Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No.

127255, August 14, 1997 Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Tolentino vs secretary of Finance Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Abakada Guro v. Ermita G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005

J. Puno En Banc Facts: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequenc

Lidasan vs COMELEC Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,

Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790 Lidasan v. Commission on Elections (same with Above) Case No. 148G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51 FACTS :Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanaodel Sur makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their

towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act4790.

Alalayan v. National Power Corporation Case No. 8G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth A c t N o . 1 2 1 . I n S e c t i o n 3 o f t h e s a m e a c t , R e s p o n d e n t i s e m p o w e r e d , i n a n y franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. ISSUE: W / N S e c t i o n 3 i s a s u b j e c t w h i c h t h e b i l l t i t l e A n A c t t o F u r t h e r A m en d Commonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121).Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be a complete index of the contents of the act.

Alalayan vs NAPOCOR (same c above) Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder, receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. Also it could renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy,. This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its] title . . . This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider. To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Case No. 149G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941) FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved. The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided. HELD: Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Taada v. Tuvera Case No. 287G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as arule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUE: W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to thenecessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately.

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Vega

In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.