Maritime Safety2 Master

ANNEX 1
SHIP SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE

Prepared by
ROYAL ASSOCIATION of NEDERLANDS SHIPOWNERS
Edition 05 (April 2003)
To meet the requirements of SOLAS 1974 Chapter XI-2
SHIP SECURITY PLAN
MASTERS OVERRIDING AUTHORITY

The Master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions, which, in the professional judgment of the master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. If, in the professional judgment of the master, a conflict between any safety and security requirements applicable to the ship arises during its operations, the master shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the ship. In such cases, the master will implement temporary security measures and shall forthwith inform the Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government in whose port the ship is operating or intends to enter. Any such temporary security measures under this regulation shall, to the highest possible degree, be commensurate with the prevailing security level.
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CONTENTS
Subject Masters overriding authority 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Introduction Definitions Company and Ship Details including Continuous Synopsis Record Company Security Officer (CSO) Ship Security Officer (SSO) Plan Documentation Ship Security Assessment Security Actions Ensuring the Performance of all Ship Security Duties
Page 2 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 20 22 23 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 33
10 Restricted Areas 11 Controlling Access to the Ship 12 Monitoring Deck Areas and Areas surrounding the Ship 13 Controlling the embarkation of Persons and their Effects 14 Supervising the handling of cargo 15 Supervising the handling of ships stores 16 Port Specific Security Communication 17 Ship/Port Facility Interface 18 Training 19 Drills and Exercises 20 Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures Example: Security Continuous Record Example: Ports of Call List
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

1.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This plan is written in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS Annex XI-2 and part A of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Requirements of US regulations NVIC 10-02 are taken into account.
2.
The purpose of the plan is to provide guidance to the master and ship security officer with respect to awareness, prevention and response with regard to security.
3.
The plan contains all information and operational instructions required by the Guidelines*.
4.
This plan has been approved by the Administration and, except as provided below, no alteration or revision shall be made to any part of it without the prior approval of the Administration.
5.
Changes to chapter 3 will not be required to be approved by the Administration. The appendices shall be maintained up to date by the owners, operators and managers.
6.
This plan will be regularly reviewed and updated. Review, other than those referred to in 5 above will be submitted to the Administration for approval. Review will be the responsibility of the Company and will be carried out at intervals not exceeding 12 months.
7.
Following an incident in which the plan has been activated, there will be a thorough review of its effectiveness.
"Guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended and Part A of the ISPS Code
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2. DEFINITIONS
Security Assessment is a risk-based decision making tool. It is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a security breach will endanger an asset, individual or function and, based on that, to identify actions to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate the consequences of a security breach. The Ship Security Plan is based on the results of the Security Assessment.
Ship security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ships stores or the ship from the risks of a security incident.
Security Survey means an inspection, check and/or audit to control and improve the mitigation strategy, protective measures and actions in the Ship Security Plan.
Company security officer means the person designated by the Company for ensuring that a ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained and for liaison with port facility security officers and the ship security officer.
Ship security officer means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the company security officer and port facility security officers.
Port facility is a location, as determined by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority, where the ship / port interface takes place. This includes areas such as anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward, as appropriate.
Ship/port interface means the interactions that occur when a ship is directly and immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or the provisions of port services to or from the ship.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Port facility security officer means the person designated as responsible for the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the ship security officers and company security officers.
Designated Authority means the organization(s) or the administration(s) identified, within the Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the implementation of the provisions of this chapter pertaining to port facility security and ship/port interface, from the point of view of the port facility.
Declaration of security means an agreement reached between a ship and either a port facility or another ship with which it interfaces specifying the security measures each will implement.
Security Level I means the new maritime security normalcy. This is the level of threat potential for which protective measures will be maintained for an indefinite period of time; in other words, these are the normal, every day security measures.
Security Level 2 means there is a heightened threat of an unlawful act against a port, waterfront facility, or ship and intelligence indicates that terrorists are likely to be active within a specific area or against a specific class of target. This risk level indicates that a particular segment of the industry may be in jeopardy, but that no specific target has been identified. Additional protective measures will be expected to be sustained for substantial periods of time.
Security Level 3 means the threat of an unlawful act against a port, waterfront facility, or ship is probable or imminent. Intelligence may indicate that terrorists have chosen specific targets, though it may not be possible to identify such targets. Additional protective measures are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

3. COMPANY AND SHIP DETAILS INCLUDING CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD 3.1 Company details
As required by the IMO, the name of the person or organization who appoints the members of the crew or other persons employed or engaged on board the ship in any capacity on the business of the ship is:
...........................................................
Ships Owner (Name and Address):
Company Security Officer:
Ships Manager / Operator: (Name and Address):
Company Responsible for Employment of Ship (including Sub-charterer if any) (Name and Address):
Company Responsible for Manning: (Name and Address):
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

3.2 Ship details
Name of ship:
International call sign:
Official number:
IMO number:
Flag state:
Continuous Synopsis Record to be inserted here.
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4. 4.1 COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER (CSO) Designation
The Company has designated a company security officer. See for further details chapter 3.
4.2
to:
Duties and Responsibilities
The duties and responsibilities of the company security officer include, but are not limited
.1 advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using appropriate security assessments and other relevant information; .2 ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out; .3 ensuring the development, the submission for approval, and thereafter the implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan; .4 ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship; .5 arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities; .6 arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the Administration or the recognised security organisation; .7 ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly addressed and dealt with; .8 enhancing security awareness and vigilance; .9 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship; .10 ensuring effective communication and co-operation between the ship security officer and the relevant port facility security officers; .11 ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirement; .12 ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and .13 ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.
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5. SHIP SECURITY OFFICER (SSO)
5.1
Designation
The ship security officer is designated by the company.
5.2
Duties and Responsibilities
The duties and responsibilities of the ship security officer include, but are not limited to: .1 undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security measures are maintained; .2 maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan, including any amendments to the plan; .3 co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ships stores with other shipboard personnel and with the relevant port facility security officers; .4 proposing modifications to the ship security plan; .5 reporting to the Company Security Officer any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions; .6 enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board; .7 ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as appropriate; .8 reporting all security incidents; .9 co-ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the company security officer and the relevant port facility security officer; and .10 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, and maintained, if any.
5.3
Liaison with Port Facility Security Officers and other Security Officers
The Ship Security Officer is responsible for liasing and communication with the Port Facility Security Officer and Ship Security Officers of other ships in case of ship-to-ship operations.
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6. 6.1 PLAN DOCUMENTATION Periodic Review Procedures
The Company Security Officer is responsible for ensuring a Ship Security Assessment is carried out. The Ship Security Officer must review the Ship Security Plan [at least twice within five years]. In addition, internal audits shall be arranged by the Company Security Officer to review the effectiveness of the Ship Security Plan. The Ship Security Plan is reviewed to ensure its efficiency, continuing suitability and effectiveness, with a view to consider the need for improvements. The aim is to re-examine all the procedures in use to see whether any improvements can be done and whether the procedures are still relevant. Procedures may need to be amended due to instructions from owners or due to fitting of new equipment. When the plan has been put to use as a response to a Security Level 2 or 3, or in a drill, all parties directly involved shall comment on the effectiveness of the plan and its content to the Ship Security Officer.
6.2
Records
According to the ISPS-code part A 9.8.1 reports and evaluations on security activities are confidential and cannot be inspected by third parties other than Flag state authorities. Records shall therefore only contain the kind of activity and time and date of occurrence. Records of the following activities addressed in the ship security plan shall be kept on board for at least the last 10 calls at port facilities: .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .10 training, drills and exercises; security threats and security incidents (relevant to the ship); breaches of security; changes in security level; communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats to the ship or to port facilities the ship is, or has been; internal audits and reviews of security activities; periodic review of the ship security assessment; periodic review of the ship security plan; implementation of any amendments to the plan; and maintenance and testing of security equipment, if any, including testing of the ship security alert system.
Records may be kept in any format but shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

7. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The ship security assessment is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the ship security plan.
The company security officer shall ensure that the ship security assessment is carried out by persons with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship,
The ship security assessment shall include an on-scene security survey and, at least, the following elements:
.1 identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations; .2 identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations that it is important to protect; .3 identification of possible threats to the key ship board operations and the likelihood of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritise security measures; and .4 identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and procedures.
The ship security assessment shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained by the Company.
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8. SECURITY ACTIONS
The Security Plan provides guidance to determine whether higher readiness conditions are required.
Threats to Ships
Threats to a ship can rapidly change. A ships location, the time of day, and international events can dramatically alter the threat to a ship. As a consequence, it is critical for the SSO to regularly monitor events to determine potential threats in the path of the ship at it travels to its next destination.
Information about potential threats is available from a variety of sources. These include port authorities, Captains of the Port, port security officers, local law enforcement officers, and local consular or diplomatic representatives. A variety of government, industry, and international business organizations also provide information on potential threats. For example, governments issue warnings for areas with high security risks. Internet sites are also available that compile data on piracy and other threats. Issues to consider when making an assessment are: Location: A ships location can be important in determining a potential threat. For instance, ships are most vulnerable to attack by pirates at sea when near land, and when sailing through narrow channels where speed and manoeuvrability may be restricted. Government / general warnings are announced for specific countries or regions of high pirate activity. Time of day: Ships are most vulnerable under cover of darkness when there is inadequate light to detect or protect against an unauthorized boarding at sea, while moored, or at anchor. Type of Ship: Cargo ships are generally more vulnerable to theft and drug smuggling than other types of ships. If terrorists are seeking to smuggle weapons into a country, they may also choose a cargo ship. But if terrorists want to block a channel, a bulk / ore ship may be targeted. If terrorists are seeking to use a ship as a weapon, they may seek to gain control of a ship transporting hazardous cargo. Type of Cargo: the presence or absence of cargo, its nature and properties and stowage may cause a threat.
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Port Facility Assessment
The Port Facility Assessment provides information to assess the strengths and weaknesses of security systems and procedures at a port facility. If security measures are found to be inadequate, steps can be taken by a SSO to compensate for the deficiencies.
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9. ENSURING THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL SHIP SECURITY DUTIES
The Master is responsible for the safety and security of the crew, passengers, and cargo. The development of general security policies and procedures is the responsibility of the Company Security Officer. The Ship Security Officer is responsible for implementing, maintaining, and supervising the Ship Security Plan.
9.1
Duties and responsibilities of security watch
The security watch must be aware of the security level the ship is operating in. A sharp lookout shall be maintained. Suspicious persons, objects and activities and malfunctioning of security equipment shall be reported to the duty officer.
9.2
Communication
To summon assistance, the security watch shall be provided with means of communication to keep in touch with the duty officer.
9.3
Briefings
All officers and crewmembers are to be briefed about their duties and the security level the ship is in at every change of security level, on possible threats, the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for vigilance.
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10. RESTRICTED AREAS
Restricted Areas on the Ship

The SSP shall identify the restricted areas to be established on the ship, specify their extent, times of application, the security measures to be taken to control access to them and those to be taken to control activities within them. The purpose of restricted areas is to: .1 prevent unauthorised access; .2 protect passengers, ship's personnel, and personnel from port facilities or other agencies authorised to be on board the ship; .3 protect sensitive security areas within the ship; and .4 protect cargo and ship's stores from tampering.
The SSP shall ensure that there are clearly established policies and practices to control access to all restricted areas.
The SSP shall identify all restricted areas. According to ISPS-code part A, 9.8.1 this information is confidential and therefore contained in Annex B.
Restricted areas include: .i .ii navigation bridge, machinery spaces of category A and other control stations; spaces containing security and surveillance equipment and systems and their controls and lighting system controls; .iii ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar spaces;
.iv spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps, or manifolds; .v spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances;
.vi spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls; .vii cargo spaces and spaces containing ships stores; .viii crew accommodation; and .ix any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the SSA to which access must be restricted to maintain the security of the ship.
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Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied to restricted areas, which may include: locking or securing access points; using surveillance equipment to monitor the areas; using guards or patrols; and using automatic intrusion detection devices to alert the ships personnel of unauthorized access.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the frequency and intensity of the monitoring of, and control of access to restricted areas shall be increased to ensure that only authorized persons have access. The SSP shall establish the additional security measures to be applied, which may include: establishing restricted areas adjacent to access points; continuously monitoring surveillance equipment; and dedicating personnel to guard and patrol restricted areas.
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which are to be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which will include: setting up of additional restricted areas on the ship in proximity to the security incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is denied; and searching of restricted areas as part of a search of the ship.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

11. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE SHIP 11.1 Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to control access to the ship, where the following may be applied: .1 checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming their reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders etc; .2 in liaison with the port facility the ship shall ensure that designated secure areas are established in which inspections and searching of people, baggage (including carry on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take place; .3 in liaison with the port facility the ship shall ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; .4 segregating checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal effects; .5 segregating embarking from disembarking passengers; .6 identification of access points that shall be secured or attended to prevent unauthorized access; .7 securing, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to which passengers and visitors have access; and .8 providing security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for vigilance.
At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship shall be liable to search. The frequency of such searches, including random searches, shall be specified in the approved SSP and shall be specifically approved by the Administration. Such searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close co-operation with the ship and in close proximity to it. Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of the ships personnel shall not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner, which fully takes into account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.
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11.2 Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied to protect against a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control, which may include: .1 assigning personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorised access; .2 limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them; .3 deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for example, in liaison with the port facility, provision of boat patrols; .4 establishing a restricted area on the shore-side of the ship, in close co-operation with the port facility; .5 increasing the frequency and detail of searches of people, personal effects, and vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship; .6 escorting visitors on the ship; .7 providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-emphasising the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities and stressing the need for increased vigilance; and .8 carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.

At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof, i.e. the PFSO. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1 limiting access to a single, controlled, access point; .2 granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof; .3 directions of persons on board; .4 suspension of embarkation or disembarkation; .5 suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries etc; .6 evacuation of the ship; .7 movement of the ship; and .8 preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.
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12. MONITORING DECK AREAS AND AREAS SURROUNDING THE SHIP
Monitoring the Security of the Ship The ship shall have the capability to monitor the ship, the restricted areas on board and areas surrounding the ship. Such monitoring capabilities may include use of: .1 lighting; .2 watch-keepers, security guards and deck watches including patrols, and .3 automatic intrusion detection devices and surveillance equipment. When used, automatic intrusion detection devices shall activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored. The SSP shall establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of weather conditions or of power disruptions.

At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied, which may be a combination of lighting, watch keepers, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment to allow ships security personnel to observe the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in particular. The ship's deck and access points to the ship shall be illuminated during hours of darkness and periods of low visibility while conducting ship/port interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage when necessary. While underway, when necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard to the provisions of the International Regulation for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea in force. The following shall be considered when establishing the appropriate level and location of lighting: .1 the ships personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side and the waterside; .2 coverage should include the area on and around the ship; .3 coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and .4 coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.
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At security level 2, the SSP shall establish the additional security measures to be applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include: .1 increasing the frequency and detail of security patrols; .2 increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and surveillance and equipment; .3 assigning additional personnel as security lookouts; and .4 ensuring coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or vehicle patrols on the shore-side, when provided. Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security incidents. When necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be accomplished by co-ordinating with the port facility to provide additional shore side lighting.

At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1 switching on of all lighting on, or illuminating the vicinity of, the ship; .2 switching on of all on board surveillance equipment capable of recording activities on, or in the vicinity of, the ship; .3 maximising the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record; .4 preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and .5 initiation of measures, including the slow revolution of the ships propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.
Differing Security Levels

The SSP shall establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship could adopt if the ship is at a higher security level than that applying to a port facility.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

13. CONTROLLING THE EMBARKATION OF PERSONS AND THEIR EFFECTS 13.0 Handling Unaccompanied Baggage
The SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied to ensure that unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with the passenger or member of ships personnel at the point of inspection or search) is identified and subjected to appropriate screening, including searching, before it is accepted on board the ship. It is not envisaged that such baggage will be subjected to screening by both the ship and the port facility, and in cases where both are suitably equipped, the responsibility for screening shall rest with the port facility. Close cooperation with the port facility is essential and steps shall be taken to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or searched up to and including 100 percent, which may include use of x-ray screening.

At security level 2, the SSP shall establish the additional security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage, which shall include 100 percent x-ray screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1 subjecting such baggage to more extensive screening, for example x-raying it from at least two different angles; .2 preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage; and .3 refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on board the ship.
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14
14.0
SUPERVISING THE HANDLING OF CARGO

Handling of Cargo
The security measures relating to cargo handling shall: .1 prevent tampering, and .2 prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored on board the ship. The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the port facility, shall include inventory control procedures at access points to the ship. Once on board the ship, cargo shall be capable of being identified as having been approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures shall be developed to ensure that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.

At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include: .1 routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo handling operations; .2 checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation; .3 ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board carcarriers, ro-ro and passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; and .4 checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.
Checking of cargo will be accomplished by the following means: visual and physical examination; and using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.
When there are regular, or repeated, cargo movement the CSO or SSO will, in consultation with the port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargo covering off-site checking, sealing, scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements shall be communicated to and agreed with the PFSO concerned.
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At security level 2, the SSP shall establish the additional security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include: .1 detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces; .2 intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded; .3 intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car-carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and .4 increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.
Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means: .5 increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination; .6 increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and .7 co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in accordance with an established agreement and procedures.
14.3
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1 suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo; and .2 verify the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances carried on board, if any, and their location.
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15 SUPERVISING THE HANDLING OF SHIPS STORES
The security measures relating to the delivery of ships stores shall: .1 ensure checking of ships stores and package integrity; .2 prevent ships stores from being accepted without inspection; .3 prevent tampering; and .4 prevent ships stores from being accepted unless ordered. For ships regularly using the port facility it will be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There shall always be some way of confirming that stores presented for delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by the ship.
15.1
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to be applied during delivery of ships stores, which may include: .1 checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board; and .2 ensuring immediate secure stowage of ships stores.
15.2
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP shall establish the additional security measures to be applied during delivery of ships stores by exercising checks prior to receiving stores on board and intensifying inspections.
15.3
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1 subjecting ships stores to more extensive checking; .2 preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of ships stores; and .3 refusal to accept ships stores on board the ship.
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16 PORT SPECIFIC SECURITY COMMUNICATION
Prior to entering a port, the Ship shall provide the following information to the Port Facility Security Officer with the aim of avoiding the need to impose control measures or steps: .1 Confirmation that the ship possesses a valid International Ship Security Certificate and its issuing authority .2 Confirmation of the security level at which the ship is currently operating; .3 Confirmation of the security level at which the ship operated in any previous port where it has conducted a relevant ship / port interface; .4 Confirmation of any special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in any previous port where it has conducted a relevant ship / port interface; .5 Confirmation that the appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during any previous relevant ship to ship activity; or .6 Other practical security related information (but not details of the ship security plan).
The Ship Security Officer (SSO) shall liase at the earliest opportunity with the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) of the port facility the ship is intended to visit to establish the security level applying for that ship at the port facility. Having established contact with a ship, the PFSO shall advise the ship of any subsequent change in the port facilitys security level and shall provide the ship with any relevant security information. While there will be circumstances when an individual ship may be operating at a higher security level than the port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when a ship can have a lower security level than the port facility it is visiting. If a ship has a higher security level than the port facility it intends to use, the SSO shall advise the PFSO without delay. The PFSO shall undertake an assessment of the particular situation in consultation with the SSO and agree on appropriate security measures with the ship.
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17 SHIP/PORT FACILITY INTERFACE
17.1
Declaration of Security
Contracting Governments shall determine when a Declaration of Security is required by assessing the risk the ship/port interface or ship-to-ship activity poses to people, property or the environment. A ship can request completion of a Declaration of Security (Annex C) when: .1 the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another ship it is interfacing with; .2 there is an agreement on Declaration of Security between Contracting Governments covering certain international voyages or specific ships on those voyages; .3 there has been a security threat or a security incident involving the ship or involving the port facility, as applicable; .4 the ship is at a port which is not required to have and implement an approved port facility security plan; or .5 the ship is conducting ship-to-ship activities with another ship not required to have and implement an approved ship security plan. Requests by the Ship for the completion of a Declaration of Security shall be acknowledged by the applicable port facility or ship. The Declaration of Security shall be completed by: .6 the master or the ship security officer on behalf of the ship(s); and, if appropriate, .7 the port facility security officer or, if the Contracting Government determines otherwise, by any other body responsible for shore-side security, on behalf of the port facility.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

18 18.1 TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES TRAINING
The Company Security Officer (CSO) and appropriate shore based Company personnel, and the Ship Security Officer (SSO), should have knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate: .1 security administration; .2 relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations; .3 relevant Government legislation and regulations; .4 responsibilities and functions of other security organisations; .5 methodology of ship security assessment; .6 methods of ship security surveys and inspections; .7 ship and port operations and conditions; .8 ship and port facility security measures; .9 emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning; .10 instruction techniques for security training and education, including security measures and procedures; .11 handling sensitive security related information and security related communications; .12 knowledge of current security threats and patterns; .13 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .14 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; .15 techniques used to circumvent security measures; .16 security equipment and systems and their operational limitations; .17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring; .18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections; .19 security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; .20 assessments of security drills and exercises.
18.2
In addition the Ship Security Officer should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate:
.1 the layout of the ship;
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

.2 the ship security plan and related procedures (including scenario-based training on how to respond); .3 crowd management and control techniques; .4 operations of security equipment and systems; and .5 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of security equipment and systems.
18.3
Shipboard personnel having specific security duties should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, including, as appropriate:
.1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns; .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures; .5 crowd management and control techniques; .6 security related communications; .7 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; .8 operations of security equipment and systems; .9 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of security equipment and systems, .10 inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and .11 methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ships stores.
18.4
All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with relevant provisions of the SSP, including:
.1 the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels; .2 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; .3 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .4 recognition, on a non discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; and .5 techniques used to circumvent security measures.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

19 Drills and exercises
According to the ISPS-code part A 9.8.1 security drills and exercises are confidential and cannot be witnessed by third parties other than flag state authorities.
The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and the identification of any security related deficiencies, which need to be addressed.
To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills shall be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25 percent of the ships personnel have been changed, at any one time, with personnel that have not previously participated in any drill on that ship, within the last 3 months, a drill shall be conducted within one week of the change. These drills shall test individual elements of the plan.
Various types of exercises which may include participation of company security officers, port facility security officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments as well as ship security officers, if available, shall be carried out at least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises shall test communications, coordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be: .1 full scale or live; .2 tabletop simulation or seminar; or .3 combined with other exercises held such as search and rescue or emergency response exercises.
Company participation in an exercise with another Contracting Government shall be recognised by the Administration.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

20 CONTINGENCY PLANS AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
20.1
Security Threats
If there is a security threat, the ship will be at Security Level 2 or 3 as advised by the Flag State or by the Contracting Government of the Port Facility. The Security Measures to be taken are as laid down in the Ship Security Plan. If the ship is a Security Level 1 and the Master or SSO considers that a security threat exists, he shall take appropriate actions to reduce the threat. He shall also inform the company, the Flag State and the Contracting Government of the Port Facility about the threat.
20.2
Breaches of Security
When security is breached, the Master / SSO shall consider doing the following: .1 Activate the Ship Security Alert System .2 Call Emergency Stations .3 Inform the Contracting Government of the Port Facility .4 Prepare to evacuate the ship .5 Prepare to leave the port .6 Act on Instructions given by the contracting governments. .7 Use the appropriate Contingency Plans (see annex D)
See Annex D for further details.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Security Continuous Record (example)
Training, drills and exercises date place Type of exercise Security level Details, remarks
Maintenance and testing of security equipment date place equipment Action taken Remarks
Periodic review of ships Security Assessment and Plan date Place review nr. Remarks, indicate if plan has been amended
Internal audits and reviews of security activities date place Auditor name Remarks
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ANNEX 2
FACILITY SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE

Prepared by
U.S. COAST GUARD
U.S. COAST GUARD
FACILITY SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. II. III.
FACILITY SECURITY .......................................................................... 1 FACILITY SECURITY PLAN OUTLINE ........................................3 MARITIME SECURITY LEVELS AND SECURITY MEASURES ......................................................................................8 FACILITY VULNERABILITY/RISK SELF- ASSESSMENT ....11 APPENDIXES .......................................................................................22
A. FACILITY SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST .................22 B. COAST GUARD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES........34 C. FACILITY SECURITY MEASURES.....................................37 D. SUGGESTED READING........................................................45
IV. V.
iii
iv
FACILITY SECURITY
Facility Security can be defined as those measures employed to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance, or terrorism. It can also be considered as embracing all measures taken to prevent interference within lawful operations. It also must include measures to prepare to respond to breeches of security. To this end, port security personnel must adequately plan for participation in multi-agency maritime response operations. Agencies that may be involved in Facility Security may include state and local law enforcement agencies, local fire departments, private facilities, federal agencies, etc. These personnel must receive sufficient training to support these operations. In addition, all personnel should be familiar with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) for use during multicontingency response operations and planned events.
COAST GUARD SECURITY MEASURES

The Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP), in conjunction with other agencies, conducts port safety and security activities to safeguard waterfront facilities from accidents, negligence, illegal acts, terrorism and sabotage. Waterfront facilities include but are not limited to piers, wharves, docks, and similar structures to which vessels may be secured; areas of land, water, or land and water under and in immediate proximity to them; buildings on such structures or contiguous to them and equipment and materials on such structures or in such buildings. The Captain of the Port is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of assets within a geographic region, and has the authority to use available resources and manpower to protect all assets from maritime incidents. The COTP has a range of tools available to help ensure the security of the port. Additionally, the Coast Guard has identified three maritime security (MARSEC) levels that may be established in a port. These levels aid in determining the resources and manpower that will be needed to be proactive in various situations. The MARSEC level is determined by the COTP, and are as follows: MARSEC 1 Normal Operations. Facilities should be aware and vigilant of suspicious activities and possible threats. Facilities should employ the necessary measures to reduce the vulnerability and risk of their waterfront facility from a marine incident. This is the baseline level of security. This security level is an enhanced security posture and will be the result of an increased risk either due to specific intelligence or increased vulnerability that heightens risk. Facilities can expect the need for additional personnel and material resources to reach this level. At this level, facilities will employ those additional measures identified in their security plan to reduce the vulnerability of and risk to their facility from an incident. This security level is a fully enhanced security posture and will be the result of higher risk that a specific threat exists to the maritime domain or marine transportation system. At this level, facilities will employ the full measures identified in their security plan.
MARSEC 2
MARSEC 3
Within each MARSEC level, the COTP has the authority to establish security and safety zones, reduce personnel access to facilities, and control operations at a facility. These actions should support measures identified in the Maritime Security Levels and Security Measures section of this guide. The following are tactics that the COTP employs to insure the overall waterside safety and security of the port. a. Safety Zones-Safety Zones protect structures, vessels, and water and shore areas by controlling access and activities within the zone. Most safety zones limit access during response to an emergency and can be set for an indefinite time period. Any person may request a security, safety, or regulated navigation area be established. Each request must be submitted in writing to either the COTP or appropriate Commander having jurisdiction over the location. The data that is required on the written request is specified in detail in 33 CFR 165.5. b. OCS Safety Zones-The Outer Continental Shelf Safety Zone is limited to an area within 500 meters of artificial islands and fixed structures on the shelf. These features are used for the removal of minerals from the ocean bottom (i.e. offshore oil drilling platforms). c. Deepwater Port Safety Zones-Deepwater Port Safety Zones are specific to deepwater ports but provide the same protection as safety zones. A deep-water port consists of any fixed or man-made structure, other than a vessel, located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of the United States. These ports are normally used for the loading and offloading of oil. d. Security Zones-Security Zones are designated areas of land, water, or land and water, which are established to prevent damage to any vessel or waterfront facility. These zones safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the United States from accidents or subversive acts by controlling access or movement of persons, vessels, and objects. These are used for national security interests rather than strictly safety considerations. Security Zones are established for each condition. e. Harbor Patrols-Harbor Patrols are used to detect suspicious activity and to determine if the level of security measures taken by vessel and facility owners and operators are adequate and sufficient to meet the existing threat level.
CONCLUSION
The following sections include a facility plan outline, maritime security levels and security measures, and a facility vulnerability/risk self-assessment. These additional sections are provided as tools for facilities to use in order to minimize the threat of a maritime incident occurring at their facility.
FACILITY SECURITY PLAN OUTLINE

This section provides an outline of a complete facility security plan. In developing this plan, a facility should be sure to fully address physical security identified and the measures to be taken at each MARSEC Level. If a particular section does not apply to a facility, it should be so stated in the plan and the appropriate reason why that section does not apply.
OUTLINE:
1. 2. 3. Purpose and Scope. State purpose and scope of plan. Area Security. Define the areas, buildings, and other structures considered critical and establish priorities for their protection. Control Measures. Define and establish restrictions on access and movement into critical areas. These restrictions can be categorized as to personnel, material and vehicles. a. Personnel Access (1) Establish controls pertinent to each area or structure. (a) (b) Authority for access. Access criteria for: 1. 2. (2) Unit personnel. Visitors.
Identification and Control. (a) Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used, include display requirements, identification and control procedures, standards for passes and badges, etc. Describe who the system applies to. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Unit personnel. Visitors to restricted areas. Visitors to non-restricted areas. Vendors, tradesmen, etc. Contractor personnel. Maintenance or support personnel.
(b)
7. b.
Emergency response personnel.
Material Control. (1) Incoming. (a) (b) (c) (2) Requirements for admission of material and supplies. Search and inspection of material for possible sabotage hazards. Special controls on delivery of supplies and/or personal shipments in restricted areas.
Outgoing. (a) (b) Documentation required, e.g., property pass. Controls, as outlined in (1) (a), (b) and (c), above.
c.
Vehicle Control. (1) (2) (3) Policy on search of government and privately owned vehicles. Parking regulations/restrictions. Controls for entrance into restricted and non-restricted areas. (a) (b) (c) (d) Privately owned vehicles. Government vehicles. Emergency vehicles. Commercial vehicles.
d. 4.
Vehicle Registration.
Aids to Security. Indicate the manner in which the following listed aids to security will be implemented on the unit. a. Protective barriers. (1) (2) (2) b. Definition. Clear zones. Criteria.
Signs.
(1) (2) (3) c.
Maintenance. Types. Posting.
Gates. (1) (2) (3) Hours of Operation. Security requirements. Lock security.
d.
Protective Lighting System. (1) Use and control. (2) (3) (4) (5) Inspection. Action to be taken in the event of commercial power failure. Action to be taken in the event of a failure of alternate source of power. Emergency lighting systems. (a) Stationary. (b) Portable.
e.
Intrusion Detection Systems. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Testing. Inspection. Use and monitoring. Action to be taken in event of "alarm" conditions. Maintenance. Alarm logs or registers. Sensitivity settings. Fail-safe and tamper-proof provisions. Monitor panel location.
(10) Areas protected.
f.
Communications. (primary and alternate sources). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Locations. Use. Tests. Authentication Emergency communications.
5.
Security Forces. Include general instructions that would apply to all security force personnel. Detailed instructions such as Special Orders and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be attached as annexes. An SOP should be written for each post. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Composition and organization. Authority and jurisdiction. Tour of duty. Essential posts and routes. Weapons and equipment. Training. Use of sentry/patrol dogs. Emergency Response Force. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Composition. Mission. Weapons and equipment. Location. Deployment concept.
6.
Contingency Plans. Indicate required actions in response to various emergency situations. Detailed plans such as Facility specific Threatcon Measures, bomb threats, hostage negotiation, natural disaster, fire, hurricanes, earthquakes, mass casualties etc., should be attached as annexes. a. b. Individual actions. Emergency Response Force actions including casualty evacuation.
c. 7. 8.
Security Force actions.
Use of Air Surveillance. Coordinating Instructions. Indicate matters which require coordination with other agencies including any MOU/MOA's in place. a. b. Integration with plans of host or nearby military installations. Liaison and coordination. (1) (2) (3) Local and state authorities. Federal agencies. Military organizations.
9.
Employee Education. Provide employee training in: general security, crime prevention, port security and antiterrorism.
MARITIME SECURITY LEVELS AND SECURITY MEASURES

Note: Once Facility has attained the required MARSEC level Facility Managers should inform COTP. MARSEC 1 Normal Operations. Facilities should be aware and vigilant of suspicious activities and possible threats. Facilities should employ the necessary measures to reduce the vulnerability and risk of their waterfront facility from a marine incident. This is the baseline level of security. Facility managers should implement the following measures when MARSEC ONE is designated at all times: a. MEASURE 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity. b. MEASURE 2. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. c. MEASURE 3. Conduct security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the Facility grounds. d. MEASURE 4. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. e. MEASURE 5. Maintain contact with local authorities on the threat and local antiterrorism activities. MARSEC 2 This security level is an enhanced security posture and will be the result of an increased risk either due to specific intelligence or increased vulnerability that heightens risk. Facilities can expect the need for additional personnel and material resources to reach this level. At this level, facilities will employ those additional measures identified in their security plan to reduce the vulnerability of and risk to their facility from an incident. Facility managers should implement the following measures when MARSEC TWO is designated: a. MEASURE 6. Continue MARSEC 1 measures and warn personnel of any other potential form of terrorist attack. b. MEASURE 7. The Facility Manager, Shift Leader or other appointed personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. c. MEASURE 8. Make personnel aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.
d. MEASURE 9. Keep all personnel involved in implementing anti-terrorist contingency plans and other applicable contingency plans on immediate recall. e. MEASURE 10. Review all plans, orders, personnel details and logistic requirements related to the implementation of the measures contained in the next higher MARSEC. f. MEASURE 11. Where possible, cars and such objects as crates, trash containers, etc. are to be moved at least 100 feet from buildings, particularly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider the application of centralized parking. g. MEASURE 12. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. h. MEASURE 13. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages. i. MEASURE 14. Examine all mail for letter or parcel bombs. This examination is increased above normal. j. MEASURE 15. At an early stage, inform security personnel of any action being taken and why.
k. MEASURE 16. Operate random patrols to check vehicles, personnel, and buildings. Increase security surveillance of waterfront areas including wharves, piers, caissons, critical communications facilities/assets, etc. l. MEASURE 17. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a vehicle.
MARSEC 3 This security level is a fully enhanced security posture and will be the result of higher risk that a specific threat exists to the maritime domain or marine transportation system. At this level, facilities will employ the full measures identified in their security plan. Facility managers should implement the following measures when MARSEC THREE is designated: a. MEASURE 20. Continue all MARSEC ONE and MARSEC TWO measures and introduce those that remain outstanding. Review all plans, orders, personnel details and logistic requirements related to the introduction of the next higher MARSEC. b. MEASURE 21. Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their places of duty. c. MEASURE 22. Limit access points to the absolute minimum. d. MEASURE 23. Strictly enforce control of entry and randomly search vehicles. e. MEASURE 24. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings. f. MEASURE 25. Introduce increased patrolling of the facility grounds.
g. MEASURE 26. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
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FACILITY VULNERABILITY/RISK SELF-ASSESSMENT

This form is a tool to assist field personnel in developing information about individual facilities within their jurisdiction. It must be completed annually for any facilities (dedicated or nondedicated) within the COTP zone. Data will be compiled and maintained by facilities, as required by 33 CFR 126. To determine facility vulnerability, 10 major factors are considered: -- Facility Characteristics -- Type of Security Force -- Physical Security Measures -- Routes of Access/Egress -- Communications -- Availability of Additional Port Security Resources -- Response Time/Distance for Security Personnel -- Proximity to Urban Areas -- Geographic Location -- Proximity to International Borders A computation sheet is provided at the end of this section to record the answers to the following survey areas. 1. Facility Characteristics and Sensitivity. Select the description which best represents your facility. a. Current Threat Analysis. (1) Threat analysis available. (2) Threat analysis unavailable. b. Facility Accessibility. Access controls would include but are not limited to the following: Perimeter security fences and/or barriers; permit/ID systems for access by authorized persons and vehicles; security forces and/or equipment to secure gates or openings in security barriers when not in use; designated restricted areas; roving guards/patrols within controlled access areas. (1) Facility has uncontrolled access.
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(2) Facility has limited access controls, i.e., at least two of the above listed access controls. (3) Facility has controlled access i.e., four or more access controls, examples of which are listed above. c. Facility Volume (measured in Vessels) per year moved. (1) High (over 300). (2) Medium (100-300). (3) Low (under 100). d. DOD Assets in close proximity to the facility location. (1) Yes. (2) No. 2. Facility Security Force Characteristics. a. Select the description which best represents the security force of the facility being assessed. (1) No security guard force. (2) A facility security manager, but no security guard force. (3) A facility security manager, a security guard force in place but with little or no security training. (4) A facility security manager with trained* facility security personnel, but not fully equipped. (5) A facility security manager with fully trained and equipped security personnel. (6) A facility security manager with trained and fully equip security personnel and security exercises being conducted on a regular basis. *Trained facility security personnel may include sworn law enforcement officers (e.g., state part authority police). Safe assumption can be made that sworn law enforcement officers have necessary security training. For other port security personnel, training should include, but need not be limited to: Communications, control of access, patrol procedures, response to emergencies, reporting, characteristics and behavior of persons who may commit unlawful acts, review of SOP's for the terminal. Records of the date and type of training for security should be maintained at the facility. 3. Physical Security Characteristics.
12
a.
Landside. Select the description which best represents the landside physical security measures in place at the facility being assessed. This should include items such as barriers, fencing, lighting, access/entry control, ID systems, electronic surveillance or other intrusion detection systems, alarm systems, etc. (1) None of the above listed physical security measures in place. (2) Perimeter fencing, landside lighting only in place. (3) Fencing, lighting and live surveillance/patrol systems in place. (4) Fencing, lighting and electronic surveillance systems in place. (5) Fencing, lighting, electronic and live surveillance systems in place.
b.
Waterside. Select the description which best represents the waterside security measures in place at the facility assessed. This should include items such as patrol craft, live or electronic surveillance systems (e.g.,surface radar, anti-swimmer sonar, barriers/nets and detectors or sensors for submerged delivery vehicles). (1) No waterside security measures in place. (2) Waterside lighting only. (3) Live surveillance only. (4) Single electronic surveillance system. (5) Multiple electronic surveillance systems. (6) Electronic surveillance systems and live surveillance/patrols. (7) Electronic and live surveillance systems with waterside lighting.
4. Physical characteristics of the facility a. Terrain. Analyze the terrain within approximately a one mile radius of the facility and select the description which best represents it. (1) Built up, commercial. (2) Mountainous, forested, undeveloped. (3) Open clear area or undeveloped farm land.
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b.
Routes of Access and Egress. Select the description which best represents the roadways adjacent to the facility being assessed. (1) Expressways. (2) Major highways. (3) City streets. (4) Less frequently traveled roads.
c.
Rail Accessibility. Select the description which best represents the railway system on the facility being assessed. (1) Rail gates open at all times. (2) Rail gates open only when in use. (3) Unused rail access. (4) No rail access on facility.
d.
Water Channels. Select the description which best represents the water channel used for access to the facility being assessed. (1) More than 3 choke points*. (2) 1 - 3 choke points. (3) No choke points.
*Choke Point - That specific portion of a waterway within the port which due to hydrographic, geological or other limited characteristics is easily capable of blockage or obstruction.The determination of what constitutes "choke point" must be a subjective one. However, due consideration should be given to the width and depth of the navigable channel, vessel traffic density, alternative vessel traffic routing schemes and any object (e.g., bridge, high voltage towers) damage to which would impede vessel traffic. 5. Communications on or readily available to the facility. Select the best description of the communications available at the facility being assessed. a. b. No communications on or readily available to the facility. Communications Interoperability between facility and only local law enforcement agencies. (1) Non-secure. (2) Secure.
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c.
Communications Interoperability between facility and federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. (1) Non-secure. (2) Secure.
6. Sustainability of additional security resources. Select the number of days local security/law enforcement resources could be sustained without calling in outside forces to assist under the threat levels indicated. a. High threat. Intelligence indicating an imminent attack of some type within the facility area. (1) 1 day. (2) 3 days. (3) 7 days. (4) Indefinite. b. Medium threat. Intelligence indicating an attack of some type is likely to occur within the facility area. (1) 1 day. (2) 3 days. (3) 7 days. (4) Indefinite. c. Low threat. Intelligence indicating the possibility of terrorist/subversive activity. (1) 1 day. (2) 3 days. (3) 7 days. (4) Indefinite. 7. Response time for specialized security personnel. Estimate the length of time it would take specialized security personnel (as identified below) to arrive at the facility being assessed in response to an attack, if the attack took place without prior warning/intelligence.
15
a.
Police patrol. (1) 30 minutes or less. (2) 30-60 minutes. (3) 60 minutes or more.
b.
Bomb squad. (1) 30 minutes or less. (2) 30-60 minutes. (3) 60 minutes or more.
c.
SWAT. (1) 30 minutes or less. (2) 30-60 minutes. (3) 60 minutes or more.
8. Response time for specialized emergency personnel. Estimate the length of time it would take emergency personnel (as identified below) to arrive at the facility being assessed in response to accidents/fire. a. Fire department. (1) 15 minutes or less. (2) 15-45 minutes. (3) 45 minutes or more. b. Pollution response team. (1) 15 minutes or less. (2) 15-45 minutes. (3) 45 minutes or more. 9. Proximity to urban areas. a. Select the description which best represents the area surrounding the facility being assessed. (1) Heavily populated urban area of over 100,000 people.
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(2) Area populated by 50,000 to 100,000 people. (3) Area of less than 50,000 people, where nearest city of greater than 100,000 people is less than 20 miles away. (4) Area of less than 50,000 people, where nearest city of greater than 100,000 people is 20 to 50 miles away. (5) Area of less than 50,000 people, where nearest city of greater than 100,000 people is 50 to 100 miles away. (6) Area of less than 50,000 people, where nearest city of greater than 100,000 people is more than 100 miles away. (7) Area is isolated and surrounded by rural undeveloped countryside. 10. Geographic location. a. Select description which best represents the geographic location of the facility being assessed. (1) OCONUS (under USCG jurisdiction). (2) East/West coast. (3) Gulf coast. (4) Alaska, Hawaii, Northwest, Central or New England. 11. Proximity to international borders. Select the description which best represents the facility being assessed under the current threat level as determined in question 1.A. a. High threat. (1) 0-100 miles. (2) 101-500 miles. (3) +500 miles. (4) Islands. b. Medium threat. (1) 0-100 miles. (2) 101-500 miles. (3) +500 miles.
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(4) Islands. c. Low threat. (1) 0-100 miles. (2) 101-500 miles. (3) +500 miles. (4) Islands.
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FACILITY RISK/VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT COMPUTATION SHEET Numbers in parenthesis denote point values 1. Facility characteristics and sensitivity a. Current threat analysis 1._______ (3) 2._______ (0) b. Facility accessibility 1._______ (2) 2._______ (1) 3._______ (0) c. Facility 1._______ (2) 2._______ (1) 3._______ (0) d. DOD assets 1._______ (1) 2._______ (0) 1. TOTAL________ 2. Facility security force characteristics a. Description of force 1._______ (12) 2._______ (9) 3._______ (6) 4._______ (3) 5._______ (1) 6._______ (0) 2. TOTAL________ 3. Physical security characteristics a. Landside 1._______ (4) 2._______ (3) 3._______ (2) 4._______(1) 5._______ (0)
b. Waterside 1._______ (6) 2._______ (5) 3._______ (4) 4._______ (3) 5._______ (2) 6._______ (1) 7._______ (0) 3. TOTAL________ 4. Physical characteristics of facility a. Terrain 1._______ (2) 2._______ (1) 3._______ (0) b. Routes of access and egress 1._______ (3) 2._______ (2) 3._______ (1) 4._______ (0) c. Rail accessibility 1._______ (3) 2._______ (2) 3._______ (1) 4._______ (0)
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d. Water channels 1._______ (3) 2._______ (2) 3._______ (1) 4. TOTAL _________ 5. Communications a. None 1._______ (4) b. Local 1._______ (3) 2.________ (2) c. State, federal and local 1._______ (1) 2.________ (0) 5. TOTAL _________ 6. Sustainability a. High threat 1._______ (8) 2.________ (6) 3._______ (4) 4._______ (2) b. Medium threat 1._______ (7) 2.________ (5) 3._______ (3) 4._______ (1) c. Low threat 1._______ (6) 2.________ (4) 3._______ (2) 4._______ (0) 6. TOTAL _________
7. Response time - security personnel a. Police patrol 1._______ (2) 2.________ (3) 3._______ (4) b. Bomb squad 1._______ (1) 2.________ (2) 3._______ (3) c. SWAT 1._______ (0) 2.________ (1) 3._______ (2) 7. TOTAL _________ 8. Response time - emergency personnel a. Fire department 1.________ (1) 2.________ (2) 3.________ (3)
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b. Pollution response team 1.________ (0) 2.________( 1) 3.________ (2) 8. TOTAL_________ 9. Proximity to urban areas a. Description 1.________ (7) 2.________ (6) 3.________ (5) 4.________ (4) 5.________ (3) 6.________ (2) 7.________ (1) 9. TOTAL_________ 10. Geographic location a. Description 1.________ (8) 2.________ (6) 3.________ (4) 4.________ (2) 10. TOTAL_________ 11. Proximity to international borders. a. High threat b. 1._________(3) 2._________(2) 3._________(1) 4._________(0) Medium threat 1.__________(1) 2.__________(1) 3.__________(0) 4.__________(0) c. Low threat 1._________(1) 2._________(0) 3._________(0) 4._________(0) 11. TOTAL_________ TOTALS 1.__________ 2.__________ 3.__________ 4.__________ 5.__________ 6.__________
7.__________ 8.__________ 9.__________ 10.__________ 11.__________
TOTAL POINT VALUE OF ALL ANSWERS_______________ RANGE OF VULNERABILITY VERY LOW 0-10 PTS LOW 11-25 PTS MEDIUM 26-50 PTS HIGH 51-70 PTS VERY HIGH 71-85 PTS
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APPENDIX A: FACILITY SECURITY
SURVEY CHECKLIST
FACILITY SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST. On routine basis COTP will use this checklist to access an existing facilitys security measures and to aid in identifying vulnerabilities and areas needing improvement. GENERAL INFORMATION Unit/Activity being surveyed: _____________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ Country: ________________________________________________________________________ 1. Is a Security Officer designated in writing? YES NO 2. Security Officer: NAME:_______________________________________________________ OFFICE ADDRESS:___________________________________________ PHONE: _____________________________________________________ 3. Is the Security Officer included in all initial construction review processes? YES NO
NOTES: _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY PLANNING 1. Does the Port facility have a current Port Security Plan (PSP)? YES NO
2. Date of plan: _________________________________________________________________ 3. Does the PSP include: a. Preventive measures to reduce opportunities for introduction of bombs? YES b. Procedures for evaluating and handling bomb threats? c. Policy for evacuation and safety of personnel? d. Procedures to be used to search for bombs? NO
YES NO YES NO YES NO
e. Procedures in the event a bomb or suspected bomb is found on the Port? YES NO f. Procedures for obtaining assistance and support of law enforcement and explosive ordnance disposal units? YES NO
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g. Procedures to be taken in the event of a bomb explosion or detonation? YES NO 4. Does the Port have a Counter Sabotage Program? YES NO
5. Does the Security Officer ensure that Physical Security Surveys are conducted at least annually? YES NO 6. How often does the Port request a threat assessment? ______________________________________________________________________________ NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY MEASURES 1. Does the Port have a Loss Prevention Plan? YES NO
2. What is the date of the Port facilities most recent risk and threat analysis?______________________________________________________________________ 3. Have areas been designated in writing by the Port Operator as restricted areas as necessary? YES NO 4. Are the basic security measures for restricted areas in effect? 5. Are all restricted area points appropriately posted? 6. Are security measures in effect to protect: a. Electrical power supplies and transmission facilities? b. Communication centers/equipment? c. Arms, Ammunition and Dangerous Cargoes? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
7. Are Physical Security Surveys of the Port conducted at least annually under the auspices of the Security Officer? YES NO 8. What is the date of the most recent physical security inspection, audit, or review by an immediate supervisor in Port? _________________________________________________________________________ 9. Does the Port have an effective after hours or weekend restricted area security check by the security force? YES NO a. Are results of security checks promptly reported to the Port Security Officer? YES NO
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10. Does the Port have a POV parking plan including: a. Restriction of POV parking in exclusive and limited areas? b. Fenced/enclave parking in controlled areas? 11. Does the Port have a Traffic Control Program? YES NO YES NO YES NO
NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY FORCE 1. Is the present security force strength and composition commensurate with the degree of security protection required? YES NO 2. Are all security posts, fixed and mobile, provided with security force orders? YES NO 3. Are security force orders reviewed by the Security Officer for currency at least monthly? YES NO 4. Are security force personnel inspected by a supervisor prior to being posted? YES NO 5. Do supervisors inspect each post/patrol/activity at least twice per shift? YES NO
6. Does Port or local community maintain an organized and equipped Crisis Response Force? YES NO 7. Does the Crisis Response Force receive adequate training? YES NO
8. How many personnel are available within the Port? ______________________________ 9. Outside the Port, how many additional security forces could be brought in with: a. One hour notice.________________ b. Four hour notice._______________ c. Any pertinent comments. ___________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________
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10. Has liaison been established with Local, State, and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies whereby early warning of threat situation will be provided? YES NO 11. Do security force personnel record or report their presence at key points in the Port by means of: a. Portable watch clocks, b. General watch clock stations, c. Telephones, d. Two-way radio communications equipment, or e. Other_____________________________________________________ 12. Are guard assignments, times and patrol routes varied at frequent intervals to avoid establishing routines? YES NO NOTES: _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE MOVEMENT CONTROL 1. Is a pass or badge identification system used to identify all Personnel within the confines of restricted areas in effect? YES NO 2. Does the identification medium in use provide the desired degree of security? YES NO 3. Are personnel who require infrequent access to a restricted area or have not been issued a permanent pass or badge for such, treated as "visitors", and issued a visitors badge or pass? YES NO 4. Do guards at control points compare badges to bearers, both upon entry and exit? YES NO a. If no, upon entry only? b. Upon exit only? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
5. Is supervision of the personnel identification and control system adequate at all levels? YES NO 6. Are badges and serial numbers recorded and controlled by rigid accountability procedures? YES NO 7. Are lost badges replaced with badges bearing different serial numbers? YES NO
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8. Have procedures been established that provide for issuance of temporary badges for individuals who have forgotten their permanent badges? YES NO 9. Are badges of such design and appearance as to enable guards, and other personnel to recognize quickly and positively the authorizations and limitations applicable to the bearer? YES NO 10. Are procedures in existence to ensure the return of identification upon termination of employment or assignment ? YES NO 11. Have effective visitor escort procedures been established when necessary? YES NO 12. Are visitors properly escorted within restricted areas when necessary? 13. Are permanent records of visits maintained? YES NO YES NO
By whom?____________________________________________________________________ 14. Are Privately Owned Vehicles (POV) and contractor vehicles which are allowed routine access to the installation registered with the security office? YES NO 15. Are random administrative inspections made of automobiles? YES NO
16. Are administrative inspection procedures issued by the Port Authority and are they concise and specific? YES NO NOTES: _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ BARRIERS AND OPENINGS 1. Does the fenced portion of the Port area barrier meet the minimum specifications for security fencing? YES NO a. Is it of chain link (cyclone) composition? b. Is it constructed of 9-gauge or heavier wire? c. Is the mesh opening no larger than two inches? d. Is selvage twisted and barbed at top and bottom? e. Is the bottom of the fence within two inches of solid ground? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
(1) In areas where the fence exceeds two inches from solid ground, have compensatory measures been taken? YES NO f. Is the top guard strung with barbed wire (or barbed tape/razor edge) and angled outward away from protected site and upward at 45 degree angle? YES NO
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g. Is the fence at least eight feet in height (including outrigger) in all required areas? YES NO 2. Does the Port facility provide for security force inspection of the security barrier, including clear zones, at least once per month? YES NO a. Are deficiencies noted and are remedial actions promptly effected? YES NO
3. If masonry wall is used, does it meet minimum specifications for security fencing? YES NO 4. If building walls, floors and roofs form a part of the barrier, do they provide security equivalent to that provided by the security barrier? YES NO 5. Are all openings properly secured? YES NO
6. If a building forms a part of the barrier, does it present a potential penetration hazard at the point of juncture with the perimeter security fence? YES NO 7. If a body of water forms any part of the barrier, are additional security measures provided? YES NO 8. Are openings such as culverts, tunnels, manholes for sewers and utility access, and sidewalk elevators which permit access to the port and restricted area properly secured? YES NO YES NO
9. Are all portals in perimeter barriers guarded or secured?
10. Do the gates and/or other entrances in perimeter barriers exceed the number required for safe and efficient operations? YES NO 11. Are all perimeter barrier portals equipped with secure locking devices? a. Are they locked when not in use? YES NO YES NO
12. Do all gates provide protection equivalent to that provided by the barrier of which they are part? YES NO 13. Are prescribed clear zones maintained on both sides of the restricted area barriers? YES NO 14. If clear zone requirements cannot be met, have compensatory security measures been implemented? YES NO 15. Are any perimeters protected by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)? YES NO
NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________ PROTECTIVE LIGHTING 1. Is the perimeter of the installation and restricted area fencing provided adequate lighting? YES NO 2. Does the protective lighting meet adequate intensity requirements: YES NO
3. Are the zones of illumination from lamps directed downward and away from guard personnel? YES NO 4. Is perimeter protective lighting utilized so that security force patrol personnel remain in comparative darkness? YES NO 5. Are lights checked for proper operation prior to darkness at least weekly? YES NO 6. Are repairs to lights and replacement of inoperative lamps effected immediately or in a reasonable time? YES NO 7. Is additional lighting provided at active portals and points of possible intrusion? YES NO 8. Are gate guard houses provided with proper illumination? YES NO
9. Does the Port facility have a dependable source of power for its protective lighting system? YES NO 10. Does the Port facility have a dependable auxiliary (emergency) source of power for protective lighting? YES NO 11. Is the power supply for the Protective Lighting System protected? 12. Are there provisions for standby or emergency protective lighting? 13. Is the standby or the emergency equipment tested at least monthly? YES NO YES NO YES NO
14. Can the emergency backup power supply be rapidly switched into operation when needed? YES NO 15. Is the emergency backup power supply self-started? YES NO
16. Is the protective lighting/emergency or stand by power source located within a restricted area? YES NO 17. Is parallel circuitry used in the wiring? 18. Are multiple circuits used? a. If yes, are proper switching arrangements provided? YES NO YES NO YES NO
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19. Are switches and controls properly located controlled and protected? a. Are they weatherproof and tamper resistant? b. Are they readily accessible to security personnel?
YES NO YES NO YES NO
c. Are they located so that they are inaccessible from outside the perimeter barrier? YES NO d. Is there a centrally located switch to control protective lighting? YES NO
20. Is the Protective Lighting System designed and locations recorded so that repairs can be made rapidly in an emergency? YES NO 21. Are materials and equipment in shipping and storage areas properly arranged to provide adequate lighting? YES NO 22. If bodies of water form a part of the perimeter, is adequate lighting provided where deemed appropriate? YES NO NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 1. Does the Port facility employ any Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)? 2. Does the IDS, where utilized, meet the following requirements? YES NO YES NO
a. Are IDS signals monitored at one central point and is the security response initiated from that point? YES NO b. Are all sensor equipment, doors, drawers and removable panels secured with key locks or screws and equipped with tamper switches? YES NO c. Have power supplies been protected against overload by fuses or circuit breakers? YES NO d. Are annunciator, control and display subsystems located in a separate area or closed off from public view? YES NO e. Are zone numbers assigned to IDS sensor locations instead of building/room numbers? YES NO 3. Is the system backed up by adequate security alert teams? YES NO
4. Is the alarm system for active areas or structures placed in access mode during normal working hours? YES NO 5. Is the system tested prior to activation? YES NO
29
6. Is the system inspected at least monthly? 7. Is the exterior IDS system weather proof?
YES NO YES NO
8. Is there an alternate or independent power source available for use on the system in the event of power failure? YES NO 9. Is the emergency power source designed to cut in and operate automatically when AC power goes down? YES NO 10. Is the IDS system properly maintained by trained and properly cleared personnel? YES NO 11. Are frequent tests conducted to determine the adequacy and promptness of response to alarm systems? YES NO NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ EMPLOYEE SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM 1. Does the activity have a current employee security education program addressing port security matters? YES NO 2. Are all assigned personnel provided port security indoctrination? YES NO
3. Is formal security education training conducted for all personnel at least annually? YES NO 4. Are all personnel indoctrinated in security procedures which apply in the performance of their duties? YES NO 5. Does the program cover such topics as: a. Pass and badge systems? b. Privately owned vehicle identification and control? c. Random package and vehicle inspections? d. Procedures for prompt reporting of security breaches? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
e. Layout of the waterfront facility to which the security force is assigned? YES NO f. Means/avenues by which the waterfront facility may be accessed from waterside and landside? YES NO g. Types of cargo operations, on the facility and on a vessel moored to the facility, that are to be expected? YES NO
30
h. General security topics?
YES NO
6. Are local law enforcement agencies asked to actively participate in pertinent portions of the program? YES NO NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY FORCE TRAINING 1. Does the Port facility provide prescribed security force training? YES NO
2. Does the Port facility provide adequate lesson plans to cover all facets of security and law enforcement? YES NO 3. Is "outside" law enforcement/security training provided? YES NO
If yes, name of school(s) _______________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ 4. Are individual training records adequately maintained for security force personnel? YES NO 5. Do all security force personnel, who are required to bear firearms, receive training? YES NO 6. Do all security force personnel receive adequate indoctrination in the use of force? YES NO NOTES: ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY FORCE COMMUNICATIONS 1. Does the activity security force have its own communications system with direct communications between Security Headquarters and security elements? YES NO 2. Is there an auxiliary power supply for the communications systems? YES NO
3. Is there sufficient equipment to maintain continuous communications with each element of the security force? YES NO 4. Is there adequate alternate means of communication available to the security force? YES NO
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5. What is the primary means of communication for the security force? ______________________________________________________________________________ The alternate means?__________________________________________________________ 6. Radio communications: a. Are proper radio procedures practiced? b. Is all communications equipment properly maintained? c. Are there at least two dedicated radio frequencies security force use? d. Are portable radios equipped with multiple-frequency capability? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
e. Are portable radios equipped with an automatic-tilt or switch activated duress frequency? YES NO 7. Does the security force use a duress code for emergency situations? a. Is the duress code changed at least monthly? YES NO YES NO
8. Is the communications center afforded adequate physical security against armed intrusion? YES NO 9. Are communication systems capable of being used to transmit instructions to all key posts simultaneously in a rapid and timely manner? YES NO SECURITY EQUIPMENT 1. Does the security force have sufficient, adequately equipped vehicles to maintain patrols, respond to alarms and emergencies and maintain supervision? YES NO a. Are security force vehicles equipped with: (1) Signs conspicuously identifying the vehicle as a security police vehicle? YES NO (2) Emergency exterior overhead lights? (3) Electronic siren? b. Do security force vehicles have relatively low mileage? YES NO YES NO YES NO
2. How often do the Security Officers and supervisory personnel review the firearms and ammunition requirements to ensure their adequacy? YES NO
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3. Do observation Towers provide security personnel with adequate observations of security areas? YES NO 4. What type of ammunition is used by armed security force personnel? YES NO
5. Is ammunition properly secured and issued only for authorized purposes? YES NO 6. Are weapons adequately stored and secured when not in use? YES NO
7. Are duties other than those related to security performed by security personnel? YES NO 8. Does the Port facility provide devices and specialized equipment for use by the security force? YES NO 9. Does the Port provide security force personnel with individual equipment?YES NO NOTES: _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________
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ANNEX 3
Guidance for Shipowners, Ship Operators & Masters on the Protection of Ships from Terrorism & Sabotage
Prepared by
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER of SHIPPING
GUIDANCE FOR SHIPOWNERS, SHIP OPERATORS AND MASTERS ON THE PROTECTION OF SHIPS FROM TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE
This document has been issued to provide guidance to operators and managers of ships and ships masters in dealing with security threats to vessels, passengers and crew. It identifies some of the ways in which ships can protect themselves from attacks by terrorists or saboteurs. The guidance is aimed at encouraging companies to lay down their own policy and should not be interpreted as limiting a master's traditional freedom to take any steps necessary to secure the safety or security of his ship. It identifies measures against which a companys own plans can be compared. The guidance is based on advice promulgated by IMO (MSC/Circ.443, MSC/Circ.754) and certain national administrations and offers recommendations to shipping companies on company and ship security planning and the identification of responsibilities of individuals designated under such a plan. The guidance will be kept under review in the light of developments and in consultation with other organisations or national authorities and revised as and when necessary. 21 November 2001
International Chamber of Shipping 12 Carthusian Street London EC1M 6EZ Telephone +44 20 7417 8844 Fax +44 20 7417 8877 e-mail: ics@marisec.org
International Chamber of Shipping Ltd. Registered in England No. 2532887 at the above address
CONTENTS 1. 2. 3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4. 5. 5.1 5.2 6. 7. 8. 8.1 8.2 8.3 9. 10. 11. 12. INTRODUCTION SHIPPING COMPANY SECURITY POLICY, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIONS THE SHIP OPERATORS SECURITY OFFICER Shipping Company Security Surveys Ship Security Surveys Security Staff Training Contingency Planning LEVEL OF THREAT AND THREAT ASSESSMENT THE SHIP SECURITY OFFICER Responsibilities Ship Security Measures and Procedures HIJACKS BOMB THREATS TO SHIPS SEARCH PLANNING AND PRACTICE Search Planning Ship Search Decision The Search System FINDING A SUSPECT DEVICE REPORTS OF UNLAWFUL ACTS SUMMARY GUIDANCE FOR MASTERS CONCLUSION
ANNEXES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Security Surveys Security Staff Training Threat Levels and Potential Responses Guidance for Masters in the Event of a Hijack Potential Bomb Threats and Countermeasures Ship Search Planning Search System and Search Methods
1. 1.1
INTRODUCTION Terrorists and saboteurs can broadly be grouped under the following headings: those whose grievance is essentially territorial, nationalist, separatist, ethnic or religious those whose political ideology is extreme left, right or fundamentalist extremist groups supporting trade protection, animal rights or environmental issues those promoting criminal activities (e.g. drug trafficking or organised illegal immigration). Terrorist acts may be aimed at : attracting publicity, advertising a cause and pressurising Governments to change policy making the public apprehensive discrediting Governments by exposing their inability to protect their citizens provoking repressive counter measures which impinge upon citizens civil rights such as travel restrictions, curfews or special legislation, thus alienating public opinion extorting money or equipment from Governments, major companies or rich individuals freeing imprisoned colleagues in return for the release of hostages promoting other illegal activity. Although most of the major terrorist incidents involving transport activities have involved aircraft, there have been incidents on board vessels and there is no doubt that certain categories of ships and shore installations present a theoretically attractive, although often difficult, target for terrorist activities. Cruise Liners could be targetted because of their high profile, their flag, ownership, particular destination or nationality of their passengers. Cruise passengers may be perceived as a high income group and this alone could make them a target. Tankers, with the political sensitivity of their cargo and the potential environmental impact and resulting wide publicity given to tanker mishaps, are potentially attractive targets, although their size, complexity and the terminals where they call may make boarding difficult. Gas tankers, with their potentially volatile cargoes, might be considered to offer a particularly high profile. RoRo Passenger Ferries may be vulnerable to the use of a car bomb attack, aimed at damaging, disabling or sinking the vessel, causing fire on board and/or harm to the passengers and the crew. Other Ships with Special Cargoes such as those transporting hazardous goods, nuclear materials or waste or livestock could be potentially conspicuous targets. Terminals, such as those handling oil or gas, might present attractive targets to terrorists or saboteurs.
1.2
1.3
1.4
Terrorists and saboteurs will generally carry out a reconnaissance of potential targets for whatever type of operation they are planning. An unprotected target is more likely to be attacked than an obviously protected one and terrorist groups will be deterred by visible security arrangements which are known to be effective. A ship whose crew is obviously vigilant is less likely to be selected as a target for a terrorist attack than one with a crew whose security procedures are neither comprehensive nor diligently enforced. Likewise, a company with efficient cargo acceptance procedures is less likely to attract unwelcome cargoes.
3
2. 2.1
SHIPPING COMPANY SECURITY POLICY, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIONS Until a company has decided its own responsibility with regard to security, it is difficult to determine the actions which should be taken. Each company needs to develop a statement of its own security policy for its vessels which should incorporate the following primary objective: Safeguarding their crew, passengers, visitors, other employees, ships and cargoes from the activities of terrorist or other criminal organisations.
2.2
To accomplish this, various steps need to be taken, such as to appoint and empower a suitably senior staff member to have overall responsibility for security on board all company controlled ships; to assess the security risk, taking account of the type of ship, the type of cargo it carries, the nationality of any passengers, the ports it serves and any other relevant factors; to co-operate with the responsible authorities in any country the ship visits and to act on any advice from those authorities; to promote security awareness amongst all employees with a view to making acts of terrorism against ships more difficult to achieve; to appoint and empower a responsible officer as ship security officer on each ship; to provide guidance and advice to masters and crews on responses to terrorist threats and keeping such guidance up to date; to recognize that additional security requirements may impose additional burdens on masters and crews which charter parties might need to take into account; to establish a reporting and recording system for incidents.
2.3
A company's plans will need to take into account a wide variety of scenarios in the different parts of the world in which they operate. In some potential incidents national governments will plan to take a leading role, in others the company may plan to direct its own negotiations. However, in all cases, the company needs to consider: responsibility for handling the incident passing information to authorities, trade associations, other ship owners instructions to masters and crew liaison with overseas authorities methods of communication plans for handling the media plans for informing and supporting the relatives/next of kin of those involved.
2.4
Arming crews in reaction to a potential terrorist threat is not recommended.
3.
THE SHIP OPERATORS SECURITY OFFICER IMO recommends that each ship operator should allocate responsibility for the security of the ships of that operator to a particular senior person in the organisation (the operators security officer) and provide resources to: conduct security surveys and subsequent inspections of each ship in the fleet develop and maintain company, fleet and individual ships' security and contingency plans and procedures encourage security awareness and vigilance amongst crews ensure adequate training for personnel responsible for security assess the potential threat in ports, terminals and sea areas on ships voyages encourage security awareness in ports and terminals visited by the companys vessels co-ordinate company and ships security plans with port security officers in each port that might be visited by ships of that fleet.
3.1
Shipping Company Security Surveys In order to prepare security plans, an initial comprehensive security survey should be undertaken of each ship to assess the vulnerability of the ship to terrorist acts. The results of this security survey should be used to determine the security measures necessary to counter the threat. The level of security deemed necessary for each ship may vary from port to port, from ship to ship and from time to time. Liaison between the port and shipping company/ship security officers is important to ensure the best use of ship and shore resources. The survey should determine what needs to be protected, what security measures are already in effect, and what additional measures and procedures are required. These issues should be periodically reviewed and the security plans updated as necessary.
3.2
Ship Security Surveys A ship security survey should consist of a preliminary assessment and an on-site survey. Further details are given in Annex 1.
3.3
Security Staff Training A continuous and thorough programme should support measures taken to safeguard the security of passengers and crews. Although all employees, ashore and afloat, have responsibilities for security in one way or another, there are three categories of personnel who may be specifically involved and who may benefit from specialised training: The ship operators security officer and his central support staff The ship security officer Inspection, control and monitoring personnel. A more detailed examination of security staff training is outlined in Annex 2.
3.4
Contingency Planning An essential part of security is the preparation of contingency plans in response to incidents which could occur and the planning of measures introduced in response to any increase in the level of threat. These plans need to cover different levels of response from the company (operator/owner) and the master, officers and crew. They might also encompass the establishment of a Threat Level procedure, identifying various measures which might be adopted by vessels in response to the perceived level of threat to the vessel in a particular place, at a particular time.
5
4. 4.1
LEVEL OF THREAT AND THREAT ASSESSMENT The security arrangements in place at any particular time or location or for any particular vessel will depend, of course, on the perceived level of threat. In this regard it is useful to consider establishing a series of threat levels against which various actions might be taken, tightening security at each higher level. A universally recognised threat level indicator does not exist although a widely used and simple threat level table is as follows: Level 1 - background level of threat; Level 2 - heightened threat due to type of ship, port, current events etc., but with no defined target; Level 3 - high level of threat against a specific target.
4.2
Notification of the appropriate threat level will generally be from national authorities through a shipping companys organisation structure responsible for security (i.e. national authority to ship operator's security officer to ship security officer). In a particular port, notification of the threat level, or a change in it, may come from the national authority, via the port security officer, to the vessel and its person responsible for security. In any event the incremental measures to be taken at each of the threat levels should be laid down. Those outlined in Annex 3 might be considered. A threat level system such as this enables actions to be established for various responsible people in the event of a threat level change. A message indicating a move from "level 1 to level 2" will, in the event that such a system is established, immediately indicate the additional actions that people responsible for security, both ashore and at sea, need to take. Although individual companies can develop a threat assessment for themselves, it is the responsibility of Governments to study the capabilities and intentions of any terrorist group which may threaten ships visiting, flagged or owned in a country, and to issue, where necessary, assessments of likely threats. It is for the shipping industry to act on such assessments. Specific advice as to what the shipping industry might do in response to any threat might also be obtained from Government departments. All advice must be kept up to date so information needs to pass in both directions. The prompt and continuing dissemination and exchange of information will assist the maintenance of effective port and ship security procedures and will enable states, port facilities, operators and shipmasters to adjust their procedures in response to changing conditions and specific or general threats.
4.3
4.4
5. 5.1 5.1.1
THE SHIP SECURITY OFFICER Responsibilities Although directed at passenger ships, IMO recommends that ship operators appoint an officer (who could be the master) to be responsible for the security of each individual vessel (the ship security officer). This recommendation should be considered in respect of all vessels. The ship security officer has responsibility for: advising the master on the threat assessment for the voyage and agreeing the ships response regular security inspections of the ship detailed contingency planning implementing/maintaining the ship's security plan designed by the operators security officer at the appropriate threat level proposing modifications to the plan encouraging security awareness and vigilance on board the ship liaising with port security officers during the ship's visit and with the ship operator reporting, as appropriate, all occurrences and suspected occurrences of unlawful acts co-ordinating the implementation of the ship security plan with the appropriate port security.
5.1.2
Good security involves a readiness to accept that a threat exists and that arrangements might be necessary to counter it. The ship security officer, together with the master, should consider: Security education - all crew members will be more security conscious and vigilant if the principles of good security are explained. It should be clear within each company who has responsibility for company policy in relation to security and each person's role in respect of the vessels. Awareness - the threat of terrorist attacks in different ports of the world varies depending on the national and international politics of the day and the grievances, real or imagined, of any of the potential groups that might be involved. The threat needs to be assessed in relation to each planned port of call, on the best information available, taking action as necessary. Liaison - good liaison with local police and port authorities will provide local "intelligence", and may give advance warning of any incident and lead to a more rapid reaction by local security forces. Where such liaison with local police or port authorities is difficult, advice might be sought from local consular or diplomatic representatives.
5.2
Ship Security Measures and Procedures Although the master's traditional authority in matters of ship security remains paramount, ship security should be continually monitored and supervised by the ship security officer. It is also important to establish and maintain communication and co-operation with individual port facilities in security matters. Additional security measures, such as those suggested in Annex 3, should be implemented to counter increased risk when warranted.
6. 6.1
HIJACKS "Hijack" is used to define the forcible seizure of a means of transport by terrorist or criminal groups as a way of furthering their cause, reaching their objective, making good their escape or even using the ship itself, and/or its cargo, as a threat or as a weapon. Aircraft have been hijacked by a single person armed only with imitation weapons and, in the right place, one armed person could be enough on a ship. However, a planned terrorist hijack of a vessel is much more likely to involve a group with real weapons. The major task facing the would-be hijackers is to board the vessel with their weapons, and security measures aimed at preventing this should be introduced when the threat level warrants it. Measures devised in respect of threats from piracy and/or armed robbery are appropriate. The key objective must be to prevent unauthorised access to the vessel. Although in most parts of the world the threat of this kind of action is low, shipping companies and masters need to have a range of measures available to introduce as and when the threat level warrants it. Terrorists may seek to board a vessel by infiltration, ruse or assault. In each case the best defences for both the deterrence and prevention of unauthorised access are crew awareness and control of access to the vessel and to key points on the vessel such as the bridge, engine room and communication facilities. In port, if the threat warrants it, access points should be manned, in certain circumstances by two persons, who should be fully briefed on their duties, the action to take in the event of an incident or emergency and the planned response to an alarm. They need to be provided with a torch, a whistle to summon assistance and communications to remain in touch with the Duty Officer. They need to hold a full list of all crew members, shore officials and expected visitors. All visitors should be asked to identify themselves and, if necessary, a responsible officer should confirm their identity. Strangers should be challenged. Vessels at anchor should regularly check anchor cables and hawsepipe covers. At sea, hijackers may try to gain access to the vessel, particularly close to land or in narrow waters where manoeuvrability is limited. Attempts could be mounted from small boats, dhows, junks, fishing boats that appear to have broken down or by any means that relies on the traditional assistance which seafarers offer each other. The best protection against this sort of ruse is an awareness of the possibilities and keeping a sharp look-out for small craft behaving suspiciously or approaching. Should a master decide to allow people to board, this should be one at a time, each one searched if necessary, while a good look-out is maintained on the other side of the ship. Particular care needs to be exercised during the hours of darkness when a surreptitious approach could be carried out more easily. When underway, if there is any doubt about the identity or motive of craft attempting to attract attention, their actions should be ignored. If it is safe to do so, and circumstances warrant it, speed should be increased and/or navigation lights and upper deck lighting extinguished. Attempts should be made to identify or photograph any craft behaving strangely and details reported ashore by the speediest means available. If another vessel approaches the ship at sea in a suspicious or threatening manner: increase speed and alter course if safe to do so: give no opportunity for the other vessel to come alongside and make no response to messages by radio, light or loud hailer. keep personnel clear of the upper deck. note details of the other vessel and photograph it if possible.
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6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
at night, direct searchlights at the approaching vessel and switch off upper deck lighting: if safe to do so, navigation lights should also be switched off. report details of any harassment to the company and, if appropriate, to a representative of the government claiming authority over the area. 6.6 A terrorist assault is more likely to occur in harbour than at sea. If the measures recommended for controlling access are in force and prove inadequate, it will demonstrate the determination and ruthlessness of the terrorists involved. Unless the terrorists are very poorly armed and equipped, no attempt should be made to resist an armed terrorist assault. If despite all efforts at deterrence and prevention a vessel is hijacked, the master and crew should try, wherever possible, bearing in mind the overwhelming priority to prevent any loss of life, to follow the guidance outlined in Annex 4.
6.7
7. 7.1
BOMB THREATS TO SHIPS Ships are vulnerable to explosive or incendiary devices: in accompanied passenger cars, freight vehicles or coaches in unaccompanied vehicles, export cars or semi-trailers in misdeclared cargo carried on board by current passengers, or by those from a previous sailing leaving a timed device in luggage placed in a baggage trolley in ships stores in the post carried on board by shore workers in port carried on board by contractors personnel.
7.2
Travelling as a foot passenger, the saboteur has to contend with customs and immigration authorities, and with being challenged by ship's staff if he attempts to disembark prior to sailing. There is also the possibility that a determined terrorist may plant a device and remain on board. Further details on potential bomb threats and possible counter measures are given in Annex 5. In addition to bomb threats, the potential use of radiological, biological and chemical weapons against ships and the people on them, although unlikely, should also be considered.
7.3 7.4
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8. 8.1 8.1.1
SEARCH PLANNING AND PRACTICE Search Planning A ships security plan should incorporate a search procedure aimed at ensuring that the vessel can be searched quickly and effectively when this is considered necessary. Search plans should be prepared in advance, to help ensure the maximum effectiveness of the search. They should be practised from time to time to build up confidence on the part of the crew and remind them that good security is everyone's business. In areas or periods of high risk or if information on specific threat has been received, searches might be made after leaving each port. Compartments which are tidily stowed are more easily, quickly and effectively searched. In the interests of good security, as well as good ship husbandry, as much gear as possible should be stowed away. The operator's security officer and the master of each ship, together with the ship's security officer, should be responsible for establishing search procedures. Drills should be held to ensure that such plans are efficient, effective, workable and well understood. Search planning and organisation is covered in Annex 6.
8.1.2
8.2 8.2.1
Ship Search Decision If a decision is taken to search the ship while it is alongside, the master should consider whether to disembark any persons/ passengers who do not have search responsibilities. If so, a reception facility should be established to ensure that a terrorist has not planted a device and then been allowed back ashore. Vehicle drivers should facilitate the search or discharge of their vehicles. If the ship is to be searched on passage the master should advise passengers of a "security alert" and ask them to remain with their baggage whilst the search is carried out. There should be no reference to the word "BOMB". On passenger ships there may be members of national security services with considerable antiterrorist experience on board. Having decided to search the vessel, the master should brief his heads of departments accordingly. They, in turn, should brief their own search group leaders who should organise their teams to search their allocated spaces using the search plans to ensure no spaces are missed. The Search System
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.3
Details of a recommended search system and methods of search are outlined in Annex 7. Some of these measures may only be applicable to passenger vessels.
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9. 9.1 9.2
FINDING A SUSPECT DEVICE Remember - the disposal of any device is the responsibility of the security services and no attempt should be made to deal with any discovered device. If a device is discovered the person responsible for security should be notified of the size and description of the device and its location and report any immediate action being taken. No action should be taken which affects or changes the environment near the device, e.g. lighting, temperature, noise etc. Do not put it in water or play water on it as this could short a control circuit and detonate it Do not run in the vicinity of the device Do not use VHF/UHF radios in the vicinity of the device Do not handle, touch, shake, open or move suspected explosives or suspected devices Do not cut, pull or touch wires, switches, fuses or fastenings Do not pass metallic tools near the suspected device Do not smoke nearby Do not move the device away from people - move people away from the device Do not direct people past the suspect device Do not get near bombs.
9.3
If a device is found on board a ship in port the master or responsible officer should evacuate the ship in accordance with an emergency plan, retaining only sufficient staff to provide technical support to the security services. If a device is found while a vessel is at sea, the master's response will be based on the size and location of the device, the ships location and the time until the security services and other assistance becomes available. The master's response should include consideration of the following measures: the need to proceed to General Emergency Stations the need to evacuate the area by routeing everyone well clear of the suspect device instructing all on board to keep clear of all doors, trunks and hatches leading from the space containing the device to avoid possible blast injuries the possibility of seeking assistance from any members of the security services travelling as passengers the likely damage stability state of the vessel if the device were to detonate the need to man the drencher room if a device is found on a vehicle deck the need to build a containment wall around the device to absorb a blast.
9.4
9.5
9.6
If a bomb explodes without warning, onboard or near the ship, the master should: ensure water-tight integrity and stability render first aid where/if necessary take fire-fighting precautions muster personnel to establish number and names of casualties inform company, local authorities (in port), and make distress call (at sea) if necessary if in port, be prepared to handle enquiries from press and next-of-kin.
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9.7
If a bomb warning is received: the master will need to decide whether the warning is real or a hoax and pass detailed information on any bomb warning, and his reaction to it, back to his company. If the warning comes via the police or local authorities, they may be able to give an opinion on its authenticity. The master's decision will determine whether searches should be made although, unless there is clear evidence that a bomb threat is false, at least a low-key search of vulnerable or public areas should be carried out. if the warning is given by telephone, the recipient of the call may be able to give further information which can contribute to a sound decision: the caller's manner; accent and language used; whether made from a call box, through an operator or privately; background noise; precise wording; time of call (e.g. after the bars close). a bomb warning may be received by the ship's radio operator who should be briefed as to the policy on responding. any search should be carried out as soon as possible, by personnel familiar with the area to be searched. Searchers need to be carefully briefed on what they are looking for. Particular attention should be paid to machinery compartments, sensitive areas, etc. if a suspicious object is found, further decisions need to be taken - on isolating it, reporting details, and issuing instructions to personnel in the vicinity. Movement of personnel about the ship needs to be carefully controlled. Even if practicable (e.g. when the ship is alongside) total evacuation is not invariably the best solution as more than one device might have been planted and the warning may be a "comeon" tactic aimed at drawing people into the vicinity of a second device.
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10.
REPORTS OF UNLAWFUL ACTS
To safeguard maritime interests against unlawful acts which threaten the security of passengers and crews on board ships, reports on incidents and the measures taken to prevent their recurrence should be provided to the authorities as soon as possible. This information will be used in updating or revising these agreed measures, as necessary. The individual circumstances of any particular incident may require a departure from this guidance to achieve the overall primary objective of personnel safety. Mention of the difference should be contained in any incident report in order to ensure that guidance can be continually improved and kept up to date.
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11.
SUMMARY GUIDANCE FOR MASTERS
This two-page summary document has been included to provide a brief outline of the measures described elsewhere in this guidance. 11.1 Each shipping company must decide its own responsibility with regard to security. Otherwise it is difficult for a master to determine the actions which should be taken. Company policy should seek to fulfill the following primary objective: Safeguarding their crew, passengers, visitors, other employees, ships and cargoes from the activities of terrorist or other organisations. 11.2 IMO recommends that ship operators appoint an officer to be responsible for the security of each individual vessel (the ship security officer) with responsibilities for: advising the master on the threat assessment for the voyage and agreeing the ships response regular security inspections of the ship detailed contingency planning implementing/maintaining the ship's security plan designed by the operators security officer proposing modifications to the plan encouraging security awareness and vigilance on board the ship liaising with port security officers during the ship's visit and with the ship operator reporting, as appropriate, all occurrences and suspected occurrences of unlawful acts co-ordinating the implementation of the ship security plan with the appropriate port security plans. 11.3 Companies and masters should establish a threat level indicator and incremental measures to be taken at each of the threat levels should be laid down. The following might be considered:Level 1 access on and off the vessel controlled and all persons identified; embarked passengers not be allowed to disembark without authority; access to sensitive areas of the vessel limited; control access to cargo spaces; unused rooms or spaces kept locked; spot checks to ensure that access points to the vessel are adequately controlled; ship security officer advised to contact port security at each port of call. closer scrutiny paid to deliveries of stores; passengers advised not to leave their baggage unattended; occasional bomb searches carried out at random intervals; checks made of seals on containers and other cargo; crew advised to be vigilant and checks made on Level 1 procedures; close liaison established and maintained with onshore security authorities; more frequent random checks of passengers, their baggage and vehicles; patrols introduced on board the vessel; no persons other than the crew allowed on the bridge or in the engine room; in port, inspections of the hull of the vessel made from the quay and outboard; access of all visitors to the vessel strictly controlled.
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Level 2
Level 3
regular and thorough bomb searches conducted; all stores checked prior to acceptance and a check made on recent deliveries; all spaces, including off-duty crew lockers and storage locations, searched; crew briefed on the seriousness of the situation and the requirement for vigilance; patrols of the vessel, especially on deck, intensified.
11.4
If despite all efforts at deterrence and prevention a vessel is hijacked, the master should keep calm and advise all others to keep calm; ensure the safety of the ship in accordance with maritime practice; broadcast a distress message if possible; offer reasonable co-operation.; try to establish what group of terrorists is involved; try, without risk, to increase the number of access points to the vessel; encourage the establishment of a secure, direct negotiation channel with the authorities.
In the event or in anticipation of military action: Do not react to strangely dressed newcomers. Do not attract attention to any unusual activity. If shooting is heard or the loud command "GET DOWN", obey it. If the loud command "STAND STILL" is heard then freeze immediately. Inform a member of the military assault force of the location of terrorist bombs or weapons. Do not take photographs of the military assault force. 11.5 Search plans should be prepared in advance, to help ensure the maximum effectiveness of the search, and should be practised from time to time to build up confidence on the part of the crew. The disposal of any device is the responsibility of the security services and no attempt should be made to deal with any discovered device.
11.6
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12.
CONCLUSION
Threats from terrorism and sabotage are part of the risks faced by the shipping industry. It is sound sense and good seamanship to reduce possible risks and those imposed by terrorists or saboteurs are no exception. The industry is conscious of the dangers that can arise. But in many parts of the world ships will be obliged to rely on the co-operation of shore authorities over whose security arrangements they will have no influence. It is therefore essential that, at both company and ship level, security measures are maintained at a level commensurate with the threat. Always remember that good security is as much an attitude of mind as the application of physical protective measures.
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ANNEX 1 Security Surveys Preliminary assessment Prior to commencing the ship security survey, the operators security officer should take advantage of all available information on the threat assessment for the ports at which the ship will call or at which passengers embark or disembark, and about the port facilities and their security measures. Previous reports on similar security needs should be studied and appropriate persons on the ship and in port facilities should meet to discuss the purpose and methodology of the survey. The operators security officer should conduct an initial vulnerability assessment, considering: the general layout of the ship; the location of restricted access areas, such as bridge, engine-room, communications facilities etc.; the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship; the open deck arrangement including the height of the deck above water; the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services; the numerical strength, reliability and security duties of the ship's crew; existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and crew; and existing security measures and procedures in effect, including inspection, control and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarms, lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.
On-scene security survey The operators security officer should examine and evaluate the methods and procedures used to control access to ships, including the inspection, control and monitoring of persons, carry-on articles, baggage, cargo and ship's stores. Each identified point of access should be examined, including open weather decks, to assess its potential for use by persons seeking unauthorised access for themselves or for terrorist materials. The operators security officer should examine and evaluate existing security measures, procedures and operations, under both emergency and routine conditions, including: established security procedures; response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions; the level of supervision of the crew, vendors, repair technicians, dock workers, etc.; the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols; the security key control system; security communications systems and procedures; security doors, barriers and lighting; and authentication procedures for communications, to alert shore authorities and the company to the possibility that communications are being sent under distress or duress.
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ANNEX 2 Security Staff Training 1 Operators security staff
The operators security officer and his staff should have knowledge and, as necessary, receive training in some or all of the following, as appropriate: 2 security administration; relevant national legislation, international conventions and recommendations; responsibilities and functions of other involved organisations; risk, threat and vulnerability assessments; security surveys and inspections; ship security measures; security training and education; recognition of profiles of persons who are likely to commit unlawful acts; ship and local port operations and conditions; dangerous substances and devices and how to recognise them; inspection, control and monitoring techniques and techniques used to circumvent them; and security devices and systems and techniques used to circumvent them. Ship security officer
The ship security officer should have adequate knowledge of and, if necessary, training in, the following, as appropriate: 3 company policy, the ship security plan and related emergency procedures; the layout of the ship; assessment of risk, threat and vulnerability; methods of conducting security inspections; techniques used to circumvent security measures; operation and value of technical aids to security, if used; recognition of profiles of persons who may be likely to commit unlawful acts; the detection and recognition of dangerous substances and devices; port and ship operations; and methods of physical searches of persons, their baggage and other goods. Inspection, control and monitoring personnel
Instruction and training, as appropriate, for persons assigned to conduct inspection, control and monitoring on board ships should take into consideration, as appropriate, the following: responsibilities under the ship security plan; inspection, control and monitoring regulations or policies and pertinent laws; detection and identification of firearms, weapons and other illicit substances and devices; operation and testing of security equipment, if used; physical search methods of persons, baggage, cargo and ship's stores; emergency procedures; recognition of profiles of persons who are likely to commit unlawful acts; human relations techniques; and techniques used to circumvent security measures.
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Ship's crew
Crew members having specific security duties should know their responsibilities for ship security as described in the ship security plan and ships security procedures and should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties.
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ANNEX 3 Threat Levels and Potential Responses Level 1 - background level of threat This represents the background level of likelihood of terrorist activity which, unfortunately, applies everywhere in the world today. Clearly some locations, types of ships or trades may be assessed at a higher level. Even Level 1, however, requires that all organisations give some thought to the possibility of a terrorist incident and make contingency plans accordingly. At this background level, therefore, it is suggested that: ports establish security committees to liaise regularly with other port users; all shipping operators produce clear statements of security policy; an appropriately senior ship's officer be appointed on each ship to be responsible for protective security matters on that ship, the implementation of the company's security policy and procedures and liaison with local port security arrangements; written bomb alert procedures be prepared for all vessels, and any crew or other staff involved informed of these procedures; contingency plans be formulated and agreed for action in the event of a threat being received, and the appropriate staff informed; plans be made for the implementation of additional security measures in response to an increased level of threat; adequate deck and overside lighting be provided to vessels; crew should be issued with photo identification; access on and off the vessel should be controlled, with all persons identified; security alarms and communication systems should be established for restricted areas and at access points to the ship to complement guards and patrols with a response plan; embarked passengers should not be allowed to disembark without the authority of an appropriate ship's officer and only when the shore authorities have been contacted; access to certain areas of the vessel (e.g. bridge, engine room, radio room, steering gear) should be limited to ships staff and other authorised personnel with a key control system established; at sea, access to cargo spaces should be controlled; where practicable, unused rooms or spaces should be kept locked; spot checks should be made to ensure that access points to the vessel are adequately controlled and that doors to unused spaces are locked; the ship security officer is advised to contact port security at each port of call.
Level 2 - heightened threat due to type of ship, port, current events etc. but with no defined target In addition to the measures described at Level 1, it is recommended that: closer scrutiny should be paid to deliveries of stores; passengers should be advised not to leave their baggage unattended; occasional bomb searches should be carried out at random intervals; checks should be made of seals on containers and other cargo; all staff should be advised to be vigilant and checks made on the procedures outlined at Level 1; close liaison should be established and maintained with onshore security authorities; all crew should be reminded of bomb alert procedures for their vessels; passenger carrying vessels should consider establishing more frequent random checks of passengers, their baggage and vehicles;
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patrols should be introduced on board the vessel; deck and overside lighting should be utilised; bomb searches should be undertaken and repeated as often as the master deems necessary; no persons other than the crew should be allowed on the bridge or in the engine room; in port, routine inspections of the hull of the vessel should be made from both the quay and outboard; access of all visitors to the vessel should be strictly controlled with a positive authorisation, or pre-clearance, being obtained from a responsible ships officer with all visitors accompanied; shore authorities should be informed if persons seeking access to the vessel are refused or decline to be subject to security measures.
Level 3 - high level of threat against a specific target In addition to the measures described at Levels 1 and 2: regular and thorough bomb searches should be conducted; all stores should be checked prior to acceptance and a check made on recent deliveries; a search should be made of all spaces including off-duty crew lockers and storage locations; ships staff should be briefed on the seriousness of the situation and the requirement for vigilance; patrols of the vessel, especially on deck, should be intensified.
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ANNEX 4 Guidance for Masters in the Event of a Hijack Keep calm and advise all others to keep calm. Do not try to resist armed terrorists unless as a last resort in a clear life threatening situation. Ensure the safety of the ship in accordance with maritime practice. Broadcast a distress message if possible. Offer reasonable co-operation. Abuse or aggression should not be returned. Be aware that hijackers are unlikely to understand fully how a particular ship works, its capabilities and limitations and may be suspicious about routine operations. They are also unlikely to be familiar in detail with the safety requirements associated with the cargo. Try to establish what group of terrorists is involved. Try, without risk, to increase the number of access points to the vessel. Without suggesting what they may be, seek to establish the hijackers demands and what deadlines have been set for meeting them. Assume that the incident will be prolonged. The longer incidents drag on, the more likely they are to end without injury to the hostages. Recognise that hostages will feel isolated during the incident, as they will be unaware of steps being taken by the company and/or government authorities on their behalf. This can lead to antagonism against the authorities and sympathy for the terrorists. Every effort will be being made to end the incident with the utmost emphasis on the preservation of life and personal safety of all innocent parties involved. Understand that establishment of a reasonable rapport between hostages and captors is likely to reduce the chances of the terrorists acting violently against their hostages. Be aware that at some stage in the incident a confrontation between the terrorists and outside authorities may occur. Before this confrontation, an opportunity may arise or may be created to pass information about the hijackers, such as their number, descriptions, sex, how they are armed, how they deploy themselves, how they communicate with each other, their cause, nationality, language(s) spoken and understood, their standard of competence and their level of vigilance, and whether any of the hostages have been separately identified as to nationality, religion or occupation (e.g. forces personnel). Encourage the establishment of a secure, direct negotiation channel with the authorities. Avoid crew members becoming directly involved in the negotiations. If crew members are forced to take part they should simply relate the dialogue back and forth. Wherever and whenever possible, the hijackers should be encouraged to surrender peacefully and should be discouraged from mistreating either passengers or crew. Military action may, in the last resort, be taken in order to save life and recapture the vessel.
In the event or in anticipation of military action: Do not react to strangely dressed newcomers. Do not attract attention to any unusual activity. If shooting, or the loud command "GET DOWN", is heard immediately lie face down, cover ears, close eyes and slightly open mouth. Do not move until an "all clear" is given. If the loud command "STAND STILL" is heard then freeze immediately. If the location of terrorist bombs or weapons is known, inform a member of the military assault force as soon as possible.
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Do not shelter or hide terrorists. Do not take photographs of the military assault force. Following the incident, the master and his crew should avoid talking to the press and other media persons about the methods used to resolve the incidents.
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ANNEX 5 Potential Bomb Threats and Countermeasures a) Covert entry and quick-plant device - The saboteur wishing to attack a ship alongside to cause specific damage or immobilise particular equipment may wish to board the ship undetected, plant an explosive or incendiary device and disembark before it detonates. Sabotage attacks differ from hostage-taking attacks in that there are no negotiations over demands. If publicity is the saboteurs' aim, it is likely that the incident will be "claimed" after the event. Sabotage attacks of this sort are likely to be directed at a ship of a particular nationality, against the shipping company's policies, or the justification may be entirely local. Since saboteurs on this type of mission need to board and leave the ship without being detected, access control arrangements may not always deter them. To guard against this type of attack, vulnerable compartments should be locked and watchkeeping personnel should make random visits to look for signs of tampering. A saboteur need not only use explosive or incendiary devices, he may try to damage the vessel's machinery. Extra vigilance is needed immediately prior to sailing, or following a bomb warning. Crew members should immediately be suspicious of unexpected objects in unusual places. Sabotage by remotely controlled or delayed action device - The saboteur may use some convenient means of concealing and smuggling on board delayed-action bombs or incendiary devices in passengers' or crews' baggage, in deliveries of ships stores or as misdeclared cargo. Crew members should be warned not to accept packages from strangers and made aware that devices could be introduced in seemingly innocent receptacles. Gas cylinders or oxygen bottles, for example, make ideal containers for explosive devices. Deliveries which have been cleared could be bound with coloured tape for departmental identification, or automatically strapped using polypropylene strapping tape. External sabotage - Major damage to a ship can also be caused by a saboteur reaching the hull, either from another vessel or underwater, and placing an explosive device in a vulnerable area. The saboteurs' objectives in mounting such attacks can be to block berths or narrow channels, or to immobilise a particular vessel. Such attacks require considerable knowledge and technical skill and lie within the capability of only fairly sophisticated terrorist groups: to be effective, some precision is required in placing the charges and this requires trained swimmers. Measures to provide protection include: over-the-side lighting giving an even distribution of light on the whole hull and waterline; keeping a good watch from the deck, to look out for bubbles (divers), floating refuse (which may hide swimmers) or small boats. All approaching boats should be challenged. If unidentified, they should be prevented from coming alongside; a boat patrol, carried out at frequent but irregular intervals and towing barbed wire or fish hooks, is an effective defence against frogmen or swimmers; if the ship is known to be under attack from swimmers, turning propellers ahead and astern creates turbulence in the water and makes swimming more difficult; if it is thought likely that a device has been fixed to the outside of the hull below the water-line, the assistance of local authorities should be sought. Some of the above measures may seem fanciful or far-fetched, but they have all been used in the past with some success and are included to show the sort of protective measures which are needed when the threat demands it.
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b)
c)
Annex 6 Ship Search Planning In order to ensure that a thorough and efficient search can be completed in the shortest possible time, search plans, specific to each ship, should be prepared in advance. This plan should be reviewed from time to time and modified in the light of experience. It should be comprehensive and detail the routes searchers should follow and all the places on the route that a device could be secreted. The plan should be presented in a logical manner to cover all options and to ensure no overlap or omission. Such a plan allows a searcher to concentrate on the actual searching without worrying about missing something. The preparation of a system of check cards for individual vessels is a useful contingency, one being issued to each searcher which specifies the precise route to be followed and the areas to be searched. The cards can be colour coded for different areas of responsibility, e.g. blue for deck areas, red for engine room etc. On completion of an individual search task the card is returned to a central control point, so that when all cards are in the search is known to be complete. In addition to a comprehensive search plan a plan for a fast search or 'quick look' of the more vulnerable and accessible areas should be drawn up. Using the card system, selected cards only would be issued to cover the vulnerable and accessible areas. It must, however, be emphasised that all bomb threats must be treated as real unless judged or proven otherwise. Searchers should be instructed to bear in mind that the terrorist may try to match the device to the background such as a tool box in an engine room. At higher levels of threat, searches of people and goods may need to be carried out. Such a fast search might be carried out where there is a short warning time before a potential bomb detonation; security management judges that a received bomb threat needs checking out; an opportunity occurs to conduct a quick search.
Types of Search There are two types of search: Reactive Search - This type of search is normally carried out in reaction to a specific threat or piece of hard intelligence indicating that bomb or weapons have been placed. It can also be used as a precaution during times of heightened threat. Whenever a reactive search is ordered it should comply with the following principles: the searchers should be familiar with the area being searched so that out of the ordinary items are noticed. the search should be conducted according to a specific search plan or schedule and must be carefully controlled by officers and management. searchers must be able to recognise a bomb or incendiary device. there must be a system of marking or recording searched or 'clean' areas. a central control point should be established to which the searchers report. searchers should be able to communicate with the search controllers. searchers must know precisely what to do if a suspect device is found.
Preventive Search This aims to deter terrorists from smuggling bombs or arms onboard a ship or into a terminal or restricted area, and to find these devices if the terrorist tries to smuggle them in. The following principles apply to all preventive searching: places need to be established where people and goods are checked or searched before they pass into the restricted or sterile zone. Once through the point, segregation
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is essential and no contact must be allowed with unchecked persons or goods. The percentage of persons/goods searched will, of course, depend on the threat level. no person or vehicle should be allowed to 'break back' from a sterile area or land from a ship without the knowledge of the person controlling the search. car, baggage and freight reconciliation with owners/drivers is a paramount objective. restricted or sterile areas and the access to them should be searched. The frequency of such searches will be dictated by the threat level.
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Annex 7 Search System and Search Methods The search system should be based on the crew searching their own area of work under their normal officer or senior rating. In this way, an unusual object is more likely to be identified. Consideration should be given to search parties working in pairs with one searching "high" and one searching "low". If a suspicious object is found, one of the pair can remain on sentry while the other reports the find. To manage any search efficiently ships staff may need to use UHF/VHF radios but operating channels should be limited to those previously worked during the voyage. The search controller should keep a record of all reports from the search groups to ensure all spaces are checked and that the master always has an up to date search status. During the search routine any lifts should be turned off. The search system can be divided into two stages: A search of unlocked spaces - Since most unused spaces should be locked a rapid search of vulnerable areas can be achieved by: checking all locked doors to ensure they have remained locked; searching all unlocked spaces, lifts and rubbish bins; search group leaders advising the bridge on completion of searches of their allocated spaces; the bridge staff keeping a record of all reports from search group leaders to ensure that the master has an up to date status report.
A search of locked spaces - If warranted, a full search of locked spaces and lift shafts can follow with: all locked spaces and lift shafts being thoroughly searched using the necessary pass keys; all crew accommodation, lockers, wardrobes and drawers being thoroughly searched; search group leaders advising the bridge on completing the search of their allocated spaces; bridge staff keeping a record of all reports from search group leaders to ensure the master has an up to date status report.
The discovery of one device should not be the end of a search as there is always the possibility that more than one has been planted. The owners of any unattended baggage, unclaimed luggage or abandoned packages found during a search should be sought while clearing the area adjacent to the suspect item. Personnel Search Locations A centralised search point ashore is generally most economical in terms of equipment, personnel and space and it allows control services such as police, customs and immigration to integrate more easily. However, keeping the "clean passengers" segregated after search may present problems of organisation and surveillance. A search at the gangway head has the disadvantage of allowing potential terrorists to get close to their target. Also space in ships is at a premium compared with ashore, and long queues of passengers, or other visitors to the ship, waiting on an open gangway to pass the search control may cause irritation. However, this option may be necessary when there is no onshore screening or when, during a high level of threat, a double check is necessary.
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Methods of Search - Persons Physical Searching - Physical searching is best carried out in booths as privacy minimises embarrassment and increased effectiveness. People being searched should not be given the opportunity of selecting a particular searcher. One person, a supervisor, should observe people waiting and note suspicious behaviour and allocate passengers to available searchers to ensure no over-loading. Metal Detection People can be screened by passing through an archway pre-set to alarm if a certain amount of metal is carried through. Hand-held metal detectors can be used for screening individuals. However, metal detectors will not pick up explosives, plastic weapons or inflammable liquids carried in glass or plastic containers. Metal detection should be augmented by a physical search of a proportion of those being screened, including some who do not alarm the detector. This would increase the chances of detection and acts as a powerful deterrent. Baggage Screening Metal Detectors - Metal detectors are of little use for screening baggage and personal belongings since most bags and brief-cases have locks, hinges and other metal components which would result in a very high alarm rate. Moreover, hand-held detectors have a limited depth of effective penetration. Vapour Detection - Air sampling systems, either static or hand-held, can be used to detect high concentrations of some explosives. However, currently no commercial system is capable of detecting all forms of explosives. X-Ray Systems - The most usual method is to use X-ray equipment. Modern equipment is capable of producing images of good definition and penetration. However, X-ray examination may not detect explosives and plastic weapons nor will it allow identification of the actual liquid in bottles or other containers. Moreover, it is possible to camouflage the image of weapons and devices by the use of other dense materials, such as lead crystal glass. The use of X-ray equipment must therefore also be accompanied by a percentage physical check of baggage, including a proportion that do not arouse suspicion. Operator efficiency decreases significantly after only a relatively short time, particularly at peak screening periods, so individual operators should only scan X-ray images for a maximum of 20 minutes and then be employed on other duties, such as a physical search, for 40 minutes before returning to the console. Each image should be presented for a minimum of 5 seconds to permit proper examination. Any baggage whose image arouses suspicion, or contains a dark area which could conceal a weapon or device, should be physically searched. Physical Search A physical search of baggage should include a check for false compartments, often used for the smuggling of weapons and devices. Although false "bottoms" are most usual, devices have been incorporated around the sides of cases, in the lids and in the compartments of holdalls. A smell of glue, or a heavy odour to mask the smell of glue or explosives, may be an indication that a lining may have been stuck back in position. Attention should be paid to any tampering or repair to a case, nonstandard or unmatched case components, and also to greasy stains or small holes in the case exterior. If the baggage weight seems disproportionate, or the bag is unbalanced for no obvious reason, then a further check for a false compartment would be justified. Particular attention should be paid to electrical and electronic apparatus, such as radios, which have often been used as containers for devices to avoid detection under X-ray examination. Passengers should be questioned on the origins of the equipment and whether it has been out of their possession for any period of time. Equipment may be examined for unusual characteristics; signs of tampering, excessive weight, loose objects inside (rotate, not shake). X-ray the equipment if suspicions are aroused. Treat all new, packaged equipment in the same manner as used models.
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Use of Dogs - Specially trained dogs can be very effective in searching cars, baggage and freight. Dogs can also be used for searching in ships but will need to be trained for the seagoing environment to achieve results.
Heavy Baggage - The screening of heavy baggage could be done by a central X-ray machine supported by physical search. It is another area where the use of dogs trained to sniff out explosives may well be beneficial. Like passenger screening, once heavy baggage has been screened it is essential it should be marked and kept under surveillance. Rules related to reconciling passengers to their baggage should be established and adhered to. Vehicles - At high threat levels, a high proportion of vehicles might need to be searched. The deterrent effect of this is considerable. As with baggage, dogs trained to sniff explosives can be used, but physical search is the most reliable method. Where random searching or percentage screening is in force, the advice of security services should be sought in selecting which vehicles to search. If possible, a covered shed with nearby X-ray equipment should be chosen so that suspect packages can be subjected to X-ray examination. If shore screening is non-existent, ships might spot search vehicles on board if they are unable to do this before boarding. Although difficult, this may be necessary at high threats levels and should be practised. Vehicle owners/drivers should accompany all such searches and should not be allowed to land once their vehicle is on board without the express authority of a responsible ship's officer and the notification to shore authorities. The searching of freight trailers before boarding is notoriously difficult, but measures may need to be taken to meet this problem. This will involve co-operation from shore staff. Careful examination of paperwork and screening of drivers, coupled with reaction to good intelligence, goes some way to solving this problem. Customs are closely concerned with freight and should be consulted. For the future, developments in air sampling systems may improve the ability to check freight. In the final event, trailers can be 'unstuffed' and physically searched using all methods mentioned above, including sniffer dogs. Other Freight Checking freight, especially bulk aggregates and liquids, is extremely difficult and costly but might need to be done on a random basis in response to a specific threat. Deliveries to Ships - Terrorists may well use innocent miscellaneous vehicles and people delivering stores to a ship. Good access control, personnel identification and random search will help to counter this risk. ___________________
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Maritime Safety2 Master

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ANNEX 1

SHIP SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE

ROYAL ASSOCIATION of NEDERLANDS SHIPOWNERS

Edition 05 (April 2003)

To meet the requirements of SOLAS 1974 Chapter XI-2

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

MASTERS OVERRIDING AUTHORITY

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Ships Owner (Name and Address):

Company Security Officer:

Ships Manager / Operator: (Name and Address):

Company Responsible for Manning: (Name and Address):

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

International call sign:

Continuous Synopsis Record to be inserted here.

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Duties and Responsibilities

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

The ship security officer is designated by the company.

Duties and Responsibilities

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Duties and responsibilities of security watch

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Restricted Areas on the Ship

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

11.3 Security Level 3

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

12.1 Security Level 1

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

12.3 Security Level 3

Differing Security Levels

Edition 05 (April 2003)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

7. 8. 9. 10. 11.__

NOTES: