What means have Russia, Belarus and Ukraine pursued to strengthen their national identity and what challenges

have they encountered? Answer with reference to TWO of the three countries. This essay will look at the actions taken by both Ukraine and Russia which has helped them secure their national identities within foreign policies, domestic nationality policies and cultural policies. Legislation laid down during or after the collapse of the USSR, and negotiations with other nations and international organisations will be used to illustrate this. The means Ukraine has taken to strengthen its national identity in this essay are quite clearly laid out in its Declaration of Sovereignty in 1990, and followed up by specific legislation. Actions taken by Russia which has strengthened its national identity have differed from much of which has been put in place by Ukraine. The main difference is the intentions behind them; Ukraine has deliberately labelled things as being for the purpose of defining the nation, whereas Russian undertakings, while obviously for the benefit of Russia, and having an effect on their national identity, have not all been marketed as such. The Declaration of Sovereignty defined Ukraine as a neutral country, and one not aligned with any military bloc. The obvious reference made here is to Russias military power, to which they would not wish to ally themselves if they wanted to define themselves as separate from Russia. More recently, the notion of joining NATO has been discussed by former president Yuschenko. It is a move which would support Ukraines integration into the West, complementing Ukraines moves to integrate with the EU. The possibility of NATO membership has been a serious challenge to the declaration, as it would guarantee Ukraines involvement in military action in the future. This challenge seems to have been overcome, as current incumbent Viktor Yanukovich states that Ukraine will never be a bloc state and will join no military alliance. (RIANovosti, 2010). And so it hasnt, to the contrary, Yanukovich

has begun to warm Ukraines relations with Russia, by extending the stay of Russias Black Sea Fleet until 2042 which, while not entirely aligning Ukraine with Russias military, certainly suggests that the doors to further alliance with Russias military have been opened. "If in the future you would consider it proper to join the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization], we would be happy to invite you and accept you," (Dmitri Medvedev, Reuters, 2010) Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has defined itself more so by its international relationships than Ukraine, which has made major changes within its own borders. This can perhaps be put down to a need to define Kuzios the other, an important factor in the determination of self. (Kuzio, 2001) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer had the same interest in promoting communism in countries such as Cuba and Afghanistan, and so had to re-think some of its international allies and dealings. With the removal of communism, many reasons for hostility towards the west, and specifically the USA, faded. This was especially so when the opportunity for Russia to take advantage of the USA as an ally arose. An interesting change in Russias behaviour towards the USA occurred after the September the 11th terror attacks. In a televised address in 2001, Putin said In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people -- we are with you." (CNN, 2002). Following this, Putin offered more support to the US in the form of intelligence and access to military bases in the Middle East. Russia, being a large military presence, has had none of the same qualms as Ukraine about neutrality and aligning itself with other military power. It is easy to think that this accommodating demeanour offered by Russia towards a former enemy is a result of a common adversary; international terrorism has affected Russia also. Other motives appear to have driven Putin to accept America as an ally. " what he [Putin] did was a revolution in terms of Russia's foreign policy," (Dmitri Trenin, CNN, 2002) it did not happen because of September 11. He used, he seized upon September 11 as an

opportunity to leapfrog in his foreign policy. The outcomes of this partnership have been quite beneficial to Russia as a whole. Russia took on a greater role within NATO and began preparations to supply energy to the West. Putin was also able to justify the military actions in Chechnya as part of the war on terror, due to their cooperation in targeting Al-Qaeda. By reaching out to the west, Russia secured its position as a major player in world politics. These were obviously intentional benefits of this partnership, but perhaps unintentionally affecting its national identity, changing its previous image of a country hostile to things western to one with certain ideologies similar to that of the west. This somewhat unexpected behaviour is perhaps explained by the instability of Russias national identity at the time, as its main defining characteristic, communism, was no longer a factor. (White, 2005) Ukraine has also built up its own bilateral ties, in accordance with the Declaration of Sovereignty. Joining the EU has been an on again/off again ambition for Ukraine. Under Kuchma, hopes were high for becoming a member state. Ukraine hopes to join the European Union around 2010. (EU Business, 2003) A major challenge to this has been adapting to EU policies, especially those of press freedom and democratic governance, making it more relevant to domestic policy, and less of a foreign policy issue. In changing its domestic policy, it has adjusted its own identity to fit better with that of the EU. Democratic governance, for example, has increased since 2006, from 4.21 to 4.61 (Freedom House, 2011). Despite these changes, Ukraine has yet to achieve the goal of joining the EU, but it has improved and maintained the ties with Europe. The situation has been described as a door neither opened nor closed (Youngs, 2008) as the EU has been inconsistent in its support for Ukraines democratisation efforts. Evrointegratsia succeeded as a means of strengthening Ukraines bilateral ties and supporting its identity as a neutral state; one comfortable with negotiating with both East and West, but not committing to either in order to remain independent.

One major identifying factor of both Russia and Ukraine which has remained since the collapse of the USSR is that of civic nationality overriding that of ethic nationality. Ukraine has strengthened this within the Declaration, in which it states that Citizens of the Republic of all nationalities comprise the people of Ukraine. In this particular aspect of national identity, Ukraine followed through with citizenship laws in 1991. A challenge to the Ukraine, before deciding upon the definition of Ukrainian citizenship, was in deciding whether to class ethnic Russians and other minorities living within the borders at the time of independence as Ukrainian citizens, effectively replacing the role that the Soviet Nationality Policy (SNP) played in defining the state, or to exclude them from civic nationality. And would the ethnic Russians have to be deported in order to make Ukraine Ukrainian? The decisions made would define what it meant to be Ukrainian, and is therefore one of the most important means to strengthen national identity. Under the constitution, the various ethnic groups within Ukraine were referred to as the National Minorities, and while there were to be considered Ukrainian by citizenship, their own right to a minority nationality within that was protected. This bolstered Ukraines identity by showing it to be a civic nation, but one that differed from the USSR in that it supported the various cultural differences, rather than homogenising them. Russian citizenship, quite simply, took over when the USSR left off; former Soviet citizens who still lived within the territory were offered RSFSR citizenship, experiencing fewer bumps along the road than Ukraine. In interesting factor in Ukraines definition of self is the language legislation, which follows a similar pattern to the citizenship issue. The declaration guarantees [] functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social activity. It follows that all citizens of Ukraine, having been declared Ukrainian by nationality, should all speak the same language. It also follows that if they are permitted their own minority ethnicities, that they should be permitted the use of their own languages. Were other languages, in particular Russian, a threat to the

revival and use of Ukrainian as the state language? Russian certainly had been. The use of the language during the Soviet era was a means of reducing Ukrainian language and culture to an inferior level, in order to assimilate it into the Soviet nation. (Hrytsenko, 2003) How to overcome the threat of Russian language drowning out Ukrainian before it took hold? The 1989 Law on Language covers the way in which Ukrainian was implemented after independence. It states that while Ukrainian would be used in all areas of public life, such as in the mass media, in schools, and in government, those within the national minority groups would have the right to use their own languages in private, and their children would have the right to have these languages taught to them in schools where a significant number of students were of a minority background. In contrast, the people of Ukraine also had the right to learn and use Ukrainian as their language of choice. Ukraine has certainly managed to work around the linguistic challenges by neither suppressing, nor particularly promoting minority languages. This is shown by the increase in rates of use of Ukrainian, in the most recent census, in 2001. Although, due to widespread bilingualism, there are differences between uses of Ukrainian as mother tongue and language of convenience, the usage equates to about 50% Ukrainian, and 50% Russian. (Jamestown Foundation, 2003) To conclude, Russia and Ukraine have both used legislative means, such as those of nationality and their constitutions, though they have had their differences. Ukraine has stuck more strictly to legislative measures, summed up in with Law on Language (1989) and the Declaration of Sovereignty (1990), and has been explicit about its nation-building mission. Its main challenges have been shaking off vestiges of Soviet power, and securing its own, separate existence without Russia. Russia, on the other hand, has less consciously attempted to strengthen its identity, by entering into foreign negotiations for the benefit of Russia, and staunchly defending itself against perceived threats. Its challenges have included defining itself without a Soviet identity, and overcoming western hostility, while remaining a major

power. Both Russia and Ukraines national identities have changed in certain ways since the disintegration of the USSR, and also retained a few aspects from the time spent under the USSR. They have both gone from countries lacking in certain aspects of identity, to betterdefined nations by implementing various means and overcoming the accompanying challenges. Word Count: 1,807

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