues have equivalent information value and, therefore, produce active search equally in emotionally significant circumstances. Several studies supported this hypothesis (Misovich & Charis, 1974; Thornton & Hagan, 1976; Truax, 1983). If there were a difference between the information values of feedback, it would be expected that there would also be differences in search times. No differences in latencies to rate change versus no-change ratings

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have been found by Misovich and Charis (1974) and Truax (1983). As noted by Thornton and Hagan (1976), increased change and decreased no-change ratings are frequently found when ratings are compared to those of control subjects.

Mediators of A ttributional Effects

4. Is the false feedback effect caused by self-persuasion or is it mediated by some other variable? At least four different potential mediators produced by the differential false feedback have been suggested: actual arousal, external attention, self-attention, and self-persuasion. Actual arousal was directly examined as a potential mediator by Goldstein et al. (1972), Kerber and Coles, (1978), Stern, Betta, and Herrick (1972), Thornton and Hagan (1976), and Truax (1983). It is evident that there can be real physiological differences between changing heart rate feedback and extraneous sound conditions (Stern et al., 1972), or between change and no-change feedback conditions (Goldstein et al., 1972; Hirschman, 1975; Kerber & Coles, 1978). However, these differences consistently failed to affect the attribution process. Barefoot and Straub (1971), Kerber and Coles (1978), Misovich and Charis (1974), Thornton and Hagan (1976), and Truax (1983) all demonstrated that there was no significant relation between actual physiological change and stimulus ratings in the typical design. Stern et al. (1972) found that the kind of physiological change produced by increasing heart rate feedback was very similar to conditions where attention was explicitly directed to sounds described as otherwise extraneous. Contrary to intent, this finding indicated that increasing heart rate feedback is a meaningful signal to which the subject attends but which does not produce a physiological arousal large enough to indicate an emotion. Moreover, many of the measurements used to index arousal are also the same measures that are often used to index attention (Porges, Ackles, & Truax, 1983), and therefore no simple distinction can be made between arousal related to emotion and that related to attention. Stern et al. (1972) hypothesized that greater external attention was directed by change feedback to slides as compared to no-change feedbackmediated rating differences. Differences in external attention are inconsistent with the frequent finding that active search can be equivalent for change and no-change stimulus conditions. Similarly, it is not consistent with the findings that feedback has effects on both change and no-change ratings (Misovich & Charis, 1974; Thornton & Hagan, 1976; Truax, 1983). In addition, review of the effects of false feedback on phobic behavior (e.g., Carver & Blaney, 1977; Valins & Ray, I967) suggests that differential feed-

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back is effective only in ambiguous decisional circumstances, a finding supported by Truax (1983). This should not occur if differential attention caused the differential ratings. The final proposed mediator, self-attention (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978), is not at all consistent with earlier research. Previous studies have indicated that the perception of any actual physiological changes appear masked or at least not noticed (Carver & Blaney, 1977; Thornton & Hagan, 1976). It has been shown reliably that arousal in response to false feedback is minimal (Stern et al., 1972), and that those physiological responses that do occur are not correlated with changes in ratings (Goldstein et al., 1972; Carver & Blaney, 1977; Thornton & Hagan, 1976; Truax, 1983). The criticisms of the external attention hypothesis also apply here. Therefore, self-attention does not appear to be a viable hypothesis. The original hypothesis of self-persuasion (Valins, 1966, 1974) seems to be the most consistent with the findings, especially those concerning the character of the active search process. The subject forms a hypothesis about the "emotionality" of the stimulus upon receiving arousal feedback (Valins, 1974). However, the self-persuasion hypothesis requires elaboration. Similar search times and equal alterations in ratings of change and nochange slides suggest that no-change as well as change feedback can prompt an active search. All slides are inspected for aspects of the stimulus that confirm the indications of physiological state. For no-change conditions, the subject attempts to persuade himself that the slide was not as attractive as o t h e r s - t h a t is, should not have produced arousal. Self-persuasion, however, appears to mediate the rating differences produced in the false feedback paradigm (also see below).

Individual Differences and A ttributional Effects

5. Do individual difference dimensions affect the emotion attribution process? It appears that at least for extreme groups, individual differences on emotionality dimensions have some impact on the processing of false feedback (Carver & Blaney, 1977; Hirschman, Clark, & Hawk, 1977; Vatins, 1967; White & Wilkins, 1973). However, since individual differences designs make isolation of causal agents difficult, it is unclear whether these differences are produced by emotionality factors or concomitant differences in other cognitive processes.

Generalization of A ttributional Effects

6. Will demonstrated effects occur when the paradigm parameters are varied?

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The robustness of the false feedback effect across methodological variations is supported easily. The effect has persisted with changes in the number of slides, type of stimuli, form of feedback, and whether or not subjects anticipated rating the stimuli, as well as many other variations. 7. Are the results and theory generalizable to emotional behavior outside the laboratory? T h e individual difference results tend to support, as White and Wilkins (1973) asserted, a similarity between processes elicited in the false feedback paradigm and emotion attribution in vivo, whether or not the specific dimensions measured were responsible for the differences observed. Perhaps the most critical question concerning the paradigm is its applicability to circumstances when strong emotions are elicited. If not applicable, any theory based on it cannot be generalized to naturally occurring emotions. Goldstein et al. (1972) concluded that the actual arousal elicited by strong emotional stimuli caused the degree of emotional experience reported, and that false feedback was irrelevant when substantial emotion was involved. Thornton and Hagan (1976) provided different results. Rating differences occurred in the absence of differences in actual heart rate change. Carver and Blaney (1977) found that with strong emotional arousal (in snake phobics), differential behavior (but not self-appraisals of own fear) was elicited by differential feedback. This study showed that false feedback can be effective in conditions eliciting strong arousal. An important qualification they demonstrated is that the effect of false physiological cues is restricted to that action that is ambiguous. Closeness of approach to the feared object (like slide ratings in the usual design), not level of fear, was ambiguous and was the response upon which the feedback had a significant impact. This study and that by Truax (1983) have provided clear indications that physiological cues may have impact on attributions only to the extent that the situation is ambiguous. It is the principal conclusion of this review that relative stimulus ambiguity may have primary significance is understanding the relation of these experimental paradigms to emotion attribution processes, and may determine the effect of physiological cues across all levels of actual or bogus arousal. The following discussion elaborates this perspective.

GENERAL

THEORY

It is possible to fit the false feedback paradigm, the Schachter and Singer paradigm, and the findings of subsequent studies using those paradigms into a more general theory. Prediction using the original theory and its extension does not encompass the existing body of evidence and has

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led to conflicting interpretation and controversy. This difficulty is primarily due to the lack o f the provision of a role for physiological cues in determining the quality and quantity of the emotion attributed. This deficit also limits the generality of the theory, since it is inconsistent with more physiologically based perspectives that suggest such a substantive role for physiological cues. If the core element in the process is the cognitive evaluation o f two sources of information in forming a conclusion regarding the emotion experienced, then the effect of one cue in the process is dependent on the relative ineffectiveness of the other. Based on an analysis of previous research, the following general hypothesis was developed: In a situation that has potential emotional significance, physiologicalcues become subjectively salient in determining the intensity and type of emotion attributed in direct proportion to the perceived degree of relative quantitative and/or qualitative cognitive ambiguity produced by situational cues. The phrase situational cues refers either to subjectively perceived stimulus elements in a particular situation, or to a present or produced thought or m e m o r y for which there is no immediate situational referent, or to a combination of the two, which have perceived, causal relevance to emotion. Physiological cues include any information that is cognitively interpreted as having reference to physiological state or change in state. Subjectively salient describes the perceived significance of cues for the definition of an emotional experience, and cognitive ambiguity implies a lack of quantitative a n d / o r qualitative distinctiveness of cues relative to other cues involved in the emotion attribution process. The terms intensity and type indicate the two descriptive dimensions upon which cues can vary in ambiguity. That is, intensity refers to quantitative differences and type to qualitative differences in the experience of an emotion. Each of these two dimensions can, in certain circumstances, vary independently in perceived ambiguity.

Sources o f Ambiguity Objective Cue Characteristics. The relative ambiguity of cues can be affected by a number of variables. Objective changes in the physical characteristics of the cues are basic sources. Changes can be either qualitative or quantitative, and changes in one dimension m a y affect another. For instance, simple changes in the intensity o f the physiological cue may also m a k e it more qualitatively distinct and salient in the attribution process. Parenthetically, if a cue intrudes sufficiently, it may cause the subject to become suspicious of the false feedback in a laboratory manipulation.

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Cause and Effect Relations. The situational cue is the cause of the emotion, and the physiological cues stemming from arousal are an effect. The order of cause and effect must be maintained, at least subjectively. One of the ways we identify the causes of our emotional responses is to examine antecedent events for occurrences that match the perceived significance of the arousal in quality, quantity, and temporal relations. The time delay between cue occurrences and the order of cue perception can change their impact and meaning. The cause and effect link can be weakened by coincidence that does not match previous experience. Schachter and Singer (1962) noted the importance of timing and sequence in describing their manipulation. Congruence of Cues. The situational cue must precede the physiological effect, and it must be plausible cause of that effect; the physiological cue must also be a plausible effect of the situational cause. The relationship must be considered from both directions. Congruence of cues completely crosscuts the dimension of cue ambiguity and can interact with ambiguity, either increasing or decreasing the ambiguity of cues. Subjective Interpretation and Previous Experience. Ultimately, how the meaning of a cue is subjectively perceived has the decisive impact on the attribution process. Many aspects of the context can influence the perceived meaning of the cues. This is especially true under experimental circumstances. Subjects' level of suspicion is automatically higher in experimental circumstances, and that context may contain many potential sources for interpretation. Meaning is typically perceived from experience in similar situations. Both objective and subjective changes in cues, or in the context in which the cues are presented, can influence their degree of relative ambiguity and change their role in the emotion attribution process by changing their perceived meaning. Cognitive Process. Since the attribution of an emotion appears to result from a more or less conscious decision-making process, the presence of cues of cause and effect need only be represented cognitively (Valins, 1966). However, aspects of the environment that may affect subjective interpretation may have important influences on the outcome. While the process may be a conscious one, unconscious influences should not be ruled out. Table I shows the basic implications of the general hypothesis. Each pair of conditions in Table I has obvious referents and specifies the possible states of relative cue ambiguity. This theoretical framework subsumes the conditions extant in both the false feedback and the Schachter and Singer paradigms. The table highlights the observation that these two paradigms represent two of the four general conditions that can occur in nature and, as discussed below, two rather special instances. Cell 1, with both ambiguous situational and physiological cues, represents the presence of no emotion, or of a very ill-defined emotion.

Determinanls of Emotion Table I. Combinations of Relative Cue Ambiguity in Emotion At-

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tribution Processes Situational cues High ambiguity Low ambiguity Psychological cues Emotion determined High ambiguity No emotion by situational cues (mood) (Schachter & Singer) Emotion determined Emotion determined Low ambiguity by physiological cues by situational cues (Valins)

Under certain conditions of physiological cue durability and intensity and of situational ambiguity, this cell might represent the necessary prerequisites of a " m o o d . " When both situational and physiological cues are unambiguous, as in Cell 4, a well-defined emotion is normally experienced. Even the presence of objectively intense cues may not qualify as a Cell 4 condition if incongruence or subjective perception creates ambiguity. In the presence of Cell 4 conditions, emotion attributions may rely primarily on situational cues even though both cues are unambiguous. In Cell 3 conditions, where only situational cues are prominent, perceived emotion may not differ substantially from Cell 4 conditions, so long as cues are congruent, despite the ambiguous nature of the physiological cues (other things being equal). Cell 3 matches conditions in the Schachter and Singer design (1962), where the social situation was relatively unambiguous while the physiological state was emotionally ambiguous (cf. Maranon, 1924). Attributions here may suffer some decrease in the intensity dimension due to the lack of an unambiguous physiological effect. Relative ambiguity of situational cues and unambiguously perceived physiological cues (Cell 2) constitute the typical conditions in the false feedback procedure. Situational stimuli are ambiguous, while false feedback cues are distinct.

ANALYSIS OF PARADIGMS

The False Feedback Paradigm

A situational cause and a physiological effect must be presented for the attribution of an emotion. These cues must not be clearly incongruent.

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For example, the significantly smaller effect of the heart rate decreasing feedback probably exemplifies the result when physiological cues are not consistently perceived as reasonably congruent with the situational cue. Even though it is more common in actuality for heart rate to decrease in such circumstances (Lacey, Kagan, Lacey, & Moss, 1963), decreasing heart rate feedback is not as plausible a consequences of viewing attractive stimuli as is increasing heart rate feedback for most subjects (Valins, 1966; Goldstein et al., 1972). A distinctive feature of the false feedback paradigm is that the context for interpreting both situational and physiological cues is made explicit. Several situational cues are presented; comparisons almost certainly take place. Arousal and nonarousaI cues are presented, setting clear contrasts between them. This produces immediate prior experience for judging. Subjects compare the intensity of the emotional impact of several stimuli rather than assessing the emotional effects of a single stimulus in a situational context. A single cause and effect circumstance is more "natural." Emotions that occur singly may be more difficult for people to assess when there is no immediate comparative base as there is in this paradigm. The comparative nature of the task is a crucial distinction because the appraisal of one stimulus can vary greatly depending upon the context of the other stimuli in which it is presented. This explicit comparative base can produce results that at first appear inconsistent, but can be explained by consideration of the effect of the context on subjects' interpretation of stimuli. For example, the lack of impact of false feedback effects in the experiment by Goldstein et al. (1972) and effectiveness of cues produced by Carver and Blaney (1977) and Valins and Ray (1967) may be due to immediate prior experience. Goldstein et al. paired feedback cues with "strong" situational cues (male nudes presented to "offend" the subjects). Valins and Ray as well as Carver and Blaney also paired feedback with strong situational cues (snakes), yet they produced opposite results. The major difference may have been that the false physiological feedback in the Goldstein et al. experiment had previously been paired with attractive female nudes. This prior experience may have established the meaning of the feedback as attraction and, therefore, would not be applicable to differences in "offendedness" from later presentation of male nude slides. The presentation of, and thus the interpretation of, each type of cue is sequential. The subject views a slide from which he derives an initial evaluation that is influenced by the experimental context of the other slides and previous feedback. Later, he receives false information that leads him to believe that the slide has or has not had a physical impact upon him, again relative to the cued impact of the stimuli. The effect then results from the

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unambiguous false feedback causing a reinterpretation of initial evaluations of situational cues through self-persuasion. The two sequential appraisals thus possible may be labeled "primary" and "secondary." Kerber and Coles (1978) have shown that increasing the ambiguity of the situational stimuli significantly increases the impact of the false feedback on the ratings. Evidence supporting the conclusion that decreasing relative ambiguity of situational stimuli estimates the false feedback effect was recently presented by Truax (1983). Several studies (Stern, et al., 1972; Valins, 1966, 1967; Truax, 1983) have shown that presenting more ambiguous false feedback (decreasing heart rate as compared to increasing heart rate) results in a reduction of the rating differences. The overtly ambiguous stimuli used by White and Wilkins (I 973) and Wilkins (1971) also directly supported this conclusion. Thornton and Hagan (1976) found that the false feedback effect was enhanced by the low discriminability of their situational cues. The ratings of attractive slide components (face, breasts, etc.; Valins, t967) suggested that false feedback depends for its effect upon situational ambiguity to foster successful self-persuasion. Subjects focused their differential ratings on the least intrinsic aspects of the models-hair style. The role of self-persuasion, and thus the false feedback effect, depends upon the degree of congruence of the sequenced cues. The order of situational and physiological cues is fixed, but the congruence of meaning regarding the target dimension may vary. The mean ratings result both from more congruous conditions, where the initial evaluation of the slide is confirmed by the arousal cue, and from less congruous conditions, where the two sources information do not agree. The cues are congruent when they indicate a similar kind and degree of arousal (e.g., a particularly attractive slide is paired with increasing heart rate feedback). They may also be incongruent. The most attractive slide of the set (from the subject's perspective) may be paired with a nonarousa! cue. If the two sources of information are very congruent, then the initial impression formed by the stimulus alone may completely determine the attribution. The physiological cue simple confirms and does not alter the initial opinion; there is no secondary reappraisal, no self-persuasion, and no effect of the false feedback. By design, potential differential effects of situational cues on mean ratings are eliminated from the results. Situational cues are randomized, counterbalanced, or homogenized. Nevertheless, in most of these designs, the rating process includes interpretations of cues that vary in the congruence of the emotional intensity they impart. Therefore, the final rating result is based on the interpretation of both congruent and incongruent pairs of cues. If the physiological cue is incongruent with the initial impression, then an active search and a revision of the assessment through self-persuasion may result. Considering that the differential level of arousal (change vs. n o -

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change feedback) in these experiments is always great (unambiguous), then the impetus for a revision is strong. Liebhart (1979) suggested that this lack of congruence is essential for feedback to have any impact. The present analysis, highlighting the secondary reappraisal in this process, draws a similar conclusion. The stronger the incongruity, the greater the selfpersuasion in reconciling cues. When the slides produce strong initial impressions of attraction oriack of attraction, self-persuasion may not be effective in producing a reevaluation consistent with the false feedback, and may thus diminish the effect of feedback. The false feedback effect is due solely to this self-persuasion process, which is likely to be effective only under those conditions where the false feedback cues are moderately incongruent with situational stimuli. A recent experiment employing two set of slides differing in their rated variability demonstrated this result (Truax, unpublished observations). Therefore, in conditions of cue congruity, the evaluation (and rating) would be derived from situational cues alone. When cues are more incongruous, the result must depend on the degree of importance (salience of the cues) the subject allots to each type of cue when reaching a final evaluation. The salience of cues is derived from the degree of relative ambiguity perceived by the subject. When the relative ambiguity is low then salience is high, but when the relative ambiguity is high salience is low. Thus, since change and no-change feedback are ordinarily distinctly different, the relative ambiguity of the situational stimuli controls the degree of effect of the physiological cues, as suggested by the present theory. In this paradigm, the impact of the presence or absence of perceived arousal on reappraisal of a situational stimulus is the dependent variable. In emotion attribution, the focus is how the stimulus affects the subject. In the false feedback paradigm, it is the emotional character of the situational stimulus itself that is evaluated. This difference (secondary vs. primary appraisal) between attribution in vivo and the false feedback procedure may or may not be important in generalizing findings using this paradigm. Results do appear to describe the secondary reappraisal process when incongruence produces ambiguity about situational causes.

The Schachter and Singer Paradigm

In the Schachter and Singer design, situational cues can be relatively unambiguous (behavioral displays of opposing types of emotion) while actual physiological arousal cues may be mild (cf. Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979) and, therefore, relatively ambiguous on dimensions of both intensity and type. When ambiguous physiological arousal cues accompany unambiguous situational cues, the present theory predicts that situational cues will determine the type of intensity of emotion experienced. Schachter and

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Singer (1962) interpreted their findings in a similar way, and Erdmann and Janke (1976) have provided somewhat supportive evidence. Maslach (1979b), however, has shown that symptoms of arousal produced by posthypnotic suggestion were not equally manipulable by positive and negative situational cues (euphoric attributions could not be induced). Marshall and Zimbardo (1979) could not reproduce the results in euphoric conditions in a partial replication of Schachter and Singer (1962). From the present perspective, and all these findings are consistent. Whether physiological cues are salient in the attribution of the type of emotion experienced depends, in part, on the magnitude of physiological cues produced by the manipulation. The Marshall and Zimbardo data showed that increases in the strength of the epinephrine arousal increased the negative quality of the arousal, decreasing its qualitative ambiguity. They suggested that there may be a threshold of epinephrine-induced arousal above which it becomes qualitatively negative. Therefore, a stronger physiological cue manipulation contributed more strongly to the attribution of type of emotion, and the incongruity between aversive physiological arousal and euphoric situational cues negated the positive contribution of the situational cues. In the presence of these conditions, subjects attempted to attain congruence between the experienced arousal and attributed cause. At some level of relative incongruence, subjects may ignore immediate causes that do not match the perceived character of the physiological consequences. Therefore, the predictions of Schachter and Singer (1962) cover those cases where physiological cues are quite ambiguous and situational cues are relatively strong. In other conditions, physiological cues "color" the attributions of emotion, defeating secondary reappraisal of the immediate situational cues and self-persuasion. This discussion provides the causes for the "extended search" suggested by Maslach (1979b).

Analysis o f the Emotion Attribution Process

The essential question in discovering the basis of the emotion attribution process, apart from specific instances, is how these two cue constellations are combined when a conclusion is formed about the emotion experienced. It cannot be a simple weighing of two sources of information, summing them to some outcome. The two classes of cues are not equivalent. The situational cue is not only antecedent, it is the cause. As the cause, it has an important role in forming the character of the emotion. The physiological cues, however, represent the effect on the individual. They are direct indications of the nature of the emotion experienced. Cognitive processes may include general rules of combination generated by prior experience with emotion and more generally with cause and effect, as has been discussed. Certainly, an important rule is that the

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present attribution should be consistent with prior experiences with similar situational stimuli. Normally, one does not suddenly love something that has been consistently hated. The gradient of generalization should apply. Another rule should be that of congruence. The emotion congruent with the nature of both cues and their cause and effect relations should be the emotion attributed. These rules have their effect within the general framework of the relative ambiguity of emotional cues. Shifts in relative ambiguity affect how these rules are applied. When the physiological cues are weak (qualitatively ambiguous but detected), reliance on the situational cue is increased. Incongruence of cues strains the acceptance of the appropriateness of the intended cognitive combination, stimulating first the secondary reapprisal of the situation and then consideration, through "extended search," of other potential causes. ("Perhaps, that's not why I feel this way. Maybe, it's something else. Probably, just indigestion.") To a large extent, then, emotion attribution is a rational process influenced, in part, by our belief about rationality. Irrationality enters into the process because emotions themselves are irrational, based on conditioned associations and perhaps instinctual factors. Our reactions to these emotions, largely in terms of our acceptance of them, may also add irrational distortions to our emotion attributions, as in efforts to maintain consistent self-perceptions in the face of inconsistent emotions. Self-persuasion is active in the emotion attribution process when incongruity between situational and physiological cues forces a secondary revision in the primary appraisal of the situational cues. The detection of a stimulus, perceived as emotional from previous experience, results in an active appraisal of it. The fact that the appraisal takes place is axiomatic in that all emotional stimuli are such because they have unusual significance to the individual. Since the perception of physiological cues of arousal follows temporally the appraisal of the situational stimulus, the situation may be reappraised in light of the additional somewhat incongruent information.
Misattribution

The theory that is derived from this experimental work is focused on the potential cognitive processes in misattribution. One cue is always ambiguous. The importance of this observation cannot be overstressed. The positive consequence is that theory can be directly applied to the understanding of how misattributions occur. In some respect, understanding misattributions may be of greater importance to human behavior than attributions in general. Misattributing the source of an arousal can be more disruptive because it may elicit inappropriate behavior toward the misattributed

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source. Prejudice, phobias, etc., likely fall into this category. These paradigms represent conditions that foster misattribution, but may not be at all applicable when both sets of cues are relatively unambiguous (i.e., intense emotions). They describe potential misattribution processes and fail to describe circumstances that occur when strong emotions are elicited. This conclusion suggests that self-persuasion does not occur in unambiguous circumstances.

Experience of Strong Emotions

The negative consequence is that theory generated from the study of conditions that foster misattributions may not be general enough to encompass the entire spectrum of emotions. Processes that predict the nature of our interpretation of ambiguous information may not fully describe the process by which we experience unambiguous, strong emotions. Cognitive theories imply that the experience of an emotion is always a cognitive phenomenon. This may not always be true. For example, the development of a strong conditioned emotional response may be experienced as fear long before conscious cognitive processes can be brought to bear. Very strong emotions may actually inhibit neocortical processes. When emotions are sufficiently extreme, cognitive processes are disrupted and emotional state can become confusing. The potential for accurate cue evaluation and attribution may occur only after the emotion has passed. Interestingly, such confusion may make cues resulting in strong emotions qualitatively ambiguous and bring to bear cognitive processing. Cognitive theories describe processes in which there is some potential for misattribution principally through self-persuasion. It is important to understand how we cope with our emotions on a cognitive level, but such theories appear to ignore a class of emotions. These are the strong emotions from congruent cues (as in Cell 4), which because of their prominent source and dramatic physiological response, may be known clearly-almost intuitively. They may never reach the stage where any uncertainty leads to a cognitive appraisal.

CONCLUSIONS No single hypothetical statement can completely describe what is in fact a complex and subtle interaction of cues and cognitive processes. However, it is important to emphasize that the present hypothesis reformulates emotions attribution theory to be more broadly consistent with empirical findings within experimental social psychology. Moreover, it permits

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integration of the research from different traditions that has indicated a significant role for physiological cues in the definition o f emotional experience. What then does the theoretical synthesis of research on these paradigms tell us about how we experience emotion outside the laboratory? First, intense emotions may result from the perception of highly salient stimuli, and may result in central and peripheral bodily changes resulting from our conditioned associations with those stimuli. The conscious description of these experiences may be limited to retrospective analysis, since cognitive capacities may even be imparied during strong emotions. Second, in less intense emotional circumstances, how we perceive situational cues largely determines what emotion is experienced-unless concomitant physiological stimuli are clearly incongruent in quantity or quality. Third, in the presence of cue incongruence and situational ambiguity, the attribution may become more like the perceived meaning of the physiological cues, through secondary reappraisal and selGpersuasion. Fourth, when the incongruence of situational and physiological cues is extreme, new causes beyond the immediate situation may be sought as sources for the experienced emotion that are more consistent with the meaning of the physiological cues. If an alternative situational cue is derived, a secondary reappraisal may ensue to reconcile the two types o f cues, and a new attribution may be produced. If no alternative situational cause is found, the arousal may be attributed to internal factors (e.g., indigestion) or nonspecific moods. While emotion attribution processes appear to be more or less conscious processes, high levels of self-awareness of these processes need not be required. Finally, the present discussion highlights that while extreme views, often represented by the positions o f James (1884) on the one hand and Cannon (1929) on the other, may be appealing, due to their simplicity or consistency with differing scientific perspectives, they are not sufficiently complex to explain the phenomena they attempt to subsume.

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