Attacks and Issues of Wireless Sensor Networks-Study

K.Indumathi#1, P.M.Shareefa jareena#2, C.Divya#3, N.Krishnan#4 #1,2 B.Tech(III),#3Assistant professor,#4Prof. & Head #1,2,3,4 Centre for Information Technology and Engineering Manonmaniam Sundaranar University,Tirunelveli
#1

mathi.indu92@gmail.com,#2shareefa14@gmail.com,#3cdivyame@gmail.com

ABSTRACT Wireless communication is the process of passing information in electromagnetic media via the free space environment, or other physical conduits. Wireless Sensor Networks are extremely vulnerable against any kind of attacks, due to several factors. Some of the factors such as resource-constrained nodes and lack of tamper-resistant packages. In this paper the security challenges in the wireless sensor network from the application layer, transport layer, network layer, data link layer and physical layer based on the system model was analyzed. These issues are divided into seven categories: cryptography, key management, attack detections and preventions, secure routing, secure location security, secure data fusion, and other security issues. Keywords: Sensor, Security, Attack, Vulnerabilities, Issues, Cryptography.

integrity of security, data and resource utilization were degrade by Sybil attack. Sybil attack can also cause attacks to other application such as routing mechanism, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation and misbehavior detection. The attack occurs in some sort of base stations or gateways could be prevented using efficient protocol. In Sybil attack, the peer to peer network is vulnerable. However, it is difficult to detect the Sybil node in a network.

I. Introduction Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is used to collect information from the environment. Even there are number of proposals had been reported on wireless sensor network security, since security remains critical and challenging task. Wireless sensor networks are used in various applications due to its great potential. In existing infrastructure based networks, wireless sensor networks can be used to work in any environment, especially in the areas where wired connections are not possible. II.ATTACKS 1. Sybil Attack The work of the sensors in wireless sensors network is to complete a tasks together by using distributed subtasks and reduancy of information. In that situation, using the identities of other legitimate node, a node can pretend to more than one node. This kind of attack in a node is called the Sybil attack. The attempts of distributed algorithm to achieve the

Figure 1: Sybil Attack

2. Black hole/Sinkhole Attack To attack all the traffic in the sensor node, a malicious node acts as a black hole. This kind of attack is called as black hole/sinkhole attack. The attacker listen to request for routes from the target node which contain high quality or shortest path to the base station then it response to it in a flooding based protocol. If a malicious device has the ability to insert itself between the two communicating node, then it can do anything to the packets passing between the communicating nodes. Even the nodes those are far away from the base station can be affected by this attack. The conceptual view of sinkhole/black hole attack is shown in the figure 2.

neighborhood. Each neighboring node receiving this replayed packet will consider itself to be in the range of Node B, and will mark this node as its parent. Hence, even if the victim nodes are multihop apart from B, attacker in this case convinces them that B is only a single hop away from them, thus creates a wormhole. III .VULNERABILITIES AND CONTROLS IN OSI MODEL A .Physical Layer Vulnerability will cause the loss of Power and Environmental Control in physical layer. Physical Theft and Physical Damage or Destruction of Data and Hardware will occur. It causes unauthorized changes to the functional environment (data connections, removable media, and adding/removing resources). Physical Data Links may be disconnected. Data Keystroke & Other Input Logging will be Undetectably Intercepted. Vulnerability can be controlled by using Locked perimeters and enclosures, Audio & Video Surveillance, PIN & password secured locks, Biometric authentication systems, Data Storage Cryptography and Electromagnetic Shielding. For controlling logging & detailed authorization Electronic lock mechanisms is used. B. Data Link Layer The vulnerability in link layer are MAC Address Spoofing (station claims the identity of another), VLAN circumvention (station may force direct communication with the other stations, by passing logical controls such as firewalls and subnets, and the errors in the spanning tree may be purposefully or accidently introduced to transmit packets in infinite loops by the data link layer environment. The layer two protocols may allow free connection to the networks by weak authentication or unauthorized entities and also encryption may allow a false sense of security in the wireless media situations. And switches may be forced to flood traffic to all VLAN ports instead of selectively forwarding to the appropriate ports and allowing interception of data by any device connected to a VLAN. The vulnerabilities in link layer are controlled by MAC Address Filtering in which the stations are identified by address and crossreferencing physical port or logical access and by avoiding the use of VLANs to enforce secure designs. The trust of the layers should be physically isolated from one another, by using policy engines such as firewalls. Wireless applications must be evaluated carefully for unauthorized access exposure.

Figure 2: Conceptual view of Blackhole Attack 3. Hello Flood Attack Hello Flood Attack uses HELLO packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in WSN. In a large area within a wireless sensor networks, an attacker with the progressing power and high radio transmission range sends HELLO packets to a number of sensor node which are dispersed in hello flood attack. The adversary who is their neighbor was persuaded by the sensors. As a consequence, the victim nodes try to go through the attacker while sending the information to the base station and act as they were know that it is their neighbor node and that node were ultimately spoofed by the attacker. 4. Wormhole Attack Wormhole attack is a critical attack in which the attacker records the packets (or bits) at one location in the network and tunnels those to another location. The tunneling or retransmitting of bits could be done selectively. Wormhole attack is a significant threat to wireless sensor networks, because; this sort of attack does not require compromising a sensor in the network rather, it could be performed even at the initial phase when the sensors start to discover the neighboring information. Figure 3 (a and b) shows a situation where a wormhole attack takes place.

(a) (b) Figure 3: Wormhole Attack When a node B (for example, the base station or any other sensor) broadcasts the routing request packet, the attacker receives this packet and replays it in its

Secure networks were applied in Built-in encryption, authentication, and MAC filtering. C. Network Layer The three vulnerabilities caused in this network layer are Route spoofing which is the propagation of false network topology, IP Address Spoofing which causes false source addressing on malicious packets and Identity & Resource ID Vulnerability which has Reliance on addressing to identify resources and peers can be brittle and vulnerable. The methods used to control vulnerability in network layer are Route policy controls which use strict anti-spoofing and route filters at network edges, Firewalls with strong filter & anti-spoof policy, ARP/Broadcast monitoring software and implementations that minimize the ability to abuse protocol features such as broadcast. D. Transport Layer The vulnerability in Transport layer causes Mishandling of undefined or poorly defined, or illegal conditions. Fingerprinting and other enumeration of host information is implemented by different transport protocol. Transmission mechanisms can be subject to attack based on crafted packets, the educated guessing of flow and transmission values, spoofing, allowing the disruption or seizure of control of communications. The vulnerabilities in transport layer can be controlled by limiting access to specific transmission protocols and sub protocol information such as TCP/UDP port number or ICMP type in strict firewall, State full inspection at firewall layer used for preventing out-of-state packets, like illegal flags, and other phony packet profiles from entering the perimeter. The stronger transmission and layer session identification mechanisms are used to prevent the attack and takeover of communications. E. Session Layer In session layer, we have some vulnerability in the situation of passing the session credentials such as the user ID and password in the clear, allowing intercept session identification, weak or non-existent authentication mechanisms, it may be subject to hijack and spoofing. Based on failed authentication attempts some information may be leaked. The bruteforce attacks on access credentials were allowed by unlimited failed sessions. To avoid vulnerability in session layer encrypted password was exchanged and stored. For credentials and authorization, accounts have specific expirations. We can protect session identification information via random/cryptographic means. Through timing mechanism we can limit the attempts of failed sessions.

F. Presentation Layer Presentation layer handles the unexpected input poorly, so it can lead to application crashes. In control contexts, it may allow remote manipulation or information leakage by unintentional or ill-advised use of externally supplied input. Cryptographic flaws may be exploited to circumvent privacy protection. There are some methods for controlling the vulnerability in presentation layer. The received input coming into the applications or library functions are carefully specified and checked. In this layer user input and program control functions were separated. These functions use the input to control the operation. Before passing the input into functions the input must be sanitized and sanity checked. To ensure current security versus know and emerging threats the cryptography solutions must be carefully and continuously reviewed. . F. Application Layer Vulnerability in application layer causes open design issues which allow free use of application resources by unintended parties and it also flaws bypass standard security controls by backdoors. In the inadequate security controls force the all-or-nothing approach results in either insufficient or excessive access. In this layer security control tends to be bypasses or poorly understood and implemented. Program logic flaws used to crash program or to cause undesired behavior. To define and enforce access to application resources, the application level access controls was used. To prevent complexity issues from the masking policy and implementing weakness standards, testing and review of application code and functionality, the controls must be detailed and flexible, and also must be straightforward. The application implementation and recommend improvements IDS systems to monitor application inquiries and activity are measured by using a baseline. The host-based firewall systems can regulate traffic by preventing unauthorized or covert use of the network. IV. ISSUES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK A.CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptography is the basic method of encryption used in security implementation. The encryption means the sending data or file in the user side is encrypted or changed into unreadable format by providing a password key and then the encrypted

file or data is send to the desired destination. On the receiver side, the received encrypted file or data will be converted to readable format by using the same method of providing the password key which is called as decryption. In which the same key is used for both encryption and decryption in symmetric key cryptography. Another type cryptography method which uses different keys for encryption and decryption is called as asymmetric or public key cryptography. Cryptography selection is the fundamental to providing security services in WSNs. B.OTHER SECURITY ISSUES Other security issues include security-energy assessment, data assurance, survivability, Security assessment, trust evaluation, end-to-end security, security and privacy support, node compromise distribution. Its very important to study these areas due to a sensor networks special character, such as battery limitation, high failure probability nodes, easier compromised nodes, unreliable transmission media, etc. V.CONCLUSION Security problems in wireless sensor network and corresponding solutions were discussed in this paper. Anyhow, there are still many open issues are available. On the one hand, WSNs are still under development, and many protocols were designed so far for WSNs which have not taken security into consideration. Hence, wireless security for WSNs is still a very fruitful research area to be explored. V. REFERENCES [1] Akyildiz, I.F., Su, W., Sankarasubramaniam, Y,and Cayirci, E.,Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey, Computer Networks, 38, 2002,pp. 393- 422 [2] Culler D.E and Hong.Wwireless sensor networks communication of the ACM Vol 147.6,June 2004,pp 30-33 [3] Dai, S, Jing, X, and Li, L, Research and analysis on routing protocols for wireless sensor networks, Proc. International Conference of Communications, Circuits and Systems, Volume 1, 27-30 May, 2005, pp. 407-411. [4] Pathan, A-S. K., Islam, H. K., Sayeed, S. A.,Ahmed, F. and Hong, C. S., A Framework for Providing E-Services to the Rural Areas using Wireless Ad Hoc and

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