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MUHS 2012

Supremacy K 1NC

K of Race Affs 1

I got this from a friend because we need one. It's a pretty baller K. - Cookie Monster

Voting aff destroys creativity it merely replaces white supremacy. Their ideal form of debate is the same kind of stagnant, rotting, unreflexive image of thought they criticize.
Jeanes 5
(Emma L. Jeanes, Lecturer, University of Exeter and Christian De Cock, Professor of Management, Swansea University, MAKING THE FAMILIAR STRANGE: A DELEUZIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CREATIVITY, http://www.iacat.com/revista/recrearte/recrearte03/Familiar_Strange.pdf, 2005, p. 4-8) This process of becoming, the creation of what is not yet, is achieved through extending the virtual; thinking in new, perhaps previously unimagined, modes of thinking. For Deleuze, the concept of difference thinking differently, becoming different, and the creation of difference is key to maximising the potential of life. The concept enables us to move beyond that which we know and experience and think how this might be extended. It provokes us, dislodges us from our ways of thinking. It creates whole new

This is thinking that reforms itself over and over again, eternally; thinking that is not defined by an image it creates of itself (Colebrook, 2002). Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting, and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, whats coming into being, whats new, whats taking shape (Deleuze, 1995:106). Deleuze argues that what is typically ignored is the power of the virtual in favour of a focus on the actual world. The virtual is a potentiality of becoming, a power to become. But the actual world is limited in its future possibilities by what is already given. The actual world, therefore, evolves through the unfolding
lines of thinking; new possibilities. of given possibilities towards a given end. In the virtual world, however, there is the power to become in unforeseen ways, unlimited by the actual world. The virtual is real, though not actual, but virtualities may become actualised in the present. Deleuze advocated actualization over realization. The process of realization is guided by resemblance and limitation. The real is thought to be in the image of the possible it realizes; the possible simply has reality added to it, but there is no difference. Furthermore since not all possibilities can be realised, there is also a

this is a process of creative evolution. What would be necessary for the creative organization of the actual would be an enlarging, inclusive movement oriented toward the future capable of producing a new
process of limitation. However for the virtual to become actual it must create its own terms of actualisation; with no preformed order unity In these terms, the organization of the actual would have to be a movement from perception to a new recollection that would be a future memory (a sort of futur antrieur or future

Central to the philosophy of Deleuze are the notions of transcendence and immanence. Transcendence is that which lies outside; it is an exteriority upon which our thinking relies. It appears as something we can know or reveal or interpret. Truth would be a form of transcendence: we imagine that there is some form of truth out there awaiting discovery or interpretation. Immanence, on the other hand, is the thought that produces the ground. Deleuze refers to planes of immanence: plateaus from which further thinking occurs; the assumptions and distinctions from which we think which constitutes the outside of thought and which creates the exterior the world we know which in turn creates planes of transcendence. For Deleuze, even our subjectivity is a form of transcendence. We have created an image of thought (Deleuze, 1994:131) which is accepted as common sense, the taken-for-granted and the foundation for opinion. For Deleuze transcendence is ultimately an illusion: it is a creation of the planes of immanence. He therefore aims to expose the illusion
perfect in the grammatical sense) as a common point of real organization (Hardt, 1993: 20-21). of transcendence, to demonstrate that the transcendent image is merely an invention. Paradoxically, this also exhibits the power of the inventive process that thinking can be so powerful as to enslave itself to images of a transcendent outside (Colebrook, 2002:71). Like Foucault (1972), Deleuze (with Guattari) explores historically situated illusions of transcendence most notably in the context of the history of philosophy where planes of transcendence have created grounds for thinking (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Philosophy, for Deleuze, gives consistency to chaos, and allows us to think the immanent difference that produces transcendence (Colebrook, 2002). But it is never a full return to the first level of absolute deterritorialization, before transcendence. By deterritorialization Deleuze refers to the freeing of a possibility from its origins, its original territory. In contrast, territorialization refers to the manner by which we organise (particularly language) such that it remains constrained by this territory. Remaining territorialized naturally limits future possibilities to what is already given, to the constraints of the ordering of language: In Deleuzes view, language is charged with power relations. The object of language is not communication, but the inculcation of mots dordre-slogans, watchwords, but also literally words of order, the dominant, orthodox ways of classifying, organizing, and explaining the world. Far from being a mere collection of ideological signifiers, language is a mode of

So philosophers have to create, and recreate concepts that give consistency to this chaos but in doing so they have to constantly reopen their thinking to the outside without allowing the plane of immanence (the assumptions, distinctions, images) to act as a foundation, to territorialize. Philosophy, therefore, is practical: Thinkings never just a theoretical matter. It has to do with vital problems. To do with life itself. (Deleuze, 1995: 105). And the notion of immanence is key to Deleuzes philosophy; it is the essence of philosophy. Thinking experience as an open and immanent whole acknowledges that each new event of experience will transform what experience is, thereby precluding in principle any final or closed ground for experience. Immanence is, then, for Deleuze the only true philosophy. If we allow thought to accept some transcendent foundation such as reason, God, truth or human nature then we have stopped thinking. And if immanence is philosophy for Deleuze it is also an ethics: not allowing experience to be
action, the various mots dordre of a culture being enforced through regular patterns of practice, collective assemblages of enunciation, or regimes of signs (Bogue, 2004: 71). enslaved by any single image that would elevate itself above others. (Smith, 2003: 79; see also Nietzsche, 1976: 451). The question, therefore, is how to avoid this grounding of our thinking that would otherwise prevent us from thinking creatively.

This both turns and solves the case better because good and bad are not binary. They wrongly think its a zero-sum power struggle between white and blacks, a fight between two sides the police and the policed. The struggle of 21st century politics is not a struggle oriented around race; rather, it is the very concept of race which has come to inhibit and constrain radical politics. The affirmatives deployment of the concept of race as the organizational focus of political struggle is a smokescreen which obscures the dynamics of oppression the very deployment of race as a concept itself is the lynchpin of racialized oppression.

MUHS 2012 K of Race Affs 2 Darder and Torress 4 (Antonia Darder, Prof of education policy studies at U of Illinois, and Rodolfo Torress, Associate prof of latino studies at UC Irvine, After Race: Racism after
multiculturalism, p. 1-2) Over a century ago, W E. B. Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk proclaimed one of his most cited dictums: The problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the color line (1989, 10). In this book we echo his sentiment, but with a radical twist. The problem of the twenty-first century is the

problem of racean ideology that has served well to successfully obscure and disguise class interests behind the smokescreen of multiculturalism, diversity, difference, and more recently,
whiteness. Whether the terms of analysis are race, racial identity, race consciousness, or political race, the category of race and its many derivatives function as the lynchpin of racism, which forbids its objects to be other than members of a race (Fields 2001, 49). As Barbara Fields has noted with respect to African Americans, Afro-Americans themselves have fought successively for different ways of naming themselves as people. . . . Each

name, once accepted into the general public vocabulary, has simply become a variant word for Afro Americans race. A sense of peoplehood, nationhood, or comradeship in struggle may be available to others; but, for persons of African descent, all reduces to race, a life sentence for them and their issue in perpetuity. (50) 1 To radically shift directions and speak against race, as Paul Gilroy (2000) suggests, or after race as we attempt to do here, is to uncompromisingly refuse to accept or legitimate any longer the perpetual racialized demarcations of raced (Guinier and Torres 2002) or problem (Du Bois 1989) populations. Our intention is to contest the notion that the color of a persons skin, and all it has historically come to signify within the sociological, political, or popular imagination, should continue to function as such. We seek to shatter dubious claims that essentialize the responses of populations, whether they exist as objects or subjects of racism; and by so doing, acknowledge the complexity of the world in which we negotiate our daily existence today. To be clear we are not arguing in the tradition of the color-blind conservatives or political pundits who would have us believe that the structures and practices that have formidably embedded racism as a way of life for centuries in the United States and around the world have been undone and that the problem of racism has been ameliorated. Our position, in fact, is diametrically opposed to this argument. Instead, the political force of our analysis is anchored in the centrality of race as an ideology and racism as a powerful, structuring, hegemonic force in the world today. We argue that we must disconnect from race as it has been constructed in the past, and contend fully with the impact of race as ideology on the lives of all peoplebut most importantly on the
lives of those who have been enslaved, colonized, or marked for genocide in the course of world history.

However, the problem isnt that the police are winning this fight the problem is that we conceive of debate as a fight at all. The reason we can even have a concept of supremacy in the first place is because debate at all accepts the ability to be governed by a single image of thought.
MacDonald 9
(Michael MacDonald, Postdoctoral Fellow @ the University of Alberta, Deleuze and the Wild, http://halfsharpmusic.wordpress.com/2009/11/30/deleuze-and-the-wild/)

this reaction is the creation of difference, or hierachy, and of the subject itself, We do not feel, experience or know any becoming but becoming-reactive {Deleuze, 1962/1983 #20} 64. But becoming reactive is not the negation of creativity. Creativity is expressed in the negotiation unleashed by becoming-reactive. The act of becoming therefore is always in relation to something else. Since the community and the environment are all outside of the subject, and
And since the subject is defined by their reaction to what is outside, then it is unnecessary and even misleading to suggest that there is a special set of negotiations between people and objects. Everything is an object to the mind and the minds negotiations and creative reactions with all of these objects affect the individual. Therefore the natural world, people, art, ideas are all

Deleuze used Nietzsches thought to replace the binary good/bad with an alternative. Deleuze said that everything is already reactive. But even in reaction there is, what Nietzsche called a will to power being expressed. The will is
particles that are synthesized in the establishment of the subject and subjects are synthesized into community. not Hobbes General Will. It is not a transcendental expression of community or humanity that motivates and activates the community through the individual. The will, according to Deleuze, is not merely the desire for power or the need for self aggrandizement. The will is not something so simple and selfish. The will to power is the, genetic element of force 53. And the force is a response in reaction. Reaction therefore is more than simple response. Reaction has two possibilities. Reaction, which defines the subject, defines the subjects relationships as well. The will to power, says Nietszche is not without morality. But it is not the morality of the Church or the State. Nietzsche claims that he has invented a new conception of the will. A will that does not finds its essence outside of itself but in the relationship between self and the world. The relationship may take two forms. It must either be reaction as subservience or reaction as creation. In either case creativity remains the constant. The will is the expression of creativity. The will to power is creativity. Nietzsche, through Deleuze, is a philosopher of creativity. There is no God as a metaphysical engine. Nietzsche taught that god is dead. But it is not the death of something concrete. Not even of something divine. But it is the death of

God has been replaced by creativity and being creative. There is no for a metaphysical driver if creativity itself is the engine of all desire. The desire to create is the will to power. Creativity itself is not the act of the arts or the intuition. Creativity is the act of thought. Thought is creativity. Thought is the basic experience of life. Through Delezue Nietzsche states that, the will to power is essentially creative and givingpower is something inexpressible in the will (85). This is the role Nietzsche plays for Deleuze. Through him
exteriority. Replaced by an inner creativity that is no less theistic, monotheistic and polytheistic. longer a need Deleuze is able to find a way to ground french deconstruction in the Spinoza-Nitzscheian critical heritage. Deleuze claims that Nietzsches genealogy is a critical but ultimately creative

Creativity is expressed by everyone. But everyone does not express creativity equally or, to use moral terminology, in an equally upstanding way. The good is the creative and the joyful and the bad is the creative that is bounded and without freedom. Creativity that is reactive-active or reactive-reactive. A reactive-active
discourse. Morality is dependent, not upon socially constituted rules and norms but in the evaluation of creativity. The will to power is expressed. creativity occurs in critique, Critique is destruction as joy, the aggression of the creator. A creator of values cannot be distinguished from a destroyer, from a criminal or from a critic: a critic of established values, reactive values and baseness (87). But Deleuze opens himself to criticism here. He claimed to avoid the role of judge. But through Nietzsche he established a criterion to judge value. But to do so he tore down class, community, tradition, and even revolution and replaced it all with a morality of creativity. Ranciere suggested that this philosophy runs into a dead end. Zizek is troubled because Deleuze attempts to always dissolve the contradiction to never allow the ultimate moment of pure negativity. But Deleuze does this to avoid the dialectic. The

There is no need to choose between becoming a or becoming b. In the reactive-active many options are created, a multiplicity. The multiplicity is the expression of creativity and the choice is the creativity in reaction. Choices are inventions and inventions are creations. Deleuze used Nietzsche to dissolve the subject:object binary, to establish a creative deconstruction called genealogy, and to deny the binary creating dialectic. The good is defined by free creativity. Free creativity can be described in another way. Nietzsches good
judge is the dialectic. The will to power, creativity, does away with the need for the judge. genealogy has a lot in common with composting. The breaking down of items to create from their debris a fertile ground from which new life can spring. Composting is life affirming and destructive. Intellectual composting, the act of destroying to affirm life, is a more active genealogy. Deleuze would prefer composting. It is a creative, life affirming act that demonstrates

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immanence. If Deleuze had been born in America instead of France his orientation may have been different. If genealogy is translated through deconstruction to composting then Deleuze may have more of a connection with contemporary ecology than one may think. Free creativity is the wild.

Voting isnt between contents, that is, to choose white supremacy or another form of supremacy, its between modes whether to choose an identity at all or to refuse that any identity should govern debate. Voting aff just installs them as the new cops of the community, forcing us to perform, or forcing us to look at our social location and arresting those who dont comply through the judges ballot. There is also no coherent way for non-blacks to participate in their movement because they cant just take off their knapsack of privileges. This perpetuates exclusions and guarantees the failure of their movement.
McWhorter 5 (Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond, Where do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies, Philosophy Social Criticism 2005 31:
533) It is true then that, as the Whiteness Studies theorists further analysis. Placing

so often say, whiteness is a norm. But the assertion by itself, no matter how often repeated, does very little to race and of course whiteness in the context of the development of biopower gives a much clearer picture of what it means to say whiteness is a norm and indicates some important directions for further study. Once that context is supplied, the
work of historians like Allen, Roediger, and Saxton can help explain why it is whiteness (rather than Saxonness, for example) that functions as the racial norm in the USA. Like Whiteness Studies theorists, Foucault meant for his work to have political effects, to disrupt power formations and make new configurations possible. Looking back on the publication of Discipline and Punish, he had this to say to an interviewer: When the book came out, different readers in particular, correctional officers, social workers, and so on delivered this peculiar judgment: The

book is paralyzing. It may contain some correct observations, but even so it has clear limits, because it impedes us; it prevents us from going on with our activity. My reply is that this very reaction proves that the work was successful, that it functioned just as I intended. It shows that people read it as an experience that changed them, that prevented them from always being the same or from having the same relation with things, with others, that they had before reading it. (Foucault, 2000: 2456) Unable to continue with business as usual, people are forced to think critically and make deliberate choices. Power relays are disrupted, which at least opens the possibility that power networks will be realigned and come to function in different ways. Effects like this are what Whiteness Studies theorists aim for as well. They hope their work will bring white people up short, make it difficult for them to continue to function unthinkingly within a white supremacist social system, and make it possible for them to imagine and create different ways of living. Whiteness Studies is less effective at this kind of political intervention than Foucaults work is, however, and far less effective than it might yet be if it took Foucaults analytics of power and account of normalization seriously. The problem lies, I believe, in Whiteness theorists failure to critique the conception of power that they have inherited from traditional Western political theory. By holding on to a conception of power that insists upon the primacy of a sovereign subject and uncritically deploys economic metaphors of possession and distribution, Whiteness Studies impedes its own efforts to account for the political production of racial subjects and works against its own explicitly stated agenda, i.e., dethroning white subjectivity. I will spend the rest of this essay showing how the conception of power that Foucault critiques still operates in Whiteness Studies. As good students of Omi and Winant, Whiteness Studies theorists believe that racism operates much of the time without the consent or even the knowledge of white subjects. But they still take white subjects to be responsible for racism; they still believe that racism originates in subjectivity, not in structures or institutions or practices. This belief is implicit in their search for a psychological account of racisms persistence. The account offered in virtually every Whiteness Studies theorists work can be summed up in two words: white privilege. The story goes that white people exercise power not so much by exercising their capacity to harm non-white people but by exercising the privileges that hundreds of years of racism have put in place for them. They are in fact deploying racist power, but they do not see it as such because to them it seems that they are simply claiming for themselves the goods to which they are entitled, and they have a deep investment in being able to continue to do so. Across the very different social analyses that Whiteness Studies theorists put forth and across their very pronounced disagreements over political strategy, this concept of white privilege stretches; it, like the claim that whiteness functions as a norm, unites theorists who otherwise have very little in common. My
contention is that wherever we see the concept of white privilege operating, we can be sure the conception of power that is also operating is the traditional juridical conception that construes power as the possession of a preexistent subject. No thorough overview of Whiteness Studies ever omits reference to Peggy McIntoshs article White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack (1989). Although McIntoshs article is tentative and limited to description at a very basic, individualistic level, it popularized the notion that white people possess (like tools in a knapsack) something called white privilege.11 McIntosh lists 46 of these unearned assets (McIntosh, 1988: 1), including such disparate tools as: (3) If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live; (5) I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed; (21) I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group; (22) I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the worlds majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion; (33) I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing, or body odor will be taken as a reflection on my race; and (41) I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me (McIntosh, 1988: 59). One could spend a lot of time critiquing this list and pointing out various problems with it, but what is important here is the focus on privilege itself. McIntosh

claims that racism persists because white people use tools that non-white people have not been given. If we want to eliminate racist exercises of power, white people have to divest themselves of those tools. Clearly this sort of analysis can never lead to an account of the production and maintenance of white subjectivities within racist regimes of power unless all we mean by white subjectivity is a generic subject plus a knapsack full of white privileges, a knapsack
that the generic subject can jettison without seriously altering its own composition. But that is surely not what the thesis of the social construction of white identity amounts to. So why do Whiteness theorists hang onto this terminology? Why does the concept of white privilege appear in virtually every Whiteness Studies book and article? Lisa Heldke and Peg OConnor are among the few writers who expend any effort at all trying to justify their use of the concept of white privilege. According to them, the analytic value of the term privilege lies in its ability to play the opposite role to oppression. Everyone generally agrees that there is such a thing as racial oppression and that the members of some races are oppressed, but what of the races that are not oppressed? Heldke and OConnor write: Some will argue that domination is the companion concept of oppression; they assert that if you are not a member of a particular oppressed group, then you are automatically a dominator (Heldke and OConnor, 2004: 299). They dislike the term domination, however, because it presupposes that a group or an individual exercises power

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over another group in very obvious and overt ways (ibid.); in other words, it runs counter to the apparent fact that, as analyses like Omi and Winants make clear, racism does not operate in obvious and overt ways (at least not by the lights of most white people) and many white people are not aware of its functioning at all. Heldke and OConnors analysis continues: . . . oppression has many different faces; it is created in all kinds of social practices, structures, and institutions. In many instances of oppression, we may not be able to point to any person or group of persons who are actively engaged in dominating the oppressed group . . . We need a companion concept that has as many different faces as does oppression. The concept of privilege will fill the bill; its multiple aspects allow us to describe and understand the roles that different unoppressed groups play in the maintenance of oppressive systems. (Heldke and OConnor, 2004: 299) In sum,

within racist societies there are three kinds of people; there are oppressed people (those without much power), dominators (those with power who intend to oppress others), and people who exercise privilege (those with power who do not intend to oppress others but do so anyway). If we hang onto a conception of power that makes it the property of a pre-constituted subjectivity and do not posit that third group, we cannot explain how racism can continue to exist if most people are not avowed racists. We will need a psychological theory to explain the persistence of racism. In other words, if we hang onto a traditional juridical conception of power, we will remain stuck where race theorists were stuck 30 years ago. I contend that the pervasiveness of the term white privilege is testament to how deeply and profoundly stuck race theorists typically
still are.

Rather, debate should be a zone of open speech of any kind, allowing infinite lines of flight with no boundaries. This isnt liberal-democratic switch-side, but eternal open evolution of the process of debate itself. Vote negative to endorse an exterior mode of debate.
Paul Patton, Professor of Philosophy @ the University of New South Wales, 1984, Conceptual Politics and the War Machine in Mille Plateaux, JSTOR. This choice is stated in several ways in the course of Mille Plateaux.2 It

is not a matter of different contents of thought, as it would be for those for whom criticism is governed by some form of opposition between adequate and inadequate representations of an external reality (science and ideology). It is rather a matter of different styles or modes of conceptual functioning: "It happens that thought contents are criticized for being too conformist. But the primary question is that of the form itself" (464). In particular, the choice is between a mode of thought governed by figures of interiority and one whose essence is exteriority: une pensee du
dehors. The classical image of thought, as it is pre- sented in the history of philosophy, is that of conceptual systems whose relationship with the outside is always mediated by some form of interiority, whether this be the soul, consciousness, or concepts themselves. These

are centered and hierarchical systems, and precisely the primary characteristic of arborescent thought is its organization around a principle of unity or interiority: this forms the underlying structure or axis in terms of which the object in question (language, the unconscious, society) and its relation to other things must be understood. Against this image, Deleuze defends a form of thought defined by its essential exteriority, its potential for multiple and polyvalent relations with an outside. This is one of the most important characteristics of rhizomes: rhizomes are a certain kind of assemblage or multiplicity and, as such, are defined by their outside, "by the abstract line, line of flight or of deterritorialization along which they are transformed by being connected to other multiplicities" (15-16). More- over, rhizomatic thought implies a style of writing which displays immediate connections with the outside: "It seems to us that writing will never be carried out enough in the name of an outside. The outside has no image,
no meaning, no subjectivity. The book, assemblage with the outside, against the book-image of the world. A book-rhizome" (34). Examples of such writing include texts by Kleist, Kafka, Artaud, and Nietzsche. Elsewhere Deleuze cites the passage from The Genealogy of Morals dealing with the founders of the State, those "terrible artists with the look of bronze": "One does not reckon with such natures; they come like fate, without reason, consideration or pretext; they appear as lighten- ing, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too 'different' even to be hated. .. ." Such texts, he suggests, are animated by a movement which comes from without, an external force or intensity such that "something jumps from the book, entering into contact with a pure outside."3 This Deleuzian alternative is not simply a matter of another image of thought, an alternative model for the elaboration of concepts. For that would imply a constant form which could then be reproduced in different domains, whereas exteriorizing thought is characterized above all by its inconstancy, its variability. Interiorizing or arborescent thought does provide a model, but there is a fundamental dissymmetry between the opposing poles here. The former lies entirely outside the domain of the reproducible, of representation, belong- ing instead to the nether world of simulacra, where repetition implies essential difference. La pensee du dehors has an affinity with maps rather than tracings. It is a matter of "the force which destroys the image and its copies, the model and its reproductions, all possibility of subordinating thought

to a model of the True, the Right or the Law (cartesian truth, kantian right, hegelian law, etc.)" (467). What is being recommended is not the repetition of some Other Form of conceptual assemblage, but a process: the operation of putting thought into an immediate relation with outside forces, "in short, of making thought a war-machine" (467). Thought as a warmachine means a nomadic thought, since it was the nomads who invented war-machines and deployed them against the apparatuses of the State. This opposition between the State and nomads allows the difference between these two modes of thought to be expressed in terms of the kind of mental space occupied or described by concepts. The classical image, or State-form of thought, involves a striated mental space which is traditionally delimited by a dual pretention to universality: "In effect, it operates with two 'universals,' the Totality as the ultimate foundation of being or the enfolding horizon, and the Subject as the principle which converts being into being-for- us" (469). In these terms, the

alternative is therefore a thought which refuses any universal subject, attributing itself instead to a particular multiplicity, race, or tribe and, which does not locate itself within some englobing totality but 62 Conceptual Politics is rather deployed in a milieu without horizon, occupying a smooth space in the manner in which nomads occupy a steppe. A number of conclusions may be drawn from this regarding Mille Plateaux itself. First, while it may, at a certain level of
generality, be "philosophy in the traditional sense," the kinds of concepts invented and their rhizomatic assemblage result in a far from traditional book. These are untimely concepts, calculated to produce critical effects on the established forms of understanding: "The philosopher creates concepts that are neither eternal nor historical but untimely, not of the present."4 Second, an understanding of the nature of a book-rhizome clearly has implications for how we should read it. It cannot be read as a series of stages in an unfolding exposition or argument. Without any fixed or delimited territory, a

conceptual rhizome has no beginning and no end; it is all middle, composed of plateaux which are themselves always in between: "Each plateau may be read in no matter what order, and related to no matter which other plateaux" (33). Different plateaux may
overlap, some- times deploying the same concepts, although not in the same manner, but they remain self-sufficient trajectories. Despite the undoubted presence of a metaphysical tendency, a system- building impulse evident in the very proliferation of concepts and distinctions, it would be futile to try to reconstitute a system from Mille Plateaux. Such an architectonic analysis would suppose the existence of a stable conceptual interiority which by right the book does not have. The question remains, how- ever, How do they function, these plateaux? How do they work, both as conceptual thought providing effects of intelligibility, however local or provisional, and as connections with an outside? An appropriate way to proceed might be to choose a particular conceptual line and track it: exegesis should follow a path rather than reproduce a system. Like the primitive metallurgist, whose importance derives from the fact that he is the ultimate source of arms for nomads and the State alike, we should identify a conceptual lode and follow it, extracting whatever gems we may discover in the process. For the remainder of this essay, we shall be guided by the political seam through Mille Plateaux. As well as being a prodigious enterprise of conceptual innovation, this is a thoroughly political text. At one point, the authors install the political as their ultimate metaphysical category: "Before being there is politics" (249). At the level of political theory, their work, like that of Foucault and others in post1968 France, needs to be read in the context of an attempt to redefine what constitutes "revolutionary" politics and to rethink the terms in which we evaluate social movements. From the section in plateau 13 where they discuss the current situation and from remarks throughout the book, it is apparent that their political sympathies lie with those "marginal" movements which

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have been the principal force of European leftism since the early 70s. These include not only the movements of women, prisoners, migrant workers, and others, but also struggles around ecology, autonomy, and the networks 63 of alternative institutions. In view of these explicit concerns, we may ask how the several plateaux serve in relation to political evaluation and action: does Mille Plateaux propose a politics, and, if so, what is it? We shall address this question primarily via the use by Deleuze and Guattari of the concepts of war-machine and nomadism. These are elaborated in detail in plateau 12, the Treatise on Nomadology, but they are also frequently invoked in contexts where it is a question of the active forces recognized by rhizomatic analysis. They are recurrent figures of the political morality found in Mille Plateaux. Our objective is not to recapture all that is relevant to political evaluation: much of the analysis of capitalism as an axiom system will be passed over. Rather, the aim is to use the discourse on nomadism and the war-machine to illustrate the manner in which philosophical and political concerns are articulated in the text. There are in the course of Mille Plateaux a number of discursive platforms in whose terms individual and social processes may be analyzed: rhizomatics, schizo-analysis, pragmatics, cartography, and nomadology are the names of just a few of these distinct but overlapping frames of reference. Before taking up directly the concepts of war-machine and nomadism, it may be helpful briefly to survey at least one of these, in order to indicate the general terms of Deleuzian analysis and to locate the concept of war-machine by reference to another platform. The political perspective for which Deleuze and Guattari are best known is probably that of "micro-politics." This is not a perspective which limits itself to the local or personal phenomena of desire, but one which explicitly takes these into account as a constitutive and sometimes leading element in social processes. The point is not to perpetuate distinctions of scale or divisions between the private and public spheres, but to obviate all of these, replacing them by a differentiation between the kinds of segment or lines of which we are composed. In Mille Plateaux, the earlier schizo-analytic analysis in terms of types of desiring process is largely superseded by a cartographic analysis of the lines of power and desire which characterize individuals or groups: on the one hand, a molar line of rigid segmentarity which implies the presence of something like a State apparatus; on the other, a molecular line of supple segmentarity along which occur affective attachments and all kinds of "becomings" -becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible. Processes of desire tend to operate along the molecular line, whereas the official organization of institutions and of lives tends to effect the molar line. However, these two distinctions do not exactly coincide, and in reality the two kinds of line are closely intertwined: Every society, but also every individual, is therefore composed of both segmentarities at once: the one molar, the other molecular. These are distinguished by the fact that they don't have the same terms, the same relations, the same nature or the same type of multiplicity. They are inseparable by virtue of the fact that they coexist, the one leading into the other . .. always in presupposition to one another. (260) 64 Conceptual Politics The difference between these two lines is not an axiological one, but an effective difference, important for the understanding of social phenomena: which processes correspond to what line in a given situation. Thus, the authors show how the specificity of fascism as a form of totalitarian regime appears once it is understood how it organizes libidinal attractions at the molecular level. Fascism, they suggest, is inseparable from a proliferation of micro-fascisms in the school, family, office, or other local centers, all in constant interaction with each other before they resonate together in the national-socialist State (261-262). There is a third type of line, however, which is the most important of all a line no less real, but more abstract than the other two. This

is the line of flight, a line without segments which is more like the collapse of all segmentarity. It is the line along which structures constituted in terms of the preceding lines break down or become transformed into something else. It is the line of absolute deterritorialization. In any assemblage, the lines of flight are primary in both an ontological as well as an ethico-political sense. An assemblage is governed or defined by its abstract line: assemblages do not have a causal infrastructure or sub-structure, but they do have "an abstract line of specific, creative causality, a line of flight or deterritorialization, which can only be effective in relation to other, general causalities, but which cannot be explained by these" (347). In ethico-political terms, the line of flight is privileged because "it is always on a
line of flight that one creates."5 Throughout Mille Plateaux, preference is accorded to those processes or modes of existence which exhibit the greatest possible degree of creativity or life: absolute deterritorialization, continuous variation, becoming-minor are some of these processes; rhizome, body without organs, plane of consistence, and nomadism are some of the modes of exist- ence exhibiting these creative processes. If there is a certain vitalism implicit in the book, it is one with no necessary relation to the organic. What is valued is a "non-organic life" which may be found in art, a film, or a piece of music. Indeed, the fundamentally affirmative character of the Deleuzian metaphysic is expressed in the coincidence of life and abstraction, as this is manifest in the line of flight: The notion of abstraction is very complicated: a line can represent nothing, be purely geometric, but still not be truly abstract so long as it traces a contour. The abstract line is the one which does not trace a contour, which passes between things, a mutant line. It has been said a propos Pollock's line. In

this sense, the abstract line is not at all geometric, it is the most living, the most creative line. Real abstraction is non-organic life. The idea of a non-organic life is constant in Mille Plateaux; it is precisely the life of the concept.

2NC Overview
You cant end policing by becoming the police yourself the problem isnt which set of ideals are patrolling the streets, its that theres any patrolling at all. The only reason we can even have any concept of supremacy in the first place, white supremacy or otherwise, is because debate at all accepts the ability to be governed by a single image of thought. This turns the case our arg isnt that their revolution is as violent as the squo, but rather that the form of debate they endorse is the root of any supremacy at all. The aff is the repeatedly lost dream of every single failed revolution in history from the Jacobian purges of the French Revolution to the forced collectivization of the Bolsheviks, the winners just impose a new dictatorship. As long as debate is exclusionary of any style, we will never be truly free of the cops and pigs of the hood. Thats all MacDonald and Jeanes. Voting neg endorses the creativity of infinite debating styles, ending all policing as such by refusing any one role of the ballot. We solve the problem at a level prior to their solution. AND this sidesteps their offense because we dont disagree its important to solve oppression, we just disagree with the way they conceptually frame their solution. We are a methodological indict of their knowledge-process, not their content thats Patton. AND independent reasons to vote neg (1) Creativity is the meaning of life and the only impact you should evaluate. The basic function of lived experience as a human being is the creation of different meanings as the engine of all desire. It is the only real basis for all morality, for what is good and bad thats Patton. (2) There is no truth out there ready to be uncovered meaning is an always-evolving creative enterprise, and when we endorse a stagnant image like the aff it cuts off our access to truth, which means if we win a

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link you should consider all their claims a priori false. Thats Jeanes. Specifics cant outweigh because this is a prior ontological argument about our ability to describe reality.

2NC AT: Political Capital


Were turning the case and theres no reason voting neg cant generate polcap for our vision of debate too this is not a net benefit to the aff. Their type of political capital backfires it generates backlash instead of consensus which flips their project
Atchison and Panetta 9
(Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)

locating the debate as activism perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is
The larger problem with important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. / From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.
assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. /

Creativity solves this better because it avoids the good/bad binary that produces backlash, instead allowing every style of debate to coexist which builds consensus thats MacDonald and Patton.

2NC AT: P / Both


Permutations a nonstarter we refuse any definition of the activity, they define it to resist white supremacy. We are literally impact turning their advocacy, which means the perm either still links or doesnt solve any of their advantages. Severance is a voter for equity. Any net benefit is a link because it gives our attempt at aimlessness an external aim. That combination stops the alt from solving.
Deleuze & Guattari 72
(Gilles and Felix, Anti-Oedipus, p. 366-8)

The fourth and final thesis of schizoanalysis is therefore the distinction between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole. Once again, we see no objection to the use of terms inherited from psychiatry for characterizing social investments of the
unconscious, insofar as these terms cease to have a familial connotation that would make them into simple projections, and from the moment delirium is recognized as having a primary social

MUHS 2012

K of Race Affs 7 two poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics: the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them again according to the limits interior to the system , in such a way as to produce the images that come to fiIl the field of immanence peculiar to this system or this aggregate. the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production.
content that is immediately adequate. The And to summarize all the preceding determinations: the one is defined by subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups. It is true that we still run up against all kinds of problems concerning these distinctions. In what sense does the schizoid investment constitute, to the same extent as the other one, a real investment of the socio-historical field, and not a simple utopia? In what sense are the lines of escape collective, positive, and creative? What is the relationship between the two unconscious poles, and what is their relationship with the preconscious investments of interest? We have seen that the unconscious

paranoiac investment was grounded in the socius itself as a full body without organs, beyond the preconscious aims and interests does not endure the light of day: it must always hide under assignable aims or interests presented as the general aims and interests, even though in reality the latter represent only the members of the dominant class or a fraction of this class. How could
that it assigns and distributes. The fact remains that such an investment a formation of sovereignty, a fixed and determinate gregarious aggregate, endure being invested for their brute force, their violence, and their absurdity? They would not survive such an investment. Even the most overt fascism speaks the language of goals, of law, order, and reason. Even the most insane capitalism speaks in the name of economic rationality. And this is necessarily the case, since it is in the irrationality of the full body that the order of reasons is inextricably fixed, under a code, under an axiomatic that

the bringing to light of the unconscious reactionary investment as if devoid of an aim, would be enough to transform it completely, to make it pass to the other pole of the libido, i.e., to the schizorevolutionary pole, since this action could not be accomplished without overthrowing power, without reversing subordination, without returning production itself to desire: for it is only desire that lives from having no aim. Molecular desiring-production would regain its liberty to master in
determines it. What is more, its turn the molar aggregate under an overturned form of power or sovereignty. That is why Klossowski, who has taken the theory of the two poles of investment the furthest, but still within the category of an active utopia, is able to write: "Every sovereign formation would thus have to foresee the destined moment of its disintegration.... No formation of sovereignty, in order to crystalize, will ever endure this prise de conscience: for as soon as this formation becomes conscious of its immanent disintegration in the individuals who compose it, these same individuals decompose it. ... By way of the circuitous route of science and art, human beings have many times revolted against this fixity; this capacity notwithstanding, the gregarious impulse in and by science caused this rupture to fail.

The day humans are able to behave as intentionless phenomena for every intention at the level of the human

being always obeys the laws of its conservation, its continued existence on that day a new creature will declare the integrity of existence.... Science demonstrates by its very method that the means that it constantly elaborates do no more than reproduce, on the outside, an interplay of forces by themselves without aim or end whose combinations obtain such and such a result. ... However, no science can develop outside a constituted social grouping. In order to prevent science from calling social groups back in question, these groups take science back in hand ... [integrate it] into the diverse industrial schemes; its autonomy appears strictly inconceivable. A conspiracy joining together art and science presupposes a rupture of all our institutions and a total upheaval of the means of production.... If some conspiracy, according to Nietzsche's wish, were to use science and art in a plot whose ends were no less suspect, industrial society would seem to foil this conspiracy in advance by the kind of mise en scene it offers for it, under pain of effectively suffering what this conspiracy

i.e., the breakup of the institutional structures that mask the society into a plurality of experimental spheres finally revealing the true face of modernity an ultimate phase that Nietzsche saw as the end result of the evolution of societies. In this perspective, art and science would then emerge as sovereign formations that Nietzsche said constituted the object of his countersociology art and science establishing themselves as dominant powers, on the ruins of institutions
reserves for this society:

They establish a stagnant image of thought which destroys creativity they assume there is a truth out there about the perfect form of debate which becomes their single, monolithic advocacy. Thats Jeanes.

2NC AT: White Supremacy Destroys Creativity


Our entire arg is we solve white supremacy better than they do, which means theres only a risk of a link the only reason there can even be any concept of supremacy at all is because of restricted creativity in debate. Its impossible for anything to be supreme with a neg ballot because we open debate to an exterior mode that has infinite lines of thought not only are solving this impact so much higher up on the ontological chain than they are, were also solving every form of supremacy which means our solvency outweighs on magnitude. Thats all of our evidence. Heres more evidence creativity solves all supremacy best
Holland 99
(Eugene Holland, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature @ Ohio State University, Deleuze and Guatarris Anti-Oedipus, p. 39) Deleuze and Guattari take this argument yet one step further, for schizoanalysis is not just a materialist semiotics: it is an historical-materialist semiotics. Not

only is the nuclear family as social institution the basis for Oedipalized subjects and Oedipal representations of desire (including psychoanalysis) alike, historically speaking it is only the latest in a long line of social institutions responsible for the construction of fixed subjectivities, and it is in some ways the weakest and the most abstract. Fixed subjects of all kinds arise from an illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis that segregates one set of subjectivities from all the others and demands that an otherwise

MUHS 2012 K of Race Affs 8 nomadic subjectivity (resulting from legitimate conjunctive syntheses) identify only with members of that restricted set: whites rather than blacks; men rather than women; Christians rather than Jews, and so forth. Instead of the I am everyone and anyone of the nomadic subject, the segregated subject believes that he/she belongs to a superior race (103105),
identifies himself/herself as essentially different from and better than all the others from which he/she is segregated. Historically, the content or rationale for such segregation has varied considerably: totem, clan, religion, race, nation, sorority/fraternity, sports team, and so on. But the the basis of a segregation aligning the subject with a superior us versus an inferior them, a

form of the illegitimate synthesis remains the same: on fixed sense of identity arises that rejects as undesirable

the multiform possibilities of nomadic subjectivity.