UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY EMPLOYERS Non-Membership or Withdrawal from Union VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (VISTRANCO) andRAFAEL XAUDARO,

petitioners, vs. CIR, UNITED WORKERS' & FARMERS' ASSN. (UWFA) VENANCIO DANOOG,BUENAVENTURA AGARCIO and 137 others, respondents.G.R. No. L-21696; February 25, 1967; CONCEPCION, C.J. Facts: VISTRANCO is engaged in the loading and unloading of vessels, with a branch office inH i n i g a r a n , N e g r o s O c c i d e n t a l , u n d e r t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f R a f a e l X a u d a r o . I t s w o r k e r s a r e supplied by the United Workers and Farmers Association (UWFA) whose men (affiliated tovarious labor unions) have regularly worked as laborers of the Company during every millingseason since immediately after World War II up to the milling season immediately precedingNovember 11, 1955, when the Company refused to engage the services of Venancio Dano-og,Buenaventura, Agarcio and 137 other persons. At the behest of the UWFA and theComplainants, a complaint for unfair labor practice was, accordingly, filed against the Companyand Xaudaro with the CIR which ruled that the company is guilty of unfair labor practice henceordered the company to ceases and desist from such unfair labor practice and to reinstate thecomplainants with back wages. The said order was affirmed by CIR en banc. Issue: Whether or not VISTRANCO is guilty of unfair labor practice. Held:Yes. The said charge is substantially borne out by the evidence of record, it appearingthat the workers not admitted to work beginning from November, 1955, were precisely thosebelonging to the UWFA and the Mr. Xaudaro, the Company Branch Manager, had told thempoint-blank that severance of their connection with the UWFA was the remedy, if they wanted tocontinue working with the Company.The order and resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed.

Company Domination PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JORGE L. ARANETA, JUDY A.ROXAS, MANUEL B. JOVER , RAMON LLORENTE and PROGRESSIVEEMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners, vs.

CIR and ARANETA COLISEUM EMPLOYEES ASSN., respondents.G.R. No. L-39546; November 29, 1977; FERNANDEZ, J.: Facts: Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a legitimate labor organization inbehalf of forty-eight (48) members, instituted a case for unfair labor practice in the CIR againstProgressive Development Corporation (PDC), operating the Araneta Coliseum, Jorge Araneta,Judy A. Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as officers of the corporation PDC andProgressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor organization existing in the PDC. The complaintalleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to disauthorize the counsel of thecomplainant ACEA from appearing in a union conference with the company; that the supervisorsof PDC encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the Progressive Employees Union (PEU)and coerced the employees, particularly the individual complainants, to disaffiliate from thecomplainant union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and August 1962 the respondents,petitioners herein, discriminated against the individual complainants by either not giving themtheir working schedules, lessening their number of working days and eventually dismissing themfrom their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their union and join theProgressive Employees Union.T h e C I R r u l e d t h a t t h e c o m p a n y i s g u i l t y o f u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e h e n c e o r d e r e d t h e company to ceases and desist from such unfair labor practice and to reinstate the complainantswith back wages. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice. Held:Yes. From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were dismissedbecause they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to affiliatewith the Progressive Employees Union which was being aided and abetted by the ProgressiveDevelopment Corporation. There is reason to believe that had the individual complainants agreedto resign from the ACEA and to transfer to the PEU, they would not have been separated fromt h e i r w o r k a n d w o u l d e v e n h a v e b e e n m a d e p e r m a n e n t e m p l o y e e s . P r o g r e s s i v e E m p l o y e e s Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner corporation's dislike for the Araneta ColiseumEmployees Association and to stave off the latter's recognition.The petitioners were correctly found to have committed acts constituting unfair labor practice. Dismissal-Union Activities ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE NLRC, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, DIONISIO ESTIOCA and THESTRIKERS, respondents.G.R. No. L-82088; October 13, 1989; GRINO-AQUINO, J.: Facts: Dionisio Estioca, supervisor of the company and president of the union, NFL posted anannouncement on the bulletin board of the employees' coffee shop

criticizing the Company for having earmarked the sum of P250,000 for the inter-department athletic tournament (which hec a l l e d " a f a r c e a n d baloony") to be held that year, instead of using the money to pay t h e employees' claims for living allowance. He urged the employees to boycott the sports event.S u b s e q u e n t l y h e w a s terminated by the company for loss of trust and confidence i n h i m . Thereafter, the union after filing a notice of strike with the Regional Director of the MOLE inZamboanga City stuck. Meanwhile the company asked the MOLE for arbitration. Estioca filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The Minister of Labor certified the labor disputeto the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In obedience to the Secretary's order, the strikers triedto return to work on August 19, 1982, but were rebuffed by the Company. Backtracking from itsearlier request for compulsory arbitration, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration of theMinister's order on the pretext that there was nothing more to arbitrate because the strikers hadbeen dismissed. When its MR was denied, the Company brought the matter up to SC which ruledthat the company must respect the right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume their respectivepositions as of the time the strike was called. Pursuant thereto the NLRC on September 27, 1988,ordered the Company to readmit the striking employees including those who had been dismissed.The Company alleged that the positions of the dismissed strikers had been filled up.In the meantime, Estioca's complaint for illegal dismissal had also reached the SC.TheSC consolidated the cases and it required the NLRC to hold a formal hearing to determine thelegality of the strike and the dismissal of Estioca and other incidental questions. Complying withthat directive, the NLRC held hearings where evidence were presented by both sides. Later,NLRC reiterated its earlier decision. Issue: Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice. Held:Yes. Celso Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager,respectively called the employees on separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked themto withdraw their membership from the union. The company also dismissed Dionisio Estioca,which is too harsh in view of Estioca's subsequent apology for his action in posting a bellicoseannouncement critical of the Company and based on false or erroneous information.Union busting, or interference with the formation of a union, constitutes an unfair labor practice (Art 248, subpar. 4, Labor Code), hence a valid ground for the declaration of a strike.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004 Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that

there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers. Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. the unions proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its employee to selforganization. UNIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; STRIKES; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., ET AL. VS. JOSEPHINE JULIAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004 Facts: On November 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), sent a letter to Rosario Apacible, treasurer and general manager of Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine Marketing Corporation and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. The letter informed her that the rank-and-file employees of the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP and demanded that it be recognized. After such notice, the following three cases arose: In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and Jecina Burabod, a Board Member and a member of the said union, were dismissed. They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter alleging that their employer had not paid them with their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13th month pay for the year 1994 salaries for services actually rendered, and that illegal deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond. Stamford alleged that the three were dismissed for not reporting for work when required to do so and for not giving notice or explanation when asked. In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50 employees allegedly dismissed illegally for union membership by the petitioners, a case for unfair labor practice against GSP which denied such averments. GSP countered that the BLR did not list Apacible Enterprises Employees Union as a local chapter of PACIWU or TUCP. Thus, the strike that said union organized after the GSP refused to negotiate with them was illegal and that they refused to return to work when asked. The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees dismissed in the second case. Petitioner corporations, however, maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents. The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent corporations were under one management.

First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was ordered to reinstate the complainants as well as pay the backwages and other benefits claimed. It was held that the reassignment and transfer of the complainants were forms of interference in the formation and membership of a union, an unfair labor practice. Stamford also failed to substantiate their claim that the said employees abandoned their employment. It also failed to prove the necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and failed to furnish written notice of dismissal to any complainants. Further, it failed to prove payments of the amounts being claimed. Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the union have lost their employment status, thus terminating their employment with GSP. GSP is however ordered to reinstate the complainants who were members of the union without backwages, save some employees specified. It was established that the union was not registered, and thus had staged an illegal strike. The officers of the union should be liable and dismissed, but the members should not, as they acted in good faith in the belief that their actions were within legal bounds. Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant their claims, as computed by each individual. All other claims were dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for petitioners failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as required by law. It was also ordered to return the cash deposits of the complainants, citing the same reasons as in the First Case. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and Third Cases, but set aside the judgment of the Second Case for further proceedings in view of the factual issues involved. On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal was filed which was decided in favor of Stamford, upholding the dismissal of the union officers. The officers made no prior notice to strike, no vote was taken among union members, and the issue involved was non-strikable, a demand for salary increases On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the officers should be given separation pay, and that Jacina Burabod and the rest of the members should be reinstated without loss of seniority, plus backwages. It provided for the payment of the backwages despite the illegality of the strike because the dismissals were done prior to the strike. Such is considered an unfair labor practice as there was lack of due process and valid cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled to backwages and reinstatement, with exception to the union officers who may be given separation pay due to strained relations with their employers. Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismisses from employment considering the illegality of the strike. (2) Whether or not the respondents union officers were entitled to backwages, separation pay and reinstatement, respectively. Held: (1) The termination of the union officers was legal under Article 264 of the Labor Code as the strike conducted was illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. Holding a strike is a right that could be availed of by a legitimate labor organization, which the union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements of following the procedures in conducting a strike under paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 were not followed by the union officers. Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal strike, as well as the distinction between officers and members who participated therein. Knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a sufficient ground to terminate the employment of a union officer but mere participation is not sufficient ground for termination of union members. Thus, absent clear and substantial proof, rankand-file union members may not be terminated. If he is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement. The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal dismissal of the union members, as there was non-observance of due process requirements and union busting by management. It also affirmed that the charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada were without credence. It reversed the ruling that the dismissal was unfair labor practice as there was nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged from joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for participation in an illegal strike was upheld. However, union officers also must be given the required notices for terminating employment, and Article 264 of the Labor Code does not authorize immediate dismissal of union officers participating in an illegal strike. No such requisite notices

were given to the union officers. The Court upheld the appellate courts ruling that the union members, for having participated in the strike in good faith and in believing that their actions were within the bound of the law meant only to secure economic benefits for themselves, were illegally dismissed hence entitled to reinstatement and backwages. (2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union officers as valid hence, the award of separation pay was deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with the notice requirements for a lawful termination, backwages were awarded to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of the judgment.