VOID MARRIAGE Case: Hernandez vs.

Court of Appeals (320 SCRA 76)

CONTENT OF THE STUDY:

Void marriage defines as a marriage that is ineffectual from the very beginning and, therefore, invalid from the start because of failure to comply with the substantive or procedural requirements of the law or public policy, e.g., marriage that is contracted where either the man or woman is below 18 years of age , or where the solemnizing officer is not legally authorized to perform marriages , or where there is no license , or it is bigamous or polygamous, or where there is a mistake as the identity of one of the parties to the marriage. These marriages are void from the beginning.
Void marriage is one that will be regarded by every court in any case in which the existence of the marriage is in issue as never having taken place and can be so treated by both parties to it without the necessity of any decree annulling it. The children of a void marriage will only be considered legitimate if at the time of the Solemnisation, the parties to the marriage reasonably believed that the marriage was valid and this Only applies if: The father of the child domiciled in Philippines at the time of marriage; In so far as it affects inheritance of any property only to children born after March 1, 1982. In the case of Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of the marriage filed by the petitioner. Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married on January 1, 1981 in Cavite. Three children were born to them, namely Maie, Lyra and Marian. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the later. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private

respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent , after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (std). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the amount of Php 9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties. Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, The prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be Set for trial. The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and Private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner Failed to show that private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage. Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration , was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after

its solemnization. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic Marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand , an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition in incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage. However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION: On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition For annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision

reads: The Court can underscore the fact that the cisrcumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons

for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code)- not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows: (1)Repeated psysical vilolence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner. (5)Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (8) Sexual infidelity Or perversion; (10)Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable Cause for more than one year. The conclusion in this case have reached makes it unnecessary to pass petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children,the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

TERM PAPER IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Submitted to: Justice Rodolfo V. Palattao/ DEAN-UDM Submitted by: Mylene B. Canezo / JD-202 -2nd Year

IMPLICATIONS To the Case of Chua vs. Civil Service Commission

CONTENT OF THE STUDY: Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D No.492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep.Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector. The appointment status of government in the career service is classified as follows: 1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligible and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility :Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

In the case of Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, the facts; In line with the policy of streaming and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A. 6683 was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due to reorganization , those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. She availed of the above mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified, being a coterminous employee. She was instead offered a severance of monthly basic pay for each year of service. And the issue on this case is whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as as coterminous employee.

And it held that, It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled of the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects. And Wherefore, the petition is granted.

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A. No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1998 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows: Sec.2 Coverage This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary , casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the Coverage of this Act.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMMENDATION:

It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil service servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law. IMPLICATIONS: It is one which, under the circumstances, is compelled by a reasonable view of the statute, and the contrary of which would be improbable and absurd. Necessity, the great master of all things, defines what may properly and logically be inferred from and read into the statute. It includes such inferences as may logically be drawn from the purpose or object of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to have intended, and from the necessity of making the statute effective and operative . It excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial or desirable . The doctrine of necessary implication may not therefore be used to justify the inclusion in a statute of what to the court appears to be wise and just, unless it is at the same time necessarily and logically within its terms. Nor may the doctrine, the purpose of which, like other rules of construction, is to ascertain legislative intent, be employed to support an interpretation destructive of the object or purpose of the law. What may be necessarily implied from a statute should, in any event, be consistent with, and not contrary to. The Constitution or to existing laws. An implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted. Aswering the issue in the affirmative , the Court ruled that a coterminous employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of government employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily implies that the former should also be entitled to such benefits. The Court added that the maxim of expresio unius est exclusion alterius should not be applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication. The Doctrine of necessary implication: So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced StatCon rule: to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a npart thereof as that

which is expressed

*Ex-necessitate legis- from the necessity of the law *Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege *In oe qoud plus sit, simper inest et minus greater includes the lesser *Necessity-it includes such inferences as may be logically be drawn from the purpose or object of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to have intended, and from the necessity of making the statute effective and operative. Excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or desirable

*must be consistent with the Constition or to existing laws * an implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted.

TERM PAPER IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Submitted to: Justice Rodolfo V. Palattao/ DEAN-UDM Submitted by: Mylene B. Canezo / JD-202 -2nd Year

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Concept of Integration

CONTENT OF THE STUDY:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) is the official organization of all Philippine lawyers whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The IBP came into being when the Supreme Court created on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration which was tasked not only to ascertain the advisability of integration of the Bar, but even more, to serve as a common vehicle of the Court and the Bar in fashioning a blueprint for integration and putting the same into actual operation. Republic Act No. 6397, which became effective September 17, 1971, confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Then on January 9, 1973, the Supreme Court, by a per curiam resolution, pursuant to its Constitutional mandate, ordained the integration bar of the Bar in accordance with its Rule 139-A, effective January 16, 1973. Within the next succeeding months, the IBP was Organized. On February 17, 1973, local chapters all over the country were finally formed And elections for chapter officers were held. Then on March 17, 1973, the first batch of Representatives to the IBP House of Delegates composed of 104 delegates representing the IBP Chapters nationwide convened in Manila and elected its first set of IBP Governors.

The IBP is composed of all Philippine attorneys now numbering about 50,000. All Persons whose name appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court (having qualified for and passed the Bar examinations and taken their attorneys oath, unless otherwise disbarred) are members of the IBP. If any such person does not agree to join the organization and regulations (such as payments of annual membership dues, now fixed at Php 1,000), he does not become, or he ceases to be, an IBP member, and at the same time his name is removed from the Roll of Attorneys. The effect of the removal is that the ceases to be an attorney. He loses the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with proper to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own Organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.