These Are Not Mine! I Got this from the Web! Persons and Family Relations Tanada v.

Tuvera GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446) Lorenzo M. Tanada and MABINI (petitioners) vs. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera et al. Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided. Held:The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code

People of the Phils v Que Po Lay GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954 FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

GARCIA vs. Recio

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government. Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia.March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to Samson in November 1997. In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. Issues: 1. Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by Philippine Laws. 2 . Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian decree of divorce. 3. Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad.

Held: 1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 2 . No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a

marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient. 3 . Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs. SO ORDERED

D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (and Maria J. Juego) respondents

Facts: On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable. Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed. Ratio: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205) Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants for scholastic merit at Arellano University. During his last semester of his fourth year, he left the defendant university and enro lled at Abad

Santos University, wherein he finished his law degree. After graduating, he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take the bar examinations, he needed the transcript of records from the defendant university. Defendant refused to give him a transcript until he paid back the tuition that the university returned when he was granted scholarship. According to the contract signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good only if the student should continue in the same school. This contract was followed fromMe morandu m No. 38 made by the Director of Private Schools. Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash valid or not? Held: The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since the memorandum made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law. The provisions are only advisory and not mandatory in nature. Furthermore, the said officer had not authority to issue such memorandum and that provisions were not published in the Official Gazette.

Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 J. Romualdez Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left

filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera G.R No. 80116 June 30, 1989 On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in

Malate, Manila where they had a daughter. After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed that there was failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since 1982.While petitioner filed an action for Legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court in Manila. On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that during the marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua. After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the respondent City fiscal a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two branches of the RTC of Manila. On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that the cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the accused have already been arraigned and if not, to move to defer further proceedings and to elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review. Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the date of arraignment of the other was merely reset. During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in contempt and was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later entered a plea of not guilty. On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case. On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the private respondet can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner. Ruling: Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter of the status of persons. Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case befor the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other. Roehr vs. Garcia GR No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration

of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of HamburgBlankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts Held: Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civel Procedure. Accoringly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental costudy

Topic: DEFENSES: ASSUMPTION OF RISK Digested by: Aubrey Case #7 G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. Facts: The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code.

Respondent Reyes Version: Mrs. Filart invited and assured that she can vouched for him in the birthday party of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu at the penthouse. When the buffet dinner was ready, Reyes lined up but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Lim (Exec. Sec. of Nikko Hotel), and in a loud voice w/in the presence and hearing of the other guests, told him to leave the party. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, but the latter completely ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, policemen approached him and asked him to step out of the hotel. He now claims P1M for actual damagaes, P1M moral and/or exemplary damages and P200k for attys fees. Lims version: At the party she noticed Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, she approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the presence of Reyes who was uninvited. The waiter said that he saw Reyes came in w/ the group of Dr. Filart. Lim inquired Dr Filarts sister about Reyes and the sister said the latter was not invited by Dr. Filart. Lim requested the sister to tell Reyes to leave but the latter just lingered. The same happened when one Capt. Batung asked Reyes to leave. When Lim spotted Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no guest in the immediate vicinity. However, as Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. When Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo." She then turned around trusting that Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. Dr. Filarts version: According to her, it was Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought that Reyes already left the place. Then there was a commotion and she saw Reyes shouting. She ignored Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him. RTC Ruling: After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. CA Ruling: On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Reyes that Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. It likewise ruled that the actuation of Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Reyes in private. Consequently, CA imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Lim and Dr. Filart the solidary obligation to pay Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not applying the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria considering that by its own findings, Reyes was a great crasher. Issue and Ruling: 1) Won the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is applicable in the case at bar. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even

if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. 2) Won Lim acted abusively in asking Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. No. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Moreover, another problem with Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Parenthetically, the manner by which Lim asked Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Filart if indeed she invited. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity." Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Lims act of by-passing Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Filart did not invite Reyes. If at all, Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages especially for the reason stated by the CA.

Sps. Quisumbing vs MERALCO gr no 142943 april 3 2002 Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. On March 3, 1995, MERALCOs inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of asking permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO 's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. The spouses were advised by MERALCO

's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, MERALCO had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the spouses unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed the spouses that they were just following their standard operating procedure. An action for damages by the spouses alleging that MERALCO acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation. Whether MERALCO observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electric supply of the spouses? Under the law, MERALCO may immeadiately disconnect any electric services on the ground of meter tampering. However, they may do only in the presence of an officer of law or by a duly authorized representative of the energy regulatory board where they can personally witnessed and attested the discovery of the tampering. If theres no government representative, the prima facie authority to disconnect granted to MERALCO by RA 7832 cant apply. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnection goes into the essence of due process. MERALCO cant be prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. MERALCO cant rely on the contractual right to disconnect if there is non-payment of bills. An adjusted bill shall be prepared and only upon failure to pay the company disconnect or discontinue service. This alo true in regard with the provision of the revised order no. 1 of the former public service commission which requires a 46 hour written notice before the disconnection may be justified. Hence, this case is partially granted wherein both of the parties are to pay each other.

BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 219 SCRA 115 FACTS: Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry. ISSUE: Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?

HELD: [I]The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp vs. CA GR No 81262 august 25 1989 Facts: Resitituto Tobias was employed by Globe mackay cable and radio corp as a purchasing agen and aadministrative assistant to the engineering operations managers. When a fictuitious purchase was discovered, henry, the vice president and general manager of the company confronted him stating that he was a number one suspect concerning the matter and ordered him to take one week off, leaving

his drawer open and his office keys. After one week has elapsed, henry went to him again and caleed him a crook and swindler and ordering him to take a lie detector and other test which the results are negative. subsequently he was suspeneded and despite the reports, he was sued for estafa but was dismissed. When he was terminated, he applied to retelco and without the request of the company, henry gave a character evaluation stating that Restituto was dismissed from their company due to dishonesty. This event lead restituto to file a case for damages against Globe mackay cable and radio corp alleging the unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of Globe mackay cable and radio corp. the lower court rebered the judgement in his favour as well as the ca. hence this appeal. The Globe mackay cable and radio corp said they cant be held liable because they have conducted the an a lawful dismissal while the restituto contended that because of their abusive manner is dismissing him and inhuman treatment, they are held liable for damges. Issues: Whether or not Gobe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp can be held liable for damages resulting to abuse of right? Held: It is expected from the employer to be firm and to resolve to uncover the truth but the treatment they have given to resituto during his employment weas uncalled for. Despite of the evidence held, they accused restituto guilty without a basis and harass him which are the standard of human conduct under art 19 of the civil code. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee should bot be confused with the matter in which the right is ecercised and the effects flowing form it. If the dismissal is done abusicelt, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. It is clearly indicated that the Globe mackay cable and radio corp failed to ecervise in a legitimate manner their right to dimiss Resituto, as result, they are held liable for damages under article 21 of the civil code which render the remedies for article 19. For the tortuous acts committed by the corporation such as calling him name which held no basis and the letter sent by them to retelco alleging resitituto was dismissed due to dishonesty, they are also held liable for art 2176 of the civil code

University of the East vs Jader G.R. No. 132344 Febuary 7 2000 Romeo A. Jadar is a law student in the university of the east. He had one subject deficit in his 1st semester of 4th year which he takes in 2nd semester and filed an

application fro removal for his incomplete grade which was approved by their dean after they payment of the required fees. He took the exam and was given a grade of 5. As a 4th year student, he was expected to graduate and was especially happy when his name was in the list of graduating student that year. He went to the graduate rite, went up to the stage when his name was called together with his mother and brother and was handed by the dean his rolled diploma certifying him as a graduate and alleging that he finish the course of law. After that, he went to celebrate and blow-out all his friends, relative and nighbhors but was shock having to learned that he has a deficiency subject when he enrolled in FEU for review classes thus failing him to take the bar examination. He filed a suit for damages on UE alleging that the it is the school negligence on why he did not able to take the bar examination when he already graduated. The school contended that it doesnt mean that his name appears in the list of graduate he has completed his requirements. The trial court rendered the judement in his favour as well as the CA with modifictaiton. Hence this appeal. Can a school be held laible for damages when their wrongful acts of negligence result injury to another? When a student enrolled in a school, a contract was formed between the institution and the student. The professors or teachers are considered as agents and administrations. It is the contractual duty of the school to informed the students of their status, whther or not they have completed their requirements to conferment of a decree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. A graduation ceremony is not an ordinary occasion it is considered as a special occasion where the school is declaring to the whole world that these students are graduated and has completed all the requirements to attain a certain degree. The school is not in good faith wherein they belatedly inform the student of the result of the removal examination, particularly at the time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exam. The absence of good faith must be sufficiently established fro a successful prosecution in article 19 and a remedy for article 20. The school cant pass the liability to the professors or teachers because of their negligence to submit or delayed report of the information. The negligent act of a professor who fails to oneserve the rule of the school is not imputable to the professor but it is an act of the school being the employer. Hence, the school is liable for the damages as a result to their negligence act of informing the student of their academic status.

Pe vs Pe G.R. No. l-17396 may 30 1962 Facts: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The family of Lolita prohibited such relationship and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. When Lolita was staying with her brother and sister in quezon city, she disappeared. An action for damages was filed by the parents and brothers and sisters, its based on article 21 of the civil code but it was dismissed by the lower court, petitioners appealed. Issue: Can the petitioners recovered damages based on article 21 of the civil code where the defendant cause injury in manner contrary to moral, public policy and good customs? Held: Trying to win the affection of Lolita dont constitute to trickery to seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. As the fact shown, the defendant frequented the house Lolita on pretext that he wanted to teach him to pray the rosary and because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family. The defendant continues to have a relationship with Lolita until the day the disappeared. There is no other conclusion to lead that the defendant did not deliberately but through a clever strategy, succeeding in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit affair with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. Therefore, defendant was order to pay for damages to the plaintiffs.

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO Facts: On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escao, 27, Marries Pastos Tenchavez, 32. The marriage was kept secret to the parents of Escao. When Escaos parents learned about it, they asked for the recelebration of the matrimony which did not took place. Vicenta Pastor. On complaint Judicial August for 22, divorce 1950, in she filled in the on a verified second of ground left for the states without informing against Pastor the District Court Nevada extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. On issued. On September 13, 1954, Escao married an American and had children and later acquired American Citizenship. Issues: Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may be invoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. Held: The Supreme Court held that the divorce is not valid, making the second marriage void since marriage ties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing. Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separation because Escao committed sexual infidelity because of the fact that she had children with the American. Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of the grounds for legal separation.

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA 133 SCRA 179 FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.