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57. What are the two (2) aspects of the RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP ? Distinguish each.

a. b. Freedom to believe; and Freedom to act.

IN the first, such freedom is absolute. He may indulge in his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all. He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what he believes. In the second, if the individual externalizes what he believes, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with due regard to the rights of others. Example: Go forth and multiply---cannot marry several times just to comply. 58. May a Jehovahs Witnesses Member who is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City, be held liable for grossly immoral conduct for living with a married man while her very own marriage was still subsisting? No. As held in ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR, 492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration), 408 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court held that she is not liable for grossly immoral conduct because: She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society; That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs; That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.

Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. However, this mode of living with another other than his or her spouse by a married person does not apply in places where divorce is allowed. 59. May children of Jehovahs Witnesses in public schools be forced to sing the National Anthem; recite the Patriotic Pledge; and Salute the Flag under pain of being expelled for noncompliance? No since such is in violation of their religious beliefs. (ROEL EBRALINAG, ET AL VS. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, March 1, 1993). Religious freedom is superior to the statute requiring the pupils to sing the National Anthem; recite the Patriotic Pledge; and Salute the Flag. The doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education was reversed. 60. How may the right to travel be impaired? The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 61. Is the right to travel affected by the Human Security Act? Yes, Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be: Detained under house arrest; Restricted from traveling; and/or

Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspects right to travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court. These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of the case filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the prosecutor.

62. May Former President Marcos validly compel the government to issue him his travel papers in order that he could return to the Philippines from his US exile in accordance with his constitutional right to travel? No. (FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989). What is provided by the Philippine Constitution is the right to travel and not the right to return. These two (2) rights are different under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. 63. What is the residual power of the President? It is the power of the President in balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. 64. May a person out on bail be validly allowed to travel abroad? Yes, subject to the following requisites ( Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149): He must however [1] convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, [2] the duration thereof, and [3] that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel. 65. Is the right to information on matters of public concern absolute? No. While the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized and access to official recordsshall be afforded the citizen, it must be subject to such limitations as may be provided by law as well as reasonable conditions imposed by public officials in custody of said records like the payment of the expenses of reproduction of public documents; the request must be done during office hours, etc. 66. May the COMELEC be compelled to publish the names of the nominees of the different party-list groups for the May 14, 2007 elections despite the prohibition on such publication as embodied by the Party-List Act? YES, the COMELEC must publish the same despite the prohibition in the law. Such prohibition violates the right to information on matters of public concern on the part of the citizen. (BANTAY REPUBLIC VS. COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007) 67. May the President validly prohibit members of her Cabinet as well as other officers in the executive department from attending investigations in aid of legislation by Congress? No. Such would violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is only through said investigations that the people will be informed of the workings of the different departments of the government. (SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006 ) 68. May a Barangay validly exercise the power of eminent domain? Yes, subject to the approval by the President.( Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83) 69. What are the requisites before an expropriator may validly obtain a writ of possession to take over possession of the expropriated property? It depends: 1. If the expropriation is for a National government projects or national infrastructure projects, like those covered by the Build-Operate-Transfer, RA 8974 shall be followed. This means that there must be a [a] Complaint for expropriation which is sufficient in form and in substance; and [2] the 100% of the market value of the property sought to be expropriated must first be paid to the owner of the property. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474)


In ordinary expropriation cases, the rule is that in the case of BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562. It provides:



If the expropriation is being done by a Local Government Unit, the Supreme Court decision in the case of THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269, shall be complied with: 1. 2. the complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient in form and substance; and the expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.

70. Who determines the just compensation in expropriation cases? What are the factors to be considered in determining the same? Determination of just compensation is a judicial function with the assistance or recommendation of the court-appointed commissioners. (Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987) The factors to be considered in determining the just compensation/market value are: 1. cost of acquisition; 2. the current value of like proerties; 3. its actual or potential uses; 4. particular case of lands; 5. their size, shape, location; and 6. the tax declarations thereon. Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING. (BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 14, 1992). 71. What are the requisites of taking in expropriation cases? The Requisites of taking are: a. b. c. d. e. the expropriator must enter the property; the entrance must not be for just a momentary period; the entry must be under warrant of color or title; the property must be devoted for public use; and the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land. (Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336)

72. May a private property already used as a private cemetery be expropriated for a public purpose? No, a private property which is already devoted to public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose. (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349). 73. What are the rights of a person under custodial investigation under the Mahinay Doctrine or the Expanded Miranda Doctrine? The rights are: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;


He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, , he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means---telephone, radio, letter or messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family; or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-governmental organization. IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED; He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation has begun;








10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some information or statements; 11. He must be informed that any statement OR EVIDENCE, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. 74. What are the rights of a person under custodial detention for one suspected or arrested as a terrorist under the Human Security Act? The rights are embodied under Section 21 thereof which states: Section 21. Rights of a person under custodial detention.- The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: 1. to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public attorneys office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAOs thus contacted to immediately visit the person detained and provide him with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel;


3. 4. 5.

allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them; and allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice.

75. Are the above rights available to a suspect if he is under investigation by a private person? No. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475 SCRA 248). The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is not tenable. The investigation under said provision refers to custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the accused are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE. The protective mantle of section 12, article III does not apply to administrative investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216); confession to a private individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673); or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity (People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In fact, even a videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307). 76. When is custodial investigation deemed to have started so as to entitle the suspect to be informed of his rights under the Mahinay Doctrine or the Expanded Miranda Doctrine? Custodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. Thus, there was custodial investigation when the police authorities, upon their arrest of some of the accused, immediately asked them regarding their participation in the commission of the crime , even while they were still walking along the highway on their way to the police station. (PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600) 77. Are spontaneous admissions made before a person could be informed of his rights during custodial investigation admissible as evidence? Yes. Spontaneous statements voluntarily given, as where appellant orally admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent), do not fall under custodial investigation. Such admission, even without the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate appellants constitutional rights AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. (PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO. 135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER 29, 2000). 78. What are the requisites before an extrajudicial confession is admissible? To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (iii) express; and (iv) in writing. A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel, without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellants confession were gospel truth. (PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R. NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000).

To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (iii) express; and (iv) in writing.

A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel, without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellants confession were gospel truth. 79. Is the presence of a lawyer to assist the suspect during custodial investigation sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Constitution? No. As held in PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413, the mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective, vigilant and independent. A lawyer who could just hear the investigation going on while working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum requirements of effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the accused subjected to custodial investigation without counsel, he was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel during the taking of his extra-judicial confession. 80. From what time must the counsel assist the suspect during custodial investigation? Who must choose such counsel? In PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 82604. December 12, 1991, it was held that the counsel must be present from the inception of the custodial investigation not at any time thereafter. Also, the lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, the former judge whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' own choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was willing to have her represent him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the Constitution. Furthermore, the former judge was not present when Marcos was being interrogated by the police. While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the statements contained in the typewritten document, this is far from being substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation. 81. Is the extrajudicial confession of a suspect obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, but speaks of gospel truth, admissible in evidence? No. In PEOPLE VS. GALIT, 135 SCRA 465, PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284 SCRA 199; and PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286 SCRA 207, it was held that even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was voluntarily given. In order that a confession is admissible, the following requisites must be present: a. b. c. d. the confession must be voluntary; the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; the confession must be express; and the confession must be in writing.

The above requirements, however, are not applicable when the suspect makes an spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. ANDAN, March 3, 1997 when the accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to the Municipal Mayor that he committed the crime imputed to him. As such, his uncounselled confession is admissible in evidence. 82. What are the two (2) kinds of coerced or involuntary confessions under Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution? The two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution. These are: a. b. confession which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; and those which are given without the benefit of Miranda Warnings. PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190

83. What is the status of coerced confessions as evidence in court? Coerced or involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence being the fruit of the poisoned tree.

84. Is the right to counsel satisfied if the suspect was assisted by the Station Commander of the Western Police District while he was being investigated by the policemen of the same station? How about if the investigation is being conducted by the NBI and the suspect was ordered assisted by a lawyerapplicant therein? There is no compliance of the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel to assist an accused during custodial investigation when the accused was assisted by the Station Commander of the WPD, Atty. De los Reyes, while being investigated by other policemen of the same police station because the interest of the police is naturally adverse to the accused. In fact, the SC in the case of PEOPLE VS. JANUARIO, 267 SCRA 608 held that a lawyer applying for a position in the NBI could not validly assist an accused being investigated then by the NBI. (PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190) 85. Is the right to counsel available to a suspect during a police line-up? The Supreme Court had conflicting decisions on this aspect but ended up with the rule that since the accused will not be made to make any testimony during the police line-up, then he is not under custodial investigation and therefore, there is no need for him to be assisted by a lawyer. ( P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261; Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642; DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196 and PEOPLE VS. HATTON) 86. Is there a valid custodial investigation if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial investigation is a public attorney who was not chosen by the accused himself but given to him free of charge? Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel? The counsel must be the choice of the accused or suspect. (P. vs. Alegria, September 28, 1990) Also, the Fiscal could not have protected the rights of the suspect, even if they are known to each other, since the Fiscal is there for the private complainant. (P. vs. Matos-Viduaya, September 11, 1990) 86-a. The appellants were arrested by the PAOCTF for Kidnapping and Murder of two (2) minor children of a businessman from Bulacan. While under custodial investigation by Col. Cesar Mancao, the lawyers given to assist them tare the lawyers of PAOCTF. Was the confessions obtained during the custodial investigation admissible in evidence? Yes. As held in the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO REYES, ET AL., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009, the Supreme Court held that since the evidence shows that the lawyers of PAOCTF assisted them from the start up to the end of their custodial investigation and that their rights were protected, the same is admissible as evidence especially so that there is no evidence of compulsion. 86-b. What are the evidence of voluntariness in the suspects extrajudicial confession making it admissible in evidence? May such confession be used against a co-accusd? Up to what extent? In People vs. Pia, 229 Phil. 577 and PEOPLE VS. REYES, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009, the Supreme Court enumerated the following as evidence of voluntariness in the extrajudicial confession of a suspect: Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination.1[93] In People v. Pia, we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim. It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.


Id. at 19.

With respect to appellant Reyess claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.2[96] In People v. Alvarez,3[97] we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the coconspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. In People v. Encipido4[98] we elucidated as follows: 87. If the extrajudicial admission or confession of the accused is declared inadmissible as evidence, must the accused be acquitted as a matter of right? No. In PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO, GR No. 125333, March 20, 2002, the Supreme Court held that though the extrajudicial confession of the accused was declared inadmissible for violation of his right to counsel, if there are evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, like circumstantial evidence, then he can still be convicted of the crime charged. This is so because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged; and [2] the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. In People vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 88. May a convicted person be released from jail through recognizance? No. In ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS, RTC 2 BORONGAN, SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175, it was held that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release of Bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before the completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him. It is patently erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 provides that there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. The only exception is when the convict applies for Probation before he commences to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense is within the purview of the Probation Law. Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE. 89. May a judge require cash bond only? No. The Rules provides for four (4) ways of posting bond and it is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to require cash bond only. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38). 90. May an accused charged of a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong be granted bail? Yes. The purpose of the bond is to assure the court of the presence of the accused during the trial of his case. If the probability of flight is nil, then the accused may be allowed to post bail. (BELTRAN VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, April, 2007) 91. May a person subject of extradition from another country and where the cases against him in said country are bailable, be allowed to post bail pending the extradition hearings? No. As held in UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389 SCRA 623 through former Chief justice Panganiban, the Supreme Court held that a person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he was charged of in a foreign country is bailable. This is so because the constitutional provision on the right to bail under Art. III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal cases, not in extradition proceedings. (EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 17, MANILA, 483 SCRA 290). This is so because of the possibility of flight. BUT IN THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. OLALIA, 521 SCRA 470, it was held that the potential extradite may be granted bail if he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. Clear and convincing evidence is an evidence with a standard lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but more than preponderance of evidence.

2[96] 3[97] 4[98]

Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1206 (2000). G.R. No. 88451, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA 364, 377. 230 Phil. 560, 574 (1986).

92. In extradition cases, is the respondent therein entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him? No. In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. JUDGE LANTION, 322 SCRA 160 (The Mark Jimenez Case) , the Supreme Court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing when a request for extradition by another country is still being evaluated. However, on Motion for Reconsideration in the same case, in a 9-6 decision, the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court. However, if bail was granted to an extradite, the same may not be cancelled without notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right to due process will be violated. (EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 17, MANILA, 483 SCRA 290) 93. What is the EQUIPOISE RULE? If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should be acquitted from the crime charged. Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction because of the accuseds constitutional presumption of innocence.(PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415) 94. May the court reverse the order of trial in a criminal case? No. such would violate the right of the accused to presumption of innocence. To be required to present his evidence first would be making him prove his innocence and not the State proving his guilt. (Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322) However, if the accused does not object to such a procedure, then a reverse order of trial is allowed by the Rules. (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July 10,l986) In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned. Thus: "However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly." 95. What is the extent of the obligation of a counsel de oficio for an accused in a criminal case? While an accused may be given a counsel de oficio which is not a lawyer of his own choice because he could not afford the services of a de parte lawyer, only the faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accuseds right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyers duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accuseds fundamental rights. The cavalier attitude of Atty. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in [a] his refusal to cross-examine Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE); [b] the manner in which he conducted Maricris Naderas cross-examination; and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. (PEOPLE VS. NADERA, JR., 324 SCRA 490) 96. If the accused has the right to be present during the trial of his case, can he also refuse to appear during the hearings of his case? No. During arraignment, promulgation of the decision and when he is to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution, he must be present. However, he can validly waive his presence after arraignment when he state in open court or in an affidavit that whenever a witness mentions his name during the presentation of the prosecutions evidence, he admits that he is the one being referred to. (Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546; P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269) 97. When may speedy trial be raised by the accused to cause the dismissal of his case? What kind of delays must occur before the same could be invoked? In JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004, it was held that the right to speedy trial is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be considered and balanced to determine if there is delay, as follows:


Length of the delay; Reasons for the delay; Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and Prejudiced caused by the delay. There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period prior to April 19, 2002, petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. 98. May the right to speedy disposition of cases be invoked for the dismissal of cases pending before quasi-judicial bodies like the Office of the Ombudsman? Yes, unreasonable delays like failure to decide a complaint against the respondent for more than three (3) years from the time all the pleadings were filed violates the respondents right to a speedy disposition of his case and the case must be dismissed. (DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721; ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA 301) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this case was resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of petitioners right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not attributable to the prosecution. The factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated: 1. 2. 3. length of delay, reasons for such delay, and assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice caused by the delay.

(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. (SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL, G.R. NO. 140188, 337 SCRA 227, AUG. 3, 2000; BLANCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 136757 58, 346 SCRA 108, NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. HON. HOW, G.R. NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22, 2000). 99. Was the failure of the court to have a sign language expert to inform the accused who is a deaf-mute of the contents of the criminal information fatal to the validity of the proceedings which resulted in the conviction of the said accused? Yes because the accused was denied of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As such, the entire proceedings is null and void and another trial be conducted in the presence of a sign language expert to inform the accused of the proceedings. (Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA 717; P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653) 100. May an accused in a Homicide case be convicted of Murder without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him? Yes. Even if the Information was captioned For: Homicide only but the body of the Information alleges treachery or evident premeditation and the same was read to the accused, he could be convicted of Murder. This is so because it is the body of the Information that is binding, not the caption thereof and therefore, the accused was duly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. (P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426) 101. What is the effect of the testimony of a witness who did not return to court for his cross examination? How about if there is only partial cross-examination? A witness who did not return to court for his cross-examination would render his entire testimony inadmissible for being hearsay. It likewise violated the right of confrontation on the part of the accused. (Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610) If the witness was partially examined, only the portion of his direct testimony where he was cross-examined shall be admissible as evidence.( P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92) 102. What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia? May an accused who jumped bail after arraignment be validly convicted by the trial court?


The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are the following: The accused was duly arraigned; The accused was notified of the hearing; and The accuseds absence [during the trial] is unjustifiable.

103. May an accused compel the trial court to issue subpoena to a Physician who is already working in the United States to testify on his treatment of the accused? Would the failure of said witness to appear and testify for the accused violates his right to subpoena witnesses and the production of evidence in his favor? No. Such witness is beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts. Further, his right to subpoena witnesses and the production of evidence will not be violated since the hospital could produce said records and another physician could testify on the contents thereof. (Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610; Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514) 104. May the accused be presented by the prosecution as the latters witness? No. Such would violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination and if such happened, the proceedings shall be null and void. (Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663) 105. Generally, to what kind of evidence does the right against self-incrimination applies? Generally, it applies only to testimonial compulsion. As such, forcing a person to give a sample of his urine to determine whether a woman is pregnant (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62); whether a person is suffering from sexually transmitted disease (US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145) or under the influence of prohibited drugs (PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000; PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA 1, AUG. 25, 2000) does not violate the persons right against self-incrimination. Likewise forcing one to try a pair of shoes, pants or shirt does not fall under the above proscription. 106. How about forcing a person to give a sample of his handwriting?. Though the same does not require testimonial compulsion, the right against self-incrimination will be violated by said act. This is so because it involves the use of the intelligence of the person. (Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570) 107. Does the right against self-incrimination applicable to civil and administrative cases also? Yes but unlike in criminal cases where the accused could not be presented by the prosecution and his right not to take the witness stand is absolute, an adverse party in a civil or administrative cases may be presented by the other party but could refuse to answer only if the question propounded calls for an incriminatory answer. 108. May a court stenographer who had resigned from the government be compelled to transcribe her notes under pain of contempt without violating her right against involuntary servitude? Yes. This is so because the testimony was taken while she was still in the government and as such, it was her obligation to transcribe the same, having received her salary for the day when the testimony was taken. (Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131) 109. Is the Death Penalty already abolished by the 1987 Constitution?

While the Supreme Court answered the same in the affirmative in the cases of P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327; P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113; P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242; P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988 it held in People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 that it was merely suspended. 110. Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual punishment?

No. (P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647). It is only when the punishment is shocking to the conscience of the community and disproportionate to the offense charged that the penalty becomes cruel and unusual. In fact, the Supreme Court held in ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE that death through Lethal Injection is the most humane way of implementing the death penalty. 111. What are the requisites before an accused may validly invoke double jeopardy? There is double jeopardy when there is:


[1] valid complaint of information; [2] filed in a court of competent jurisdiction; [3] the accused was validly arraigned; and [4] the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1) 112. If the dismissal was with the express consent of the accused, may the dismissal result in double jeopardy? Yes in two (2) instances. As a general rule, if the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or with his express consent, there is no double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two (2) exceptions: 1) the motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency of evidence or Demurrer to Evidence; and 2) the motion to dismiss is based on the denial of the accuseds right to speedy trial. (PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1) -double jeopardy has set in. In these two (2) instances, the correct description of what happened is that the accused was acquitted and not the case was dismissed with his consent. It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on speedy trial since the same was not predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. It is only when there is a clear violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial that the dismissal results in double jeopardy. 113. The accused was charged of theft of electricity based on the City Ordinance of Batangas City. After arraignment, the case was dismissed because it was found out that the same has prescribed because it was filed after more than 60 days. The Fiscal filed another information based on the Revised Penal Code. Has double jeopardy set in? Yes. If the accused was charged of theft of electricity based on the City Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has prescribed, the government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in. If an act is punished by law and an ordinance, acquittal or conviction in one shall bar prosecution from the other. (PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292) 114. The accused was charged of grave coercion before the MTC and was duly arraigned. The Judge dismissed it without any motion form the accused because the case is allegedly outside the MTCs jurisdiction. Another information for the same offense was filed with the RTC which was likewise dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction. As such, the Fiscal filed a 3 rd information for grave coercion before the MTC. The accused pleaded double jeopardy. Is he correct? Yes. Since the accused was already arraigned in the 1 st information before the MTC which has jurisdiction over the same and the case was subsequently dismissed without his express consent, then double jeopardy has set in. 115. The accused was arraigned of homicide and entered a plea of guilty but prayed that he be given the chance to prove incomplete self-defense which the court granted. After presenting his evidence to prove incomplete self-defense, the court acquitted him because what was allegedly proven by him was complete self-defense. May the accused validly invoke double jeopardy if the Prosecutor moves for the reinstatement of the case for him to present the evidence of the prosecution? No because one of the requisites of double jeopardy is missing. There was no valid arraignment. This is so because his plea was one of guilty and yet, he was acquitted. In this case, he has to be rearraigned for him to enter a plea of not guilty in order that he could be validly acquitted. 116. The accused was convicted of frustrated murder. Within 15 days from promulgation, he filed a Motion for New Trial based on a newly-discovered evidence which was granted by the court. After the presentation of the alleged newly-discovered evidence, the accused was acquitted. May the prosecution appeal the acquittal since the evidence presented was not really a newly-discovered evidence but a forgotten one and that even assuming that the same is a newly-discovered evidence, it was insufficient to overturn the evidence of guilt as proven by the prosecution.


In the case of P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121, the Supreme Court held that indeed, the evidence presented was not newly-discovered evidence and that assuming it to be so, it was not sufficient to overturn the evidence of guilt as shown by the prosecutions evidence. However, though the decision was erroneous, double jeopardy has set in and the government could no longer appeal the decision. So even if the court obviously erred in the appreciation of the evidence resulting in a decision of acquittal instead of conviction, appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. (Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217) 117. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the penalty imposed? No since double jeopardy has set in. (PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000). As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs. Sandiganbayan. However, if the accused was the one who appealed the decision of the CFI convicting him of homicide (though he was charged of murder), the appellate court may convict him of murder if the evidence warrants and that the lower court mis-appreciated the evidence. This is so because if the accused appeals the decision, the same will be subject to a complete re-examination of the evidence on record. 118. What is the "Supervening Fact Doctrine." It simply provides that an accuseds conviction shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information when the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge or that the facts constituting the graver charge became known only or were discovered after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information. (Section 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260; P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766; P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712; P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462; P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; and P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637 119. When may the ex-post facto law rule be invoked? Only if the law sought to be applied is a criminal law or penal. Otherwise, the same may not be invoked as when the questioned law involves the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is not a penal law. Ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. (PANFILO M. LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999) 120. What are the different forms of ex-post facto law? In order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be one a. b. c. d. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required a the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage; that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, 35 SCRA 429; MEJIA VS. PAMARAN, 160 SCRA 457; TAN VS. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686; PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 211 SCRA 241). *******************************************

e. f. g.