The Past and Present Society

A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands 1618-1648 Author(s): J. I. Israel Source: Past & Present, No. 76 (Aug., 1977), pp. 34-74 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650409 Accessed: 04/11/2009 07:05
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A CONFLICTOF EMPIRES: 1618-1648* SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS

"SINCE THEY DERIVEALL THEIR GAINS FROM TRADE WITH SPAIN AND

Italy", claimed the marques de Aytona, referringto the Dutch in the Spanish Council of State ln July I622, "should they lose this commerce, they shall be less powerful enemies and we can expect a good settlement favourable to Spain''.l This assertion of one of Philip IV's senior ministers well illustratesthe thinking that lay behind Spanish policy at the outset ofthe Spanish-Dutch struggle of I62I-48. Essentially, Philip's ministers aimed to weaken the United Provinces an concierto, agreement settling the various sufficiently to win a buen issues in Spanish-Dutch relations, mostly relating to commercial and colonial matters, to the advantage of the Catholic Monarchy. The principal means by which it was proposed to achieve this, and that which was primarily used, was the application of economic pressure on a scale that had never before been attempted and with which there was to be nothing comparableuntil Napoleon's Continental System more than a century and a half later. In the conflict of I62I-48 the land war was mostly rather static and often perfunctory. The famed army of Flanders played a largely secondary and defensive role. As regards Spain at least, it was in the sphere of economic warfarethat the major effort was made, producing a considerableimpact not only on the Netherlands and Spain itself but on much of the rest of Europe. By any measure,the second Spanish-Dutch war was a key formative episode in early modern history and yet curiously, until very recently, it has attracted virtually no scholarly interest. Partly perhaps this may be due to a lingering tendency to regard the conflict as a continuation of the Dutch struggle for independence which, to all intents and purposes, was won by I609 when the first Spanish-Dutch war ended. A common assumption, at any rate, is that there is an essential continuity between the wars, that the struggle of I62I-48 was merely the second phase of a so-called Eighty Years Warin which a declining but incorrigibly obstinate Spain exhausted itself in* An earlierversion of this paper was read to the Dutch History Seminarat the Institute of HistoricalResearch, University of London, JanuaryI976. It is based on researehformingpartof a long-termprojeet,supportedby the Soeial Scienee ResearchCouncil,on the soeialand eeonomieeontextof Spanish-Duteh I should also like to reeord in eonfliet and rapproehement the period I6I8-60. my gratitudeto ProfessorK. W. Swartand ProfessorJ. H. Elliott for their help and advice with this artiele. 1 Consulta,6 July I6225 fo. 5: Arehivo General de Simaneas,Estado, lepio (hereafterA.G.S. Est.) 2036.

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independence and to the effectually striving suppress political religious vigorousrepublic. And this, except perhapsfor of an increasingly old-fashionedDutch patriots,does not constitutea very edifying there has longbeen good causefor doubting subject. Nevertheless, such an interpretation. Decadesago it was shownthat che way in which the Spanish-Dutchrupturewas presentedpublicly in the by political determined domestic in UnitedProvinces I62I waslargely the and the considerations especially needto convince Dutchpeopleof only in certain the necessityof a warfor whichtherewasenthusiasm quarters. The mission of Archduke Albert's delegate, Petrus 2 to Peckius, fromBrussels The Haguein MarchI62I, wasdeliberately PrinceMaurice,and his circleto looklike twistedby the stadhouder, demandthat the States Generalsubmitto the an uncompromising sovereignty PhilipIII whenin factit wasnothingof the kind. The of of of actualSpanishdemands I62I, satisfaction whichwasthe condition for renewalof the truce, werethat freedomof worshipbe conceded to the Dutch Catholicminority,that the river Scheldt be fromthe Indieseastandwest. reopened thatthe Dutchwithdraw and little andyet, untilrecentlyZ or aothing This too haslongbeen how further, to consider serious and hasbeendoneto takethe analysis why they led to the type of war these demands, Spainwasin making that ensued and how Spanishand Dutch thinkingchangedas the struggle proceeded. Nor has much thought been given to the involved. enormous impactof this struggleon the countries recently war The view of the second Spanish-Dutch put forward to in by JoseAlcala-Zamora a majorSpanishcontribution ourknowledge of Europein this period,4though it stops short at I639, iS a advanceon the meagrepicturethat preunquestionably dramatic cededit. "Spain'sstrugglefrom I62I to I639X', concludedAlcaliZamora,"was more a fight for economicsurvival,under threatof and paralysisby the Dutch, than a quest to realizea constriction or of expansion hegemony".5 Alcali-Zamora programme territorial
known3

s M. G. de Boer, "De hervatting der vijandelijkhedenna het twaalfiarig xv (I920), pp. 34-49; I. Schoffer, "De crisis van de bestand", Tiid.Gesch., ed. geschiedenis Nederlatulen, J. A. der jonge Republiek, I609-I625", Algemene van Houtte et al., I2 vols. (Utrecht, I949-58), Vi, pp. 57-8. Divided, I609-I648 s De Boer, op. cit., p. 35; Pieter Geyl, TheNetherlands en Spanje van (London, I936), p. 84; J. J. Poelhekke,'T Uytgaen denTreves: in de Nederlanden I62I (Groningen, I960), pp. 37-4I. Flandes el Mar del y 4 JosE Alcala-Zamoray Queipo de Llano, EspaXaJ after completing Norte,I618-39 (Barcelona,I975). I first read Alcala-Zamora an attempt is made to the original draft of this piece. In the present version with that condensethe analysisas much as possible where it agreessubstantially of Alcali-Zamora. a Ibid., pp. 475-6. In another recent work Peter Brightwell, though he makes several important points regarding colonial rivalry, in general leans towardsan older view, seeing the Spanish crown as being insistent above all on maintainingthe territorialintegrityof the empire, and leaves out of the account much of the economic reasoning:Peter Brightwell,"The Spanish System and the Twelve Years Truce", Eng.Hist.Rev.,lxxxix(I974), pp. 270-92.

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convinced the struggle essentially domination the North that was for of Sea andthe Baltic,concentrates Spanish on navalactivityand ambitions in north European waters,6 thoughhe does considerthat the Spanishwar eXortwas intendedto damageDutch interestsin all parts. However,Alcala-Zamora not use any Dutch or Flemish did sources, printedor manuscript, although workis basedon the and his rich Spanisharchival material Simancas, confinedhimselfonly at he to certainsectionsof it.7 The resultis that his documentary is base relatively narrow indeed,rathertoo narrow whathe attempts. for Majoraspectsof the conflictin the llorth, especiallythe effect of Spanishactionson the Dutch but also, in some cases,the Spanish actionsthemselves, such as the greatrilrer blockade I625-9 or the of attack DutchNorthSeafishing, treated cursorily, many on are too Wit}1 features distortedor emitted. Furthermore, Alcala-Zamora, preoccupied withthe north,barely toucheson Spanish actions againstthe Dutch in the southwhich,arguably, no less crucialand possibly are moreso. WithAlcala-Zamora havean extremely we significant new picture,but one that is ratherroughlysketchedandill need of both modification extension, and particularly reference a fullerrange by to of sources,Spanishand non-Spanish. In Spain,Flandersand Portugal (whichwas then attachedtO thC Spanishcrown),discussionof Spanish-Dutch relations was intense throughout period of the Twelve Years Truce (I609-2I) and, the fromI6I8, the Dutchquestion a chiefconcern no lessthanfour was of royalcouncils Madrid, at thoseof State,War,Portugal the Indies. and In all thosecouncils,andalsoat B1ussels, leastamongthe Spanish at officials, at Lisbon,it wasthe general and viewthatthe truceof I6C9 hadbeenutterlyruinousbothfor Spainatldforthe empireas a whole and that it wasvital, on its expiryin AprilI62I, tO PUt an end to the situation thathadarisenfromit, eitherby negotiating different terms or by war. Some influential officersand officialssuch as Luis de Velasco,CarlosColomaand Juan de Villela,openlypreferred war, advising that Spainshouldonlyseemto wanta newtrucefor the sake of appearances.8Others, moreaware the chronic of stateof the royal 6 Alcala-Zamora, Op. Cit., pp.46-8, 67,I72.

7 The Simancas series containingrelevantmaterialof importancewhich are unused by Alcala-Zamora the rough draftsof cfmsultas are relatirlgto the Low Countries(A.G.S. Est. 2I38-2I60), royalcorrespondence with Flanders(A.G.S. Est. 2230-2246), letters from ministers in Flanders to the king (A.G.S. Est. 2300-232I), consultas relating to Spain and Portugal (A.G.S. Est. 2645-2664V, and the consultasfor the relevant years of the consejo guerra and consejo de de hacienda. On these papers, see M. van Durme, Les Archivesgezterales de Simancaset l'histoirede la Belgique,4 vols. (Brussels, I964-73), and G. Parker, Guideto the Archivesof the SpanishInstitutions or concerned in with the NetJzerlands, I556-I706 (Brussels, I97I). 8 Velasco to Philip III, II Feb. I6I9: A.G.S. Est. 634 doc. 32I; Villela to Philip III, 22 Dec. I620: A.G.S. Est. 2309; "Cartade Don Xrovalde ]3enavente para su Mgd hazd?relacion de las cosas de Olanda",g June I620: Brit. Lib. Add. MS. I4005, fOS. 34-40.

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without preferred terms.9 But all, virtually new finances, balance on that exception, agreed warwasbetterthanthe oldterms. The advice of Georgesde Henin, a Walloonofficialwho was almost alone at Madridin urgingthat Spainshouldat all costsavoidwarand seek a respite from struggle(a respite which in his view was desperately ofthe country wereto be solved), problems neededif the manyinternal uncleand the most by de was dismissed Balthasar Zuniga,Olivares's but influential ministerof the period,as well-intentioned hopelessly confused. 10 The generalconvictionin the Iberianworldthat the truce was a disasterwas basedmainlyon the obviousfact that the yearsof truce relationof with a transformation the Spanish-Dutch had coincided of ship to the disadvantage Spain. Clearlythe truce years were a period of dramaticexpansionin Dutch navigationand trade and as Philip III's ministerswere inclinedto link the two phenomena cause aIldeffect.ll The truce had removedall obstaclesto Dutch while had tradewith Spainand Portugal,l2 left Antwerpblockaded Amsterdam continuedto usurp the functionsthat had once been and enabledthe Dutch to dominateEurope'snorthAntwerp's,l3 trade,includingthe vital flow of Balticgrain,copper south carrying and and navalstoresto the Iberianpeninsula Italy,to an extentthat had neverbeen seen before.lX This in turn meantthat a very large proportion the silver leaving Spain proceededto Holland,thus of and trade makingpossiblefurtherDutch investmentin navigation over such rivalsas the and bringingthe Dutch a decisiveadvantage It Englishand the XanseatictOWIlS.l5 was also evidentthat I)utch were,by such meansas misusinggrain and Dutch Jewishmerchants licencesand smugglingin quantitiesof false coppercoinage,using to their successin Spainand Portugal evadethe king'straderegulafurther illegally, thereby increasing additional silver tionsandto extract
9 Consultaof the Brussels junta, 3 Apr. I620, and Albert to Philip III, sur de I4 Apr. I620: Correspondance la courd'Espagne les affairesdes Pays-Bas au XVIIe siecle, ed. H. Lonchay and J. Cuvelier, 6 vols. (Brussels, I923-37), indocs. I466 and I468. 10"Jorge de Henin muestra las consideraciones. . ." and the memorandum on this of Balthasarde Zuniga: A.G.S. Est. 285I. 11Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.2078, fos. 45-52; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fos. 344?* l2 "01andeses. Discurso sobre el prorrogarmejorar o romper las treguas con ellos", IS Jan. I620: Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fo. 46. 13Ibid.; Carlos ColomatoPhilip III,Cambrai, 8June I620: A.G.S. Est. 2308. 14 Consulta of the Council of Portugal, 28 MaY I6I8, and memorandumof FranciscoRetama: A.G.S. Est. 634. 15Ibid. The export of silver to Asia was of course crucial to the operations of the East India Company:Kristof Glamann,Dutch-AsiaticTrade,I620-I740 (Copenhagenand The Hague, I958), PP. 5I-3; for the role of Spanish silver in Dutch-Russiantrade,see S. Hart, "AmsterdamShippingandTradeto Northern vereniging van Russia in the SeventeenthCentury",Mededelingen de nederlandse xxvi voor zeegeschiedenis, (I973), PP. 26-9.

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the alarmingly adverse balance Ibero-Dutch of trade. 6 Significantly 1 in these years a number of Spanish writers, such as Sancho de Moncada,l7 were inclinedto see in the unfavourable tradebalance the most important causeof Spain'seconomicdeclineand it was a widespread belief in the peninsula that it was an increasingly poorer Spainthat was fiIlancing Dutch growth. A secondfeature the trucedeplored PhilipIII's ministers of by was the addedimpetusthatit had lent to furtherDutch expansion the in East and West Indies.l8 By I6I9, when the Dutch East India Company established principalFar Easternbase at Batavia,the its Portuguesehad alreadylost severalpossessions and much of their shareof the spicetrade. In the Americas Dutchhadmadeless 19 the progress indeedhadat firstshownsomeinclination respectthe and to rathervague clauseof the I609 truce whichimpliedthat they were excludedfromthe king of Spain'sIndies. There was at any rate a markedreductionin Dutch activityin the Caribbean after I609.2? However,Dutch involvement the Brazilian in sugartradehad continuedand,fromaboutI6I5, numerous incidents showedthatDutch ambitions the Americas in werereviving. The exploitsof a squadron under Van Spilbergen the Pacificcoastsof Peru and Mexicoin off I6I5 caused particular indignation Madrid. The overthrowof in Oldenbarneveldt I6I8 removed lingering in any tendencyin Holland to acceptexclusionfrom the New World and, althoughthe West India Companywas not finallyformed until June I62I, after the outbreak war,Spanish of oicials in Brussels, carefully who scrutinized commercial initiatives Holland,knewby I620 thatit wouldbe set in up andthatshortof the use of forceor the negotiation dramatically of new terms,there was no way of preventing Dutch making the rapid gainsin SpanishAmerica.2l A third substantial disadvantage the truce for Spain resulted of fromtheshiftineconomicpower: increasing wealth enabled Dutch the to acquire,besidesthe world'slargestnavy,the only standingarmy in Europeremotelycomparable strength that of Spainandthis, in to in turn,facilitated extensionof Dutch influence the throughEurope
18 Albert to Philip III, Ghent, I8 Aug. I6I8: A.G.S. Est. 2305; memorandum of the conde de Benavente, I2 Sept. I620: A.G.S. Est. 2309. 17 SatlChO de Moncada,Restauracion politicade Espana(Madrid, I746 edn.), pp. I2, I7, 2I-2, 53-6lS Memorandumof Juan de Cirica: A.G.S. Est. 634, doc. 3I8; Philip III to Albert, I2 Jan. I620: Correspondance la courd'Espagne, Lonchay and de ed. Cuselier, i, doc. I450. 19 Consultaof the Council of Portugal,28 May I6I8: A.G.S. Est. 634. Of the most valuableAsian commodity, pepper, the Dutch harldledover twice as much as the Portugueseby I62I: Glamar)n, cit., p. 74. op. 3?C. Goslinga, TheDutchin the Caribbean on the fFild Coast, I580-I680 and (Assen, I97I), pp. 82-3. 21Albert to Philip III, Brussels, 28 Feb. I6Ig: A.G.S. Est. 2306; Pedro de San Juan to Juan de (Dirica, Brussels, 29 Feb. I620: A.G.S. Est. 2308.

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withthe meagre all andbeyondin a waythatcontrasted too obviously this beforeI609. Morever, role international playedby the republic to Dutch influenceseemedto be devotedspecifically one spreading by aim that of checkingSpainat everypoint. In Germany, I620, and in the republichad occupiedEmden, much of Julich-Cleves, additionthe vital fortressof Papenmutz(Mondorf)on the Rhine men andmoneyelseand betweenCologne Bo22 and,by providing in ambitions Habsburg the where,was assuming lead in obstructing France had Europe. In Italy,the UnitedProvinces succeeded central and, by agreeas the mainforeignthreatto the Spanishascendancy with Veniceand Savoy, ments and militaryand navalco-operation area.23 In Mediterranean forcein the central hadbecomea powerful to fromLarache North Africa,whereSpainheld coastalstrongholds Oran as a barrierbetween Islam and Spain, and Islam and the growthin Dutch involvepowers,therewas a remarkable Protestant Jewsas intermediaries; mentfrom I608, using Dutch asldMoroccan of was by I62I the republic the mainsupplier armsandmanufactures to North Africaand the chief ally of the sultan of Moroccoin his with Spain a fact that caused much disquiet in confrontation Madrid, especiallyas it coincided with a markedresurgencein and the Muslimpiracyaround coastsof Spain,Portugal Sicily.24 The trucethat Madridwouldhavesettledfor in I62I wasone that in the wouldhavereversed shiftthat hadoccurred the yearsI609-2I. to precisely securesucha reversal. wereintended The threeconditions invariably though for rights DutchCatholics, for The demand religious the was nevertheless of placed first and undoubtedly consequence, placed of leastimportant the threeas is shownby the lesseremphasis terms.2 of in on it by Spanishministers any discussiotl the proposed Partly, this requirementderived from the traditionallymilitant political crown,but it wasalsoa shrewd standof the Spanish Catholic withit wouldserveSpanish move,not onlyin thatDutch compliance but prestigeinternationally also becausethe Dutch Catholicswere
22 Consulta, I2 Nov. I620: A.G.S. Est. 2034; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fo. 35. fos. 35, 45; Alfred van der Essen, "L'alliance defensive hollando23 Ibid!., Leonisvan in historica honorem venetienne de I6I9 et l'Espagne",in Miscellanea der Essen)2 vols. (Brussels and Paris, I947), ii, PP. 8I9, 829. 24See the discourse of Carlos Coloma printed in Antonio Rodriguez Villa, AmbrosioSpfnola, primer marquesde los Balbases (Madrid, I904), PP. 385-6 Marrakesh,IOApr. I6I I, and other Sultan Moulay Sidan to the States GeI?eral, de inddites l'histoiredu Maroc de I530 a I845 ed. H. de documents: Les sources des Castries,2nd ser., Archiveset bibliothAqaes Pays-Bas, 6 vols. (Parisand The Hague, I906-23), i, pp. 668-7I. of pp. 26 Poelhekke,'T Uytgaenvan den Treves, 37, 40; memorandum Juande (:irica: A.G.S. Est. 634, doc. 3I8. A recent article seems to make the mistake of confusingthe religiousissue of I62I with the very differentand more decisive religious issue that prevailedbefore I598: see G. Parker,"Why did the Dutch Revolt last Eighty Years", Trans.Roy. Hist. Soc., sth ser., xxvi (I976), p. 62.

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such a large and potentially active minority in the republic. In Madrid the mounting religious strife in the United Provinces after I609 both the growing dissension among the Protestants, and the persistence of the Catholics in the face of increased Calvinist pressure was regarded as the one solid gain from the truce,26and anything likely to undermine Dutch domestic stability still further was considered highly desirable. At the same time the demand explicitly acknowledgedDutch political and religious independence and demonstrated the changed and strictly limited nature of Spanish aims. The second condition, concerning the Scheldt, was doubtless partly meant to involve the interests of the Southern Netherlands in those of the empire as a whole with respect to the confrontation with the Dutch Republic. However, it is quite clear that the revival of Antwerp was above all iIltended to restore part of Europe's north-south carrying trade to direct Spanish control and reduce the role of Holland, thereby stripping the Dutch of the gains they had made since the closure of the Scheldt and particularly since I609.27 The last demand, concerning the Indies, reflected the fears of the councils of the Indies and of Portugal. The Spanish intention was to prevent the formation of the West India Company, secure unqualifiedacceptance from the States General of Dutch exclusion from the New World and salvageat least a part of the Portuguese-Asiantrade. In other words, the third condition was designed to bring Dutch coloIlial expansion to a complete halt. The Spanish conditions, though they did not directly threaten the existence of the republic, stood no chance whateverof being accepted, precisely because they did threaten its prosperity and well-being. The very groups who stood to lose most from war and were least swayed by thoughts of liberating Flanders from the Spanish yoke, the merchants of Holland, would have had to make the greatest sacrifices to obtain a new truce. The almost miraculouseconomic boom of the previous twelve years simply could not continue beyond I62I whether the States Generalgave in to Spanish pressureor not. In the circumstances the unenthusiastic were forced into the camp of Prince Maurice and the war party. Nevertheless, mere rejection of the Spanish terms was quite inadequate as a popular explanation and justificationof the war. The status of the Scheldt was of coIlcernto relatively few and its opening would actually have favoured some parts of the country,28 while colonial commerce hardly seemed a
2eBrit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fos. 36V-37; consulta, 30 July I62I, fo. 5: A.G.S. Est. 2035. 27 Coloma to Philip lII, 8 June I620, fo. 2: A.G.S. Est. 2308. 28 Isabellato Philip IV, 22 Sept. I62I: Correspondance la courd'Espagne de ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier,ii, doc. IO9. Indeed, some Zeelandtowns, notably Plushing, seemed quite anxious that it be reopened- see A. Gielens, "Onderhandelingenmet Zeeland over de opening der Scheide, I6I2-I3", Antwerpsch archievenblad, ser., vi (I93I), pp. I94-9. 2nd

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fundamentalissue in the four inland provinces now faced with heavier taxation and other burdens. Consequently, there was some reversion in the Dutch popular pamphlets of I62I to the stirring themes of an earlier epoch:29 the cruel and oppressive Spaniardsvas determined still to place the Dutch once again under his despotic rule. At the same time, however, there was added some additionalpropagandamore relevaIlt to the times. War, it was held, would serve both the economic and political interests of the republic.30 The economic argument, which was to play a majorrole in Dutch as well as Spanish thinking throughout the struggle, perhaps made little sense with respect to Holland, but in other areas,notably Zeeland where the truce had brought stagnation rather than growth3l war did offer some real attractions, especially the prospect of trade with the Americas and privateering. As for political aims Dutch pamphleteers claimed that the republic would never be fully secure while Spain remained so powerful, and that numerous advantages would follow were Spain to be weakened. It is diEcult to see that they were wrong. The conflict envisaged in Brussels and Madrid during the course of the deliberations of I6I8-2I was emphatically not a war of conquest. Spanish officials, mindful of the strength of the Dutch defences, proposed either a limited use of the army of Flanders in conjunction with economic pressures or else) in some cases, of economic pressures of alone. Cristobalde Benavente, veedorgeneral the army of Flanders, urged the conquest of Cleves and a limited thrust in the Arnhem region, combined with embargoes in the peninsula and the Spanish viceroyaltiesin Italy, and a river blockade in Flanders and north-west Germany.32 Others such as Carlos Colomamade similarproposals.33 Hurtuno de Urizar, however, a Basque oicial of long experience in Flanders, proposed keeping the army entirely on the defeIlsive and defeating the republic by economic means alone in particular,the breakingofthe Dutch north-south carryingtrade by embargo.34 The peculiarly Spanish inclination towards a systematic use of embargoes had, in fact, been generallyapparentboth in Spain and Flanders since Philip the sporadic attempts at such action in the years I598-I607.
Pecki*s(The Hague, I62I ghedaenvandenAmbassadeur Anon., Propositie Knuttel 3I87); anon., Aen-merskingeop de propositievanden Ambassadeur Peckfus (Amsterdam, I62I; Knuttel 3I96), P. 8, states that Peckius had demandedthat: "We should recognizethe king of Spain as our lord and submit vandenverreourselves to the Spanish yoke"- see also anon., Den Compaignon (The Hague, I62I; Knuttel 3204), fo. 2v. siendenWaerschovwer fos. 30Den Compaignon, 3-4. der 31Ibid., fo. 3 anon., Resolutieby de heerenRaeden ende Vroetschappen (Haarlem, I630; Knuttel 4009), p. 8- F. Snapper Stadt Aherlem[sic]ghenomen (Amsterdam op Oorlogsinsloeden de overzeesehandel van Hollarzd,I55I-I7I9 I959), PP. 63, 65-6. 32 Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fos. 37-9. Villa, Ambrosio Spinola,pp. 387-9. 38 Rodr?guez of 34 Recommendations Hurtuno de Urivar,3 Peb. I6I8: A.G.S. Est. 2847.
nD

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III's embargoes undoubtedly had made some impact.36 It was an appealingargumentthat much greatersuccess could be achieved simply by maintainiIlg embargoes the longerand with more determinationthan before. Thus, embargohad a centralplace in all Spanish strategicthinking of the period. The strategy actually decidedon in the firstinstancewas that favoured most oicials, a by limitedland warcombined with economic pressure. The expiry of the truce in April I62I was followednot by any immediateoutbreakof hostilities,but by months of generaluncertainty both in the Low Countries the peninsula, whichthe and to deathof PhilipIII a few daysbeforethe expiryaddedconsiderably.36 However, thosein the know,the situation the springandsummer to in of I62I was muchless unclear than it was generally, sincetherewas no sign of any shiftin previously statedpositionsat eitherMadridor The Hague,and the young king, Philip IV, was clearlyresolvedto follow the path indicatedby his father. The inactionof the army of Flanders in fact due to its lackof preparedness especially was and its lackof cash.37 Onlyin the economic spheredidthe conflict begin in earnestin April I62I. Dutch vessels were orderedout of all portsof the empirein Europe NorthAfrica everything and and owned or manufactured subjectsof the republicwasplacedundera total by embargo. A massive exodustookplacefromFlanders, pexiinsula the and southernItaly. At San Sebastian entireDutch contingent the left port on the day of the expiry,38 while on the Spanisheast coast the viceroyof Valenciawithin five days expelled4I Dutch vessels including II from the salt pans of La Mata alone.39 Eventually, however, the land war began also. Spinola, commanderof the Flandersarmy, first of all moved against Dutch-occupiedJulich whichfell aftersevenmonthsof siege in February I622; duringthe summerof I622 he invaded Dutch Brabant capturing Steenbergen and laying siege to Bergen-op-Zoom.This siege, though not discussed by Alcala-Zamora, in fact a majorturning-point the was of war. It was not merelyunsuccessful rathera ruinousfailurein but whichSpinoIa's strike-force I 8,ooomenmeltedawaythrough of death and desertionto 7,ooo in only a few months.40 Not surprisingly,
H. Kernkamp,De handel denvijand I572-I609, 2 vols. (Utrecht, op ii, pp. 227-8, 252, 260, 27I; E. Sluiter, "Dutch-SpanishRivalryin the CaribbeanArea, I594-I609", Hispanic Amer. Hist.Rev.,xxviii(I948), pp. I70,
3S J. I93I-4),

Philip IV, 26 July I62I: Correspodance la courdnEspzne, de ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, doc. 73; Poelhekke, 'T Uytgaen denTreves, van A.G.S. Guerra 873. de Aragbn, Archivo de la Coronade Aragdn,Barcelona(hereafterA.C.A. C.A.), 684 86/2. 40 Consulta, 0Ct. I622, fo. 3- A.G.S. Est. 2036. 27
39viceroy Consejo

I 76-7. 36 Isabella to

pp. I-3. 37 Consultas, asld 30 July I62I: A.G.S. Est. 2035. I7 38 Martin de Amezquita to Philip IV, I4 Apr. I62I: of Valencia to Philip IV, I8 Apr. I62I:

I SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 6I8-I648

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shockin Madridand indeedprothe setbackcauseda considerable reaction againstthe wholeconceptof usingthe army vokeda marked on to put pressure the republic.ol Spanishministers,with Olivares increasinglyprominentamong them,42 concluded that besieging )utch towns was nothing but a waste of men and money. The that in Flandersin I622 it had spent to Councilof State reckoned no purposesome 3,700,000 ducats from the Spanish and Italian revenues.43 The decisionto dispenseentirelywith the army as a means of putting pressureon the Dutch, though not finallytaken until after I623, was certainlyin the making. In DecemberI623 on Brusselswas instructedto reducethe monthlyexpenditure the navalspending armyfrom300,000to 250,000ducatsandto increase in Flanders from20,000 to 70,000ducatsa month.44 of The Bredacampaign I624-S,the most famousSpanishsuccess greatestpaintfor of the warand the inspiration one of Velazquez's ings, was begun on Spinola'sown initiative,possiblyto redeemhis reputation,but in any case to the utter dismay,when they learnt was in the news,of PhilipIV'sministers Madrid.45 Breda evenbetter and it was consideredin Madrid fortifiedthan Bergen-op-Zoom that, even if Bredafell, the siege wouldserveonly to decimateonce againboth the armyand the king'scoffers. Indeed,even Spinola's impactof its capture triumph,the takingof Bredaandthe enormous in the capitalsof Europe,failedto weakenin the leastthe conviction now deeply entrenchedin Spain that besiegingDutch towas was and only to "littlefruitand completely pointless,leadinginevitably as discussion to whether muchcost".46 Therewassomehalf-hearted Dutch territorycould be usefullyinvadedwithoutbesiegingtowns, but from this nothingemerged. After the fall of Breda,Isabella, was Philip'saunt and the governessof the SouthernNetherlands, instructed keepthe armystrictlyon the defensive.47 Duringthe to period I625-35 the armyof Flandersremainedunder these orders intendedto and, apartfromthe briefinvasionof I629 to Amersfoort forcethe liftingof the siegeof Den Boschby the Dutch,foughtonly guerradefensiva. The Bredacampaign,then, led to what by any land situation. A predominantly power, standard an extraordinary is much weakerthan its opponentat sea, having won a resounding victoryon land, resolvedto dispensewith its land forcesand defeat alone. its enemyby economicpressure
41 Consultas, OCt. I622, and r6 Sept.and26 Oct. I623: A.G.S.Est.2037. 23 42 Consultas, and24 JuneI623: A.G.S.Est. 2037. I4 43 Consulta, Apr. I623:A.G.S.Est. 2037. I4 to IV, 4 Jan.I624: A.G.S.Est.2038;Isabella PhilipIV, 44 LaCueva Philip to 7 Jan.I624: A.G.S.Est. 2038. 45 Consultas, Sept.and5 Dec. I624: A.G.S.Est. 2038. I8 46 Consultas, Mar.,29 Juneand28 Sept. I625:A.G.S.ESt. 2039. II Spinola,pp. 4to, 446-7; Alcala-Zamora, 47 RodriguezVilla, Ambrosio y Espana, Flandes el MardelNorte,p. 2IO.

measure of naval This economic pressure certainly included a possessed in I62I substantial naval forces at Cadiz, Spain warfare. I62I, new armadas on Lisbon, the Basque coust and elsewhere and, in Galicia and at Gibraltar. However, established in Flanders and were challenge the forces were not used, at any rate before I639, to these Spanish and Portunavy as such. Their role was to protect Dutch and to disrupt Dutch traEc, especially the Atlantic guese regards the latter, especially high hopes shipping. As commercial the Gibraltar of placed on the armada Flanders and, initially, on were was spent in the early on squadron, which some I50,000 ducats yearly in the event posed I620S.48But the squadronand straits of Gibraltar hindranceto the Dutch Mediterraneantrade less a much considerable Dutch vessels Spanish ministers had hoped. Although some than colleges countered the lost at Gibraltar)the Dutch admiralty were armed convoys, into by threat forming the straetvaert large, heavily fifty vessels carrying some seven hundred guns) of usually over to tackle.49 that were too strong for the Gibraltarsquadron convoys convoy system was a major nuisance this, the Mediterranean Despite considerably to the andexpense for Dutch merchants and added only the on strain the resources of the Dtltch navy. Nevertheless, to the Dutch at sea. of armada Flanders caused heavy losses I622 there were of At first, the armada Flanders grew slowly. In (king's ships), though these captured a only four coningsschepen of salt and wine dozenDutch vessels in that same year, mostly carriers capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, howfromwestern France.50 After the new momentum.5 ever,the build-up in the Flemish ports acquired a number of privateersand were twelve coningsschepen, ByI625 there although expansion plansfor acquiring up to fifty royal vessels and, of I629 in Flanders, there were, ceased with the financial collapse in Philip's throughouttheI630S and I640S, some twentylargewarships authoritiescould northernarmada.To this force the Dutch admiralty costly convoy into a find no answer. Having formed the straetvaerl by I625 forced to use convoys on every route system, the Dutch were well as to London, to the Danish Sound, Norway and Muscovy, as Newcastle)) St. Malo, Nantes, Yarmouth, C'Scotland" (usually

44

AND PAST PRESENT

76 NUMBER

flotas,

26 Dec. I62I: A.G.S. Est. 23I0; La Cueva to Philip IV, 22 Sept. anddel estrecho,2 Feb. I623: A.G.S. comnranderof the armada Philip IV to Guerra 888. verzameling Bisdom, Algemeen 49 Records of the Admiralty Colleges, ii, pp. 89, I64, 49I. The Hague (hereafterA.R.A. Bis.), vol. 48carrieda total of 720 Rijksarchief, of straetvaerders the convoy of May I622 The fifty-one guns) an immense armamentfor the time. armada",8 Oct. I622: A.G.S. Est. el 50 "Relacionde las pressas q ha hecho 23I2. A.R.A. Bis 54, fo. 305; 61A.R.A. Bis. 52, fo. I06; A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. I40; A.R.A. Bis. 55, fo. 63V.
48

I SPAIN AND THE NETHERI.ANDS 6 I 8- I 648

45

Bordeaux and Bayonne.a2 However, it was simply not possible to convey all Dutch sea-borne trade by convoys and, in any case, the was armada too powerful for any but the strongest escort squadrons. bases, Ostend, Immense effort was put into blockading the srmada's Nieuwpoort and Dunkirk, with usually thirty and often more Dutch warshipspatrollingthe Flemish coast, but it was impossible, given the conditions of the time (especially after storms and during the long winter nights), to make the blockade fillly effective.53 The armada consequently carried out some extremely punishing sweeps,54 the first in November I625 when several dozen Dutch vessels were seized together with and sunk. From Januaryto March I627 the armada, the privateers, took 38 Dutch and English vessels and sank a further sank 3 vessels and In the first two months of I628 the armada I8. captured 36 Dutch and English prizes, valued at 400,000 ducats-or more than the entire cost of maintaining the army of Flanders for a took period of six weeks. In the winter of I636-7 the coningsschepen 35 prizes alld in I642, among numerous others, captured a convoy of g returning from Archangel with furs and caviare worth I30,000 ducats. In view of such losses it is not surprising that, as Spanish oicials noted with satisfaction,freight and insurancerates in Holland were forced up drastically.55 Between I625 (when it was already much higher than in I62I) and I645n the cost of shipping timber from Norway to Holland increased by over 50 per cent and at times by nearly I00 per cent. The benefit of this sharp rise in Dutch costs was of course mainly enjoyed by Holland's competitors. The armadaof Flanders, besides disrupting Dutcll merchant shipping, was also employed against another major pillar of Dutch prosperity the North Ses fisheries. It had long been a Spanish aim to attackthe famous herringfishery, which was thought to account for some three-fifths of the total Dutch fish revenues, earning over 600,000 ducats yearly.58 Some herring-busses were sunk as early as
s2 Papers of the Dutch Admiralty Colleges (hereafterA.R.A. adm.) 2456, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 2I Feb., 29 June, II July and 3 0Ct. I626- the Bordeaux and convoyssometimestook the Calaisvaerders otherswith them- at other times separateconvoyswere organizedfor Calais,Rouen, St. Malo and Nantes. A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 7I-2; A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. 33. 63 A.R.A. Bis. 5I) fos. I8-I9; The blockadeforce was strengthenedand its officialfire-powerraisedfrom over 600 tO over 700 gUIlS in I627: A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 305v-307. 54 Alcala-Zamora,op. cit.t p. 205- La Cueva to Philip IV 23 Apr. I627: A.G.S. Est. 23I8- Isabella to Philip IV, II Mar. I628: A.G.S. Est. 232INederder of E. Stols, De SpaanseBrabanders de handelsbetrekkingen zuideliyke (Brussels, I97I), pp. I72-6. zoereld landenmet de Iberische 55 La Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Ntar. I628: A.G.S. Est. 232I * J. Schreiner,"Die Niederlander und die norwegische Holzausfuhr im I7. Jahrhundert", Tiid. Gesch. xlix ( I934), p. 324. 2nd ser., Nonciature de Flandre, vi (rg38), 68 inalecta Vaticano-Belgica, gericht tegen visscherij pp. 658-9; P. J. Blok, "Een merkwaardigaan^ralspl2n en handel der vereenigde Nederlanden in de eerste helft der I7de eeuw" xix genootschap, (I898), pp. 8-9. van en B2ydragen mededelingen het historisch

46

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

I622 but the real pressure beganin OctoberI625 when the armada caughtthe SouthHollanddivisionof the herring fleetoff the Scottish coast, destroying80 busses accordingto Spanishsources and 60 according reports to fromNewcastle.57 The StatesGeneral assigned as many warshipsas was feasibleto the protectionof the fisheries (I9 in I626) but the overburdened admiralty colleges,hampered a by constant shortage cash,couldnot cope.58 Evenwhennavalescorts of wereup to strength, whichwasrare,it wasdifficult shieldtheherring to fleetsfromattackbecausethe size and complexity theirnets comof pelledthe bussesto spreadovera widearea. In I626 thereweremore losses,whilein October I627 the Dunkirkers crushed ofthe naval part escort and capturedand sank many dozens of herring-busses.59 Anotherheavy attackoccurredin I632, while in August I635 the armada ravaged ZuiderZee divisionof the groote the visscherij its on way to the fishinggrounds,capturing herring-men sinking 906 and 89 herring-busses, accordingto Spanish sources, and over I00, according the town of Enkhuizen, to which tookthe heaviestloss.60 In I637 well over one hundredmorebusseswere destroyed; in and I639,61and again in I642, when Zierikzeealone lost I8 herringbusses,there was furtherconsiderable damage.62 Someidea of the scaleof lossesto the Dutch herringtownsis given by the reportsof the States of Holland to the States Generalon the situation at Maassluis, leadingherring the portof the SouthHolland areasupplying the Rotterdam market.63 The SouthHollandfleetsformedone of the threemaingroupsof fleets,those of Zeeland,South Holland and the Zuider Zee constitutingthe Dutch herringfishery. The three were of roughlyequalsize thoughthe Zeelandfleetsformeda slightly smallerentity than the other two.64 From I63I to I634 Maassluis, besideslosing25 non-herring fishingcraft,lost I62 busses with theirnets, affecting nearlytwo thousand fishermen; allother50 were lost in the years I635-7 when Enkhuizen, fact, took much in heavierlosses. Herring-busses, sizeablecraftwith an averagecrew size of ten, though often mannedby as manyas sixteen men, were 67 Consulta, Nov. I625: A.G.S. Est. 2039; A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 260V,27I, 25 277; Calendar State Papers: Venetian,I625-6, p. 2I3. of 58 A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. I30, I39, I63V, I65-659 Consulta, 0Ct. I627: A.G.S. Est. 204I. 8 60 A.R.A. adm. 2458, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 29 July I632; A.R.A. Bis. 62, fo. I9I; Memorialhistorico espanol,49 vols. (Madrid, I85I-I948), Xiii, pp. 247-8, 272, 308; Calendarof State Papers: Venetian,I632-6, pp. 44-5. 61 Memorial histbrico espanol) xiv, pp. 20I-2.

62 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Historieof verhaelvan saken van staer en corlogh in, ende ontrerzt Vereenigde de Nederlanden,I4 vols. (The Hague, I667-7r), v,

pp. 360-I. 63 A.R.A. Bis. 62, fo. 59; Aitzema,?. Cit., Vi, p. 624. 64 The naval escort for the Zeeland fleets was Sed

in ratio of 5:7 or in some years, of 4:6 as againstboth the South Holland and Zuider Zee divisions: A.R.A. Bis. 50, fo. 60, and A.R.A. Bis. 52, fo. 72.

I6I8-I648 SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS

47

as officially reckoned beingworthovers,ooo guilderseach,so that in lost periodMaassluis one millionguildersworth of this seven-year herring gear, the equivalentof 3so,ooo Spanish ducats. If one counts this as half the damagesufferedby one-thirdof the total pressure abouthalfof the periodof heavySpanish herring fleetduring withoutcounting estimate),the total damage, (surelya conservative may loss of herringsales or ransomspaid for capturedfishermen, well have been in excess of twelve million guilders. Nevertheless, despite the extent of this destruction,Spanishnaval activity has scarcelyfigured in recent accountsof the herringfishery in the though it has been suggested,contraryto seventeenthcentury,65 fleetswerein fact believed,thatthe herring whatwasonce commonly in declinewell beforethe firstAnglo-Dutchwar of I652-4. It has been noticedthat certainherringfleets, notablythose of Schiedam and Delftshaven,both belongingto the South Hollanddivision,66 in contracted markedly the first half of the century. What should at however, thatthe declineat Schiedam least, is be notedin addition, of froman average 49 bussesin the decadeI6I6-25 to only 23 in the decadeI626-35 (a loss of morethan half) is very abrupt,suggesting processbut a sharpsetbackin the I620S and I630S not a gradual caused, surely, by Spanish naval action. Certaialyother factors to to can besidesthe Dullkirkers be pointed as contributing the herring herringsales, damaged recession these years. The riverblockade in increase contributed the sharp to whilethe saltshortage atleastbriefly, possibly,to the slight in herringpricesin Hollandafter I62767 andZ to 68 in of shrinking the proportion herring Dutchexports the Baltic. in of werealsoconsequences Spanishactionsand But these phenomena and, to that the ones designedto complement activityof the armada that there is a the extent, they wouldtend to strengthen argument directlink between Spanishpressureand the declineof the Dutch herringfishery. Yet the armadaof Flanders,for all its undoubtedeXectiveness, to alternative the armyof shouldnot be seen as beingin itself Spain's the meansof attacking Dutch. WhenPhilip Flanders the principal as
65 hanenburg does not mention the Spanishcampaip md nor does vm der though it is mentioned in some 57oude in his study of the Noorderkwartier, older works such as that of de Jonge: H. A. Kranenburg,De zeevisscherij der (Amsterdam,I946)* A. M. van der Woude san Hollandin de tWid Republiek 2 Het Noorderkwartier, vols. (A. A. G. Biidragen, xvi, Wageningen, I972); zeewesen,5 vols. (Haarlem van J. C. de Jonge, Geschiedenis het Nederlandsche

H. Watien, "Zur Statistik der ?. cit., pp. 33-4, 2I7-I8; hollandischen Heringfischereiim I7. und I8. Jahrhundert",HansischeGeschichtsblatter, ( I 9 I 0), p. I 59 . xvi 2 Nederlaische pnisgeschiedenis, vols. (Leiden) I94367 N. W. Posthus, 64), i, p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 658. (Copegen md 68 A. Christensen, Dutch Trade to the Baltic Jout I600 ii, The Hague, I94I), diagram20; VaIl der Toude, Noorderkwartier, p. 406.

I858-62), i, pp. 66 Kenbsg,

235-6,

262.

48

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

IV's ministersstated,as did the duquedel Infantado July I622, in that the "greatesthostility that can be shown to the Dutch is to deprivethem absolutely totallyof their commerce, and increasethe armada Flanders arrange of and mattersat the Straits[of Gibraltar] so that they enter and lealre[the Mediterranean] difficulty",t;9 with what they meant was that naval action was to be part of a wider programme which the embargoes in were to be the main element. Alcala-Zamora, though he misses severalof the main points concerningthe Dunkirkers their effect,nevertheless and maintains that the navaloffensivewas the principalSpanishweaponand dismisses the embargoes, whichhe sayslittle,as unworkable, on ineffective and of only marginal importance.70In fact, however,Spainkept within fairlymodestlimitsin taking offensive sea. Annual the at expenditure on the armada Flandersnever exceeded600,000 ducatsand was of usuallymorein the regionof 400,000 ducatsor less - about oneeighthofthe spending the army. Arguably, newcommercial on 71 the system was considerably costlier,requireda greateradministrative effort and had a far heavier impact on the Dutch and Iberian
economies.

The departure severalhundredDutch vesselsfromPhilip IV's of European dominions AprilI62I, thoughit severely in joltedEuropc's commercial structure, was only a firststep in the layingof the embargoes. Dutchflagsandpassports wereno longerseenin the peninsula, but Dutch merchants svereable,at first,to continuetheirtrade thereby variousmeans. Dutch cargoesweretransported neutral in shipping, especially English and Hanseatic,2 while some Dutch 7 vesselscontinued visit Spanish-controlled underthe pretence to ports of beingneutrals. Evenso, the setback considerable. Manyof was the eight to nine hundredDutch vesselswhichhad tradedannually with the Spanish territories duringthe last yearsof the truce73 could no longerbe used, causinga seriousslumpin shippingin Holland.74 69 Consulta,6 July I622, fo. IX': A.G.S. Est.2036.
71

? Alcala-Zanqora, Espana,Flandesy el Mar del Norte, pp. I82-4. "Relacionde lo q SMd ha menester . . ." gives 600,000 ducatsfor the peak year I626: A.G.S. Hacienda 62I; the consultaof 8 Dec. I630 gives under 300,000 ducats for I63I: A.G.S. Est. 2I48; and the "Relacionde la provission . . " gives 349,800 for I644: A.G.S. Est. 2062. 72 H. Taylor, "Trade, Neu rality and the 'English Road', r630-48", Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., xxv (I972), pp. 236-60; H. Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte im Hamburger Porougalund Spanienkandel, IS90-I625 (Hainburg,I954), p. 63. 7S Francisco de Retama, in his "Conssideraciones . .", fo. 4, estimates 82I . vesseIs yearly: A.G.S. Est. 2847; Alcala-Zamora, what is presumablya misin print, gives the figure of 8,ooo: Alcala-Zamora, Cit., p. I79. Op. 74 La Cueva to Philip IV, I7 OCt. I62I: A.G.S. Est. 23IO; La Cueva to Philip IV, II Mar. I622: A.G.S. Fst. 23II. That there was a shipping slump in Holland in or around I62I iS not in dispute, however, the phenomenonis usually explained without any reference to Spain. See Christensen, Dutch Tradeto the Baltic, p. 88; M. Bogucka,"Amsterdamand the Baltic in the First Half oi the Seventeenth Century", Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., xxvi (I973), pp. 437-8-

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 6 I 8- I 648 I

49

Moreover Dutchshipsstilltrading withthe peninsula afterAprilI62I had to sail mainly with foreign crews, which forced thousandsof I)utch seamenout of the carrying trade,thoughthere was now the alternative an expanding of navy and the newly-founded West India Company. The carryingof salt from Portugal,in which a high proportion the Dutchshipsvisitingthe peninsula beeninvolved of had was continued,though sporadically, with French and particularly Scottishcrews as the States Generalexplained the Moroccan to sultan,baffled to whynumerous as Scotssailorsweresuddenly falling into the hands of his captainsoff Portugaland why The Hague desiredhim to treatthese Scotsmenas he wouldDutchmen.75 Yet despitethe earlyimpactof the embargoes, ministers Madrid, in aware that the Dutch could not easilybe forcedto give in and confronted daily by evidenceof loopholes,were at first highly dissatisfied with the working theirmeasures. of Little by little the embargoes were extendedand refined. Local authorities the portswereinstructed insistthat neutralshippers in to to the peninsulabring certificates from their ports of embarkation, signedby magistrates statingthat cargoeshad not originated and in the republic werenot ownedby Dutch subjects.7(;Shipsowned and by neutrals builtin Hollandafterthe expiryof the trucewerealso but placedunderembargo. Appealsfromthe royalCouncilof Finance, disturbedby the shortageof copper after I62I,77 and from the authorities concernedwith organizing Americantrade in Seville,78 hampered the growingshortage navalstores,that Dutch ships by of be allowedwith Germancrewsto bringat least some supplies,were repeatedly rejected: wasmadeclearin the Councilof Statethatthe it exclusionof the Dutch was to take priorityover every other considerationno matter how vital. Early in I622 the corregidores (districtoicers) of the Castilian ports,undernew instructions, began inspecting neutral shipping moremethodically previously the than and firstEnglish Hanseatic and shipswereseizedforcarrying Dutchgoods. 79 In Galicia similar boarding new procedures wereintroduced I623-4 in by the captain-general, marquesde Cerralvo.80Nevertheless the evidencecontinuedto accumulate local officialswere often less that than zealous in imposing the embargoesand that the system of
75 States General to Moulay Sidan, The Hague, 20 Jan. I623: Les sotlrces i?ledtesde l'histoiredu Maroc, ed. Castries, 2nd ser., Archiveser bibliotheques des Pays-Bas, i:,pp. 26I-2. 76 Consulta, 27 Nov. I62I: A.G.S. Est. 2645. 77 Consulu, 7 July and 3 Nov. I62I: A.G.S. Est. 2645. 78AntonioDomirlguezOrtis, 'sGuerraeconomicaycomercioextranjeroenel reinadode Felipe IV", Hispania,xxiii (I963), p. 73. 79 Corregidor Guipuzcoa to Philip IV, I May I622: A.G.S. Est. 2847. of 80 Cerralvo to Philip IV, Corunna, 26 May I623: A.G.S. Guerra 898 Cerralvoto Philip IV, Ig Feb. I624: A.G.S. GuerragoI.

so

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER 76

certificates as yet veryimperfect.8l A caseparticularly was notedin Madridwas that of a New Christianof Lisbon, Jorge Rodriguez, who had been arrestedfor infringingthe embargoes in whose and possession a letterfroma Jewishmerchant Hamburg, was of Duarte Estevesde Pina, revealingthat the senateof Hamburgwas openly providingmerchantswith false certificates assertirlg that they had sworn before magistrates that they were complyingwith the embargoes, whenin factno suchoathswereactualizr taken. In October I623 tlle crown,using specialcommissioners, simultaneously into put effect an embargo generalin Andalllsiaand Portugal,seizing I60 neutralandostensibly neutral vessels,including (thelargest 44 group) in San Lucarand 33 in Cadiz.82 Tradewas broughtto a standstill formonthsandtherewasa stormQfprotest froinforeign ambassadors, but the exceptionally thorough search tookplaceled to numerous that foreignmerchants suSering finesandconfiscations actingas interfor mediaries the Dutchandthe arrest several for of secretcorrespondents of Dutch merchants who had been operatingalongthe coast from Malaga Lisbon. to Suchfindingsmadeit clearthat therewas a limit to how far commercialregulation could be tightenedwhile employitlg existing the administrative machinery.83If more was to be achieved,new and moreefficient institutions wereneeded. Already DecemberI622 in PhilipIV had set up a new centraleconcomic committee, junta de the comercio, to adviseon virtually everyaspectof Iberianeconomiclife, but with the specific purposeof finding means of renderingthe measuresagainstthe Dutch more effective.84Also in I622 it was decidedthat implementation the embargoes of could no longer be entrusted the ordlnary to localadministration, particularly in the not mostvital areas,Andalusia Portugal, planswereaccordingly and and drawnup for establishing more specializedand readilydisciplined oflicers. Commissionero commercewere appointedin Sevilie, of San Lucar,Lisbon, Oporto,Bilb<so other portsand also in the and Canaries the Azoreswherethe I)utch had begunto go for many and of the products theycouldno longerobtainin the peninsula.8 Then in OctoberI624, in a crucialstep towardsa reformedcommercial adrninistration, Philip IV set up the almirantazgo los paises de seote?lrionales, basecl Seville,to supersede in completely previous the
81 Fernando Alvia de Castro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 8 and I9 Oct. I622: A.G.S. Est. 2847; Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte, 26. p. 82 Instructions to Pedro de Arze: A.G.S. Contaduria Mayor de Cuentas (hereafterA.G.S. C.M.C.) 2267 expediente I0- papersrelating to the embargo generalin San Lucar: A.G.S. C.M.C. I437* Pedro de Arze to Philip IV, Cadiz I8 Feb. I624: A.G.S. Guerra 895; AKellenbenz, cit., p. 26. op. 83 Conszxltas) July, 28 Sept. and 8 Oct. I622: A.G.S. Est. 2036. 6 84 Philip IV to Montesclaros,I Dec. I622: A.G.S. Est. 2847. 85 "Los comissarios q su Md ha nombrado para lo del comercio": A.G.S. Est. 2847.

I6I SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 8-I648

5I

and for arrangements the controlof tradebetweenAndalusia northern heavily was Europe.86 Partly,the almirantazgo intendedto organize but armedconv3yssailingbetweenSan Lucarand Dunkirk, in this it was was not very successful. Its majorimportance as an extremely which by I626 was staffedby sixty formidablecustomsapparatus ports. In I625 an regularofficersoperatingin all the Andalusian in was almirantazgo also established Flanders,basedat St. Winokswith with the purposeof actingin conjunction bergennearDunkirk, and the body at Seville.87 In the SouthernNetherlands eventually using a system of also in the Hanseatictowns the almirantazgoz, more permanentresidents,were able to develop a considerably sophisticatedframeworkof proceduresand certificatesthan had previouslyexisted. In addition,to handlethe many cases arising dispatch,the with reasonable of from infrillgements the embargoes courts of suchcasesfromthe jurisdiction the ordinary crownremoved casesat the head for structure commelcial andset up a specialjudicial formedin I625 del mayor almirantazgo of whichit placedthe tribunal at Madrid. the Clearly impactof the new methodswas considerable. If the proeffect,the new boarding had only a temporary general embargo courts transformed and cedures,the almirantazgos the commercial of conditionsin Spain'sports for gcod. The city administrations that Seville, San Lucar,Malagaand elsewhereprotestedrepeatedly but their trade was being ruined,88 the crownremainedunmoved. to preferred sufferloss of tradeand commercial PhilipIV's ministers revenuesif in so doingthey could injurethe Dutch. The pressure that: was unremitting. One Spanishwriterdeclared
all with the almirantazgo the tradeof the entireworld passed to Holland and armed with the decrees againstcontraAmsterdam. . . for the almirantazgo, band, especiallythat of I5 October I625, closed the door to all commerce,of friends and enemies alike, with their certificates,inspections,condemnations and confiscationssuch that within a short time, Spain was without trade ships, supplies or foodstuffs, customs revenues fell and the produce of the country was without means of exit.89

And indeed, the evidence for the contractionof those sectors of until in conlmerce whichthe Dutchhadpredominated I62I, Castilian while the share of neutralssharplyincreased,is generallyso subto the has stantialthat the historian eitherto attribute phenomenon the problemsof supplyaXecting Dutch alone, of which there is no the or indication, accept that in largemeasure Dutchwereshutout of
A.G.S. Est. 2847; Dominguez Ortiz, "Guerra I624: 4 86 Royal cddulan OCt. econdmicay comercio extranjero",pp. 78-9. 87 Ibid. p. 79.
88Consultade parte, II Aug. I627: A.G.S. Est. 4I26* consultaof the junta 30 de comercio, Jan. I626 and 28 Sept. I627: A.G.S. Est. 2645 Seville to Philip IV, 7 Sept. I627: A.G.S. Est. 2646. 89"Cavsaspor donde crecio el comercio de Olanday se hizo vn monopolio vniuersal":Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4005, fO. 27.

52

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

Castileby Spanishaction. The export of Andalusian salt, which had been carriedonly by the Dutch, dwindledin the four years I62I-5 to virtually nothing.90 Indications a chronicshortageof of copper,timberand othernavalstoresfirom I62I areso frequent that it can scarcely doubtedthatthe supplyof thesematerials Spain be to was interrupted. In exportingto and carryingfrom Bilbao, Santanderand San Sebastian, English, Frenchand other neutrals the took a dramatically increased shareof the tradefrom I62I while at the sametime the totalvalueof tradeto the northCastilian portswas almostexactlyI0 per,cent lowerin the yearsI62I-4 thanit had been in I6I7-20 and,afterI625, muchmorethanI0 percentlower.9l The conclusionmust surelybe that the Dutch carrying trade to Castile largelycollapsed. In easternSpain,as in Castile,economic warfare against Dutch the was wagedwith considerable determination. The crownhad three initial aims in the east of the pellinsula:92 halt the supplyingof to Valencia,Barcelona Alicanteby the Dutch with the grainand and fish wllichtraditionally beenimported had therein massisJe quantity, to deny the Dutch the use of the salt pans,,especiallythose of La MataandIbiza,andto prevent entryof Dutchgoodsinto Castile the from the neighbouring French port of Bayonnevia Navarreand Aragon. In I623 a fourthaim was addedwhen, prompt:ed the by juntade comercio, crownsoughtto excludespicesfromthe Dutch the EastIndies,previously major a importatAlicante, decreeing in by that future, whatevermerchantsand ships brought the spices, only Portuguese spicesregistered Lisboncould be admstted.93These in aims, despitesome evasionfacilitated the greatstrengthof loca1 by institutions the easternviceroyalties, in wereon the wholeachieved. As in Castile boarding inspection new and procedures introduced were at the portsandtradecontracted, with sharpfallsbothin the importing of foodstuSsand tlle exportof localwines,soapand fruit.94 At a timewhensaltwasshortin muchof Europe, saltpansof Valencia the and Ibiza fell almostinto disuseowingto the effortsof the viceroys of Valencia and Mallorcato drive the Dutch were
away.98 Spices

Consulta,8 Mar. I626: A.G.S. Hacienda62I. 91 "Diezmos del marde Castilla"gives the yearlyrevenuetotalsfor the -arious north coast ports for I6I7-28: A.G.S. C.M.C. I950 expediente I. 92 "Para la prohibicion del comercio de los rebeldes", sections on Araaon Cataloniaand Valencia:A.G.S. Est. 2847. ss Protestofthe arrendador ofthe aduanaof Alicante:A.C.A. C.A. 603 I21X6"Discurso sobre la prohibicionde la entradade pimientade la India orientalen Alicante": A.C.A. C.A. 603 I2128. 94 Consulta,I2 Sept. I630: A.G.S. Est. 2648- "Diputats del gnl del reyno de Valencia",24 Jan. I629: A.C.A. C.A. 576. 95 Viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, II Feb. I623: A.C.A. C.A. 603 doc. 5. Pedro Martinez de Vera stated that no salt was extracted from La Mata in I622 owing to thc "wars of Flanders": Pedro Martinez de Vera to Nicolas Mensa, g Mar. r623: A.C.A. C.A. 603 doc. 6.
90

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS I6I8-I648

53

checked systematically for Lisbon seals, much to the distress of the city council of Alicante.96 The loophole through Navarre proved extremely diEcult to close and the cortes at Pamplona fought its hardest to resist the jurisdiction of the tribunal mayor almirantazgo del in Navarre; but it indicates the extent of royal determinationthat the question of Castilian procedures and jurisdiction in checking trade became the foremost coIlstitutionalissue in Navarre and remained so throughout the I620S. More important than the campaign in eastern Spain, however, though likewise unmentioned by Alcali-Zamora, was the campaign iI1 Portubal. The Portuguese ports were a major market for naval stores and one ofthe largest for Baltic grain, as well as being an important source of supply for sugar and other Brazilian products, and wines, olixJe and fruit; moreover, at Setubal lay the richest salt oil pans in all Europe. Portuguese trade was in fact of fundamental importancein the overallstructureof Dutch Europeancommercesince much of the Dutch Baltic trade depended directly on it;97 and Portugal,in the sphere of Europeantrade, was in fact Philip IV's most vital possession after Andalusia. Consequently,throughout the period from I62I until the Portuguese secession in I640, the regulation of Portuguese commerce was a major preoccupation in Madrid. The decision to circumvent the local Portuguese administration, which in Spain was regarded as being particularly unreliable, was put into effect even before tlleLt relating to Andalusia. Despite the fact that since annexation in IS80 Madrid had been wary of antagonizing Portuguese feeling and had mostly left Portugal'sadministrationas it was, from I623 the crown did not hesitate to use Castilianofficersto impose the embargoes and placed them under the jurisdictionnot of the Council of Portugal but of the Council of War, staffed mainly by Castilian noblemen. Considerabletension developed between Portuguese and Castilian officers in Portugal, and also between the two councils in Madrid,98but there was no relaxation of the pressure. Diego Lopez de Haro, who directed the operation in the LisbonSetubal area, introduced the new boarding procedures and, by May 623, reported to Madrid that the Dutch had given up Lisbon and -ere being driven from Setubal.99 One vessel manned by Scots cscaped from Setubal only by threatening Lopez de Haro and his
96 Alicante to Philip IV, I4 Mar. I624: A.C.A. C.A. 603 I2j3; viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, I5 Jan. I624: A.C.A. C.A. 603 I21I4. On Ibiza, see the consulta of 8 Aug. I63I: A.G.S. Guerra I030. 97 13ogucka, "Amsterdamand the Baltic", pp. 437-8. 98 Lopez de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, I2 Aug. and 23 Sept. I623: A.G.S. Guerra 898; consalta of the Council of Portugal, 2 Sept. I624: Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.II3I; and Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.II35, fo. IggV. 99 L6pez de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 7 Jan. I623: A.G.S. Guerra 89sL6pez de Haro to Philip IV, 5 Feb. I623: A.G.S. Est. 2847 Lopez de Haro to Philip IV, IgMay I623:A.G.S. Guerrag88.

guardswith a salvoof musketfire. Subsequently commissionerswerealso usedin investigations Oporto,Castilian at Aveiro,Faroand elsewhere.l??The Lisboncity councilcomplained endlessly Castilian oicers were ruining Portugal's trade with thatthe northern Europe,l?l thesecomplaints, but thoughsupported the Councilof by Portugal, madeno headway the Councilof State,which in the Councilof War. Spanishministersdid not deny supported thatthe new procedures werecausingor contributing the economicdepression to in Portugalbut held that, if slump was the price of damaging the Dutch, then they were determinedto pay it.l02 At Lisbon and Setubalthe slumpwasto continue,despitethe granting after licences a limitednumberof Dutch shippersto takesalt, I630 of to until the revival Dutch-Portuguese in tradebegan in I64I. At Faro in the Algarve Dutch shippingalmostentirelydisappeared until I64I and, despite markedincrease neutraland especially a in Hanseatic traffic, the increasewas a mere fractionof the massiveloss caused by the absence ofthe Dutch.l03 In Italytherewasfurtherscopefor Spainin the struggle with UnitedProvinces. Italy,like Spainand economic the Portugal, since had theI590S importedvia Hollandgreatquantitiesof Balticgrainand other north European products.l04 Even in years of good harvest Dutch shippingwasusedextensively carrySiciliangrainto to and Genoaandalso in Italiancoastaltradegenerally. Italy Naples wasalso dependent Dutchshipping bringwoolandsaltfrom on to Alicante and La Mata. Generally,the lDutch-Italian trade was belieared be to balanced heavilyin favourof the Dutch, with Italy'sstock of cash being drained gradually the financing otherDutchactivities into of in the samewayas Spanish silver.l05 The embargoes AprilI62I were of imposed the Spanish in viceroyalty Naples(in areathe largeststate of in Italy), and in Sicily, Sardinisand the duchy of Milan,l06 while 100 Consulta the junta de comercio, Apr. I624: A.G.S. Est. of 28
2847; consultas, and 24 May I628: A.G.S. Est. 2646. Elementos para a hist<3ria Municipiode Lisboa,ed. E. Freire de do Oliveira 6vols.(Lisbon, I882-9I), iii, pp. I54, 4I7, 458, V. Rau, A explora,cao o comercio sal de Setubal 525, 567, axld iv, p. I45, e do (Lisbon, IgSI), pp. I66, I74. 102 Consalta of the Council of State, 27 Sept. I624: Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.I I3I, fos. 288, 290-I. loaV. Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do Lisboa durante o seculo XVII", Anais da movimento dos portos de Faro e Academiaportuguesade historia, 2nd v (I954), pp. 2I9-27. ser., lOg Watjen, Die Niederlander H. im zur Machstellurtg (Berlin, I909), pp. I22-3, Miottelmeergebiet Zeit ihrer hochsterl 393, 398-403; G. di Naipoli secoloXVII (Rome, I955), pp. 52 note, I I0, Coniglio, II viceregno en I20 note; C. Trasselli, "Sul naviglio'Nordico'in Sicilianel a Vtcens Vives,vols. (Barcelona,I965-7), ii, secolo XVII", in Homenaje 3faime 2 pp. 689-702. lob Consnlta,6 July I622, fa. 5: A.G.S. Est. 2036. See also Antonio Serra, Breve trattatodelle causechepossono abbondare far dfove non miniere(I6I3), repr. in Scrittori classicili regnid'oroe d'argento sono politica ed. Custodi, Parte antica, 7 vols. (Milan, I803-4),italiani di economia P. i. 106 Philip III to Italianviceroys, 27 Mar. I62I: A.G.S. Est. I883; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I8787, fos. 223V-4. I3 Jan. I627
101

54

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER67

SPAIN AND THE NETHEREANDS 6 I 8- I 648 I

55

Genoa,with which Spainhad close ties, and the Papacywere subjectedto heavypressure to deal with the Dutch in the matterof not grain supplies.l? The force of the Spanish measuresin Italy, though doulotless ratherless in overallimpactthan in the Iberian peninsula,was neverthelessconsiderable. rrhe llarvestof I62I-2 was bad throughoutItaly, yet the Dutch were, except for a few speciallylicetlsedcases,prevented fromcarrying suppliesto Naples, and they did not transportSiciiiangrain;Genoa,despitemaximum diplomatic effortin Madrid,couldnot obtainSpanishconsentto call in the Dutch. Moreover, viceroyof Naples who infringedthe the embargoes throughfear of the consequences food shortage the of in largest in Italy,wasrebuked the kingwithspecialseverity city by and left in no doubtthatin futurehe hadto faceriotsin thLe streetsrather thanagaincallin the Dutch.l08 The Dutchwerecertainly out of cut the carrying tradebes:ween Spainand Italy with considerable injury to many Geneese merchants who had hithertosuppliedItaly with Spanishproductsusing Dutch shipping.l?9 Of course,the republic still hadreliableentrepots Lisrorno Venice;and after I630, at at and Naples, as in Portugaland Spain, the crown began to issue grain licencesto Dutch shippersin times of food shortage. Nevertheless, it is clearthatOutchtradewith Italysuffered throughSpanish action in a variety lraysandthata substantial of number Dutch shipsand of crews,attempting tradeunderforeignflags)vere scizedin Sicily to and Naplesduxingthe courseof the war.llo In northern EuropcSpanishpowerin I62I basedprincipally on Flanders the adjoining and areasof Germany whereSpainmai1ltainedplazas fuertes (fortified strongholds). In this regioneconomic warfare againstthe reptlblin wagedin two phases,orseof which, was a totalriverand canalblockade, lastedonly the fouryearsfrom I625 tQ I629. Beforeand aftertheseyearsonly a limitedembargo in was eXectbut it rlevertheless deprivedthe Dutch of one of their best customers shipping Europe. Brhere br in Dutch shipshadformerly crowdedFlemishports)froin I62I to I646 they were almostcompletely absent and Flemish merchantsused English and Frexlch shippislg. Furtherrnore, onlydidtheydispense 111 not withthe Dutcl in thcir carrying tradebut, knowingonly too well the rigoursof the
sYvas

Phiiip IV to viceroy of Naples, 22 Jatl. I622: A.G.S. Est.I884. Viceroy of Naples to Philip IV, I7 A&z. and 2 June I622, md viceroy of Naples tO Mateo de Arostegui, 3 Mar. I622: A.G.S. Est. I884. l09Castaneda Philip IV, Genoa,22 June I624: A.G.S. Est. I936; Castaneda to to Philip IV, I Oct. I624: A.G.S. Est. 2038. t10Castanedato Philip IV, 4 Dec. I624: A.G.S. Est. I936- viceroy of Sicily to Philip IV, I4 Sept. I64I: A.G.S. Est. tS93. There were II5 Dutch sailors prisoner iIl Sicily in I629: A.R.A. Bis. 56, fo. 39. 1l1Stols, De SpaanseBrabanders, I2I-9; J. de Ssnet, "Le mouvementde pp. la navigation au port d'Ostende, I640-55", ERulletin la Commissio^z de royale d'ht3t0zre, (I930), pp. 208-I4. XCiY
107 108

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

almirantazgos, ceasedalso importingDutch cloth and manufactures via the binnenstromerl (inlandwaterways) re-export the peninfor to sula, SpanishItaly and SpanishAmerica.ll2 From I622, however, Spanish ministers Madrid in beganworking towards something rather more rigorous. One of the most vital sectorsof Dutch commerce was the export,via the inlandwaterways, immensequantitiesof of foodstuffs,materials manufactures the SpanishNetherlands, and to Liege and the Cologneregion,and the importing the sameroutes by of Rhineand Maastimber,Flemishflax and other materials. The revenues collected by Isabella from this traffic were substantial, amounting I623 to over800)000 florinsor 270,000Spanishducats, in the largestpartfromthe Maascomproirs and abotlt25 per cent from the plazas fuertes on the GermaTl rolltes,especially Rhine,Lippe the andEms;ll31lnderstandably, Philip'sauntwasreluctant relinquish to them. The pressurefrom Spain howeverwas such that in July I625ll4a full riverandcanalblockade against lDutch put into the was effect, while in Octoberthe repllblicreplied to this CCinsolent and tyrannical edict" with their own ban on inland trade,ll5 a move interpreted Brussels an attemptto avoidloss of prestige. The in as Dutchbanwassubsequently removed I627 in response domestic in to pressure. The blockade, contrary the view of Alcala-Zamora alleges to who thatit wasineffective,llshad an enormous impact. Fleetsof barges wereturnedbackat Antwerp, on the Maus,Rhine,Emsandother and Flemish and German waterways.ll7 Spanish claims that what remained Zeeland's of tradenow collapsed totally,that the common peopleof Hollandsufferedheavilyfrom the loss of outletsfor their herringand otherproduce,and that Dutch cheesepricesfell by half (not to mentionone reportthat Dutch cheese,butterandwineprices tumbledto virtuallynothing)are doubtlessratherexaggerated, but nevertheless grounded fact.ll8 Cheese butterpricesin I625-6, in and while they rose sharplyat Antwerpand Brugge,ll9in Hollandcollapsedto almosttheir lowest level of the seventeenthcentury,and
Stols, Op. Cit., p. I6I. Isabella to Philip IV, Brussels, I8 Apr. I624, and enclosed list of river revenues: A.G.S. Est. 2038. llAnon., Ordinantieons Heeren des Conincx, inhoudende verbodtvanden coophandel mettegherebelleerde provintien (Brussels,29 July I 625; Knuttel 3584); Aitzema, Van staet en oorlogh,ii, pp. 75-9. The ban was imposed on the Scheldt, Maas, Rhine, Lippe and Ems (at Lingen) axldat Groenlo (Grol). 115 Placcaet of I5 0Ct. I625: A.R.A. archive of the States General 4947 ii; A.R.A. ain. 2457, Res. Coll. Zeeland, I4 0Ct. I627. 6 Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Fla?desy el Mar del Norte, pp. I84-6, 297-9. 7 Consulta, 28 Sept. I625: A.G.S. Est. 2039. 118 La Cueva tO Philip IV, I7 Sept. and 2 0Ct. I625: A.G.S. Est. 23I5; Analecta Vaticano-Belgica, ser., vi, p. 66I. 2nd 119 Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van priJzen en lorzen Vlaanderen in e?? Brabant, xte-xviife eeuw, ed. C. Verlinden et al., 3 rols. (Brugge, I959-65), i, pp.63, 85, I04-5, II2, and iii, pp. 7I2, 720, 734-5, 739.
2 113

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 6 I 8- I 648 I

thele were sharpfalls also in wine, herringand otherfish prices.l80 At the sametime lElemish andfruitandGerman flax timberandwine wereheldbackcausing, according Spanish to sources,l2l amongother effects a rise of 30 per cent in the cost of shipbuilding timber in Holland. There was also a total ban on correspondence) which disruptedmuch of Antwerp'sinsurancebusinessin the republic. Hourever, blockadewas soon deSated by its own drasticeffect. the Foodshortage, ruinous pricerisesandmounting difficulty supplying in the Sparxish garrisons in June I62Sto the liftingof the banon the led importing butter,cheese,grainandherring.l22 In otherrespects) of however, blockade the continued. Spices,wines,sugar,cloth)bricks soapand Newcastlecoal werethe Dutch commodities most affected, whilethe banon the Rhinecontinued hamper tcs Dutchshipbuilding. The importing sugarfromHolland Antwerp, thrivingactivity of via a until I625, remainedat a mere fraction of its previouslevel.le3 Rhenishwine continuedtO be largelyabsentfrom Dutch exportsto northernEurope.l24 The river blockade,with the exceptionof a specialbanon Rhinetimber)wasfinallycalledoff, not in I630,125 but in AprilI629. The reasonwasnot thatthe blockade ineffective) was nor that it annoyedthe Germanprinces,thoughit did annoythem considerably,l26 simply that it was provi1lgtoo damagingto but Flemishcommerce, causing muchdiscontent the Southern was too in Netherlands, was depriving and Brussels sizeablefunds at a time, of duringthe MantuanSuccessioncrisis in northernItaly, when considerableSpanishresources were being divertedfrom Flandersand
1'0Posthurnus, 'ederlandsehe priisgeschiedenisn pp. 262n 47s, sco, 708-9 ii, 776) 807. 2l La Cueva to Philip IV, 2 Jan. I626: A.G.S. Est. 23I6. A.R.A. adm. 2684, Res. Coll. Zeeland3 June I 626 Relazione 20 2veneziane: Venetiaansche berichten over de Vereenigde Nederlanden I600-I795) ed. P. J. san Blok (Rijks geschieiundige publicatidn,vii, The Hague, I909) p. I90. 123 H. Pohl, "Die Zuckereinfuhr nach Antwerpen durch portugiesische Kaufleutewahrenddes 80 jahrigenKrieges",ahrbuch fur Geschichte Staat von Wirtschaftund GesellschaftLateinarlerikas,iv (I967), pp. 355-8; the article, however)gives no explanationas to why sugarimportillgfrom IIollandcollapsed
ln I 625. 124 J, Ai. Biziere, "The Baltic %'ineTrade, I563-I657>'t ScandinatianEcon. tSt. RD., XX (I972) pp I25-32o 125 Alcala-Zamora inaccurateon this: Alcala-Zamora, is Espana, Flandes y el Mar del tlorte, pp. 297-8. See Isabella to Philip IV, 3 Mar. I629: A.G.S.

57

Est. 2322; ann., Nieswe Liiste van t' Recht vandeLicenten. . . Iancxde riviere van Antwerpen,Sas van Genh . . . (Antwerp, Apr. I629)' H. H. G. Wouters sCHetLimburgse Maasdal gedurende de tachtigjarige en de dertigjarige oorlog", in *imb2erg's uerleden:Geschiedenis NederlandsLimburgtOt I8I55 van ed. E. C. M. A. Batta et al., 2 vols. (Maastricht,I960-7), ii, p. 200. 126 Cons>2a I6 Feb. I628: A.G.S. Est. 2328. The lifting of the river blockade was apparentlyproposedby Olivares,worriedat the conditiono? FIanders in JanuaryI629: consultan Jan. I629, in Correspondance la cour d'Espagne 9 de ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, doc. I334' see also Hurto de Urizar to Philip IV) 8 June I629: A.G.S. Est. 2322.

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

the Brussels administration was faci1lgan exceptionallydifficuit financial situation. In Germanythe Spaniards were drivenfrom Wesel, Rhei1lberg, Lingen,OrsoyandtheirotherlowerRhineandEmsbasesin the years I629-34, and therebylost any remaining capacityto damageDutch interestson German waterways. However,besidesthe northRhine region,there remained anotherareaof Germany offeringimportant assets to Spain in the economicstrugglewith the repllblic-the north Germanmaritimezone. In the years I626-9, duringwhich the armiesof the emperorand the GatholicLeat,uelargelyoverran north Germany,Madridendeavoured establish,in co-operation to with the emperorand the king of Poland, a combinedSpanishGerman navyat Wismar, be paidforlargely Spain,andir.tended to by to secure northern Germany, dominate Baltic imposea measure the and of Habsburg controlon the Baltictrade.ls7 This project,with its obviousdangers the Dutch republic,collapsed for sviththe Swedish invasionof I630 and the captureof the materials cash already and gatheredby Spain at Wismar. However, there remaineda less grandiosescheme which had long attractedSpanishattentionand ssrhich moreeasilyrealizable-that of persuading Hanseatic was the towns to accepta measureof Spanishinfluencein the regulation of theirtrade,whilein returnfillingthe vacuum the carrying in tradeto the peninsula by the departure the Dutch. Spainhal to have left of Balticgrain,copperaxldnavalstores,and it wouldclearlyCOllStitUtC a majorgainweretheseto be suppliedby the Hanseatic townsacting as rivalsto the Dutch ratherthan as theirintelmediaries.l'8 It was graspedin Madridthat purely commercial factors,such as freight ratesand shippingresources, againstthe northGermans, it told but wasconsidered forging that new Spanish-Hanseatic wasp1ecisely links the sortof shiftthatcouldbe achieved Spain'sunrivalled by territorial and administrative power. The Harsscatic tosTans rsotlike either did the residentssent to them from Flandcrs and Spainor tlle rigoro?.s inspectionof cargoesby customsauthorities tlle peninsula,but in although frictionovercertificates boarding and continued throughoul: the Spanish-Dutch war,the Hanseatic towllS were forccdto acconz modatethemselvesboth to the als71irantazgo*R and to the residents, especially with the developmentof substantial Spanish-Danish coinmercialco-operation from I628 onwalds.1'9 Although it has beenquestioned whether Hanseatic the townsnanagedto increase their Iberiantrade after the outbreak the Spanish-IDutch of war,l30 iS i'L
Alcala-Zamora, cit., pp. 267-76. Op. Corulta,8 OCt. I622: A.G.S. Est. 2036. 129 Consulta, May I628: I4 A.G.S. Est. 2328; constxlta, I Sept. I629: A.G.S. Est. 2329; H. Kellenbenz, Sephardim derulxteren (Wiesbaden, I958), an ElDe
1s7 128

p. I44-

lS?Christensen,Dtatch Trade theBalticn Eg. to p.

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS I6I8-I648

59

perfectlyclear that except for Emden, which being under I)utch occupation embargoed commonwith the Dutch,l3l Spanishwas in Hanseatictrade expandeddramatically.Hamburgbecame Spain's principal supplierof Balticproducts organized massiveconvoy and a system.l3? Over50 Hamburg lressels sailedto the peninsula I625 in most of the tonnageboundfor west Andalusia Portugal. The and Hamburg convoysof I627 and I629 werealsoof over50 vesselseach whilethatof I633 wasof 43; in eachcaseSanLucarwasthe portmost visited. Lubeck,despitethe Balticdepression the I620S, which of was in fact mainly a Dutch depression,also greatlyincreasedits businesswith the peninsula, culminating the decadeI630-9 when in two anda halftimes as manyLubeckvesselsvisitedthe peninsula as in the decade I6Io-Ig.l33 Like Hamburg,and in the face of continuingDutchhostility,Lubeck formed Iberian its tradeintoconsroys, thatof I626 consisting I7vesselsloaded of withgrain,masts,ropesand copper. Much of the Lubeckcommerce, however,involvedPortuguesesaltandlargelycollapsed the I640S whenthe Dutchreturned in in forceto the Portuguese pans. OthernorthGerman salt portsthat notably increased theirtraffic the peninsula to until I64I wereDanishcontrolled Gluckstadt, Friedrichstadt, Stettinand Danzigitself.l34 In generalthe Spanishmeasures againstthe Dutch can be said to have been one of the principal factorsdetermining Dutch economic development andindeedthatof allEurope-in the periodI62I-48. Until I62I the Dutch carriedBalticgrainchieflyto the Iberianand Italianpeninsulas. In the I620S) whilethe Hanseatic graintradewas thriving, Dutch Baltictradeentereda severeslumpowingat first the largely Spanish to measures, in the yearsI626-30 to a combination and of Spanishmeasuresand Swedishaction againstDanzig and the Prussian ports.l35 From I630 Dutch Baltictraderevived,aidedby a ruil of exceptionally bad harvestsin Portugal,Spain and North Africa ashasbeenshown,l36 but, instead carrying Lisbon,Seville, of to Valencia Naples,the Dutchnowcarried and mainly western to France, especially Bordeaus, fromwhichportthe grainwasoftencarried in on 31Consulta,27 Nov. I62I: A.G.S. Est. 2645.
132A.R.A. Bis. 53, fos.76V) III; A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos.g6v-g7, 23g, 253v; Kellenbenz, Unterneh7nerkrafte, 6I, 63; Kellenbenz, Sethardim an der pp. unterenElbe p. I44. 133 A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. III; W. Vogel, "Beitragezur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiiahrt im I7. und I8. Jahrhundert",HansischeGeschichtsblatter, xxxiii
(I928), pp. I35-4I.

134 Consultas the junta de estado,28 Sept. I627 and 3 Jan. I628: A.G.S. of Est. 2328; Kellenbenz, Sephardiman der unterenElbe, p. I44; A. Jurgens, Zur schleswig-holsteinische7 IIandRelsgeschichte I6. und I7. 3fahrhunderts des (Berlin, I9I4), pp. I97, 203-7. 135 Bogucka, '<Amsterdam and the Baltic", pp. 434-5, 437-8; Christensen3 op. cit., pp. 88, I04, 3I5-I6. 136 Bogucka,op. cit., pp. 438-9. Boguckademonstratesthe shlft but entirely misunderstandsthe reason for it, offering the unconvincing explanationthat trade with the Iberian peninsula had become unpro&table.

60 revival in Only from I64I, with the and English French vessels. Dutch grain-carryingrestored to full trade, was were Dutch-Portuguese was salt. If the Dutch No less affected than grain health. of the Caribbeansupplies were also deprived Iberian denied salt, they since the I590S.137 In been exploiting sporadically Caribbean salt pans they which had began building forts at the the I62I Spaniards of Dutch zoutthat year, the first convoy in the and, December of the Zuider Zee from the to (salt-ships) returned empty Caribbean salt vaerders By the late I620S very little focus of their coast.l38 Venezuelan the true that in shifting reaching Holland. It is was the Dutch were peninsula to western France, trade from the during the carrying salt without diEculty, except to ableobtain La Rochelle by the French government, but French of siegesthe Huguenot town in neither quality nor quantity.l39 5 guilders matched the Iberian product salt being stable at just over prices in Amsterdam, from to over I0 guilders in the period Salt rose Portubarrel during the truce, per 8 guilders until after the and did not again fall below I628-34 the collapse of Dutch saltdespite secessionl40- and all this guese Dutch salt exports to the and a marked shrinkingin to carryingItaly aXected a wide in the price of salt in turn Baltic.l4lThe sharp rise a number of other In addition, of range Dutch food prices.l42 of the peninsula as from France's replacement resulted disconsequences west, notably the virtual chief trading partner in the wines from north European Holland's Portuguese of appearance Spanish and dramatic boom of viticulture in the with the combined markets merchants involved in European region.l43 A11 Dutch Bordeaux changes) some very seriously. were affected by these great effectiveness of the Spanish carrying of the Oneof the major indicators Dutch Jews. Amsterdam setback sustained by the was trade, was, measures the specialized in the Iberian a Jewry, group which had played in the trade with western France it the despite prominent role by the changes of I62I that it was only so hard hit North Africa, to recover. and Spain that it began finally with the Portugal's secession from after depositors still only 89 Jewish Aslate as I64I there vzere I620. 144 as compared with I06 in Wisselbank, Amsterdam consequences of the Spanish important Arguably one of the most pp. Caribbean, I26-37. Goslinga, TheDutch in the Bis. 48 ii, fo. I70* 138 A.R.A. Est. 209I. and ii, 2I7-I8, I2 Sept. I658: A.G.S. i, 139 Consulta, prijsgeschiedenis, pp. 2I5, Nederlandsche 140 Posthumus, 778diagramsg and I0. pp. 29I-2, 453, 633, Tradeto the Bcgltic, 41 Christensen,Dutch p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 500, 658. I32. i, Trade", pp. I24, I27, 42 Posthumus, op. cit., te Biziere, C'Baltic Wine Bogucka, op. cit., p. 438; van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen l43 J. G. Bis. 49 i, fos. II3V-II46; I, De PortugeescheJoden", 144 A.R.A. der zeventiendeeeunv. Amsterdamin de eerste helft I4-I6Tiyd.Gesch.,1 (I935), pp137

PRESENT AND PAST

76 NUMBER

I6I SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 8-I648

6I

measures was the setback to new drapery production in Holland and the generaltransformationof the Dutch textile industry, accompanied by the temporary advance of new drapery output in Flanders and a more permanent advance in England, and due particularlyto loss by the Dutch of key marketscontrolled by Spain. Until about I62I the manufacture of a wide range of cheap, light draperies had steadily developed in several Dutcll towns and particularly at Leiden, the centre of the Dutch textile industry. As with Flemish and English new draperies a large part of Dutch production was destined for export to southern Europe and especially Andalusia and Portugal. Although N. W. Posthumus, the great historian of the Leiden cloth industry, assigned no role to Spain in his account of the decline of Dutch new drapery output after 162I,145the evidence for the loss of the territoriescontrolled by Spain as textile marketsfor the Dutch is so considerable that there can scarcely be doubt that it did indeed constitute a serious blow. Certainly in Brussels it was assumed that Spain had inflicted great damage on Holland's cloth industries and, by I626, it was estimated that some 40,000 textile workers had been thrown out of work in the republic sirlce I62I, many having to go abroad in search of u!ork.l46 The corresponding growth in output of similar types of textiles in Flanders and England strongly suggests that as a result of the Spanish measures these rivals were ab;e to take over what Holland was losing.l47 Of course, as it happened, Leiden managedto compensatefor its losses in new draperiesby expandingits production of old draperies, the celebrated lakenswhich were more suited to north Exlropeanmarkets; but although the overall value of textileb produced at Leiden undoubtedly increased between I62I and I648 (old draperiesbeing much costlier than new draperies),in terms of quantity of cloth produced and of labour required Leiden in fact declined. During the I620s the Dutch also completely lost their former prominence in the carryingof Castilian wool from Bilbao and San Sebastian to northern Europe - first to the English, then to the French and, after I630, once again to the English and ceased also to carrysuch vital dyestuis as Mexican cochineal,Campechewood and Guatemalan indigo from Seville and Cadiz; these changes however were probably much less harmful to Dwtch industry than the loss of markets. Very little Spanish wool was used at Leiden until after I635 when the French textile centres of Normandy and Brittany,which had traditionally used much more Spanish wool than Holland, were cut
3 van de Leidschelakealindustrie, vols. De 145 N. W. Posthumus, geschiedenis (The Hague, I908-39), iii pp. 930-2 ff. 46 La Cueva to Philip IV, 27 Mar. I626: A.G.S. Est. 23I6. pp. I47-So; E. Coornaert,La draperie147 Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders, (Paris:,I930), pp. 50, 53, 57; P. Deyon and A. Lottin, sayetteried'Hondschoote "Evolution de la productiontextile a Lille aux XVIe et XVIIe siecles", Revue do Nord, xlix (I967), pp. 3I-2.

62

AND PAST PRESENT

76 NUMBER

war, from their supplies by the outbreak of the Spanish-Frenchwool off over to a virtual dependence on Spanish Leiden did not go and price of Mexican after until I648. However, it is noteworthythat the rose sharply in the I620S, on cochineal the Amsterdam exchange again from I646 as high remained throughout the war and fell steeply in Holland rose embargoes began to be lifted.l48 Indigo prices the though here the East as likewise Guatemalanindigo became scarce, by importiIlg Company was able to profit from the situation India Asia; with the return of Guatemalanindigo in supplies from limited by nearly 50 mid I640S, indigo prices in Amsterdam dropped the cent. per affected Dutch Yet for a11the evidence that the Spanish measures for various reasons which require explanation, substantially, interests General came Dutch Republic was not weakened and the States the for a truce on Spanish terms. near being forced to sue nowhere of Spain and the Moreover war did so much damageto the economies whether the disthat Spanish ministers began to consider Portugal than what they of advantages the war for Spain were not even greater of the truce. Alreadybefiore to continued regardas the disadvantages in Madrid as to whether war I62I there had been some disagreement after I62I a or new truce on Spanish terms was the better alternative; By I623 a small junta, contherange of disagreement widened. bishop of Segovia, of sisting Agustin Messia, Fernando Giron and the and to assess the contacts being made between Brussels anddelegated views of such hard-liners as The Hague, was strongly criticizing the and de comercio, the themarques de Montesclaros, head of the junta the chief Spanish minister in Brussels.l49 The de Cardinal la Cueva, on the terms of Dutchwere supposedly willing to agree to a new truce but would go no further. MontesI609, plus a few lesser concessions, all the ruinous cost clarosand La Cueva persisted in maintaining, for truce had been to the king and the collapse of trade, that the previous even held that it was better to worse than the present war. They than settle again suffermilitary setbacks and lose some Flemish towns and those who for the terms of I609.l5? The bishop of Segovia the state of the that, given thought like him, by contrast, considered in Flanders, Philip financesand the risk of mutiny and other disasters to compromise; the war, they believed, was worse had no choice but was decided at the for Spain than the previous truce. The matter presumably by Olivares, who inclined highest level. Philip, guided there was to be no to the hard line, put a stop to the discussion; i, pp. priisgeschiedenis, 4I5-I6, 420-I. 5 Mar., Nederlandsche Posthumus, contactswith the Dutch, of the junta deliberating 149 Consulta Est.2I47. 5 to Olivares, July 4 andI4 JulyI623, andjunta A.G.S.Est. 2I47. I623: A.G.S. I4 Consulta, Nov. I623: 150
148

I6I SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 8-I648

63

by concessions the Major on settlement termscloseto thoseof I609. Dutch wereessential.l5l crisisin Italy Succession From I623 untilthe startof the Mantuan essentially standsremained and Spanish Dul:ch in I628 the respective of unchanged. However,the diversion Spamshfundsandtroopsto position the weakened Spanish Italyin I628, whichverysubstantially of led in the Low Countries, to a resumption heavy pressurefrom in moderates both Madridand Brussels. At the time, the principal point of contactbetweenSpanishand Dutch was at the talksbeing in of by conducted officials both sides at Roosendaal Dutch Brabant exchangeof prisoners. Isabellaused the occasion over a proposed initial conciliatory to soundout the Dutch and met with a somewhat of somemention the Scheldtbeingre-opened whichincluded response in the eventof a new trucebeingarranged.lo2Many,possiblymost, and and Spanishofficials, still moreIsabella Spinola,nowconsidered that the kingshouldquicklycometo a settlement. In the end, after in and protracted at times bitterargument Madrid,the opportunity, this if such it actuallywas, was allowedto slip by. Traditionally, failure to respond has been blamed on the alleged monumental himself.l53 Certainly to and inflexibility blindness realityof Olivares Spanishpolicyto a muchgreater determinirlg he wasnow personally degreethanin the earlyI620S, but it is by no meansclearthathe was not courage to panicin so actirlg imprudently. It neededconsiderable in that the circumstances prevailed I629 whentherewas a realprospowerbothin the Netherof collapse Spanish pectof the simultaneous talksproceededOlivares landsand northItaly. As the Roosendaal but in that becanleconvinced the Dutchwerenot slegotiating earnest, to simplyholding out bait as partof theirschemefor exploiting the to opportunity weakenSpain.l54 Whenin the otmostan unrivalled of summer I 629the Dutchforceslaysiegeto Den Bosch,the mostvital in Spanishfortresstown ill north Brabant,he was confirmed this that in I629 Spain in belief. Olivares any casewasrightin thinking and weakness thatthere from wasrlegotiating a positionof exceptional would long continue. If was no reasonto thinkthat this weakness lookedat mattersin a normally situation,arldOlivares the European Europeanperspective,promisedthe Dutch great successes,it was also one fraughtwit:hdangersfor them, owing to the Habsburg
Ibid. de Isabella to Pllilip IV, I3 Aug. I628 and 3 June I629: Correspondance la cour d'Espagne,ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, docs. I265, I40S Aitzema ii, Yanstaeten oorlogh, pp. 907 ff.; J. Cuvelier,"Les negociationsde Roosendael of d'histozre erts a Henri Pirenne,2 vols. (Brussels, Ig26) t627-30", in DIelanges inpp.73-80153 Cuvelier, op. cit., pp. 74, 78; Rodriguez Villa, AmbrostoSpinola, pp.
151 162

480-92.
154

A.G.S.

Cwonsulta) 2 June Est. 2o43.

Ifi2g

"voto

del corsde

duque",

and

29 consulta, Aug. I629:

64

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

victories Germany, crushing Denmark, the occupation in the of and of muchof northGermany Catholic by forces. Andindeed,despitethe situationat DeIl Bosch,it seemedhighly probable I629, barring in the unexpected, that once Spainextricated itself from Italy,it could in combination the emperor with haveput heavier pressure thanever on the republic. Olivares's assessment the republic notin earnest wanting that was in a trucein I629 was basedat leastin parton information to him sent from Flandersby Spanishofficials, who werefollowingthe political situation the republic recognized the Dutchwarpartywas in and that still much strongerthan the peace party.l55 And in this analysis, Olisrares's informantswere undoubtedlycorrect. This continued preponderance the hard-liners the UnitedProvinces appear of in may at firstsightto tell against notionthatSpainsucceeded inflicting the in considerabledamage on the Vutch economy. The stadhouder Frederik Hendrik (I625-47) andthemilitary leadership weredoubtless likelyto favourwarbecausetheirinfluence muchgreater war was in thanin peace-time. But this is no answerfor, as Spanishobservers saw, the strengthof the Dutch war party derived not from the sladhouder, armyor the French,but frommassivesupportfrom the the city administrations provinces the republic. NYars are and of that extremely expensiveand have been severalyearsin progress not are normallypopular. Moreover,besides the general evidence that Spaindid damage the Dutch economy,it shouldbe noted that it to was widely realizedin the republicduring the I620S that Dutch tradewascontracting underSpanish pressure because, despitevarious increases duties,totalcustoms in receipts Holland for failedto increase whilethose for severalpartsof the countryactually fell.l56 Besides this, the additional taxation neededfor the warwas oftenhighlyunpopular,as is shown by the case of the increasein I624 of the tax on butter in Holland which caused riots at Alkmaar,Haarlem, Amsterdam Enkhuizen the killingof several and and burghers the by troops called out to quell them.lo7 All this presentsthe historian with a problem. Actually,opinionover the warin the republicwas deeplydivided but, for several reasons, thosewho wishedto fighton hadthe greater inxquence all levels of Datch government. Dutch societyin the at golden age, for all its confidenceand prosperity, was rackedwith tensions. The republic had a far larger Catholicminority than
1-;6 Pedro de San Juan to Olivares, 30 Aug. I629, and Juan Boberio to Olivares,I3 Nosr.I629: A.G.S. Est. 2322. l5e A.R.A. Eis. 54, fos. 93_94V; de JoIlge,Nederlandische Zeewesen, p. 240; i, Snapper, Oorlogsinsloeden5 10-I, 73. pp. 157 La Cueva to Philip IV, I5 June I624, and "avisos de Almsterdam"^and 3 I0 June I624: A.G.S. Fst. 2314; see also La Cueva to Philip IV, I6 Apr. I626: A.G.S. Est. 23I6.

I6I8-I648 SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS

65

England and this minority, estimated at 4o,ooo in Amsterdam alone, considered pro-Spanish and suspected of collusion in the fall of Amersfoort to the Spaniards in I629, was rigorously excluded from any part in the political process.l58 Also, the Protestant majority was in turn sharply split between Remonstrants and CounterRemonstrants.l59 Since the overthrow of Oldenbarneveldtin I6I8 most city councils in the republic had been linked with the staunchly Calvinist Counter-Remonstrantparty and associated politically with the stadhouder.At the same time factions opposed to the CounterRemonstrants remained active and, with the support of many who opposed the war, gathered strength, particularlyin Holland. Since the Counter-Remonstrants, a dominant but threatened group, had always presented themselves as the patriotic party and preached the necessity of war with Spain, Dutch local government was in effect in the hands of an embattled faction, representativeof only a section of Dutch society and strongly inclined to continue the war for local political and religious reasons. The more those opposed to the Counter-Remonstrantsspoke of the need for a truce, the more the latter sought to overwhelm their opponents with votes and printed propagandaadvocating war. This however is ollly part of the answer. For whatever the ideological stand of the Counter-Remonstrants,they could surely not for so long have dominated enough city administrations, and therefore the provincial states, had they not had the assistance of important economic forces and effective economic propaganda. Curiously, it was maintained by the Dutch war party with only somewhat less persistence than it was in Madrid that the truce of I609 had been a disaster for their trade and, like Montesclaros and La Cueva, they argued that whatever the disadvantagesof the war, the situation was nevertheless still better than that of the truce.160 The CounterRemonstrants claimed that several regions, notably Zeeland, had declined during the truce, implied and sometimes openly stated that it was actually better for Dutchmen to do without trade to the peninsula, and held that in any case the war had not adverselyaffected the common man. And, indeed, Zeeland had stagnated during the truce. It is true, of course) that Zeeland's trade dwindled still more after I62I and that everyone in Zeeland knew it: the States of Zeeland declared in the States General in I627 that its customs revenues had
158 AnalectaVaticano-Belgica, 2nd ser., v, p. I62. Geyl mentionsan estimate that one quarterof the populationof Hollandwas Catholicin I624 and one third Divided,p. I44. of that of Frieslandand Groningen:Geyl, Netherlands 159 Aitzema, Op. Cit., ii, p. 9I9, arldiii, pp. 54-60- the Counter-Remonstrant war party dominatedmost completely in Frieslandand Zeeland. 16O Willem Usselincx, Waerschouwinge den Treves. . . (Flushing, I630; over Knuttel 40I6); Resolutie ... der Stadt Aherlem,prw.8-9, I4- anon., Klare Aenwiisinge de vereenigde dat Nederlanden gheen Treresmet den Vyandtdienente maecken (The Hague, I630; Knuttel 40I4), pp. 8 ff.

66

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

fallen every year since I6I6 owing to Spanish action.l6l But this did not lessen in the slightest Zeeland'sfierce supportfor the CounterRemonstrants and the war. On the contrary the war was regarded as the salvation of Zeeland, for the funds and seamen of Middelburg and Flushing, driven from local and European trade, found new opportunities in the West India Company, itself born of war, alld the privateering,chiefly at Portuguese expense, which was supported by the Company. This crucial shift, a frequent theme of La Cueva's reports to Madrid,l62made Zeeland the staunchest supporter among the seven provinces of the West India Company and was the most dramaticinstance of several investment and employment shifts within the Dutch economy which favoured the war party. The East India Company,like the West India Company, strongly opposed peace with Spain, even after the secession of Portugal,l63not only in the hope of acquiring additional Portuguese possessions in Asia, but because the slump at home favoured it by causing a flow of cash from European into colonial commerce. The other major beneficiary of the war, and therefore of the slump in European trade, industry and the fisheries, was Dutch agriculture. If Spanish ministers were right, as surely they were, that the export of foodstuffs via the binnenstromen of vital importanceto the Dutch, it cannot be denied that was the warincreasedthis importance except brieflyin the years I625-6. The Dutch and Spanish armies, by far the largest and most costly armies in Europe, encamped close together in fixed positions along the canals and rivers of the Low Countries and north-west Germany, did not pilfer their food in the style of the armies in the rest of Germany. They lOepresented fixed and strong demand and paid in a cash. The huge sums spent on the food supplies of the Dutch forces may be viewed as a subsidy paid by the Dutch maritime towns to inland agriculture, while expenditure on the Spanish forces was also in a sense payment by the non-noble populace of Castile and Naples to the Dutch farmers. In this respect the Counter-Remonstrants were right to argue that their war by no means iIljuredthe common man. After the failure of the Roosendaal talks the character of the Spanish-Dutch struggle was soon considerably changed by events. In I630, strengthened by the capture of the Mexican siler fleet in I628, West India Company forces gained their first substarstial foothold in the Americas the Pernambuco region of northern Brazil.
161 A.R.A. Bis. 54, fo. 94; La Cueva to Philip IV, I8 OCt. I627: A.G.S. Est. 23I9. 162 La Cueva to Philip IV, I5 Jan. and 4 Feb. I627: A.G.S. Est. 2318; La Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Mar. I628: A.G.S. Est. 232I. 163 Aitzema, Van staet en oorlogh, vi) p. 87. As it happens, the end of the Spanish-Dutch war and the revival of Dutch trade with Spain from I647 did in fact coincidewith a remarkable of momentumin the developmentof the loss East India Company:Glamann,Dutch-AsiaticTrade,p. I6.

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS I6I8-I648

67

In I632 Frederik Hendrik launched the most successful Dutch offensive of the war at home, capturing Venlo, Roermond, Sittard, Maastricht and Limburg in rapid succession. With this breakthrough in the Maas valley Spanish power in Flanders, severely curtailed by the low level of remittances from Spain following the Mantuan war, the loss of the silver fleet, and the crushing of Habsburg forces in Germany in the unexpected force of the Swedish invasion, came close to collapse. A wave of revulsion against the war swept the Southern Netherlands, and Isabella, in her panic and much to the displeasure of Philip IV and Olivares,ls4 gave way to pressure to convene the previously almost defunct States General of the southern provinces. The representatives of the southern provinces at once opened negotiations with the Dutch States General, thus initiating the most public and formal of the various rounds of talks that took place during the conflict, those of I632-4. The Dutch, seemingly on the verge of massive victories, were understandablyin no mood to offer anything to Spain.lo5 In return for a truce the Dutch States General demanded the total withdrawal of Spanish forces from the Low Countries and north-west Germany, the continued closure of the Scheldt, the restitution of Breda, the annexation of all the places captured by the Dutch plus those parts of the hinterland of Den Bosch still occupied by Spain, the stalus quo in the Indies east and west, numerous tariff concessions and such freedom of movement and private religious practice for Jewish subjects of the republic in the Spanish territories as Dutch Protestants would enjoy. This, of course, was an opening position and the Dutch were preparedto yield somewhat on certain points.l66 Nevertheless, even the most conciliatoryFlemish delegates were appalled by the vast gulf that now existed between the two sides. Olivares was thoroughly disgusted with the whole affair.l67 He was totally opposed even to consideringthe Dutch terms, whether regardingEurope or the Indies. Besides looking on the talks as disreputable,originatingas they did in circumstancesverging on rebellion against the crown, he regardedthe Dutch ambitions for territory on the Maas and Rhine, as well as in Brazil, as incompatible with the essential interests of Spain which he, in distinctionperhapsto other Spanish ministers, saw as being strategic as much as economic and colonial. The Dutch now held almost all the Maas and lower Rhine crossings formerlypossessed by Spain and, in Olivares'sview, unless Spain recovered the major Maas crossings, especially Venlo and Maastricht, and at least one key Rhine crossiIlg,
64 Consulta,2 Mar. I633: A.G.S. Est. 2I5I. 165 G. de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen M. zwischenSpa7zien und den Niederlanden dCen in 3tahren 632 und I633 (Groningen, I898)) pp. 66-8. 166 Ibid., p. go. 167 Consulta,29 May I633 "voto de Olivares", and consulta,I6 June I633 "voto del sr conde duque" (drafts):A.G.S. Est. 2I5I.

68

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

preferablyRheinberg(the "whore of war"), Flanders would no longer serve as a viable base, orplaza de armas,for Spanish power in northern Europe.l68 Deprived of all her Maas and Rhine strongholds, Spain in Flanders, as the conde-duque subsequently put it, would be "locked in a cage''.l69 To secure a Spanish-Dutch this time, Olivares was prepared to offer the Dutch compromise at Breda, Stevensweert, one million ducats and concessions in the sugar market at Lisbon in return for northern Brazil, the disbandment of the West India Company, and Venlo, Maastricht and Rheinberg, it being understood that the Dutch would keep their other conquests.l70 But as matters stood he saw that there was not the slightest chance of the Dlltch accepting these terms. Most of the conde-duque's colleagues in Madrid were as indignant as he was at the Dutch "condiciones indecentes", as they were termed by the duke of Alva, most of all that regardingthe Jews,l7l and when the Dutch suggested, inview of the impassereached concerningthe Indies, that the truce relate to Europe only, leaving the war to continue proposed in Asia and the Americas, the indignation spread to the councils of Portugal and the Indies.l72 It was consequently, despite the now catastrophic condition of both army and finances, much e<asier the for condeduque to fling back the Dlltch terms in I634 than it had beell in I 629. With the breakdown of the talks of I632-4) continued Spanish weakness Flanders and Swedish success in Germany, it in <eemedto Olivaresthat what was now needed was a major effort by Spain to swingthe European balance of power back in her favour. Only thus couldSpain wrest reasonable terrns from the republic. For sesreral years heavier taxes had been levied in Castile, Portugal and Naples and,by September I634, Spanish ministers were planning to spend the enormous sum of 5 1 million ducats in Flanders that is, against theDutch-in I635. The sending of Ferdinand, the cardinalinfante, the Spanish Netllerlands, because of his to exploits against theSwedes in Germany in I634 during the march from Milan, and the subsequent outbreak of war between France and Spain in May I635, has never been sufficiently recognizedas being a move intended, essentially, swing the balance againstthe Dutch. It has even to bee svritten, quite erroneously, that when the Spanish-Frellch war bega in I635, the "vvaragainst the Dutch was at oIle:e abandoned>'.l W In
"Voto del conde-duque", I6 Oct. I633 (draft):A.G.S. Est. 189 Olivares to the cardinal-infante, Dec. I636: Bayerische 2I5I. IS Staatsbibliothek (hereafter B.S.), MS. cod. hisp. 22, fo. 33\. 170 "E1 conde duque mi sor sobre la tregua" (undated I633, draft): A.G.S. Est. I. 2I5 171 Consulta,I6 Mar. I634: A.G.S. Est. 2048. 172 Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 4 Mar. I634: A.G.S. Est. 2I50. 173 G. Parker, "Spain, Her Enernies and the Revolt of the Netherlands, I559-I648", Past and Preserzt, no. 49 (Nov. I970), p. 92.
l68

SPAIN AND THE NETERLANDS I6I8-I648

69

fact, no sooner was the French invasion of Flanders in I635 repulsed than FerdiIland,aided by a diversion of Dutch forces due to a successful surprise attack on Schenkenschans in July, invaded Dutchoccupied territory with 26,000 men capturing Goch, Cleves and Gennep, while another Spanish force retook Limburg.l74 The Spanishoffensiveof I635 againstthe Dutch, though a departure from the concept of guerradefensiva I625-34, was nevertheless of consistent with the strategic maxims formulated in Madrid in I622-4 in that FerdinaIld,attacking where he could penetrate quickly, while still posing a threat, nevertheless studiously avoided besieging any well-fortified towns. The taking of Schenkenschanson the Gelderland border, an unexpected stroke of luck, breached the entire Dutch defensive system iIl the eastn opening an easy route, north of the rivers, iIlto the heart of the republic. The event caused dismay throughout the United Provinces and so elated the conde-duque that, with his usual extravaganceof phrase, he assured Ferdinand that, in holding Scheakenschans, he could not win more glory were he to capture Paris or The Hague.l75 The purpose of the offensive was made clear when Ferdinand entered into new truce talks with the Dutch at Kranenburgin the duchy of Cleves. In line with OIilrares's aspirationsSpain demanded Venlo, Maastricht,Rheinberg and Dutch svithdrawalfrom the Americas, offering in return Schenkenschans, Goch, Gennep, Cleves, Breda and a large cash sum.l76 Once agaiIl, the talks broke down. To Olivaresthe capture of Schenkenschanssignified not iust a vrital breach in the Dutch defences but also the chance to fortify a line runmng from Eindhoven via Helmond and Gennep to the Rhine, which would undoubtedly have proved extremely dangerous for the Dutch axld would have virtually cut off Venlo and Masstricht from the rest of Dutch-occupied territory.l77 Although in I636 the condeduque and his colleagues gave priority to the French front, there was a great reluctaIlceto do so. Remarkablyenough, the start of the war with France coincided with a completely new phase in the SpanishDutch war in which Spain for the first time since I622 resumed
1:4 Cardinal-idante to Philip IV, 24 Dec. I635: A.G.S. Est. 2050; A. Waddington, La reptiblique Prosinces-Unies,la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols des de I630 a I650, 2 vols. (Paris, I895-7), i, pp. 272-3. 175Olivaresto the cardinal-infante,I4 Mar. I636: B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22, fO.I2; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.I4007, fOS.53V,57-60; F. H. Westermann,Ruckblick a2lf die Geschichte HerzogthumsCZeve. . . vom gahre I609 bis I.666 des (%TeSeI) I830), PP. I89-90. 1 8 Cardirlal-infante to Philip IV, Genneps I I OCt.I635: A.G.S. Est. 2050; Martin de Aspe to the cardinal-infante, Kranenburg,27 Oct. I635: Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne,ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, iii, doc. 2I9; Aitzema, Van slaet en oorlogh,iv, PP. 223-4. 17 "E1 conde duque sobre los puntos principales del uItimo despacho de Flandes", I9 Sept. I635: A.G.S. Est. 2I53; consults, I6 Nov. I635 "VOtO del conde duque": A.G.S. Est. 2I53.

7o

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER76

deliberate of the armyof Flanders a major use as meansof squeezing the United Provinces. In the years I635-9, in both Flandersand Madrid) theretook placea continuing strategic debateas to whether it was in principlebetterfor Spainto directher maineffortagainst Franceor the republic and,in general, therewasa marked preference for concentrating againstthe latter.l78 It was arguedthat although it waseasier invadeFrance takeFrench to and townsthanto penetrate Dutch territory, there was little to be gainedby doing so. It was thought that Spain'sbest prospectfor breaking Franco-Dutch the alliancewas to maintainthe pressurethat had been kept up for so long and use the exceptionally large funds availablein the years I635-8 to gainthe additional bargaining countersneededto securea satisfactory settlement with the republic. However, this general preference partially was checkedby the fearof leavingFrancewith a free hand and, in particular, risk of a Frenchinvasionof Italy. the Thus the Spanishinvasionof Francefrom Flanders I636, which in caused such panic in Paris, was nothing more than a short-term preventive strikewhich, in Madrid,was considered no meansas by important strategically holdingthe gainsmadeat the expenseof the as Dutch in I635. When Ferdinand, a result of the effortagainst as France,nevertheless Scherlkenschans April r636 there was a lost in greatstormof angerand dismayin Spain,includingone of the worst ragesof Olivares's entirecareer.l79 In I637, however,the Dutch theatreof war was once againthe centreof operations although and, Ferdinand too slowto prevent was Frederik Hendrik's encirclement Bredaandthe subsequent of of loss the town,he did break Dutchline in the Maasvalley,recapturing the Venlo and Roermond isolatingMaastricht; and despitethis he was rebuked Madridbothfor the loss of Bredaandfor not penetrating in furtherand laying siege to Graveor Niimegen.l80 The offensive of I637 was the final attempton land to acquiremore bargainirlg piecesfromthe Dutch. The loss of Bredaalso put an end to plans for initiating new phaseof amphibious a warfare, usingheavilyarmed bargeson the canalsrunningnorthfrom Breda. In the threeyears I635-7 Spainhad spentover I5 millionducatsin Flanders with only modestgains,and yet the fundsavailable offensive for actionagainst the Dutch as a resultof the increased taxationin the peninsula were not yet exhausted. The stalling the offensive landwasdue to 181 of on
178 Cons1lltas, 25 and 26 Feb. I637: A.G.S. Est. 205I- consulta, OCt. 8, 7 I637: A.G.S. Est. 2052; consulta the juntadeestado, Mar.I638: A.G.S.Est. of 7 2053. 179 C7onsulta, I7 June I636: A.G.S. Est. 205I; B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22,

fos. I7V-I9v.
180 181

I637 "VOtO del coIlde duque": A.G.S. Est. 2052. B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22, fos. 30V,4tv; officially,the cardinal-infante was receiving 500,000 ducats monthly duringthe first half of I638.

Consulta, OCt. 7

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS I6I8-I648

7I

the increasingco-ordination the French and Dutch attackson of Flandersand the mounting difficultyof supplyingthe Southern Netherlandswith Spanish and Italiantroops, especiallyafter the capture Breisach the Frenchin I638 whicheffectively of by closedthe Rhine route to Spain. The last phase of the Spanishoffensiveto end the Dutchwarconsequently placeat sea. In I639 two large took armadas weredispatched from Spain,one to Brazilto try to end the most troublesomeof Spanish-Dutch embroilments the colonial in sphereby recapturing Pernambuco, the otherto the Channel and to force suppliesthroughto Flandersand challengethe Dutch to a decisivebattle for supremacy sea. Both initiatives at failed utterly, withthe battleof the Downsendingin a major disaster Spainwith for 32 warships destroyed the DutchunderAdmiral by Tromp.l82 The losses involvedin the two setbacks,navaland financial, were overwhelming. From I63g Spainneitherdid, nor could,endeavour any longer to acquire gains from the Dutch by force and, weakened furtherby the paralysing effect of the revolt of Catalonia and the breakaway Portugal,both in I640, was reducedto the role of a of shattered powerstriving onlyto keepwhatit still heldagainst superior forces. In I64I PortugueseBrazil followed Portugal itself and severedits linkswith Spain. The loss of southernBrazil,and with it all prospectof recovering anypartof the territory, actually was muchless decisive determining in Spanish-Dutchrelations in the I640S than one might suppose. Brazil had,of course,beenthe singlemostdifficult pointof contention in the variousnegotiations the I630S and, in the long run, its loss of clearedthe path to peace by makingplausiblethe exclusionof the Dutch from SpaxiishAmericawithout deprivingthe West India Company all raison of d'etre. But in the mediumterm, as was soon realized in Madrid,l83 implicationsof the loss of Brazil for the Spanish-Dutch relations werenot particularly auspicious. The West India Company itself, contemplating reducedSpainand seemingly a an easy task for itself in Brazil,now had less reasonthan ever for agreeing relinquish otherAmerican to its ambitions, was indeed and farfromdoingso as is shownby the sendingof the expedition under HendrikBrouwerto Chile in I643. In any case the crux of the problemlay not in the Indies but in the United Provinces,where Frederik Hendrik the warpartywerestilldominant and and,aidedby Frenchmoneyaxldinfluence, everyintentionof keepingthe war had in progress. The stzzdhouder, despiteconsiderable ill-health,showed a continuing for leadingthe Dutch forcesand conquering zest more Flemishterritory which,indeed,the recentcollapse Spanish of power
182 t83

Alcala-Zamora, Espana,Flandesy el Mar del Norte, pp.>9-34. J. J. Poelhehe, De Vredeuan Munster(The Have, I948), appendixiv,

pp.

547-5I-

72

PAST AND PRESENT

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promisedto facilitate. In the city administrations, though losing groundin Holland,the Counter-Remonstrants had the upper still hand. Moreover,there can be little doubt that Spanishministers werecorrect theirsomewhat in pessimistic forecast. Indeed,opposition to a Spanishpeacein the republic,despitea wavering Holland, remaiIledso strong after I64I that, despite enormousefforts by Madrid,Brusselsand those in the United Provinceswho wanted peace, there was no significant breakthrough the Spanish-Dutch in talksat Munsteruntil the winterof I645-6.184 The breakthrough, whenit came,tookplaceesseIltially because a of crucialshift in the balanceof politicalforces within the republic whichsubstantially increased powerof thoseinterests the involvedin European commerce. Although resurgence Dutch-Portuguese the of tradefrom I64I madegood one of the principal setbacks that Dutch commercehad sufferedfrom the Spanisheconomicmeasures,the embargoesand the Dunkirkers continuedto registera substantial effectwhich) maybe argued, thegradually it in changing circunlstances of Dutch domesticpolitics in the I640S actuallyproducedbetter results for Spain than duringthe years when the embargoeshad includedPortugal. The Dutch continuedto be shut out of every Spanishport except insurgentBarcelona, also out of southern and Italy and Flanders. The effectivenessof the Dunkirkers against Dutch merchantmen fishingfleets alike,especially the years and in I64I-3 whenveryheavylossesweresuffered the Dutch, was such by that Dutch marineinsuranceand freight rates now reachedtheir highest levels of the entire war.l85 At the same time the flow of capitalfromEuropean colonialcommerce, into whichhad servedthe Dutch war party so well in the I620S and I630S, now completely ceased and, indeed, moved strongly back. By I64I West Indis Company shareswere already losing valueas it becameclearerthat judgedas a commercial enterprise companymade no sense: it the had to fight both Spaniards and Portuguese makeits way, and to colonial warfare so costlythatit couldmakeno profit. However, was after I64I, responding the failureeitherto completethe conquest to of Brazilor to reducemilitary spending there,andthe Chilean fiasco, the company's sharesbeganto fall muchfaster,so that by I645 they stoodat well underhalf the valuethey had held in I64o,l86and the company carried merefraction the politicalweightin the United a of Provincesthat it had done formerly. Elsewhereon the Dutch
184 Consulta the janta de estado,3 June I646: of A.G.S. Est. 2065; Coleccion de documentos indditos para la historiade Espana, ed. M. FernfindezNavarrete et al., Il2 vols. (Madrid, I842-95), lXXXii, pp. 3I7, 33I-45. 185 Aitzema, Yan staet en oorlogh,v, pp. 360-In and vi, p. 2I6* Schreiner, "Die Niederlander und die norwegische Holzausfuhr im I7. Jahrhundert", p. 324. 186 Goslinga, The Durchin

the Caribbean) 509. p.

I6I8-I648 SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS

73

of politicalscene the other champions war were also losingground. were The hard-lineCounter-Remonstrants virtuallystrippedof all powerin the town councilsof Holland,and interestshostileto the trade European and of ambitions the stadhouder intenton promoting of beganto becomemoreassertive.l87 The contention the warparty threatto Dutch securitywas was that Spainin Flanders a continuing would in by countered pointingout that France Flanders increasingly and the Hendrik threat. For a time Frederik now be an evengraver aftera hard Gennep recapturing on pressed withtheircampaigns, army a through formidable siegein I64I and,in I644 andI645 afterfighting much to the conquered, complexof canalsand forts, the stadhouder of advantage Zeeland,the townsand districtsof Sassvan Ghentand Hulst in Flanders. Hulst, however,was the last campaign. From I645 Hollandrefusedany longerto providefunds for the war and, since Hollandwith its greatwealthsuppliedmorethanthe othersix provincesput together,this broughtthe armyto a completehalt. entirely in forcedthrough the yearsI646-8, almost Peacewasfinally centresof Hollandand of owingto the pressure the greatcommercial CalviIiist in strongresistance especially devoutly continuing against and Friesland,in Utrechtwherethe nobilitywas influential closely and linkedwith the stadhouder, aboveall in Zeelandwhichfoughtto the last to keepthe waralive.l88 Evenafterthe signingof the treaty year war, the issue of Munster,formallyending the twenty-seven first Spain's ambassador wasfarfromdead. "Thoseof Amsterdam", PhilipIV in I649, "areour best friendsand informed to the republic still most to the peaceand who contribute to those who contributed moreit maintain despitethe wishesof othertowns''.l89 Amsterdam over soon obtainedits reward. IsradebetweenSpainand Holland floweredso rapidlyfrom I647, as the carryingtrade of Holland's that it to competitors Spain, Flandersand southernItaly slurnped, commerce. was soon once againa key elementin Dutch European of Indeed,in some respects,such as the greaterdependence Dutch on textile manufacturing Spanish wool, Spanish-Dutcheconomic in relations the yearsafterI647 werecloserthanthey hadeverbeen. viewed ministers Beforelong it was againthe casethat when Spanish with alarmthe outflowof silverfrom Spainto northernEuropein what preoccupied paymentfor importsof food and manufactures, to was them almostexclusively its movement Holland.190 a was of The struggle I62I-48, obviously, essentially victoryfor the yet United Provinces, in manywaysthe treatyof Munsterwas less
Divided, I 39-40pp. Geyl, Netherlands pp. van Poelhekke,De Vrede Munster, SI5-Iv, 529IS and consulta, Sept. I650: A.G.S. 189 Brun to Philip IV, 27 Aug. I649, Est. 2070. S 26 190 Consulta, Dec. I649: A.G.S. Est. 2070; constflta, Feb. I650: A.G.S. 24 Est. 2072; consulta, Aug. I656: A.G.S. Est. 2088.
18 7 188

NUMBER76 an endingthan a 74 turning-point the Spanish-Dutch in as it hadbegunto develop confrontation Spainhad gone to warto sincethe time of the TwelveYearsTruce. weakenthe republicin orderto prolDlems solve the posed by increasing both economicand political. In fact,as a resultof Dutch influexlce the conflict, wellas of as it was Spainthat was otherfactors, weakened. Nevertheless Spainremained centreof a largeempireof the crucial in and trade,andmanyofthe specificimportance international afEairs that trucewere to reappearafter problems hadarisen the the treaty of Munster. during largely The dominated commerce with Spainitself and became Dutch leadingEuropeaninterloper by farthe in Cartagena BuenosAires.lsl Spanish America, especially at and Furthermore wasmoreimportant it than ever for Spain,increasingly threatened the risingpowerof by France England,to and prevent enemies.In I62I Madridhad the republicfrom reinforcing her solution wasattempted soughta solutionthroughwar; the that from I648 onwards to try was special politicalrelationship with the United Provinces,to forgea both as a counterweight France and to claimed a threatto the England, which Spanish ministers were Spain indeedthey were),well-beingof the republicas well as to (as alld with whichto moderate forcealsoto providethe politicalmeans the Although of the pointsin of Dutch economicpenetration.l92 most disputeat Munsterhad been in favour the republic, of settled withDutch Catholics right public worship,the remaining of Scheldtstayingclosed andwithoutthe keeping conquests, the Dutch their therehad been one solid republic Spanishgain: the formally acknowledged accepted total the subjects all the territoriesand exclusion its from of of Spainin the Indies.l93 Fromthis startiIlg-point SpanishministersstartedOx1 a new path obtain pressureand by agreement seriesof further after I648 tO a commercenavigation,l94 and concessions in to keepconstantcheckon of agreements these the working by meansof Spanish in representatives agents and Holland, to securethe and co-operation the States Generalin of their implementation everypoliticalmeans by at PhilipIV's In way,afterI648, this relations with the Dutch Republic disposal. to a major be pre-occupation those who governed continued of empire. the Spanish

PAST AND PRESENT

University London College,

191

7. I. Israel

Consulta,7 OCt. I65I: Indies, I652: A.G.S. A.G.S. Est. 2076, consultaof the Council I9 Apr. of the Est. 2078. 192 Consultas,IS and 25 Sept. I650: A.G.S. Est. 2072- "Parecerdel Penarandaunion con sobre conde de 193 Consulta, Aug. I650, Olandeses":A.G.S. Est. 208I 6 fos. 2v-3: A.G.S. Est. van Munster, 359-60. 2072; Poelheklre, pp. De Frede 194 Consulta, July I650: A.G.S. 3 Est. 2072; consulta,2 Oct. Est. 2076. I65I: A.G.S.