Case 345, Part A

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 19441946

James R. Howard and David S. Painter

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During World War II, U.S. policy makers realized that the Chinese Communist Party posed a challenge to the U.S.-backed Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. To achieve its goal of a strong, unified, and pro-Western China, the United States, from mid-1944 to the end of 1946, attempted to mediate a political settlement between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese in hope of averting a full-scale civil war and a possible Communist victory. These efforts failed, and as 1947 began, the United States found itself in the position of supporting a reactionary and corrupt regime being successfully challenged by a popular and growing Communist-led insurgency. By the end of 1944, Mao Tse-tungs Chinese Communist forces controlled one-fourth of China, governed more than ninety million people, and were able to field a well-disciplined army of almost one million men. Although still vastly outnumbered by Chiang Kai-sheks Nationalist forces, Chinese Communist strength had increased dramatically since 1935, when 30,000 diseased and hungry troops had straggled into Yenan, in Chinas remote northwestern Shensi province, after a year-long, 6,000 mile retreat to escape annihilation at the hands of the Nationalist armies.

Maos Communists represented an obstacle not only to Chiang Kai-sheks efforts to unify all of China under the Nationalist government but also to the realization of U.S. postwar aims for China. As envisioned by U.S. policy makers, a strong, unified, and pro-Western China was needed to act as a stabilizing force in East Asia following Japans defeat. A strong and independent China would also serve as a buffer against possible Soviet expansion in northeast Asia. Committed to that end, U.S. policy in 1945 aimed to strengthen the Nationalist government while attempting to avert a Chinese civil war by securing Communist participation in a coalition government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

MEDIATION: HURLEYS NEGOTIATIONS

Efforts to unify the Nationalists and the Communists began in August 1944, with General Patrick J. Hurley, U.S. Ambassador to China, acting as mediator. Hurley faced the formidable task of overcoming twenty years of violent political struggle between the two factions. Formed in the early 1920s under the sponsorship of the Soviet-dominated Communist International (Comintern), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), at Soviet urging, entered a working alliance with Sun Yat-sens Soviet-backed Kuomintang (National Peoples Party or KMT) in 1924. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, who had assumed the leadership of the KMT following Sun Yat-sens death in 1925, broke with the CCP. In the White Terror

Copyright 1995, 1989 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. ISBN: 1-56927-345-6 Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 200571025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

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Case 345, Part A

that followed, Chiang expelled his Soviet advisers and ordered the massacre of thousands of Chinese Communists and their sympathizers. In 1931, Chiang launched the first of five Bandit Extermination Campaigns against the surviving Chinese Communists who had regrouped under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. In 1934, after three years of bitter struggle against the Nationalists and facing annihilation, the Communists began the Long March to Yenan. Since 1937, when the Nationalists and Communists joined in a United Front to combat Japanese aggression, an unsettled truce had existed between the two sides. Most China experts within the U.S. State Department believed that a resumption of open hostilities between the Nationalists and Communists was unlikely as long as the war against Japan continued. Once the war ended, however, in the words of one U.S. official, the active struggle for political control in China is likely to be renewed.1 By December 1944, Hurleys efforts to mediate an agreement between the Nationalists and Communists had achieved little. The Nationalists demanded that the integration of Communist forces into a national army should precede the establishment of a coalition government. The Communists, believing that any integration of their forces into a national army without prior political guarantees was suicidal, insisted that the formation of a coalition government in which they had substantial power had to precede the integration of the armed forces. Moreover, in the eyes of the Chinese Communists, Hurleys efforts at mediation were suspect. Shortly after his appointment as Ambassador, Hurley defined his role in the following terms: (l) To prevent the collapse of the National Government, (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander, (4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse, and (5) to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.2 Subsequently, in reporting to the President on the course of the negotiations, Hurley stated, I have not agreed to any principles or supported any method that in my opinion would weaken the National Government or the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.3

Chiangs Nationalist Government and support for a coalition government. Roosevelt believed that Soviet support for a settlement would pressure the Chinese Communists into entering a coalition government, thereby averting civil war. His thinking was echoed by Hurley, who believed that the Communists would be forced to accept terms for a coalition government if they could be politically and militarily isolated. At Yalta, on February 11, 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin signed the Far Eastern Agreement that granted territorial and economic concessions to the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan and support for the Nationalist Chinese Government. The Agreement stipulated that after Japans defeat, 1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian Peoples Republic) shall be preserved. 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz. a. the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union. b. the commercial port of Darien shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored. c. the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the SouthManchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Darien shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interest of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria. 3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.4

THE FAR EASTERN AGREEMENT

Lack of progress in the negotiations led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to seek a CCP-KMT settlement by securing Soviet recognition of both

ADVICE AND DISSENT

After Roosevelt had obtained Soviet agreement at Yalta to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance

Case 345, Part A

The United States and China, 1944-1946

with the National government of China, Hurley renewed his efforts to mediate a settlement while rejecting Chinese Communist requests for material with which to fight the Japanese. There was widespread consensus among U.S. Foreign Service officers in China that instead of reducing the likelihood of civil war, the current U.S. policy would probably precipitate it. At the end of February 1945, while Hurley was en route to Washington for consultations with the President, the U.S. embassys Foreign Service officers questioned the viability of U.S. policy in a cable to the State Department: The situation in China appears to be developing in some ways that are not conducive to effective prosecution of the war, nor to Chinas future peace and unity. 1. The recent American attempt through diplomatic and persuasive means [Hurleys mission] to assist compromise between the factions in China was a necessary first step in the handling of the problem. Unity was correctly taken to be the essence not only of the most effective conduct of the war by China but also of the peaceful and speedy emergence of a strong, united and democratic China. But the cessation of Japanese offensives, the opening of the road from China, the rapid development of our Army plans for rebuilding Chiangs armies, the increase of other assistance such as the War Production Board, the expectation that the Central Government will share in the making of important decisions at San Francisco, and belief that we are intent upon the definite support and strengthening of the Central Government alone . . . as the only possible channel for aid to other groupsthese circumstances have combined to increase greatly Chiangs feeling of strength and have resulted in unrealistic optimism on his part and lack of willingness to make any compromise. . . . 2. The Communists for their part have come to the conclusion that we are definitely committed to the support of Chiang alone, and that we will not force Chiangs hand in order to be able to aid or cooperate with them. In what they consider self-protection, they are . . . actively increasing their forces and aggressively expanding their areas southward. . . . In grasping time by the forelock, the Communists intend to take advantage of the isolation of East China by the Japanese

capture of the Canton-Hankow Railway, to make themselves as nearly invincible as possible before Chiangs new armies . . . are ready, and to present us the dilemma of accepting or refusing their aid if our forces land anywhere on the China coast. Communists close to the leaders are now talking of the necessity of their seeking Soviet assistance. . . . 3. Although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct, if this situation continues . . . chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated. Even for the present it is obvious that this situation, in which we are precluded from cooperation with the large, aggressive and strategically situated armies and organized population of the Communist areas . . . is unsatisfactory and hampering from a purely military standpoint. . . . Unless checked, this situation is apt to develop with increasing acceleration as the tempo of the war in China and the whole Far East is raised and the inevitable resolution of Chinas internal conflict becomes more urgent. The time is short and it will be dangerous to allow affairs to drift. 4. If the high military authorities of our Government agree that some cooperation with the Communists and other groups who have proved themselves willing and are in position to fight the Japanese is or will be necessary or desirable, we believe that the immediate and paramount consideration of military necessity should be made the basis for a further step in American policy. . . . The first step we propose for consideration is that the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan [emphasis added]. . . . We can assure the Generalissimo that we are not contemplating reducing our aid to the Central Government. . . . We may include in the statement that we will keep the Central Government informed of the extent and types of such aid. We can also tell the Generalissimo that we will be able to use the lever of our supplies and cooperation to limit independence and aggressive action on their part, restricting them to their present areas. And

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we can point out the advantages of having the Communists helped by us rather than seeking Russian aid or intervention, direct or indirect. [T]he Generalissimo . . . might also be told . . . that although our effort to persuade the various groups of the desirability of unification has failed and we can no longer delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war, we consider it obviously desirable that our military assistance to all groups be based on unity and the coordination of military command; that we are prepared to continue to lend our good offices to this end . . . and that while we believe that the proposal should come from the Generalissimo, we would be disposed to support: (1) The formation of . . . a supreme war council or war cabinet in which Communists and other groups would have effective representation and some share in responsibility for the formulation and execution of joint war plans, and (2) the nominal incorporation of Communist and other selected forces into the Central Government armies under the operational command of American officers designated by the Generalissimo on the advice of General Wedemeyer, on agreement by all parties that these troops would operate only within their present areas or specified extended areas. It should be made clear, however, that our decision to cooperate with any forces able to assist the war will not be delayed by or contingent on the completion of such internal Chinese arrangements. . . . The Generalissimo and his Government will not at this time on their own initiative take any forward step which will mean loss of face, prestige or personal power. The Communists will not, without guarantees in which they have confidence, take any forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual elimination of their forces upon which their present strength and future political existence depend. The step we propose taking will exert on both parties the force necessary to break this deadlock, and the modus operandi embodied in those two proposals should initiate concrete military and, as an inevitable result, political cooperation and accordingly provide a foundation for increasing future development toward unity. . . . Even though not made public, however, the fact of our assistance to the Communists and other forces would soon become generally known

throughout China. This, we believe, would have profound and desirable political effects in China. There is tremendous internal pressure in China for unity based on a reasonable compromise with the Communists and a chance for the presently repressed liberal groups to express themselves. . . . By these steps we would prove that we are not so committed [to the KMT], we would greatly raise the morale and prestige of these liberal groups, and we would exert the strongest possible influence through these internal forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions necessary to unity. There is no question that such a policy would be greatly welcomed by the vast majority of the Chinese people (although not by the very small reactionary minority in control of the Kuomintang) and that it would raise American prestige. . . . The majority of Chinese believe that the settlement of Chinas internal problem is not so much a matter of mutual concessions as reform of the Kuomintang itself. They also declare, with justification, that American non-intervention in China cannot help but be in fact intervention in favor of the present conservative leadership. Also by such policy, which we consider realistically accepts the facts in China, we could expect to secure the cooperation of all of Chinas forces in the war, to hold the Communists to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia . . . to convince the KMT of the undesirability of its apparent present plans for eventual civil war, and to bring about some unification which, even though not immediately complete, would provide the basis for peaceful future development toward full democracy.5 Hurley strongly opposed these recommendations. In a news conference on April 2, following a meeting with the President, Hurley reiterated the U.S. position of recognizing and supporting only the Nationalist Government. In response to a reporters question, Hurley denied that the Chinese Communists had ever requested military aid or political recognition from the United States.6

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CCP: HOW STRONG THE LINK?
President Roosevelts death and Harry S. Trumans assumption of the presidency in April marked no

Case 345, Part A

The United States and China, 1944-1946

immediate change in U.S. policy toward China. As the summer of 1945 progressed, and Hurleys efforts to mediate the Nationalist-Communist dispute continued with little result, the debate over U.S. policy toward China continued. John Paton Davies, a career foreign service officer and second secretary at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, again questioned the course of U.S. policy in a memorandum prepared for Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The son of missionary parents, Davies had been born and raised in China and had served in China as General Joseph Stillwells political officer from 1942 to 1945. In this memorandum of April 15, which briefed Harriman on one of Hurleys visits to Moscow, Davies pointed out the following: In attempting to estimate the course of future political and military developments in China, the following comments may be helpful. 1. Since the middle of the 19th Century China has been undergoing a revolutionpolitical, economic, military and social. Japans attack in 1937 caught China in mid passage between medievalism and modern statehood. The old had not died and the new had not been born. Japans aggression imposed an armistice on the contending forces in China seeking to shape that countrys destiny. But the internal conflicts have been too great. The truce has begun to break down. 2. The principal contending forces in China are: (a) The National Government. Although it is a one-party (Kuomintang) Government, the party and therefore the Governmentis not of a single mind. A left wing faction is sympathetic to immediate multiparty coalition government. However, all Government factions, for opportunistic and other reasons, are more or less committed to the Generalissimo and his resolve to create a unified state under his personal preceptorship. (b) Residual warlords. They are mostly in West China. Because they wish fully to recover their feudal rights, they are anti-Chungking and anticommunist. (c) Separatist elements in South China. These are composed of politicians and generals who, during last winter, established practically autonomous regimes. The most prominent of these leaders has been making overtures to the Communists. These elements are anti-Chungking.

(d) The League of Democratic Parties. The league is made up of several minority parties, individually of little strength but collectively significant, especially as the League has been working with the Communists. However, it is the only force here listed without troopsa critical weakness. (e) Chinese Communist Regime. The Chinese Communists are more than a Party. They are a de facto regime claiming about 650,000 square kilometers and 90 million people under their control and 600,000 regular troops, plus 1,500,000 militia. The Communists are the major challenge to Kuomintang supremacy. (f) The puppets.7 These outright opportunists, with an estimated 300,000 troops in Manchuria and 900,000 in China Proper, work for the highest bidder. When collaboration with the Japanese ceases to be profitable, they will offer their armies and civilian retinues to whomever they believe willing and able to assure them the best terms. For the puppets, the Communists will be difficult (but not impossible) to do business with. Chiang will probably grant more attractive terms because his need of puppet aid is greater and his attitude toward the collaborators more tolerant. Those puppets in Manchuria and much of North China will, however, scarcely be able to establish military contact with Chiangs forces and so will probably be compelled by circumstances to seek terms from the Communistsand possibly the Red Army. 3. In the confused Chinese domestic struggle, the Government-Communist conflict is paramount both in magnitude and future portent. The other forces tend to arrange themselves with one or the other of major contestants. 4. The prospect for the attainment of Chinese unity through negotiation would not seem to be bright. The central issue in Chiang-Communist negotiations has been the establishment of a coalition government. Chiang knows both the Kuomintang and Communists too well to accede to this seemingly innocent proposal. He knows that the Kuomintang is corrupt and vulnerable to boring from within. He knows that the Communists are so well organized and so well disciplined that they would sooner or later dominate the coalition. . . .

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Case 345, Part A

As for the Communists, they are not likely to compromise with Chiang on anything short of coalition. They would like coalition because it would mean a relatively cheap acquisition of control over most if not all of China. But if coalition is not forthcoming, they can afford to wait. The Communists reckon that time is on their side. Their steady expansion southward behind the Japanese advances of last year continued as they negotiated. Expansion and consolidation presumably still continue in North, Central, and South China. And then there is always the possibility of eventual positive support from the Soviet Union. 5. The prospect for the attainment of Chinese unity through military action by the Government is scarcely more hopeful. It is difficult to believe that Chiangs armies, even though rejuvenated by American supplies and training, can accomplish what the Japanese have, in nearly eight years of effort, failed to doeffectively conquer North China. With the solid support of the masses (which the Government armies do not have) the Communist forces may be expected at the very least to hold what they now have North of the Yellow River. Should the Red Army enter North China, the picture would radically change. In such an eventuality, we may anticipate that Chiangs troops could not and would not advance into that part of North China occupied by Soviet forces. Whatever action the Soviet Union may initiate, any serious attempt by Chiang to take over Communist areas by military measures will precipitate bitter and violent civil conflict. It is possible that with American help, Chiang can, over a period of years and at the cost of disruptive civil war, effectively conquer the Communist enclaves in the Yangtze Valley and South China. But most of North China would seem to be permanently lost to him. 6. If China cannot be unified under Chiang through either political or military measures, can his Government be strengthened to the extent that it will serve as a dependable balance and buffer in eastern Asia? The answer is: perhaps depending on (a) the extent of foreign support given him and (b) whether the Chinese Government is able to reform itself so that it commands positive popular backing.

The extent of foreign intervention required to set up Chiangs Government as a dependable balance and buffer should not be underestimated. Foreign underwriting of the Chinese Government militarily, economically and politically would be necessary. And on a scale which might well be repudiated by the electorates of the underwriting Governments. Nor should there be illusions regarding the fundamental weakness of Chiangs Kuomintang Government and its need of reform. It lacks active popular support. It has at present no program which promises to attract active popular support. It is venal, inefficient and stale. If it is to exist alongside a dynamic and disciplined Communist China and hope to survive, it must, in addition to receiving far-reaching foreign aid, radically reform itself. It is debatable whether the Kuomintang Government is at this late time capable of reforming itself. It may well be that, like the Bourbons, it has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. 7. What is the nature of the Communist regime? The Chinese Communist Party began as an instrument of Moscows policy of world revolution. With the Kremlins abandonment, however temporary, of that policy the Chinese Communists were left pretty much to shift for themselves. Realizing that their strength must be based on the masses and recognizing that the Chinese masses are composed of conservative individualistic peasants, they revised their platform in the direction of moderation. They adopted agrarian democracy as their immediate goal, socialism as their distant one. The trend in the direction of nationalist rather than international thinking was given further impetus by the formation of the United Front in 1937 and Japans invasion of China. This feeling has presumably been reinforced by the fact that the Chinese Communists have attained the status of a de facto regime and can look forward with some hope to functioning as the established administration of North China. Although Communist political leaders at Yenan will not admit any disappointment over the failure of the Kremlin to aid them while acting as lightning rod for the Soviet Union, they would scarcely be human if they did not feel some resentment on that score.

Case 345, Part A

The United States and China, 1944-1946

With the growth of the nationalist feeling among the Chinese Communists, the shabby treatment which they have received from the Kremlin during the past nine years and the possible prospect of the Red Army invading Manchuria and North China and Russian suzerainty being imposed on the Yenan regime, it would seem to be logical to assume that there are at least some elements among the Chinese Communists who might welcome foreign support designed to ensure the continuance of their expansion and independence. . . . 8. At this point it may be useful to examine the American position in relation to the problem of China. If we conclude that the Chinese Communist regime is here to stay; that China cannot be unified; and that we cannot with any assurance of success attempt to build up the Kuomintang Government as a balance and buffer in eastern Asia, is it worth our while to embark upon a policy of cooperation with and assistance to the Chinese Communists? Before discussing this question, it should be said that an affirmative answer does not imply abandonment of Chiangs Government. Presumably, such a policy would be predicated on the assumption that when dealing with as uncertain a situation as that which exists in China, it may be prudent not to commit all of our policy eggs to one basket. (a) In considering a possible American policy of cooperation with and assistance to the Chinese Communists, the first consideration is probably will the Chinese Communists be willing to cooperate with us on terms equal or better than those which they will extend to the Soviet Union? In other words, will they be voluntary creatures of Russian foreign policy? We do not know. And the operations of Communist-dominated regimes in Europe do not give us convincing indication of how the older and more self-sufficient Chinese Communist regime would react to American overtures. Further investigation of Moscow-Yenan ties by a competent observer at Yenan might throw more light on this important issue. What can be said at this juncture, however, is that if any communist regime is susceptible to political capture by the United States, it is Yenan [emphasis added].

(b) If we set out to formulate a policy of aid to and cooperation with the Chinese Communist regime, we should recognize that such a policy will involve competing with Russian drawingpower rather than seeking to block it off, as would be the case were we to bolster Chiang as a balance and buffer. To have any chance of success, such competition would in the economic field have to be on or about the same scale as now planned for Chiangs Government and in the cultural field on a greater scale. In so far as political considerations are concerned, there would not seem to be reason for large-scale military aid and cooperation. Finally, American aid and cooperation in all fields would be utterly abortive if not integrated under expert and resolute political direction. . . . 8

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET POLITICAL POLICY REGARDING CHINA

Davies assessment that the United States might be able to detach the Chinese Communists from the Soviet Union was questioned by Eldridge Dubrow, chief of the Division of Eastern European affairs, in a memo of May 10. Dubrow, a career foreign service officer with experience in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, regarded the Chinese Communists as an extension of Soviet Communism. While the Soviet Government has been preoccupied in the European war, it has not played a prominent part in China but has been content to permit the United States to take the lead in that area. It has, nevertheless, been following developments closely and through its encouragement of the Chinese Communists in central China it has maintained an effective apparatus in that country for future eventualities. . . . It is obvious that the Soviet Government does not look with favor on the Chungking Government and while they pay lip service to it now by continuing to recognize it they will in all probability endeavor to undermine its influence still further by either giving additional and substantial assistance to the Chinese Communists or if a coalition is effected between the Communist and Chungking Governments the Soviet authorities will immediately apply their well-perfected infiltration tactics to take over control of the coalition. Under present circumstances, they would undoubtedly prefer the latter course to civil war

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and, therefore, they may not be expected to oppose any efforts made by the United States to bring about such a coalition. On the basis of reports from American observers in Yenan, it is evident that the structure of the Communist Government is a replica of that of the Soviet Government. If and when the Soviet authorities decide to take a more active part in China, they will, if they wish to use it, have at their disposal an effective machine to build upon and expand their influence in a somewhat similar manner to the methods they have used in central and eastern Europe. The principal difference will be that they will be dealing with an agricultural population with a comparatively small number of urban workers. This fact may make their task more difficult since the Marxian appeal is usually more difficult of implementation with rural populations who by instinct are individualistic and only desire outside aid in order to increase their own individual well being and economic plight. The Soviet authorities, therefore, will champion a policy which will be directed to win over the peasantry by a well-integrated program of land reforms and promises of material aid for the rural population which will be implemented by some positive action coupled with a large share of glowing promises, which may be fulfilled later. Therefore, unless the Chungking Government can liberalize itself, [and] adopt a definite forwardlooking program . . . the chances are that the Communist-controlled groups will prevail in the end. It is evident that the Soviet authorities desire the complete destruction of Japan as a force in the East so that, as in the west, with the defeat of Germany there will not be any powerful force to either threaten the Soviet Union itself or prevent, or be in a position to hinder, the extension of Soviet influence in this region. . . . While we should in no case try to prevent the attainment of legitimate Soviet interests in China, we should in our own interests exert every effort to prevent Soviet influence from becoming predominant in China [emphasis added]. To do this, it would appear that we should bend every effort to bring about a liberalization of the Chungking Government, assist them in drawing up a positive program which would have a direct appeal to a large section of the population and assist them

financially and materially to carry out effectively such a program. The United States is in a position to furnish the material aid necessary to implement such a program while the Soviet Union is not. For this reason, the Soviet Government will find it difficult to give large-scale material assistance to the Communist elements in China in order to help them carry out their promises. If we, on the other hand, can furnish such material assistance to liberal non-Communist elements, many of whom may now, because of lack of faith in the present policies of Chungking, be fuming to the Communist groups, we should be in a position to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union in this area and start China on the path which should lead eventually to the creation of a truly liberal regime rather than the establishment of another proletarian dictatorship.9 The viewpoints of Davies and Dubrow, however different, were in stark contrast to those of Hurley. Following his meeting with Stalin in April 1945, Hurley reported that Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to Americas policy in China as outlined to him during the conversation. To Hurley, Stalin pledged his complete support for the unification of the armed forces of China with full recognition of the National Government under the leadership of Chiang Kaishek.10 In July 1945, with negotiations between Nationalist and Soviet representatives underway in Moscow for the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Hurley again expressed his conviction to the Secretary of State that the Chinese Communists could be pressured into accepting Nationalist terms. We are convinced that the influence of the Soviet will control the action of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communists do not believe that Stalin has agreed or will agree to support the National Government of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists still fully expect the Soviet to support the Chinese Communists against the National Government. . . . Nothing will change their opinion on this subject until a treaty has been signed between the Soviet and China in which the Soviet agrees to support the National Government. When the Chinese Communists are convinced that the Soviet is not supporting them, they will settle with the National Government if the National Government is realistic enough to make generous political

Case 345, Part A

The United States and China, 1944-1946

settlements. The negotiations between the National Government and the Communist Party at this time are merely marking time pending the result of the conference at Moscow. The leadership of the Communist Party is intelligent. When the handwriting is on the wall, they will be able to read. No amount of argument will change their position. Their attitude will be changed only by inexorable logic of events. The strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Communist has been exaggerated. The area of territory controlled by the Communists has been exaggerated. The number of Chinese people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated. State Department officials, Army officials, newspaper and radio publicity have in a large measure accepted the Communist leaders statements in regard to the military and political strength of the Communist Party in China. Nevertheless, with the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communists could bring about civil war in China. Without the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communist Party will eventually participate as a political party in the National Government.11 Hurleys optimism proved unfounded. Despite the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945, in which the Soviets pledged their moral, material, and military support to China and solely to the Chinese National Government, negotiations for a settlement between the Nationalists and Chinese Communists remained stalemated. Both sides clung to their respective positions: The Nationalists insisted that Maos Communist forces be incorporated into the Nationalist Army prior to any political reorganization of the government. The Communists, distrustful of Nationalist intentions, pressed their demands that any unification of the armies be preceded by political reform and a true sharing of political power. Efforts to avert a civil war through negotiation were overtaken by the Japanese surrender on August 14, which was followed by the outbreak of fighting between Nationalist and Communist forces.

U.S. INTERVENTION: THE MARINES IN CHINA AND THE MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
By mid-summer, with the war in the Pacific drawing to a close, a key issue facing U.S. policy makers was how to secure the surrender of the two million Japa-

nese and almost one million Japanese puppet troops in China. Given the stiff resistance encountered in the Pacific battles against the Japanese, and their apparent willingness to fight to the death, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planners were concerned that Japanese forces in China might continue to resist after the Japanese government in Tokyo had surrendered. The JCS believed that the Nationalist Chinese forces were incapable of effecting the timely surrender of Japanese forces in China without the employment of U.S. forces. The JCS feared that any Japanese troops remaining in China, assuming a political agreement between the Nationalists and Communists was not reached, would be sucked into the resulting civil war. On August 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander of U.S. Forces in China, to assist the Nationalist government in both securing the surrender of Japanese forces and restoring Nationalist control in the Japanese-occupied areas. In carrying out these directives, Wedemeyer was ordered to avoid involvement in fratricidal warfare. Five days later, President Truman, in General Order No. 1, directed that all Japanese forces in China surrender only to the forces of the Nationalist Government or its designated representatives. On August 19, in a cable to the Chief of Staff, Wedemeyer noted, Whereas the United States purported intent is to assist the Chinese Central Government in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese in China, actually in effect and concomitantly we are making an important contribution to preclude successful operations by Communist forces. Wedemeyer also warned that the use of U.S. transports to move Nationalist forces into the specified areas and the deployment of U.S. Marines ran the risk of involving U.S. personnel in clashes between Communist and Nationalist forces. In closing, he remarked that while U.S. personnel have been instructed to withdraw from the vicinity of clashes, he intended to employ U.S. combat air forces or other appropriate means . . . to carry out my mission and to protect American lives and property that may be endangered.12 Amid the concern over the deployment of U.S. Marines and the transport of Nationalist forces, T.V. Soong, the National Governments Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Washington. In a series of meetings with Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Soong requested the dispatch of a U.S. military mission to China to help train and advise the Nationalist forces.

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In a meeting with President Truman on September 7, Soong was informed by Truman that the State, War, and Navy Departments were studying the request. On October 22, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East outlined a program for sending a 4,000 man military advisory group to China. The program included a JCS proposal that consideration should be given to obtaining certain economic and military rights or concessions in return for U.S. support. Essential concessions, as outlined in the JCS proposal, included the following: China will impose no import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost, on material, equipment, supplies, or goods shipped by the U.S. . . . to be used or consumed by U.S. military personnel in China; U.S. service military or naval courts . . . will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of . . . the Military Advisory Group and over American nationals employed by or accompanying these forces; and the Chinese will agree that purchases from foreign powers other than the U.S. of arms, ammunition and military equipment will be made only after consultation with the . . . Group.13 Desirable concessions included the following: Preferential treatment for U.S. Government, citizens, and commercial organizations in respect of pipelines, roads, air bases, and other installations in China constructed by or at expense of United States, and Chinese agreement not to pursue or support any policy or measure, which has the effect of denying us access to, or the ready processing of strategic or critical raw materials either for current use or for future stockpiling.14 The JCS proposal elicited a sharp rebuttal from John Carter Vincent, an old China Hand and Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. The size and character of the Group, the statement of concessions desired, and the general tenor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, Vincent informed Secretary of State Byrnes on November 12, raise a question as to whether we are not moving toward establishment of a relationship with China which has some of the characteristics of a de facto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese army under our direction. Exploring the possible impact of such military assistance, Vincent noted, Chiang Kai-shek has in the past shown a decided preference for military methods, rather than political methods, in seeking a solution of internal difficulties in China. . . . Consequently, Vincent argued, It is not unreasonable to anticipate that American military assistance on the scale contemplated might encourage Chiang to continue along the line without promise of suc-

cess, and discourage attempts at unity by peaceful methods.15 Byrnes endorsed Vincents objections and implementation of the program was delayed for their consideration. By mid-October, fighting between Nationalist and Communist forces was reported in eleven of Chinas twenty-eight provinces. In the interim, almost 60,000 United States Marines had arrived in China to protect vital rail lines, ports, and airfields. On November 5, Wedemeyer reported that Nationalist forces were in a position to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in North China and he was prepared to begin the phased withdrawal of U.S. Marines from China. Wedemeyers cable sparked debate over when, and under what circumstances, the Marines were to be withdrawn. Everett Drumwright, former second secretary of the U.S. Embassy in China and current chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, responded on November 16 that the Marines should remain incountry and their mission be expanded to include supporting the movement of Nationalist forces into Manchuria.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA: A DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT THERETO
It will be clear that the situation in China has reached a critical state and that the developments of the next few weeks will have a momentous bearing on the future of China, of the Far East and the world. It is evident that the Chinese Communists are making a supreme effort to assert control of north China. It is becoming more and more clear that the Chinese Communists are, furthermore, making a strong bid to seize control of Manchuria. It appears that in this effort to absorb Manchuria, the Chinese Communists have been aided and abetted by the U.S.S.R. which has been in control of all or parts of Manchuria since about the middle of August 1945. Without Soviet assistance, it is difficult to see how the Chinese Communists could have become so securely entrenched in Manchuria as they appear to be today. . . . It is assumed that our primary objective in this uncertain and disordered worldcertainly prior to the establishment of an effective world organization to ensure world peaceis the promotion of the security of the United States.

Case 345, Part A

The United States and China, 1944-1946

11

What policy of policies should we follow with respect to China in order to attain this primary objectivethe security of the United States? It has been our traditional policy to advocate and support respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of China. As a corollary to that policy, we have sought the emergence of a strong, unified, progressive government in China. Since 1928 we, in common with the great majority of the Powers, have recognized the National Government of China as the legitimate government of China . . . . How may we best safeguard our security and interests in the light of developments in China as described above? We appear to be faced with two major alternatives: (1) to give vigorous and sustained support to the National Government to the end that it may obtain effective control of all parts of China, including Manchuria, or (2) withdrawal of our support from the National Government and of our armed forces and facilities from China. In the interests of our own security and peace and stability in the Far East, we should move resolutely and effectively to assist the National Government of China to effect restoration of the recovered areas of China, including Manchuria [emphasis added]. We appear to be on firm legal and moral grounds in pursuing such a policy, and its implementation will, it seems clear, offer the best opportunity for the unification of China and diminution of the possibility of foreign intervention. Failure to afford substantial assistance to the National Government in this respect is likely to result in the creation in Manchuria and perhaps in parts of north China and Inner Mongolia of a strongly entrenched Chinese Communist regime contiguous to the U.S.S.R. . . . Such a Communist regime could hardly be expected to regard the United States in a friendly light. The United States, bearing in mind the close ideological and other ties that exist between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., could scarcely, for its part, view the development of such a state, de facto or otherwise, with equanimity. Considering the character, the ideology and the past attitude of the Chinese Communists, it is difficult to perceive how American interests of any kind could flourish is such a Communist state. The creation of such a Communist state

would seem, in effect, to bring about a situation which in many important particulars would be little different from that obtaining before the defeat of Japan. Instead of a Japanese-dominated puppet regime we should probably find in its place one dominated by the U.S.S.R. Obviously such a development is neither one that was contemplated by us when we went to war with Japan nor one that will promote the security and interests of the United States. . . . It is submitted that in the implementation of our policies toward China we should be guided primarily . . . by considerations of our own security interests. Other considerations, such as democracy in China, questions as to the relative efficiency of the two contending factions, the questions of fratricidal strife, et cetera, would thus seem to be of secondary concern and should accordingly be so regarded at this time. It is submitted that any policy of American withdrawal from China at this juncture or of halfhearted assistance to China will destroy what we wish to achievea strong, united China with close and friendly attachments to the United States.16 Drumwrights assessment of Soviet intentions toward China was subsequently challenged by George R. Kennan, U.S. charg daffaires in the Soviet Union, who wrote the following to Secretary of State Byrnes on January 10, 1946: Since we note that interpretation of Soviet aims and tactics in China and of Soviet relations with Chinese Communists presented in some of [the] material received from Washington seems to reveal [an] imperfect understanding of this subject, we venture to set forth below [a] survey of these questions as seen from Moscow. . . . [The] USSR seeks predominant influence in China. It does so because, by revolutionary tradition, by nationalist ambition and by kinetic nature, Russia is an expansionist force. . . . It would be a mistake to assume that [the] USSR necessarily seeks in Manchuria [a] regime composed predominately of Yenan Communists. In most respects [the] USSR can perhaps be better served by docile opportunists of all colors of [the] political spectrum than by exclusively Yenan personnel who are ideologically acceptable but who

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as [a] result of their nationalist sentiments may prove headstrong. . . . We frankly do not know with any degree of certainty what [the] present relationship between Moscow and Yenan is. Although we have received convincing evidence of Moscow control over Communist parties in Europe, our files contain no evidence either proving or disproving that Yenan now receives and acts on Moscows orders. . . . We are quite prepared to believe that [the] Chinese CP [Communist Party] like other CPs is subservient to Moscow. Yet we hesitate to accept such an interpretation as definitive. We submit that Moscow-Yenan relations are more subtle and obscure [than] any in [international Communism]. We would not be surprised for example to learn that Yenan enjoyed what might seem to be a surprising degree of independence of Moscow. Our reasons are: 1. Chinese Communists have little reason to be grateful to [the] USSR. They have survived and grown not because of but despite relations with Moscow. Adherence to early Comintern directives resulted in near disaster for [the] CCP. And in [the] Sino-Jap[anese] conflict [the] USSR supplied only Chungking which used

some of those arms in blockading Yenan. Current Soviet stripping of Manchuria is plucking [the] plums on which Chinese Communists have long had their eye. 2. [The] Chinese Communist Party is [the] most mature of all Communist Parties and has developed its own brand of Marxism and indigenous traditions. 3. Chinese Communists are no fugitive band of conspirators. For 10 years they have had an established de facto regime, their own army and civil administration. Consequently, they have developed substantial vested interests. 4. Chinese Communists have taken on nationalist coloration. From 1936 to [the] Jap[anese] surrender they were confronted with and their propaganda concentrated against an external foe. Rapid expansion of their armed forces and civilian following was largely on [the] basis of nationalism. While foregoing factors would seem to represent forces tending to wean Yenan away from Moscow, it should be remembered that Yenan has no latitude of choice in its foreign relations. Events have tended to keep Yenan in or force it back intoSoviet orbit. . . .17

NOTES
1. Warren L. Cohen, 2d ed., Americas Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 171. 2. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, With Special Reference to the Period 19441949 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 71. 3. Ibid., p. 82. 4. Cohen, Americas Response to China, pp. 17576. 5. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 24246. The message was drafted by George A. Atcheson with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers at the embassy. 6. Ibid., pp. 31722. 7. Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. In February 1932, after seizing Manchuria, Japan sponsored the formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, which subsequently declared its independence from China. 8. Foreign Relations (1945), pp. 33438. 9. Ibid., pp. 86365. 10. United States Relations with China, pp. 958. 11. Foreign Relations (1945), pp. 43033. 12. Ibid., pp. 53133. 13. Ibid., pp. 58398. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., pp. 61517. 16. Ibid., pp. 62934. 17. Foreign Relations, vol. 9 (1946), pp. 11619.

Case 345, Part B

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 19441946
James R. Howard and David S. Painter

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
Do Not Duplicate This is Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use. It is available only through the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. 202-965-5735 (tel) 202-965-5811 (fax)

MARSHALLS MISSION
Although Truman and his advisers had no desire to involve the United States directly in a civil war, a divided China was inconsistent with U.S. policy objectives. Following the resignation of Ambassador Hurley on November 27, 1945, Truman chose to continue seeking a negotiated settlement by naming General George C. Marshall as Hurleys replacement. Truman also decided that the United States would continue supporting Nationalist forces in their bid to reoccupy North China and Manchuria. In a conversation with Secretary of State Byrnes, General Marshall, and Admiral Leahy on December 11, 1945, President Truman discussed at length the situation in China. General Marshall summarized the Presidents point of view. The President stated that he wished to have a clear and complete understanding among us as to just what was the basis on which I was to operate in China in representing him. Mr. Byrnes outlined the policy of this Government as he understood and advocated it. In effect he stated this, that first of all we, that is the Army and Navy, were being authorized to proceed at once with the arrangement of shipping for the transfer of the armies of the Generalissimo to Manchuria and for their logistical support; also for the evacuation of Japanese from China; and finally, though this was to be maintained in a status of secrecy, for the present, for the transfer of the Generalis-

simos troops into North China for the purpose, on our part, of releasing the Japanese forces in that area and facilitating their evacuation and deportation to Japan. Mr. Byrnes stated that the reason for holding secret for the present the preparations for the movement of the Generalissimos troops into North China was to enable General Marshall to utilize that uncertainty for the purpose of bringing influence to bear both on the Generalissimo and the Communist leaders toward concluding a successful negotiation for the termination of hostilities, and the development of a broad unified Chinese government. The President stated his concurrence with the proposition outlined by Mr. Byrnes and informed General Marshall that he would back him in his . . . efforts whatever they might be to bring about the desired result. General Marshall stated that his understanding then was that he would do his best to influence the Generalissimo to make reasonable concessions in his negotiations with the democratic and communist leaders, holding in abeyance the information that this Government was actually preparing shipping to assist the Generalissimo in moving his troops into North China for the purpose of releasing the Japanese in that region and, incidentally, taking over control of the railroads.

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That, on the other hand, General Marshall, was to utilize the same uncertainty as to the attitude of our Government toward the establishment of the Generalissimos troops in North China in the effort to bring the Communist leaders to the point of making reasonable concessions in order to bring about desirable political unification. That in the event that the Communist leaders refused to make what, in General Marshalls opinion, were reasonable concessions, he was authorized to back the Generalissimo by assisting in the movement of troops into the region. . . . Finally General Marshall stated, that if the Generalissimo, in his [General Marshalls] opinion, failed to make reasonable concessions, and this resulted in the breakdown of efforts to secure political unification, and the U.S. abandoned continued support of the Generalissimo, there would follow the tragic consequence of a divided China and of a probable Russian reassumption of power in Manchuria, the combined effect of this resulting in the defeat or loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific. Under these circumstances, General Marshall inquired whether or not it was intended for him, in that unfortunate eventuality, to go ahead and assist the Generalissimo in the movement of troops into North China. . . . The President and Mr. Byrnes concurred . . . [that] we would have to back the Generalissimo to the extent of assisting him to move troops into North China in order that the evacuation of the Japanese might be completed. There was some discussion and Mr. Byrnes restated the policy of this Government adding specifically that it was not the purpose of the U.S. to send additional troops, divisionshe mentioned, to China, that he was opposed to that and that it would be contrary to the expressions of policy he had made public up to this time. The President agreed with this point of view. . . .1 About another conversation with President Truman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson three days later, General Marshall noted the following: The President handed me a final draft of his letter of instructions. . . . I stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing . . . that in the

event that I was unable to secure necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of Chinathrough the Generalissimo. . . . The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of this direction. . . . The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, confirmed this as his understanding of my directions. . . .2 On December 15, President Truman outlined U.S. policy toward China in a public statement: It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation [emphasis added]. The Government of the United States believes it essential: (1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces. (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strifea solution which will bring about the unification of China.

Case 345, Part B

The United States and China, 1944-1946

15

The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China. . . . In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove [the] possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States Marines are in North China for that purpose. The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China. The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of the Republic of China is a one-party government and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation

in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party political tutelage established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively in to the Chinese National Army. . . .3 Marshalls first efforts at mediation were rewarded with the successful negotiation of agreements in January and February that seemed to offer hope for a peaceful settlement of Nationalist-Communist differences. On January 10, 1946, an agreement for the cessation of hostilities between both sides was reached. The agreement provided for the establishment of a joint Executive Headquarters in Peking to enforce the truce, and it stipulated that all troop movements were to cease. With CCP concurrence, however, Nationalist forces were free to continue moving into Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945. On January 31, the Political Consultative Conference (PCC), involving representatives of almost every political faction in China, adopted a series of resolutions providing for the establishment of an interim coalition government, the convening of a National Assembly in May to adopt a constitution, and the guarantee of civil rights. One month later, on February 25, a third agreement was reached detailing a program for the integration of Nationalist and Communist forces into a unified national army subordinate to the civilian government. Initially hailed by both the Nationalists and Communists as a major breakthrough in the effort to avert a civil war, the spirit of compromise was quickly undermined by the situation in Manchuria, where both sides continued to consolidate their positions. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region in April soon created a vacuum both sides sought to fill, leading to new clashes between Nationalist and Communist forces. A temporary truce halting the fighting in Manchuria, negotiated by Marshall in early June, collapsed in early July as a result of Chiang Kai-sheks decision to force a settlement by military means.

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Chiangs decision was apparently based on his growing belief that the United States would not abandon the Nationalist government, or permit a Communist victory in China, even if the Nationalist government was responsible for initiating a full-scale civil war. In reaction, Marshall, unable to convince Chiang to alter his course, requested an embargo on the shipment of all arms and munitions to China. Marshalls request was approved by President Truman, who explained his decision in a letter to the Generalissimo early in August: The rapidly deteriorating political situation in China, during recent months, has been a cause of grave concern to the American people. While it is the continued hope of the United States that an influential and democratic China can still be achieved under your leadership, I would be less than honest if I did not point out that latest developments have forced me to the conclusion that the selfish interests of extremist elements, both in the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, are obstructing the aspirations of the people of China. A far sighted step toward the achievement of national unity and democracy was acclaimed in the United States when the agreements were reached on January 31st [1946] by the Political Consultative Conference. Disappointment over failure to implement the agreements of the PCC by concrete measures is becoming an important factor in the American outlook with regard to China. In the United States, there now exists an increasing school of thought which maintains that our whole policy toward China must be re-examined in the light of spreading strife, and notably by evidence of the increasing trend to suppress the expression of liberal views among intellectuals as well as freedom of the press . . . and there is increasing belief that an attempt is being made to resort to force, military or secret police rather than democratic processes to settle major social issues. The firm desire of the people of the United States and of the American Government is still to help China achieve lasting peace and a stable economy under a truly democratic government. . . . It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous attitude toward your

nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of Chinas internal problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America. I earnestly hope that in the near future I may receive some encouraging word from you which will facilitate the achievement of our mutually declared aims.4 On August 30, 1946, the United States concluded with the National Government of China an agreement for the sale of $500 million worth of U.S. military surplus supplies and equipment. Although the sale did not include arms or ammunition, the Chinese Communist Party claimed in a memorandum to Marshall two weeks later that the Nationalists were using these supplies solely in the civil war effort. Marshall later had to concede to Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communists chief negotiator, that the Nationalists were in fact reselling the material to finance the purchase of weapons and munitions. Dear General Marshall, Your mediation in Chinas internal dispute has been generally acknowledged as a great success during the first three months after your arrival. However, this initial success was not made lasting and your efforts were nullified by the fact that the Kuomintang Government soon tore the agreements to pieces and carried the war from Manchuria into China proper, which quickly assumed the nature of an all-out offensive against all Communist-led Liberated Areas. . . . In analyzing this grave situation, one cannot fail to draw the conclusion that the one-sided American financial and war and otherwise material assistance to the Kuomintang Government, even viewed singularly, has contributed much to the civil war policy of the Government authorities. I wish to recall that, as far as is known, since the Sino-Japanese War the U.S. Government has granted to China 14 loans with a total credit of US $1,314,590,000; this plus other account transfers now leave at the disposal of the Chinese Government a deposit of US $700,000,000 in the United States. In addition to that, according to a despatch datelined Washington July 21, the U.S. Government has since 1942 under the Lend Lease Act delivered to China a total of over US

Case 345, Part B

The United States and China, 1944-1946

17

$1,500,000,000 worth of arms and war-supplies, about three-fifths of which was made available since the V-J day. During the past twelve months the Kuomintang Government has made ruthless use of these vast resources practically all for supporting its full-fledged civil war and nothing else. Most recently, while the civil war is reaching its pitch, the U.S. Government has concluded with the Kuomintang Government an additional agreement governing the sale of US $825,000,000 worth of surpluses and equipment, which being tantamount to adding fuel to flame would evoke nothing but agitation and bitter resentment among the Chinese people. I wish further to draw your attention to the fact that such moves on part of the U.S. Government are inconsistent with its enunciated policy toward China, as was specifically expressed in the following words of President Trumans statement of December 15 last: United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. As early as the Chinese Communist Party learned that a negotiation for the sale of surpluses was underway, it filed a protest on August 23 with you, as representative of the U.S. Government to China, voicing opposition to the sale at this moment and pointing out the serious consequences involved therein. Notwithstanding our protest, the deal was concluded on August 31. I am therefore again instructed on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the 140,000,000 population in the Communist-led Liberated Areas to lodge a formal protest through you to the U.S. Government over this sale and demand that the U.S. Government would freeze up all supplies, shipping, etc. covered by this agreement pending a settlement at the time when peace and unity is restored and a coalition government is initiated in China. . . .5 The August sale of equipment, coupled with Trumans decision in February 1946 to authorize the establishment of a U.S. Military Advisory Group although smaller than the one first proposed in October 1945contributed to both Chiangs determination to continue seeking a military solution and the Chinese Communists growing perception that further negotiation was pointless. Marshalls efforts at continued mediation collapsed in mid-October following the success of a Nationalist offensive in Chahar Province. In a September 30 memorandum, Chou had warned Marshall that if Nationalist mili-

tary operations were not halted, the Chinese Communist Party feels itself forced to presume that the Government is thereby giving public announcement of a total national split, and that it has ultimately abandoned its pronounced policy of peaceful settlement.6 On November 19, the Communist delegation broke off further negotiations. General Marshall, with the concurrence of Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, requested the phased withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from North China before they became entangled in a full-scale civil war. On December 1, Marshall met with Chiang Kaishek. Attempting to dissuade the Nationalist leader from using force to settle KMT-CCP differences, Marshall warned that the Communists were too strong to defeat militarily and argued the necessity of resuming negotiations. About the meeting, Marshall stated the following: The Generalissimo opened the meeting by asking me what was to be done in the present situation; the Communists not having replied to my question as to whether or not I continued to be acceptable to them in the role of mediator and also considering their refusal to participate in the National Assembly or in further negotiations. I outlined at length the various developments which had led to the present situation emphasizing the fact, in my opinion, that the complete distrust of the Government in the good intentions of the Communists of last Spring had now been replaced by an overwhelming distrust on the part of the Communists of the good intent of any proposal of the Government towards a pacific settlement of differences. . . . I summed up the situation with the comment that the Communists were too large a military and too large a civil force to be ignored; that even if one disregarded the brutality of the inevitable procedure they could not be eliminated. Therefore, it was imperative that the efforts to bring them into the Government should continue and the greatest care should be taken to avoid having military action disrupt the procedure of negotiations. The Generalissimo replied in a statement of more than an hour. He expressed again his firm conviction that the Communists never intended to cooperate with the Government; that they were acting under Soviet influence; that their purpose

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was to disrupt the Government and to influence its foreign policy. . . . The Generalissimo stated that he felt that it was necessary to destroy the Communist military forces. If that were done there would not be great difficulty in handling the Communist question. He estimated that some eight to ten months would be required for this purpose. . . . The Generalissimo then expressed the opinion that I should consider that my mission was not exclusively confined to bringing the Central Government and the Communist Party together, that now that the Communists had displayed an unwillingness to cooperate, my role should be to facilitate the development of stability in the present Government of China and in the Far East. ... I did not discuss what to me was of vital concern and that was the collapse of the Kuomintang Party and the growing disapproval of the people in the character of government or misgovernment the party was giving the country.7 On December 18, 1946, President Truman, in a public statement on U.S. policy toward China, reaffirmed that a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace. Recounting Marshalls unsuccessful attempts to mediate a peaceful solution of Chinas internal difficulties, he noted that the plans for political and military unification agreed to in January and February, although never implemented, remained fundamentally sound. Noting that our position is clear, Truman declared that the United States remained pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China.8 Three weeks later, Truman recalled Marshall to Washington. Upon his departure, Marshall released a statement outlining the reasons behind the breakdown in negotiations between the Nationalists and Chinese Communists. In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other. On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of

government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type. The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government of the type endorsed by the Political Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new government and intended by coercion of military force and the action of a secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation. They each sought only to take counsel of their own fears. . . . I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government . . . there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. . . . They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperations by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. . . . On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists . . . men who put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuom-

Case 345, Part B

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intang and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. . . . Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13th which the Government could not be expected to accept. Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerilla action against the long lines of rail communications regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people. The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in

the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government. In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted. Soon the Government in China will undergo major reorganization pending the coming into force of the constitution following the elections to be completed before Christmas Day 1947. Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government. . . . It has been stated officially and categorically that the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is at an end. If the termination of oneparty rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial support from the Government. I have spoken very frankly because in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the United States to even a partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.9

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James R. Howard and David S. Painter

Case 345, Part B

NOTES
1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 768. 2. Ibid., p. 770. 3. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, With Special Reference to the Period 19441949 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 60709.

4. George C. Marshall and Lyman P. Van Slyke, Marshalls Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947 (Arlington, Virginia: University Publications of America, 1976), pp. 38182. 5. Ibid., pp. 39597. 6. Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 10 (1946), pp. 25859. 7. Ibid., pp. 57578. 8. Marshalls Mission to China, pp. 48189. 9. Ibid., pp. 51621.

APPENDIX Two Opinions

Later in 1947, two articles contrasted two different points of view on U.S. policy toward China. In a July 21, 1947, editorial entitled Gamblers Choice in China, the New Republic outlined its perspective on U.S. policy: To face the future in China requires of America a certain amount of courage. No likely solution will please our ethics or tradition. All we can seek is the solution that will be the least dangerous and costly. Two ruthless groups are contending for the control of the people of China. Chiang rests on terror and American support; his terror is tempered by no return of more rice, more land or better living to the people. The Communists who contend with Chiang are ruthless men, too. But in return for the sacrifices they demand of the people, they give control of the land to the people who till it. The policy advocated by those who demand support for Chiang is based upon these assumptions: that no matter how embarrassing Chiangs political countenance, he is good because he hates Communists; that communism everywhere is the same brutal conspiracy; that, finally, all Communists everywhere are tools of Moscow. All of these assumptions need careful study. Chiang, to be sure, hates Communistsbut that in itself does not make him good. Hitler, too, hated Communists. Communism, to be sure, has brutality sealed in the core of it; but in China, Chiang Kai-shek is far more brutal. The last assumptionthat all Communists are tools of Moscowis the most dangerous. Beyond doubt the Chinese Communists are a Communist Party of the classic Marxist model. But they have a history of bitter disagreement with Moscow. The Chinese Communist Party has been riven again and again by the struggle between doctrinaire followers of the Kremlin and men who give their first allegiance to China herself. In China, the present leadership of the party is in the hands of native Chinese, not Moscow functionaries. When the Kremlin presses too closely, Chinese Communists rebel. Mao Tse-tung has in the past gone so far as to imprison Comintern representatives and to force their Chinese adherents out of his policy committee. Nothing we can do will create democracy in China. A policy of nickel-and-dime aid cannot salvage Chiang from defeatit must eventually force the Chinese Communists to seek aid in Moscow and commit their entire policy to Moscows direction. . . . The only policy left is one of complete withdrawal, a hands-off gamble. This gamble can mean that China relapses into unending strife and chaos, proving to the world that China as yet lacks the makings of greatness. Or, it can mean that the Chinese people will choose their own leadership and that this leadership will be responsible to Chinese interests alone, not to the military security of either the United States or the Soviet Union. This is an uncertain gamble; but these are the best alternatives that history can give us in this age of struggle. Under the title China: A Report to the American People, William C. Bullitt, the former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote the following in Life magazine in October 1947:

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To prevent the domination of China by any nation which might eventually mobilize the 450,000,000 Chinese for war against us is a vital interest of the United States. Today Soviet Imperialism, using the Chinese Communists as instruments of its power politics, is striving to make China a Soviet satellite. In selfdefense, therefore, we must keep China out of the hands of Stalin. But by what means?. . . . The problem must be attacked at once on three fronts: (1) economic and financial; (2) military; (3) political. Since the essence of the problem is the ejection of every armed Communist from China, an intelligent project can only be based on an estimate of the time it will take to win the war. American military experts believe that this may take three years. Let us try to sketch a Three-Year Plan and estimate its cost. 1. During the next three years China will need large quantities of American cotton, tobacco, wheat, oil, gasoline, and many manufactured articles, from locomotives to spare parts for trucks. She will, therefore, need credits. The highest figure for such necessary credits given by American and Chinese economic experts is $250,000,000 a yeara tiny fraction of Europes requirements. Let us scale that down to $200,000,000, and budget for our total Three-Year Plan $600,000,000 of credits for purchases in the United States. . . . 2. According to estimates of the ablest American and Chinese military men, to drive out of Manchuria the 350,000 Communists will require reequipment of the Chinese divisions which now have worn out American arms, and also the training and equipment of ten new divisions. In North China the problem is one of cornering guerrillas. For this purpose light-armed, fast-moving troops are needed. American and Chinese

officers estimate that 20 divisions properly equipped should be able to clean up North China. Even a small air force would greatly facilitate operations in both North China and Manchuria. We have thousands of planes which are obsolete and valueless in terms of our air force but firstrate material for the Chinese. To declassify this material and turn it over the Chinese would cost us nothing. The total cost to the United States of the military element in this Three-Year Plan would probably be no more that $200,000,000 a year $600,000,000 in all. . . . 3. But all this aid will be ineffective unless the Chinese, in addition to supplying the men who fight and die, can revitalize their political life, arouse a new spirit in the country, and raise morale in the army. Can we help them to do that, or will suggestions from us be considered impertinent? They will not be, if they are made by the right man in the right way. We have in the Far East today a general who possesses the military knowledge, political skill, and personal magnitude to organize such cooperation. If President Truman were to ask General MacArthur to add to his present duties and powers the title of Personal Representative of the President and the rank of Ambassador, and to organize with the Generalissimo a joint plan to prevent the subjugation of China by the Soviet Union, the whole Far Eastern horizon would brighten with hope. If China falls into the hands of Stalin, all Asia, including Japan, sooner or later will fall into his hands. The man power and resources of Asia will be mobilized against us. The independence of the United States will not live a generation longer than the independence of China.