3/16/2012 10:16:00 PM

Government of the United States vs. Purganan

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government sent to the Philippine Government a note requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. After several motions, the petition for extradition was eventually set for hearing. The petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest." Before the RTC could act on the petition for extradition, respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing.In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The RTC directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Petitioner now assails the procedure adopted by the trial court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez. Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for bail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings.

HELD: In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis in a class by itself they are not. An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (including the right to bail). To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite.

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The extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

Note: Right to bail cannot also be invoked in civil proceedings.

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr.

FACTS:

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Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court for several crimes. DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. RTC then issued an order of arrest and Munoz was arrested. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed in the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. RTC Judge denied the petition for bail. Later, the RTC Judge inhibited himself from trying the case and was replaced by respondent judge Olalia. Respondent judge granted the petition for bail. Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent judge. Private respondent on the other hand, maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one's liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prospective extraditee may avail the right to bail despite the ruling in Purganan.

HELD: Although the right to bail is not applicable to extradition proceedings, however, the Court cannot ignore trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee's right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be

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invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Private respondent had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail (the burden is therefore on the extraditee to show proof that he wont take flight). The standard of proof required in granting or denying bail in this case can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must

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prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Note: The Court in this case thinks that there should be a reexamination on the case of Purganan. The unique part of this case in comparison with Purganan is that the extradite is entitled to criminal due process where the right to bail springs.

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RULE 114 Bail

SECTION 1. Bail Defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety; property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions: (a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall

remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it; (b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the

court or these Rules;

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(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and (d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the

final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a) SECTION 3. No Release or Transfer Except on Court Order or Bail. No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. (3a) SECTION 4. Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a) HEIcDT SECTION 5. Bail, When Discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by

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the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a)

That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or CAHTIS

violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional

pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released

on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the

pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a) SECTION 6. Capital Offense Defined. A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (6a) EHTISC

SECTION 7. Capital Offense or an Offense Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment, not Bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a) SECTION 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (8a) I

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SECTION 9. Amount of Bail; Guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; Nature and circumstances of the offense; Penalty for the offense charged; Character and reputation of the accused; Age and health of the accused; Weight of the evidence against the accused; Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; Forfeiture of other bail; The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a) SECTION 10. Corporate Surety. Any domestic or foreign corporation,

licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a) SECTION 11. DaIACS

Property Bond, How Posted. A property bond is an

undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Registry of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned. Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention. (11a) SECTION 12. Qualifications of Sureties in Property Bond. The qualifications

of sureties in a property bond shall be as follows: (a) (b) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines; Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the

amount of the undertaking;

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(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded. AECacT

In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. (12a) SECTION 13. Justification of Sureties. Every surety shall justify by affidavit

taken before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)

SECTION 14.

Deposit of Cash as Bail. The accused or any person acting in

his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (14a) SECTION 15. Recognizance. Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the

court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a) SECTION 16. Bail, When not Required; Reduced Bail or Recognizance. No

bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide. When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

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A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a) SECTION 17. Bail, Where Filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed

with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (b) CTEDSI

Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be

released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal. (c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with

any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a) SECTION 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor. In the application for bail

under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a) SECTION 19. Release on Bail. The accused must be discharged upon

approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a) SECTION 20. Increase or Reduction of Bail. After the accused is admitted to

bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing

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of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody. (20a) SECTION 21. Forfeiture of Bail. When the presence of the accused is

required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must: (a) and (b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;

to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a) SECTION 22. Cancellation of Bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with

due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (22a) SECTION 23. Arrest of Accused Out on Bail. For the purpose of

surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a) SECTION 24. No Bail After Final Judgment; Exception. No bail shall be

allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail.

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When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (24a) SECTION 25. EASCDH

Court Supervision of Detainees. The court shall exercise

supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodations and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees. In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein. HEITAD

A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and other pertinent information. (25a) SECTION 26. Bail not a Bar to Objections on Illegal Arrest, Lack of or Irregular

Preliminary Investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

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Alonte vs. Savellano

FACTS: Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn Punongbayan. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. The petition for change of venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and waived pre-trial. Immediately following arraignment the prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest in further prosecuting the action. The Prosecution then manifested that the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners. The two accused did not present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor admitted the act

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charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." A decision was rendered convicting petitioners of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not right to due process in criminal proceedings were deprived against petitioner.

HELD: Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." There were a few deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial.

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People vs. Dramayo

FACTS: The accused Dramayo, in one drinking session brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. Soon their plans were executed. Early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo and Escubin was charged and convicted by the RTC for the crime of murder. The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused were held culpable. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence were overcame during the trial.

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HELD: Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. There is need, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt (the definition of proof beyond reasonable doubt may be culled from this statement). Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. The prosecution had already presented convincing evidence leading to the guilt of the accused. The presumption of innocence can no longer protect the two. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being

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acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having arisen as to their culpability.

Note: Some of the defendants were acquitted because they testified in behalf for the State. Even if one of the accused is acquitted where conspiracy was involved in a crime, it does not mean that the others would also be acquitted as well.

Dumlao vs. COMELEC

FACTS: This petition filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, sought to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Among the provisions contended is Section 4 of BP 52 which states:

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence.

HELD: An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

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Marquez vs. COMELEC

FACTS: In the petition, the Court is being asked to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:

"Sec. 40.

Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position: "xxx "(e) xxx xxx

Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.

ISSUE: What is the definition of the term fugitive from justice?

HELD: From the deliberations of the Oversight Committee (which finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government

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Code of 1991), it provided: "Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: "(a) . . . "(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. " Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Courts en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Note: The correct definition of the term fugitive from justice (according to Atty. Gabriel) include also those who took flight after being merely convicted of a crime or charged with an offense. The difference between this case and that of Dumlao is that the mere filing of a complaint alone does not make a person fugitive. It is only when a person takes flight after the filing he becomes a fugitive.

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Corpus vs. People

FACTS: Petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. Petitioner was charged for malversation of public funds. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons. The Sandiganbayan found him answerable for the misappropriation. In this petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner contends that the absence of a post-audit which could have established his guilt that he malversed the public funds was not enough to overcome the presumption of his innocence.

ISSUE: Whether or not presumption of the accuseds innocence was overcame.

HELD: The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.

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People vs. Holgado

FACTS: Holgado was charged in the CFI with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." During trial accused pleaded guilty without a counsel. The trial court found him guilty and convicted him for the crime of kidnapping and serious detention. Accused now sought the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not accuseds constitutional right to counsel was violated.

HELD: The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that: "If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney." Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable

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time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

Note: This decision by todays standards has been modified by Rule 115. An accused is always entitled to a counsel whether he likes it or not. Rule 115 presents a case where non-lawyers may represent a person in court.

RULE 115 Rights of Accused

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SECTION 1. Rights of Accused at the Trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (a) doubt. (b) (c) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable

proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on

matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. (e) (f) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either

party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (g) aTEHCc

To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses

and production of other evidence in his behalf. (h) (i) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)

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RULE 113 Arrest

SECTION 1. Definition of Arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

SECTION 2. Arrest; How Made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)

SECTION 3. Duty of Arresting Officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)

SECTION 4. Execution of Warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten

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(10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)

SECTION 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to

believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal

establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a) SECTION 6. Time of Making Arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6) SECTION 7. Method of Arrest by Officer by Virtue of Warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a) SECTION 8. Method of Arrest by Officer Without Warrant. When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has

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escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a) SECTION 9. Method of Arrest by Private Person. When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a) SECTION 10. Officer May Summon Assistance. An officer making a lawful

arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a) SECTION 11. Right of Officer to Break into Building or Enclosure. An officer,

in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a) SECTION 12. Right to Break Out from Building or Enclosure. Whenever an

officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a) SECTION 13. Arrest After Escape or Rescue. If a person lawfully arrested

escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13) SECTION 14. Right of Attorney or Relative to Visit Person Arrested. Any

member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)

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Amion vs. Chiongson

FACTS: A verified complaint was filed by Baltazar D. Amion charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson with ignorance of the law and oppression. The complaint was relative to a murder case pending before his court, in which the complainant is the accused. The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel. In his comment, respondent judge alleged that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accusedcomplainant is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the

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latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that the accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may appoint a counsel de officio against the accuseds will.

HELD: An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. As held in People vs. Barasina, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter." Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

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People vs. Quitlong

FACTS: The information for murder filed against the appellants failed to avert that they conspired with each other in the commission of the offense charged. But then, after trial, the RTC convicted the appellants as charged, finding that there was conspiracy between and among them in the commission of the crime and the indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum was imposed. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the evening of October 20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were confronting the fishball vendor who did not admit that he had short-changed Calpito, eight men approached and aggressively confronted Calpito and Gosil. Appellant Emilio then embraced Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong held Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively.

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Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of his body just below the nipple which became the cause of his death. In this appeal, the Quitlong brothers argued among others that the RTC erred in finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in the information or complaint. The trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information logically convey that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing the offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that purpose." It held that no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts of the malefactors and attendant circumstances. It concluded that the Quitlong brothers acted in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-principals for the death of Calpito.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was violated.

HELD: Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained in U .S. vs. Karelsen. These are: First, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

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In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of times, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated must: state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the

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conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them." Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.

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Soriano Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Soriano for violating RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of the charge. In this petition, petitioner argued that the facts presented to the Sandiganbayan make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. According to the petitioner, The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all, is Direct Bribery." (The Supreme Court explained that the facts of the case is indeed in resemblance for Direct Bribery and not in violation of RA 3019)

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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be convicted for the crime of Direct Bribery instead if it would be found out that the Sandiganbayan committed error in convicting him for violating RA 3019.

HELD: In the light of the foregoing, Court agrees with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed. The Cour held that judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

Note: It is therefore possible for a person to be convicted for crime B when it would later be found out that the lower court erred in convicting him for crime A.

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RULE 120 Judgment SECTION 1. Judgment; Definition and Form. Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a) SECTION 2. Contents of the Judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a) SECTION 3. Judgment for Two or More Offenses. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense. (3a)

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SECTION 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof . When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a) SECTION 5. When an Offense Includes or is Included in Another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (5a) SECTION 6. Promulgation of Judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. DIETcC

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court. The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address. In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. IEHTaA

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If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a) SECTION 7. Modification of Judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) CEDScA

SECTION 8. Entry of Judgment. After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36. (8) SECTION 9. Existing Provisions Governing Suspension of Sentence, Probation and Parole not Affected by this Rule. Nothing in this Rule shall affect any existing provisions in the laws governing suspension of sentence, probation or parole.

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Roco vs. Contreras

FACTS: Cals Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The MTCC convicted petitioner for the violation charged. Petitioner went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right to due process when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to present his evidence. The RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the cases to it for the reception of petitioner's evidence. During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. The MTCC issued an order granting petitioner's aforementioned request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas. During the trial, the private prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance of the requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by saying that judges order had become final and hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioner's request for the issuance of subpoenas. In a resolution, the MTCC, this time thru Judge Edward B. Contreras (a different judge), denied petitioner's request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases. Petitioner sought the matter to the RTC and then to the CA but to no avail. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena testificandum and subpoena duces tecum by respondent judge is violative of the

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constitutional right of the accused enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution.

HELD: A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow: In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced. Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., we held: Wellsettled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a 'subpoena duces tecum,' it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document

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containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. It thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it. Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The offense is already consummated from the very moment a person issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by such payment. Here, petitioner would want it to appear that the books and documents subject of his request for subpoena duces tecum are indispensable, or, at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees. Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal's Corporation with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment. We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.

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US vs. Javier

FACTS: Doroteo Natividad fastened his carabao in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiches. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he

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found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused. Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court for theft of a large cattle. In this appeal, the accused contends that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presca regarding what he saw on Nov. 20. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court committed an error in admitting exhibit B in violation of accuseds right to confrontation.

HELD: There are two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which grants the right to confrontation. The first reason is the right of crossexamination, and the second is that the tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of Presa (now deceased), yet if there has been no opportunity for crossexamination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone of accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.

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Talino vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles. The 4 cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Basilio, Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan

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rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to confrontation was violated.

HELD: The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation. The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not

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cross examine Ulat," and was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused." As this was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner' s part in the offenses.

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Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice GR No. 132601, October 12, 1998

FACTS: On June 25, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of death penalty for the said crime. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode execution from electrocution to lethal injection and passed RA 8177 (AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LEGAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD FOR CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659). Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution of by lethal injection of petitioner arguing, inter alia, that it is unconstitutional as cruel, degrading and inhumane.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8177 is unconstitutional for delivering death penalty by lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

HELD: It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this Court held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The Court believes not. The implementing details of RA 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.

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Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. A few minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation. What is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice and must draw its meaning form the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. The primary indicator of societys standard of decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the countrys legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, the Court must confine its inquiry to the legality of RA 8177.

People vs. Esparas GR No. 120034, August 20, 1996

FACTS: Accused Josefina Esparas was charged with violation of RA 6425 as amended by RA 759 for importing into the country 20 kilograms of shabu. After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. The trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of death penalty is considered a prohibited punishment in violation of Art. III Sec. 19 of the Constitution.

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HELD: The 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. There is more in Philippine jurisprudence mandating the Courts review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. The Court must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and its efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. An accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in the Constitution which recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to a minority of one has the right to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

People vs. Estoista GR No. L-5793, August 27, 1953

FACTS: Appellant was acquitted on the charge of homicide through reckless imprudence but was found guilty for the illegal possession of firearms. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment. In this appeal, appellant contends that the penalty of 5-10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by RA No. 4 is cruel and unusual.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty of imprisonment for 5-10 years for illegal possession of firearms is a cruel and unusual punishment.

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HELD: Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5-10 years for possession or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.