Art as Knowledge Author(s): Carl H. Hamburg Reviewed work(s): Source: College Art Journal, Vol. 12, No.

1 (Autumn, 1952), pp. 2-11 Published by: College Art Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/773357 . Accessed: 22/03/2012 16:55
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ART AS KNOWLEDGE
Carl H. Hamburg
UNDERSTAND art as knowledge, to think of one in terms of the that of other, would seem to requirespecification a set of characteristics could justly be applied and predicatedto both. To avoid turning the "artas knowledge" theme into an "artis knowledge"identity,we must be contentwith the thesis that only some and not all of the definingelementsof art can be intellito gibly correlated elementsgoing into the definitionof knowledge.By neither to prove that art is the same as knowledge,nor that it can do better attempting or worse what, e.g., scientificknowledge is supposedto be able to do, we are relievedfrom having to proceedfrom too tight a definitionof eitherenterprise or to end up with definitions of such vast generalitythat nothing-except possibly one's own conciliatoryefforts-will remaindistinct. To understand as a type of knowledge,it will neitherdo to equateboth art nor, indeed, to createbetween them an opposition so radicalas would befit, if at all, only the highest formal achievements theoretical of knowledgeon one side, and the lyric cry on the other. In what follows, we will not enlarge upon all the things that art is not, nor shall we add another to the many compilationsof all the things that art is. Instead,we will point to the common ground occupied by what, in actual usage, has been understoodby art and knowledge. If "art as knowledge"-then, as knowledge of what? As knowledge of something other than the piece of art itself? If so, we are committedto a reductive analysis, a quest not so much for what we know in the arts, but through them. If art as knowledge of a special kind, what could we possibly ? mean by this expression Surely,art is art, and not knowledge; if it is to be neither the same as knowledge, nor opposed as utterlydifferentfrom knowledge, if it is not even consideredas reductivelyyielding, through an artistic medium,knowledgeof a non-artistic subjectmatter,as what sort of knowledge is art to be conceived?At worst, to speak of "artas knowledge"would just seem to shift the problem of distinguishingthe two by requiring new distinctions between the theoreticaland artisticmeaningsof knowledge. At best -and from this assumptionwe shall proceed-such shift in terminology emphasizesa continuity, an embracingof the arts as comparableto other modesof humanunderstanding.

To

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Academic man, it has been observed, comes in schools. Thinkers, and writers, in the field of aestheticsare no exception to this rule. And as there are different schools of thought, there are also different definitions of art to be found in the many volumes written on the subject. Such broad terms as "significant form," "qualitativeness,""intrinsicness"and others have usuallydone servicefor definitorypurposes.To argue, as we propose, for art as a "mode" of knowledge, would seem to confront us with the following situation:we should either startout from a tight definitionof knowledgeand, to upon emphasizingits superiority other definitionsoffered,proceedto show how nicely it also accommodates that the arts have ever claimed to be all and do; or, again, we could avoid much argumentby formulatingboth art and knowledge in terms so general and lofty, bathingthem in so rich a glow, that nothing, except possibly one's own good will, would stand out distinctly any more. However, we shall try a somewhatdifferentprocedure.Instead of starting from ad hoc definitions, we will point our argumentby indicating the commonground implied by the very dichotomiesthat have been appealed to by those who, time and again, have perpetuated so much a meaningful not betweenscienceand art. distinctionbut an isolating separation
1. Perfect-Imperfect Knowledge. In these terms, different thinkers have

at differenttimes distinguishedthe artisticfrom the scientificenterprise.The underlying assumptionhere is that the "true nature of reality"is somehow known and, depending upon what it is taken to be, it will either be the arts the will be more which, in approximating essentialfeaturesof this "reality," "perfect"a means for that end than the sciences,or vice versa.Thus, given a Platonicrealmof ideas, or a universeof mechanicalor electrodynamic laws as the basic structureof reality, it will be science, and not the arts, expressing which must appear as the more perfect vehicle to take one there. Starting with the concept of a living, dynamicand "irrational" universe, expressed, Nietzsche and Bergson, e.g., in the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Schelling, it will be the arts, ratherthan science, which promise a more perfect apprehension of its essential features. "It is the beginning of all poetry"-writes Schlegel--"to abolish the law and method of rationallyproceeding reason, and to plunge us once more into the ravishing confusions of fantasy, into the original chaos of human nature." For Bergson, too, the unique grasp concededto art is implied in his valuationof intuition as capableof pushing beyondthe symbolswhich, like the veil of Maya,stand betweenthe "rational" thinker and live, dynamic reality. Philosophies of art, oriented around physical, religious or bioprivileged reality-concepts-be they mathematical, of necessityhave to put varyingemphasesupon sometimesart, logical-will,

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sometimes (scientificor philosophical) knowledge as the more perfect routes to the "reallyreal." With the contemporary emphasisupon "experience"(as being equally open to artisticas well as to scientificinterpretations)and of "culture"(as comprehendingscience as well as artisticand other endeavors as of equal status), philosophershave, of late, preferredto think of realityas (culturally) equally "real" in all the aspects in which human minds have been able to experienceit. It has becomequite pointless, therefore,to classify at this time either the arts or the sciencesas respectivelyperfect or imperfect modesof knowingthe realas such. 2. Emotion-Reason.In this version, art, instead of knowing all, now knows nothing at all. Far from reachingknowledgeof a profound or intimate type inaccessibleto the sciences, art as emotion is entirely divorced from true"aboutthis world. FromPlato inquiriesinto what is "true"or "probably to Tolstoy, the arts have accordinglybeen chargedwith infecting or disturbing our emotions.More recently,the positivistshave pointed the issue by conor from scienceas the body trastingthe arts as emotive utterances ejaculations of verifiablepropositions.In some people's minds this has taken the form of assertingthat the arts are after emotions-and the sciences after truth. And yet, such a science as psychology will contain verifiable propositions,state "truths"aboutemotions (among other things)-and thereare some art-forms in which even the sober striving after truths can be dramatizedand thus be made emotionally more significant. It is useful to remember: 1) that, as emotions are dealt with in both science and art. Neither has subject-matter, a monopolyon them, or any other topic, for that matter; 2) that, as states of mind, emotions inhabit the scientist as well as the artist even though the mere "having of emotions"neither disqualifiesthe former nor distinguishes the latter.For ourpurpose,it is to be kept in mind: a) that having emotions and articulatingemotions are two different affairs; b) that the arts, while they may be "infecting" emotions sometimes, moreoften clarifyand intensifythem; is c) that artisticappreciation less a matterof having, than of realizing the meaning and impact of, emotions; and d) that expressionof emotion,if it is to be artistic,implies structure to as such becomescomparable other symbolicforms of expression. Much has been made of this undeniabledistinc3. Imagination-Concept. of tion between the sober, conceptualstructures (theoretical) knowledge on one hand and the remarkably fluctuatingcreationsof artisticimaginationon

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the other. On this alternative, there is no chance again for art really to "know" anything. To "imagine things" has become synonymouswith being is ignorantof them. The "imaginative" too easily identifiedwith the "imagiand unfit for any nary"-and both are dismissed as "anthropomorphic" serious "objective" is studyof things. And yet, the "anthropomorphic" still of very real concern, if only to the anthropos; if it imposes a perspective,a slant-so does all the perspective conceptualizingof our sciences which for operateon variouslevels of abstraction variouspurposesof generalization.
'science'and 'art'and all the high talk aboutthem,watch "Forgetthe abstractions the individualscientistand artist at work, and they look more alike than either is like and his artistryis as any other worker. The artist, too, is a ceaseless experimenter, rigorous a discipline as a scientific inquiry. . ... Nor are utterly differentfaculties involved in this process.The scientificmind is not a mere logic-grinder, turning out truthswith remorseless precision.It, too, feels its way, has flashesof insight, leaps to conclusions. . . although the final experimental test is all-important-what is tested feats." (HerbertMuller: Scienceand Criticism,257.)

is a hunch, an inspiration, a dream. All the great scientific theories are great imaginative

4. Fiction-Fact. This is anotherpopularform of the above "ImaginationConcept"polaritybetweenthe artsand sciences.It is just as easy, of course,to reduce the "fictional"to the "false," as it is to think of the "imaginative" as If merely "imaginary." so reduced,imaginationis said to lead to fiction,while betweenart and scienceagainhas conceptsalone refer to facts. The separation been so overstretchedas to have become stultifying. Actually, this version operatesfrom an ideologicalbasisthat has since been abandoned. Philosophers of sciencesince Vaihingerand Duhem have made explicit a good manyof the fictional elements involved in scientific fact-"finding."On the other hand, the arts have often proven the only medium by which to get close to certain aspects of the hard factualityof human experienceand existence. We have traits: both knowledge- and art-makers alreadylisted comparable experiment, a discipline on their respectiveactivities,explore, make hit-and-miss impose trials. Neither employs essentiallydifferentfaculties.Both imagine, articulate, formulateand construct.Let us add that they also startwith the samedata.No matter how far the theoreticalscientist soars from the level of sensoryperception, from it he takes off and to it he must return-if it is verificationof his constructionhe wants. Nor is the artist in so different a position. No matter how far one feels transported,inspirationallytouched or lifted "out of this world," the artist's appeal is still to and through the senses. Both scientist and artist use senses to make sense, both start with some "fact"and arriveat an interpretation fact (accessibleto all, many or few)-not of at fiction.

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Like its predecessors,this popular alternativetoo 5. Passivity-Activity. has its feet firmlyplanted in mid-air.Whateverplausibilityit possessesis derived from its appeal to what are indeed different emphasesin both enterof prises.But such shadingsin emphasisshouldnot be frozen into criteria final If knowledge is, admittedly,an "activity" some specifickind, of opposition. its function is still the "settling"of doubt. However active, dynamic,evoluthat will, for a tionary or revolutionary,science still aims at determinations conflictand furtherresearchactivityin a given subject-matter. while, suspend While this may ultimatelybe a matter of temperament, seems difficultto it divorce altogether contemplationas a genuine phase of either scientific or philosophicalthinking. It is just as difficult,if not impossible,to accountfor worksof artas eitherissuing in or appealingto a merelycontemplative, passive and receptive mind. Such disinterested-yet rapt-attention may be one isolable feature in artisticcreationor consummation. However, such a phase must in the end be abstracted which from the full contextof art-appreciation is characterized much inner movementand conflict-solvings(conscious or by not) by which one feels and thinks oneself through in an estheticallystrong of an or experience.However materially"disinterested," "interest" "concern" some kind is alive in art-production Yet interestsinvolve and appreciation. conflictseven though, as Eliseo Vivas remarks,"as is true of garlic, a small amountof it goes a long way." (A NaturalHistoryof the EstheticTransaction; 103.) A good case could indeed be made for finding instancesof poor-acaare demicor sentimental-art, whereverhappyendings and harmonizations too to with nothing in particular standin need of harmonization. easilyintroduced, A number of conventional dichotomies have now been considered. Others, such as "Public and Private Worlds," "Discourse and Vision," "Realityand Illusion" could have been added. Their rejectionas inadequate for characterizing arts and sciences respectivelyis implied in our earlier the comments.We have rejectedan emotionalinterpretation, accordingto which the arts know nothing, and an intuitive version, accordingto which the arts know what is importantto know better than any other mode of knowledge. We have suggested that both emotional and structural,intuitive and conIf ceptual,activeand passivefactorsenterboth enterprises. then neitherartnor science are to be understoodas more or less adequategrasps-as chips of the old block-reality, if they are consideredinstead as differentlycenteredperof spectives, issuing in differentinterpretations whatever"reality"may come to mean in human experience,then, we suggest, a more satisfactoryway of indicating their common features would be to conceive of both art and science as two different "languages"in which man can articulatehis world for differentpurposesand by differentcriteriaof precision.Actually,we find

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ourselves in good company. Since the turn of the century,mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of science have combined with semanticists, estheticians,naturalistsand idealists in holding that knowledge is a sort of "language,"a faith mediated by "symbols."An imposing arrayof thinkers have come to see in man's symbolic activity a function universalenough to encompassboth artisticand scientificsense-making. In what follows, we propose to be careful and, while realizingthe common genus, pay attention to the characteristic differencesbetween the two and "languages."Languagesdiffer in their "vocabularies" their "grammars." The question to be asked then is: what is the specific differencein the type (or use) both the artisticand scientificlanguagesmakeof their "vocabularies" (symbols) on one hand, and of the relation between symbols, their on "grammar", the other? Symbolsin Art and Science. "Whateverelse life may be"-it has been said--"it is an experience";whateverelse an experiencemay be-we addit cannot occur more than once. If thereforeit is not to eventuateinto what William James called a "blooming, buzzing confusion", it must be due to our seeing, feeling and realizingit in certainrecurrent patterns.Somethingis as something,one perceptionbecomesa cue for others,a color desigrecognized nates aspect and distance of a "thing" or "person." All this, the Gestaltpsychologistshave pointed out some time ago; if we are to take them serioccurson levels where it has ously we must also recognizethat symbolization not ordinarily been looked for. If this be accepted, artistic and scientific languagescould be presentedas more consciousand organizedmanipulations of symbols, rising from an already symbolic level of immediate commonsense-perception,to more specifically guided and consistently articulated of symbol-structures theories and art-products.What then distinguishes the artisticfrom the theoreticsymbol-structuresDo they confinethemselvesto ? differentsymbols? Surely not; the same symbolscan figure characteristically as easily in one as in the other; auditoryand pictorialsymbolsare vehicles for both enterprises. There is, however,a significantdifference the use or manner in of employmentof their symbolic media by art and science respectively.As regardsthe symbol-useof theoreticalknowledge, it must be unambiguousand well-defined,i.e.: (1) fixed in its meaning; (2) substitutions(equivalentexpressions) must be possiblein principle; (3) it must be translatableinto other (though not necessarily all) languages.
The artistic symbol-use, in contradistinction, owes its very success to the

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richnessof its connotations.In a sense, it profitsfrom ambiguityof meaning, since: (1) it need not mean the same thing to differentaudiences,or to the same audienceat differenttimes; (2) it will make a complex, if not diffuse, reference;in not being precise, it will all the betterconveyfeeling tone, do justiceto perceptual rhythms and proportions and enrich meaning while blurring its contours; in (3) it will be part of the meaningitself. Symbol-use the artsis unique exactlybecause"what"is said and "how"it is said are not separable and thus not substitutable without loss in the medium of any other language. In consequence:we may not use the standardsof one way of symbolof usage to measurethe achievements the other. The artistic symbolmay be more fully charged with emotive-attitudinal meaning, the scientific symbol may be more livelesslyexact, neithercan do the work of the other. When the poet compareshis beloved to a flower, he speaks neither to botanistnor to When the biologist classifiesman-loved or unloved-among anthropologist. the "mammals" is not arguingwith the poet's description some humans he of as "roses",even though he is saying and implying much about man which, if not alwaysinteresting,is certainlyimportantto all men at some time or other. It has becomecommonplace point to the "high price",the loss of concreteto ness we have to pay for the controlled abstractions science. There is no of need to add to this theme here. It is sufficientto rememberthat precisionand abstractness the scientific symbol-workis neither more nor any less imof of portantthan the meaningfulnessand concreteness the artisticsymbol-work; and control of the pervasivefeaturesof our world would be as understanding and enjoymentof its perceptualfeatures, pointlesswithout the intensification as the latterwould be insecurewithoutthe consequences the former. of relatethe symbols Relationsin Art and Science.Both theoryand art-work different meaning-funcwhich they mediate their characteristically through tions. There is usually no question about the fact that the scientist, when investigatingor expressingthe resultsof his investigationsrelatesthe particular item of his concernwith other items with which it can be shown to enter into regular and, if possible, measurablerelations. The artist, it can be shown, does the same. Both scientist and artist, e.g., may talk about "gold" or "water"and disclose aspectsabout either which are not otherwiseobvious. Expressingthe one as "H20" and the other by its various chemico-physical propertiesis, of course,to relatethem to otherelementsas well as to empirical

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laws and mathematical operations.The artistalso, if painting or talking about "water"and "gold", relates these to as many aspectsof our perceptualand emotive experienceas he can get awaywith. "Water",insteadof merelystanding for anything "wet", will be relatedto such sensuousaspectsas the clearness of crystal,the smoothnessof silver, the roaringviolence of its waves; it may be relatedto its purifying, fertilizing or soothing properties.It takes the poet to tell us more about "gold" but that it is "hard,yellow, malleableand expensive." Its romance,its power, its lustre, its tragic or comic relationsto humanpursuits,all these are legitimateand significantpropertiesnot revealed in chemistry-books. Whether we express the meaning of a given item in human experiencethrough a structuralatomic formula which makes explicit its componentsand relationsthat characterize physical natureor whether we intensifythe meaningsof such items by metaphorically relatingthem to a great varietyof perceptualand emotionalaspects,in eithercasewe aretalking about reality,in differentlanguagesand for differentpurposes.Neither scientistnor artistcan tell us what "water"or "gold" really are in glorious isolation from anything else; for both, the realizationof their meaning is achieved within The differencein these schemes differentlyorientedschemesof interpretation. can be specified,we suggest, by paying attentionto the mannerin which both the arts and sciences relate differentlythe experientialitems with which they are concerned.Philosophersof art, when reflectingupon contrastor similarity between art and science, have sometimesemphasizedone, sometimesother, distinguishing features. Accounting for their findings, the following set of relational contrastsmay be sufficientto specify the differencesbetween the scientificand the artisticexperience-accountings: I. Intensive-Extensive Relations. It is in these terms that Cassirer,e.g., distinguishesthe respectivelanguagesof artand science.Both compare,in that "theyrelatea manifold to a unity." (Essay on Man, 143.) They differ in that the language of science achieves this unity by operating with an extensive abstractionfrom experience; art, on the other hand, is said to present us with an "intensification" experience.Art aims at "concretion,"science at of "functionalabstraction." experienceis renderedartisticallyif, and to the An extent that, it has been so related to other items and modes of experiencing that its meaning has been enriched,felt, and thus been intensifiedbeyond its surface-and commonsense-aspects. An experiencehas been accountedfor scientificallywhen, by experimentallycontrolled abstractionfrom the incidental "hereand now" of its appearance, has been so relatedto other events it can (or classes of events) that its occurrence be "explained"and, if possible, predicted. II. Qualitative-Quantitative Relations. In this manner of contrasting

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sciencefrom art, attentionis directedto the quantitative aspectof the scientific enterprise. In contradistinction,it is said of the artist that he relates the immediatequality of an experience.In terms of this distinction,it could be said that what the artist relatesmay not be measurableand weighable-and and essential. yet be immeasurably important imponderably III. Intransitive-Transitive Relations.This divisionhas been suggestedby the following considerations:in the scientific relations we pass from the object of direct experienceeither backwardto causal connectionsor forward to consequences.The object, in other words, is resolved into a network of relations."Ourinterestis in a complexof events not embodiedas meaningsby the object from which investigationstarts,but which lie beyond it." (Eliseo Vivas: Naturalismand the Human Spirit, 99). Thus, while in sciencewe aim at the formulationof "transitive" relations,we look in the arts at the object "in order to see it, to listen to it . . . we fasten our attention on it, arrest it in such a way that we do not wanderfrom it but rest within it attentively." (ibid.) An apprehensionof this kind has, in contrastto the scientificaim, been termed "intransitive." IV. Conditional-Presentational Relations. Emphasis may be placed on the conditionalmood in which the scientistrelatesphenomena:when relating phases in the states of one event-seriesto phases in another series, and by relatingthem both to a numericalseries, he is thinking, if not alwaystalking, in a conditionalsense. "IF such and such be the case, and IF such and such relations are established,then such and such will probablybe the case." On the other hand, when the artist gives us his picture or vision of a face or a landscape he expresses whatever relations he establishes to our senses and moods in a directlypresentative,if not an imperative,manner.In presenting an experience by relating it to significant perspectives,the artist deals in concernwith mattersof human concernand, unlike the scientist,he does not even attemptto be "neutral."As it has been put: "we point with pride, with alarm,with disgust; we deal with facts in terms of Hurray,Ouch, Phooey." (H. J. Muller: Science and Criticism,262). Artistic emphasismay be more subtle or more profound than that; at any rate, when OmarKhayyamspeaks of "That invertedbowl we call sky, whereundercrawlingcoop't we live and die"-neither he nor we would be botheredby the more sober conditional sense in which the scientist may question any descriptionof the sky as a "bowl"or the humanmode of locomotionas a form of "crawling." In summary: have discussedboth art and scienceas modes of "knowwe The advisabilityof such interpretation was supportedby referenceto ing". and relationalstructure which the arts sharewith theoreticalforms symbol-use

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of knowledge. We have briefly indicated considerationswhich have led to treat of both as comparablelanguagesabout, ratherthan chips of, reality.In conclusion, let us reaffirmthat while art as knowledge may not comparein reliabilitywith the precise symbol-workof the sciences, it is still up to the artistto disclose to us what we may know and understandof those aspectsof the human condition from which the scientist must forever look away in orderto deliverto us his formulaeof control. If there is any merit in reflections the orderof generalityas attempted of it may be to guard us againstascribingto the arts as a whole properties here, ascribableonly to some of them. The history of aesthetics is replete with partialdefinitionsof art which, adequateto literature,e.g., do not befit music or, generalizing upon the specific languages of the visual arts, are not accommodatingto the remainingart-forms.Sculpture,poetry, music etc. surely emphasizeand utilize differentlyboth sensorydata and their symbolicorganization. As art-forms,however,they sharewith theoreticalknowledgethe same basic faculties of observation, imagination and abstraction.Also, like the and sciences,they are subjectboth to formalprinciplesof consistency empirical principles of relevancywhich control symbol-useand symbolic relations as brieflyoutlined in a precedingpassage.While each art-formmust differently determinethe criteriaappropriateto the formal unity of its structure,these criteriamust be other than, or more than, the logical criteria of linguistic consistencywhich formally control scientific discourse. As regardsthe empiricalrelevanceof artisticsymbol-structures, are they not verifiedby the mere occurrence experimentally of controlledsense-data;instead aestheticconsummation%"verifies" a complex (emotive-conative-perin of the total individualityof the "tester."Considerceptive-cognitive)response ing that any normal perceiver,under standardconditions, can verify theory, the great universalityand proceduralreliabilityof theoreticalsymbolismsbecomes evident. Considering,however,that data-perception coversonly a small of humanresponsiveness that, even when perceiving,standard-conand range ditions are rarelyrealized,it becomesequallyevidentthat the culturalvalue of the artsis linked with their role in attendingto, and cultivatingdiscriminating sensitivity to, those reality-aspectswhose sensuous beauty and emotional significancemust be ignoredfor the purposesof theoreticsymbolization.