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2008 Parliamentary Election Monitoring in Mongolia (Summary of findings) (2008-07-31) 2008 Parliamentary Election Monitoring in Mongolia (Summary of findings) Background Mongolians have voted in four Parliamentary elections since 1990. Although the process has largely been peaceful in all four elections, the public confidence in the electoral process has always been undermined by a widespread use of public resources in election campaigns, vote buying, perceived lack of impartiality in the conduct of election management bodies and alleged allegations of electoral fraud involving inaccurate voter lists, fake ballots, stealing of ballot boxes etc, compounded by overall lack of transparency in the entire process. The voter list is not public, inaccessible by all stakeholders including political parties and civil society watchdogs; the law explicitly restricts access to polling stations for domestic observers on the Election Day. As a result the previous four Parliamentary elections saw a steadily dropping voter turnout reflecting the general distrust in the democratic process. In December 2007, in order to improve the transparency of political elections in Mongolia, Forum carried out a series of activities, in collaboration with independent researchers and local NGOs, including a set of research assessing the current legal and institutional frameworks and a National Forum on Election transparency on the eve of 2008, which produced a set of recommendations on further actions to take in order to make the electoral process more transparent. These activities prompted an initiation of draft amendments to the election law requiring, among other changes, an early disclosure of voters lists for public scrutiny. In January, 2008 Government formed a task force that consolidated the voter registration nationwide, which was then made available on the Internet three months ahead of the Parliamentary election on June 29, 2008. This was the first time the voter registry was ever made available for public and political parties to verify and check for inaccuracies. However, the law still does not permit civil society watchdogs to obtain the copy of the voter lists for monitoring purposes. In addition to these restrictions on transparency in the legal framework, Mongolias civil society lacks capacity, skills and information to exercise effective oversight in the electoral process. In 2004 Forum initiated the first election monitoring projects in Mongolia, and invited experts from Providus Center in Latvia to train two local NGOs in monitoring the use of public resources in election campaigns. These two NGOs then conducted a monitoring of election campaign financing during the 2004 Parliamentary election, focusing on the use of public resources and hidden advertisement. The findings of this monitoring prompted the 2005 adoption of new restrictions in campaign financing in the election law, making it illegal to use public resources for campaign purposes. Other than these experiences, election monitoring has remained a remote area of operation for many NGOs. In March 2008, Forum organized an International Seminar on Election Monitoring and Advocacy. This event brought together 180 representatives from local NGOs and civil society groups and 21 experts from fifteen countries in Europe and Asia who are engaged in election monitoring and advocacy to share best practices, methodologies and tools and advocacy strategies. The goal of this event was to raise awareness about the importance of comprehensive election monitoring toward ensuring integrity of the electoral process and to transfer knowledge and skills to monitors in Mongolia. 2008 Election monitoring In February 2008 Open Society Forum initiated a Civil Society Watchdogs for Fair Election network and

conducted a series of training for its members to carry out monitoring in following areas: Voter lists Transparency of election commissions Ballots printing, distribution, storage Campaign financing Media monitoring

In May, the Civil Society Watchdogs for Fair Elections reached an agreement with the General Election Commission and signed a Memorandum of Understanding in order to collaborate in ensuring the transparency of the electoral process within the possibilities allowed by the electoral code. Thus during the pre-election period, starting in April, five NGOs carried out monitoring in previously mentioned five areas. Especially significant were the voter list audit, transparency of election commissions (including the implementation of the legal requirements for equal representation of parties and coalitions in the formation of election commissions which is intended to ensure internal oversight), and ballot printing and related processes- all of which specifically focused on the election administration procedures and process. Forum set up a website where all interim reports and findings are posted. In addition, throughout the election period, Forum operated a media center to disseminate information to journalists and media outlets and a hotline to receive information from citizens about the process. On the Election Day alone, we received about 400 calls from voters, reporting fraud, violation of their right to vote, misconduct of polling station staff etc. Voter list audit results The full voters registry was made available on the Internet in March of 2008, giving individuals an opportunity to access their own information on the list and verify accuracy thereof. At the same time, the General Election Commission voiced concerns over the fact that there were 432149 multiple registrants (116568 individuals registered at 432149 multiple addresses) in the consolidated list. Despite this fact, however, because Mongolias election law restricts access to voter registry for civil society watchdogs, independent monitors were not able to obtain the copy of the voters lists in full in order to verify its accuracy on a broad basis. However, after an agreement with the General Election Commission, we were able to access some parts of the list. And based on this information the monitoring team conducted monitoring in election district # 22 in Ulaanbaatar, which had the most number of voters with duplicate addresses or multiple registrants and election district #9 in Zavhan province. (The total number of election constituencies/or districts nationwide is 26) In election district 22 in Ulaanbaatar, a list-to-people test was launched on May 27, 2008 and over a three week period verified the relevant information of 47354 individuals, which roughly equals one third of the total number of voters in this district. The goal was to ensure that every name on the voter list is that of an actual person who is eligible to vote and that his/her particulars, such as address, are correct. Monitoring findings are as follows: Out of 47354 we found 15392 eligible voters who are assigned to polling stations in their election district based on their correct residence address. However, out of these 15392, 575 were multiple registrants who said they plan to vote in a different election district and 6 soldiers who wont be voting from the address where they reside on the Election Day. Our test revealed 38 ineligible voters in the list, including 11 underage, 2 imprisoned, 25 deseased, inlcuding a man who died ten years ago. The test also revealed 2961 voters who relocated and had moved to a

different address, 3222 who were temporary residents and had moved from the area. The test revealed 11003 ghost voters, who are absent or do not live at registered address. For instance eighteen voters registered as residents at apartment #23, building #6 of 15th khoroo in Bayanzurkh district. None of them were found to be living at this address, where totally different people were residing. At apartment #18, where 14 people were registered, we found only five who actually live there. Similar cases were observed in other apartment buildings. In addition, there were a number of cases where hundreds of voters were registered at addresses that do not exist. Out of a total of 47354 voters included in the test, we could not verify the relevant information of 14677 for various reasons. In some cases the respondents refused to provide information, in other cases homes were empty and doors were not answered. In latter cases, we revisited homes at least one more time at different hours. Provision 20.4 of the Law on Parliament Elections states that the voter lists shall be disclosed for public scrutiny at least 15 days prior to the Election Day in polling stations. Considering that such public disclosure could help in many ways to reduce the inaccuracies in the voter list, the monitoring team visited 34 out of total 42 polling stations scattered throughout Election District 22. According to the law, the polling stations were supposed to have completed the quality check of voter lists by morning of June 9 and ensure public disclosure by June 14 in the office. Our monitors revealed that compilation of lists was not completed and not made available for public to review according to the law, further undermining the transparency of the voter registration process. Ballots monitoring The ballots monitoring work started with a review of the draft ballots printing, storage and distribution regulation prepared by the General Election Commission (GEC) in May 2008. We sent comments to the GEC based on this draft with regard to susceptibility to counterfeiting and the security of the ballot in relation to the printing process, verification of the ballots, and storage of the ballots prior to their shipment and distribution to the different areas in the country. In our comments made to the GEC, we also voiced concerns about a provision in the draft regulation about printing 10% additional ballots as back-up ballots to make up for spoilage during the casting of votes. International experiences show that ballot stuffing occur when there are more than enough ballots. Because there were past experiences of reported ballot stuffing, telegraphing and ballot forging in previous elections, the 2006 changes adopted in the election law required printing ballots with special barcodes to prevent fraud. However, due to lack of equipments required and concerns about electricity shortage in some parts of the country, the Parliament passed a law on Implementation of the Law on Parliamentary Elections in April and postponed the use of barcodes until 2012 elections. Hence GEC passed a decision to use watermarks as the only ballot paper security feature in the 2008 Parliamentary election. The ballots printing process started at midnight on June 19, 2008 and the GEC informed us the time and date in advance as agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding. However, our monitors were not given a chance to observe the watermarking process, a crucial security feature. In addition, the GEC did not accept our recommendation to assign a set of serial numbers to each election district in order to safeguard against ballot telegraphing and counterfeiting. The printing of tables with names of the candidates on the watermarked paper went without major irregularity. Our monitors watched the process 24 hours in shifts. Shipping is carried out according to our recommendations by a group constituted by representatives of different parties and election observers appointed by the district election commissions to provide a balanced

oversight in this process. The GEC ignored our recommendations to limit the number of back up ballots and distributed 10% more ballots to each election district. Monitoring of the distribution of ballots to polling stations revealed some of the polling stations received up to 16% more ballots. This happened, for instance in election district 26, the exact number of voters was not finally determined at the time when the printing process started, and therefore had requested 200 more ballots for each of the polling stations in the district area. The voter turnout was average 70 percent this year, so those polling stations that received 16 % more ballots ended up with 46% percent more ballots. Given the excess number of ballots distributed to polling stations, it was crucial to monitor the actual use of ballots during the casting of votes. This part of our monitoring covered 10 polling stations in 5 election districts, assessing the accuracy of the ballot reconciliation reports, focusing on the number of used ballots, unused ballots, and use of back up ballots. The monitoring revealed in all 10 polling stations average 23% of all distributed ballots remained unused. The number of voters assigned to the polling stations had increased average 12% after the ballots were distributed for advance voting purposes five days prior to the Election Day. Even with this increase in the number of voters, due to inadequate quality of voters lists, the number of remaining ballots suggests the 10% back up ballot was not necessary. In addition, the number of spoiled ballots in all ten polling stations was average 1.3% of all distributed ballots. Seven of the ten polling stations covered by this monitoring refused our monitors a chance to manually count the ballots against their ballot reconciliation reports. In three polling stations we were given a chance to count the ballots used in advance voting, mobile voting and invalid votes. Although, in general no major discrepancy was found, our monitors revealed in one of these polling stations 60 of the 121 ballots, sorted as invalid votes, were in fact perfectly valid ballots, which were all cast in favor of one particular party. This can only be explained as an act intended to influence the outcome of the votes illegally. Monitoring the Election Administration Formation of election district commissions As stipulated in the Law on Parliament Elections, the General Elections Commission shall form and publicly announce the composition of election district commissions including the chair, secretary and nine members 40 days prior the voting day. In conformity with this provision of the Law, the GEC approved and publicly announced the composition of election district commissions for 2008 Parliament elections on 19 May 2008, 40 days prior the voting day set on 29 June 2008. The information on 26 election district commission members include such information as name, age, gender, occupation, education background, party affiliation, position in the election district commission (for more detailed information on composition of election district commissions, please visit www.gec.gov.mn/#201011@md2_id) Provision 14.3.3 of the Law on Parliament Elections states the composition of election commissions shall not be dominated by any of the party or coalition participating in the elections, provision 14.3.4. states chair and secretary of the election commissions shall not be from the same party. The purpose of this provision is to ensure internal oversight mechanism through equal participation of parties and coalitions in the composition of election district commissions. This internal oversight mechanism will play a critical role in the prevention of undue influence on the election process and contribute to enhanced confidence in the electoral process by stakeholders. There are 12 political parties and one coalition that expressed the interest to participate in the 2008

Parliament elections and that have been formally handed the certificates. To the extent possible equal representation of these parties and a coalition in the election district commissions will be in line with the principles of the aforementioned provisions of the Law. Analysis of party affiliation of commission illustrate that in 26 districts there are total 286 people with 33% representing MPRP, 34% Democratic party, 25.5% from other parties and a coalition and 7% are non-party (graph1).

Unlike MPRP and the Democratic Party, which nominated 76 candidates in all 26 districts, not all smaller parties nominated candidates in all 26 election districts. Yet, in 20 out of 26 election districts, where they did nominate their candidates smaller parties and independent candidates failed to secure their representation to participate in the internal oversight of the district elections commissions,. Review of party affiliation of 26 election district commissions chairs and secretaries illustrates that except district No 16, in all other districts, MPRP and Demparty dominate. MPRP Demparty Non-partisan Total

Chair of election district commission

18

26

Secretary of election district commission

19

26

There are no such irregularities as the dominance of one party or coalition with 6 and more out of 11 members in the election district commissions, representing the same party or coalition. However, the overall review of composition indicates there is a dominance (67%) of two ruling parties. In most commissions there are 3-4 representatives of MPRP and Democratic Party and up to one representative from other parties, if they managed to join. There is a common tendency of dominance of MPRP and Demparty in several commissions with 4-5 representatives of MPRP and Demparty. For example, Democratic party in 3 and MPRP in 1 district commissions had 5 representatives from their respective parties appointed.

Total number of representatives Number of districts with own in election commissions representation Parties PRP Demparty Citizenss will party Motherland party National New party Civil Coalition Republican party 93 100 20 16 13 10 11 26 26 20 16 13 10 10

Traditional party Non-partisan

3 20

3 15

Out of 26 districts in 15 districts there are 20 representatives who are not affiliated with any parties. The Law on Parliament elections does not have a specific provision on whether an individual not affiliated with a political party can be a member of the election district commission and if yes, what are the criteria and who is responsible for nomination etc. The representation of individuals not affiliated with a political party is a positive sign to ensure contribution of the civil society into the internal oversight. On the other hand, since the law does not have a clear provision on criteria for nomination and the nominating body, there is likelihood that any parties or coalition taking the advantage of majority in Citizens khural will nominate an individual representing their interest. For example, in election district 10, auditor general who suspended from MPRP membership due to his position is registered in the records as a person not affiliated with a party. Similarly, in Khovd aimag, aimag auditor general appointed as a chair of the election commission was suspended from MPRP membership, who was a member of Citizens Khural in 2004 nominated by MPRP. These cases conflict with the principles of the Parliament Elections law on transparency of the election process, the transparency and oversight of the performance of the election commissions. Political appointees in election commissions Provision 14.2.5 of the Law on Parliament elections states that political appointees shall be prohibited from nomination in the election commissions. 71% or 203 members, chairs and secretaries of commissions work in the public organizations, 9% or 25 members work in the NGOs, 20% or 58 members work in the private sector. Out of 203 members working in the public organizations, there are no political appointees as defined per the Article 6, Law on Civil service. Formation of election district sub- commissions and polling station commissions We sampled 5 election districts for this analysis, including 3 in Ulaanbaatar and 2 in the countryside. A total of 46 election district sub-commissions and 244 polling station commissions were formed throughout the 5 disticts under monitoring 30 days prior to the Election Day as required by the Law on Parliament Elections. The focus of our work was to assess to what extent the internal oversight mechanism or the legal requirements for plularist representation from a balance of political parties and coalitions has been observed in the compositions of sub commission and polling station commissions. As mentioned previously provisions 14.3.3, 14.3.4 of the Law on Parliament Elections states the composition of election commissions shall not be dominated by any of the party or coalition participating in the elections and chair and secretary of the election commissions shall not be from the same party. The purpose of these provisions is to build confidence in the activities of the election commissions and to facilitate their independent and impartial operation. Our monitoring revealed, similar to the pattern observed in the analysis of the district election commissions, the composition of sub-commissions and polling station commissions showed overall dominance by the representation of the two ruling parties- the MPRP and Democratic Party. Smaller parties and independent candidates were given only a marginal representation. And the review of party affiliation of election commissions chairs and secretaries illustrates that in all cases MPRP and Democratic Party also dominate. In election district 14 of Tuv province, out of a total of 84 polling station commissions, in violation of the law, we found in 14 polling station commissions a clear dominance of one party or coalition with 6 and more out of 11 members representing the same party or coalition.

Provisions 17.1, 18.1 of the electoral code require that the composition of district sub-commissions and polling station commissions be announced publicly within the boundaries of respective jursidictions upon approval by local hurals (parliaments) 30 days prior to the election day. Because the law does not prescribe a uniform format for public disclore of this information, in some districts only a few irrelevant statistical data (names, gender etc) was offered on the announcement boards placed outside the district and polling station commission offices, while in others the information was published in a small newspaper, unknown to most people. Monitoring team sent formal requests to district election commissions requesting detailed information on the composition of sub-commissions and polling station commission, however our requests were denied without sufficient explanation. This violated provision 9.1 of the electoral code which states electoral process shall be transparent and open. Media Monitoring The monitoring was conducted in four sequences, 02- 07 June (the first monitoring period), 08-14 June (the second monitoring period), 15-21 June (the third monitoring period) and 22-27 June (4th monitoring period), which were the official campaigning period in accordance with the Law on Parliament Elections. The monitoring focused on following: objective and balanced coverage of the candidates and their platforms information quality 10% Legal Restriction on Broadcast Time Hidden advertisement

The media monitoring involved 12 media outlets: six national television channels, one national radio and three daily newspapers and two daily tabloids. The monitoring had taken in three directions: quantative and qualitative analysis, 10% legal restrictions of media campaigning on broadcast time.

Broadcast Media Mongolian National Public Radio (MNPR) Mongolian national Public Television (MNPTV) UBS, private Channel 25, private TV5, private TV9, private Eagle, American invested news channel

Daily newspapers Odriin Sonin Zuuny Medee Onoodor

Weeklies Seruuleg

Humuus

Main findings are as follows: 12 political parties and one coalition (Civic Coalition of Mongolian Green Party, Mongolian Social Democratic Party and Party of Civil Movements) contested for 76 seats in the Parliament. In total, 354 candidates were running for the elections, and 45 among them were independent ones. Globe International monitored 155,889 minutes of six national television channels, 26,235 minutes of national radio and 69 issues of three daily newspapers and 10 issues of two weeklies. Television stations devoted 50,447 minutes and radio- 2,804 minutes of the airtime to the election coverage. The daily newspapers provided 70,221 sm2 and weeklies- 70,221 sm2 of the spaces for the election coverage. The broadcast and print media allocated a small portion of the airtime and spaces to the voters education materials and information of the General Election Committee. MNPTV provided 8.4% and MNPR 10.5% - for voter education. Regarding the private channels, UBS allocated the biggest portion (13.9%) of the airtime and TV9- the smallest (6.8%) for the above mentioned purposes. The portion of the voters education materials was very small in the newspapers. The biggest equal to 2% devoted in Zuuny Medee and the smallest was in Odriin Sonin (1.4%) Balanced Coverage Two biggest political parties: Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and Democratic Party (DP) received the most of the airtime and spaces on the monitored broadcast and print media. 37% of all the monitored airtime devoted to MPRP and 28%-to DP. The rest of the airtime and spaces shared by other parties and independent candidates. DP election coverage dominated in newspapers. 41% of the newspapers spaces allocated to DP and 38%- to MPRP. MNPTV devoted 30% of its airtime to MPRP and 14% -to DP. The other parties seated in the Parliament received from 5% to 9% if airtime on the public television. As concerns the rest of the parties, airtime allocation was under 6%, while 4% devoted to the independent candidates. FGF MNPR allocated 31% to MPRP and 13% to DP. Other parties seated in the PARLIAMENT received the comparatively same amount of 6-7% and the portion for the rest of parties could not reach 1%, while only Civic Coalition had 9% of the airtime. 15% of airtime devoted to the independent candidates. In a positive development, election debates amongst all parties and independent candidates took place on MNRTV. Regarding the private channels, UBS allocated 45% of its airtime to MPRP and 29%-to DP. On TV5 channel 47% of the airtime was devoted to MPRP and 34%-to DP. TV9 allocated 49% of the airtime to MPRP and 31%- to DP. On Channel 25 a both parties had almost equal time; MPRP- 32% and DP-35%. On Eagle DP had more time (40%) than MPRP, which received 20%. Other parties seated in the PARLIAMENT received a little airtime on all the television channels. Civil Will Party (CWP) received 10% on Eagle TV and, while RP had no time received on Channel 25. The airtime allocated to the other parties was under 9%. The maximum amount of 9% devoted to the Civic Movement Party on TV9. Television channels devoted from 2 to 10% of the airtime for the independent candidates. The maximum coverage equal to 10% was on TV9. UBS and TV5 provided the same amount of 7%, Channel 25-5% and Eagle-5% for the independent candidates. Daily newspapers devoted from 45% to 54% of their spaces to MPRP while DP party received from 29% to 53%. MPRP dominated in Zuuny Medee and Onoodor, and DP- in Odriin Sonin. The other parties seated in the PARLIAMENT received very little spaces ranging between 4- 1%. No spaces were devoted to RP. Regarding the rest of the parties, only Civic Coalition and Mongolian Traditional United Party (MTUP) received some spaces. Civic Coalition had the same 5% of spaces in Onoodor and Odriin Sonin, and 3% in Zuuny Medee. Onoodor devoted 2% of the spaces to the MTUP. Regarding the independent candidates, 13% of spaces were allocated by Odriin Sonin. Onoodor devoted to the independent candidates 9%, while Zuuny Medee-5%. Weeklies allocated more spaces for DP and it is almost same for a both of weeklies; 50% in Seruuleg and 53% in Humuus. MPRP received the comparable 30% in Seruuleg and 31% in Humuus.

Regarding the other parties seated in the PARLIAMENT, they had under 4%, while Motherland Party(MP) had no spaces allocated in Humuus and RP did not receive any spaces in Seruuleg. Only 11% allocated to Civic Will Party(CWP). The rest of the parties only Civic Coalition had the same amount of 3%. Others had no spaces allocated. The independent candidates received 7% in Seruuleg and 4% in Humuus. During the election campaign all the candidates could not receive the equal airtime and newspaper spaces as it was obliged by the election law. The most presented candidates on television during the whole campaigning were Z.Altai, B.Lhagvajav, S.Bayar, B.Undarmaa, B.Batbold. The candidates mostly covered by the newspapers, were S.Bayar, L.Bold, D.Zagdjav, Ts.Elbegdorj and D.Naymhuu. A big number of the candidates did not receive any airtime and newspaper spaces in the monitored media outlets.

Information Quality Coverage of all candidates was overwhelmingly positive or neutral in tone. 65% of coverage on television was positive and 29% -neutral, while negative was 6%. For the print media, 47% was positive in tone and 42%-negative, and 11%- negative. MNPTV provided 67% of the neutral coverage, 28%- positive and only 5% was negative in tone. 28% of the positive information devoted to MPRP and 10%-to DP. On MNPTV the portion of the negative coverage devoted to two biggest parties are comparable; 42% devoted to DP and 38%- to MPRP. On MNPR 60% of the coverage was neutral in tone, 27%- positive and only 3%- negative. 46% of the positive coverage devoted to MPRP and 12%- to DP. 65% of the negative information provided for DP and 29% for MPRP. Regarding the private channels, the most positive coverage on MPRP was UBS, TV5 and TV9 provided. Channel 25 and Eagle provide the most positive information on DP. On other channels except for TV5, the negative information devoted to MPRP. The biggest portion of negative coverage equal to 81% on TV9 was about MPRP. For the daily newspapers, the positive information on MPRP dominated in Onoodor and Zuuny Medee and DP positive coverage- in Odriin Sonin. 95% of the negative coverage was about MPRP in Odriin Sonin. Weekly newspaper Humuus provided 56% of neutral, 37% of the positive information. Only 7% of their coverage was negative. 58% of the positive information and 50% of negative information devoted to DP. Seruuleg, weekly provided 69% of the positive, 29% of neutral and only 2% of the negative information. 51% of the positive information devoted to, while 83% of negative coverage also provided for DP.

10% Legal Restriction on Broadcast Time Television stations devoted 34, 064 minutes of the airtime for the paid election coverage and MNPR265. MNPTV aired 829 minutes and MNPR aired 265 minutes of the paid programs. According to the lection law, MNB shall not air any paid election programs. Such programs aired mostly in 2d and 3d weeks of monitoring and it was radically decreased during the 4th week. MNPR had no paid coverage in the 1st week of monitoring. Regarding the private stations, during the whole election campaigning all of the channels exceeded 10% of the legal restriction on broadcast time. The smallest portion equal to 4.9% was on TV5 and the biggest- 27.6% was on Channel 25.

Hidden Advertising The hidden advertising on television stations had increased smoothly in 2d and 3d weeks of monitoring and it radically increased in 4th week. The daily newspapers devoted 82,122 sm2 107,069 sm2 to the hidden advertising. The biggest portion was in Odriin Sonin and the smallest- in Onoodor

Regarding weeklies, Seruuleg devoted 23,649 cm2 and Humuus- 41,398 sm2 to the hidden advertising. MNPTV allocated 7.5% and MNPR- 2.6% of the airtime for the hidden advertising. The private channels also provided some hidden advertising; the biggest portion was on Channel 25, which equals to 38.5%. The smallest portion was on TV5.