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New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century Author(s): Barry Buzan Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs

(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 431-451 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621945 . Accessed: 20/01/2012 16:07
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of New patterns globalsecurity in thetwenty-frst century

BARRY BUZAN

has writes Buzan. He analyses The twenty-first postbegun, Barry century already and the of Cold War,post-East-West powerrelations traces consequences changed in ') relationships between greatpowersof theNorth(or 'centre forstates the the is he and the South (or 'periphery').The centre now more dominant, argues, sincedecolonization more subordinate it thanat any time to began.In periphery has and thatsense,Western capitalism triumphed bothcommunism Third over he are Worldideology. of Amongthepossibilities outlines thedevelopment a as civilizational 'cold war' between Northand Southin thecoming decades Islam to rankofopposition Western continued hegemony; is pushedto the front recedes thedistant into in militarization theSouth; and, as decolonization past, an as Societal assaulton post-colonial boundaries there, we saw in theGulfcrisis. he are on agendathat concerns, writes, likelyto assumea prominence thesecurity states the of European theyhave notheldsincebefore establishment themodern system. of This is a speculative article.It tries sketchthemain features thenew pattern to of of global security relationsthatis emergingafterthe great transformations it and the first I989-90 post-Cold War crisisin the Gulf. In particular, triesto of identifythe likely effects changes in what used to be called East-West relationson the security conditionsand agenda of what used to be called the Third World.' Because itsstarting-point thenatureand impact of changesin is the North, it does not pretendto offer comprehensive a pictureof the South.2 the fourkey Aftersetting out the analyticalframework, articlewill identify in relationships between the major powers in the North and suggest changes what theirconsequencesmightbe forthemajority states theSouth. It goes of in on to examine in more detail the impact of theseconsequenceson the security
2

I should like to thank Pierre Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup, H. 0. Nazareth, Barbara Allen Roberson and Ole Wxever for comments on an earlier draftof this article. In order to look ahead in a systematicfashionand to avoid being swamped by detail, some theoretical frameworkis necessary.The study is based on a combination of a broadly structural realistapproach and a centre-periphery model of the internationalsystem.However, it does not demand prior knowledge of these frameworks.See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The logicof anarchy:neorealism structural to realism(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, forthcomingin I992); Johan Galtung, 'A structuraltheory of imperialism',Journalof Peace Research8:2 (I97I), pp. 8i-i i8.
43I-45I

International Affairs 3 (I99I) 67,

Barry Buzan agenda of the South in termsof five sectorsof security-political, military, economic, societal and environmental. Into the twenty-firstcentury One immediateproblem is thatso many of the termsin which a discussionof thiskind would normallybe cast have become obsolete. It is a commonplace to observe thatthe term'Third World' has lost nearlyall its content.3 the In absence of a Second World now that the communist system has largely how can therebe a Third? What now unitescountries diverse as disintegrated, as South Korea, India, Malawi and Bahrain thattheyshould be referred as to a distinct 'world'? Geographicallabels are not much more helpful.What does 'West' mean when it includes or Japanand Australia, 'North' when it includes Albania,Romania and theSoviet Union, or 'South' when it includesKorea and termthanThird World, thebest excludesAustralia?AlthoughSouth is a better available set of termsto capturethe relationships the I99OS comes fromthe of centre-periphery approach elaborated in the dependency literatureof the 'Centre' here impliesa globally dominantcore of capitalist I960s and I970s.4 and politicallyweaker economies; 'periphery'a set of industrially, financially statesoperatingwithina set of relationships largelyconstructed the centre. by The more robustand developed statesin the periphery forma semi-periphery, whose aspirationis membershipof the core. This approach capturesthe key elements of hierarchy that now shape international relations, without recourseto misleadinggeographicalimages. necessitating and openness The ending of the Cold War has createda remarkable fluidity and qualityof international relations. in the whole pattern Althoughthe events of I989 were centredin Europe, theyrepresent changesof such magnitudethat it is appropriateto talk of the end of an era for the international systemas a whole. Specifically, I989 markedthe end of the postwarperiod. It seemslikely will also come to markit as theend of thetwentieth The thathistorians century. two world wars, the Cold War that followed them and the process of decolonization that accompanied all three already begin to look like a selfcontained historicalperiod. In this sense, we are already in the twenty-first thatthenew century will be like the There are quite strongindications century. nineteenthin having, at least among the great powers, neither a major ideological divide nor a dominating power rivalry. My question is, what security consequencesthispatternof relationships among the major powers in the centrewill have for the statesin the periphery. The security lens used here is a broad one. Securityis takento be about the and societiesto maintain of and theabilityof states pursuit freedomfromthreat their independent identityand their functionalintegrityagainst forces of is change which theysee as hostile.The bottom line of security survival,but it
3
4

balanceof power', International Affairs 66:4 (I990), p. 745. 'The North-South JohnRavenhill, in International Organization See specialissueon 'Dependenceand dependency theglobalsystem',
32:I

(I978).

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New patterns global security of also reasonablyincludesa substantial range of concernsabout the conditionsof existence.Quite where thisrangeof concernsceases to merittheurgencyof the ' security' label (which identifiesthreatsas significantenough to warrant emergencyaction and exceptional measures,including the use of force) and becomes partof theeverydayuncertainties lifeis one of thedifficulties the of of concept. concernsthe two-levelinterplay thearmed offensive of and Militarysecurity of and states'perceptions each other'sintentions. defensive capabilities states, of Political securityconcerns the organizational stabilityof states, systemsof and the ideologies thatgive themlegitimacy.Economic security government, concerns access to the resources,finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal securityconcerns the abilityof societiesto reproducetheirtraditional patterns language, culture, of association,and religiousand national identityand custom within acceptable concernsthe maintenance of conditionsforevolution. Environmental security the local and the planetarybiosphereas the essentialsupportsystemon which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security but in problematique,and a way of orderingpriorities, all are woven together a strongweb of linkages.5 was dominated by the highly During the Cold War, international security militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontationbetween the divided theindustrialized North into theFirst superpowers.This confrontation World (the West) and the Second World (the Soviet bloc). Because their concerns the rivalrywas intense, dangerof war was real,and political/military dominated the securityagenda. This political/military emphasis was transmittedinto the periphery the use of arms transfers both superpowersas by by a means of exploitingalready existinghostilities withinthe Third World as a vehicleforpursuingtheirown rivalry.In the opening yearsof the twenty-first thereare alreadystrongsignsthatthe security century agenda among the great powers will be much less dominated, perhaps not dominated at all, by and issues.The Second World has disintegrated, as thearmed political/military confrontation between theUnited Statesand theSoviet Union is wound down, issuesare pushingtheirway into the top economic, societaland environmental ranksof the international security agenda. is One major questionforthe statesin the periphery how theirown security agenda will be affected the new patternsof relationsamong the major by powers. Will they share the shift away from political/military priorities towardsa more non-military security agenda, or will echoes of theterm'Third World' continueto demarcatea major divide, anotherworldin which things are ordered(and disordered)in ways quite different fromthoseof theadvanced countries ? industrial
' For a fulldiscussion thesethemes, BarryBuzan,People, and international see states fear:an agendafor of I99I); Warera(HemelHempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, see also Ken security studies the in post-Cold and security (London: Harper-Collins, I99I). Booth,ed, New thinking strategy international about

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Barry Buzan There are of coursesome massivecontinuities theinternational in positionof theex-ThirdWorld (now periphery) thatare largelyunaffected the changes by in the top ranksof the greatpowers. The centre-periphery approach captures much of what remainsconstant fromthepast and is a usefulframework within which to consider the impact of changes in the core on the securityof the The identity 'Third World' signified oppositionalstanceto the periphery. an West and generatedthe distinctive ideologies of Non-Alignment and tiersmondisme. But in the centre-periphery perspective,the aspirations of the periphery more collaborationist are than confrontational. is betterto be the It lowest member of the centrethan the highestof the periphery. Changes in the centre In order to understandthe securityconsequences of being in the periphery decade of the twenty-first during the first one first needs some sense century, of thechangesat thecentre.At thisearlystagein thenew era one can withsome for confidencesuggestfour definingfeatures the new patternof great-power relations. 1. The riseof a multipolar in powerstructure place oftheCold War's bipolar one The term 'superpower' has dominatedthe language of power politicsfor so for many decades thatone is leftfloundering wofds to describethe new power that structure is emerging.The precipitate economic and politicaldeclineof the Soviet Union has clearly removed it from this category, despite its still formidablemilitary strength. The decline of the United Stateshas been much less severe,arguablyleaving it as the last superpower.But the rise of Europe, the particularly consolidationof theEuropean Communityas an economic and politicalentity, largelyremoves(and in thecase of theSoviet Union inverts) the spheres of influencethat were one of the key elements in the claim to It superpowerstatus.6 seemstimeto revivetheterm'great power '. Ifone thinks how this term was used before I945, Russia still qualifies. So do China and India, which mightbe seen as the contemporary equivalentsof regional great or powers such as Italy, Austria-Hungary the Ottoman Empire before I9I4. Despite theirpolitical oddities,Japan and the EC are strongcandidates,albeit stillmore obviously in the economic thanin the military and politicalspheres. The United Statesis undoubtedlythe greatestof the great powers. The term in superpower, however,seemsno longer appropriate a multipolarworld with so many independentcentresof power and so few spheresof influence. If one moves away from the strictrealist (and neo-realist)conception of economic and politicalstrength power as aggregatedcapabilities(i.e. military, all together),7 and towards the disaggregatedview of power taken by those
6

See BarryBuzan,MortenKelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, ElzbietaTromerand Ole Wever, TheEuropean order security recast: scenariosfor post-Cold the Warera(London:Pinter, I990). N. Kenneth Waltz, Theory international of politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, I979), pp. I29-3I.

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New patterns global security of who thinkmore in termsof interdependence,8 thenglobal multipolarity stands out even more clearly. The militaryinhibitionsof Japan and the political loosenessof Europe count forless in relationto theirstandingas major poles of strength stability theglobal politicaleconomy. Althoughnot all six great and in powers are withinthe global core, multipolarity suggestsa centrethatis both less rigid and less sharply divided within itself than under bipolarity. A multipolarcentrewill be more complex and more fluid,and may well allow for the developmentof militarily hesitant greatpowers. If military threats are low, such powers can afford-as Japannow does and as the United Statesdid beforeI94I-to resttheirmilitary on security theirabilityto mobilize massive civil economies. A multi-centredcore offersmore competing points of contact for the At fromtwo superpowersto several great periphery. the same time, the shift powers should mean both a reduction in the intensityof global political concernsand a reductionin the resourcesavailable for sustainedintervention. This in turnpointsto the riseof regionalpolitics.Because the greatpowers are spread across several regions and do not include a dominatingideological or into the power rivalrywithintheirranks,theywill project theirown conflicts peripherymuch less forcefully and systematically than under the zero-sum regimeof the Cold War. Because regionsare less constrained the impact of by theirconflicts the global scorecardof two rival superpowers, on local rivalries and antagonisms will probablyhave more autonomy.Local greatpowers such as India, China and perhaps Brazil should also find their regional influence increased. A muchlowerdegree ideological and rivalry division of

2.

looseness of the new centreis a much reduced Complementingthe structural level of ideological conflict.The twentiethcenturymight well go down in as history the era of wars between the greatpowers about industrial ideology. and ideological wars unleashedideological rivalries During thisshortcentury, rivalries unleashed wars-both 'hot' and 'cold'. The firstround of war, in starting I9I4, gave birthto fascistand communiststate challengersto the liberalcapitalist West. Aftersome uncertainty alignment,the second round of saw the Western and communist powers combining in I94I to eliminate fascism a seriousideological player.The thirdround (of cold war) saw a long as of period in which the military paralysis nucleardeterrence theemphasison put competitionin arms racing, technologicalinnovation,economic growth and societal attractiveness. This competition ended peacefullyin I989 with the comprehensive collapse of the communistchallengein the face of a decisively superiorWesternperformance. The defeatof fascism and communismas alternative ideologies foradvanced industrial thatit is hard to imagineeitherof them societyhas been so definitive
8

Buzan, Jones and Little, The logic anarchy, of section one.

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Barry Buzan revivingtheirchallenge.Liberal capitalism, with all itswell-knownfaults, now commands a broad consensus as the most effective and desirable form of formula of political pluralismplus political economy available. The difficult marketeconomics has many critics,but no serious rivals. This development means thatthe centreis less ideologicallydivided withinitselfthanit has been since the firstspread of industrialization. conjunction with the shiftto In multipolarity,this further reduces political and military incentives for competitiveintervention into the periphery.

3. The global dominance a security of community amongtheleading capitalist powers As thealliancestructures the Cold War dissolveinto irrelevance- the Soviet of than the Western-a looming void seems to be appearingat ones much faster theheartof theinternational security system. The decliningsalienceof military threats among the great powers makes it unlikelythat thisvoid will be filled by new alliances, especially if the European union is viewed as a single international actor (even thoughit is stillwell shortof being a singlesovereign structure thenew era requiresthe viewer to of state).Indeed, the main military lensesforit to come clearlyinto focus,forit is inversein form put on different to traditional alliance structures. The dominantfeature thepost-Cold War era is a security of community among the major centresof capitalist power. This means a group of statesthatdo not expect, or prepare for, the use of militaryforce in theirrelationswith each other.9This is a different in some ways more profoundquality than the and collectiveexpectationand preparation use forceagainstsomeone else thatis to the essence of alliance relationships.During the Cold War this security community grew up within,and in itslatter daysit was maskedby, or disguised as, the Westernalliance system. The capitalist powers had good reasonto form an alliance against the communiststates.But equally importantis that they dominantreasonsforeliminatingthe developed independentand increasingly use of military forcein theirrelationswith each other.The factthattheywere able to expunge military fromtheirown relations was a major factorin rivalry their ability to see off the communist challenge without a 'hot' war. The communistpowers were conspicuouslyunsuccessful establishing similar a in security communitywithintheirown bloc. The existence thiscapitalist of security community-in effect, Europe, North America, Japan and Australia, standing back to back-gives the Western powers an immenseadvantagein theglobal politicaleconomy. Because theydo not have to competewitheach othermilitarily, theycan meet otherchallengers more easily,whethersinglyor collectively.The relativeease with which the a United Stateswas able to construct military(and financial)coalition to take
9 Karl Deutsch and S. A. Burrell, Politicalcommunity theNorthAtlantic and area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, I957).

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New patterns global security of on Iraq shows both the potentialof such a security structure how it might and work to meet otherperiphery challengesto the stability the global political of economy. The example of the Second Gulf War suggestsa model of concentric circles to complementand modifythe raw centre-periphery idea. In the centrecircle stood theUnited States,which was willingto lead only iffollowed and to fight only if given wide support and assistance.In the second circle were others prepared to fight-some members of the centre (principally Britain and France), and othersof the periphery(principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In thethirdcirclewere thosepreparedto pay but not to fight, primarily Japanand Germany.In the fourth circlewere those preparedto supportbut not to fight or pay. This group was large, and containedthose preparedto vote and speak in favour of the action, some of whom (such as Denmark) also sentsymbolic forces.It also includedthe Soviet Union and China as well as a mixture military of centreand periphery states.The fifth circlecontainedthosestatessatisfied to be neutral, neither nor opposing theventure, preparedto accept supporting but UN Security Council resolutions.Within these five circles stood the great and all themajor powers. In thesixth majorityof theinternational community, circle were those prepared to oppose, mainly verbally and by voting. This containedCuba, Jordan,Yemen, and a numberof Arab states. In the seventh circle stood those preparedto resist-Iraq. This model does not offer hard image of the future.It is not a permanent a coalition, nor is it likely to recur. But it does suggest the general nature of relationsin a centre-dominated security world, the mechanismsavailable, and the ability of the centre to isolate aggressorswho threatenthe recognized political order and the workingsof the global economy. The capitalistsecuritycommunitythatunderpinnedthis coalition acts as a major moderator to the new multipolar power structure.One danger of multipolarity least in its pre-I945, pre-nuclearmanifestations) was that a (at balance of power, driven by a plethora of antagonismsand security shifting of dilemmas,would generateunstablepatterns alliance and periodiclapsesinto in wars. But a multipolar great-power system which the threestrongest powers is are also a strongsecurity community somethingquite new, and should defuse or perhapseven eliminatemost of theseold hazards.In the inelegant jargon of of systemstheory,one could describe the new structure power relationsas multipolarin the sense thatseveralindependentgreatpowers are in play, but unipolarized in the sense that thereis a single dominant coalition governing internationalrelations. It is the single coalition that gives force to the model and makes the new situationunique. centre-periphery 4. The strengtheninginternational of society This last defining featureof the new centreis the least certainof the four,but it is a plausible product of the other three. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson definedinternational societyas:
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Barry Buzan a a groupof states moregenerally, groupof independent (or, political communities) form system, thesense in that behaviour eachis a necessary the of whichnotmerely a in but and factor thecalculations theothers, alsohaveestablished dialogue consent of by of and their commonrulesand institutions theconduct their for relations, recognize in commoninterest maintaining these arrangements.10 The distinction between systemand societyis central.Systemis the more basic and prior idea, as it is inherentin the significant interactionamong states. As Societycan be seen as a historical responseto theexistenceof a system. states recognizethepermanenceand importanceof theirinterdependence, theybegin and for facilitating desired to work out rules for avoiding unwanted conflicts exchanges.As Bull argues,international societyis thusclosely associatedwith of theidea of international order,where ordermeans'an arrangement social life such thatit promotescertaingoals or values.91 The foundation moderninternational of societyis themutualrecognition by statesof each other'sclaim to sovereignty. This establishes themas legal equals and provides the foundation for diplomatic relations. The top end of and contemporaryinternationalsociety is the whole range of institutions regimeswith which groups of statescoordinatetheirbehaviour in pursuitof common goals. Some of these institutions and regimes are already nearly universal-the United Nations, the Law of the Sea regime,the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Others, such as the European Community, have been more restricted. But the EC, though only regionalin scope, has now become so deeply institutionalized that many are beginningto see it more as a single actor than as a systemof states. During the Cold War the Western states established particularly a richinternational societalnetworkof institutions and thatthey the regimesto facilitate relatively open economic and societalrelations wished to cultivate.These included the IMF, theWorld Bank, the OECD, the GATT and theGroup of Seven. As a rule,thedevelopmentofglobalinstitutions and regimeswas obstructed the Cold War, almostthe only exceptionbeing by superpowercooperationin the promotion of nuclearnon-proliferation. With theendingof the Cold War and of thesystemic dominanceof theWest, it does not seem unreasonable to expect the extension of the Western networks towards more universalstanding.Old Marxian argumentsthat the capitalists were keptunitedonly by theircommon fearof communismseem to have been overriddenby the global scale and deep interdependence earlytwenty-firstof of to century capitalism.The eagerness theex-Soviet-type systems join theclub is a strongpointertowardsconsolidationof Westernregimes,as is thedramatic upgradingof theUN SecurityCouncil as a focusforglobal consensus-building and legitimation seen in the Gulf crisis.If thisoccurs,a stronger international Western norms and values, will be a powerful society, largely reflecting elementin the security environment the periphery. of
1

HedleyBull and Adam Watson,eds., Theexpansion international (Oxford:OxfordUniversity of society Press,I984), p. I; see also Buzan,People, states ch. andfear, 4. " HedleyBull, Theanarchical society (London: Macmillan, I977), ch. i.

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New patterns global security of These four developmentsat the centrewill reshape the way in which the centredominatesthe periphery.In general,they seem likely to diminishthe standingand the influence the periphery of states. Implications for the periphery These massive changes in securityrelationswithin the centrewill have both directand indirect effects security on withintheperiphery. There will of course be many continuities, especially in the locally rooted dynamics of regional of security, whose patterns amity,enmityand rivalrydo not depend on input fromthe centre.12 But as suggestedabove, many aspectsof relationsbetween centreand periphery will change. It is usefulto look at thesechangesin terms of the five sectorsof security sketchedabove. 1. Politicalsecurity Perhaps the most obvious political impact of the end of the Cold War is the demiseof bothpower bipolarity and ideological rivalry central as of features the centre'spenetration into the periphery.One immediateconsequence of thisis as to lower thevalue of periphery countries eitherideological spoilsor strategic assetsin great-powerrivalry.During the Cold War, Third World alignments were important symbols of success and failure in the global competition between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. This factgave Third World a governments usefullever on the divided centre,thoughit also exposed them in to unwanted intervention theirown domesticinstabilities. the unfolding In order of the twenty-first centurythere will be little or no ideological or incentivefor great powers to compete for Third World allegiance. strategic This loss of leverage will be accompanied by the loss of Non-alignmentas a for usefulpoliticalplatform theperiphery. Non-alignmentwas a reactionto the Cold War and provided many Third World eliteswith a moral and political positionfromwhich to play in the game of world politics.But with theending of the Cold War, thereis no longera divided centreto be Non-aligned against. stateshave found the legitimacyof theirone-party Further, many periphery undermined the collapse of communism.So long as the communist systems by statessustainedtheirchallengeto theWest, theyopened up a politicalspace for The existenceof a Soviet superpower authoritarian Third World governments. formof government statecontrola legitimate made centralized elsewhere,and for provided a handy complementarity thoseThird World stateseager to take up anti-Western, post-colonial postures.With the conceding by the leading thispolitical space communistpower of the virtuesof pluralismand markets, and has narrowedsharply. Anti-Westernism now has no great-power supporter no convincingalternative politicalmodel. It remainsan open questionwhether in will fareany betterthanauthoritarianism theunstableand in many pluralism
12

See Buzan,People, statesandfear, ch. 5.

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Barry Buzan of ways unpromising politicalenvironment many Third World states.Theory does not tellus much about the relativevirtuesof democraticversuscommand approaches to the early stages of state-building. Experience stronglysuggests is that state-building a tricky,difficult, long-termand oftenviolent business so underany circumstances-especially forpoorly placed and poorly endowed latecomers underpressure conformto normsthathave alreadybeen reached to naturallyby more powerfulstatesin the international system. comes from states A further blow to thepoliticalpositionof manyperiphery the fact that the twentiethcenturywas also the main era of decolonization. Decolonization was a high point in the epic and on-going struggleof the rest of of the world to come to termswith the intrusion superiorWesternpower. A more difficult period is now in prospect in which the euphoria of has independencehas faded and the realityof continuedinferiority reasserted itself. As the twenty-first century unfolds, with the West in a dominant the states post-decolonization era. For position,it will become fortheperiphery in most Afro-Asiancountriesdecolonizationnow lies one or two generations the past and is therefore beyond the personalexperienceof a large and rapidly growingproportionof thepopulation.As decolonizationrecedesinto a former the distanceof many periphery era, becoming old ratherthan recenthistory, is governments increasedfromthe event thatnot only definedtheircountries but also provided them with a convenient,and sometimes justified, excuse for in the many failings theirpoliticaland economic performance. decolonizaAs in tion becomes remote,many governments theperiphery will findthemselves increasingly labouring under the weight of their often dismal performance record, without the support of the colonial rationalizations that might once findit increasingly to evade or parrythe have forgivenit. They will difficult and risingcontemptof both foreigners theirown citizens.Only thosefew that such as Taiwan and South Korea, can have made it into the semi-periphery, escape thisfate. in statesmay also findit Particularly Africaand the Middle East, periphery difficult sustain legitimacy thecolonial boundariesthathave so signally to the of failed to define viable states. The Cold War ran in parallel with the development of a strongnorm cultivatedin the UN that global boundaries should remain very largelyfixed in theirpostwar,post-colonialpattern.This norm has even been reinforced the Organization of AfricanUnity, a body by whose membershipcomprisesstateswhose colonial boundariesare among the in most arbitrary the international system.As James Mayall has noted, this and 'at least so faras the attemptto freezethe politicalmap is unprecedented, territorial divisionof theworld is concerned,seemsunlikelyto be successful '.13 Although thereis no clear link between the Cold War and the attemptto fix boundaries,the ending of the Cold War is opening up boundary questionsin a rather have been unified-eliminatinga state, major way. The two Germanies
13

James Mayall, Nationalismand international society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I990), p. Herbst, 'Liberalization and the African state system', paper for SSRC conferenceon 56; and Jeffrey foreignpolicy consequences of liberalization,San Diego, CA, Mar. I99I.

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New patterns global security of reasserting nationalistpolitical principle, and dissolving the most potent a existwithinthe Soviet boundaryof the Cold War. Strongrevisionist pressures Union and EasternEurope (and especially,but not only, Yugoslavia) eitherto theirsignificance. redrawboundariesor to redefine The consolidationof theEC can also be read as an exercise in changing the significance, though not the position,of boundaries. These changesat the centrehave littledirectconsequence forthe periphery, but their symbolic consequences may be large. It is notable that Saddam Hussein's attemptto eliminateKuwait and more broadly to unifythe Arab world was an explicitassaulton thepost-colonialboundaries.Arab nationalism and Islamic communalismmake a heady anti-Western politicalbrew thatcould wash away territorial boundaries stronglyassociated with the divisions and humiliations of colonization. If the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshapedin the Firstand Second Worlds, it will become harderto resistthe in pressures tryto findmore sensibleand congenial territorial to arrangements the ex-Third World. It is not yet clear whether it is the norm of fixed locations.But it boundariesthatis under assaultor only the practicein specific is clear that this norm is vulnerable to the counter-normof national selfand on determination, thatsome of the restraints boundary change have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War. A further possible impact of changes in the centreon the political security agenda of the peripheryis the pushing of Islam to the frontrank of the opposition to Westernhegemony. The collapse of communismas the leading and many anti-Western ideology seemsto propelIslam into thisrole by default, exponents of Islam will embrace the task with relish. The anti-Western credentialsof Islam are well establishedand speak to a large and mobilized In clashbetweensecular politicalconstituency. partthiscan be seen as a straight and spiritual values, albeit underpinned by an older religious antagonism between Christendomand Islam."4In part,however,it has to be seen as a kind of civilizational resistance the hegemonyof the West. Islam is centredin the to only one of the four classical areas of power and civilization that has not itself a significant as world actorsincethe retreat the of managed to re-establish Westernempires.Both Chinese and Hindu civilizations have consolidatedlarge and quite powerful stateswhich give them at least an acceptable position in international society.The Middle East-which is the oldest core of civilization and which has been a major centre of international power for five millennia-remains divided, fractious and weak. this combined legacy of historical frustrationand ideological Given of sentiment antagonism,Islam could become the leading carrier anti-Western in the periphery-though it could just as easily be kept impotent by the of fierceness its own numerousinternalsplitsand rivalries. But since the West now dominatesthe centre,while Islam has a large constituency Africaand in define a major political riftbetween Asia, this old divide may nevertheless North and South in the coming decades. If it does, one resultwill be a security
14 See Edward Mortimer, 'Christianity and Islam', International Affairs 67:I
(I99I),

pp.

7-I3.

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Barry Buzan problem for Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia, for both share a huge territorial boundary with Islam, and in the case of the Soviet Union this boundary is inside the country.The security issuesraised may or may not be militaryones, but they will certainlybe societal-an aspect to be explored further below.
2.

Military security

Developments in the centrecan easily be read as pointing to a lowering of in A militarization theperiphery. lessideologicallydividedand more multipolar centre will have less reason to compete politically to supply arms to the The ending of the Cold War reducesthe strategic salienceof many periphery. bases in the periphery, and lowers incentivesto use arms supply as a military The outcomes of way of currying ideological favourwith local governments. domesticand even regionalpoliticalrivalries withintheperiphery should,other to things being equal, be of lessinterest the greatpowers thanpreviously.In the the absence of ideological disputesamong themselves, greatpowers will have statesas assets,and more reasonsto see them as fewerreasonsto see periphery liabilities.The ending of the Cold War thus largely turns off the political mechanismthatso effectively pumped armsinto the Third World all through the I960s, I970S and I98os. In places where great-power interventionin regionalconflicts veryheavy (as in south-east was Asia) or wheretheideological constructionof the Cold War stronglyunderpinneda local conflict(as in Southern Africa) the ending of the Cold War points to an easing of local confrontations a significant and military mediatoryrole for the greatpowers. But thisprospectraisesan importantquestion about whetherthe West will to use its new pre-eminence neglectthe Third World, or whetherit will seek to subjectit to stronger collectivesecurity and regional managementregimes. At the time of writing, thisquestionis an open one. The longer-term outcome of the Gulf crisiswill powerfullyaffect which directionis taken. If the allied is intervention eventuallyseen to be a successat a reasonablecost,and does not give riseto long-termchaos in the region,a precedentwill have been set fora more managerialand interventionist global collectivesecurity regime. Under such conditionsthe sanctityof existingboundaries would be reinforced, and peripheryleadershipsput on notice that while broad tolerance for internal nastinesswould continue,efforts change international to boundariesby force would be firmly The United Nations SecurityCouncil would become resisted. a clearinghouse and legitimator a global collectivesecurity for regime. But ifthe outcome is messy,costly,and judged a failure, thenthe West may well take a more isolationist view of the periphery, and puttingup the shutters local rivalries leavingit more or lessto itsown devices.Under theseconditions, and power balances would come into play withouteven the restraint imposed of by the global interventionism the Cold War. The local roots of many regionalrivalries, especiallyin South Asia and the Middle East, are so deep that the ending of the Cold War in the centrewill make littledifference them. to
442

New patterns globalsecurity of A loweringof great-powerconcernand engagementwould by definition give more leverage to local powers to reshape the political environmentof their regions. This scenarioof neglect cannot be pushed too far.Among otherthings,an in abiding interest oil will keep the West engaged in the Middle East. There must also be a concern that too detached an attitudetowards the periphery might eventually,perhaps even quickly, generatemilitarythreatsfrom these countriesto the centre.Both these interests were at play in the response to Saddam Hussein. Whether the centre attemptscomprehensiveor selective in intervention the periphery, two specificmilitarysecurity issuesarise either of way-control of the arms trade, and the strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The nuclearnon-proliferation regimehas attracted verywide supportdespite itsinherent inequalityas a small club of nuclearhaves and a large one of havenots. Inasmuch as one of the key tensionswithin it was the failureof the superpowersto make much progresstowardstheirown nucleardisarmament, the ending of the Cold War and the consequentmassivereductions strategic in forcesshould point to a strengthening the regime. The successor failureof of thisregime will have a big impact both on security withinthe periphery and on militaryrelationsbetween centre and periphery.Iraq's obvious nuclear ambitionsunderlinethe salienceof the issue,but at thisjuncturethe fateof the non-proliferation regime is unclear. Several thingsfavoura consolidationof the regimeas the Non-Proliferation Treatyapproachesits I995 renewalconference. UN organizations are generally emergingfromthe Cold War twilightinto sunniertimes.The winding down of the nucleararmsrace at the centrereduces,thoughby no means eliminates, the tensionbetween haves and have-nots.In Latin America,the once worriedabout nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina is evolving steadily towards a regional inspectionregime along the lines of Euratom. In South Africa, once a key threshold it state, seemshighlyunlikely thatthewhiteregime either needs thereassurance nuclearweapons any longer,or wantsto takethe of riskof having to hand controlof them over to a black-led government.Civil nuclear power remainsin the doldrums,which much reducesan independent pressure thespreadof militarily for civil technology.Even in France, significant which has been the most vigorous promoter of civil nuclear power, technological and economic problems are mounting alarmingly.15 If the economic complementarity betweencivil and military nuclearpower collapses, sectorunsupported a civil one, the costsof maintaining leaving the military by nuclear power will rise. large-scalemilitary But there are other developmentsthat put even the existingregime into jeopardy. In South Asia, both India and Pakistan are on the brink of going public as nuclear powers, and almost no one doubts that Israel is already a nuclear-weaponsstate. The fictionof a closed club of five nuclear-weapons statesthus cannot be maintained,but neitheris it obvious how the change to
15

TheEconomist, 2 Feb.

I99I,

pp. 73-4.

443

Buzan Barry eight can be incorporatedinto the regime without seeming to reward nonto complianceand open thefloodgates otherclaims.Even more seriousin some ways is the problem of what to do about violatorswithinthe regime. Libya's leader makes calls for an Arab nuclear weapon which Saddam Hussein was It doing his best to fulfil. is hard to imagine thatIran would not 'eat grass as ', Pakistan did, in order to match the nuclear capability of its main regional enemy should Saddam Hussein be able to re-embarkon his previous course. While Iraq is temporarily down, Algeria has become a focus of speculationas the source for an Arab bomb."6 Meanwhile North Korea soldiers on with suspiciousnuclear activitieswhile continuingto evade its legal obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. These challengesfromwithin raiseseriousquestionsabout thelong-term viability theregimein theabsence of of some firmermechanisms for enforcement, either through the Security in Council or unilaterally the styleof both the Israeliand Anglo-Americanair attackson Iraqi nuclear facilities. On top of theseparticular problems sitsa more general one arisingfroma and nuclear-weaponsstatesover moves disputebetween non-nuclear-weapons towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. At the I990 Review Conference a serious split developed on this issue, with Mexico leading demands for a strong,fixed-term commitmentby the nuclear-weaponsstates to a comprehensive test-bantreaty, and the United Statesand Britainarguing the need for continuedundergroundtesting.This disputewas seriousenough to wreck what would otherwisehave been a productive and positive final document.If pushedtoo far,it could have seriousconsequencesfortherenewal of the NPT in 1995. Greatercontrolof the conventionalarms trade between the centreand the is periphery anotherdevelopmentthatmightbe expected fromthe end of the Cold War, but the likelihood is thattwo powerfulmechanismswill continue to supporta substantial flow of military The first capabilityinto the periphery. is the armstrade,drivenby an ever-increasing numberof suppliers, most eager and some desperateto sell theirproducts.In the fiercecommercialcompetition of the post-Cold War world, arms exports will remain one of the very few industrial areas of comparativeadvantage for the Soviet Union and China, as well as some smallerstatessuch as Czechoslovakia. The implications thiscan of already be seen in China's willingnessduring the I980s to sell almost any military technology(includingnuclear-capableballisticmissiles)to almost any buyer.This logic also appliesin lesserdegree to Britain,Franceand the United States. These three struggle to compete with Japan and Germany in civil but have an easier time in the militarymarket, where old manufactures, wartimehangoversgreatlyrestrict All Japaneseand German participation. five armsproducersface shrinking domesticdemand as a resultof the end of major the Cold War, and so need exports to sustain their militaryindustries.In countries addition,severalindustrializing includingBrazil, India, South Korea, Israeland South Africaincreasingly have the means and the will to compete in
16

Sunday Times, Apr. I99I. 28

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New patterns globalsecurity of combined with strongdemand the arms trade. Competition among suppliers, control of pull and the sheerdiversity sourcesof supply,make any systematic of the arms trade unlikely. The second mechanismarisesfromthe unbreakablelinkbetween industrialization and the ability to make weapons. Industrializationis spreading inexorablyacross the planet,and all but the most extremeGreenswelcome it as an essentialingredientin the development of human civilization.But the armsindustry not separatefromthe civil economy: thinkof how the United is Statestransformed itself frombeing a largelycivileconomy to being thearsenal of democracyin just a few yearsduringthe I940s. In the I99Os, many of the technologiesfor making weapons are now old. The knowledge and skillsfor ago, makingpoison gas and machineguns were developed more thana century As and even nucleartechnologydates back nearlyhalfa century. technologies industrialized countries such age, theybecome easierto acquire even forlightly as Iraq. technologyis especiallyobvious in The overlap between civil and military but the case of the nuclearand chemicalindustries, also applies to engineering, vehicles, aircraftand shipbuilding. In all these industries,there is fierce plant. Any country competitionto export both productsand manufacturing has it everything needs possessinga fullcivil nuclear power industry virtually chemicals to make a nuclearbomb. Any countrythatcan make basic industrial can also make poison gas. Any that can make fertilizercan make high explosives. Whoever can make trucks, bulldozers or airliners can make armoured cars, tanks and bombers. The concern over Iraq, Libya, Israel, Pakistan,South Africa,Brazil and other stateshas as much to do with their industrializaon as with theirdirectimportsof arms, and thereis no way of capabilityinto the periphery.Any stopping the spread of industrial-military into directopposition attemptto do so would put the goal of arms restraint with that of economic development. means that The combined effectof the arms trade and industrialization militarycapabilitywill spread by one mechanismor the other. Attemptsto as at efforts military block the arms trade will intensify industrialization, they did in South Africa,so adding to the numberof armssuppliers.The industrial genie, with its militaryprogeny, is permanentlyout of the bottle. As a consequence,military security will remainan elusive objective posing difficult policy choices. The ending of the Cold War should resultin some diminution of the flow of armsforpoliticalmotives,but thereis no reasonto thinkthatit in will eliminatethe problem of militarization the periphery. Any regimewith access to cash will stillhave access to suppliesof modern weapons. security 3. Economic If economic securityis about access to the resources,finance and markets necessaryto sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power, then the massivepoliticalchanges of the past few yearsmay well make littledifference 445

Barry Buzan to the economic securityproblems of the periphery.The idea of economic is security riddled with contradictions and paradoxes."7These are indicatedin the cruel truthcapturedby the aphorism,'The only thingworse than being exploited is not being exploited'. To the extentthatit has any clear meaning in relationto peripherycountries,economic securitypoints to the persistent structural disadvantagesof late developmentand a positionin the lower ranks of wealthand industrialization. consequencesof such weaknessrangefrom The inabilityto sustain the basic human needs of the population (as in Sudan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Liberia), through the disruption of fluctuatingand uncertainearnings from exports of primaryproducts (as in Zambia, Peru, in Nigeria), to inabilityto resistthe policy pressuresof outside institutions return needed suppliesof capital (as in Brazil, Argentina, for Tanzania). There seems no reason to expect any fundamental change in the overall problem of in the periphery occupying a weak position in a global marketwhose prices, trade,financeand technicalevolution are all controlledfromthe centre. The periphery, otherwords, will remainthe periphery. in Some argue that itspositionwill continueto deteriorate because of decliningcommodityprices, greater divergence of interestamong the developing countries,successful strategies the centreto divide and rule, the acute vulnerability the debt by of crisis,and the loss of comparative advantage from cheap labour to smart automationtechnologyin the advanced industrial countries.18 The politicallooseningand diffusion power withinthe centremay evolve of into a seriesof regionaleconomic spherescentredon Europe,Japanand North America. But it is not clear thatbeing transferred froma global periphery into a regionalone would make much difference eitherto the structural positionor to the economic security most periphery of countries.It mightalso be argued thateconomic aid will dwindle as the Cold War political motivesthatfuelled it subsideand as Westerncapital turnsto the redevelopmentof the ex-Sovietattitudesalready point towards a futurein which the type systems.Western allocation of aid and investmentis conditional more on the rectitude of economic policy than on fading notions of strategicvalue. Against this, however, standtwo new motivesforaid. One is environmental and the other societal.The periphery will increasingly able to call on theself-interest the be of centrein relationto the meetingof global environmental standards. They will also be able to threatenthe centrewith unwanted migrationunless welfare standardsare maintained and development prospectskept alive. Both these levers are discussedin more detail below, and togetherthey may well suffice to maintainor even increasethe flow of economic aid. It is not impossibleto imagine thatin some partsof the periphery, notably those where both importedstate structures and economic developmenthave failedtotally,theremay evolve a kind of de factoinstitutional recolonization, thoughsome more diplomatictermwill need to be foundto describeit. There are many potentialcandidatesforthisin Africa,and some in South and South17

18

Buzan, People, statesandfear, ch. 6. Ravenhill, 'The North-South balance of power', pp. 73I-48.

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New patterns global security of East Asia, Central America and the Caribbean. Given the waning of postdecolonizationsensitivities about independence, harshrealities economic the of and political failureand the strengthening global institutions a Westernof dominated international society,a subtle returnto 'managed' statusfor the most hopeless peripherystatesmay well occur. There are hintsof thisin the international schemes for Cambodia and in the influenceof IMF and World Bank 'advisers' in many places. Bangladesh,forexample, depends on the IMF and foreign aid for all its development budget and some of its current Even iftheywere successful, such efforts could at bestbringthe consumption.19 worst peripherystatesup to the point at which they could compete in the international economy. 4. Societalsecurity Societal securityis likely to become a much more prominentissue between and withinboth, than it has been duringthe Cold War centreand periphery, is and vulnerabilities era. Societal security about the threats thataffect patterns of communal identityand culture. The two issues most prominently its on agenda at the beginning of the twenty-first century in centre-periphery relationsare migration20 and the clash of rival civilizationalidentities. communal identity and cultureby directly Migration threatens alteringthe ethnic,culturalreligious and linguisticcomposition of the population. Most societieshave resultedfromearlierhuman migrations and already represent a mixture. Many welcome, up to a point, the cultural diversitythat further migrationbrings.But beyond some point, migrationbecomes a question of numbers.Too great a foreigninfluxwill threatenthe abilityof the existing societyto reproduce itselfin the old way, which can easily create a political constituency immigrationcontrol. Uncontrolled immigrationeventually for swamps the existing culture. This is one way of looking at the European fromthesixteenth onwardsinto North and South America, migrations century New Zealand and South Africa.It is what Estoniansand Kazaks fear Australia, about Russians,Palestiniansfear about Jews (and vice versa), Baluchs about Punjabis, Assamese about Bengalis, and so on. For the past fivecenturies has been mostlymigrating it Europeans thathave posed threats(and not just societal ones) to otherpeoples. A residuumof this remainsin the culturalimpact of mass tourism.2" But at the beginningof the incentives risingformore permanent mass population are twenty-first century movementsin the other direction,from peripheryto centre.The advanced industrial cultures Europe and North Americahave low birthratesand high, of often rising standardsof living. Immediately to their south lie dozens of peripherycountrieswith high birthrates and low, oftenfallingstandardsof
2 19 The Economist, 20

Mar. I99I, p. 58. Affairs Jonas Widgren, 'International migration and regional stability', International 66:4 (I990), 749-66; Francois Heisbourg, 'Population movements in post-Cold War Europe', Survival 33:I
(I99I), pp. 3I-43.

pp.

21

For a graphic and penetratingaccount of this phenomenon see Pico Iyer, Video nightin Kathmandu... East (London: Black Swan, I989). fromthe not-so-far and other reports

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Barry Buzan living. Substantial immigrant communities fromthe South alreadyexistin the North. Transportation not a significant is barrier. The economic incentives for large numbersof young people to move in search of work are high, and the markets the centrehave a demand forcheap labour. As the Vietnameseboat of risk people demonstrated, even a substantial of deathor an unpleasant reception are weak deterrents determinedeconomic migrants.High incentivesto to migrateare sustained the fadingof hopes thatpoliticalindependencewould by bring development and prosperity.In a few places these hopes have been but most face a bleak futurein which they seem likely to fall ever fulfilled, further behind the still rapidly evolving political economies of the capitalist centre.Some even facefalling behindthedismalstandards theirown present. of An acute migration problem between societies can hardly avoid raising barriersand tensions between them. In defending itselfagainst unwanted human influx, country not only to construct a has legal and physicalbarriers to but fromthe societywhose members entry, also to emphasizeitsdifferentiation it seeks to exclude. Questions of statusand race are impossibleto avoid. The treatmentof migrantsas a kind of criminal class creates easy ground for antagonismbetween the societieson both sides. The migrationproblem does not exist in isolation.It occurs alongside,and identities betweentheWest and mingledin with,theclashof rivalcivilizational the societiesof the periphery.Here the threattravelsmostly in the opposite the direction,reflecting older order of Western dominance. It is much more from the centre to the peripherythan the other way around, though the existenceof immigrant communitieswithinthe centredoes mean thatthereis some real threatfrom peripheryto centre,and a perceived threatof 'fifth column' terrorism. The clash between civilizational identities is most conspicuousbetween the West and Islam. As noted above, thisis partlyto do with secular versus religious values, partly to do with the historicalrivalry between Christendom and Islam,partlyto do withjealousy of Westernpower, over Western domination of the post-colonial partlyto do with resentments of and politicalstructuring theMiddle East,and partlyto do with thebitterness humiliation of the invidious comparison between the accomplishmentsof Islamic and Westerncivilizationduring the last two centuries. The last point is true as between the West and all periphery societies.22 By its conspicuouseconomic and technologicalsuccess,the West makes all others look bad (i.e. underdeveloped, or backward or poor, or disorganized or or and so erodestheirstatus and legitimacy. repressive, uncivilizedor primitive) The tremendous wealth,inventiveness organizational and energy, dynamismof the West, not to mentionits crassmaterialism and hollow consumerculture, cannothelp but penetrate worldwide. As it does so, deeplyinto weakersocieties it both insertsalien styles,concepts, ideas and aspirations-'Coca-Colaization'-and corrupts bringsinto questionthe validityand legitimacy local or of customs and identities.In the case of Islam, this threatis compounded by
22

Theodore von Laue, The worldrevolution Westernization: twentieth of the century global perspective in (New York: Oxford University Press, I987).

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New patterns global security of geographicaladjacency and historical antagonismand also the overtlypolitical role thatIslam playsin the lives of itsfollowers.Rivalrywith theWest is made more potent by the fact that Islam is still itselfa vigorous and expanding collectiveidentity. In combination,migrationthreatsand the clash of culturesmake it rather easy to draw a scenariofora kind of societal cold war between the centreand at least part of the periphery, and specifically between the West and Islam, in which Europe would be in thefront line. There is no certainty thatthisscenario will unfold,and much will depend on the performance (and supportgiven of to) moderategovernments withinthe Islamic world, but most of the elements necessary it are alreadyin place. Whateverthe finaloutcome of the Second for Gulf War, it will certainly leave behind it a vast reservoir heated and easily of mobilized anti-Westernfeeling among the Arab and Islamic masses. The resulting tensioncannotavoid feedinginto themigration issue.It will, inter alia, increasefriction between theexistingIslamicimmigrant communities and their host societiesand help to legitimizea tougher attitudetowards immigration controls,which might otherwisebe morallytroublingin liberal societies. This civilizationalCold War could feed into the massive restructuring of relations going on within the centre consequent upon the ending of the East-West Cold War. It could well help European political integration, by providinga common foreignpolicy issue on which a strongconsensuswould be easy to find. To the extent that it was seen as a securityissue, it would confront European Communitywith a challengewhich both fellwithinits the mandateand which it could handle withoutmuch help fromthe United States. If therewas a generalheatingup of the boundarybetween 'Christendom' and the Europeanizing tendencieswithin the Soviet Islam, it would strengthen Union and weaken thosefavouringa more isolationist, Slavophile,position.A societalCold War with Islam would serveto strengthen European identity the all round at a crucial time for the process of European union. For all these in reasons and others,theremay well be a substantial constituency the West prepared not only to support a societal Cold War with Islam, but to adopt policies thatencourage it. Such a developmentwould put Turkey into an extremelycentralposition. Turkey is anyway the naturalinsulatorbetween Europe and the Middle East, not only geographically but also culturally (non-Arab) and ideologically Its (Islamic,but with a strongsecularstatetradition). positionon the front line of a Europe-Islam Cold War would not be withouthazards,but it would fit the country'srecenttraditions and give it a greatlystrengthened hand to play in negotiatingits relationship with the European Community. A similarkind of bufferrole is available for Mexico, though between North and Latin Americatheissueis more purelya migrationone, and much lessa civilizational Cold War, than is the case between Europe and the Middle East. I have drawn particularattentionto societal securityproblems between centreand periphery, itis important note thatsuchissueswill also be very but to much on security Both the agendas withinthe centreand withinthe periphery. 449

Barry Buzan European integrationproject and the breaking down of the Iron Curtain between Eastern and Western Europe will unleash considerable migration insidethe continent. Withintheperiphery, thereare alreadymassmigrations in theMiddle East and South Asia in searchof work and away fromconflict (both illustrated Iraq). In Bangladesh, the Horn of Africa,and South-EastAsia, by mass movementsare easilystimulated famine,war and politicalrepression. by is The clash of civilizationalidentities just as strongon the otherside of Islam, where it abuts Hindu civilization,as between Islam and the West. 5. Environmental security Much of the environmental agenda falls outside the realm of securityand is more appropriately seen as an economic questionabout how thepollutioncosts of industrialactivityare to be counted, controlled and paid for.23Where to environmental issuesthreaten overwhelmthe conditionsof human existence on a large scale, as in the case of countriesvulnerableto extensiveinundation from modest rises in sea level, then casting such issues in securityterms is of appropriate.The recentfloodingof Bangladesh gives a small foretaste what could well be quite literallya risingtide of disaster.There may also be some advantage in treatingas international securityissues activitiesthat may cause substantial changesin the workingsof the planetaryatmosphere.These might includethemassproductionof greenhousegasesor chemicalssuchas CFCs that erode the protectiveozone layer, or exploitativeor polluting activitiesthat threatento diminishthe supply of oxygen to the atmosphereby killing off forests and plankton. It seems safeto predictthatthiswhole agenda is going to risein importance It as the density human occupation of the planetincreases. is much harderto of will become. assesshow quicklythiswill happen and how intensethe pressures If serious climatic changes begin to occur soon, this could easily become a transcendent issue. Quite a few peripherycountriesare vulnerableto virtual obliterationby sustaineddrought and desertification by risingsea levels. or that Their abilityto cope with such changesis small,and the mass migrations would be triggered would quicklyfeedinto the societalissuesdiscussedabove. Even lessdrasticchangesthatdid not threaten obliteration mightput such stress on weak statestructures to cause politicalbreakdown,adding to thepressures as on boundary maintenance. Barring such dramatic developments, environmentalissues look set to become a regular featureof centre-periphery dialogues and tensions. The holistic quality of the planetaryenvironmentwill provide the centre with in in reasonsforwantingto intervene theperiphery thename of environmental and The periphery will gain some politicalleverageout of thisinterest, security. centreforhaving createdthe problem will continueto blame theindustrialized in the first place. This exchange may well staywithinthe politicalframework
23

On the risksin the idea of environmentalsecurity,see Daniel Deudney, 'The case against linking environmentaldegradation and national security', MillenniumI9:3 (I990), pp. 46i1-76.

450

of New patterns global security But it could also become of below the threshold security. of interdependence, entangled with the broader debate about development in such a way as to of As seriousconflicts interest. othershave pointed out, environmental trigger controlover water supplies,look likelyto generatequite a issues,particularly withinthe periphery.24 bit of local conflict
*

agenda of the periphery It is apparentfromthisbriefsurveythat the security fromthe one different countriesin the I99OS and beyond will be significantly of a polarized centreby one we have been used to since I945. The replacement to seemsalmostcertain weaken community security dominatedby thecapitalist in thepositionof theperiphery relationto the centre.In thissense,theWest has triumphedover both communismand tiers-mondisme. impact on the periphery. The changes in the centrewill have a substantial relations-in both directionsnot only centre-periphery They will redefine Some aspectsof thesecurity agenda will withintheperiphery. but also relations albeit with some new twists.This is most obviously likelyin remainfamiliar, in theeconomic sector,thoughtherewill also be many continuities themilitary increasein importance,but whether one. Environmentalissues will certainly agenda is more questionable.The theywill become a major partof the security biggest changes are most likely to come in the political and societal sectors. Extensive shiftsboth in prevailing political norms and in the nature of seem entirelyplausible. It does not seem too political interests international politicalrelations, much to say thatalmostthe entirerange of centre-periphery from boundaries and bases to aid and alignment,is open for redefinition. Societal concernsalso seem destinedto riseto a positionof prominenceon the of securityagenda that they have not held since beforethe establishment the modern European statesystem. The change in terminologyfrom 'Third World' to 'periphery' may look view. like a promotionfromthirdrankto second, but thisis only a superficial The deeper realityis thatthe centreis now more dominant,and the periphery more subordinate, than at any time since decolonizationbegan.
24

i6 Ravenhill, 'The North-South balance of power', p. 748; The Economist, Dec. I989, p. 70.

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