Calalang v. Williams, 70 PHILS 726 (1940) F: CA No.

458 authorizes Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Comms. to promulgate rules and regulations for regulation and control of use and traffic on national roads. The Director, with approval of Secretary of Pub Works and Comm, and upon recommendation of Nat'l Traffic Commission, issued an order closing to animal-drawn vehicles certain parts of Rizal Ave. and Rosario Street. Petitioner challenges constitutionality of the Act (and order) as being an undue delegation of legislative powers. ISSUE: W/N there is undue delegation HELD: No. The authority delegated to Director and Secretary is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the Nat'l Assembly, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstruction on, roads and streets designated as nat'l roads" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of vehicles "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience or interest." The delegated power, if at all, is not the determination of what the law should be but merely the ascertainment of facts and circumstances on which the application of the law is to be predicated. This is an administrative function which must depend on discretion of another govt official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether there is proper occasion to execute the law. But the exercise of such discretion cannot be said as making the law. ISSUE: W/N there is proper exercise of police power HELD: Yes. The Act aims to promote safe transit, relief from traffic congestion and to avoid obstructions on nat'l roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Public welfare then lies at the bottom of the enactment of the law and the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, property, business and occupations. ISSUE: W/N, as averred by the petitioner, the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. Adapted. HELD: NO. The promotion of social justice xxx is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. "Social Justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex." Villar v. TIP, 136 SCRA 706 (1985) F: The petitioners were students of the Technological Institute of the Phils. (TIP). They filed an action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the TIP had denied them enrollment bec. of their involvement in student demonstrations and activism. On the other hand, the TIP claimed that the students were denied enrollment bec. of academic deficiencies. Their records showed that Rufino Salcon and Remeo Guilatco each failed in 1 subject in the first semester of the SY 1984-1985. Venecio Villar failed in 2 subjects in the first sem of SY 1983-1984. Inocencio Recitis passed all subjects in the first sem of 1983-1984 but failed 1 subject in the 2nd sem. of that year and the next year he had 2 failing grades. On the other hand, Noverto Barreto failed in 5 subjects in the 1st sem of SY 1983-1984 and in year 1984-1985, he again failed in 6 subjects. Edgardo de Leon had 3 failing grades in the 1st sem of the SY 1984-1985. Regloban

Laxamana had 5 failing grades and no passing grade in the 1st sem of the 1984-1985 SY. VV.

ISSUE: W/N the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of resp. TIP could be a basis for their being banned from enrollment. HELD: NO. As in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable sassembly carries w/ it the implication that the right to full speech has also been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression w/c is the liberty to discuss publicly & truthfully, any matter of public interest w/o censorship or punishment & w/c is not to be limited nor denied except on a showing of a clear & present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning "includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice in expulsion of students. However, it cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise this constitutional rights to peaceable assembly & full speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate guidance by the students prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. ISSUE: W/N the constitutional provision as to the state maintaining "a system of full public elem. educ. & in areas where finances permit, est. & maintain a system of the pub. educ. up to high school level excludes the exercise of that it in colleges & universities. HELD: The Constitutional provision does not per se exclude the exercise of that right. in colleges & universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duly to be obligatory in the case of students in colleges & Universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, Art. 26 of the Universal Declaration of HRs provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Educ. shall be full at the least in the elem. & fundamental stages. xxx Technical & professional educ. shall be made generally available & higher educ. shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." Hence, to that extent, there is justification for excluding 3 of the pets. bec. of their marked academic deficiency. Adapted. Right to quality education available only on the basis of merit.-- While the right to college education is a social, economic and cultural right, it is available only "on the basis of merit," as provided in Art. 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights. Accordingly, bec. of marked academic deficiency, the denial of enrollment to Barreto, De Leon and Laxamana was justified. However, w/ regard to Villar, Salcon, Guitlatco and Recitis, the refusal of the TIP to allow them to enroll was unjustified. They could not be expelled for exercising their constitutional right of free speech and peaceable assembly. As J. Fortas said, students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate. VV.

Tangonan v. Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 (1985) F: Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977. She had been previously provisionally admitted the previous schoolyear, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the course again in another school, but she was refused admission bec. she tried to bribe the dean of the school. When she tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied admission. She brought the matter on certiorari. VV. ISSUE: WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit petitioner. NO. HELD: Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet. is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of

Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing enrollment of a student. Adapted. Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8 (2) Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by w/c truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the over-riding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent. VV.

servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances andconditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the

Kuroda v Jalandoni
Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international. ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts? HELD: EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

People vs. lagman In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Sec 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service."

Ichong vs. hernandez

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund

People v Lagman, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13 and Zosa

Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty

years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information.

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Aglipay v. Ruiz Case Digest Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

Facts:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution. Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

Everson v. Board of Education

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his status as a taxpayer, filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent), to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from school.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that, while no law respecting an establishment of religion will stand under the United States Constitution (Constitution), neutral laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld. Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider the issue.

Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children.

Held. Affirmed. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged. Dissent. The dissents of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) and Justice Wiley Rutledge (J. Rutledge) stand for strict adherence to the establishment clause. Discussion. It is important to understand, in striking down the Establishment Clause challenge, the Supreme Court highlights the fact that funds cannot be commingled when they are reimbursed only for transportation costs already expended. Thus, because there is no possibility of funding parochial activities in themselves, the statute is allowed to stand.