Bright Ideas in Arc Flash Protection

Written by Robert A. Wilson Regional Technical Manager ABB Inc. and Daniel Aronson Regional Sales Manager ABB Inc.

Presented to: 2008 Distributech Conference & Exhibition Tampa, Florida January 23, 2008

Abstract Reducing clearing time is a critical component in reducing arc flash incident energy levels. Additional benefits include reduced collateral damage, lower production downtime and lower personal protective equipment requirements. Optical arc flash protection has been available for over 15 years worldwide and has a proven track record in reducing arc flash hazards and saving lives. This paper discusses optical arc flash protection using long optical fiber sensor technology, the benefits of this technology and documented cases of arc flash events where this protection was implemented. Also covered are test results involving retrofit applications in older airmagnetic switchgear. Index Terms Arc flash, arc flash hazard, incident energy, personal protective equipment I. INTRODUCTION Arc flash is not a new phenomenon but interest and concern about the dangers associated with arc flash events has increased dramatically in recent years. This increased awareness and concern is largely due to new guidelines and standards put forth by IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers), NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), NEC (National Electric Code) and OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration). IEEE Standard 1584, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, contains step-by-step procedures for calculating the available incident energy where workers might be exposed to energized electrical equipment. NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, adopts the IEEE Standard 1584 calculation procedures and assigns hazard levels ranging from 0 through 4 to incident energies up to and including 40 cal/cm 2. It also lists typical PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) suit levels appropriate for working near energized electrical equipment at each of the defined hazard levels. Beginning in 2002, NEC has included a section requiring the labeling of panels with arc flash warnings. OSHA regulations represent the fourth major impetus behind the increased interest in arc flash hazards. The primary OSHA regulations are in 29CFR 1910 Subparts I and S. These regulations are primarily concerned with hazard assessment and documentation as well as training workers in the proper use of PPE. The efforts of these four groups have combined to raise the awareness and concern about arc flash hazards to new heights. II. HAZARD LEVELS NFPA 70E assigns relative hazard risk levels depending on the calculated incident energy levels. NFPA 70E also lists an example of typical PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) clothing appropriate to each hazard category. For actual applications, the calculated incident energy must be compared to specific PPE combinations used at the facility being evaluated. The example given in NFPA is shown below in Table 1:

TABLE 1 PPE Characteristics [2] Required Minimum PPE Arc Rating (cal/cm2) N/A (1.2) 4 8 25 40

Hazard Risk Category 0 1 2 3 4

Typical Protective Clothing Systems Non-melting, flammable materials (natural or treated materials with at least 4.5 oz/yd2) FR pants and FR shirt, or FR coverall Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants and FR coverall Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants and multi-layer flash suit

Note that the highest defined hazard category is level 4 having an upper limit of 40 cal/cm2. While PPE is certainly available in ratings well above 40 cal/cm 2, working near exposed energized equipment above this level is discouraged. NFPA 70E notes that greater than normal emphasis should be placed on de-energizing the equipment (Annex D.8 FPN) at such high incident energy levels [2]. III. MITIGATING STRATEGIES The three most obvious mitigating strategies for reducing arc flash hazards are: 1. Reduce the fault current 2. Increase the working distance 3. Reduce the arc duration A. Reduce the fault current Some protective devices are current limiting by design. Current limiting fuses, for example, are capable of both limiting the magnitude of fault current and duration provided the fault current is within their current limiting range, typically 10-15 times the device rating [3]. Fault currents below this range must be analyzed like non-current limiting devices based on their time-current characteristics. Lower level arcing currents can easily result in higher incident energy because the clearing time may be longer. Current limiting reactors (CLR) may also be used to limit the available fault current. The disadvantage of a CLR is that it also introduces impedance in the circuit and its associated undesirable voltage drop [4]. In some cases, a high-speed pyrotechnic-operated high-current fault current limiter can be justified. Such devices have interrupting ratings exceeding 200 kA and operate in less than 2 milliseconds [5].

B. Increase the working distance Increasing the working distance has a dramatic effect on the incident energy due to the exponential effect of distance on arc flash incident energy. Examples of this strategy include remote racking and the use of extension tools such as hotsticks. However, many tasks may not be able to be accomplished remotely and remote racking devices may not operate as desired. If the remote racking device fails, a backup plan is needed. C. Reduce the clearing time The incident energy from an arc flash is directly proportional to the duration of the arc. Where a circuit breaker is involved, this time consists of the relay operating time plus the breaker operating time. Table 2 lists typical power circuit breaker operating times ranging from 1.5 cycles to 8 cycles depending on the class of breaker. Table 2 Power Circuit Breaker Operating Times [1]

Circuit breaker rating, type Low voltage (molded case) (<1000 V) (integral trip) Low voltage (insulated case) (<1000 V) (power circuit bkr) (integral trip or relay operated) Medium voltage (1-35 kV) Some high voltage (>35 kV)

Opening time at 60 Hz

1.5 cycles

3.0 cycles

5.0 cycles

8.0 cycles

Relay operating times depend heavily on the type of protection being used. Instantaneous over-current (ANSI device 50) and bus differential (ANSI device 87) are relatively fast with typical operating times of 2-3 cycles. On the other hand, operating times for time over-current elements (ANSI device 51) are very dependent on the current magnitude and can vary from a few cycles to over a second. Time over-current relays are especially slow where coordination with downstream protection requires delayed tripping of the upstream time over-current relay. Some of the most common methods to reduce the relay operating time are listed below with their advantages (+) and disadvantages ().

a. Lower (temporary) protection settings (+) Inexpensive to implement (+) 2 cycle typical operating time () Activation may require operator action () Downstream coordination likely sacrificed () Deactivation may require operator action b. High impedance bus differential protection (+) 2 cycle typical operating time () Requires CTs on all circuits expensive () Prone to CT saturation concerns () Doesnt protect feeder cable compartments c. Zone interlocking scheme (+) 3-10 cycle typical operating time (+) Relatively inexpensive to implement () Requires communication between relays d. Optical arc flash protection (+) 0.15 cycle typical operating time (+) Requires CTs only on sources - moderate cost (+) Immune to CT saturation (+) Can protect all switchgear compartments (+) Selective tripping capability IV. OPTICAL ARC FLASH PROTECTION An arcing fault instantaneously releases large amounts of radiant energy. This radiant energy includes both light and thermal energy. Light intensities can be thousands of times higher than normal ambient light during an arcing event. Optical arc flash relays use this phenomenon to achieve faster operating times than is possible with conventional relaying. Optical sensors detect the sudden increase in light intensity resulting from an unconstrained arcing event. At the same time, instantaneous overcurrent peak detecting elements determine fault current levels via conventional current transformers (CTs) connected to the source side of the main circuit breaker(s). When both light and high current are simultaneously detected, an arc flash event is declared. High-speed tripping is initiated via two independent solid-state Insulated Gate Bi-polar Transistor (IGBT) outputs. Total operating time is typically less than 2.5 milliseconds [6], about one-tenth the time required by conventional fast relaying schemes such as high impedance bus differential protection. Optical arc flash protection has been used since the early 1990s and thousands have been installed worldwide. Early models used single point light sensors called lens sensors that were mounted in each medium voltage compartment and radially connected to a central electronics unit. In 1999, the long optical fiber sensor technology was introduced. This light sensor consists of a special wide diameter, unclad fiber that allows light to enter the fiber

throughout its external cylindrical surface making the fiber a continuous light sensor throughout its length. The fiber sensor is routed through the various medium voltage switchgear compartments where an arc flash could occur. A flash anywhere along the fiber path can be detected. An arc flash event is declared when light and high current are simultaneously detected. There are several advantages to the long fiber sensor technology. A single sensor fiber can be as long as 200 feet.[6] A doubled-ended switchgear lineup can typically be covered by two sensor fiber loops that overlap in the tie breaker compartment. One long sensor fiber can replace dozens of single-point lens sensors so the cost of implementation is reduced. If the sensor fiber is configured in a loop with both ends connected to the electronic central unit, the system can continuously monitor the integrity and continuity of the optical sensor itself. Up to twenty additional fiber sensors can be added for large applications or physically separated switchgear sections. Provisions are also available for selective arc flash isolation and fast circuit breaker failure protection. Compared to bus differential protection, the optical arc flash protection is typically less expensive because CTs are only required on the main breakers. Moreover, it can easily be expanded to cover the feeder cable compartments which are outside the bus differential protection zone, thereby protecting all medium voltage compartments, not just some of them. Last, but not least, it is faster than bus differential protection so incident energy levels can be reduced even further. Optical arc flash protection is independent of other protection schemes and does not need to be coordinated with existing protection systems. Figure 1 shows a suggested fiber routing path in a singlehigh main-tie-main switchgear configuration [7]. This illustration only shows the main fiber routing for the right half of the lineup. The fiber route forms a large loop traveling from the central unit (electronics), horizontally through the breaker compartments, returning horizontally through the bus compartment with a slight detour through the Voltage Transformer (VT) compartment, then back to the central unit. The central unit also has conventional CT inputs from the main breaker(s). When high current and light are simultaneously detected, high-speed tripping is initiated. In this scenario, the Main2 and Tie breakers would be tripped. Similarly, simultaneous light and high current detection anywhere along the left-hand fiber route would result in high-speed tripping of the breakers at the Main -1 and Tie positions. When implementing optical arc flash protection, the routing paths of each fiber determine which breaker(s) should be tripped. Each fiber represents a common tripping action or protective zone. Regardless of where the flash occurs along the fiber, the same breakers will be tripped. Where different tripping actions are desired, separate fiber sensors are installed to define each protective zone.

Figure 1 Suggested Fiber Sensor Routing Path Note that the main fiber loop in Figure 1 does not enter any of the cable compartments. There are two ways to provide arc flash protection for the cable compartments. The easiest and least expensive approach is simply to add these compartments to the routes taken by the main sensor fibers mentioned earlier. However, this results in one-half of the switchgear lineup being tripped for an arc flash in any cable compartment along the fiber path. To achieve more selective tripping, an independent light sensor must be installed in each cable compartment using an extension unit. This creates a separate arc flash protection zone for each cable compartment which trips only the appropriate feeder breaker for a flash in the associated cable compartment. Fortunately, this selectivity can be accomplished without adding time. Typical tripping time remains 2.5 milliseconds wherever the flash may occur. V. REDUCING INCIDENT ENERGY WITH OPTICAL ARC FLASH PROTECTION The incident energy of an arc flash event is directly proportional to the total clearing time per IEEE Standard 1584. Figure 2 shows a spreadsheet which illustrates this relationship and details potential incident energies for various available bolted fault currents on a 13.8 kV grounded system. The incident energies shown in interior cells

are shown as a function of the available bolted fault current and total clearing time (relay operating time plus breaker operating time). Incident energy values are calculated per IEEE Standard 1584 in cal/cm2. Cell shading indicate the hazard level as defined by NFPA 70E and listed previously in Table 1. The column marked Arc Flash Relay is based on a total clearing time of 0.086 seconds. This time includes 0.083 seconds (5 cycle breaker operating time) plus 0.0025 seconds (arc flash relay operating time). Comparing this column with protection schemes having longer total clearing times illustrates the potential improvements in incident energy and hazard level made possible by implementing optical arc flash protection.

Figure 2 Incident Energy Comparisons VI. OPTICAL ARC FLASH RELAYING IN AIR MAGNETIC SWITCHGEAR Optical arc flash relaying is ideally suited to equipment with vacuum or SF6 interrupters, the predominant modern medium voltage circuit breaker technologies. With these technologies, interrupters are sealed and normal fault interruption is contained within the sealed interrupters. Therefore, any light flash outside the interrupter is cause for concern. A simultaneous light flash and fault current detection in this switchgear represents an arc flash. Air-magnetic breakers operate differently. In this type of breaker, an arc is drawn in air during normal fault interruption. The arc is extinguished by blow-out coils that create magnetic forces causing the arc to be elongated and segmented. Most of the light is contained within the arc chutes but these chutes are not completely sealed. Concerns have been raised whether optical arc flash relaying is appropriate for air magnetic breakers because escaping light might initiate an undesired trip of the optical arc flash relay.

To answer this question, high-current tests were conducted on two medium voltage air-magnetic switchgear cubicles in November, 2006.[8] One frame contained a General Electric MagnaBlast 13.8-500-5H-1200 A (15 kV Class, 500 MVA, 1200 A) air-magnetic circuit breaker and a second frame contained a Westinghouse 50DHP250-1200 (5 kV class, 250 MVA, 1200 A) air-magnetic circuit breaker. The purpose of the tests was to determine if the optical arc flash relay could be fooled by the light escaping the arc chutes during normal fault clearing from low level currents to nearrated interrupting levels. A. GE MagnaBlast 13.8-500-5H-1200 tests [8] The General Electric MagnaBlast circuit breaker tests consisted of nine optical arc flash protection relays tested simultaneously in three groups of three relays. Each of the relays within a group had a different Background Light Reference Level Adjustment setting (light sensitivity). One was set at minimum, one at maximum and one midway between. A fiber light sensor loop for each relay was routed through the breaker and main bus compartments. The fiber optic sensor groups were laid out in three distinct routes. The three routes were: 1. Across the bottom of the structure away from the arc chutes 2. Midway along the side of the structure to allow easy removal of the breaker 3. Midway along the back of the structure to allow easy removal of the breaker In this manner, all combinations of three light sensitivity settings and three fiber sensor routes could be evaluated. Another optical arc flash relay with eight radial lens sensors was also tested. The radial lens sensors were placed in the vicinity of the arc chutes and in front of the circuit breaker. Three-phase current interruption tests were performed at 13.8 kV as listed in Table 3. Table 3 13.8 kV GE MagnaBlast Breaker Tests

Test Number 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Average Symmetrical Current (kA) 8.44 16.0 16.9 17.0 20.6 20.2 20.4 20.6

Average Total Current (kA) 12.5 16.2 25.4 25.7 31.5 26.6 26.1 24.8

The optical arc flash relay was tested with the Trip Condition key switch in the Light Only setting meaning light detection alone (no current sensing) was sufficient for

tripping. Trip activity was checked after each test and adjustments were made between tests where necessary. Proper light detection tests were routinely conducted between current interruption tests to ensure that the optical arc flash relay was operational and would detect an actual arc flash event. A flash camera attachment was used to simulate an arc flash for these verifications. The optical arc flash relays sensors in the breaker and main compartments did not sense sufficient light to operate for current interruption levels in tests 18 through 22, 24 and 25. The radial lens sensors in the breaker and bus compartments also did not detect enough light to operate the optical arc flash relay for tests 18 through 22, 24 and 25. During test 23, a cable connected to a main bus bar pulled out of the connector causing a flashover. All arc flash relays detected the arc flash including one relay whose optical fiber sensor was broken during the flashover event. Figure 3 shows the GE MagnaBlast breaker racked into the breaker compartment with the back metal sheet removed. The openings on the top of the arc chutes allow gas and pressure from the arc interruption to escape. A radial lens sensor was mounted over the top of the left arc chute. Figure 4 shows the GE MagnaBlast breaker in the disconnected position. In order to allow removal of the circuit breaker without breaking the optical fiber sensor, the fiber was fastened closely to each side wall and a back wall flange above the breaker. Figure 5 shows the position of the optical fiber sensor in the background behind the chain.

Fig. 3 Circuit Breaker Racked In

Fig. 4 Circuit Breaker Withdrawn

Fig. 5 Optical Fiber Sensor (located behind the chain) B. Westinghouse 50DHP-1200 tests [8] The Westinghouse DHP circuit breaker tests also included nine optical arc flash relays, again configured in three groups of three relays with similar light sensitivity setting variations among the relays within a common group. Optical sensor fibers were looped through the breaker, main bus and feeder cable compartments. Radial lens sensors were located in the main bus and breaker compartments. The optical fiber sensors groups were routed in the same three distinct patterns used in the GE breaker tests. Another optical arc flash relay with eight radial lens sensors was also tested. The radial sensors were placed in the vicinity of the arc chutes and in front of the circuit breaker. Three-phase current interruption tests were performed at 4.76 kV as listed in Table 4. Table 4 4.76 kV Westinghouse DHP Breaker Tests

Test Number 3 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 15

Average Symmetrical Current (kA) 2.92 2.90 2.93 2.94 19.7 10.1 10.0 10.2 16.5 14.1

Average Total Current (kA) 3.98 3.99 4.02 4.04 29.1 14.3 14.2 14.3 23.4 18.8

During test 9, the Westinghouse DHP circuit breaker failed to interrupt the test current of 19.7 kA even though its interrupting rating at 4.76 kV is 30.3 kA. The fault was subsequently isolated by an upstream breaker. All optical fiber sensors and all optical lens sensors detected sufficient light and tripped when the Westinghouse breaker failed to interrupt the test current. The optical fiber sensors detected sufficient light to operate the optical arc flash relay when the Background Light Reference Level Adjustment was set at the minimum setting for the 2.92 kA levels in tests 3 through 7. The optical fiber sensors in the breaker compartment shown in Figure 6 did not detect sufficient light to operate the optical arc flash relay when the Background Light Reference Level Adjustment was set between midway and maximum for tests 10 through 13 and test 15.

Fig. 6 Optical Fiber Sensor in the Breaker Compartment The optical fiber sensor loops placed in the vicinity of the arc chutes sensed sufficient light to operate the optical arc flash relay for tests 10 through 13 and test 15. All radial lens sensors detected sufficient light to operate the optical arc flash relay in the breaker and bus compartments at all levels of current interruption. Figure 7 shows the external damage to the circuit breaker resulting from the failed 19.7 kA interruption test.

Fig. 7 Failed Westinghouse DHP Breaker VII. DOCUMENTED CASE STUDIES

There have been at least two documented cases to date where an arc flash event occurred in medium voltage switchgear protected by optical arc flash relays utilizing the long fiber sensor technology. A. Case #1: Detromovice Power Plant [9] During the morning shift at the Detromovice Power Plant in the Czech Republic on June 26, 2006, two workers were exercising a 6.3 kV breaker that had been withdrawn to its test position. Unfortunately, they forgot that the breaker was closed as they tried to rack it into the operation position. To make matters worse, they bypassed the mechanical interlocks as they forced the breaker into position. This initiated an arc that could have caused extremely serious consequences. Fortunately, the switchgear was equipped with dedicated optical arc flash protection utilizing long fiber sensor technology. Within 82 milliseconds, the entire substation was disconnected and a major personnel and equipment catastrophe was averted. Eyewitnesses reported that the cubicle compartment was full of white sticky smoke from the burned plastic parts but that was the extent of the damage. Repairs consisted of cleaning the breaker and cubicle as well as replacing the breaker rosette and cubicle pins. Figure 6 shows photos taken immediately following the incident. No permanent damage to the installation or surrounding equipment was encountered and the plant was quickly returned to service thanks to the fast reaction time of the optical arc flash relaying. Most importantly, however, both workers escaped injury and possible death. For those who may not have witnessed the after-effects of an arc flash explosion, the photos in Figure 6 may seem severe. Actually, the opposite is true. It is not uncommon

for an arc flash event to cascade down a switchgear lineup before the fault can be cleared. The fact that damage was confined to the single cell is remarkable. Had the optical arc flash protection not been installed, the estimated direct cost of the physical damages could have been as high as $1.6 million USD.[10] Indirect loses including extended loss of production would probably have been many times higher yet. A similar accident at this same plant occurred in 1979 well before the installation of dedicated arc flash protection. That incident resulted in a three-day outage. Loss production and equipment damages totaled several million dollars.

Figure 6 Detromovice Power Plant 6/26/06 Arc Flash Event Photos B. Case #2: Kemira Grow How Plant [11] Kemira Grow How has a fertilizer plant located in Uusikaupunki, Finland. Energy consumption is 18 MVA and the plant has 7 MVA of on-site generation. Primary products are fertilizers for farms, greenhouses, gardens and forests. In 2003, the Kemira Grow How plant narrowly avoided a major catastrophe just one day after installing optical arc flash protection based on long optical fiber sensor technology in 1965 vintage medium voltage switchgear. The arc flash event was initiated when a disconnect switch was opened but failed to extinguish the arc. The disconnect switch that was being opened fed a long underground cable, not normally energized. Due to the capacitive no-load current in the cable, the air disconnecting switch could not extinguish the arc. Instead, the arc progressed to the bus compartment where it evolved into a three-phase bus fault. According to Jari Lintula, Electrical Department Manager, the accident was the result of human error. Jari Lintula (Manager) and Pentti Laine (Technician) were working in the same room when the flash occurred. Neither was injured although both were a bit shaken.

The just-installed optical arc flash protection detected the arc flash and tripped before the switchgear could sustain any significant damage. The plant was restored to service in a few hours. Had dedicated arc flash protection not been installed, the fault clearing time would have doubled and the incident energy would have doubled as well. It is difficult to estimate the damage that might have occurred but it would most likely have been quite expensive. One day of lost production costs millions of dollars. Arc flash protection was originally installed at this site as insurance to limit the direct and indirect damages associated with an electrical accident. The investment was paid back many times over in one day. VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Incident energy is directly proportional to the total arcing time. Ultra-fast clearing of arc flash faults is essential in controlling arc flash hazards and minimizing incident energy levels. Even a few milliseconds improvement can shift hazard levels and PPE requirements to a lower category. With a typical operating time of only 2.5 milliseconds, optical arc flash protection is far faster than conventional relaying schemes. Compared to the more common bus differential protection scheme, optical arc flash protection is both faster and less expensive to implement but most of all, it protects all high voltage compartments not just some of them. The availability of long fiber light sensors makes this form of protection an even more practical and cost effective form of arc flash protection. Optical arc flash protection is ideal for equipment with vacuum or SF6 interrupters since all normal arc-interrupting flashes are contained within sealed interrupters. In airmagnetic breakers, the breaker cell design must be carefully studied to determine the best location for fiber sensor routing as well as lens sensor placement. Neither type of sensor should be located near or above the top of the arc chutes. The optical arc protection system can be effectively applied in 15 kV/500 MVA GE MagnaBlast breakers with good security at all Background Light Reference settings. Although the optical arc flash protection system tests involving 5 kV Westinghouse DHP breakers were inconclusive above 16.5 kA, the tests demonstrated the effectiveness in detecting an arc flash event resulting from an improperly functioning breaker attempting to interrupt fault current. IX. REFERENCES [1] IEEE Guide for Arc-Flash Calculations, IEEE Standard 1584-2002 [2] NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2004 Edition [3] Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Mitigation, Chris Inshaw and Robert Wilson, 2006 Texas A&M Relay Conference, April 2005, College Station, Texas [4] A Total Approach to Arc Flash Compliance, Alan C. Bast, Jeffrey L. Bennett, Norman E. Reifsnyder, Richard Mages, Preston Cooper, Power-Gen International 2006 Conference [5] Is-Limiter, ABB Calor Emag Medium Voltage Products, ABB AG, All Rights Reserved [6] ABB Buyers Guide, REA 10_ Arc Protection Relay, 1MRS750929-MBG, May, 1999

[7] REA10X Optical Sensor Fiber Routing, ABB Instruction Book 1VAD266601-MB, May, 2006. [8] Arc Flash Mitigation Applied in Switchgear with Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers, Daniel Aronson, Western Protective Relay Conference, October, 2007, Spokane, Washington [9] Electric Arc The Unpredictable Phenomenon, ABB Inc. publication, 2006 [10] Letter of Reference, Ludvik Pavlik, Detramovice Power Plant [11] REA 10_ Arc Protection System Saved Lives and Equipment, ABB Inc. Publication, 2006

X. VITAE Robert A. Wilson is a Regional Technical Manager for ABB Inc. in Houston, Texas. He received his BSEE degree (Honors Curriculum) from Purdue University in 1974 and his MSEE (Power Option) degree from Carnegie Mellon University in 1976. He started his career with Westinghouse Electric Corp. and transferred to ABB Power T&D Co., now ABB Inc. with the merger of the two companies in 1989. He is a Senior Member of IEEE and a Registered Professional Engineer in Texas and Pennsylvania. email: bob.a.wilson@us.abb.com Daniel Aronson is a Regional Sales Manager for ABB Inc in Allentown, PA. He has been with ABB Inc. for the past 27 years. Prior to ABB, he had electrical engineering positions with Buckeye Pipe Line Company, United Engineers & Constructors and American Electric Power Service Corporation. He received his BSEE Degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1970. . He is a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Pennsylvania and a member of IEEE. email: dan.l.aronson@us.abb.com