Factors Shaping Pakistans Foreign Policy By Dr Ishtiaq Ahmad

Pakistans foreign policy, like that of any country, is influenced by a host of factors, which have domestic, regional and international dimensions. Given the limitations imposed especially by geography and history, the broader orientation of the policy reflects continuity. However, since the process of foreign policy formulation is also determined by current considerations and future motivations, its specific aspects do overtime experience visible change. In this context, perhaps the most challenging factor is the countrys unique location in South Asiabetween the Himalayan peaks linking it with China and the Indian Ocean making it proximate to the oil rich Persian Gulf; and sharing long borders with India on the east, and Afghanistan and Iran on the west. However, the same factor offers the country enormous opportunities. Decades-old conflicts in the region, such as Kashmir, which has caused several wars and standoffs between India and Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which has seen successive rounds of warfare in the last over three decades, have essentially produced a situation whereby the countrys security establishment plays a determining role regarding core its foreign policy areas such as the nuclear issue and relations with India, Afghanistan and the United States. Criticize Pakistan, if you will, over why its security establishment dominates foreign policy, or, for that matter, domestic politics! However, a logical analysis of the countrys historical evolution since independence suggests that it has mostly been confronted with rather difficult and potentially threatening circumstantial realities limiting the national choice for a democratic system and a foreign policy decision making led by civilian governments. There are, indeed, consequences when a countrys foreign policy, as well as domestic politics, is not consistently shaped by civilian forces. These consequences are, for instance, visible in Pakistans current preference for employing force to quell insurgency or combat terrorism, rather than adopting broader political economic and social measures towards the same end. However, again, the countrys long borders and unbreakable ethnic bond with Afghanistan, where a full-fledged international war has been underway in the last nearly a decade, makes the use of force an absolutely essential means of safeguarding national security. The same holds true for the general notion about Pakistans foreign policy being Indocentric. There is no doubt that the countrys security establishment generally has a final say when it comes to relations with India. It is equally true, however, that the same has mostly been the case even during successive civilian regimes of the 50s, 70s and the 90s. However, there have been several instances of civil-military differences over relations with India; for instance, at present, the leaders of both the mainstream political parties, the ruling PPP and the opposition PML-N, see no harm in pursuing peace process with India. As for the security establishments approach towards the issue, it must be different. In its perception, the pursuit of peace process with India is futile in the absence of any meaningful gesture from New Delhi that it is serious in negotiating an amicable settlement of Kashmir with Pakistan. There appears to be no change in Indias post-9/11 policy of isolating Pakistan by questioning its credibility in combating terrorism. Even during the former regime of President Musharraf, who, despite leading the countrys security establishment, initiated a peace process with India, a course that we can generally expect its civilian leaders to take.

In retrospect, while there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the shaping of Pakistans Indo-centric foreign policy approach, just as in the case of the countrys policy towards Afghanistan, what India does or is unwilling to do, in its relations with Pakistan is a major factor shaping the perceptions and approaches of latters security establishment and governing leadership. On the more than one occasion since 9/11, for instance, India has raised security stakes for Pakistan on its eastern borders, especially at a time when Pakistani army and paramilitary has been engaged in combating al-Qaeda and Taliban. If one part of this battle is motivated by Pakistans domestic security consideration, the other is guided by the requirements of the US-led international war against terrorism in the region, especially Afghanistan. Obviously, when a country is faced with an existential threat from non-state insurgentterrorists inside and across its western borders with Afghanistan, the recurrent emergence of a third source of security danger from traditional foe India in the east must be worrisome for the security establishment. If this is not enough, at least in the latters perception, there is significant increase in Indias clout in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Sand-witched between two hostile states is the last probability that any countrys security establishment can contemplate. It is, therefore, extremely important that if and when the peace process between India and Pakistan gets in vogue, it will be founded on concrete assurance by each side of guaranteeing the legitimate mutual interests in the region. Since Pakistani tribal regions bordering Afghanistan and Afghanistans eastern and southern areas are lived by Pashtuns, both parts ridden with insurgency and terrorism, Islamabad should naturally be expected to pursue a reconciliation inside Afghanistan whereby legitimate political, economic and security aspirations of the majority Afghan Pashtun population are accommodated. If Indias security establishment perceives such settlement in Afghanistan as problematic for itself in the region, then it leads to a conflict of interest between New Delhi and Islamabad over the conflict resolution in Afghanistan. In this context, it does not matter whether the civilian government or the security establishment is at the helm of Pakistans Afghan policy. The countrys unique historical, geographical and ethnic links with Afghanistan entail that the conflict in Afghanistan is resolved in accordance with the countrys complex ethnic composition. For its part, Pakistan cannot expect India to move credibly on the path to peace without addressing New Delhis legitimate security concerns regarding the continued presence of outlawed non-state actors such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) in Pakistan accused of perpetrating the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. So, in the end, it all comes down to quidpro-quo in determining whether and how far ties between countries move from hostility to completion to cooperation. But, then, the situation, especially in a theatre of global geo-politics and violent regional and international struggles that accompanies it, is generally so complex that its explanation without ifs and buts tends to be rather simplistic. For instance, with reference to the outlawed insurgent-terrorist groups like LeT or the Haqqani Network, allegedly using North Waziristan as a safe haven to attack Afghan and foreign troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan is often accused of deliberately overlooking their violent activities or even acting as a collaborator. Whatever the truth, if the ground realities are rationally analysed, there is indeed some scope for alternative explanation. Consider, for example, the possibility that the very forces

which Pakistans security establishment nurtured in the 90s to bleed India in Kashmir may have become a Frankenstein Monster for it in recent yearsjust as the Arab Mujahideen became for the United States in the form of al-Qaeda! Thus, rather than being unwilling to do as much as India or the United States expect from Pakistani counter-terrorism campaignwhat to speak of collaboratingthe security establishment may be helpless in tackling self-created forces of insurgency and terrorism. In other words, it may be a simple case of former friends becoming current foes. Suppose the accusation that Pakistani security establishment is unwilling to combat the forces of insurgency and terror inside its territory is true. Even the justification for such unwillingness can, at least to some extent, can be rationally analysed. For example, like any other country, Pakistan can be expected to first attack those like home-grown Taliban groups who are attacking its soldiers and civilians. Once the existential threat they pose to the country is fully dealt with, only then it will be able to focus on terrorist-insurgent groups using Pakistani territory to commit insurgency in Afghanistan and terrorism in India. Again, if and when the times arises for the second leg of Pakistans counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism campaign, its resoluteness should depend upon how far Kabul and US-led international forces in Afghanistan are willing to serve Pakistans legitimate security concerns and interests in the country, especially in terms of any future process to resolve the Afghan conflict. The same, or even more, holds true in the case of India: how far it is willing to go to address, for instance, Pakistans legitimate demand of settling Kashmir.