Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
S/2012/348/Add.1
Distr.: General 27 June 2012 Original: English
Security Council
Letter dated 26 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council
In connection with my letter dated 21 June 2012 addressed to you, by which I submitted the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and requested its issuance as a document of the Council (S/2012/348), I have the honour to submit herewith the addendum to the Groups interim report (see annex). (Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev Chair
*1239339*
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda
I. Introduction
1. Pursuant to its oral briefing to the Sanctions Committee on 13 June 2012 and in fulfilment of its commitment to provide timely information on arms embargo and sanctions violations to the Committee, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submits the present addendum to its interim report (S/2012/348).1 2. Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has gathered evidence of arms embargo and sanctions regime violations committed by the Rwandan Government. These violations consist of the provision of material and financial support to armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the recently established M23, in contravention of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1807 (2008). 2 The arms embargo and sanctions regimes violations include the following: Direct assistance in the creation of M23 through the transport of weapons and soldiers through Rwandan territory Recruitment of Rwandan youth and demobilized ex-combatants as well as Congolese refugees for M23 Provision of weapons and ammunition to M23 Mobilization and lobbying of Congolese political and financial leaders for the benefit of M23 Direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce M23 Support to several other armed groups as well as Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo (FARDC) mutinies in the eastern Congo Violation of the assets freeze and travel ban through supporting sanctioned individuals.3
__________________
1
The Group submitted its interim report to the Sanctions Committee on 18 May 2012, which in turn transmitted it to the Security Council on 21 June 2012. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 1807 (2008) the Security Council decided that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related materiel, and the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities, including financing and financial assistance, to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;. See official list of designated individuals and entities for Sanctions Committee 1533 (2004) available from www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf.
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
3. Over the course of its investigation since late 2011, the Group has found substantial evidence attesting to support from Rwandan officials to armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Initially the RDF appeared to establish these alliances to facilitate a wave of targeted assassinations against key officers of the Forces dmocratique pour la libration du Rwanda (FDLR) thus significantly weakening the rebel movement (see S/2012/348, paras. 37 and 38). However, these activities quickly extended to support for a series of post-electoral mutinies within the FARDC and eventually included the direct facilitation, through the use of Rwandan territory, of the creation of the M23 rebellion. The latter is comprised of ex-CNDP officers integrated into the Congolese army (FARDC) in January 2009. Since M23 established itself in strategic positions along the Rwandan border in May 2012, the Group has gathered overwhelming evidence demonstrating that senior RDF officers, in their official capacities, have been backstopping the rebels through providing weapons, military supplies, and new recruits. 4. In turn, M23 continues to solidify alliances with many other armed groups and mutineer movements, including those previously benefiting from RDF support. This has created enormous security challenges, extending from Ituri district in the north to Fizi territory in the south, for the already overstretched Congolese army (FARDC). Through such arms embargo violations, Rwandan officials have also been in contravention of the sanctions regimes travel ban and assets freeze measures, by including three designated individuals among their direct allies. 5. In an attempt to solve the crisis which this Rwandan support to armed groups had exacerbated, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have held a series of high-level bilateral meetings since early in April 2012. During these discussions, Rwandan officials have insisted on impunity for their armed group and mutineer allies, including ex-CNDP General Bosco Ntaganda, and the deployment of additional RDF units to the Kivus to conduct large-scale joint operations against the FDLR. The latter request has been repeatedly made despite the fact that: (a) the RDF halted its unilateral initiatives to weaken the FDLR in lateFebruary;4 (b) RDF Special Forces have already been deployed officially in Rutshuru territory for over a year; (c) RDF operational units are periodically reinforcing the M23 on the battlefield against the Congolese army; (d) M23 is directly and indirectly allied with several FDLR splinter groups; and (e) the RDF is remobilizing previously repatriated FDLR to boost the ranks of M23. Elevated standards of evidence 6. In the light of the serious nature of these findings, the Group has adopted elevated methodological standards. Since early in April 2012, the Group has interviewed over 80 deserters of FARDC mutinies and Congolese armed groups, including from M23. Among the latter, the Group has interviewed 31 Rwandan nationals. Furthermore, the Group has also photographed weapons and military equipment found in arms caches and on the battlefield, and has obtained official documents and intercepts of radio communications. The Group has also consulted dozens of senior Congolese military commanders and intelligence officials as well as political and community leaders with intricate knowledge of developments between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Moreover, the Group
__________________
4
The last FDLR officer to be assassinated was Captain Theophile, the S3 of the Military Police Battalion, in late-February 2012.
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
has communicated regularly with several active participants of the ex-CNDP mutiny, the M23 rebellion, and other armed groups. Finally, while the Groups standard methodology requires a minimum of three sources, assessed to be credible and independent of one another, it has raised this to five sources when naming specific individuals involved in these cases of arms embargo and sanctions regime violations.
A.
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
combatants who later deserted the movement, and Congolese intelligence services, the evacuated weapons included such heavy weapons as Katyusha rocket launchers, RPG 7, and 14.5 mm machine guns, some of which were brought from Makengas weapons caches at Nyamunyoni (see S/2012/348, para. 118). Image 1 Colonel Makengas home and private dock on Lake Kivu in Bukavu
Image 2 Map of the transport of weapons and troops from Col. Makengas home on 4 May 2012
11. The three former M23 combatants who participated in the operation also told the Group that upon arrival in Cyangugu, RDF and Rwandan police brought them to a military camp. The RDF subsequently provided them with full Rwandan army uniforms to be worn while travelling within Rwanda. The troops and the military equipment were afterwards loaded onto three RDF trucks, and transported via the towns of Kamembe, Gikongoro, Butare, Ngororero, Nkamira and brought to the RDF position at Kabuhanga. This military position is situated on the Democratic
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Republic of the Congo-Rwanda border, near the village of Gasizi in Rwanda (roughly 27 km north of Goma). This ex-combatant testimony was corroborated by several sources interviewed by the Group, who all attested to the movement of troops from Rwanda into the DRC: (a) Four local leaders interviewed separately in Kibumba personally witnessed Rwandan soldiers offloading equipment and soldiers from RDF trucks and jeeps at Gasizi on those same dates; (b) Two Congolese border agents observed the RDF trucks which brought the troops and military equipment to Gasizi; (c) A civilian intelligence officer reported that the troops had been brought to Gasizi in trucks; (d) An FARDC internal intelligence report states that the troops were brought to join Makenga at Gasizi (see annex 1). 12. Several former M23 combatants also told the Group that General Ruvusha accompanied Makenga to meet with his troops in the RDF base at Kabuhanga (see image 3). RDF commanders ordered the Congolese soldiers to once again put on their FARDC uniforms and provided them with plastic sheets, food, soap and kitchen utensils. RDF officers also instructed the soldiers to remove any signs identifying Rwanda, such as labels on uniforms and water bottles. Image 3 M23 travel through Rwanda facilitated by the RDF
13. That night, RDF officers ordered the FARDC deserters to offload and transport the weapons brought from Bukavu through the Virunga National Park, to Gasizi on
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
the Democratic Republic of the Congo side,5 between Karisimbi and Mikeno volcanoes. On 8 May, these soldiers joined up with the mutineers who came from Masisi territory to the assembly point at Gasizi. Military and police officers, as well as local authorities from Kibumba reported on the arrival of the mutineers from Masisi near the border, and the movement of Makengas troops from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A local authority gathered reports from Rwandan civilians who had been forced to carry the weapons from Gasizi, in Rwanda, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo border. After Ntagandas and Makengas groups merged, they advanced further through the park and took control of Runyoni on 10 May to officially launch military operations of the M23 rebellion (see S/2012/348, para. 104).6
B.
__________________
5
The corresponding village along the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is also called Gasizi. CNDP issued an official communiqu announcing the creation of M23 on 6 May 2012, just after the desertion of Colonel Makenga. CNDP held a stronghold in Runyoni in 2008. See S/2008/773, para. 64 (b).
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
17. According to FARDC officers, Congolese intelligence and civilian sources in Kibumba, a second point of entry for recruits from Rwanda to join M23 is the town of Njerima, 8 located on the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of the Congo border south-west of Kinigi (see annex 2). Local traders who sell their goods at Njerima told the Group that during the last week of May, M23 recruits passing through the village included refugees from Masisi, as well as Rwandan nationals. Recruits arrive by bus at Ruatano at about a kilometre from Njerima. From Njerima, walking paths lead to Kabare in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is located within the Democratic Republic of the Congo Virunga National Park, in between the volcanoes Mikeno and Karisimbi. According to park authorities, Kabare is a natural clearing in the forest where a rebel presence has been observed since the last week of May 2012. 18. The Group has not been able to establish the total numbers of recruits, as upon arrival to Runyoni they are immediately deployed among the various M23 positions situated on seven distinct hills. 9 According to Rwandan former M23 combatants, groups that depart from Kinigi, are composed of 30 to 45 recruits at a time. All recently recruited former combatants observed other civilian recruits from Rwanda upon arrival to Runyoni and saw new recruits arriving from Rwanda every second day. One M23 deserter deployed at Ntagandas position counted 130 to 140 recruits from Rwanda when he arrived, while another from Chanzu counted about 70 recruits from Rwanda. For their part, two ex-M23 combatants from Kavumu saw 60 recruits.
__________________
8
In 2008 Njerima also served as an entry point for infiltrations from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See S/2008/773, enclosure, para. 64 (b). At Runyoni, the mutineers established positions on Runyoni, Chanzu, Kanyanja, Jomba, Kavumu, Mbuzi, or Bugina hills.
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
19. All ex-M23 combatants confirmed that there were children under the age of 18 among the waves of recruits. The Group interviewed two 15-year-old boys who had escaped from M23. While one ex-combatant reported that he saw 28 children at Ntagandas position, another witnessed at least 20 minors at M23s position at Chanzu. As for most of the M23 recruits, these children are given a weapon and undergo very rudimentary training before immediately being sent to the battlefield. Demobilized ex-FDLR 20. The RDF has also deployed demobilized former FDLR combatants to reinforce M23. According to several former senior FDLR officers, all former combatants of Rwandan armed groups, upon completion of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions programme, are automatically enrolled in the RDF Reserve Force, commanded by General Fred Ibingira. As members of the Reserve Force, they can be ordered to deploy on behalf of the RDF on short notice. Former RDF officers and politicians and M23 collaborators indicated that ex-FDLR combatants from within the RDF Reserve Force have been remobilized and deployed to Runyoni alongside M23. Active FDLR officers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also confirmed this remobilization of previously repatriated FDLR combatants. According to Rwandan former M23 combatants who escaped from Runyoni, small groups of former demobilized combatants arrive every day and are dispatched between the various M23 positions.10 21. The Group interviewed two former FDLR, who had previously been demobilized in Rwanda and were sent to Runyoni in May 2012. Both belonged to the Reserve Force. One was deployed after being called by RDF officers, while the other was invited to join a meeting with other demobilized soldiers when he was instructed to depart for military service. Both were taken to the military base at Kinigi, where they received weapons and ammunition, and were escorted to Runyoni in the same way as the civilian recruits. Both testified that they had been sent to Runyoni in a group with 70 other people, among whom 31 were demobilized soldiers. Upon arrival, they saw 11 other demobilized soldiers at Chanzu (see S/2012/348, para. 123).
C.
__________________
10
These ex-FDLR combatants remobilized from Rwanda should not be confused with the FDLR splinter group Mandevu, which is also fighting alongside M23. See paras. 100-102 of the interim report.
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
23. All 30 ex-M23 combatants from Rwanda interviewed by the Group stated that the RDF forced them to carry one box of ammunition and one weapon each when crossing into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Near the Democratic Republic of the Congo border crossing with the Rwandan village of Gasizi, the Group obtained a box of ammunition, which FARDC officers and ex-M23 combatants attested had been provided by the RDF and was destined for the M23. The metal casing included 7.62 mm tracer ammunition for AK-47 rifles, which were painted with a green tip, in contrast to FARDC ammunition (see image 6). One displaced villager from Runyoni, interviewed by the Group in Bunagana, stated that M23 rebels forced him to carry the same ammunition boxes from Chanzu to Runyoni. Current RDF officers confirmed for the Group that this type of ammunition did indeed belong to the RDF. Image 6 7.62 mm tracer rounds provided by the RDF to the M23 (on right) compared with FARDC ammunition (on left)
10
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
24. Furthermore, the Group photographed anti-tank rounds recovered from the battlefield near Kibumba (see annex 3). Col. Makengas arms cache at Nyamunyoni contained over 300 75 mm anti-tank cannon rounds (see S/2012/348, para. 118 and annex 4). According to several Congolese senior commanders and logistics officers, neither the anti-tank rounds found on the battlefield above nor those from Makengas cache have ever been distributed by the FARDC. 25. Ex-M23 combatants have also surrendered with AK-47 rifles that are distinct from those used by the FARDC. The Group photographed one such rifle, which has a larger barrel muzzle than those used by the FARDC (see image 7). Image 7 AK-47 rifle surrendered by ex-M23 soldier
D.
12-39339
11
S/2012/348/Add.1
dmocratie (RCD) politicians to join M23. Several politicians told the Group that senior Rwandan Government officials had directly contacted them. One politician and one ex-CNDP officer acknowledged to the Group that RDF Capt. Celestin Senkoko,11 the personal assistant of Rwandan Minister of Defence Gen. James Kabarebe, 12 had called on several occasions to convince them to become a part of M23. Another politician told the Group that Senkoko and Jack Nziza, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, called and threatened him after he refused to join M23. Still another politician interviewed by the Group was contacted by Kabarebe, Senkoko, and Nziza, all three requesting him to mobilize support for M23. According to three other politicians, Charles Kayonga, RDF General Chief of Staff, has called politicians and invited them for a meeting about M23 in Kigali. Former CNDP Gen. Laurent Nkunda, has also been a key mobilizer of M23 and has been calling ex-CNDP officers to convince them to join the new rebellion (see S/2012/348, para. 107). RDF-convened meetings 28. According to intelligence sources, politicians, and M23 collaborators, on 23 May 2012, Senkoko organized a meeting, with the participation of RDF officers and 32 community leaders, mostly CNDP cadres, in Gisenyi at the residence of CNDP member Gafishi Ngoboka. Senkoko introduced himself as the representative of Kabarebe and conveyed the message that the Rwandan Government supports M23, whose new war was to obtain a secession of both Kivus. After showing the territory to be liberated on a map, he instructed politicians to convince all Rwandophone army officers operating in the Kivus to join M23 and stressed the need for M23 to gain more popular support and begin collecting funds. According to intelligence sources, politicians, and M23 collaborators, Nziza came to Gisenyi and Ruhengeri at the same period, to supervise both military and mobilization activities related to M23. 29. Another similar M23 meeting with Rwandan authorities took place on 26 May 2012 in Ruhengeri, Rwanda, at Hotel Ishema. According to intelligence sources and to politicians with close ties to Kigali, the RDF organized the meeting for CNDP politicians, which was chaired by Bishops John Rucyahana 13 and Coline, both senior RPF14 party leaders. The aim of the meeting was to convey the message that the Rwandan Government supports M23 politically and militarily. All Rwandophone politicians and officers were instructed to join M23, or otherwise leave the Kivus. In particular, CNDP politicians have been asked to resign from the North Kivu
__________________
11
12
13
14
Capt. Celestin Senkoko, a native from Goma, has previously worked for Gen. Jacques Nziza, and currently works as the personal assistant for the Rwandan Minister of Defence, James Kabarebe. For years, he has been executing specific aspects related to Rwandan foreign policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In particular, he played an instrumental role in the distribution of weapons by Tous pour la Paix et le Dveloppement (TPD) designated for targeted sanctions by the Committee for these same acts on 1 November 2005 (www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8546.doc.htm). James Kabarebe, formerly the Rwandan Chief of Staff, has traditionally been in charge of the Congo file within the Rwandan Government. John Rucyahana has been the head of the Anglican Church at Ruhengeri, president of the Bagogwe community from Rwanda, and President of the Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the ruling party of President Paul Kagame.
12
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Governorate and to withdraw from the Presidential Majority. 15 Following the decision taken during the meeting at Ruhengeri, CNDP Minister of Justice Franois Rucogoza resigned from the Governorate in North Kivu on 2 June (see image 8). After considerable pressure to declare CNDPs withdrawal from the Presidential Majority, Edouard Mwangachuchu, the head of the CNDP political party, refused to do so. CNDP politicians siding with M23 and acting from within Rwanda, made such a declaration nevertheless (see annex 5). Image 8 Resignation letter of CNDP provincial ministry following instructions from the RDF in Ruhengeri meeting
__________________
15
A participant to the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri meetings informed the Group that the conclusions of the meetings included the creation of various cells in Gisenyi, Masisi, Goma, and Ruhengeri, in charge of collecting financial contributions to purchase supplies for M23.
12-39339
13
S/2012/348/Add.1
30. According to politicians, individuals closely associated to M23, and to Congolese intelligence services, on 2-3 June, and once again on 9-10 June, representatives of the business community from Goma, comprised mostly of owners of fuel stations represented by Desir Rwabaenda and Dieudonn Komayombi, met Gen. Kabarebe in Kigali, to discuss mobilizing financial contributions to M23.
E.
RDF units directly reinforcing M23 during operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
31. Former M23 combatants, FARDC officers, local authorities, intelligence services, and ex-RDF officers informed the Group that RDF units themselves have also been deployed to reinforce M23 for specific operations at Runyoni. The following sources have provided detailed accounts of such direct military involvement of the RDF: (a) An RDF soldier, who surrendered on 14 June 2012 from Ntagandas position in Runyoni, stated that his unit had been trained for two weeks in Kanombe military camp in Kigali, before being deployed in Runyoni already during the first week of March. Having previously fought as a CNDP soldier under Laurent Nkunda and as part of joint RDF FARDC Amani Leo operations, the soldier in question was recruited alongside several other Rwandan ex-CNDP soldiers by an RDF Captain at the beginning of February. The mission of his 80-men unit was to prepare the arrival of Ntaganda in Runyoni. On its way to Runyoni via Kinigi the unit was joined by an estimated 150 more RDF soldiers; (b) FARDC officers informed the Group that they had captured a Rwandan soldier who had been working for Ntaganda while gathering information on the FARDC deployments at Kibumba at the end of April in preparation of the arrival of M23 (see image 9); (c) An M23 officer who surrendered from Ntagandas position at Runyoni stated that he witnessed how RDF troops supported M23 during their operations. He said that the RDF use the path going from Kinigi into Chanzu, or the path going through Njerima to Kanyanja, where Ntagandas position is located. The same source reported that RDF troops have been deployed in the park not far from Kanyanja to assist the rebels during combat operations against the FARDC. He estimated that there were about 150 RDF troops deployed at Kanyanja; (d) Another ex-M23 officer who surrendered from Ntagandas position at Runyoni told the Group that he personally witnessed how one RDF battalion came to reinforce the mutineers after a FARDC helicopter bombarded their positions. The RDF unit passed through Ntagandas base and went to support Zimurinda on Bugina hill; (e) After deserting the M23 from his position at Mbuzi hill, another ex-M23 officer told the Group that he had witnessed RDF units coming to support the rebels on three occasions after FARDC advances; (f) An officer who surrendered from the position at Runyoni reported that he had witnessed the arrival of four waves, each of about 100 RDF soldiers and 30 recruits;
14
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Image 9 Extracts from FARDC internal intelligence file on an RDF soldier captured while conducting spy operations prior to the establishment of the M23 in Rutshuru
(g) An ex-M23 soldier recruited in Rwanda reported that among the 40 RDF soldiers who accompanied the recruits up to the Democratic Republic of the Congo border, 20 continued marching and remained with Ntaganda at his position after changing into FARDC uniforms; (h) An ex-RDF officer asserted that two RDF units have been deployed to Kinigi, and have specifically been tasked with periodically reinforcing the M23 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; (i) Radio communications between RDF and M23 intercepted by FARDC and shared with the Group demonstrate that an RDF officer acknowledges having received a visit of M23 officers on Rwandan territory, while an M23 officer states that they already had received 400 to 500 soldiers in reinforcement from the RDF and requests additional troops (see image 10);16
__________________
16
This cassette will be placed on United Nations archives for future reference.
12-39339
15
S/2012/348/Add.1
(j) Several displaced leaders from areas currently under the control of M23 told the Group that the rebels occupying their home villages have been joined by other soldiers identified as Rwandan because of their distinct military equipment, notably their green high boots, bright spotted uniforms, waterproof tents and packed food items; (k) Two civilians from Chanzu interviewed by the Group in May saw Rwandan soldiers also crossing into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, initially wearing RDF military uniforms who subsequently changed into FARDC uniforms. 32. Since the beginning of 2011, two joint RDF and FARDC units have been deployed in Rutshuru territory to conduct operations against the FDLR.17 Though these units have not taken part in hostilities alongside M23, FARDC officers told the Group that they feared such a scenario.
__________________
17
16
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
F.
III. Rwandan support to armed groups and mutinies linked to the M23
35. In addition to RDF support to M23, the Group has gathered evidence indicating that Rwandan officials have been supporting other armed groups and
__________________
18
In accordance with paragraph 6 of the present report, the Group identified the individuals based upon the testimony of at least five separate credible and independent sources.
12-39339
17
S/2012/348/Add.1
mutinies often using Ntaganda and other ex-CNDP commanders to foster such alliances. Acting through these armed groups, Rwandan officials managed to weaken the FDLR through a series of targeted killings of FDLR officers. M23 officers and armed group leaders have acknowledged these alliances with the common aim of destabilizing the central Government.
A.
B.
__________________
19
20
In January 2012, along with three other senior RDF officers, General Rutatina was suspended from his duties and subsequently placed under house arrest as a result of accusations that he was involved in unauthorized private business ventures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Colonel Balumisa was assassinated by Ntaberi during the CNDP mutiny in April 2012, on orders from Ntaganda, following his refusal to ally to the mutineers.
18
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
C.
D.
E.
__________________
21
Chiribanya was condemned for his alleged involvement in the killing of former Democratic Republic of the Congo President Laurent Kabila. He is also one of the founding members of the Mudundu 40 armed group, which collaborated closely with the RDF during their deployments to the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1998 and 2002. In 2003, Chiribanya launched a secessionist movement, whose aim was to break away Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu provinces and Ituri district from the rest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
12-39339
19
S/2012/348/Add.1
plan the creation of the UCDD. On 9 May 2012, Chiribanya diffused the news about the establishment of the UCDD by text message (see image 11). Image 11 Text message circulated by Xavier Chiribanya on 9 May 2012 declaring his UCDD movement as an ally of M23
42. Chiribanya subsequently held a series of meetings with armed group leaders during which he claimed full support from the Rwandan Government to pursue open rebellion against Kabila in order to obtain the secession of the eastern Congo. One former UCDD member stated that Chiribanya had told him in a meeting on 24 May in Bujumbura that Rwanda had more than 2,000 ex-FDLR combatants trained for their struggle. According to an official signed statement of a detained armed group leader, Chiribanya invited others to meetings in Rwanda to harmonize their efforts with the Rwandan authorities. The Group obtained a text message from a UCDD member which confirmed such invitations (see image 12). Image 12 Text message of UCDD members about politically important meetings in Ruhengeri, Rwanda
20
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
43. Furthermore, according to Congolese intelligence, FARDC officers and a former UCDD member, Chiribanya has already provided weapons to multiple armed groups in Uvira territory as well as Mai Mai Yakutumba in Fizi territory. 22 The Group has obtained text messages of UCDD communications with the latter (see image 13). According to several FARDC officers and intelligence sources, Chiribanya has also established ties with units of Raia Mutomboki in South Kivus Nindja forest and communicates frequently with FARDC deserter Col. Albert Kahasha of the Union des patriots congolais pour la paix (UPCP) in Southern Lubero (see S/2012/348, paras. 126 and 127). Kahashas UPCP has facilitated the movement of ex-CNDP deserters seeking to join M23 in Rutshuru.23 Image 13 Text message from General William Amuri of Mai Mai Yakutumba in preparation of a meeting with UCDD members
F.
__________________
22 23
24
M23 officers confirmed for the Group that they are indeed allied to Mai Mai Yakutumba. Ex-CNDP Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Mboneza defected from the FARDC in Beni on 16 June and instead of joining M23 actually remained with Kahasha and Lafontaine to strengthen the UPCP. The UPCP is also allied with the FDLR breakaway group Ralliement pour lunit et la dmocratie-URUNANA (RUD) led by General Jean-Damascne Ndibabaje, alias Musare. Both officers subsequently joined the M23 rebellion.
12-39339
21
S/2012/348/Add.1
to detained former CONSUP members, several individuals attending such meetings claimed the movement had the full support of Rwanda. 45. CONSUPs initial objective was to spark unrest by agitating members of the political opposition through urban strikes and protests until staged provocations of the security forces would lead to the killings of protestors, thus sparking an armed rebellion against President Kabila. According to several CONSUP members detained before it could take action, following the uprising in Bukavu, reinforcements from the RDF were to come from Cyangugu/Rusizi in Rwanda on the pretext of coming to assist the Rwandophone population or Rwandan citizens supposedly the victims of persecutions or targeted by the manifestation (see image 14). CONSUP leader Ren Kahukula is currently in hiding in Rwanda according to Congolese intelligence and FARDC commanders. Image 14 Extract from FARDC internal report based on official records of interviews with over a dozen detained CONSUP members
G.
__________________
25
Byamungu was already in communication with the Burundian rebel groups of the FNL and the Burundian National Front (FRONABU) to help facilitate his flight, according to several FNL officers in Uvira territory.
22
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
H.
12-39339
23
S/2012/348/Add.1
B.
C.
24
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
55. The Rwandan Government participated in the Joint Verification Commission (JVC) established by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to interview 11 Rwandan nationals who had surrendered to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) on 20 May 2012. At the conclusion of the interviews on 9 June, the Rwandans submitted their findings, which attested that they found no evidence in the testimonies to implicate the RDF in any support to M23 (see annex 9). Furthermore, citing a need to return to Kigali for consultations, the Rwandan delegation failed to sign the confirmation of the JVCs collective findings. On 10 June, the Democratic Republic of the Congo delegation proceeded to sign a Procs verbale de carence along with a representative of MONUSCO as an observer in the process (see annex 10). Nevertheless, prior to his return to Kigali, the head of the Rwandan delegation, RDF Maj. Sam Ruhunga, signed the official records of interviews for 9 of the 11 Rwandan nationals jointly interviewed by both government delegations (see image 16). Image 16 One of nine records of official statements signed by RDF Major Sam Ruhunga confirming the testimony of ex-M23 combatants recruited in Rwanda as part of the JVC
12-39339
25
S/2012/348/Add.1
56. In a briefing to the African Union Peace and Security Council on 21 June, the Ambassador, Joseph Nsengimana, stated that the Government of Rwanda bares no responsibility, whatsoever, in the ensuing set of regrettable events and misguided initiatives that ruined prior constructive efforts and escalated the crisis towards fullblown military confrontation. Furthermore, Nsengimana added that Rwanda has been receiving detailed information on collusion between and support from FARDC units to FDLR forces (see annex 11). The M23 rebels made similar accusations in a press communiqu 26 on 22 May 2012 in which they stated that they detain irrefutable proof that FARDC positions have been held by FDLR troops, while denying accusations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that they have themselves allied with FDLR (see S/2012/348, para. 105 and annex 12). The Group will continue to investigate such allegations, but has not yet obtained or been presented with any substantiated evidence in this regard. 57. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has presented the Rwandan authorities with information regarding RDF support to M23 on several occasions. At the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 27 May 2012, during a bilateral meeting between the two countries, Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities shared detailed accounts of the facilitation provided to Makenga, his troops, and his weapons by the RDF. Furthermore, on 19 June, the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities presented the Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs, during her visit to Kinshasa, with a comprehensive report documenting Rwandan support for M23. To date, the Group has not received any official response or explanation from the Rwandan Government regarding the information provided to it by the Congolese Government. 58. The Group has made extensive efforts to engage with the Rwandan Government regarding its findings, with some limited success. All six members of the Group participated in an official visit to Kigali from 12 to 14 May 2012, though the Rwandan Government did not receive them for any substantive meetings to discuss these issues. However, during a meeting to discuss the Groups current findings in New York on 25 June 2012, the Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs invited the Group to Kigali for a second official visit in order to conduct an exhaustive point-by-point review of the information contained in the present addendum. The Group is eager to accept such an invitation and is committed to clarifying and/or correcting any information in this addendum as well as annexing any formal written response from the Rwandan Government in its final report to be submitted to the Committee in October 2012.
__________________
26
26
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 1 FARDC military intelligence report outlining Makengas departure for Runyoni and that of his troops and weapons from Bukavu via Rwandan territory
12-39339
27
S/2012/348/Add.1
28
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
12-39339
29
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 2 FARDC operational map of the RDF military deployment at Njerima and troop movements to and from Runyoni
30
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 3 Anti-tank round recovered near Runyoni from M23, which has never been supplied by the FARDC to its units
12-39339
31
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 4 75 mm canon rounds from Makengas arms cache in Nyamunyoni which have never been supplied by the FARDC to its units
32
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 5 Communiqu announcing the withdrawal of the CNDP from the Presidential Majority, following a decision taken during a meeting led by Rwandan Government officials in Ruhengeri, Rwanda
12-39339
33
S/2012/348/Add.1
34
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 6 Internal FARDC report on interview with ex-combatant from NDC who confirmed links between Rwandan officials and the rebel group
12-39339
35
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 7 Official statement by the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 May 2012
36
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 8 The New Times article describing torture of Rwandan nationals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15031&a=55081
12-39339
37
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 9 Rwandan findings within JVC on their interviews with the 11 Rwandan nationals who surrendered to MONUSCO on 20 May 2012
38
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
12-39339
39
S/2012/348/Add.1
40
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
12-39339
41
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 11 Briefing by Rwandan Ambassador Joseph Nsengimana before the AU Peace and Security Council on 21 June 2012
42
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
12-39339
43
S/2012/348/Add.1
44
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
12-39339
45
S/2012/348/Add.1
46
12-39339
S/2012/348/Add.1
Annex 12 M23 Statement claiming information on collaboration between the FDLR and the FARDC
12-39339
47
S/2012/348/Add.1
48
12-39339