The Problem of Language and Mental Representation in Aristotle and St. Thomas Author(s): John P.

O'Callaghan Reviewed work(s): Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Mar., 1997), pp. 499-545 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130071 . Accessed: 11/05/2012 15:20
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AND OF THEPROBLEM LANGUAGE MENTAL AND IN REPRESENTATIONARISTOTLE ST. THOMAS

JOHNP. O'CALLAGHAN

I
In the opening passages of his De Interpretationen Introduction. Aristotle provides a simple summary of how he thinks language re lates to the mind and the mind to reality, a sketch which has often been called his "semantic triangle." He writes:
in the soul, and written Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the the same for all; and of the soul?are first place signs of?affections are likenesses also the of?actual these affections what things?are in the work on the soul and same. These matters have been discussed do not belong to the present subject.2

It has been called a triangle because of the three vertices, words, affections of the soul, and actual things. It is semantic because it has been interpreted to be providing a sketch of the meaning of words,
and how the form Kretzmann As Norman they relate to things. Latin of Boethius's translation, sixth-century out, in points this passage tradi and the onto

"constitute[s]
having tion of reflection world,

the most

influential text in the history of semantics,"3

the subsequent philosophical of language, mind, interrelations often puts it, "how language on

an enormous

influence the upon Putnam

or as Hilary

hooks

of Notre of Philosophy, to: Department University Correspondence Notre Dame, IN 46556. xThe Greek title is Peri hermeneias. trans, with and De Interpretatione, Categories 2Aristotle, Aristotle's notes by John L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 43. "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Conven 3Norman Kretzmann, in Ancient ed. John Corcoran and Its Modem Interpretations, tion," Logic Norman Company, 1974), 3-21. (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing "Semantics, History of," in vol. 7 of The Encyclopedia of Philoso Kretzmann, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 367. phy, ed. Paul Edwards Dame, The Review of Metaphysics
Metaphysics

50 (March 1997): 499-545. Copyright ?

1997 by The Review of

500
the world." yond This is particularly philosophy. is a vision received

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

into modern there or

philosophers, call a standard upon language

but also be Ages, some among Indeed, contemporary of this opening that one might passage view, namely that Aristotle's a seed reflections that grew rela within British of language to

true of the Middle

interpretation planted in Western flowered continuously philosophy, to influence the philosophy and continues empiricism, tively this day. In light of criticism tinuous terize tradition, the Aristotelian Dummett's in this century directed these contemporary however, tradition remarks: as fundamentally

in the De

at this

relatively

con charac

philosophers flawed.

Consider

Michael

to Locke and beyond, from Aristotle had as A continuous tradition, the power of expressing ideas', and to com signed to individual words that of expressing binations of words complex ideas'; and this style of talk had blurred, or at least failed to account for, the crucial distinction a sentence of words which constitute and between those combinations those which form mere phrases which could be part of a sentence.4 made by Grund the most important of all the contributions Perhaps is the attack on the imagist or associationist lagen to general philosophy once fully di This is another of those ideas which, theory of meaning. a obvious: yet Frege was the first to make appear completely gested, clean break with the tradition which had flourished among the British The attack that and had its roots as far back as Aristotle. empiricists was launched by Frege on the theory that the meaning of a word or ex in its capacity to call up in the mind of the hearer an consists pression in the early mental associated image was rounded off by Wittgenstein to rehearse the and it is scarcely necessary part of the Investigations, a hope in detail, the imagist theory now being dead without arguments
of revival.5

In fact, even make tation totle's

interpre to the "notorious" with Aris reference problems oblique on the other hand, hopes to pro Norman remarks.6 Kretzmann,

recent

translators

and commentators

on the De

tect Aristotle
text from ditional

from these kinds of criticism by distancing Aristotle's

tradition of interpretation. He believes that the "tra of is a product for "symbols" in the West [these] passages" the Greek words of translation

its Latin

of misreading unfortunate Boethius's

4 2d ed. (Cambridge: Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, 1981), 3-4. 5 Ibid., 637-8. 6 ". . . the of thought is inadequacy of this as an account or explanation note to and De Interpretatione, Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories notorious"; 16a3,p. 113.

ANDMENTAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

(auu?oXa)
thereby

501
"notae,"

and "signs" (or||xeia) by the single Latin word

between and distinction the Aristotelian symbols "obliterating in conjunction He believes that Boethius's translation, symptoms."7

with the adverb "primarily" (jcq??tcoc) has led, or misled

the tradition

or di to Aristotle that our words the view into attributing primarily or indirectly and only secondarily involve mental impressions, rectly from the This charge would involve certainly gain support things.8 1 in the Prima of Pars of question translation Blackfriars 13, article the Summa Theologiae, reads: which, citing the passage from the Peri

hermeneias,

Aristotle says that words nesses of things, so words The first phrase

are signs for thoughts and thoughts are like refer to things indirectly through thoughts.9 is the translator's that appears of paraphrase in the Latin text. of St. Tho translates It St. to

the quotation The second mas's mediante

in "of things" ending from the Peri hermeneias

phrase

explanation

is the translation in "thoughts" ending The translator of the Aristotelian quote. as

intellectus "indirectly through thoughts." conceptione that from this translation to go on and conclude is no great leap are directly related that words to the thesis is committed Thomas

I be "refer" to thoughts. that they even directly perhaps thoughts, < trans a misunderstanding, and a misleading that this is lieve, however, at St. if it is leveled is false, Kretzmann's In addition, lation. charge I cannot that of Aristotle. Thomas's argue However, interpretation case to indicate Imerely want of this article, For the purposes at the Aristotelian tradition. a plausible directed that it is charge to Ar for the problem he does not attribute responsibility Though here.10

a critical eye over philosophical Sokolowski, casting istotle, Robert or ideas, writes: and concepts words between accounts of the relation

7 "Semantics," 367. Kretzmann, 8See "Aristotle on Spoken Sound," 7. Kretzmann, 9 "Dicendum voces I Peri hermeneias, Philosophum, quod secundum et sic patet sunt rerum similitudines; et intellectus sunt signa intellectum, intellec mediante referuntur ad res significandas conceptione quod voces Thomas Aquinas, Summa q. 13, a. 1, I, (hereafter, S.T), Theologiae tus"; trans. Herbert McCabe 1964), 49. (Cambridge: Blackfriars, ad this in a forthcoming 101 pursue paper, a paper that specifically and St. Thomas, how in their commentaries dresses Ammonius, Boethius, One can also examine John in Aristotle. among others, interpret this passage on Signification and Mind in John Magee, Boethius Magee's fine treatment E. J. Brill, 1989). (Leiden:

502

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
In a Lockean to range only over the do spirit we have allowed words main of our ideas, and we have tacitly taken ideas to be some sort of in ternal things. But philosophically this is terribly naive.11

This

problem, tions conceived

the yoking of language of as "internal things,"

to ideas animates

or mental many

representa of discussions

language and the philosophy

The contemporary critics often

of mind

in contemporary

philosophy.
as a

use mental

representationalism

blanket term to refer to the philosophy of mind to which the account of language is yoked. John Haldane provides the following paraphrase
of mental representationalism: It is the view that the immediate objects of cognitive acts or states are internal entities: species, sentential and such ideas, images, formulae relation to like, which may or may not stand in some further referential objects and features in the world; and that it is the former, inner, rela or inten tional attitudes which constitute the essential object-directed', tional character of cognitive states.12

Alexander Broadie points out that Thomas Reid, already in the eigh teenth century, criticized Hume specifically, but with him the whole tradition back to Plato, for holding theses such as Haldane describes.13 and Reality, Hilary Putnam re More recently, inRepresentation to the theses from the De interpretatione as "a scheme that has fers
proved remarkably robust" for characterizing view," and meaning and reference, the Frege,

though he ultimately
broadly ses with a number

rejects

it as fatally flawed.14
associates advocated purportedly

He refers to it
by Mill,

as "the Aristotelian of others

its constitutive

11 Robert

of Mind," and Current Philosophy John Haldane, "Reid, Scholasticism and Eric Matthews Thomas Reid, ed. Melvin Dalgarno in The Philosophy of Publishers, 1989), 287. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 13 and the Theory of Ideas," Pro "Medieval Notions Alexander Broadie, 87 (1987): 153-67. the Aristotelian Society of ceedings 14 in Represen Hilary Putnam, "Meaning, Other People, and the World," recent and tation and Reality 1988). For a more (Cambridge: MIT Press, treatments of the relation be Putnam to Aristotelian approach by congenial inMod tween language and the mind, see his "Aristotle after Wittgenstein," ed. Robert W. Sharpies em Thinkers & Ancient Thinkers, (Boulder: West view Press, 1993), 117-37; and his recent Dewey Lectures, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the Human Mind," The Journal See also his joint article 91, no. 9 (September 1994): 445-517. of Philosophy on Aristotle's Aristotle's Mind", inEssays with Martha Nussbaum, "Changing and Am?lie Oksenberg ed. Martha C. Nussbaum De Anima, Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 27-56.

ics 40 (March 1987): 456. 12

Sokolowski,

"Exorcising

Concepts,"

The Review

of Metaphys

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION

Russell, and to a certain extent Chomsky, Carnap,15 for example, John Searle's Consider, programmatic Fodor,

503
and Searle. about

comments

the philosophy of language:

Since Frege, reference has been regarded as the central problem in the of language; and by reference I mean not predication, or philosophy but reference, the relation between such expressions truth, or extension as definite descriptions and proper names on the one hand, and the I now think it was a mis things they are used to refer to on the other. take to take this as the central problem in the philosophy of language, because we will not get an adequate theory of linguistic reference until we can show how such a theory is part of a general theory of Intention in the world in gen ality, a theory of how the mind is related to objects
eral.16

Any philosopher in the least favorable toward the passage from the De cannot but look with approval at this passage from interpretation
Searle. As we have seen, however, Putnam is not alone in his charac

terization of this approach and its criticism.

Dummett:

Consider again Michael

a word The British an and Aristotle, empiricists represents whereby a complex of "idea," and a phrase or sentence represents accordingly ideas, is simply too crude to serve even as a starting point; it virtually forces us to adopt the conception whereby the meaning of a word is em bodied in a mental image.17 The guage desires fundamental never criticism of these is that contemporaries in attaining the world, but our lan

actually

succeeds

remains

trapped in the murky internal depths of the mind, despite the explicit
of Aristotelians. talk about On trees the our apparent our mental Aristotelian in supposedly account, at best we succeed in bringing to mind There can critics that are "hook serious onto the difficulties trees" via

of trees. representations with the further thesis that language these mental If these representations. tively recently, has managed that is, in this century, from to emerge

it is only rela the philosophical tradition account of mind and

are right,

this unfortunate

15 Putnam, "Meaning, Other People, and the World," 19. 16John and Meaning: Studies in the Theory Searle, Expression of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), xi. From this quote, itwould appear that Searle differs from Putnam on the interpretation of Frege. For an argument from Putnam on why Frege, despite his anti-psy of 'Mean chologism, ought to be included in the list, see his "The Meaning and Reality ing'," in Mind, Language (Cambridge: University Cambridge Press, 1975), 222. 17 in vol. 3 of The Encyclopedia Michael Dummett, "Frege, Gottlob," of 228. Philosophy,

504

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
pro and "re

that these critics We might refer to the characterization language. view of Aristotelian vide as the "received representationalism," criticism, criticism." ceived However, totle and his their to the extent that it displays a certain unity, the

praisal, than Putnam's, the Aristotelian and most

an eye over the long tradition one might wonder whether interpreters, isn't considerably itself to Locke, confining casting or Dummett's. tradition, we Though we can examine cannot one of

embodied Sokolowski's more survey

in Aris ap

judicious of the whole lasting, Thomas

influential If we

Aquinas. theses, ity for we does

interpretations, this particular consider anachronistic of

namely

its longest that of St.

it appear

interpretation to Aristotle to assign

of Aristotle's responsibil If con

the problems language St. Thomas's examine interpretation

and mental

representationalism? in its own of Aristotle

text, do we find that it suffers from the difficulties

leveled at it in con
triangle show this, I is not to

view accurate? Is the received temporary philosophy? semantic of Aristotle's account In fact, St. Thomas's avoids will the main focus upon thrust of the contemporary criticism. of Putnam's However, criticism. my To purpose Putnam's

with mental rep larger argument as an argument ad but rather to test its adequacy resentationalism, do four I will and St. Thomas. to Aristotle dressed Consequently, in the De remarks a brief account of Aristotle's First, Iwill give things. I of them. and of St. Thomas's Next, understanding interpretation, criti in which Putnam's context a sketch of the historical will provide crit Putnam's Iwill then examine cism should be understood. directly evaluate the soundness icism. Finally, Iwill indicate why this criticism does not, in fact, "cut of St. Thomas's of Aristotle.

at the joints"

interpretation

II Aristotle quoted Ackrill's to the passage, and Dummett's "notorious." and St. Thomas. At the of beginning I did this because something the I article, in his notes

translation Ackrill view,

of Aristotle. seems

himself calling

to share

like Putnam the text

Here,

because

with associated the problems St. Thomas's I am going to examine Boethius's Latin translation

appro

priation of Aristotle,
was commenting

Iwill provide a translation of the text St. Thomas

of the Greek.

on, namely

Boethius's
Kretzmann "signs"

Latin does not differ that much

notes, in the translation by the single of both Latin word

from the Greek except, as

and "symbols" (?u|i?oA,a) where In addition, "notae."

(?Tifxeia)

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION

the Greek first has the adverb has Boethius

505

place," writes: Aristotle

as "in the by Ackrill "jtQ x ?," translated the genitive plural adjective "primorum."18

are in articulated sound are signs of those passions Thus, those which are in the soul: and those which are written are of those things which which are in articulated sound. And just as letters are not the same for sounds the same: but the passions of the all, so neither are articulated these are signs, and the soul are the same for all, of which first passions are also the same. But these things things of which these are likenesses were spoken of in those which were said of the soul, for that is another
work.19

The

ten word

to notice is that "sign" is used to characterize the writ point to the spoken word, to and the spoken word relative relative to characterizing when it comes of the soul. the passions However, first

to things, of the soul relative passions "sign" drops out of the discus we will see, the use of "likeness" As sion, to be replaced by "likeness." to the contemporary in this context adds weight criticism. On the to it suggests that the relation of passions of the soul other hand, things is not of the soul. In any work the same kind of relation as between words and passions matter of the the to

according vocal is "significative context

case,

to St. Thomas sound."20

the

Aristotle his

subject himself

appropriate for that

for understanding work." This

remarks,

by his taken

provides reference

"[those] things [which] were spoken of in those which were said of the
soul, ence Ackrill is another anima. is commonly to be a refer the De anima. start to the De is more and Edghill Apostle simply cite in associating it with De anima he

ing where ing, and opinion, where Aristotle

specific Aristotle distinguishes and where recapitulates

III 3-8,

understand sensation, imagination, treats mostly of imagination, ending what he has just done. All this comes

18 central A of Kretzmann's claims about the errors of presupposition an adverb and an Boethius's translation centers upon this difference between As I note above, I intend to examine his claims in another paper. adjective. 19"Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum eorum quae sunt in voce. notae. Et ea quae scribuntur Et quemadmodum nece littere omnibus eaedem, sic nee eaedem voces. Quorum autem hae pri morum notae sunt, eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae res etiam eaedem. De his quidem dictum est in his quae de an similitudines, ima dicta sunt; alterius est enim negocii"; text of Aristotle in 16a3-9 in Sancti Thomae De Aquino, Eocpositio Libri Peryermenias (hereafter, CPH) (Roma: Commisio Leonina, 1989). 20St. Thomas cites Boethius. The Leonine editors attribute this citation to Boethius's in librum Aristotelis Commentarii Peri hermeneias, proe
mium.

506
before

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

he begins to treat of the soul as moving chapter 9, where princi the body. notes that the text may not have ple Ackrill, however, at all, but rather the addition been Aristotle's of an editor. This textual well with Ackrill's coheres suspicion general philosophical suspicions of concerning mentators in the De the text. The Leonine editors note that Aristotelian com are uncertain anima. also attributes the citation to the De anima, writing: as to the place (de loco dubitant

expositores)

St. Thomas

of these [Aristotle] excuses himself from a more attentive consideration of the soul may be, and in things, because what nature the passions what way they may be likenesses of things, was spoken of in the book De anima; for this work does not pertain to logic, but to the philosophy
of nature.21

commentary as Ackrill. mind

His

the same passages in roughly the picks up Aristotle's point and stresses as background account of the soul and its cognitive for the De powers to the De anima, back the analysis of By referring interpretation. of words and statements the signification is immediately associated suggests St. Thomas that he has a logically understand prior discussion of the means22 beyond "any name by which the soul would human be ani

with ings

mam).23

things (res) existing St. Thomas writes elsewhere,

(extra be aimlessly

21 ". . . excus?t horum consideratione, [se] a diligentiori quia quales sint et quomodo sint rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro De animae passiones ad logicum negotium, sed ad naturalem"; anima; non enim hoc pertinet CPH, L. 1, lectio 2, no. 22. Aquinas, 22 "Non enim se habent ad intellectum sicut quod [species intelligibiles] In Aristotelis Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, sed sicut quo intelligit." intelligitur, librum de anima commentarium (hereafter, CDA), L. 3, lectio 8, nos. 717-18 1936). (Turin: Marietti, 23Consider is that it also Jerry Fodor: "The idea, to put it in a nutshell, to pull off a double reduction: First derive the semantic might be possible from the intentional of mental of linguistic properties symbols properties a population of mental states; then postulate representa symbols?mental of beliefs and desires from tions, . . . , and derive the intentional properties in Scientific An Introduction," in these"; "Mental Representation: Inquiry ed. Nicholas Rescher University Philosophical Perspective, (Washington: from Searle quoted Press of America, 1987), 114. Consider1 also the passage Imention Searle and Fodor not to suggest that they are simply con above. It is account, but merely to gesture at the similarities. tinuing the Aristotelian relate terms with understanding, not clear that when Aristotle and Aquinas sense Fodor might have in mind. their intention is a "reduction" in whatever clear in this article that the latter's intention is not to itwill become Further, a realm of "mental representations," in the modern and contempo postulate
rary sense.

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION

of something unless predicated through stand something it."24 concerning to St. Thomas, Aristotle's According (passions of the account His text reads: soul" animae) signification involves of general that name we might

507
under

reference to avoid

to "passions

of the

an effort terms

in the Platonism, in scientific discourse.

sounds signifying by human institution; But here [his] saying concerns as that here passions and so it is necessary of the soul be understood conceptions of intellect,2* which names, and verbs, and sentences sig to the view of Aristotle. So it cannot be that they signify nify, according which appears from the mode of things themselves without mediation, from signifying: for this name man signifies human nature in abstraction So it cannot be that it signifies a singular man without media singulars. held that it signified the separate idea itself of tion; hence the Platonists to its abstrac man. But because in the view of Aristotle, this, according it was neces tion, does not really subsist, but is solely in the intellect, to say that articulated sounds signify the conceptions for Aristotle sary and things by their mediation.26 of the intellect without mediation General ation count of vocal the terms concepts, signify the intellect's extra on concepts, animam. the manner and, via the medi ac St. Thomas's in which general ideas.

of Aristotle's

res signify thesis focuses

terms signify, their modus

things general The generality

significandi.
extra

General terms do not signify

animam) the human or Platonic

of know from activity The extramental in a general concept. thing signi things ing singular or Plato, or Helen, or Xanthippe, "man" is Socrates, fied by the noun not a general Platonic idea. or Aristotle, all singular beings, and informally is used loosely here; it should not "Thing signified" be taken for the more formal notion of the res significata, or simply

the soul (res beyond of the term is taken

nisi per illud nomen al aliquod nomen de aliquo praedicatur L. iquid de eo intelligamus"; S. Thomae De Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, 33 (Turin: Marietti, 1946). 1, cap. 25 in this context that "passions of the He is ruling out the possibility soul" be taken as "affections of the sensitive appetite," since certain groans may more or less naturally, not by institution, signify pain. 26 "Sed nunc est sermo de vocibus ex institutione humana, significativis animae hie intelligere intellectus conceptiones et ideo oportet passiones quas Aristotelis: et verba et orationes secundum sententiam nomina significant, non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex modo signif in ab enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam icandi apparet: significat a singularibus, immediate unde non potest esse quod significet straction Unde Platonici hominem posuerunt quod significaret ipsam singularem. non suam abstractionem ideam hominis separatam; sed, quia haec secundum sed est in solo intellectu, sententiam Aristotelis, subsistit realiter secundum intellectus dicere quod voces significant fuit Aristoteli ideo necesse concep tiones immediate, et eis mediantibus res"; Aquinas, CPH, L. 1, lectio 2, no. 15.

24 ?Frustra

508

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

the significata of a general vocal utterance. the more formal Using a general of the significata, notion vocal utterance does not take as a singular its signification but rather the itself, say Aristotle, thing or nature of a singular or nature human in Aristotle, form thing, say St. Thomas writes: Plato, or Xanthippe. . . . there are two things to be considered in any name whatsoever: is called the quality namely that from which the name is imposed, which of the name; and that to which the name is imposed, which is called the of the name; and the name, properly speaking, substance is said to sig the name is imposed; on the other nify the form or quality from which hand it is said to stand in place of [to supposit for] that for which it is
imposed.27

Using terance, erence." teacher

this more we

formal

notion

would

then

of the significata its suppositio specify

of a general vocal ut a particular in utter term "ref

ance, where

of Plato, the Lyceum wrote the De interpre of "man" is the human nature the significata of Aristotle, tation^ is the singular In "the man who while its suppositio Aristotle. being of Alexander, and founded to Syracuse, in his mission failed Aristotle, was not present at the death of Socrates," Academy nature of Plato and supposits for Plato. the human taught common a common fers character of human in the nature two in Aristotle sentences, and founded the "man" Because

to the contemporary is much closer suppositio man who was a student in "the So, for example,

signifies of the

signification in the two contexts. if we

and Plato, "man" has but its supposition dif

at the passage from St. Thomas's closely in its application it is clear that signification, to things Commentary, in this technical in but more the soul, is not being used sense, beyond in abstrac nature human writes uman signifies St. Thomas formally. However, look tion from singulars," concept. human vocal which Nowhere nature abstraction is then associated with the in tellect's signifies general in the passage does he write that "man" in singular he writes that the Instead, things. "man" does not "signif[y] a singular man with

utterance

27 ". . . in scilicet id a quo imponi quolibet nomine duo est considerare: et id cui imponitur nomen, quod tur nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis; et nomen, proprie nominis: dicitur significare dicitur substantia loquendo, a qua imponitur nomen; dicitur vero supponere formam sive qualitatem pro eo cui imponitur"; In 3 Sententia, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3 (my translation), from Gyula Saint Thomas Aquinas's Meta Principles Klima, "The Semantic Underlying and Theology 5 (March 1996): 111. I Philosophy physics of Being," Medieval am indebted to Klima's analysis for the formal notion of signficata. There are of course further distinctions to be made with respect to the supposition of concrete and abstract terms. See 15-20. and signification

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

out mediation." mediation" that it does However, a conception that established having he returns of the intellect, it signifies in the end

509
"without to tell us

of the intellect's concept. "things" by the mediation signify to characterize he does not use "singular" "things" in this last Though that the "singular m[e]n," fairly clear that he has in mind line, it seems nature not human are signified without he has just denied mediation, in those men. Later tinction singular "taken" in his commentary, signifying animam, St. Thomas the nature when does make in res how extra dis the requisite and the animam,

between res extra

a general word is to be is sig it is clear that what There enunciation.28 in a particular "homo" is human nature, which may be that of So nified by the nomen or Helen, be or Aristotle, all singular or Plato, or Xanthippe, crates, the in mind to keep that in analyzing it is important ings. However, he asks passage of interest to us here, the soul his use can be is informal. signified by a general term be

beyond Things term without cause the general The nifies a general concept. ness shares differ of

mediation,

the things beyond their form, a form that, when the diverse intelligible constitutes things. We characteristic a principle

general soul that

sig though conventionally, in turn is a natural like concept are singular it because beings, does not considered absolutely, call the form, considered ab

among an solutely,

can

In the intellect, of the thing. a thing beyond the of knowing such of the in and as a principle the act of understanding, soul; it informs The act so informed act it is called the intelligible tellect's species.29 a form

28 10-11. See, for example, CPH, L. 1, lectiones 29 ". . .nam in actu, consideratur qua fit intellectus species intelligibilis, cum omne agens agat secundum actionis ut principium quod est intellectus, in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis prin q. 8, a. 1, dePotentia, Disputatae cipium"; S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones 1949). (Turin: Marietti, respondeo in actum specierum See also: ". . . reducatur quemadmo intelligibilium, in actu, et tune idest habens scientiae dum sciens, habitum, habet species actum. Hoc autem accidit, statim, cum dicitur intellectus qui est secundum quae est ipsum in intellectus, aliquis potest per seipsum operari operatione formam tune aliquis in actu habet, quando potest sicut et quamlibet telligere: illius formae explere"; Aquinas, CDA, L. 3, lectio 8, no. 700. operationem in Me of the intelligible I am well aware that the interpretation species Intelli and involved. See Leen Spruit, Species dieval authors is complicated to Knowledge (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994). See also gibilis: From Perception in Thomism John Peifer, The Concept Associates, (New York: Bookman form taken its use here?the Let me say that I am simply stipulating 1952). as informing the act of understanding. precisely

510
is called

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

the concept.30 In the thing beyond the soul that is known, the form is the principle of being of the thing.31 the conventional between vocal word and Despite relationship the relationship between the concept and the thing is natural concept, and the same for all human beings.32 this is not a doctrine of However, innate from ideas, the nature as if the of the concepts intellect as are naturally likenesses of present of things. soul" in or emanate The concepts ani to indi "from

terms are "passions by vocal signified that the term St. Thomas writes mae). cate from something else; receptivity things by means as agents upon to be structured that structure things."34 That the of a certain the soul

the

"passion" they have

(passions is used here their origin

or passion," which impression things act to cause It is natural them.33 for the intellect by or forms the intelligible characters to the extent that it is "potentially all are actually likenesses of things natural of the things, principles the soul, not from the natu beyond by them.35 presupposed, language for my and and the difficul intellect. here, I issues of

and delimited and delimit

beyond from namely, ral principles Without ties

passions soul results

things, of the soul from the

of the doubt

in things their origin intellect that is modified there are many

to be sorted simply

through

in this account a summary.

I have

provided

However,

purposes

the use of "concept," which has again I am simply stipulating several different uses in St. Thomas's works. 31 cases in for the contrast does not consider This is not quite accurate, case the principle is known from its effects, in which which of something is not formally the same as the principle of being. The full account knowing esse principia, quia is as follows: "... dicuntur eadem essendi et cognoscendi non sunt principia sunt etiam principia quaecumque essendi, cognoscendi; cum effectus autem e converso, interdum sint principia cognoscendi causas"; de Veritate S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones Disputatae (hereafter, QDV), q. 3, a. 3, ad 7 (Turin: Marietti, 1949). 32 "In autem animae oportet attendi rationem similitudinis passionibus eas d?signant, non ex institutione"; ad exprimendas res, quia naturaliter Aquinas, CPH, L. 1, lectio 2, no. 19. 33For a recent discussion of the relation between concept and res, see "The Life of Signs," The Review John Haldane, 47 (March of Metaphysics 1994): 469-70. 34 "Concludit autem ex hoc esse intellectus quod non contingit naturam idest nullam determinatum, sed hanc solam naturam habet '?eque unam,' respectu omnium"; Aquinas, CDA, L. 3, lectio 7, no. 681. quod est possibilis 35 For a discussion of how "likeness" or "image" is and is not being used of Names" in Ralph Mclnerny, The Logic of Anal here, see "The Signification the image ogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 51-2: "Most properly, from the imaged, as the son is the image of the father." Emphasis originates added.

30 Here

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

want to focus on this fundamental structure as interpreted mediation, without things.

511
by St. Tho concepts

mas?words that constitute

signify things, by signifying, of those the understanding

Ill
Historical philosophy As Setting. these supposedly in the hands I indicated Aristotelian at the start, theses in contemporary not fared have

as

well
mind

in the hands of recent influential philosophers

as they did of St. Thomas. However,

of language and
as the passage

from Sokolowski
the difficulties

that I quoted suggests, it is important to understand

by accounts Consider of language and mental representa of Bertrand

faced

tionalism in contemporary philosophy within their historical setting in

modern Russell:36 existent which may be The view seems to be that there is some mental outside the mind of the person who has called the "idea" of something us and outside a veil between the idea. ... in this view ideas become attain to the things we are sup never really, in knowledge, things?we posed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.37 There first the existence to Russell's two key elements difficulty, known is directly and which medi mental of an internal entity which and second the subse the mind, of things outside ates the knowledge are quent skepticism about knowledge of the external world. philosophy. the following comments

The first difficulty

receives

illumination

in the light of themes

and Hume. Locke, Berkeley, from, among others, Descartes, stemming evident for whom it is immediately with Locke, Let us begin, however, is applied his mind of every man that "that which to the consciousness ideas that are there."38 These the Ideas, about whilst being thinking, function der those as pictures appearances of one's before which the mind, to us Things "represent are fitted to produce in us."39 and is thinking about or what un The one

object

knowledge,

they one what

36 the Russell However, speaks of ideas, a term I have not introduced. stands as is for concepts. of the quotation Further, he is not strictly dis gist itwill become apparent why his of terms. However, cussing the signification nonetheless. bear upon the discussion comments 37 and by Description," Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance 119. 10 (1910-11): in Proceedings Society of the Aristotelian 38John Human An Essay Concerning (Oxford: Understanding Locke, Clarendon Press, 1979), book 2, chap. 1, no. 1. 39 book 4, chap. 4, no. 4. Locke, Essay,

512
the private is primarily stock knows, or her own consciousness. He writes: of ideas

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
internally present to his

and Knowledge, is only about the Ideas existing Every Man's Reasoning ... ; and our in his own Mind, and Reasoning about other Knowledge Things, is only as they correspond with those our particular Ideas.40

The mind
openings

is a "closet wholly
left, to let in external

shut from light, with only some

visible Resemblances, or Ideas

little
of

things without; would

the Pictures coming into such a dark Room but

in their simplest ideas their origin The forms42 have stay there."41 to the mind.43 to the things external from things external However, are not present to the understanding.44 account In Locke's the mind an external that func is represented internally by an appearance to this appearance. of it. Thought attends tions like a picture directly to the only things of words then constrained is The signification thing known Because words and the talked about, of contents namely, the mind the ideas that fill up our

directly minds.

are wholly internal and or im as their "primary "voluntary signs" having private,45 to communicate them to oth mediate ideas, serving signification"^ is not to communi is that the goal of language ers.47 The suggestion our to communicate but about extramental cate things, directly are

40 book 4, chap. 17, no. 8. Locke, Essay, 41 book 2, chap. 11, no. 17. Locke, Essay, 42 of those that arise from the mind's reflection upon With the exception its own activity. 43 "The of seems to me, not to have the least glimmering Understanding it doth not receive from one of these two. External Objects any Ideas, which theMind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those dif furnish the Under in us: And the Mind furnishes ferent perceptions they produce book 2, chap. 1, with Ideas of its own operations"', Locke, Essay, standing
no.

44 ?por since the are none of them, be Things, the Mind contemplates, that something 'tis necessary sides it self, present to the Understanding, else, should be present to it; of the thing it considers, as a Sign or Representation and these are Ideas"-, Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 21, no. 4. 45 and such, from "MAN, though he have great variety of Thoughts, which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of book 3, chap. 2., no. 1. Also, be made to appear"; Locke, Essay, themselves cannot be laid open "... the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, to the immediate view of another..."; Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 21, no. 4. 46 book 3, chap. 2, no. 2. Locke, Essay, 47 "... because can the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, to commu Therefore to the immediate view of another,... not be laid open ; to one another, as well as record them for our own use, nicate our Thoughts Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 21, no. 4. Signs of our Ideas are also necessary";

5.

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

internal were ideas about extramental accessible seems use of to other minds, to suggest. "voluntary signs" and his of words reference to the to remind If the contents things. there would be no need for

513
of our minds language,

or so Locke Locke's mary the De discussion ever,

or immediate interpretation. in Aristotle he was

signification," It certainly and

ought some similarity the with suggests how be a mistake, It would St. Thomas. commenting suggestion upon of that. or employing the De J. Ashworth Earline at Oxford Locke to use

"pri us of

to think

interpretation. that suggests mind.48 phrase external

directly There is no had near

he

of the signification of ideas" to characterize how substantively But it presently words. appears things by for Aristotle to St. Thomas, is. According his account different general but they can also be said without words mediation, concepts signify

Still, given "by the mediation

contemporary we might the similarity,

scholastics expect

in the

properly to signify things by the mediation

we have in St. Thomas's two analogous One use

of concepts.
uses

I think that

thought to the pair [words, passions applies use applies to the triple [words, Another relation. a two-term a three-term the soul]; this involves of the soul, things beyond Since term one relation is a two-term relation, while the other

of "signification." of the soul]; this involves passions relation. is a three

to and its cognates of "signification" the application relation, but must be analogous.49 them cannot be univocal, on the other hand, words For Locke speaking signify properly a "secret He says that men to the mind. give only the ideas internal to the ideas the ideas of the mind, to words reference" namely beyond So to the mind. and to things external of others, in the minds present that it is il but he suggests of things occurs, some sort of signification licit, writing: ... it is a perverting the use of Words, into their Signification, and Confusion for anything, but those Ideas we have and brings unavoidable we make whenever in our Minds.50 Obscurity them stand

48See Earline J. Journal "Locke on Language," Canadian of Ashworth, "Do 14, no. 1 (March 1984): 45-73; and Earline J. Ashworth, Philosophy Sources of Locke's Theory of Words Signify Ideas or Things?: The Scholastic 19 (July 1981): 299. theHistory Journal of Philosophy of Language," 49Since the two uses are not is not an op pure equivocation unrelated,
tion.

50

Locke, Essay,

book

3, chap. 2, no. 5.

514 Properly speaking, words

the internal St. Thomas Hume the internal

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN should not signify external things, but only

in as

of external What is analogous representations things. in Locke. is perverse in large measure follows Locke in his account of ideas

of knowledge.51 He differs from him in drawing objects more out the implications doubt upon whether rigorously, casting are representations these internal of external objects really objects. are ever present to the mind For him, ". . . no beings except percep tions."52 He writes: [t]he most make itself tion of an me, is only
tion.53

informs us that no external object can vulgar philosophy known to the mind immediately, and without the interposi That table, which just now appears to image or perception. a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a percep

Our

conviction arises

that external because the

tations condition

objects internal

resemble

these

internal are

representations

represen a necessary are ex If all we less vibrant

for describing external Hume criticizes55 However, objects actually attenuated external

objects.54 conviction Locke's

that

there

ternal can more exist

by our resembling perceptions. represented sense are internal and know impressions ideas, to the mind no sense that can be made cause of the claim and

that objects

resembling

representative

51 Hume chided Locke for applying the term "idea" to all the However, that Locke "perverted" the term from its original mind's perceptions, writing that sense. However is a terminological the dispute one, as Hume specifies less vibrant and forceful though similar to ideas are a species of perception of sensation. that are impressions the original perceptions 52 Human ed. Lewis A. Selbe-Bigge David Hume, A Treatise Nature, of (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), book 1, part 4, sec. 2, p. 212. 53 Hume, Treatise, book 1, part 4, sec. 5, p. 239. 54 "We never can conceive and therefore must anything but perceptions, book 1, part 4, sec. 2, p. make every thing resemble them"; Hume, Treatise, 216. 55 of Berkeley. "But philosophers This is a criticism reminiscent having do not exist without objects of perception plainly seen that the immediate the mistake of the vulgar, but at the the mind, they in some degree corrected same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are the mind, or having a subsistence dis certain objects really existing without our ideas are only images or resem of which tinct from being perceived, blances, imprinted by those objects on the mind"; George Berkeley, Princi (London: Penguin Books, 1988), part 1, no. 56. ples of Human Knowledge

ANDMENTAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

perceptions in minds.56 Further, the very notion of an external

515

object our internal representations is the "monstrous resembling offspring"57 of Locke's Reminiscent of a philosophical dark room, system.58 of a luminous external world, the connotation he com though without the mind to a stage: "The mind is a kind of theatre, where sev eral

pares

make their appearance; pass, repass, successively perceptions in an infinite variety of postures and situations. and mingle glide away, .. ."59 It seems a mere fa?on to refer to to continue de parler for Hume or as as representations of external of the mind the contents objects, referring that they language the mind. for we have no good reason for thinking objects, or refer to anything It seems external. that at best represent in the theater that appear of the perceptions is only about to external Russell's description finds real correlates,

So at least historically

and his worries

in Hume. about

about the inevitability of skepticism find justification

little outside of Locke has been said To this point, however, of words. Most of the discussion and reference has the meaning on the external not language. of knowledge, Yet centered objectivity as to this account of mind and its objects, of language it is the yoking as its suspected in Aristotle, that our contemporaries well patrimony find so problematic. in the The turn to language in part to have been it can be understood and what to be understood
ism.

last hundred a turning

years, has

from,

in light

of

this

so-called

classical

representational of classical influenced

to recognize that It is important in this century, sentationalism though

the criticism

repre by

in large measure

it fol as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions, or a relation of cause and effect be lows that we may observe a conjunction it between tween different perceptions, but can never observe perceptions or any of the that from the existence It is impossible, and objects. therefore, the ex concerning qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion istence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular"; Hume, Treatise, book 1, part 4, sec. 2, p. 212. which arise from the sense, their ultimate "As to those impressions, cause is, ... ,perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and it will always be to decide with certainty, whether from the they arise immediately impossible by the creative power of the mind, or are derived object, or are produced from the Author of our being"; Hume, Treatise, book 1, part 3, sec. 5, p. 84. 57 Hume, Treatise, book 1, part 4, sec. 2, p. 215. 58 The first book of the Treatise to carrying is in large measure devoted this critical analysis for the impressions and ideas of substance, through cause, self, mind, and personal identity. 59 Hume, Treatise, book 1, part 4, sec. 6, p. 253.

56 "...

516
Wittgenstein, ings of his turn of the did not criticism century

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
are certain There foreshadow begin with him. in others, Husserl and Frege. Near the especially both of them, concerned for the objectivity of

of language, and the reference reacted truth, meaning, strongly against and the identification classical of the meaning of representationalism em terms with internal mental Besides the classical representations. piricists, writes: the name 'Bismark' itmakes not the slightest difference to my of the word's I imagine the unified meaning, whether understanding uniform, or whatever great man in a felt hat or coat, or in a cuirassier's I may adopt. It is not even of importance pictorial representation of meaning, whether any imagery serves to illustrate my consciousness or to enliven it less directly.60 If I hear He 2 to the analysis of Investigation and cri on these questions and Hume of the repre Berkeley, tique of Locke, He criticized them for making of thought. ideas character sentational devotes section interior a large both of them had in mind their latter-day descendants, espe

cially the psychologism

of John Stuart Mill

in his Logic.

Husserl

that in Locke, such interior pre of perception. objects Noting are usually that is, "each idea is an intentional sentations experiences, he criticizes him for con it presents idea of something, something," is as such presented, with what the "presentation appearance fusing as a really immanent the act or act-phenomenon, with what appears, the object of consciousness, with intended."61 in the stream element a parallel with Russell's crit from Husserl One can see in this passage icism. tween terms, consist of Something, the mind he writes, in picking an "act or act-phenomenon" and the object. Further, is intruding with itself in be to universal regard .. , names does not,. complexes In a pas 'meanings'."62 from such

of universal "naming by means out particular ideas universal them to words as their

ideas,

and attaching

60 trans. John N. Findlay (New Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, York: Humanities Press, 1970), book 1, chap. 4, no. 30. 61 book 2, chap. 2, no. 10. Husserl, Logical Investigations, 62 Ibid. see the deceptive confusions in "now we completely Also, name truth that each universal From the obvious train of thought. Locke's he passes on to assert that a general has its own peculiar universal meaning, idea is for him simply a sepa to every general name, which idea corresponds and "we tend naturally to turn our gaze among rate intuitive presentation"-, to whatever has primary intuitive palpability; we are then logical phenomena our are found to accompany into taking the inner pictures which misled that a of those names. Ifwe become names as the meanings clear, however, is merely what we mean, or what we understand by an expression, meaning we cannot maintain such a conception"; Husserl, Investigations, Logical book 2, chap. 3, no. 15.

ANDMENTAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

sage writes that foreshadows the problems we will see in Wittgenstein, of Hume:

517
he

... the same individual idea fits into many circles of similarity, though in ideas from one such cir it only represents each definite thought-context in a given cle. What circumstance picks out this circle of representation function of the individual idea in context, what limits the representative this manner and so makes unity of sense possible?63 For Husserl, the fundamental or general problem in the is that "historical treatment of

"the sign did duty for representation, abstraction," for of or substitutes in place The sign stands the thing signified." that We saw earlier the latter is not present. because what is intended contemporary Husserlian commentators like Robert Sokolowski con

tinue this criticism. Continuing the quote from Sokolowski

words in the beginning, namely to range only over taken ideas to be some sort idea other is not an internal

that I cited

that "in a Lockean spirit we have allowed of our ideas, and we have tacitly the domain of internal things," Sokolowski sense adds, it is really "an not

we find to Frege, that he wishes from the logical, the subjective the psychological sharply He writes: jective."65 When What

to the thing we turn

entity and in an important it is the idea."64 of which

"to separate from the ob

is a content of my consciousness, my idea, should be sharply dis the thesis Therefore from what is an object of my thought. tinguished can be the to the content of my consciousness that only what belongs of my thought, is false.66 object of my awareness, in part

states that of mental character and private the subjective to account for the "ob to posit his "third realm" of thoughts led Frege con and the common These of language. objections jective" meaning Itwas cern with the skepticism perceived to be attendant upon mental

63 book 2, chap. 5, no. 34. Husserl, Logical Investigations, 64 456. See also Barry Smith, "Frege and Hus Sokolowski, "Exorcising," Journal of Reference," serl: The Ontology Society for Phenom of the British enology 9, no. 2 (May 1978): 111-25. 65 trans. John to Foundations Gottlob Frege, introduction of Arithmetic, L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1980), p. x. 66Gottlob "The Thought: A Logical 65, no. 259 Inquiry," Mind Frege, 306. Trans. Anthony M. and Marcell Quinton. (July, 1956):

518
representations, serl, Frege, and form a historical point of their heirs.67

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
intersection between Hus

Wittgenstein

in the Philosophical
to criticism the thesis

Investigations

submitted clas

sical representationalism68 He criticized nalism.69 can be accounted

for by internal in conjunction of the objects talked about, with meaning-confer ages or assign acts that correlate the representations to external ring or written The criticism in the Investigations sounds of symbols.70 determination of reference finds its context in the Trac the pictorial of sentence but also in the Fregean the tatus's picture theory truth,71 67 concerns and common of the original interaction of For a discussion and Frege (Bloomington: Husserl and Frege, see J. Mohanty, Husserl Indiana The Phenomenological Move Press, University 1982); Herbert Spiegelberg, ment 1982), 84-100; Barry Smith, "On the Ori (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Graezer Philosophische Studien 35 (1985), Philosophy," gins of Analytic 153-73; Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge: Har "Husserl and Frege," Jour vard University Press, 1994); Robert Sokolowski, nal of Philosophy 84, no. 10 (1987): 521-8; Smith, "Frege and Husserl"; Rich Husserl and Analytic Kluwer ard Cobb-Stevens, Philosophy (Dordrecht: Academic Publishers, 1990). This last is particularly interesting for the stress the Aristotelian tradition. it places upon seeing Husserl as continuing 68 address by name Descartes, He does not, however, Locke, Berkeley, are by no means exhausted and Hume, and the Investigations by the treat ment of representationalism. 69Inwhat follows I am "Life of Signs." partially indebted to Haldane's 70 ". . . a mental ac than calling meaning is more wrong-headed nothing that is, one is setting out to produce Witt confusion"; Ludwig tivity! Unless, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Investigations, genstein, Philosophical Macmillan Co., 1958), no. 693. Publishing 71 "At the first as it stands printed on [Satz]?say glance the proposition not seem to be a picture of the reality of which it treats. But nor paper?does score appear at first sight to be a picture of a musical does the musical piece; nor does our phonetic spelling (letters) seem to be a picture of our spoken in the ordi prove to be pictures?even language. And yet these symbolisms Trac sense of the word?of what they represent"; Ludwig Wittgenstein, nary & trans. Charles K. Ogden (London: Routledge tatus Logico-Philosophicus, added. Kegan Paul Ltd., 1986), no. 4.011. Emphasis in the Tracta to Wittgenstein that according It is important to recognize are not pictures of objects, but rather of facts [no. 2.1], which tus, sentences it is impor Even more of states of affairs. facts are themselves composed relation generally of the picturing that he did not conceive tant to recognize sense of the "even in the ordinary lines, despite his phrase along sensual it shares the very same word [pictures]." A sentence pictures a fact because as the fact, not because its sensual appearance is like the logical structure of the fact it pictures?it sensual appearance pictures the fact's logical struc and picturing, see Justus Hartnack, Wittgen ture. For more on the Tractatus of Notre Dame Press, stein and Modern Philosophy (Notre Dame: University to Wittgenstein's An Introduction Tractatus 1986); and G. E. M. Anscombe, of Pennsylvania Press, 1971): chaps. 3-5. University (Philadelphia:

for its picturing and its inter that the meaningfulness of language conceived of as im representations

ANDMENTAL REPRESENTATION 519 LANGUAGE

sis that the sense of a term is "the mode ent,72 or as reference."73 sense it is more If sense said commonly is to determine of presentation" these days, "sense and we picture pictorial of its refer determines identify presenting represen men the

or meaning of a term with then what to the mind an external object, an object is referred to from

reference, an internal mental is it about

tation that is sufficient for performing this function? How is it that we

know an examination of its internal tal representation? Wittgenstein writes: our Has

is to see that the same thing can come before is essential What still be different. minds when we hear the word and the application both times? I think we shall say not.74 it the same meaning a Renaissance has his wife and baby painter Suppose and child. The painter's of the Madonna for a painting and the child Jesus, but anyone who it represent Mary pose knows

as models is that his wife

intention

and child would

and Jesus.

likely take it to be representing

about the painting If it is replied resemblance, as such that while

the latter, not Mary

unambigu his sym

Nothing it represents. ously what wife and child by visual

determines

it naturally can

represents and conventionally still determine rather

Mary and Jesus, bolically representing an examination alone of the picture by woman that it is of this particular uously closely point sister resembling about the universal and child. character

then we one could

ask whether unambig than say her Hume's

and child, need only

We

consider that:

of ideas,

namely

in themselves ideas are, therefore, Abstract individual, however they The image in the mind is may become general in their representation. of it in our rea only that of a particular object, though the application soning be the same as if itwere universal.75 is not the picture Perhaps and child, but all of them. intended How to represent any particular determine this? mother

can we

in Translations the from Frege, "On Sense and Reference," ed. Peter Geach and Max Black Gottlob Frege, Philosophical Writings of 1970), no. 26. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 731have not been able to find Frege actually using the phrase "sense de use of translations. I am making termines reference," though admittedly Those who use this phrase in the context of Frege typically cite the passage in which he says that the sense of a term is the mode of presentation of its See for example Dummett, Frege, chap. 5, "Sense and Reference." reference. 74 no. 140. Investigations, Wittgenstein, 75 book 1, part 1, sec. 7, p. 20. Compare John Haldane, Hume, Treatise, of images are either particular, who writes, "the representational properties or else they are general and sin in which case generality is left unexplained, "Life of Signs," 459. for"; Haldane, gular reference remains unaccounted

72 Gottlob

520
It seems painting, or perhaps own that the painter determines sense already knowing determines and what and concerns,

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
the object represented by the to represent; what he wants in view intent of his of the

in some

the observer

context

is represented of the irrespective

one knows when painter?"only cance of the picture."76 Outside faceless icons. are, in a sense, into an internal mental image,

the story does one know the signifi of the context of use, representations when the picture is made However, the difficulties are compounded. Who

or observer the referential of the is the painter properties establishing it to an object? Not the mind acting internal presentation, determining on the image, for by supposition the mind does not have independent knowledge ter of the In fact, regress of the reference but seeks to fix the representative by which to determine the reference from of the thesis is that on it leads charac the image. infinite

image, one line of criticism

to an images.77

of homunculi

Wittgenstein's to pictorial likened tations to represent in order tation tal images must

reference conferring centered criticism upon resemblances determinate

internal

that represen recognizing a context of interpre require internal men which objects,

interpretation cannot give

are going to determine reference. Yet "any do, it interprets, and in the air along with what still hangs do not de themselves it any support. by Interpretations if they

76 Wittgenstein, 77 "We cannot in order

some entity?a

no. 663. Investigations, in terms of representation because explain Intentionality there must be some agent who uses for there to be a representation
picture or a sentence or some other object?as a representa

some agent uses itmust be because tion. Thus if a belief is a representation of be But this offers us no account whatever the belief as a representation. lief because we are not told what the agent does in order to use his belief as a homuncu the theory requires a mysterious and furthermore representation, in order that it can use the beliefs as represen lus with its own Intentionality tations; and if we follow this through itwill require an infinite regress of ho states in has to have further Intentional since each homunculus munculi, or indeed in or order to use the original Intentional states as representations Vermont: der to do anything"; Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms (Montgomery, An Bradford Books, 1978), 122-5, as quoted in John Searle, Intentionality: Mind in the Philosophy Press, of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Essay 1988), 21. Searle remarks that "Dennett, who thinks this is a genuine prob is to postulate that the solution lem, calls this 'Hume's problem' and believes See in general chap. 1: whole armies of progressively stupider homunculi!" See also Searle's more "The Nature of Intentional States," esp. 13-14, 21-2. Of recent The Rediscovery 1994), 212-14. (Cambridge: MIT Press, of Mind in the idiom of "intentionality." course Searle is speaking See, however, and also John Mc "Life of Signs," 459, using the idiom of reference, Haidane's in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Dowell, "Meaning and Intentionality 17 (1992): 40-52, esp. 42. in Philosophy Studies Midwest

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

What termine meaning."78 to determine the meaning turn determines accompany "when mind vehicle the is required of is a custom and context which

521
of use79

speech. I think in language, of thought."80

in characters, meaning linguistic or may not of the images that may interpretation is that to Wittgenstein, what is clear According there going 'meanings' the language expressions: aren't through my is itself the

in addition

to the verbal

IV Putnam's Criticism. This historical of provides setting the "Aristotelian a context view." By

criticism Putnam's for understanding now we find familiar his paraphrase:

in the mind that picks out the ob the picture is that there is something that we talk about. When such a something jects in the environment of the meaning (call it a "concept") is associated with a sign, it becomes the sign.81

For Putnam
Fregean sentation cle thesis

it is clear that the central difficulty

that

is raised by the
the mental repre arti the of In his

to representationalism: adapted refers what the word determines 'Meaning'," of his criticism, which

of "The Meaning elements fundamental the account of what

is the

to, if anything. locus classicus is key,

this element

along

with

cal

solipsism

he calls methodological solipsism. Methodologi that "no psychological is the thesis state, properly the existence state of any that function about. individual The other than thesis is ascribed."82 then

so

called, ject quires

presupposes to whom that that the

the sub re

ological world

representations must still solipsism and talked

Fregean the scope fall within

of method

thought

in the to "pick out" the objects of the mental By a knowledge

78 no. 198. Investigations, Wittgenstein, 79 of identifying of the inadequacies For a discussion "meaning" with ac rules of use, and nothing more, see John tual use in accord with established "Life of Signs", esp. part 3: ". . . all such rules tell us is how to pro Haldane, ceed in [a language]; they advert to a usage but do not explain how it is possi ble for the usage itself to exist. To explain that "cat," say, can refer to a cat because people use "cat" to refer to cats, does not yet explain how this or any 454. other sign can be invested with significance"; 80 no. 329. Investigations, Wittgenstein, 81 19. and Reality, Putnam, Representation 82 Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" 220.

522
representation is supposed Putnam's difficult several ous ways identified to know criticism with

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
the meaning of a term, the referent of that term. the Aristotelian

is so broadly in scope conceived that it can be to determine the specific I think just what target is. However, can be picked out as essential theses to it, theses that in vari can be seen to be at play criticism of it. in the classical The first thesis modern is that tradition, there are

and Wittgenstein's things or objects

in the mind,83

which

and appearances images, the mind and external that are "interposed"

of things there things,

things or objects So outside the mind. is a third realm

are pictures, to in addition things Iwill call

of mental things.

between

the mind

and external

this the third-thing

conscious it primarily Aristotelian, activity knows. Putnam

thesis. The second thesis is that the mind

attends to these internal Comparing indicates so-called that what Platonistic they share objects versions with

in its
the

of thinking

as what

in common

is that:

. . . speakers are supposed to to be able to direct their mental attention means of something if A and B are akin to perception, and, concepts by to B are different to A and attending then attending different concepts, . . . The mental which state of the speaker determines states. mental what it is he refers and thereby determines he is attending to, concept
to.84

The difference
is that where, the

for Putnam between

concepts a mental is no

the Platonist and the Aristotelian

are internal mental objects. Else as "something relation and the introspectible." between represented the

the Aristotelian's he characterizes

object

So Iwill refer to this as the introspectibility

thesis that mental outside there intrinsic or necessary in the mind, so-called things representations it. He writes:

thesis. Finally, there is

Even

both verbal and vi a large and complex system of representations, with what connection still does not have an intrinsic, built-in,... sual, of how itwas caused and what connection it represents?a independent of the speaker or thinker are.85 the dispositions it betrays a "survival of magical thinking"86 to suggest

For

Putnam,

that there is some intrinsic relation between mental representations Mental Content?1 stresses and what they represent. Colin McGinn, in
in the mind. thinks that they are events or occurrences and Reality, chap. 2, note 1, p. 129. Representation ^Putnam, 85 Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge Hilary Putnam, Reason, Press, 1981), 5. University 86 2. Truth, and History, Putnam, Reason, 87 Colin McGinn, Mental Content 1989). (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 83 Putnam

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

the

523

as that Putnam of the background of this element importance to be in sumes to criticize; the internal things are thought and wishes to the mind. incor This specifically facts internal dividuated solely by of methodological the assumption solipsism. Following porates

McGinn, Iwill call this the internalist

Putnam provides does not often

thesis.
against these theses,88 but

pro experiments, counterexamples thought to argue that mental fashion89 in Wittgensteinian representa ceeding his most sort do not determine reference. tions of whatever Perhaps of The burden is the idea of "Twin Earth."90 counter famous example the Twin thought or communities Earth, So could with Earth experiment of persons, have is to indicate one on earth identical how two different on a ficti representa to distinct XYZ may our Twin and one mental refer

argue formally and imaginative

persons tions natural look, Earth

tious Twin

associated kinds.

a word, for

qualitatively that same word yet with on Twin like our Earth, earth's

instance just

substance

H20. When to "water," however, they are not referring repre H20, as we do when we use the term, but to XYZ. So the mental on the two earths, cannot be ex hypothesi is identical which sentation, of the term. As McGinn the reference out, if the points determining were then varying the reference, mental determining representation feel, and taste smell, use the term cousins

88 to his use of the He will make reference This is not strictly accurate. is intended to formally prove the impos Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, which Of course, in or realism. sibility of another thesis that he calls metaphysical and der for his proof to have the kind of generality he wants, he assumes, is a formal does not show, that any system of mental representation theory in It would remain open for an opponent the sense required by the theorem. is a theory in the system of representation simply to deny that a particular if it can be thought to be a theory at all. sense required by the theorem, Though this point about the sense of "theory" required for use of the theorem arti and prior to my reading of the following to me independently occurred in Reading Put see Michael Hallett, "Putnam and the Skolem Paradox," cle, 1994), 66-97. nam, ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, as well as a bibliography, Hallett provides a detailed and in-depth discussion, of Putnam's use of the Theorem. 89 of representation that we know about He writes, "none of the methods it is refer to whatever has the property that the representations intrinsically 21. and Reality, that they are used to refer to"; Putnam, Representation 90 ?Twin Earth" made its first in Putnam's article "The Mean appearance of 'Meaning'." This article has recently been reprinted in The Twin Earth ing on Hilary "TheMeaning Putnam's Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection and Sanford Goldberg ed. Andrew (Armonk: M. E. Pessing of Meaning'," of some of the most prominent discussions Sharpe, 1996). This is a collection of Putnam's piece that have appeared over the years.

524
in the environment everything should not vary the reference. Putnam except

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
the mental representation

on this example,91 variations but what is com provides mon is put is that the qualitative identity of the mental representations sense in terms of the identity of descriptions predominantly involving to distin and the ability on the basis of sense experience experience, guish distinct external objects. The sense understood is itself predominantly however, to ances to the mind; we talk about water that exists external internal consists of appearances of water that ex but our experience the mind, ist internal view, while about words, cannot identity we the to the mind. can be talking His about claim that on the Aristotelian requires two distinct things or kinds of things, we are talking what that determine to our to these we are introspection. internal mental talking the assumption is not aspect, about. So, in our use of experience along the so described, lines of appear

internal

are qualitatively

appearances identical

consciously attending what be determining

representations The qualitative that the mental

re intrinsically of that is, the assumption the mind, outside it represents lated to what one could not vary so related, For if itwere solipsism. methodological manner for the thought in the the environment necessary experiment, remain the same. and have the representation Putnam chotomy totelian nal believes the internal representationalist is committed to this di between pictures The Aris and external appearances reality. user as holding before his mind an inter language the language this internal appearance by knowing to know the external by this appear thing pictured the thing talked user about. There is some "third talked and the external thing" about.

embodies of the appearances in its representational representation,

the

appearance; user is supposed ance, The and so know to the in addition third

thing language itself... between "intrudes representation, thing, the mental as Russell In fact, it is difficult while and the object," the mind says. treatments various not to think of Locke's Putnam's analysis reading essences in the Essay. of real and nominal There are then three crucial elements to the three to Putnam's theses thesis,

counterexample, above. First,

corresponding corresponding

by argument that we outlined there is a realm

to the third-thing

91The in Twin Earth is the term "water," and the substances example in it could be real world examples and XYZ, but as Putnam indicates, H20 and brass, and the term "gold." Also his "brain in a vat" can be volving gold evil de taken to be a variant. The latter is in a way an updating of Descartes' mon thought experiment.

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION

of internal appearances in addition to the because to the mind and external

525

Second, we are edge

corresponding talking about

introspectibility of our internal

things. thesis, we know what and introspective knowl

that represent the external appearances objects. Third, to the internalism of identity the conditions of thesis, corresponding do not include the external but the appearances represented, things or in Putnam's to the mind, internal facts entirely only terminology, of these and operational constraints." Each of these the solely by "theoretical or another ses can be seen to be at play in one way in Locke and a "dark closet" or "the of the mind and their metaphors being Hume, are particularly Putnam's of appearances" criticism apt. Further, to be a fanciful updating of Wittgenstein's. appears un the picture fit more If we try to make St. Thomas's explicitly ater at the beginning of the article, of Aristotle described derstanding to be the concept, inside the soul. the third thing appears existing to things outside and necessary relation has no intrinsic concept soul. Furthermore, signify because extramental words then The the and

mediately

things,

objects primary scious attention, jects are talked move on criticism alism directed

of knowledge, that the language about. Now, whether

immediately signify concepts, as it is by knowing the concepts con them before the mind's holding user knows what extramental theses, is subject we ob may to the

to determine

in light of these three account St. Thomas's

in modern

of language and mental contexts. and contemporary

at the union

representation

Cutting at the Joints

sis. Recall that

of the Three Theses: The Third-Thing

thesis asserts that there is some

The
inter

the third-thing

nal mental
world. isa: John

thing (res) that is interposed between

Haldane, summarizing the difficulty,

the mind
indicates

and the
that there

common tendency to assume that the existence of a process of a product distinct from it. More particularly, existence that talk of forming a thought, or of making a representation, manufacture of a third thing to which consciousness is then

implies the to suppose implies the directed.92

92John "Brentano's Problem," Graezer Philosophische Studien Haldane, 35 (1989): 25. Though not always agreeing with them, inwhat follows I am in debted to Haldane and Searle in Intentionality for clearing away many obsta cles inmy own thought on this point.

526
Is there such a tertium

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

and interposed between quid manufactured a thing (res) other intellect and world? For St. Thomas, is the concept than the intellect that knows,93 and other than the thing (res) extra an imam that is known? for the most part confining his crit Sokolowski, icism tion to modern trends, thinks that an affirmative is not how answer properly things and known to this ques to applied are essen thing, a concept not is philosophically The answer concepts. tially three. involved, ought

naive; "thing" to the question, to be two, knowing

many

thing

In the account

I have

given

of St. Thomas's

thought,

is

the informed activity of the intellect, as it grasps things beyond the

soul (res extra stance's capacity it, is to the animam). to engage intellect, The intellect is simply the human sub as I am in just that act, that is, the concept, as act to potency. There is a process-prod

using This

uct ambiguity when describing

this informed activity of the intellect.

to the intellect's act. Often is not, however, peculiar ambiguity an act, we are correct our estimation in times in describing that, in ad to the act, something other than it is produced. So for instance, dition re we normally act of pitching of the pitcher's think that the product we call the pitch. a certain in the ball having which sults trajectory, On such the other additional We hand, there are activities the though "Sebastian say, engage we language strolled we in that involve no use might suggest in Bologna." Alterna in Bologna." Do we sug or object that Se thing If we it do, how does that we normally

product,

otherwise.

might took a stroll say, "Sebastian tively, we might the latter that there is some additional gest by bastian relate took, to accompany to other predicates him while with

strolling? phrases

modifying

find appropriate in descriptions of things taken? Did he take the stroll off the shelf? Did the stroll belong to someone else, so that he did not
a stroll, but stole a stroll? Did he take the stroll in hand, perhaps No. Or sup under the starlight? at it in the moonlight, to pitch woo are other things a fateful bath." Here there pose we say, "Marat took and so forth. Yet none of these the soap, the water, involved?the tub, take is the thing that presumably we would have in mind when we say, "Ma

93 it is the intellectual substance that knows, Of course, strictly speaking means See Aquinas, CD A, L. 3, lectio 7, no. 690: "Manifes of his intellect. by tum est enim quod hie homo intelligit_intellectus est, quo igitur possibilis hie homo, formaliter loquendo, intelligit." See also Aquinas, S.T., I?II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 2.

LANGUAGE AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION

rat took a fateful bath." Itwould for him be entirely inappropriate to take alone?"

527
to respond,

is awry. that something Clearly we are examples suggest "take" in any literal sense when we speak of "taking a stroll," not using "to take a stroll" or "to At best, or say, "Marat took a fateful bath." "to stroll," or "to of saying to be elliptical take a bath" appear ways that are their forms do not indicate additional things by bathe," which "taken." "Sebastian is no more gna"; verbs way One way strolled that the conjunction, this is to recognize of seeing took a stroll in Bologna," and Sebastian in Bologna in Bolo strolled "Sebastian than the simple informative of "p & p," rather than just "p." Nominalization not a is a way of talking about our activities, to our activi in addition realm of things another one makes of the great us look sources for a thing be of philosophical that corresponds

"Oh, wasn't These

it too heavy

it is like asserting into substantives

of recognizing "We are up against a substantive wilderment: ties. to it."94 is not point in these examples This

est

consider difference act. than nent

or insightful. The inter surprising, particularly lies in the context they provide when we turn to is the the examples between In fact the difference concepts. a transient act and an immanent between for St. Thomas act, the act has its termination in some being other In an imma the agent,

In a transient

or perfecting that other being. the agent, completing sense within in some act, the act has its termination or perfecting "employ," the concept," it. When we employ words and so like

completing prehend,"

in chil them, we develop grasped should our use to function dren the concepts necessary linguistically," "He pitched be analyzed of such words along the lines of the example, "He took a stroll," and "He took a or rather like the examples, the ball," fateful bath"? I think that the answer is clearly the lines of the stroll and along form of talking about our act of is a nominalized the bath. "Concept" of class or category to an additional not a way of referring conceiving, we retain if to our acts. Strictly or things, in addition speaking, objects the tactile word "grasp,"95 we do not grasp concepts. We conceive,

"develop," "produce," or "by speaking with

"grasp," "ap as in "he forth,

94 The Blue and Brown Books: the Blue Book (New Ludwig Wittgenstein, York: Harper & Row, 1965), 1. 95 "It follows that the soul is to the hand; for as the hand is a analogous is form of forms and sense the form of sensible tool of tools, so the mind ed. Richard in The Basic Works of Aristotle, things"; Aristotle, De anima, 432al-3. York: Random House, McKeon 1941), (New

528
and in our Thomas execute we conceiving "someone writes, grasp things other has a form in act

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
than our St. conceiving. as he is able to

inasmuch

an operation of that form."96 Our conceiving is informed by the forms of things, and the activity differs just as Sebastian's thereby, may have the form of a stroll, or the form of a run, bodily movements or may be informed more or less by speed or grace. His activity will as Marat's differ bath may be more or less warm, mundane, thereby, my Consider another If I grasp the pen in analogy. can certainly that my grasp is of a pen, and not a hand, say In the antecedent ball. of this conditional, as a verb, "grasp" functions while in the consequent as a noun. functions Do I need, "grasp" then, medicinal, then we to posit a third thing between the pen and my grasping hand, namely the grasp itself, a third thing named by the use of "grasp" as a noun? If I fail to grasp the pen, do I say that I succeeded in grasping the grasp, but failed to grasp the pen? No. There is no third thing that exists be tween hand and pen. conceiving If I grasp with my hand a ball instead of a pen, the form of my will be different than when I grasp a pen, corresponding to what grasp to grasp a ball, and not a pen. Now my hand, grasping is required ei ther a ball or a pen, does not look like either a ball or a pen; nonethe to the pen that it grasps, it is perfectly less, in its relation appropriate to call its form "the form of a pen-grasping hand," rather than say "the form of a ball-grasping I grasp differently, as the hand"; according must of my grasping differ for the diversely informed I things are informed to grasp. wish acts that we perform, concepts Similarly, in order to understand the soul (res extra ani usually things beyond are informed as we conceive inasmuch di mam). Concepts diversely form res extra animam. informed versely They other than the intellect that grasps res extra terms they are the acts of the power capable the acts Once of the we intellect. recognize that a concept is related to the intellect as act are not, animam. of grasping however, things In Aristotelian those things, intellect Similarly, and res extra there animam. is no third thing between the or fateful.

to potency,

itmakes very little sense to treat intellect and concept as if

as if the intellect in another context, is one thing and a concept interesting another insight on provides

not one, they were St. Thomas, thing.

96 "... tionen! 19).

formam tune aliquis in actu habet quando potest Opera quamlibet illius formae explere"; Aquinas, CD A, L. 3, lectio 8, no. 700 (cap. 2,18

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION

the more verse. general erroneous Discussing and body one, he sets them in a more He writes: unity of act and potency. question various of how act

529

are one and not di and potency views about what makes soul general setting concerning the

. . . they held such [erroneous views] because they inquired about what makes a potency and an act to be one thing, and they sought the differ ences of these things, as if it were necessary to collect them as through some single medium, to act. just like things which are diverse according to a But as has been said, the ultimate matter, which is appropriate form, and the form itself are the same thing (idem). For one of these is
as potency, while the other is as act... . Potency and act are in a certain

For that which is in potency ismade to be in act. And so it respect is not necessary for them to be united through some bond, like those are entirely diverse. So no cause makes those things things which from matter and form to be one, except that which which are composed
moves a potency to act.97

one.

Of course union

that point does, Yet, a larger context, and that context is how act and by bringing are not diverse potency things, but one thing. This is the thesis that in to bear terests us. There is no question by that in his extends their the pairs analogy use in the discussion analysis form-matter of knowledge, St. and act-potency, We

the particular of soul and body.

point

that St. Thomas as he often

is pursuing he discusses

here

is the

Thomas from have

intel length the form as matter to the form that informs is compared it. If we lect, as act to potency, to the intellect that a concept is compared recognize in the passage that St. Thomas makes above ap then the general point as if it to treat the concept It is just misguided plies straightforwardly. as such, were quid a distinct is then thing related from the or united intellect, to the only to ask how this We intellect. should tertium not be

original at discussed

of change and motion. the intellect. The informing

97 ". . . est, quia inquirebant quid fa quod causa quare talia posuerunt, et actum, et inquirebant ciens unum potentiam differentias eorum, quasi eas colligari per aliquod unum medium, sicut ea quae sunt diversa oporteret actum. Sed sicut dictum est, ultima materia, secundum quae scilicet est ap propriata ad formam, et ipsa forma, sunt idem. Aliud enim eorum est sicut
potentia, aliud sicut actus. . . . Potentia et actus quodammodo unum sunt.

Quod enim est in potentia, fit in actu. Quod enim est in potentia, fit actu. Et sic non oportet ea uniri per aliquod vinculum, sicut ea quae sunt penitus di versa. Unde nulla causa est faciens unum ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, nisi quod movet potentiam in actum"; Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum L. 8, lectio 5, no. Aristotelis Expositio, 1767 (Turin: Marietti, 1950).

530
looking, intellect, as St. Thomas but

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
for something to relate concepts writes, to its act. for the cause that moves the intellect to the

VI

The Introspectibility
concepts Putnam are introspectible it:

Thesis.
primary

Consider
objects of

the second
the mind,

thesis that
the knowl

edge of which secondarily provides knowledge

puts

of external objects. As

. . . speakers are supposed to be able to direct their mental to attention means of something akin to perception, concepts by and, if A and B are to B are different to A and attending then attending different concepts, . . . The mental states. state of the speaker determines which mental what it is he refers to, and thereby determines concept he is attending
to.98

We

know

what

we

are

talking

about

because

our

language

is yoked

to

this philosophy
mas's account? We thing form

of mind.
No. here like

Does this thesis cut at the joints of St. Tho

because St. Thomas in several explicitly places. poses some

are blessed

very much in the

this problem ... is related

In the Summa,

for instance, he asks whether

the "intelligible species

to our intellect

[the intelligible

is un intellect] the intellect's that the form informing There he explains derstood?"99 the discus else. He relates of knowing is a means something activity activ and immanent of transitive account sion to the more general as that which ity,100 and the forms when He is adamant species
stands."101

or principles he writes, to the intellect

takes place. such activities by which to be said that the intelligible "it ought as that by which the intellect under

is related

However, the

by

itself

this

is not holds become

sufficient something means

to establish like this,

introspectibility once ternal objects ternal these objects internal

thesis known

For the point. that in namely, ex that him

they represent. acts are primarily

Instead objects

for knowing whatever denial it is St. Thomas's that allows

of knowledge

98 and Reality, chap. 2, note 1, p. 129. Putnam, Representation a. 2. 99Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 85, 100For transitive section. and immanent activity, see the previous 101"... dicendum se habet ad intellectum est quod species intelligibilis quo intelligit intellectus"; Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 85, a. 2.

ut

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

to escape Aristotle's thesis and its criticism. the introspectibility he writes that: De anima, very forcefully Commenting

531
on

the intellect is made to it is clear that the intelligible species, by which For they are not related to be in act, are not the object of the intellect. it under but as that by which as what is understood, the intellect
stands.102

He cies

asserts

it is "manifestly is understood." is that which that Theologiae,

false"

that

"such

an

[intelligible] for denying

spe what

In the Summa

he cites

two

reasons

I have been calling the introspectibility thesis. First, he appeals to the objects of science which he takes for granted are things beyond the
thesis introspectibility and everyday. both scientific of knowledge, the objectivity as well. on the De anima in the commentary this argument He uses If our knowledge has of error. to the experience he appeals Second, of things, then error would internal appearances as its primary object soul, not threatens the intellect's own contents. The

be impossible,
appear to him

for everyone would

or her. Thus echoing

always judge truly of how things

Aristotle, he writes: said that everything
at the same time

the error of the ancients would

it appears..., and so ...

follow, who
would

is true as
be true..

contradictories

.. and so itwould

follow

that every opinion will be equally

true_103

Far from leading to skepticism

to be true," as we instead threatened,

in the sense of "nothing can be known

is of It is to in puts

of knowledge the objectivity expect when might to a sort the thesis leads in the other direction, at all can be known to be false.104 referred animae that the passiones as Putnam are not things known first, or,

hyper-anti-skepticism?nothing account clear in St. Thomas's the De interpretation

102 Aquinas, CDA, L. 3, lectio 8, no.718, esp., "Manifestum est etiam, quod fit in actu, non sunt objec quibus intellectus possibilis intelligibiles, species sicut quod intelligitur, Non enim se habent ad intellectum tion! intellectus. sed sicut quo intelligit." 103 error antiquorum dicentium quod omne "Secundo, quia sequeretur essent simul verae. Si est verum; et sic quod contradictoriae videtur quod de ea solum judicat. nisi propriam passionem, enim potentia non cognoscit afficitur. Sic autem videtur aliquid secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva erit de eo quod judicat, scil Semper ergo judicium potentiae cognoscitivae erit secundum icet de propria passione, quod est; et ita omne judicium
verum;"

104 Of course, one might argue that if nothing at all can be known to be however, false, nothing at all can really be known to be true. St. Thomas, to stress the former. chooses

Aquinas,

S. T.,

I, q. 85,

a. 2.

532
to which it, objects extra animam may On the other conscious subsequently hand, attention

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
is directed, be known. in order that res

of understanding to understand of coming nal things. St. Thomas

introspective self-knowledge is possible. The intellect is capable the means writes: by which

of one's by

activity

it primarily

introspection exter knows

... because the intellect reflects upon itself, it understands to according that reflection its own understanding and the species by which it under stands. And so the intellectual is secondarily that which is un species But that which derstood. is understood first is the [external] thing of which the intelligible species is a likeness.105 This parallels the discussion very closely on the De anima at L. 3, of the same 8 and issues 9, where in the he

commentary writes:

lectiones

what the intellect understands the intelligible species, except itself, and

is an essence which is in things, but not insofar as the intellect itself reflects upon

is as such the possible intellect, which nor neither understands gible things, species taken into it.106 For

in potency in the order of intelli is understood except through a

the soul are known, and only subse St. Thomas, things beyond are the passiones ani animae known. First the passiones quently are they them mae are means of knowing things, and only secondarily This accords well with St. Thomas's of knowledge. selves objects axiom repeated The act of the passio be the understanding often mae
else.

that a thing is known only insofar as it is in act. is simply to in question animae here, a concept, some object extra animam. ani The passio of insofar as it is a means of knowing something the order impressions is

can be known

only

In the reversed.

criticism

of mental

representation,

however, that mental

In that criticism,

it is presupposed

105"Sed secundum eandem re supra seipsum reflectitur, quia intellectus et suum intelligere et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species flexionem intelligit est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo secundario intellectiva est similitudo"; Aquinas, S.T., q. 85, a. 2. est res cuius species intelligibilis 106"... quod intellectus intelligit est quidditas quae est in rebus, non au nisi in quantum intellectus tem species super se ipsum reflecti intelligibilis, in ordine intelligibi qui est tantum in potentia tur"; and "intellectus possibilis, in eo susceptam"; Aquinas, nec intelligit nec intelligitur nisi per speciem lium, CDA, L. 3, lectio 8, no. 718; and lectio 9, no. 725.

AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

or passiones The problem lieves know before ogy. good he must those one animae attributed know are known the means first, and things (res) to the mental

533
subsequently. is that he be

representationalist

St. Thomas things. can know the means rotator learn cuff

before he can for knowing things, the things denies this. One must know for knowing them. Consider this anal

A healthy pitchers

is necessary

to throw

at all about anything knowing until they injure of their rotator cuff superfluous, find any knowledge in lan can know it. People apply their knowledge things, and happily or practical the means first knowing without by activities, guage are in a sense means trans The takes place. which such knowledge to the agent parent This is where to appear with the sort begin In the thesis. in the discussion of the third-thing I used of examples to know the hand the pen, it is possible of the hand grasping example St. In the case of the intellect, to its grasping the pen. however, prior access to seems to claim that we have no independent Thomas prior the things beyond apart from its actually grasping intellect, a useful later John of St. Thomas will make Centuries between what he calls formal and the soul. in pursuit of an end. evident disanalogies

Yet most for good pitching. first consciously without good pitches rotator cuffs. of them their Indeed most

ical distinction

terminolog instrumental signs:

a formal sign is an informed knowing, which of itself, not by the media A sign is instrumental, which by itself being tion of another, represents. other than itself, as for known first as something, represents something the cow.107 the footprint of the cow represents example St. Thomas does not I suspect concepts Indeed, "signs." to be unfortu in the end prove to concepts may to be more that it proves amenable to the extent himself call of mind, as well as to the criticism directed at is not an argument I am pre

nate

that applying "sign" and misleading, to modern those latter accounts accounts.

here. pared to make John of St. Thomas's; Thomas's, tions of how for it finds

That, however, In any case, the troublesome but the distinction he exact nearly are known:

parallels

may be terminology is St. is trying to capture in St. Thomas's descrip

things

107 alio, "Signum formale est formalis notifia, quae seipsa, non mediante instrumentale est, quod ex praeexistente cognitione repraesentat. Signum sicut vestigium bovis repraesentat sui aliquid aliud a se repraesentat, bovem"; John Poinsot, Tractatus De Signis, 10al3-17, ed. John Deely (Berkeley: Uni versity of California Press, 1985).

534

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
. . . something is understood in two ways: in one way in itself, when is formed from namely the power of the one observing (acies intuentis) or known; in another way when something the thing itself understood is seen in another, which other having been known, it is known.108

The

involves power involves

"first way" of understanding that St. Thomas mentions something calls a "formal sign," the informed John of St. Thomas what a thing. The "second way" that St. Thomas mentions knowing what John of St. Thomas calls an "instrumental sign."

John of St. Thomas's

way are cepts for a direct accounts. contrast modern

terminology
to be drawn

is useful because
between St. Thomas

it clears the
and more

formal are

that terminology, concepts Using not instrumental; in St. Thomas's signs, of the one observing... formed "the power or known." What it is for a concept is for it to be a means

for St. Thomas con "first way" from the thing it

self understood character

qua act of intellect, known. thing else, not for it to be something then can the concept known its means, only by

to be, its essential some for knowing Once is something become known.

itself

In the understanding
Putnam's criticism, become

of the British empiricists, and as presupposed

concepts or ideas are instrumental signs, not

by
for

mal.
sis,

To the extent that they then exemplify

subject the concept account is primarily itself what known, and to Putnam's criticism.

the introspectibility
because

the
in is an

they St. Thomas's not

However, sound by an articulated signified which but is simply a means by

extramental ity thesis does Only our

he avoids the introspectibil and signified, thing is known criticism. the part played by it in Putnam's to know other than ourselves by first coming something come to be knowable and its exercise for knowing capacity but they must first be acts. does not this introspection in virtue the faculty

acts are introspectible, to us; our cognitive was the deed." "In the beginning Further, require we understand a new apart faculty, special res extra animam. writes: from

of which

St. Thomas

... that which is primarily cognized by the human intellect is [the nature the act itself is cognized by which of material things]; and secondarily and through the act the the [the nature of material things] is cognized; to understand is the perfection. of which itself is cognized, intellect

108". . . uno modo in dicendum, quod aliquid intelligitur dupliciter. scilicet ex ipsa re intellecta vel cogita formatur acies intuen seipso, quando et illud cognoscitur"; videtur aliquid in altero, quo cognito tis; alio modo Aquinas, QDV, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5.

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

And
acts

535
before acts, and

so the Philosopher
before powers.109

says that objects

are cognized

The

or faculty, is that it is the very same power point of the passage res extra animam, its own knows that knows the human intellect, a is no special There itself. and knows faculty, introspective acts, itself from itself to make "mind's eye," nor can the intellect separate its own further is other acts acts: than objects. "hence It is true that the intellect the understands understands itself its acts the act by which the the act by which intellect by a stone under

intellect

understands

that un a stone, and so on."110 Still it is the very same faculty standing a stone. Here a stone and understands itself understanding derstands one might external call St. Thomas's a foretaste we receive of what ism which we will examine in the next the two section. As a condition for acts, understanding can only iden a stone, St. Thomas understanding is originally understood to a stone which the acts by reference tify of the intel the primary falls within nature, object and, as a material act. lect's this distinction between a stone

making and understanding

we are primarily and awareness and attention, By our cognitive or our concepts. For not upon ourselves to others, by nature directed that begins with an account of human knowing St. Thomas, introspec is in his or her cognitive tion is off target. The human person capacity fundamentally ticular material uniting with in par and open to other beings, for of this capacity the actual exercise Only by beings. come to does the human person another by introspection and primarily directed an unexam life is not a

If for Socrates and self-enlightenment. self-understanding an unlived ined life is not a life worth living, for St. Thomas life worth examining.

est huius ab intellectu humano id quod primo cogniscitur et per actum cognosci et secundario modi objectum; objectum; cognoscitur Et ideo Philosophus cuius est perfectio tur ipse intellectus, ipsum intelligere. et actus potentiis;" Aquinas, dicit quod objecta praecognoscuntur actibus, I have translated "the nature of material things" S.T., I, q. 87, a. 3, respondeo. before the one quoted the passage for "objectum," because immediately it clear that "objectum" refers to this. makes no "Tjnrje alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est ac et sic inde"; Aquinas, S.T., q. 87, a. 4, tus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem, ad 2.

109"Et ideo

536 VII
The According concept uated Internalist to it there and extramental by facts solely Thesis. is no

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

consider Finally, or necessary intrinsic the concept

the

internalist between to be

thesis. the

relation

of methodological account? Thomas's Recall that

things; to the mind, internal the assumption embodying cut at the joints of St. Does this thesis solipsism. No.

is supposed

individ

in discussing the likeness of the passiones to animae res extra animam, Iwrote that a general is a natural likeness concept are diverse of things beyond the soul which because it singular beings, shares their form, a form that when considered does not absolutely differ form, among the diverse things. I wrote there that we can call the an intelligible characteristic of the absolutely, such a form or intelligible In the intellect constitutes character things. a principle the soul (res extra animam)-, of knowing it beyond things and as a principle of the intellect's the act of understanding, informs considered act it is called the intelligible and species. the The act so informed is called of a form (ab et es the concept. Intelligible back hearken soluta character absolute consideration absolutely early work and 1256. to the discussion of natures considered De ente

consideratio

composed sent?a,111 to us remains thesis of interest A nature takes In the can be considered only case into account of man,

in St. Thomas's ipsius) at Paris between 1252 with

St. Thomas

the However, his career. throughout considers or to it as such. considered,

case one in which absolutely, that pertain those characteristics rational and being animal are

being

111

".

. secundum

naturam

et

rationem

propriam.

." S.

Thomae

De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4, no. 1 (Turin: Marietti, Opusculum Aquinatis, St. Thomas becoming Master 1957). The De Ente is an early work, preceding Friar Thomas 1252 and 1256. See James Weisheipl, at Paris, dated between of America Catholic University Press, 1983), 78-9, D'Aquino (Washington: in sua Meta Consider 386-7. also, "Dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam Una, prout consideratur triplex est alicuius naturae consideratio. physica, esse quod habet in singularibus;... ali Alia vero est consideratio secundum esse suum intelligibile;... Tertia vero est consider cuius naturae secundum atio naturae absoluta, prout abstrahlt ab utroque esse; secundum quam con natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque consideratur siderationem alterius, quantum tali naturae"; S. Thomae Aquinatis, ad ea tantum quae per se competunt no. 8, q. 8, a. 1, respondeo Quaestiones Quodlibetales, (Turin: Marietti, 1949). See also Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1, 2 and 4; and Aquinas, CD A, L. 1, lec tio 1, no. 13.

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

but not

537

there, at this time or at that time, one or being here or being a In the case of red being in re or in anima. of many, predicable an apple, and so forth.112 but not being the color of color is considered, can be considered to two with On the other hand, a nature respect ways of existing, as a principle of being, or modes one way in singular way and another (in singulari as a principle to the nature of in virtue things in anima or being there, in re or in an

bus) of knowing. these modes at this

ima.

time

characteristics Some pertain here but not as such?being of existence, or at that time, one or predicable of many, leave out of consideration in its mode

If we concept abstract, tellect other,

may

possess

universally, predicated be clear it should then, or individuated

a characteristics the particular in anima, of existence for example, and in this intellect now, or in that in that an a concept with is identified nature it ex from another by the character is which intelligible

and diversified

character, intelligible presses?the of it is a principle it is in virtue of the thing or things for which what or similitude between likeness This is the basis of the natural being. passiones animae and res extra animam. St. Thomas writes:

of is not to assign identity to the conceptions the intention of Aristotle as if for one articulated to articulated the soul by a comparison sounds, articulated sounds are di sound there should be one concept; because verse among diverse peoples; but he intends to assign the identity of to things, which things he of the soul through a comparison conceptions similarly says are the same [for all].113 to be a form St. Thomas's In this respect, appears analysis in his Mental Content. by Colin McGinn ism, as described of external St. Thomas

112 sicut See also ".. .per modum considerationis; simplicis et absolutae . de alio. . . . Sed . . modo abstra cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando here per intellectum rem, non habet falsi quae non sunt abstracta secundum Si enim intelligamus vel dicamus apparet. taem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in colorem et proprietates Si vero consideremus eius, opinione vel in oratione. etiam voce de pomo colorato, vel quod sic intelligimus, nihil considerantes et orationis. Pomum enim non erit absque falsitate opinionis exprimamus; colorem est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet intelligi, nihil intelli gendo de pomo"; Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1. 113"... intentio Aristotelis non est asserere identitatem conceptionis ani mae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis una sit conceptio: identitatem sed intendit asserere sunt diversae apud diversos; quia voces ad res, quas similiter dicit esse animae per comparationem conceptionum easdem"; Aquinas, CPH, L. 1, lectio 2, no. 21.

538
"is individuating mental
something conditions yond the other of soul. their formal than mental states."114 upon The

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN states (to put it intuitively) by reference

identity contrasts internalism, that is, the the concepts existence with

to

for the depend of things be what he calls, states

McGinn enough,

externalism the thesis

straightforwardly from his

"that mental

are determined by facts relating to the subject considered

solipsism. provides environment,"115 I mention McGinn's a lens assumption and terminology to view St. Thomas's

in isolation
if it

of methodological not as analysis, thought

through is that St. Thomas's After all, part of my thesis clearly. should be read in its own context. McGinn's of Aristotle where St. Thomas's

which

more

appropriation sim analysis account can

a point of intersection ply provides meet the contemporary objections. of form This claim of identity passiones nam, "itmakes animae and res extra He no sense."

or

animam

character intelligible is a difficult thesis.

between To Put

objects:

sense of the claim that objects and even if we could somehow make of the rela events have intrinsic form, there still remains the question it is that thinks about that form and the form of whatever tion between or represents the object. To say that the relation is identity, whether makes no sense.116 "identity" be taken literally or metaphorically that Putnam I suspect the Aristotelian thinks believes this thesis makes no sense because he

an explanation of knowl is trying to provide there is an identity of form between that the latter claims edge, when to an explanation that is supposed and known, knower fortuitously a claim that to I am going to make answer Here difficulties. Putnam's some may Thomas is not The very contentious. appear an explanation of anything; discussion rather, in St. of identity ex this claim makes

plicit what
we

is presupposed
what

in being able to talk about knowing.

Once

have made

to investigate der to be capable their acts, which

we can go on in knowing, is presupposed explicit in or have the human person must what characteristics ofthat knowing. In these contexts, St. Thomas often

echoes Aristotle with

acts

the principle
are

that powers

are known

through

their objects. through access that we have no cognitive section from the previous Recall a human the exer to the intellect, upon power, apart from reflection to understand the identity One way cise of its acts of understanding. in turn known

114 McGinn, Mental Content, 3. 115 Ibid., 2. 116 "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," Putnam,

126.

ANDMENTAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

claim is to consider what remains to characterize an act some object X, ifwe leave out of consideration standing in this intellect, to it as an act existing istics that pertain this

539
of under the character at this time, at is for us to spec

and so forth. All that remains level of generality, we ask "how For example, of what it is an understanding. suppose ify a dog differ from our of of the substantiality does our understanding of a man, of the substantiality leaving out of consider understanding as to the acts of understanding that accrue ation all those attributes modes "one is an understand We will not answer of being in anima?" or "one is an understanding in your in the other yesterday," ing now, In answering all this question, and so forth. the other in mine," tellect, to those characteristics that pertain is to make reference that remains an to a man as such; we might to a dog as such, and those that pertain that while out the is an understanding is of an animate the other the intentional phrase we would one of an animate rational substance. these are sub but non-rational of,"

swer

stance, we leave very

If the

same

parently fer from teristics

answering of a dog dif "How does the substantiality question, those charac We will end up specifying that of a man?" just to their absolute extra animam that pertain of the natures different So absolutely not differ from considered of understanding X understood, when the an act

characteristics

"understanding list if we were

the ap

consideration.

an

latter the object object X does it is for an act what is absolutely considered, absolutely considered; or quod quid to be of an object X, the act's essence of understanding not differ from what it is for the object X to be, the ob est esse, does or quod quid est esse. ject X's essence We duce have to be careful here that we do not the third considered to the thing we does denied not in the previous an additional et essentia eighth reintro inadvertently A nature abso section. mode in of being, in the De ente. Metaphys orga his this

lutely addition

constitute ente

two modes in the De

that St. Thomas

discusses to Avicenna's quodlibetal

St. Thomas's ics is well

debt known.117

In fact,

in his

question,

nizing the distinctions

Avicenna discussion

slightly differently, he gives credit explicitly to

one respect in which concerns of Avicenna

for having made them.118 However, from the Latin translation differs

117Weisheipl, Friar 118". . . secundum

naturae consideratio....

Thomas DAquino, 78-9, 386-7. in sua Metaphysica, Avicenna

Una, prout consideratur secundum

triplex
esse

est alicuius
quod habet

in singularibus_Alia suum intelligibile, Aquinas,

vero est consideratio alicuius naturae . . . Tertia vero est consideratio naturae no. 8, q. 1, a. 1. Quaestiones Quodlibetales,

secundum absoluta.

esse . . ";

540
very point, namely,

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

the being attributed to the nature abso considered like St. Thomas after him, does not attribute lutely. Avicenna, being in re or being to natures in anima or as such, considered absolutely, or per se. Using the example of the definition of horse, Avicenna says that "from itself, it is neither many nor one, nor existing in these sensi nor in the soul."119 from However, in sensibles being considered taking another example, or in the soul, he does attribute to a (esse):

bles

apart nature

existing as such a certain

... for from this being (esse) it is neither a genus nor species nor an indi But from this being it is animal as such and vidual nor one nor many.
manas such... .12?

to Avicenna, According to the nature considered of existence mas it has either

there

as such

of "being" that is appropriate or absolutely, apart from the modes in re or in anima. St. Tho Here, however,

is a sense

from Avicenna; there is no single departs thing that is the nature now now in res extra animam, considered that exists in absolutely a Absolute consideration is just that, a mode anima. of considering not a mode As Joseph of being for a nature. Owens describes nature, to be framed in a way "the text seems the De that ente, carefully avoids ered."121 sider consider differ. any implication with Presented of being a nature with result that is both in the in res another of the there essence extra absolutely we animam, consid can we may con can not

it absolutely. Presented The it absolutely. Yet it does not follow that considered in anima. Putnam's

nature two

in anima, considerations

absolutely and the nature Perhaps known arises

the nature

is a third nature, qua existing in res extra, animam,

to the and of knower objections identity the suspicion that the Aristotelian is claiming from that a nature that is identically there is just such a third nature, the same in res extra animam and in anima. It is clear, however, that this suspi 119

in his sensi "Ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec unum nec est existens nec in anima"; Avicenna, Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia divina sive scientia in prima (Louvain: E. Peeters, 228; quoted 1977?80), "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic Joseph Owens, in Inquiries into Medieval ed. and Scotistic Metaphysics," Philosophy, is James Ross (Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 187. My summary of Avicenna upon Owens' analysis. heavily dependent bilibus
120 "... ex hoc enim esse nec est genus nece species nece individuum nec

unum

nec multa.

Sed ex hoc prima,

esse

Avicenna, Philosophia 121 Ibid., 192.

est tantum animal et tantum homo. "Common Nature," 234; quoted in Owens,

. . ."; 190.

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

cion is off base. Extra nature, while as an accident crue further associated

541

accrue to a characteristics individual animam, of both characteristics in anima individuality, namely, ac or that particular and universality of this intellect, Yet the theses from the De Ente do not constitute those a attribution the of additional characteristics

to a nature. positive with

two modes

that would are

pertain presumably a negative characterization: essentially

beyond characteristics additional of being, The theses to a third mode of being. there are distinct individ that do not

of being and knowing, ual principles considered fer when absolutely. the Despite between priority of formal language the things related. de veritate, which true or not,

namely,

natures,

dif

disputatae Quaestiones are the measures against quate or not,

identity here, there is an order of of St. Thomas's In the language the forms of res extra animam activity those res is judged extra to be ade animam

the mind's because activity.

provide Peri hermeneias, the sense mae, must

namely, the form of the intellect's St. Thomas

in which

explicitly a simple act of understanding, be true. He writes:

on the In fact, commenting he discusses this when repeats a simple passio ani

to the intellect] as the measure is compared In one manner [something to the human spec and so natural things are compared to the measured, as it is ulative intellect. And so the intellect is said to be true according as it is at variance from to the thing [rei], but false according conformed the thing_and just as a thing [res] is called true through a comparison is so also with sense and intellect, of which the measure to its measure, So a sense is called true a thing beyond the soul [res extra animam]. the to a thing existing beyond when through its form it is conformed that a sense is true of proper sensibles. soul. And so it is understood the essence of a thing [quod And in this way the intellect apprehending or division, is always true, as is said in III composition quid est] without
De anima.122

122"Uno modo res et sic comparantur ad mensuratum, sicut mensura dicitur Et ideo intellectus humanum. ad intellectum naturales speculativum verus secundum quod discor rei, faisus autem secundum quod conformatur ad suam mensuram, sicut dicitur res vera per comparationem d?t a re_Et, est res extra animam: unde cuius mensura ita etiam et sensus vel intellectus, rei extra ani sensus dicitur verus quando per formam [suam] conformatur sit verus. Et mam existenti. Et sic intelligitur quod sensus proprii sensibilis est absque composi intellectus hoc etiam modo quod quid apprehendens tione et divisione semper est verus, ut dicitur in III De anima"; Aquinas, CPH, L. 1, lectio 3, nos. 29 and 31.

542
The to

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN

to things beyond is related the soul as what is measured concept In practical its measure. is reversed; the order the knowledge, or done. is to be made mind's what In speculative activity measures the intellect this "essence of a however, knowledge, apprehending thing without it conforms or division" composition to res extra animam. is called true to the extent that

of being It is not, however, in form, or identical simply a matter res extra animam or being measured that determines by reflecting of St. Thomas. Innate concepts the externalism also stand in might these sorts of relations to res of the De characteristics is used extra animam. the opening passages is in its formal cept that the term St. Thomas, analyzing stresses that the con of the soul. from He writes

interpretation, a passion to indicate

"passion" of the soul have else; passions or passion," certain impression soul units extra and the which to cause them. Form of a certain animam.123 identity intellect these kind.

their

receptivity something of a "from things by means origin act as agents which the upon things

to things, causing them to be identity brings than it is of res This is no less true of concepts

as we have seen, that bring unity the forms Thus, act of understanding do not arise from intellect's in things understood, itself, but from the extramental of being. forms are principles to the

Put of mental current causal accounts representation, Criticizing as presently conceived the philo nam writes that external causes, by "form" to be "self-identify do not have enough community, sophical account. In Aristotelian in St. Thomas's is not the case ing."124 This now seems to recognize this as a virtue of the Aristotelian fact Putnam comes The final ob into view. But then his real problem account.125 jection account know is to the underlying and of language to have been the Aristotelian of his metaphysics, our knowledge attributed not to the internalism we of the now of things, which to the Aristotelian. enough that there form

given this part

erroneously for a robust credit Putnam denies

Having to overcome es

objection,

are unique

123 and St. Tho thesis in Aristotle This is not contrary to the well-known The context of that discus mas that matter is the principle of individuation. it clear that what is being shown is how units of the same kind are sion makes identi because from one another, precisely they are formally distinguished or of the same kind. The latter thesis does not involve the claim that the cal, in their material disposi identity of units of the same kind consists wholly
tion.

124 "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," Putnam, 125 Ibid., 124-9.

124.

REPRESENTATION ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE

sences. His

543

as it is upon based very weak, appears however, denial, an unquestioned meta like It just looks of sciences. the multiplicity inves on his part that because scientific separate assumption physical to their subject, essential characteristics different consider tigations of es there must that therefore be, or at least may be, a multiplicity sences course, of ways for any one was St. Thomas thing, well studied aware distinct by those of this, for he often sciences. reminds Of us not

to confuse the ways of knowing with the things known; a multiplicity

of things known. imply a multiplicity in this point, and accepts understands though of 'Meaning'," he clearly terms. In "The Meaning more contemporary a multiplicity of senses does not imply a that for his readers explains us that a differ reminds he is the one who of referents; multiplicity of knowing himself Putnam does not ence of intension this does not of extension. imply a difference has the best of company, Putnam the characteristic mistake differ Here, since of the Pla a ge the argu on to in ac

committing cording tonists.

fallacy, this was to St. Thomas It is clear that

between descriptions an evolutionary and a biologist studying biologist, neticist, to give us some needs Putnam of dogs. However, morphology of descriptions ment that the multiplicity map straightforwardly the essential a multiplicity of things described, a multiplicity of essences

in dogs.

After all, the different scientists mentioned by Putnam all claim to be scientifically investigating dogs, albeit in different ways. What is it in
virtue of which of dogs, In his recent Into the class the same thing, they can all claim to be investigating essences? and distinct if they are investigating many and the Senses: "Sense, Nonsense, Lectures, Dewey the Powers of the Human Putnam Mind," the Aristotelian

An

suggests the down he cannot follow its attraction, that, despite He sug of knowledge. in the account and their place road to essences with Realism "Aristotelian that he could have titled his lectures gests Inquiry Metaphysics," and at the same time titled them:

out Aristotelian

to show that Deweyan Realism for Dewey, as I read him, was concerned defense of the com we can retain something of the spirit of Aristotle's and of both the metaphysicians mon-sense world, against the excesses to any variant of the ourselves the sophists, without thereby committing that Aristotle propounded.127 essentialism metaphysical

126 Putnam, 127 Putnam,

"The Meaning

216-19. of'Meaning'," and the Senses," 445-517. Nonsense, "Sense,

544
Of course of the problem the common-sense An Aristotelian context, immediately world" account would arises can

JOHN P. O'CALLAGHAN
whether be Aristotle's divorced from from "de his its

fense

in fact

metaphysics. larger Where

philosophical Putnam wishes

seem

of knowledge, divorced to be Aristotelian

in name

only. What motive

knowledge account mas's context. sense omist
poses.

is served by continuing

to call it Aristotelian?

from

Here of

to separate account of language Aristotle's and its largely metaphysical the virtue of St. Tho context, to place is that he seeks it ever more firmly in that very there may be a fundamental between the equivocation and be as used talking by the Th at cross pur

as used by Putnam "metaphysical" to describe St. Thomas. The two may the end

to recognize of the day, it represents where progress to hold on lies. Many the real argument may not wish contemporaries ac in St. Thomas's involved to the underlying externalist metaphysics At count. than Such that of a rejection, internalism. clear, res to be on grounds will have however, As the discussion of the concept that extra animam have enough form, other I have and are

provided

makes

"self-identifying," even if they identify themselves

as "this or that thing" simply, but an intrinsic and necessary indeed mam joints. and concepts, and the

to the intellect not

"a thing of this or that sort." There is res extra ani between connection thesis does not cut at the

internalist

VIII
Conclusion. dition of reflection when We on have seen to the Aristotelian that objections are perhaps and the world mind, of its greatest exponents, from within his own three elements tra a lit

tle too quick mas Aquinas. we have seen nam's target

language, at one directed

St. Tho context, Put no finds

Approaching that with respect

St. Thomas

to at least of

of Hilary

his criticism "mental representationalism" picture, of Aristotle. in St. Thomas's First, appropriation or objects extramental between the mind's

the concepts and external

primarily signified by terms do not constitute a third realm of mental

things those interposed activity

things; they are the informed activity of the mind

things. Second, the mind's

in uniting itself to
are not prima

concepts

rily objects of knowledge, the introspective knowledge of which leads to knowledge of extramental things. Their being is to be to and for

ANDMENTAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION 545

others, things. namely Finally, understood the there and of primary objects is an intrinsic relation the mind's knowledge?extramental between the external ob

jects extramental spect, knows

imam.

can be said objects and can be said to be formally them. "We name as we know."

a relation concepts, to be self-identifying identical What we with name

those by which re in a certain the intellect extra that an

are res

University

of Notre

Dame