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William McPike State Bar #95869 257 East Bellevue Road, # 188 Atwater, CA 95301 (559) 841-3366 Email: mcpike@psnw.com Attorney for Acacia Corporate Management, LLC & Michael Scott Ioane..

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


STEVEN BOOTH and LOUISE BOOTH, Plaintiffs, Case No. CV F 12-0171 AWl GSA

DEFENDANTS REPLY RE: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT REMOVED FROM STATE COURT. v. AND OBJECTION SUPPORTED BY JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MICHAEL SCOTT IOANE, ACACIA CORPORATE MANAGEMENT LLC, , DECLARATION OF IOANE Does 1-25,inclusive; and All Persons Unknown Claiming Any Legal or Equi- Date: May 21,2012 table Right, Title, Estate, Lien or InTime: 1:30 pm. terest in the Property Described in the Ctrm: 2, 2500 Tulare St., Fresno, CA Complaint Adverse to Plaintiffs' Title Hon. Anthony W. Iishi or Any Cloud) Upon Plaintiffs' Title Thereto, Named Herein as Does 26 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants. _______________________________ AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION. COMES NOW DEFENDANTS Michael Scott Ioane and Acacia Corporate Management LLC, by and through counsel, objects and replies to plaintiffs opposition as follows: First, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any competent evidence that this suit against Acacia Corporate Management, or Michael Ioane has been authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, 26 U.S.C. Section 7401. This veiled tax collection >quiet title= action is barred by 26 U.S.C. '7401 since there is no statutory authorization for the action. The requirement that the Secretary of Treasury (or a delegate) authorizes or sanctions these types of tax collection actions is jurisdictional. U.S. v One 1972 Cadillac, Coupe Deville, 2-Door Hardtop, 355 F.Supp. 513 (D.C. Ky, 1973). Allegations of such authorization would necDEFENDANTS REPLY TO GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS Page 1

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essarily need to appear in the complaint. Here of course, since the real underlying purpose of the action was concealed, no such allegations are made. Given the undeniable conclusion that the Booths= Aquiet title@ claim is actually for the sole purpose of attempted tax collection, it is barred by '7401. No court would have jurisdiction over this concealed, unauthorized, tax collection matter, and it must be dismissed. ( the Booths own; reply to the government opposition, which defendants Michael Ioane and Acacia Corporate Management have objected, clearly states the Booths seek to have title restored to them so that they can list and market the property independently(obviously, with the consent of the government), instead of having the a forced sale conducted by the government. page 2 lines 5-9). Second, it is undeniable the Booths= complaint is a virtual carbon copy of the 2007 federal claim that had already been filed against them by Acacia and Ioane. There the Booths entered into a private stipulated agreement and associated stipulated judgment that they had no right, title or interest in the properties at issue here; see Judicial Notice filed in support of this reply, Judicial Notice # 3. However, in the instant case (and in an attempt at an endrun around the jurisdiction of this Court by filing the complaint in state court), they are attempting to claim the exact opposite. Nowhere do they attempt any explanation as to (1) why they tried to skirt this Courts jurisdiction over a pending matter by filing a duplicative action in state court, (2) why they should not be bound by the settlement agreement and stipulation they entered in this Court, ( I might add under penalty of perjury) (3) why any duplicate actions should exist at all, or (4) how their conflicting positions in separate actions could possibly be resolved since they show a clear lack of credibility of the Booths. (5) why the Booths own Attorney John Reedy, in a letter, dated May 14, 2008, to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration states that his client has no interest in the subject three properties, see Judicial Notice number four filed in support of this reply. Given the circumstances, the Booths= complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, and all issues involving any dispute over the properties should be adjudicated in the original case that was filed in this Court, Civ. No. 07-1129, (Hereinafter referred to as the pending case).
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Third, the Booths opposition fails entirely to address any of the detailed claims of being duped by Ioane or how that has anything to do with Acacia Corporate Management LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company: The well-established state law elements of fraud which give rise to the tort action for deceit are: (1) misrepresentation of a material fact (consisting of false representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to deceive and induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (5) resulting damage. Fraud/deceit claims are also required to be pleaded with specificity. Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1557. Under federal rules, a fraud claim also requires specificity, including an account of the Atime, place, and specific content of the false representations,@ as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). The complaint in this case is simply lacking in every respect. Fourth, although plaintiffs counsel believes, in form, that plaintiffs complaint may comply with state law for making a quiet title claim; but, the complaint miserably fails to demonstrate their excusable neglect for their failure to comply and timely comply with the rules if they had desired to retain interest in their property in case 07-1129 (hereinafter referred to as the pending case), F.R. Civ. P 13. If the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim is barred. See American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. National Electric Signaling Co., 206 Fed. 295 (E.D.N.Y., 1913); Hopkins, Federal Equity Rules (8th ed., 1933), p. 213; Simkins, Federal Practice (1934), p. 663 As a matter of fact these plaintiffs were willing participants in the pending case from its inception to conclusion, and entered into a private settlement agreement and associated stipulated judgment to quite title as to the parties to the agreement/stipulation. The stipulation and associated judgment was signed under penalty of perjury and authorized by the court. Booths current claim that they only participated in the stipulated agreement and associated judgment was for purposes of defrauding themselves is utterly preposterous and surely the most novel argument I have ever heard.
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Even if these plaintiffs believed that they were required to retain interest in Acacia Corporate Management LLCs property, they should have and were required to timely motion the court, in the pending case according to F.R.Civ.P. 59 (for new trial or alter or amend judgment) or F.R.Civ.P. 60, (relief from judgment or order). There is nothing in the record in the pending case to suggest that these plaintiffs filed either of these motions according to the rules. The plaintiffs position that a private settlement agreement and associated stipulated judgment somehow relieve them of their duty to comply with the rules is without merit. Fifth, plaintiffs Attorney seems to forget that the settlement agreement and stipulated judgment between the parties, dated and authorized by this court on September 25, 2007, is just that a settlement agreement and stipulated judgment, the form of the complaint is entirely irrelevant and all objections are waived. Collateral Estoppel and Direct Estoppel: The Booths are collaterally estopped from asserting a fee ownership interest in the real properties, subject of this case. Prior judgment between same parties on different causes of action is an estoppel as to those matters in issue or point controverted, on determination of which findings or verdict was rendered. In this case the same parties entered a stipulated settlement agreement and associated stipulated judgment, which the court in addition to authorizing the settlement agreement entered findings of facts regarding the chain of Title. Numerous if not hundreds of sites omitted. Judicial Estoppel: The Booths are Judicially Estopped; a party is bound by his judicial declarations made by them and may not contradict them in a subsequent proceeding involving the same issues and parties. Numerous if not hundreds of sites omitted. See Judicial Notice numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 attached filed in support of this reply. Sixth, although completely irrelevant to this case, Mr. Ioane is not in federal prison, in fact the Ninth Circuit on March 20, 2012, ordered Mr. Ioane released, See Judicial Notice number one, filed in support of this reply. Seven, Acacia Corporate Management, LLC was not nor is it now a party to the criminal proceeding involving Mr. Booth and Mr. Ioane; the out-come of that criminal proceeding negative or positive is irrelevant to these proceedings, simply Acacia Corporate
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Management, LLCs was not a party to the criminal proceedings and Mr. Ioane has no ownership interest in Acacia Corporate Management, LLC. Eight, if the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with the rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it, Federal Rules Civil Procedure, 41(b). This rule does not limit the Defendant(s) from moving to dismiss this action or any claim against them due to Plaintiffs failure to prosecute or to comply with the rules in the pending action, (07-1129). Nine, based on the Declarations and Judicial Notice filed in support of this reply the court is authorized to proceed on summary judgment. GENERAL OBJECTION Defendants generally object to each and every claim Plaintiff has made in this case that is irrelevant to actions it was required by rule to take in the pending action. CONCLUSION It is these plaintiffs that are misleading the court. If they believed they had to retain their ownership, they were nonetheless required to follow the rules by timely filing the required motion or motions. At any time in the pending case Plaintiffs could have sought counsel, and filed motions, but have waived their opportunity to do so before and after executing a stipulated agreement. In fact in this case the Booths were counseled by their own Attorney John Reedy through every step of the process and as indicated in Booths own declaration he authorized his Attorney to file a complaint with the Treasury Inspector General of Tax Administration, see Judicial Notice number 4, filed in support of the reply. The truth of the matter is that these plaintiffs all of a sudden, after 5 years, want to be vested with interest in the property because the sword of Percales hangs by a thread over plaintiff Steven Booths head to comply with the plea agreement he entered into with the government in case number 09-00142-001 LJO, Document 199 Filed 02/17/12. Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of Mr. Booths plea agreement incorporated by reference. Judicial Notice number 7, filed herewith in support of this reply. For plaintiff Steve Booth it is either forum shopping, and hopefully he would be revested with the subject property, or jail for contempt of his said plea agreement or even worse prison.
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Taking these circumstances and facts into consideration, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate their excusable neglect and grounds for the court to disturb the private stipulated agreement/judgment entered into by them in the pending case. Attorney, Randolf Krbechek says that we should be candid and then rambles on that Mr. Ioane somehow stole real property from the Booths, unsupported rhetoric. Well here are the facts, so we can be perfectly candid: Acacia Corporate Management, L.L.C., (Not Mr. Ioane), purchased three pieces of real property from Bakersfield Properties and Trust, in December of 2005, for valuable consideration, namely cash, notes and assumptions of the existing deeds of trust, secured against the subject real properties of this litigation. The Trustee at the time was Jean Liascos, see declaration of Jean Liasco, Judicial Notice, #5.Those deeds of trust state on their face state that Southern Financial Services, Treble LLC and its assigns are the beneficiaries. See Judicial Notice # 3, filed in Support of this reply. The estimated balance owed on those deeds, as of today, is $800,000. According to the Booths Southern Financial Services and Treble LLC are the alter egos of themselves, so ultimately they knew they would get those funds. How then were Dr. and Mrs. Booth insolvent either at the time of the sale, 2005, or now? The bigger question is why the Booths and their Attorney continue to falsely claim that Acacia Corporate Management LLCs purchase of the subject real properties was without consideration. The reality is that Mr. Booth foolishly plead guilty to a crime that never occurred. His business and life circumstance have now changed. Now he wants, without authorization or legal authority, to unwind legitimate business transactions to accommodate his current situation and circumstances; albeit, under duress and threats by the United States Government and agents of the Internal Revenue Service. The real properties subject of this litigation was purchased for valuable consideration evidenced by the record and the courts order and finding of facts dated September 25, 2007, see Judicial Notice # 3. The consideration is undisputed! The foregoing considered the court is authorized under F.R.Civ. P. 41(b), but, not limited to this section, to grant Defendants Motion to dismiss the state court removed complaint with prejudice. The court is further authorized to award Defendants their attorneys fees and costs addressing this frivolous complaint. An awarded of sanctions would
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surely send a message to the plaintiff to stop filing any more actions in this court or other courts involving the same parties and subject matter. Respectfully submitted this 15th day of May, 2012. /s/ William Mcpike_/s/
William McPike

Certificate of Service It is hereby certified that on May15, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Dismiss, removed state court case Judicial Notice in Support of Reply Declaration of Ioane in Support of Reply Objection and request to strike to united states opposition to motion to dismiss Objection and request to strike reply by plaintiff to US opposition to motion to dismiss. With the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

G Patrick Jennings Trial Attorney Tax Division US Dept of Justice P.O. Box 683 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044-0683 And Randolf Krbechek 9477 N. Fort Washington Road, Suite 104 Fresno, CA 93730 By:/s/ William McPike /s/ William McPike

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