REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E.

Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. COMPLAINT Plaintiff, through the undersigned counsel, respectfully avers that: 1. Plaintiff and the defendant are of legal age and residents of Mandaluyong City; 2. Sometime the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district; 3. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994; 4. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675; 5. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no; 6. By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect; 7. Plaintiff claims that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution; 8. R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 9. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court: 1. To invalidate the conversion of the City of Mandalayung into a highly urbanized city be by reason of R.A. No. 7675s unconstitutionality; and 2. To allow the people of San Juan to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for. Copy furnished to the counsel of the defendant.

ANNE FRANK Counsel for Plaintiff Mandaluyong City Roll of Attorney 12345 IBP 123456; 12/12/12; MC PTR 12345; 12/12/12; MC MCLE Compliance VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) CITY OF MANDALUYONG )

S.S.

I, E.E. Cummings, of legal age, and a resident of Mandaluyong City after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and state that: 1. I am the plaintiff in the above-stated case; 2. I have read the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are true and correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of authentic records; 3. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no such action or proceeding is pending in them; 4. If I should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending after its filing, I shall report that fact within five (5) days from notice to the court or where the complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Mandaluyong City, 14 March 2010.

E.E. CUMMINGS Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14TH day of March 2012 in Mandaluyong City affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No.12345 issued on November 11, 2011in Mandaluyong City.

HELEN KELLER Notary Public Commission Serial No. 12345 Until Dec. 31, 2012 IBP 78910; 12/12/12; MC PTR 78910; 12/12/12; MC Doc. No. 1; Page No. 2; Book No. 3; Series of 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E. Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. ANSWER Defendant, through the undersigned counsel, and in answer to plaintiffs complaint, respectfully avers that: 1. He admits paragraphs one, two, three, four, five and six of the complaint; 2. That he is without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averments made in paragraph seven thereof; 3. He DENIES specifically each and every material allegation made in paragraphs eight and nine such that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution and the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that: 1. Judgment in favor of defendant be granted with respect to the plaintiffs complaint. 2. The conversion of the City of Mandaluyong be recognized in law. Copu furnished to the counsel of the plaintiff. Mandaluyong City, 20 March 2010. VIRGINIA WOOLF Counsel for Defendant Mandaluyong City Roll of Attorney 14324 IBP 14324; 12/12/12; MC PTR 14324; 12/12/12; MC MCLE Compliance

VERIFICATION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) CITY OF MANDALUYONG )

S.S.

I, Edgar Allan Poe, of legal age, and a resident of Mandaluyong City after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and state that: 1. I am the defendant in the above-stated case; 2. I have read the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are true and correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of authentic records; Mandaluyong City, 14 March 2010.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21ST day of March 2012 in Mandaluyong City affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No.51544 issued on November 11, 2011in Mandaluyong City.

HELEN KELLER Notary Public Commission Serial No. 12345 Until Dec. 31, 2012 IBP 78910; 12/12/12; MC PTR 78910; 12/12/12; MC Doc. No. 2; Page No. 3; Book No. 4; Series of 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E. Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLAINTIFF COMES now, plaintiff, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully submit and present this memorandum in the above-cited case, and avers that: Parties 1. Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of Mandaluyong City where he may be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court; and 2. Defendant is of legal age and a resident of Mandaluyong City where he may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto. Statement of Facts 1. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. 2. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Hence this case, the plaintiff contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution, to wit: Article VI, Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI, Section 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Article VI, Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

Issues 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Arguments 1. The inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. 2. Said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements and that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. Prayer WHEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully prays that the Honorable Court render judgment in favor of him and declare the conversion of the City of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city unconstitutional. Other reliefs that are just and equitable are likewise prayed for. Copy furnished to the counsel of defendant. Mandaluyong City, 25 March 2012 ANNE FRANK Counsel for Plaintiff Mandaluyong City Roll of Attorney 12345 IBP 123456; 12/12/12; MC PTR 12345; 12/12/12; MC MCLE Compliance

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E. Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENDANT COMES now, defendant, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully submit and present this memorandum in the above-cited case, and avers that: Parties 1. Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of Mandaluyong City where he may be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court; and 2. Defendant is of legal age and a resident of Mandaluyong City where he may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto. Statement of Facts 3. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. 4. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Hence this case, the plaintiff contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution, to wit: Article VI, Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI, Section 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Article VI, Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

Issues 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Arguments 1. Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. 2. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), it ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." 3. Further, the liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). 4. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. 5. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Prayer WHEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing, the defendant respectfully prays that the Honorable Court render judgment in favor of him and declare the conversion of the City of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city constitutional and the complaint of the plaintiff be DISMISSED. Other reliefs that are just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

Copy furnished to the counsel of the plaintiff. Mandaluyong City, 25 March 2012. VIRGINIA WOOLF Counsel for Defendant Mandaluyong City Roll of Attorney 14324 IBP 14324; 12/12/12; MC PTR 14324; 12/12/12; MC MCLE Compliance

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E. Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. RESOLUTION COMES now, the plaintiff, invoking his rights as taxpayers and as a resident of Mandaluyong, assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." The antecedent facts are as follows: Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. The following are the issues presented by the plaintiff before this Honorable Court: 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675. Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), it ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof. Palintiff contends that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, plaintiffs additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ANAIS NIN Presiding Judge

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ____ Judicial Region Branch (Venue) E.E. Cummings Plaintiff, -versus-

Civil Case No. _____________________ Questioning the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.

EDGAR ALLAN POE Defendant. DECISION COMES now, the plaintiff, invoking his rights as taxpayers and as a resident of Mandaluyong, assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Factual Background Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Issues 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Discussion Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election

The contentions are devoid of merit. Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675. Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), it ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was

Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof. Palintiff contends that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, plaintiffs additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ANAIS NIN Presiding Judge

March 10, 2010 E.E. Cummings Mandaluyong City Dear Mr. Cummings Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and your documents, are as follows: Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. The following are the issues to be resolved: 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election The above-cited provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. It is then my opinion that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. To emphasize, the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. Moreover, Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution provide: Sec. 5(1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective

inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. Hence, the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements and that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4). These are my opinion based on provisions of law applicable to your case. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confident that the case will be decided in your favor. Respectfully yours, Anne Frank

March 10, 2012 Edgar Allan Poe Mandaluyong City Dear Mr. Poe, Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and your documents, are as follows: Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. The following are the issues to be resolved: 1. Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election

Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), it ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." Further, the liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. Hence the contention of the plaintiff is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. These are my opinion based on provisions of law and the jurisprudence applicable to your situation. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confident that the case will be decided in your favor. Respectfully yours, Virginia Woolf