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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Affirmative
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Observation One: Nuclear Power might be Coming, Bad reactor choice made
Electricity demand will increase across the globe and there will be an inevitable global shift
to the adoption of nuclear power to meet new base load electricity demands. It is no longer
of a question of will nuclear power exist, but rather what reactor type. The U.S. has
cancelled its Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program and moving towards other style reactors.
Without the IFR the U.S. will inable to lead globally on the reactor design chosen in the
future
Clay Sell (Deputy Energy Secretary) June 26 2007 Energy Department Documents and Publications, Lexis
Let me elaborate. The
Department's Energy Information Administration predicts that energy demand will increase by nearly
60 percent by 2030. More dramatically, it predicts a near doubling of world consumption of electricity during that
same period. Much of the growth, of course, will come from the developing economies around the world. That is an extraordinary
amount of new demand that will require an extraordinary amount of new supply. As such, the President has stated a
policy goal of promoting a great expansion of nuclear power here in the United States, and around the world.
Nuclear power is the only mature technology of significant potential to provide large amounts of completely
emissions free base load generation to meet this need--resulting in significant benefits for clean development,
reducing world greenhouse gas intensities, pollution abatement, and the security that comes from greater energy
diversity. To be more direct, no person can be serious about climate change without being serious about greatly
expanding nuclear power. But nuclear power, with all of its potential for mankind, carries with it two historic
challenges: (1) what do we do with the nuclear waste? and (2) how can we prevent the proliferation of fuel cycle
technologies that can lead to weaponization? GNEP seeks to address and minimize those two challenges by developing technologies to recycle
the spent fuel in a proliferation-resistant manner and support a reordering of the global nuclear enterprise to encourage the leasing of fuel from
fuel cycle states in a way that presents strong commercial incentives against new states building their own enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities. This is a major change in U.S. civilian nuclear policy. And no longer will the U.S. government be casting a baleful
eye on the rest of the world's reprocessing activities, but instead seek international cooperation to foster the growth of global nuclear power,
including improved methods of recycling. The useable material in spent civilian nuclear fuel and excess weapons fissile material will now be
recognized as potential valuable assets, to be developed and used, and not just liabilities to be buried. This approach was heartily endorsed just
last month, when Secretary Bodman met with ministers from China, Russia, Japan and France, along with observers from the United Kingdom
and the International Atomic Energy Agency to discuss ways to enhance cooperation within the GNEP framework. As Secretary Bodman said
after the meeting: "Today's Joint Statement officially puts the 'P' in the Global Nuclear Energy 'Partnership. For Americans, pursuing
nuclear power is wise policy; for industry it can be good business; internationally, it is unmatched in its ability to
serve as a cornerstone of sustainable economic development, while offering enormous potential to satisfy the
world's increasing demand for energy in a clean, safe and proliferation-resistant manner." I couldn't have said it better myself. There
are two items relating to GNEP and non-proliferation that deserve additional comment - fuel leasing and the form of recycling that the United
States envisions. In an international fuel leasing regime - enrichment and recycling of spent fuel would be limited to countries that already
have these capabilities. They, in turn, would lease fuel to other nations who would agree to refrain from enrichment and reprocessing in return
for a guaranteed fuel supply and removal of spent fuel. This is a concept that goes back to the Acheson-Lillienthal report of 1946. It has been
discussed at various times and in various forms since that date and was actually implemented by the Soviet Union. What makes fuel leasing so
important is the increasing recognition that enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel are, in principle, within the grasp of most nations and
could foster proliferation. Furthermore, there is now a view that spent fuel - like enriched fuel - could become managed as an asset in states
with advanced fuel cycle technologies. This latter realization opens up commercial possibilities for the provision of services benefiting both
fuel cycle and reactor-only states. In this way the market and the international desire for less proliferation could in principle become aligned --
a potentially powerful combination. But not all recycling methods - separation and burning of spent fuel - are equal. We believe that the
current PUREX reprocessing technology can be significantly improved, and we are looking forward to working with our international partners
to develop a new generation of more effective and proliferation resistant recycling technologies. These two policy ends--a reduction of nuclear
weapons to the lowest possible numbers, and increasing the beneficial use of nuclear power--are strategically and operationally interlinked in a
number of specific ways. First, reducing the number of warheads in the stockpile could result in a significant amount of uranium and
plutonium to fuel an increasing number of reactors, while at the same time permanently reducing the amount of weapons usable material. The
"Megatons-to-Megawatts" program is but one example of this. Second, the science and technology - and in particular computation and
simulation - that was developed within stockpile stewardship will surely be applicable for a next generation of civilian nuclear power, and
many of the advanced security and safety techniques being developed for the RRW and the transformed weapon complex should likewise be
applicable to an expanding global civilian nuclear power enterprise. And third, as the Global Partnership expands and becomes embedded into
international norms and behavior, it is not too far-fetched to envision further reductions in nuclear weapons. All of this represents a great
opportunity and challenge for the Department of Energy--perhaps the greatest challenge since its creation some three decades
ago. Though some might doubt our ability to respond. When I first came in contact with DOE while working for Congressman Mac
Thornberry of Texas in 1995, the prospects for DOE were pretty grim. The Superconducting Supercollider in Texas had been
cancelled in 1993; the Rocky Flats plutonium plant posed real challenges for nuclear materials management; weapons labs were in despair
about the loss of testing and mission; WIPP was still under injunction; the Integral Fast Reactor had been cancelled, as had the
Advanced Neutron Source, and the Material Protection Control and Accounting work in Russia had just begun.
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Plan: The United States federal government should provide loan guarantees for the
development of Integral Fast Reactor nuclear power plants in the United States.
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Advantage One: The Mountain of Death
A.) The administration move to make nuclear power a priority has fast tracked the
development of Yucca Mountain as a place to store nuclear waste
The Daily News June 4 2008 “Time to quit stalling on Yucca Mountain repository”
http://www.tdn.com/articles/2008/06/04/editorial/doc4845c309450e6103843205.txt
The Bush administration is pushing ahead with plans to build a nuclear waste repository near Yucca Mountain in
Nevada. On Tuesday, the U.S. Department of Energy filed an application for a construction permit with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The administration’s determination to move this project forward in the face of stiff
congressional opposition is praiseworthy. The government is contractually obligated to take possession of the more
than 50,000 tons of radioactive waste piled up at commercial reactor sites around the nation. That number includes 4,700
of spent fuel rods currently stored at the idled Trojan Nuclear Power Plant near Rainier. Fulfilling that obligation is important for both strategic
and practical reasons — reasons that Democratic congressional leaders have chosen to ignore in favor of political expediency. Strategically, it’s
important that the nuclear waste accumulating at commercial utilities be shipped to one centrally located, secure site. This radioactive waste
now is scattered around the nation at 131 sites, raising theft and safety concerns. From a practical standpoint, the nation already has invested
more than $6 billion and some 26 years in this project. Walking away from it now would leave the federal government liable to the utilities for
an estimated $60 billion in damages. To date, the government has paid out $243 million in damages for having fallen a decade behind the
contractual deadline for taking possession of the waste. Additionally, how the Yucca Mountain project proceeds could impact the nation’s
energy future. The rising cost of crude oil on the world market has prompted many in government to give nuclear power a new look. The
administration has made the construction of new nuclear plants a priority. Several congressional initiatives to spur
development of nuclear power have been put forward over the past year, including legislation that would authorize
more than $3.7 billion in subsidies for new plants. But we’re unlikely to see the dawn of a new era of nuclear power until it’s clear
that the federal government will honor its promise to take possession of radioactive waste left over from the previous era. Congressional
leaders purposefully ignore this connection between the Yucca Mountain project and the role of nuclear power in the country’s energy future.
Even as they tout nuclear energy initiatives, they’re cutting budgets for Yucca Mountain in an effort, as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
said, “to drive the final nail into (the project’s) coffin.” We take some encouragement from the administration’s dogged
determination to advance the project — that and our belief that congressional opposition will soften following the
November elections. Most lawmakers recognize the national interest in building a single, secure nuclear waste
dump and understand that there is no alternative plan for one.
First, Accidents, Yucca Mountain accident would be the equivalent of a Nuclear War
Helen Caldicott 1994 “Nuclear Madness- What Can you Do?,” pg. 202-203
The National Energy Policy Act directs the National Academy to look only at the impact of the facility on any single individual, rather than
looking at the global impact over the hazardous life of the waste that will be placed there. Carbon 14, released by the fractured stone
of Yucca Mountain into the atmosphere, will contribute to global fall out, with 70,000 curies as the projected release. The
dump is planned to hold seventy thousand metric tons of potent, high-level waste, and a large release, according to
some experts, could cause environmental damage on the scale of nuclear war. Ground water beneath the mountain
could rise as it has in previous geological time frames, flooding the hot canisters and blowing the top off the
mountain. Alternatively, contaminated water could seep into the ground water and spread to Death Valley, producing
radioactive hot springs. U.S. Geological Survey scientists compare the Yucca Mountain Program to “NASA before the Challenger.” One
spent-fuel assembly contains ten times more long-lived isotopes than the Hiroshima bomb, and 140,000 of these
assemblies will be transported across the United States to the mountain. Temperature inside the repository will be
above boiling point for 1,250 years, and the temperature inside the bore hole of the rock will be 527 degrees
Fahrenheit and in the canister, 662 degrees Fahrenheit. Such heat could induce rock fractures and fault movement.
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Second, the mass movement of waste causes nuclear terrorism
Bob Kerrey (former U.S. senator from Nebraska, is president of New School University in New York) April 29
2002 Yucca Mountain Nuclear Storage is Bad for Nevada and the Nation,
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0429-07.htm
Transporting nuclear waste across our country is an undertaking that every American concerned about our nation's security should take
very seriously. Sharing our highways with tens of thousands of radioactive shipments is a disaster waiting to happen. An
accident involving a truck with radioactive waste is a statistical certainty. Just as certain is the increased exposure to terrorism.
DOE and outside experts both agree accidents will happen; though no one can predict their likely impact. More troubling is the
potential for radiation exposure. The government-approved casks, which have never undergone rigorous full-scale testing, leak radiation and
could become portable X-ray machines that cannot be turned off. This concern is not trivial either from a health or a liability standpoint. Most
serious of all is that these shipments will become irresistible targets for terrorists. After Sept. 11 and the increasing incidents of suicide
bombings, our elected leaders should not approve this plan unless they can guarantee the safety of these shipments. They cannot simply
trust the DOE or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who are still analyzing risks based on terrorist incidents
from the 1970s and 1980s. Without proper security measures, these shipments could easily be used as a "dirty bomb." It is
imperative that an up-to-date plan is in place to prevent them from becoming low-grade nuclear weapons and that the cost of this plan be
measured against the potential benefits of a single site. The American people and their representatives in Congress must keep this in mind: There is no pressing
reason to move ahead with the Yucca Mountain site without completing a comprehensive evaluation. Even the administration agrees that the current storage system
can safely remain for many years. Congress must now decide. Will it opt for the administration's unsound policy that jeopardizes our health and safety or will it
choose to act responsibly? At a time when we need to be doing everything in our power to secure our nation's safety, a policy that puts us on the road to another
national tragedy is a step in the wrong direction.
IFR’s provide a solution to Yucca mountain and nuclear waste- Recycling of spent nuclear
fuel will not only evaporate the waste problems but also prevent future proliferation—
Congress must take action
University Wire March 7 2002 “Dump Yucca Mountain nuclear disposal plan,”, lexis
There is no more tempting solution to a problem than digging a hole and burying it. But buried problems tend not
to remain that way, and President George W. Bush's plan to sweep the nation's nuclear waste under the Nevada desert
will further illustrate this unless Congress has the vision to stop it. The president announced last month his decision to build a
permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Members of Congress, among them Minnesota Sen. Paul Wellstone (D), have ceaselessly pointed out the
flaws in the Yucca proposal. Their criticisms are now more necessary than ever, and they deserve public support as they push for a better nuclear waste policy.
Burying nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain is the worst of the available waste disposal options. The proposed site
sits atop 32 earthquake fault lines, is close to young volcanoes and is subject to flooding when, as many scientists predict, its
presently low water table rises. Radioactive waste would be transported to Nevada from across the country via highways and railroads, tempting fate, terrorists and
pranksters with the opportunity to wreak havoc with thousands of tons of nuclear material. Even if the waste could be moved safely, no policy-maker has yet
devised a plan for guaranteeing the Yucca facility's maintenance and safety for the next 10,000 years -- nearly twice the length of recorded human history.
Scientists have been developing more promising and productive approaches to the nuclear waste problem for
decades. Now is the time for Wellstone and other congressional leaders to insist those plans finally be given serious policy consideration.
Perhaps chief among these is the Integral Fast Reactor, a new breed of power plant designed to process spent nuclear
fuel rods with nearly 100 percent efficiency (compared with a light-water reactor's 1 percent) and passive safety systems that
make the operator error and technical failure of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island relics of the past. For the same cost
as a conventional coal plant, the IFR can burn nuclear waste in a process incapable of isolating weapons-grade materials,
reducing both the storage problem and proliferation risk waste presents. Former President Bill Clinton eliminated the
IFR's funding in a failed attempt to turn the rest of the world away from any nuclear power use, and the time is
ripe for Congress to reconsider that decision.
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Advantage Two: The Black Death
Electricity demand in the United States is growing. To meet these needs the U.S. will build
more coal-fired plants because investment in nuclear power in the status quo are too risky
Fred Bosselman (Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law) 2007 “The new power generation:
environmental law and electricity innovation: colloquium article: the ecological advantages of nuclear power”, New
York University Environmental Law Journal, lexis
Will a new generation of nuclear plants be built in the United States? The United States is the world's largest supplier of
commercial nuclear power. In 2005, there were 104 U.S. commercial nuclear generating units that were fully licensed
to [*3] operate, and they provided about 20% of the Nation's electricity. But no new nuclear plants have been built in
the United States for over twenty years. 2 Some policy makers and designers of such plants believe that they can now
build plants that avoid the mistakes of the past and produce power that is both safe and economical. 3 Although
Wall Street remains doubtful about the economics of such plants, the idea seems to be gaining momentum. 4 The Energy Policy Act of
2005 provided "Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays," authorizing the Department of Energy to enter into up to six contracts with
sponsors of new nuclear power plants under which the federal government will guarantee to pay certain costs incurred by the sponsors in case
full power operation of the plant is delayed by litigation. 5 For individual projects, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
consolidated its permitting processes and established an Early Site Permit (ESP) program to resolve in advance all on-site environmental issues
associated with the licensing of a new reactor. 6 Although no company has [*4] definitely committed to building a new plant,
companies have filed applications for more than two dozen plants that are in various stages of the permit process. 7 The NRC must take into account various issues
when deciding whether to allow these applications to go forward. Although Congress and the Administration have made their support for new nuclear power plants
clear, any decision to build a nuclear power plant requires the agreement of many entities, including: (1) a company prepared to build it; 8 (2) financial backers
willing to invest in it; 9 (3) federal policymakers and regulators; 10 (4) state energy and environmental regulators; 11 and (5) a local community prepared to site it.
12 These entities will undoubtedly take into consideration a wide range of issues, including safety, efficiency, profitability, health, and security. 13 [*5] This
article concentrates only on one issue related to that decision - an issue that often receives less attention than it deserves: How will the decision affect ecological
processes and systems, both in the United States and globally? 14 The article makes three arguments: (1) if
nuclear power plants are not built, the
gap will be filled by more coal-fired power plants; (2) the impact of coal-fired power plants on ecological processes
and systems is likely to be increasingly disastrous; and (3) nuclear power's ecological impacts are likely to be neutral or
even positive.
Bringing new coal plants on line will ensure human induced warming that will cause mass
extinction and ecosystem collapse—We are at the tipping point now, we must transition
away form coal or die
USA Today June 24 2008 “NASA warming scientist: 'This is the last chance'”
WASHINGTON - Exactly 20 years after warning America about global warming, a top NASA scientist said the situation
has gotten so bad that the world's only hope is drastic action. James Hansen told Congress on Monday that the world
has long passed the "dangerous level" for greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and needs to get back to 1988 levels. He said
Earth's atmosphere can only stay this loaded with man-made carbon dioxide for a couple more decades without
changes such as mass extinction, ecosystem collapse and dramatic sea level rises. "We're toast if we don't get on a
very different path," Hansen, director of the Goddard Institute of Space Sciences who is sometimes called the godfather of global warming
science, told The Associated Press. "This is the last chance." Hansen brought global warming home to the public in June 1988 during a
Washington heat wave, telling a Senate hearing that global warming was already here. To mark the anniversary, he testified before the House
Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming where he was called a prophet, and addressed a luncheon at the National Press
Club where he was called a hero by former Sen. Tim Wirth, D-Colo., who headed the 1988 hearing. To cut emissions, Hansen said
coal-fired power plants that don't capture carbon dioxide emissions shouldn't be used in the United States after 2025, and should
be eliminated in the rest of the world by 2030. That carbon capture technology is still being developed and not yet cost efficient for power
plants. Burning fossil fuels like coal is the chief cause of man-made greenhouse gases. Hansen said the Earth's atmosphere
has got to get back to a level of 350 parts of carbon dioxide per million. Last month, it was 10 percent higher: 386.7 parts per million. Hansen
said he'll testify on behalf of British protesters against new coal-fired power plants. Protesters have chained themselves to gates and equipment
at sites of several proposed coal plants in England. "The thing that I think is most important is to block coal-fired power
plants," Hansen told the luncheon. "I'm not yet at the point of chaining myself but we somehow have to draw attention to this." Frank
Maisano, a spokesman for many U.S. utilities, including those trying to build new coal plants, said while Hansen has shown foresight as a
scientist, his "stop them all approach is very simplistic" and shows that he is beyond his level of expertise. The year of Hansen's original
testimony was the world's hottest year on record. Since then, 14 years have been hotter, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Two decades later, Hansen spent his time on the question of whether it's too late to do anything about it. His answer: There's
still time to stop the worst, but not much time. "We see a tipping point occurring right before our eyes," Hansen told the AP
before the luncheon. "The Arctic is the first tipping point and it's occurring exactly the way we said it would."
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Advantage Three: A race to death
The U.S. rejection of the CTBT and continue acts of unilateralism are placing the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation norms on the brink of collapse—The
needs to embrace the IFR to send a renewed signal to prevent the NPT collapse and to stop
global proliferation
Taylor Burke (J.D., University of Tulsa, 2006; B.A., Political Science and History, University of Tulsa) Winter
2006 “nuclear energy and proliferation: problems, observations, and proposals”, Boston University Journal of
Science and Technology Law, lexis
Nuclear energy can provide relatively cheap and emission-free energy in places that lack sufficient natural resources to
provide for their population. 182 As international energy demand continues to rise, nuclear energy is a clear answer to
offset the corresponding rise in cost. Furthermore, the promotion of such technology, while not serving an ideological interest as it did
during the Cold War, could serve a more prophylactic measure in the future. Some of the potentially threatening nations in the world, such as
North Korea, Belarus, and Afghanistan, have extremely limited energy infrastructures. 183 Even if they could grow, these nations likely lack
the capability to develop the basic services, such as sufficient electric access, needed for successful development. 184 Proliferation-safe
reactors, whether they be IFRs, thorium reactors, or simple light water reactors (which often make the cost of [*22] reprocessing too great),
would offset some of these concerns. 185 In addition, better international monitoring could ease the concern of proliferation. The
United States should take a lead in promoting a diverse energy supply. As the growing international demand for
fossil fuels increases, so will international tensions over fossil fuel access, as well as the continuing moral ambiguities
policymakers face in dealing with a fungible energy source. 186 Nuclear energy is a component of a larger strategy to diversify
the global energy supply, particularly because it can address the growing fossil fuel emission problems worldwide. 187 Of course,
whatever policy is adopted will require some form of international oversight, such as by the IAEA. 188 B. What Measures Can Be Taken to
Ameliorate the Proliferation Risks Posed by Nuclear Energy? As noted above, proliferation-safe reactors, whether they be IFRs or simple
light water reactors, would offset proliferation concerns. 189 United States policymakers should at least evaluate the possibilities of
these technologies, rather than relegate them to the present status of Cold War relics. Better international monitoring could also reduce the
proliferation concern. At present, the IAEA is woefully under-funded given its responsibility of overseeing the safety of nuclear technology
around the world. 190 Changes to the organization are necessary, whether through an increase in funding or a reassignment of the task to
another organization. Of course, proliferation safe reactors, if actually technically viable, could make the IAEA's job much easier if the reactor
vessel with all the dangerous nuclear gizzards is welded shut. 191 Finally, the United States must choose whether it intends to
enforce the NPT, an international agreement that sought to limit the military applications of nuclear technology. At times, the United
States has failed to live up to other obligations of the agreement, such as the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
("CTBT"). 192 Some argue that this policy undermines the NPT from [*23] the standpoint that the NPT stands for the abolition of military
applications of nuclear technology. The logic is that it is impossible to agree to that system without curbing nuclear weapon production. 193
The next issue is determining whether the United States can "go it alone" in its goal of curbing proliferation. There has been much debate on
this issue since Congress rejected the CTBT in the late 1990's. One side argues that United States' unilateralism on these
issues undermines the international nonproliferation effort when it rejects the very process it participated in for years. 194 At its
root, this is a contract theory issue: if a party refuses to live up to an agreement, questions arise as to its basis for participating in the agreement
long-term. 195 On the other hand, there is an argument that the CTBT does not effectively curb proliferation. Critics of the CTBT argue that
the regime is ineffective towards the issues of national sovereignty that inevitably arise in its enforcement, where international monitors would
be privy to sensitive state information and have some authority over a state's national security strategy. 196 Moreover, critics often cite
concerns that the CTBT's goals are tangential from the goals of the NPT, which critics view as curbing nuclear proliferation instead of
disarmament. 197 C. Is the Present Division of Labor Within the Federal Government Appropriate to Address the Myriad Issues Created by the
Unique Nature of Nuclear Technology? Given the analysis presented above, there should be little doubt that the federal
government's oversight of nuclear issues must be rethought, particularly in the realm of nuclear proliferation. The
United States has failed [*24] to implement a clear strategy to prevent future abuses of nuclear technology. One idea
following September 11, was to create a separate White House post, overseeing the myriad DOE, DOD, and DOS programs related to the
international trade of nuclear materials. 198 This "nuclear proliferation czar" would coordinate the respective efforts of the various foreign and
domestic policymaking bodies involved with proliferation issues, with the overall goal of developing a unified policy. 199 The Bush
Administration has also proclaimed a "Global Threat Reduction Initiative," which would expand the Nunn-Lugar Program. 200 The program
would compensate for the external limitations of the existing CTR program, expanding the DOE's anti-proliferation efforts beyond Russia. 201
Whether this program will be successful remains to be seen. 202 If the United States chooses to promote nuclear energy, it should be a
leader in developing safer civilian applications of the technology and promoting the use of technology like integral
fast reactors, thorium reactors, and diversion-proof fuel. Some have argued that sharing this technology is an obligation under the NPT. 203
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Proliferation snowballs – collapse of the nonproliferation regime would trigger an
avalanche of nuclearization.
Lewis Dunn, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation, 1990. BEYOND 1995: THE
FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME p. 31-32
Collapse of the nonproliferation treaty in 1995 would increase significantly the prospects for the further spread of
nuclear weapons around the globe. Heightened perceptions of the likelihood of runaway proliferation, corrosion of
the norm of nonproliferation, lessened assurance about neighboring countries intentions, and a weakening of
nuclear export controls are but some of the direct results of the treaty’s breakdown. As a result, the world would become
more dangerous, and all countries’ security—both former parties and outside critics—would be gradually undermined. To elaborate, one
direct impact of a breakdown of the NPT in 1995 would be to change international perceptions of the likelihood of
widespread nuclear proliferation. More specifically, over the nearly two decades since the NPT entered into force in 1970, perceptions
held by government leaders, observers, and others about the prospects for the spread of nuclear weapons have markedly changed. In the early
1960s, it was widely expected that there would be twenty to twenty-five nuclear-weapon states by the mid-1070s. In the late 1980s, it is now
widely assumed that such proliferation can be prevented. The very fact that more than 135 countries have renounced nuclear weapons by
adhering to the NPT has greatly contributed to this change of perception. Particularly, if the treaty’s collapse followed several highly visible
nonproliferation breakdowns, there would be many fears that the earlier predictions, though premature, were correct. Such fears would be
further reinforced if after a failure to renew the treaty many parties were reluctant to reaffirm otherwise their commitment not to acquire
nuclear weapons. This perception of the likelihood of more widespread proliferation could well become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Leaders of countries that had renounced nuclear weapons would now be asking whether such renunciation would be
reciprocated by other countries, especially their close neighbors. At the least, some countries could be expected to hedge their bets by starting
low-visibility programs to explore the steps needed to acquire nuclear weapons. In other countries that had already been weighing the pros and
cons of covert pursuit of nuclear weapons, a perception that many countries might soon move toward nuclear weapons in the decades after
1995 could tip the balance for a national decision.
Specifically, as nuclear power use increases countries will model the U.S. reactor choice, the
U.S. must revitalize its nuclear program to send a correct signal
Michael Driscoll (Professor of Nuclear Engineering at MIT) 2003 “The Future of Nuclear Power: An
Interdisciplinary MIT Study”, http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower
There is another national security dimension to nuclear power. Combating nuclear proliferation is one of our most
important foreign policy objectives. There is no doubt about the great risk to the security of the United States and the rest of
the world that the spread of nuclear weapons to other states and perhaps non-state actors would bring. So there is a major
security interest in how all aspects of nuclear commerce develop around the world. For example, the extensive U.S.
“Cooperative Threat Reduction program,”6 provides assistance to Russia for the purpose of improving their efforts to protect their nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive materials against theft.7 On the other hand, there is considerable tension between the United States and
Russia created by Russian assistance to Iran on commercial nuclear power, especially since Iran is awash in natural gas. Indeed,it is worth
recalling that the unresolved nuclear fuel cycle “schism” of the 1970s between the United States and its European and Japanese allies
stemmed from nonproliferation concerns. In the Ford and Carter administrations, the United States stopped the recycling
of plutonium in commercial reactors because of proliferation risks associated with a “plutonium economy. ”The
hope that others would emulate this policy was not realized, as energy resource-poor countries, such as France and Japan, evaluated the
balance of risks differently. As countries look to shape today’s nuclear fuel cycle policy and R&D decisions in the context of the
world environmental, economic development, and security needs of the next fifty years, finding a common path among the G-8 and
others can itself contribute significantly to managing proliferation concerns. The expansion of nuclear power, should it
occur, will raise proliferation concerns that call for ongoing American engagement in nuclear fuel cycle issues independent of
nuclear power’s level of contribution to domestic electricity generation.
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Observation Two: Solvency
IFR’s, have been developed into a usable technology, but have yet to be built
Argonne National Laboratory 1998 http://www.anlw.anl.gov/anlw_history/reactors/ifr.html
The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) was an advanced nuclear reactor and complete fuel cycle technology development
program. The IFR program began in 1983 and ran until September 30, 1994. The IFR included improvements to
nuclear power with respect to safety, waste management, fuel efficiency, and proliferation resistance. From its
beginning, the IFR program had one overriding goal: To produce an improved nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technology that would be directly
responsive to public and business concerns about future reliance on nuclear energy. Although an IFR reactor plant has yet to be
built, the EBR-II served as an IFR prototype for many years.
The United States should invest in Integral Fast Reactors, it would provide cheap
electricity and solve for nuclear waste
Culpeper Star-Exponent June 27 2008 “Can the U.S. be energy independent?”, lexis
Jun. 27--In
today's economy of skyrocketing gas prices, many Americans are listening more closely to suggestions
for weaning the United States from its oil addiction, and one Culpeper man thinks he holds the key. Robert Wical, who has lived
in Culpeper for the past 25 years with his wife, is the author of "Total Energy Independence of the United States: A Twelve-Year Plan." Wical is
a retired computer programmer and electronics engineer with a master's degree in business. Wical is not a scientist, but rather an inventor who
spent four years researching his 12-year plan on the Internet, which he says is the first "viable, self-financing plan" that is publicly available.
His idea involves the country investing trillions in "integral fast reactors," or IFRs, that would generate hydrogen as fuel and
consume nuclear waste. "I just kept looking," Wical said. "With all the things that have been invented and done recently, why is it that
nobody has come up with a plan or suggested anything to solve the problem? You can search the world over; there is no plan to make the
United States energy independent." Wical said he had patents for past inventions, which include an electronics assembly machine and "a cute
little flowerpot hanger." The IFR, which Wical said comprises known science and proven technology, would use nuclear waste to
heat water into steam, using the steam to create electricity. The IFR, according to Wical, recycles its own fuel and thus
never has to be refueled It could also generate liquid hydrogen as a fuel source for the country. "One of these reactors is a gigawatt of
power," he said. "That's a billion watts. That's enough to light Culpeper, Charlottesville and Warrenton for 40 years. We could do away with
Dominion. And the icing on the cake is it would consume all the nuclear waste we're trying to get rid of." Wical said the IFRs produce
electricity for a penny a kilowatt. Today, he said it costs $6 a gallon to make a gallon of hydrogen from water. If the IFR was
implemented countrywide, it would cost 35 cents.
IFR’s passive safety system prevent any meltdowns and it pyroprocess prevents
proliferation through the recycling of spent fulel
Argonne National Laboratory 1998 http://www.anlw.anl.gov/anlw_history/reactors/ifr.html
The heart of an IFR power plant was a liquid-sodium-cooled reactor with a new type of metal-alloy fuel. With this
new fuel, 10-20% of the nuclear fuel actually fissions to produce power before the fuel must be recycled. This is
much more efficient than the 3-6% that current reactors achieve. The spent fuel that remains was to be sent through the IFR
fuel recycling process, called the pyroprocess. This simple, inexpensive process would remove the uranium, plutonium,
and other transuranic elements from the other fisson products. This serves two purposes: The transuranic elements
serve as fuel, and can be burnt in the reactor to produce more energy; and By removing these long-lived
radioactive elements from the waste, the final waste products lose their radioactivity much sooner than waste from
standard reactors. The pyroprocess naturally keeps the most toxic and long-lived radioactive materials (the transuranics)
locked up in the recycle fuel material, where they are ultimately destroyed to make electricity. By processing spent
fuel with IFR technology, the waste volume will be reduced by at least a factor of two, and possibly as much as a factor
of 10. Because the long lived transuranic elements (also known as actinides) would be essentially eliminated, the radiological toxicity hazard
from IFR waste would persist for only a few hundred years rather than hundreds of thousands of years. The IFR process reduces the
volume, heat generation, and longevity of nuclear wastes, which greatly simplifies management of waste. Another
breakthrough in the IFR is its passive safety. Its design features made many of the complex safety systems used in
current reactors unnecessary. The IFR took advantage of the natural characteristics of materials and design. While
protective barriers and primary safety systems are retained, reliance on expensive systems for emergency protection were replaced by reliance
on laws of nature. The IFR's passive safety was demonstrated in 1986 in the IFR prototype, EBR-II. In these tests,
conditions were created that would be expected to lead to severe core melt-down in most types of reactors. EBR-II
simply shut itself down without the operation of any active safety systems, without operator intervention of any
kind, and without any damage. These tests, unprecedented in any other reactor, demonstrated that nuclear
accidents of the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island type are not possible with an IFR plant.
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IFR 1ac
Loan guarantees are essential to get new nuclear power projects off the ground. The
guarantee will provide the financial incentive for investors to get on board, and these
investments will causes the market to shift, making nuclear power cost competitive which
ensures future investment and plants
Larry R. Foulke (ANS Vice President/President Elect) February 2003 “The status and future of nuclear power in
the United States”, Nuclear News, lexis
This all sounds logical and compelling. However, no new, large commercial electrical generating capacity of any kind will
be built today without a suitable and reliable financial return on investment from the private sector. Hence, industry
and government need to work together to address specific financial risks involved with building nuclear plants. To
have a new nuclear plant by 2010, industry should encourage the government to take additional steps to mitigate
financial risks. While energy planning should not constrain price competition or innovation, it should promote dependable and clean energy supplies for the long term. The nation's
energy plan should permit government intervention in situations where market forces alone cannot bring about long-range goals to meet a national imperative. Driving forces
such as environmental quality and energy independence require more aggressive short-term government
investment to obtain the long-term benefits that nuclear energy provides. Major deterrent to near-term nuclear power As indicated above, a
major roadblock to building a new nuclear power plant in the United States now is financial risk. Other barriers to
building new nuclear plants have not vanished but have been reduced: * The management of spent fuel took a giant step forward with the support of a
geological repository at Yucca Mountain by the President and Congress. "Spent fuel management" is a problem of perception and, therefore, a political issue. In reality, the used fuel from nuclear power plants has some great
advantages that we do not exploit -- the waste is of small volume per MW of energy produced; it is sequestered and segregated from the start; and it is easy to track. In fact, only about 3 percent of used fuel is truly waste. The bulk
of the used fuel remains as valuable fertile and fissile material that we may recycle someday -- and, thereby, reduce waste volumes and activity still further. * Renewal of the Price-Anderson Act appears to have support from both
houses of Congress. * The NRC's new combined construction and operating licensing process (10 CFR 52) looks promising, but until it is demonstrated and court-tested, there will still be concern whether or not the new ITAAC
(Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria) process works. * The majority of the population is pronuclear, especially in light of growing environmental concerns regarding global warming, although they tend not to be
activists in their belief. * Operating costs are low, and the facts show that the risk to humans from nuclear power per MW of energy produced is very low. The nuclear industry responded to the President's National Energy Policy
with "Vision 2020," n10 which sets a goal of 50 000 MW of new nuclear generating capacity to be added to the U.S. grid by 2020. The Nuclear Energy Institute took a lead role in formulating this vision and has established an
triple initiative in which the government and the private sector will work together to (a) explore sites for new nuclear power plants, (b) demonstrate the efficiency and timeliness of
key processes designed to make licensing of new plants more predictable, and (c) encourage and fund research needed to make the safest and most advanced technologies available. This is all
but it may not be enough. Government has a role to ensure supply
excellent Governing bodies have, and have had, a clear role and
responsibility to assure reliable sources of energy, and, hence, to help remove
barriers to an expanded role for nuclear power in
the United States. Such issues are too important to be left to the vagaries of a free market. Such issues must be considered and
planned in light of the inextricable linkage among energy independence, national security, global economic competitiveness, and environmental quality. Governing bodies can mitigate these
risks for the benefit of the nation. While deregulated markets can stimulate low prices through competition, they do not capture well the long-range benefits of energy independence, energy
diversity, and a reduction of environmental pollution. Once upon a time in a regulated market, the utility's job was to provide reliable power while recovering costs in the rate base. In other
words, reliability of supply and financial solvency were paramount. But now many utilities face new economic forces. There is little premium for vision and investment in the national welfare.
There is currently no financial benefit for production of electricity from non-polluting energy sources or for enhancing the nation's energy independence and security. Moreover, the CEO of a
generating company has little incentive for doing more than that which satisfies his board of directors. National imperatives seldom come into a board decision -- financial return does. Hence,
national imperatives force us to find alternative ways to motivate the mitigation of financial risks and to promote
financial credits for the nonfinancial benefits of the nuclear option. Financial issues and mitigating actions Let us consider the four major issues
and the potential mitigating actions for near-term nuclear power in the United States. The actions proposed are not out of line with a recent report to the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory
Committee (NERAC) by an integrated project team composed of key DOE staff members and Scully Capital Services. n11 Let us also keep foremost in mind that new nuclear power plants are
The higher cost of early plants is
projected to be competitive after the first several plants are built and the financial risks associated with the first plants no longer exist.
associated primarily with two learning-curve issues: First-of-a-kind-engineering and construction. Once these two
issues are put behind the industry, new nuclear plants may still be relatively expensive but they will generate
power that is competitive in many markets. Early costs for these learning-curve issues could be addressed by government dollars as a "preferred equity"
investment. n12 Dividends to the government on the equity investment would occur after plant capacity factors reach a preset level. Commercial lenders would then loan only as much as they
the government could provide loan guarantees for a portion of the plant cost during the
consider economically justified. As an alternative,
construction period. Once the high-risk period is passed and the plant is operating, the plant owners could
restructure the debt, thus avoiding the need for guarantees by the government. Investment tax credits payable during construction to mitigate the issue
of significant earnings dilution during the construction period have usefulness, although the credits are limited. Investment tax credits would amount to a modest percentage of the investment in a given year, but the credit would
normally be granted only once for a particular investment. Since a new plant will take three to four years to build, two or three years of investment will still have to be carried without earnings. Hence, investment tax credits are not
enough to eliminate the hit in earnings over a multi-year period -- but they would help mitigate them. Also, accelerated depreciation could be made available for new nuclear plants to be more in line with other major industrial
facility additions. Such steps may be necessary in a deregulated environment in which the power company cannot pass on construction costs as an "allowance for funds used during construction." Issue 2: There are concerns about
delays and/or termination of plant projects as a result of acts of government (regulator) or the acts of the public (intervenors). The government could assume extraordinary costs associated with delays due to the acts of government
or the acts of the public (as a consequence of government actions) through standby credit facilities. Through these facilities, the government would agree to carry interest payments resulting from construction delays caused by
changing government requirements and not contractor faults. Such standby credit facilities could also offer a "make whole" provision under which the government would take ownership of the plant and repay both the lender and
equity-holder in the event that "acts of the government" and "acts of intervenors" (that could result from government actions) prevent plant commissioning. This step would provide excellent protection from the specific risks that
are at issue but without the disadvantages of loan guarantees. Issue 3: A great financial risk is recovering costs from a deregulated market. The solution here is a long-term power purchase agreement from a creditworthy entity.
Reduced uncertainty in siting and licensing is helpful, but it may not be enough. Given the higher capital cost of a nuclear plant, the risk of long-term recovery of that investment is a great financial penalty faced by the plant owner.
The government could guarantee the purchase of a certain amount of the future power production from a new plant at a negotiated price. This would mitigate the risk of forecasting electricity demand and price for many years out
in the future. This temporary floor price would allow investor returns similar to that achievable from alternate power-generated sources. Issue 4: The government should provide credits for the nonfinancial benefits of nuclear
power. Free enterprise can hurt the nation if credits for nonfinancial, national benefits such as environmental quality, energy security, and the burnup of weapons-grade fissile material are not entered into the financial equation.
Initiatives must be pursued to create a level playing field for nuclear power. Carbon trading would create an enormous incentive to build
nuclear plants. Every citizen is a stakeholder when it comes to burning up weapons-grade fissile material, and having clean air, clean water, reliable electricity supplies, and energy security.
More prominence must be given to the emission-free nature of nuclear power, and its role in helping to meet the challenge of international agreements to limit carbon emissions. Emissions
These financial proposals are meant to ease the introduction
credits for nuclear generation would go a long way toward encouraging new construction.
of the next generation of nuclear plants. Once the technology and processes are demonstrated, overcoming many
of the first-of-a-kind hurdles, normal financial markets can be expected to provide traditional financing as more
generating companies and financial markets become confident in the technology and reliability of construction
schedules. Regardless of the financing scheme, clean air credits are a legitimate incentive that will help stimulate nuclear construction and provide a mechanism for addressing the
challenge of Kyoto.
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Yucca: Earthquakes
Yucca is prone to earthquakes
Allison Macfarlane 2000 The Earth Around Us, pg. 291
Perhaps the second most pressing technical issue at Yucca Mountain has to do with its geological stability Actually, the Yucca Mountain
region is not as stable as it first looked. It is located in the heart of the Basin and Range Province of the western United States, an
area that was and still is tectonically active. The majority of recent earthquake activity is located south and west of
Yucca Mountain, relatively close to the San Andreas fault system. The Yucca Mountain region itself has experienced
seismicity. On 29 June 1992, a magnitude 5.4 earthquake centered on an unknown fault in Little Skull Mountain, six miles southeast
of Yucca Mountain, rocked the area.’4 There are other active major faults in the region also. The length of the mountain runs
north—south, parallel to the most potentially hazardous fault in the region, the Bare Mountain fault, located about six miles to the west of
Yucca Mountain. There are active faults within the repository itself, the largest of which are the Ghost Dance and Bow Ridge
faults.
An earthquake would cause plutonium to enter the water table and atmosphere
Cyber West Magazine September 2 1997 Earthquake could cause flooding of Yucca Mountain repository
http://www.cyberwest.com/cw14/14scwst2.html
Using computer modeling based on geological data, historical quakes and results from about 20 test wells, they showed that a magnitude 5 or 6
earthquake could raise the water table between 450-750 feet at the storage site. Because the repository would be only 600 to 800
feet above the present water table, "flooding could be expected to occur," they write. The water table below the Yucca
Mountain site is unusually deep, about 1,500 feet below the surface, Davies said. But within a 6-mile area north of the proposed
storage facility the groundwater level rapidly rises to a more normal depth of about 600 feet. The reason for this
abrupt change in the water table is a cause for concern, Davies said. Davies and Archambeau believe that the presence of
open fractures underneath Yucca Mountain has allowed the water table to descend to unusually low depths, and
that closed fractures to the north have resulted in a more normal water table level. The danger is that an earthquake of
sufficient magnitude could cause the open fractures underneath the Yucca Mountain site to squeeze shut, forcing the
water upward into the storage facility. "If water hits the storage area it could cause a rapid corrosive breakdown of
the containers and allow the plutonium to leak into the water table and the atmosphere," Davies said.
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Warming: Speeding Up
The heat is on—the 3 biggest feedbacks are all positive and guarantee rapid warming,
greater than anticipated—newest research proves
Fred Pearce July 24 2004 “Harbingers of doom?; Clouds have emerged as the real wild card in global warming
predictions. Add them to climate models and some frightening possibilities fall out”, New Scientist, lexis
The climate's sensitivity to warming depends critically on feedbacks that may amplify or damp down the initial
warming. If you double the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, the direct greenhouse effect is only about 1 degreesC. Not much to worry
about. But climate scientists expect the warming to trigger a series of feedbacks, of which the three biggest, at least in
the next few decades, will be from ice, water vapour and clouds. Take ice. As the world warms, snow and ice from
polar caps and mountain glaciers melts and is replaced by open water, bare rock, tundra and forests. As this
happens, the surface of the Earth becomes darker and absorbs more radiation from the sun. This positive feedback is
already evident in much of the Arctic, where warming in recent decades has happened faster than elsewhere. But it will also warm up the global
atmosphere. Water vapour, like CO2, is a potent greenhouse gas. Without it our planet would freeze. But what will happen to water
vapour as the world warms is not as clear-cut as with ice. A warmer surface will certainly cause more water to
evaporate. And, though some sceptics disagree, this will probably increase the amount of water vapour in the atmosphere.
That again will amplify warming. In the standard climate models extra water vapour in the air will at least double the direct warming
effect of CO2. Add the impacts of water vapour and ice together and we are close to climate scientists' central prediction -- a warming of about
3 degreesC for a doubling of CO2. But it's when we come to the third feedback mechanism that things get really sticky.
Clouds are clearly linked to water vapour. A lot of water vapour in the air eventually forms clouds. During their
short lives, clouds produce both positive and negative feedbacks. We all know that during the day, they can keep us cool by
reflecting the sun's harsh rays. And at night they keep us warm, acting like a blanket that traps heat rising from the ground. But which of these
effects wins out depends a lot on the height at which the clouds form, their depth, colour and density. Researchers still know surprisingly little
about how many and what sort of clouds are up there. Last year, for instance, it emerged that there may be vastly more heat-trapping cirrus
clouds in the upper atmosphere than anyone had thought. Some studies suggest that, taken globally, the cooling and warming effects of clouds
may largely cancel each other out. But nobody is sure. And small changes in either the area of cloud cover or the types of clouds that form
could change things radically. So for modellers of our future climate there are two issues. Will global warming change clouds? And will the
changes produce positive or negative feedback on the climate? A first guess would suggest that extra evaporation and water vapour in the
atmosphere will make more clouds. But it may not be so simple. Higher evaporation rates in the heat of a greenhouse day may
"burn off" clouds without them ever producing rain. Equally, clouds may "rain out" more quickly, leaving clearer
skies rather than cloudier ones. The fear is that clearer skies will amplify, rather than damp down global warming.
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The United States must reevaluate its nuclear energy program in order to rally its global
leadership
Pete V. Domenici (Republican Senator NM) 1997 Issues in Science and Technology, “Future Perspectives on
Nuclear Issues”, Winter, http://www.issues.org/issues/14.2/domen.htm
The United States needs to take a fresh look at nuclear technologies in order to tap their potential more effectively.
In the United States, we've traditionally optimized new advanced technologies to serve our nation's needs; this has
helped us craft an impressive economy and quality of life. With nuclear technologies, we have not followed this pattern. With
only a few exceptions such as nuclear medicine, we have done a poor job of evaluating nuclear technologies, addressing real
risks, and optimizing benefits. Instead, we worry about our dependence on fossil fuels and increasing oil imports,
but we don't use advanced nuclear energy systems that we've licensed and are selling overseas. Many
environmentalists who want to reduce carbon emissions don't want to consider nuclear power. We may worry about
excessive stockpiles of nuclear weapons, but as we dismantle our own weapons, we store the complex classified components that would allow
us to rapidly rebuild weapons. Some who are concerned about the dangers of nuclear waste oppose efforts to move the waste from power plants
to a more remote and secure location or to explore systems that enable far better management of waste issues. We have consumer groups
concerned about food safety that accept bacterial contamination of food instead of supporting irradiation of food
supplies. In a world of increasing global competition, we can't afford to accept these contradictions. We can't
afford to abandon the broad suite of nuclear technologies when they hold real promise for further national benefits
in many areas. Although at first sight these issues appear to be distinct, they are tied together by their dependence
on nuclear science and by strong public concerns about nuclear technologies in general. These public concerns have
frequently been molded by an antinuclear movement focusing only on risks, both real and perceived, in ways that have been tremendously
appealing to the mass media. Actions to address risks have rarely received equal attention and have suffered from lack of national leadership in
key cases. In many cases, decisions and policies crafted in one policy arena are limiting our options in other arenas. We need a dialogue
focused on benefits and risks of nuclear technologies. Where real risks exist, we need research focused on
quantifying and mitigating them, followed by solid progress in addressing them. Where past programs have lacked
leadership to achieve success, we need to energize that leadership. The time has come for a careful scientifically based
reexamination of nuclear issues in the United States.
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Developing nature of threshold states will increase the effectiveness of the NPT in
preventing proliferation.
Amir Azaran, BS 1995, University of Illinois; MS 1997, University of Colorado; JD Candidate 2006, University
of Chicago, Summer, 2005. “DEVELOPMENT: NPT, Where Art Thou? The Nonproliferation Treaty and
Bargaining: Iran as a Case Study,” 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 415
First, the threshold state will not merely have security concerns, but it will have legitimate security concerns coupled with a
concurrent need to grow its economy. This is a straightforward consequence of cost justification -- in order to trade
NPT enrichment rights, a state must acquire the means to enrich. This includes specialized technology and trained
personnel, and is very costly. If a state undertakes this enterprise for the sole purpose of trading NPT rights for
economic incentives and the bargain never materializes, the costs would far exceed the benefits of domestic
enrichment capabilities. On the other hand, if the state also is in a precarious security position, enrichment
technology gives it the ability to create nuclear weapons. This is a large benefit because it can be realized without
actual weapons production; merely having the capability to build nuclear weapons may tip the geopolitical scales
in the state's favor. Iran meets this first criterion. While it has large oil and natural gas reserves, its economy was decimated during its
eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s. At the end of the war, a population boom doubled Iran's size from 35 million in 1979 40 to nearly 70
million today. 41 As a result, 70 percent of Iran's citizens are under the age of thirty, 42 creating a great need for job growth. In addition to its
[*423] economic needs, Iran's security situation is precarious; it is surrounded by four of the world's eight nuclear powers -- Pakistan and India
to the east, Russia to the North, and Israel to the west. 43 Further, Iran is made nervous by the substantial presence of the United States military
in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's direct neighbors to the east and west. Moreover, a threshold state probably will be at odds
politically with the Western democracies. This is related to the first characteristic -- it is the Western democracies that, for the most
part, can provide the economic concessions and security guarantees that would cost justify the entire enterprise. A country seeking a
more favorable economic position or a better security arrangement presumably would pursue such goals using
diplomatic channels if possible, since diplomacy is far less costly than trading uranium enrichment rights.
Furthermore, acquiring the means to enrich uranium carries with it adverse diplomatic consequences because the
state will be criticized for wishing to "go nuclear." While this reputation cost will be less for a state with favorable
relations with the West (those with good relations are less likely to criticize each other diplomatically), it
nevertheless weighs against a state resorting to bargaining enrichment rights if it has other means of bargaining
available.
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NPT Impacts
Strong NPT is key to solve global prolif
Jayantha Dhanapala (Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs UN) May 2001 “The State of the Global
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: 2001”, http://disarmament.un.org/speech/21may2001.htm
For their part, multilateralists must pay closer attention to issues of national perception. In particular, they must work
harder to ensure that the global rule of law does in fact translate into concrete national payoffs, in the form of enhanced
security and material prosperity. They must recognize that global norms do not enforce themselves and that many
improvements in enforcement measures are needed internationally, including in the areas of export controls, sanctions, and
other compliance mechanisms. A broadened alliance of shared interests and ideals would help substantially in advancing
the full gamut of international efforts, quite beyond non-proliferation and disarmament. It would help in building
and sustaining coalitions needed to shape national policies and legislation. It would help in educating the public, by
clarifying how each person has an important stake in the success of efforts to improve the conditions of peace and prosperity at the global level.
The ultimate challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime comes not from so-called rogue nations - despite the attention they
typically get in various circles of government, the news media, and in academia. Instead, the ultimate challenge is to sustain and expand the
foundation of political support for the goals for which it stands - namely, the elimination of nuclear weapons in the interest of international
peace and security, and non-proliferation as a stepping-stone to that goal. The more one considers the potential gains from
meeting this challenge - and the tragic consequences of failing to meet it -- the more apparent it becomes how
much international peace and security depends upon the future of the NPT -- the linchpin of the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime, if not international peace and security itself. Full compliance with all the provisions of the treaty is - as the late
William Epstein would say -- our "Last Chance" for a safer world for everybody
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Proliferation Impacts
Nuclear proliferation creates multiple scenarios for nuclear war
Samuel Totten (Associate Professor, College of Education, University of Arkansas) 1994 The Widening Circle of
Genocide, p. 289
There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to the following: the
possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the
miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack;
a nuclear weapons accident due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of
such weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a period of
instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such weapons by terrorists. While
it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the
assistance of a renegade government.
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Proliferation Impacts
Multiple flashpoints of nuclear tension exist – proliferation could turn them all deadly
Arjun Makhijani (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research) June 1998 Foreign Policy In Focus,
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n18asi_body.html
If India tries to approach the size and variety of China’s arsenal (estimated to be about 400 warheads), it will have to
expend enormous resources. Moreover, India simply cannot match the industrial and economic infrastructure of China, although they
both have a similarly large population base. A nuclear arms race would mean that India would fall further behind in
industrial infrastructure, economic growth, and consumer goods, even if one ignores the impact of the U.S.-
imposed sanctions. The situation is even worse for Pakistan, which will suffer far more from U.S. sanctions than India—it has a
far smaller population base, is far deeper in debt, and has a much weaker scientific and industrial base. It would be ruinous for Pakistan to try to
match India’s nuclear capabilities. Further, Pakistan has left itself almost no room to maneuver since its nuclear policy is
even more reactive than that of India. It has tied its nuclear policy—including its strategy on nuclear testing and
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)—to India’s nuclear policy. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests have greatly increased the
threat of nuclear war in South Asia, notably over the Kashmir question. Moreover, there are also numerous global
dimensions to the South Asian nuclear crisis. The tests have rekindled a nascent nuclear crisis in the Middle East,
coming as they did at a time when the failing Middle East peace process is spreading gloom and restlessness throughout
the region. At the same time, they have aggravated the already grave dangers associated with the potential
diversion of nuclear materials from Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union into international black
markets. In the Middle East, harsh U.S. sanctions against Pakistan for nuclear tests are being contrasted anew with U.S. military and
economic aid to Israel (which has a far larger nuclear arsenal than Pakistan). This is intensifying resentment in Arab countries and
strengthening proliferation pressures. Pakistan has strongly denied that its bomb is an "Islamic bomb," and its policy since the tests appears to
be consistent with its statements. However, there is the possibility that, given its very weak financial position and the debilitating
impact of U.S. sanctions, Pakistani leaders may decide that sharing its nuclear-weapons technology and expertise
with countries that provide it with aid may be necessary for the survival of the Pakistani state. Pakistan, which has
declared a financial emergency, has already begun economic aid discussions with Saudi Arabia. By unhappy
coincidence this complex nuclear emergency is developing when the Asian financial crisis is deepening and affecting Russia in adverse ways.
Economic conditions in Russia (the largest potential source of fissile materials for nuclear black markets) could
greatly increase the severity of any regional nuclear crisis and more rapidly turn it into a global one. Another
concern is that Russia’s deteriorating nuclear infrastructure presents the United States and the rest of the world
with the threat of destruction by accidental nuclear war.
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Incentives Needed
Market forces alone will not drive investment in new reactors, must develop incentives to
drive investment
Alvin M. Weinberg (former director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory) Summer 2003 Issues in Science &
Technology, “New life for nuclear power”, p. 60-62
Most of what I wrote in "Engineering in an Age of Anxiety" and "Energy Policy in an Age of Uncertainty" I still believe: Inherently safe
nuclear energy technologies will continue to evolve; total U.S. energy output will rise more slowly than it has hitherto;
and incrementalism will, at least in the short run, dominate our energy supply. However, my perspective has changed in some
ways as the result of an emerging development in electricity generation: the remarkable extension of the lifetimes of many generating facilities,
particularly nuclear reactors. If this trend continues, it could significantly alter the long-term prospect for nuclear energy. This trend toward
nuclear reactor "immortality" has become apparent in the past 20 years, and it has become clear that the projected lifetime of a reactor is far
longer than we had estimated when we licensed these reactors for 30 to 40 years. Some 14 U.S. reactors have been relicensed, 16 others have
applied for relicensing, and 18 more applications are expected by 2004. According to former Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman
Richard Meserve, essentially all 103 U.S. power reactors will be relicensed for at least another 20 years. If nuclear reactors receive normal
maintenance, they will "never" wear out, and this will profoundly affect the economic performance of the reactors. Time annihilates capital
costs. The economic Achilles' heel of nuclear energy has been its high capital cost. In this respect, nuclear energy
resembles renewable energy sources such as wind turbines, hydroelectric facilities, and photovoltaic cells, which have high
capital costs but low operating expenses. If a reactor lasts beyond its amortization time, the burden of debt falls
drastically. Indeed, according to one estimate, fully amortized nuclear reactors with total electricity production costs (operation and
maintenance, fuel, and capital costs) below 2 cents per kilowatt hour are possible. Electricity that inexpensive would make it economically
feasible to power operations such as seawater desalinization, fulfilling a dream that was common in the early days of nuclear power. President
Eisenhower proposed building nuclear-powered industrial complexes in the West Bank as a solution to the Middle East's water problem, and
Sen. Howard Baker promulgated a "sense of the U.S. Senate" resolution authorizing a study of such complexes as part of a settlement of the
Israel-Palestinian conflict. If power reactors are virtually immortal, we have in principle achieved nuclear electricity
"too cheap to meter." But there is a major catch. The very inexpensive electricity does not kick in until the reactor
is fully amortized, which means that the generation that pays for the reactor is giving a gift of cheap electricity to
the next generation. Because such altruism is not likely to drive investment, the task becomes to develop accounting
or funding methods that will make it possible to build the generation capacity that will eventually be a virtually
permanent part of society's infrastructure. If the only benefit of these reactors is to produce less expensive
electricity and the market is the only force driving investment, then we will not see a massive investment in
nuclear power. But if immortal reactors by their very nature serve purposes that fall outside of the market economy, their original capital
cost can be handled in the way that society pays for infrastructure.
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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Affirmative
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***Answers To Arguments***
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A2: Accidents
Should not evaluate nuclear accident risk—no baseline for evaluating the probability
Taylor Burke (J.D., University of Tulsa, 2006; B.A., Political Science and History, University of Tulsa) Winter
2006 “nuclear energy and proliferation: problems, observations, and proposals”, Boston University Journal of
Science and Technology Law, lexis
There is no clear way to evaluate the risk of a nuclear accident, much less the risk posed by nuclear proliferation.
The lack of a tangible means of evaluating the probability of such incidents is not a reason to ignore the problem.
If nuclear energy is a necessary step in addressing the rising energy demand worldwide, it will take an investment
in the future to protect the world from dangers posed by nuclear proliferation. Allowing examples like the
Kinshasa reactor to discourage a policy that pursues the safe development of nuclear energy is a mistake.
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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Affirmative
Starter Pack
A2: Radiation
Radiation fears are just that, nuclear industry workers have best health record
Brian Downing Quig (program director Decentria) March 22 1997 The Journal of History, “The integral fast
reactor could usher in the hydrogen economy”, http://truedemocracy.net/td2_4/57-fast.html]
There is a very unscientific media fed phobia of anything nuclear in this country. Except for the slightest short
lived perturbations following atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons there has never been a measurable increase
in background radiation that our most delicate instruments could detect. If low level radiation was so harmful, it
would make sense to filter radon gas which accounts for more than half of the 360 millirems exposure of average
US citizens. The health of nuclear workers in the U.S. is measurably better than other occupations. They are
essentially the only persons receiving even the slightest elevated dosage.
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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Affirmative
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A2: Uranium/Natives
IFR solve uranium mining—zero link to the natives debate
George S. Stanford (nuclear reactor physicist) May/June 2001 Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, “The integral fast
reactor could do it”, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/mj01/mj01letters.html
Enrichment of uranium would have permanently ceased. Any enrichment operation would constitute prima facie
evidence of intent to proliferate, as would a PUREX reprocessing facility.
Until the uranium currently on hand had been used up—which could take centuries—no milling of uranium nor
mining of uranium or coal would be needed.
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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Affirmative
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Economy Add-on
Electricity is the backbone to the U.S. economy and stable electricity prices are to generate
sufficient amounts of electricity
NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute) 2004 “Nuclear Energy and the Nations Future Prosperity”,
http://www.nei.org/documents/Vision2020_Booklet.pdf
More than half of the academy’s top 20 achievements depend on electricity. What is more striking, however, is how the diffuse items on the list
interact, in combination with electricity, to power the nation’s economic progress. One prominent example is the
country’s technology-reliant digital economy. Such an economy could not operate, let alone prosper, without
reliable electricity to power computers (ranked eighth), electronics (ranked ninth) and the Internet (ranked thirteenth) that are so basic
to our economic success. In other words, electricity is an economic multiplier—a gateway technology that fosters
economic growth and additional technological progress. The strong historical correlation between electricity
demand and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is powerful evidence that electricity plays an essential role in economic
growth (see Fig.5 ). As the nation’s GDP rises,electricity demand follows with near lockstep precision. Stated differently,increased
availability of electricity spurred wider and more diverse applications of that electricity. This in turn spawned
increasing economic growth as the nation developed new ways to derive increased economic value from electricity and to improve the
overall standard of living. While these supply and demand variables remain in balance, electricity prices remain stable
and economic growth continues. Moreover,the wider application of electrotechnologies results in greater productivity gains and the
more efficient use of this valuable commodity. This can be seen in the measure of electricity intensity—the ratio of kilowatthours per unit of
GDP. As electricity demand increases over time,electricity intensity has fallen since 1974 (see Fig.6 ).
Nuclear power loan guarantees are essential to maintain stable electricity prices
NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute) February 28 2007 Nuclear Energy Industry Experiences Record Year, Anticipates
Developments, Growth, http://petrochemical.ihs.com/news-07Q1/nei-nuclear-energy.jsp
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included incentives for a limited number of advanced-design nuclear plants among its provisions encouraging
improved energy efficiency and the construction of renewable energy sources and cleaner fossil-fired power plants. The legislation provides
limited investment incentives for construction of nuclear plants and other high-capital-cost clean energy technologies. But it does not by itself
resolve all financing challenges, particularly with regard to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) implementation of the clean technology-
neutral loan guarantee program that the energy bill authorized, Bowman said. "The construction period is when a new nuclear
project most needs credit support," he said. "Unfortunately, the [DOE] interim guidelines published last year were developed without
input from companies with financial expertise and are not optimal for large power projects. So we must continue to work cooperatively with
the agency as it moves forward. Constructive input from credible organizations and institutions, including the financial community, will be
essential to making this program a success." Properly implemented, the loan guarantee program will reduce financing costs
and thus reduce the consumer cost of electricity from the project, Bowman said. The industry's average production costs -
including expenses for uranium fuel and operations and maintenance - were an all-time low of 1.66 cents/kW in 2006, according to preliminary
NEI figures. Average production costs have been below 2 cents/kW for the past eight years, making nuclear power plants cost competitive with
other electricity sources, particularly those capable of reliably producing large amounts of electricity. Electricity production at nuclear power
plants has increased 36% since 1990, adding the equivalent of more than 26 large power plants to the electrical grid and preventing the
emission of massive amounts of controlled air pollutants and greenhouse gases. The average production cost dropped to a record-
low even though prices for uranium fuel have increased over the past three years. Production costs are a key
measure of an electricity source's competitiveness in the market because generating companies typically dispatch
their low-cost electricity to the grid first. Even when expenses for taxes, decommissioning and yearly capital additions are added to
production costs to yield a total electricity cost, nuclear-generated electricity typically clears the market for less than 2.5
cents/kW. By comparison, production costs alone for natural gas-fired power plants averaged 7.5 cents/kW in 2005, according to Global
Energy Decisions data.
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Price Shocks
New nuclear plants are key to avoid electricity based price shocks
Marvin S. Fertel (Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer at Nuclear Energy Institute) March 24 2004
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, “Nuclear Power Generation”, lexis
New nuclear plants will be essential in the years ahead to achieve a number of critically important public policy imperatives for our
country's energy supply and electricity market. First, new nuclear power plants will continue to contribute to the fuel
and technology diversity that is the core strength of the U.S. electric supply system. This diversity is at risk because
today's business environment and market conditions make investment in large, new capital-intensive technologies
difficult, notably the advanced nuclear power plants and advanced coal-fired power plants best suited to supply baseload
electricity. More than 90 percent of all new electric generating capacity added over the past five years is fueled with natural gas. Natural gas
has many desirable characteristics and should be part of our fuel mix, but "over-reliance on any one fuel source leaves consumers vulnerable to
price spikes and supply disruptions." Second, new nuclear power plants provide future price stability that is not available
from electric generating plants fueled with natural gas. Intense volatility in natural gas prices over the last several
years is likely to continue, and subjects the U.S. economy to potential damage.
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