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THE LEGAL PROFESSION by Judge Seville CASE DIGESTS

Karl Rainier Barcenas, EH401 CAYETANO vs. MONSOD, 201 SCRA 210, Sept. 3, 1991 FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino for appointment in the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano, herein petitioner, opposed the nomination alleging that respondent does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. He contended that the 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ISSUE: WON the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. RULING: DISMISSED. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of respondent, citing the case of the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, to wit: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Petitioners contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification in Section 1, Article IX-C of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. LEGAL PROVISION(s): Section 1, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution - There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs. AGRAVA, GR. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959 FACTS: Herein petitioner, Philippine Lawyers Association (PLA), filed a motion for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, respondent herein, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. Subsequently, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally. ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition and enjoined respondent from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to comply to his circular, in that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. L-19450 FACTS: Accused was charged with the Crime of Malicious Mischief. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, where it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Accused then argued that the court violated the aforementioned ruling in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Subsequently, the court issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent ISSUE: WON City Attorney Fule engaged in the private practice of law. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of plaintiff, affirming in toto the decision of the trial court, ruling that the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. LEGAL PROVISION (s): Section 32, Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) - no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIOMA. CUI, G.R. NO. L-18727, AUGUST 31, 1964 FACTS: Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospiciode Barili. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. RULING:

Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, andupon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Barexaminations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws initself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with therequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all theprescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there areinstances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had notgone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Barexaminationsand to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids andincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it thattherules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successivelytothe descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

RE: IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970 FACTS: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. ISSUE: WON Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyers Certificate of Title. RULING: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN, AC No. 838, January 21, 1974 FACTS: Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the decision of the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath were affixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the decision to forestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for reconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed not to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she would vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead filed the Petition for Relief.

ISSUE: WON the petition for relief against the respondent who committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila be approved. RULING: The Supreme Court, dismissing the case and exonerating Atty. De Guzman, agreed with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated." LEGAL PROVISION (s):

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO VS. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, AC No. 244, March 29, 1963 FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941. Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for such claim from any proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that Previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required by the Department of Private Education ISSUE: WON Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law. Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return his law diploma within thirty days. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN JR. vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003 FACTS: Simbillo advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist. These advertisements appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000. Subsequently, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan. Simbillos advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Courts indulgence, this rings hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001. ISSUE: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court RULING: The Supreme Court in suspending petitioner from the practice of law for 1 year and warning the latter that a repetition of the same offense will result in more severe punishment, ruled that Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The practice of law is not a business, it is a profession in which duty to public service, money is not the primary consideration. LEGAL PROVISION (s): Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement orclaim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court - Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

ELMER CANOY vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, A. C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005 FACTS: Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was too busy. Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant filed this complaint but later on withdrew. ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: The Supreme Court, in suspening respondent for 1 month, ruled that Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended. There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided. The respondent was warned that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. LEGAL PROVISION (s): CANON 17, Code of Professional Responsibility A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18, Code of Professional Responsibility A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxxxxxxxx Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04, Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. xxxxxxxxx CANON 22, Code of Professional Responsibility A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. xxxxxxxxx Rule 22.02, Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. IAaCST

BORJA, SR. vs. SULYAP INC., 399 SCRA 601 FACTS: Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals,association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreement stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorneys fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyap filed a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyaps fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein. Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection. ISSUE: WON Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that while a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent or forgery, they find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioners failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof. Finally, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case. LEGAL PROVISION (s): DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent., A.C. No. 4219, December 8, 2003 FACTS: Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed. Because of respondents transgressions, his client was haled to court as partdefendant. Respondent also refused to return petitioners money in spite of his meager service. ISSUE: WON Atty. Marcelo G. Flores violated Canons 17 and 18 by not protecting his clients interest RULING: Supreme Court found respondent guilty of negligence and incompetence and suspended the latter for (6) months and to return the money of complainant with interest. The SC also sternly warned Flores that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. LEGAL PROVISION (s): CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite demands after his failure to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainants papers. This conduct violated the following Canon: CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA vs HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974

FACTS: Petitioner herein, Adelino Ledesma, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. He then commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rafael Climaco, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge however, denied said motion. After the motion for reconsideration was also denied, petitioner instituted this certiorari proceeding. ISSUE: WON the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion. RULING: In dismissing the petition and ordering costs against the latter, the Supreme Court found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume on that day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that hiswork as an election registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high court described the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing and added that the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. LEGAL PROVISION (s): Sec. 32, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court (now Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court) - The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the Solicitor General.

CARLOS B. REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, respondent. FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias Vitan for gross negligence. The complaint alleges that sometime in June 2001, complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter's niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila, in Civil Case No. 99-92657 ordering the partition of the properties left by complainant's brother Damaso B. Reyes; and that respondent, after receiving the amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's case. When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion. ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility due to gross negligence.

RULING: Supreme Court held that Respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is guilty of violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility wherein he was unable to uphold his task as a lawyer and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. For it, he is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. LEGAL PROVISION (s): Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

SPOUSES OLBES vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, AC-5365, April 27, 2005 FACTS: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ISSUE:

WON the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. RULING: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. LEGAL PROVISION (s): Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents, GR. No. L-22320, July 29, 1968 FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: LEGAL PROVISION (s):

JESUS V. OCCEA and SAMUEL C. OCCEA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V. BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C. Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol, intervenor, GR No. FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: LEGAL PROVISION (s):

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL.,defendants-appellees, G.R. Nos. L-10236-48, January 31, 1958 FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed the examinations, it was resolved: A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64; B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of the Court; C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice of law; D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of

Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice; E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.) It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

LESLIE UI vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, AC. No. 3319, June 8, 2000 FACTS: Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June 1988, Leslieconfronted the respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio for the illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said that she will cut off the said relationship. OnDecember 1988 Carlos and Iris had a second child. On March 1989 complainantpleaded to respondent to stop their illicit relationship.On Atty Iris side, she asserts that she had no knowledge of Carlos previousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the one who represented himself as single during theircourtship. She submitted her Certificate of marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe courts investigation it was found out that the marriage was in fact on Oct 1987. In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love withhim and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him ISSUE: WON Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral conduct as aground for disbarment RULING: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supportedby the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. IrisBonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and wilfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning thata repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty. LEGAL PROVISION (s):

FLORA NARIDO, complainant, vs. ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent, A.C. No. 944, July 25, 1974 FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: LEGAL PROVISION (s):

LAPUT vs. REMOTIGUE, 6 SCRA 45, Sept. 29, 1962 FACTS: Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves RillasV d a . d e B a r r e r a r e t a i n e d p e t i t i o n e r A t t y . L a p u t t o h a n d l e h e r " T e s t a t e E s t a t e o f M a c a r i o Barrera" case in CFICebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of said estate.Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrerascounsel.Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents appearances were unethical and improper; (2) theymade Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioners Power of Attorney" purportedly todisauthorize him from further collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. MacarioBarreras corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan. 1955Mrs. Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging his services. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filedhis appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel. The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter recommended the complete exoneration of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional andunethical conduct in soliciting cases. RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty.Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, the petitioner'svoluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb.

1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for thepayment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. T h e S C a l s o h e l d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t A t t y . R e m o t i g u e w a s a l s o n o t g u i l t y o f u n p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct in as much as he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance.As to Atty. Patalinghugs preparation of documents revoking the petitioners power of attorney,the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurtpetitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix.Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.

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