EnhancingTransparency?U.S.

ChinaMilitary toMilitaryContactsandStrategicDialogues
CarlyleA.Thayer

Presentationto6thBerlinConferenceonAsianSecurity,TheU.S. andChinainRegionalSecurity:ImplicationsforAsiaandEurope CosponsoredbytheStiftungWissenshaftundPolitikand KonradAdenauerStiftung,Berlin,June1819,2012

EnhancingTransparency? U.S.ChinaMilitarytoMilitaryContactsandStrategicDialogues CarlyleA.Thayer*

Introduction
Thispaperfocusesonmilitarytomilitarycontactsandstrategicdialoguesbetweenthe United States and China. This paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 provides a brief introductionintotherationaleformilitarytomilitarycontactsandstrategicdialogues. Part 2 provides an historical overview of U.S.China defense contacts and cooperation from 1980 until 2008. Part 3 provides an analysis of militarytomilitary contacts and dialoguesundertheObamaAdministration.Part4presentsasummaryandconclusion. TheUnitedStateshasrepeatedlysoughttoengagewithChinatobettermanagetheir bilateralrelations.Currently,theU.S.andChinahaveinplacebetweenfortyeightand more than sixty annual official dialogue mechanisms to coordinate strategic policy issuesincludingmilitarytomilitarycontactsandstrategicdialogues.1 Senior Chinese officials stress that militarytomilitary contact serves to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation.2 The United States argues likewise that militarytomilitarycontactandcooperationisnecessarytoreducemiscalculations,and misunderstandingandmiscommunications.3InJanuary2012,forexample,theObama AdministrationissuedanewdefensestrategythatstatedwithrespecttoChina:
Overthelongterm,Chinasemergenceasaregionalpowerwillhavethepotentialtoaffect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral

Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
1

Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, U.S.China Relations: Friction and Cooperation Coexist Uneasily,ComparativeConnections,September2011andDavidShambaugh,TheU.S.Engagementwith Asia, Presentation to Session II, Asias SecurityStrategic Outlook, Regional Outlook Forum, Institute of SoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore,January5,2012.
2

DefenseMinisterLiangGuanglie,January2011,quotedinBonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S. ChinaRelations:PompandSubstance:HusStateVisittotheUS,ComparativeConnections,May2011.
3

SecretaryofDefenseRobertGates,remarkstomediagaggleenroutetoBeijing,January2011quotedin BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:PompandSubstance:HusStateVisittothe US..

3
relationship. However, the growth of Chinas military power must be accompanied by greaterclarityofitsstrategicintentionsinordertoavoidcausingfrictionintheregion.4

At the recent 11th Asia Security Summit (or ShangriLa Dialogue) in Singapore, U.S. SecretaryofDefenseLeonPanettaannouncedinhiskeynoteaddressthatby2020the UnitedStateswoulddeploysixtypercentofitsnavalforcestotheAsiaPacificregion.At thesametimePanettastated,Impersonallycommittedtobuildingahealthy,stable, reliable, and continuous miltomil relationship with China Our aim is to continue to improve the strategic trust that we must have between our two countries, and to discusscommonapproachestodealingwithsharedsecuritychallenges.5 Duringthequestionandanswerperiodfollowinghispresentation,Panettawasaskedby Senior Colonel Zhao Bao, the Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of Chinas Ministry of National Defense, to elaborate a little more on how U.S will develop its militarytomilitaryrelationswithChina.InreplyPanettastated:
WethinkthatastrongmiltomilrelationshipwithChinawouldbeextremelyimportantin dealingwiththeissuesthatbothofournationsconfront. Thewayweareapproachingthisistodevelopaseriesofhighlevelexchangesbetweenour twocountries Inadditiontothat,wehavediscussedtheabilitytodevelopteamsthatcanworktogetherto focus on some of these more difficult areas such as cyber and what we can to exchange information and try to ensure that we develop perhaps some standards when it comes to theuseofcyber In addition to that, obviously we will continue to have exchanges with our military commanders,ourPACOM[PacificCommand] So the key here is to try to strengthen our miltomil context so that we can have greater transparencybetweenourtwocountries.6 The next sections provide an historical overview of the development of U.S.China militaryto militarycontactsandtheinitiationoftheirfirststrategicdialoguesfrom1980to2008.

4 5

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2.

st

Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, United States, The U.S. Rebalance Towards the AsiaPacific, th Keynote presentation to the First Plenary Session, The 11 IISS Asia Security Summit The ShangriLa Dialogue,Singapore,June2,2012.
6

FirstPlenarySessionTheU.S.RebalanceTowardstheAsiaPacificQ&ASession,DepartmentofDefense Transcript,June2,2012.Availableat:http://www.iis.org/conferences/theshangriladialogue/shangrila dialogue2012.

HistoricalOverview,198020087
Militarytomilitary cooperation between the United States and China was first proposed by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown when he visited Beijing in January 1980. In 1981, the U.S. removed the ban on arms sales to China. In September 1983, SecretaryofDefenseCasperWeinbergervisitedBeijingandthefirstcommercialsaleof military equipment to China followed soon after. Between 1985 and 1987 the U.S. agreed to four governmenttogovernment weapon sales under the Foreign Military Salesprogram. In sum, militarytomilitary cooperation comprised three areas: strategic dialogue, reciprocalexchangesinfunctionalareas,andarmssales. InFebruary1990,theUnitedStatessuspendedmilitarytomilitarycontactsinresponse to the Tienanmen massacre on June 4, 1989. China retaliated by cancelling one of its arms contracts. In December 1992 President Bush terminated all four sales programs agreedtoundertheForeignMilitarySalesprogram. In 1993 the Clinton Administration initiated a new effort to engage Chinas leadership including senior Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officials. The results were limited and progresswassetbackbytheTaiwanStraitsCrisisof199596andtheNATObombingof theChineseEmbassyinBelgrade,Yugoslaviain1999. In 1994 and 1996, the United States and China exchanged highlevel defense visits. Secretary of Defense William Perry visited China in October 1994 and General Chi Haotian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Minister of Defense, paidareturnvisitinDecember1996.DuringtheirmeetingSecretaryPerryprovideda draft proposal for a bilateral agreement on maritime and air safety. The two defense ministersagreedtoinstitutionalizeformalcontactsthroughDefenseConsultativeTalks (DCT)andtoexchangeregularvisitsbyseniorofficials.8 The sections below will review progress in militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialoguesthroughthreebilateralmechanisms:DefenseConsultativeTalks,theMilitary Maritime Consultative Agreement and the Strategic Policy Dialogue/Defense Policy CoordinationTalks.

DefenseConsultativeTalks
In May 1997, General John Shalikasvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited ChinaattheinvitationofGeneralFuQuanyou,ChiefofthePLAGeneralStaff.General Shalikasvili urged his counterpart to complete its review of the U.S. proposal for an agreement on maritime and air safety. In October 1997 President Bill Clinton and
7

ThissectiondrawsheavilyonAppendix.MajorMilitaryContactsandIncidentsSince1993,inShirleyA. Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February10,2012,4469.
8

Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,45and48.

President Jiang Zemin held a summit and agreed, inter alia, to hold regular Defense ConsultativeTalksandtoconcludeanagreementonmilitarymaritimeandairsafety.9 The 1st U.S.China Defense Consultative Talks were held at The Pentagon from December 1112, 1997. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyWalterSlocombe,ChinawasrepresentedbyLt.Gen.XiongGuangkai,PLADeputy ChiefofStaff.Thismeetingwitnessedtheinitialingofthedraftagreementonmilitary maritimeandairsafety(discussedseparatelybelow). The2ndU.S.ChinaDefenseConsultationTalkswereheldinBeijingfromOctober2021, 1998. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe,ChinawasrepresentedbyGeneralChiHaotian,ViceChairmanoftheCentral Military Commission. They discussed global and regional security issues, defense relationsintheAsiaPacific,militarystrategyandmodernization,andmilitarytomilitary cooperation in 1999. The Chinese side raised objections to the U.S. plan to field a theater missile defense system in the AsiaPacific region. This was the first indication thatChinaintendedtopoliticizeDCTmeetings.10 DefenceConsultationTalksweresuspendedfollowingtheNATObombingoftheChinese EmbassyinBelgrade.TheyresumedinJanuary2000whenLt.Gen.XiongGuangkai,PLA Deputy Chief of Staff traveled to Washington to attend the 3rd DCT. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe. This meeting consideredtheprogramformilitarytomilitarycontactsfor2000.SlocombeandXiong alsodiscussedinternationalsecurityissues,U.S.strategyinAsia,Chinasmissilebuildup, Taiwan, missile defence, weapons proliferation and North Korea. General Xiong met with Defense Secretary William Cohen; General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; James Stienberg, Deputy National Security Advisor; Under Secretary of StateThomasPickering;andStateDepartmentSeniorAdvisor,JohnHolum.11 DefenserelationswithChinaimprovedafterSecretaryofDefenseWilliamCohenvisited BeijingfromJuly1115,2000.The4thDCTwasinheldinBeijinginlateNovemberthat year. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe and PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai. The two sides discussedtheprogramformilitarytomilitarycooperationin2001. PlanstostepupU.S.Chinamilitaryrelationssufferedamajorsetbackwhen,onApril24, 2001, a PLA Navy F8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP3 reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the South China Sea forcing the EP3 to conduct an emergencylandingonHainanIsland.SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldsuspended militarytomilitarycontactswithChina,includingsocialcontactsandvisitsbyshipsand aircraft,onacasebycasebasis. TheU.S.suspensionofmilitarytomilitarycontactsremainedinplacefortwoyearsuntil
9 10

Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,50. Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,52. Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,54.

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December2002whenSecretaryRumsfeldagreedtoresumeDefenseConsultativeTalks. TheU.S.andChinaconvenedthe5thDCTinWashingtonatThePentagoninDecember. The U.S. was represented by its Under Secretary for Defense Policy, while China was representedbythePLADeputyChiefofStaff.AttherequestoftheU.S.,GeneralXiong Guangkai brought a proposal for military exchanges in 2003. After the meeting Under Secretary Rodman told the press he could not claim progress in gaining greater reciprocity and transparency in militarytomilitary exchanges from China. China characterizedtheDCTmeetingasdefenseconsultationsattheviceministeriallevel. The6thDCTwasheldinBeijinginFebruary2004.ItwasattendedbyUnderSecretaryof DefenseforPolicyDouglasFeithandPLADeputyChiefofStaffGeneralXiongGuangkai. TheU.S.raisedmaritimesafetyissuesandproposedadefensetelephonelink(DTL)or hotline.ChinaraisedTaiwanselections.Bothsidesdiscussedtheprogramformilitary exchanges in 2004. China once again characterized this meeting as defense consultationsattheviceministeriallevel. In April 2005, the 7th DCT was hosted in Washington by Under Secretary of Defense RichardFeith.GeneralXiongGuagkaiattended.TheydiscussedU.S.proposalsforahot lineandanagreementonmilitarymaritimeandairsafety. InOctober2005SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldvisitedChinathefirstvisitbya U.S. Defense Secretary since 2000. In his discussions with his Chinese counterpart RumsfeldraisedmilitaryexchangesandgreaterPLAtransparencyonbudgetarymatters. Two months later Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Peter Lawless visited Beijing to discussthemilitaryexchangeprogramfor2006andmilitarymaritimesafetyissues. The 8th DCT was held in Beijing in June 2006 but at a downgraded level. Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman represented the U.S. He met with Assistant Chief of the GeneralStaffMajorGeneralZhangQinshengtodiscussesmilitaryexchangesandother matters. Ayearlater,inNovember2007,DefenseSecretaryRobertGatesmadeanofficialvisitto BeijingfordiscussionswithhiscounterpartCaoGuangchuan.Gatespressedforbroader exchanges beyond the senior level and secured a commitment from Cao to set up a defensetelephonelink. The 9th DCT was held in Washington in December 2007 under the shadow of Chinas decisionthepreviousmonthtodenypermissiontoU.S.shipstomakeaportcallinHong Kong. Chinas decision affected two minesweepers seeking to refuel in the face of an impendingstormandaThanksgivingDayholidayandfamilyreunionforthecrewofthe USSKittyHawkaircraftcarrieranditsescorts.TheU.S.wasrepresentedattheDCTby Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, China was represented by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Ma Xiaotian. The two sides discussed, inter alia, the program of militaryexchangesin2008,lowerrankingexchanges,andthehotline.TheU.S.raised theissueofChinassuspensionofportvisitstoHongKong,whiletheChinesesideraised their objections to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. legislation restricting military contacts(discussedbelow).

On October 3, 2008 President Bush notified Congress of arms sales to Taiwan. China respondedbysuspendingsomemilitaryexchanges.InDecember2008,DeputyAssistant SecretaryofDefenseDavidSedneywasdispatchedtoBeijingtosoundoutthePLAon theresumptionofmilitaryexchanges.SedneymetwithPLAAssistantChiefofGeneral StaffChenXiaogonganddidnotreceiveapositiveresponse.

MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement
Asnotedabove,the1stDCTwitnessedtheinitialingofthedraftagreementonmilitary maritime and air safety. The formal signing ceremony took place in Beijing in January 1998 during the visit of Defense Secretary William Cohen. This document is formally entitled Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the Peoples Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety; it is referredtocolloquiallyastheMilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement(MMCA).12 Article1enjoinsthepartiestoencourageandfacilitateconsultationsbetweentheU.S. Department of Defense and Chinas Ministry of National Defense for the purpose of promotingcommonunderstandingsregardingactivitiesundertakenbytheirrespective maritimeandairforceswhenoperatinginaccordancewithinternationallaw,including theprinciplesandregimesreflectedintheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawofhe Sea. Article2providesforannualmeetingsoffromtwotothreedaysconsistingofbriefings anddiscussiononagendaitemstobeagreeduponbyconsensusincludingmeasures to promote safe maritime practices and establish mutual trust as search and rescue, communications procedures when ships encounter each other, interpretation of the RulesoftheNauticalRoadandavoidanceofaccidentsatsea.Annualmeetingsunder theMMCAalternatebetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateswitheachsiderepresented byapersonholdingtherankofadmiralorgeneralofficer. Article 2 also made provision for the setting up of working groups of subject matter expertsandspecialmeetingstobeconvenedthroughmutualagreement. Article3providesforthepreparationofasummaryoftheproceedingstobesignedby the heads of delegations. Article 4 specifies that consultations held under Article 2 shall remain between the Parties but the summary of proceedings can be made availabletothirdparties. Insummary,MMCAwasintendedtosetupaframeworkfordialoguetominimizethe chancesofaccidentsbetweenU.S.andPLAforcesoperatingintheseaandair.Itdidnot includeprovisionsforcommunicationsduringcrisesorrulesofengagement.
12

AgreementbetweentheDepartmentofDefenseoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheMinistryof National Defense of the Peoples Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety, available at www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/ uschina98.htm. Seealso:Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,50.

 OnestudyoftheMMCAassessedtheagreementinthesewords:

The1998AgreementbetweentheDepartmentofDefenseoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica and the Ministry of National Defense of the Peoples Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safetyor Military Maritime ConsultativeAgreement(MMCA)wasmuchmorediplomaticinnatureandtonethanthe classicINCSEAmodel,minimizingtheroleofoperationalexpertsandcontainingnoprovision forrealtimetacticalcommunication,aswastobetragicallyhighlightedbythe2001midair collision off Hainan. While annual meetings are useful to discuss incidents, they are not muchhelpwheneventsareunfoldingrapidlyon,over,orunderthesea.13

InlateApril1998theU.S.DepartmentofDefenseandtheChineseMinistryofNational Defense held the first preliminary discussion on the MMCA.14 Two months later (June 25July3),asummitbetweenPresidentsClintonandJiangZeminagreedtoconvenethe firstformalmeetingoftheMMCAandtosetupahotlinebetweendefenseministries.15 The first plenary meeting under the MMCA was held in Washington from July 1415, 1998. Two working group meetings under the MMCA were held in 199899. In December 1998 talks took place between the U.S. Navy and the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China was represented by the Director of the PLAN Operations DepartmentCaptainShenHao.InMay1999,aU.S.Navyworkinggroupvisitedtheport ofQingdaotodiscussinternationalstandardsforcommunicationatsea. On May 17, 1999 U.S.led NATO forces mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Although President Clinton tendered an apology, China responded by suspending all militarytomilitary contacts including ship visits to Hong Kong. The ban onportvisitswasliftedinSeptember1999butnoplenarymeetingsundertheMMCA werehelduntilMay2000.Inanefforttokickstartaresumptionofmilitarytomilitary contacts Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt CampbellvisitedBeijinginNovember1999. Campbellsvisitwasasuccess.InMarch2000aworkinggroupundertheMMCAhelda planningmeetinginChina.AndinlateMay/earlyJunetheU.S.andChinaconvenedthe 2nd plenary meeting under the MMCA. This meeting was hosted by the U.S. Pacific Command(PACOM)inHonolulu.TheU.S.sidewasrepresentedbyPACOMsDirectorfor Strategic Planning and Policy (J5), while China was represented by the PLAs Deputy Chief of Staff. This meeting reviewed a joint document entitled, A Study on SinoU.S. Maritime Navigational Safety, including Communications. A working group under the MMCAheldameetinginChinainDecember2000. TheApril2001EP3incidentresultedintheU.S.andChinaconveningtheirfirstSpecial MeetingundertheMMCAonGuaminSeptember2001.Thismeetingfocusedonhow
13

David Griffiths, U.S.China Maritime Confidence Building: Paradigms, Precedents and Prospects. China MaritimeStudiesInstituteNo.6.Newport,RI:NavalWarCollege,July2010.
14 15

Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,51. Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,51.

topreventsimilarincidents.TheU.S.raisedthefollowingissues:principlesofsafeflight andnavigationformilitaryservicesconductedonthehighseas,internationalairspace and Exclusive Economic Zone, and safety of ships and aircraft exercising the right of distressedentry.AworkinggroupundertheMMCAmetinBeijinginDecember2001to carrythesediscussionsforward. The atmosphere for U.S.China military relations improved when the U.S. and China reached agreement for a visit to Washington by Vice President Hu Jintao. The 3rd plenarymeetingundertheMMCAwasheldinShanghaiinApril2002.Itwasattended bythePLADeputyChiefofStaffandPACOMsJ5.AlsoinApril,ChinasVicePresidentHu Jintao made an official visit to Washington. He met with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Agreement was reached to hold a meeting of defense representatives to discusstheresumptionofmilitaryexchanges.AtthistimeChinaonlyapprovedmilitary exchanges on a casebycase basis. In June 2002, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman was dispatched to Beijing to follow up on this understanding and to press the Chinese on transparency, reciprocity and consistencyinmilitarytomilitarycontacts. RodmanmetwithGeneralXiongGuangkai,PLADeputyChiefofState,andMinisterof NationalDefenseGeneralChiHaotian.RodmanwasinformedthatChinawasprepared to resume militarytomilitary contacts. In August and December 2002, two Maritime and Air Safety Working Group meetings under the MMCA were held in Honolulu and Qingdao,respectively. Despite lingering tensions arising from the EP3 incident militarytomilitary contacts pickedupafterSecretaryRumsfeldliftedhisbanonmilitarycontactwithChina.The4th plenarymeetingundertheMMCAwasheldinHawaiiinApril2003betweenPACOMsJ5 andChinasDeputyChiefofStaff.TheMilitaryMaritimeandAirSafetyWorkingGroup undertheMMCAmetinHawaiiinAugust2003andinShanghaiinMarch2004. InJuly2005,theU.S.andChinaPLAheldtheir5thplenarymeetingundertheMMCAin Qingdao. They discussed unresolved maritime and air safety issues. The 6th plenary MMCAsessionwasheldinHawaiiinAugust2006alongsidemeetingsofMMCAworking groups. The plenary reached agreement on three items: to establish communications protocols; to plan communications and maneuver exercises; and to draft plans for a twophasesearchandrescueexercise.ThefirstcombinedexerciseundertheMMCA,a searchandrescueexercise(SAREX),wasconductedintheFallof2006aftereightyears oftalks. InFebruary2008,U.S.andChinaheldtheir7thplenaryMMCAmeetingthefirstsince August2006.TheU.S.sidewasledbyPACOMsJ5andtheChinesesidewasledbyPLAN Deputy Chief of Staff, Zhang Leiyu. China proposed amendments to the MMCA and requesteddetailsofplannedfuturenavalexercises.TheU.S.objectedtoraisingpolicy andplanningmattersatMMCAmeetings.

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SpecialPolicyDialogue/DefensePolicyCoordinationTalks
InlateJanuaryearlyFebruary2005,inlightofthestalledMMCAdiscussions,Chinaand the U.S. held their first Special Policy Dialogue to address defense policy issues not addressed under the MMCA. The U.S. was represented by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, and China was represented by the Director of the PLAs Foreign Affairs Office Zhang Bangdong. Lawless raised four issues: the agenda for the nextDCT,thestatusoftheFebruary2004proposalforadefensehotline,negotiations to reach agreement on military maritime and air safety, and the program of military contactsin2005. In December 2006 the 1st Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) were held in WashingtonasanoutgrowthoftheSpecialPolicyDialogueheldin2005.TheU.S.was represented at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, China was represented by the Director of the PLAs Foreign Affairs Office. They focused their discussionsonmilitaryactivitiesinChinasEEZ. In February 2008, the U.S. and China held their 2nd DPCT meeting in Shanghai (the 7th MMCAmeetingalsometatthistime,seediscussionabove).TheU.S.wasrepresented atthelevelofDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefense,thePLAwasrepresentedbythe Director of thePLAs Foreign AffairsOffice.They signedanagreementto setupa hot line. Between1980and2008theUnitedStatesandChinaestablishedtwomainmechanisms for militarytomilitary contacts, the DCT and the MMCA process. These mechanisms were repeatedly interrupted and suspended for political reasons. The United States suspended all militarytomilitary contacts in response to the Tienanmen massacre in 1989 and suspended the DCTfortwoyearsfollowingtheEP3incidentin2001. China suspendedmilitaryexchangesinresponsetothecrisisintheTaiwanStraitsin199596, and suspended meetings under the MMCA for a year following the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The next section will review U.S.China military engagement under the Obama Administration16 and the development of new mechanismsforstrategicdialogue.

StrategicDialogueandMilitarytoMilitaryContacts,20092012
In2009,theincomingObamaAdministrationquicklyreachedouttoChinatoenlistits supporttoaddresspressingissuessuchastheglobalfinancialcrisisandclimatechange. OnApril1,PresidentsBarackObamaandHuJintaometonthesidelinesoftheGroupof 20 financial summit in London and agreed to build a positive cooperative and comprehensiveU.S.Chinarelationshipandtoraisebilateralrelationstoanewlevelby mergingtwopreviousbutseparatedialogues,theStrategicDialogueandtheStrategic Economic Dialogue, into a Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The two leaders
16

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongressMilitaryandSecurityDevelopments InvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2012(May2012)providesabriefoutlineofU.S.military engagementstrategytowardsChinain2011,13.

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further agreed on the importance of developing militarytomilitary contacts and cooperation.17 This section provides an overview of militarytomilitary relations under the Obama Administration followed by a more detailed assessment of three bilateral defense cooperation mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks, Military Maritime Consultative AgreementandDefensePolicyCoordinationTalks.

Overview,20092012
The1stU.S.ChinaSE&DwasheldinWashingtonfromJuly2728,2009.18Thestrategic track was cochaired by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and State Councilor Dai Bingguo,whiletheeconomictrackwascochairedbySecretaryoftheTreasuryTimothy Geithner and Vice Premier Wang Qishan. In light of Chinas suspension of military contacts in response to the Bush Administrations arms sales to Taiwan, and Chinese harassment of U.S. Navy surveillance ships in March and May 2009, President Obama stressedtheimportanceofdevelopingmilitarycooperationasaframeworktodiminish disputes. The strategic track comprised four pillars: bilateral relations, international security issues(nonproliferation,counterterrorism),globalissues(health,development,energy andglobalinstitutions)andregionalsecurityandstabilityissues(Afghanistan/Pakistan, IranandNorthKorea).19 Defense representatives from both China and the U.S. were included in the 1st S&ED. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy andPACOMCommanderAdmiralTimothyKeating.Chinasentalowerlevelofficial,Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, Deputy Director of the PLAs Foreign Affairs Office. The military representatives held separate discussions at which they agreed to resume bilateral military exchanges (previously announced after the DCT talks in June). The U.S. proposed cooperation in military exercises, personnel exchange and humanitarian rescue.20 China accepted an invitation for General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the CentralMilitaryCommission,tovisittheUnitedStates. GeneralXusvisithadoriginallybeenscheduledforDecember2008butwaspostponed by China in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Xus visit was rescheduled for October 2009 and he was received by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at The
17

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Laying the Groundwork for Greater Cooperation, Comparative Connections,July2009.
18

Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 66 and Bonnie Glasser, Strategic & Economic DialogueSetsAgendaforCooperation,ComparativeConnections,October2009.
19

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Strategic & Economic Dialogue Sets Agenda for Cooperation, ComparativeConnections,October2009.
20

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Strategic & Economic Dialogue Sets Agenda for Cooperation, ComparativeConnections,October2009.

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Pentagon.21GeneralXualsometwithNationalSecurityAdvisorJamesJones,Chairman oftheJointChiefsofStaffAdmiralMichaelMullen,andDeputySecretaryofStateJames Steinberg.HealsopaidacourtesycallonPresidentObama. XuandGatesreachedagreementonsevenpoints(dubbedthe7pointconsensus): Promoting highlevel visits; enhancing cooperation in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; deepening military medical cooperation; expanding exchanges between armies of the two nations; enhancing the program of midgrade and junior officer exchanges; promoting cultural and sportsexchangesbetweenthetwomilitaries;invigoratingtheexistingdiplomatic andconsultativemechanismstoimprovemaritimeoperationalsafety.22 ItwasclearthatU.S.Chinamilitaryrelationsstillhadalongwaytogo.GeneralXu,for example,tabledfourmajorobstaclesthatheclaimedharmedbilateralrelations: The first and foremost obstacle is the U.S.Taiwan military relationship The Taiwan issue is related to the core interests of China and is a core issue that preventsthedevelopmentoftheU.S.Chinamilitaryrelationship.IftheU.S.side cant handle this issue very well, a healthy and stable ChinaU.S. Military relationshipwillnotbepossible. Second,U.S.militaryaircraftandshipsintrusionsintoChinasmaritimeexclusive economiczoneshouldbeterminated.ChinahopestheU.S.militarycanobserve UNConventionontheLawoftheSeaandChinesemaritimelegislation,andstop suchactswhichwouldthreatenChinassecurityandinterests. Third, there is some U.S. legislation which restricts the development of the ChinaU.S.militaryrelationship.Mostnotablyisthe2000DefenseAuthorization Actpassedin1999. AnotherobstacleistheUnitedStateslackingstrategictrustinChina.23 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000 prohibits the Secretary of Defense from authorizing any militarytomilitary contact with the PLA if thatcontactwouldcreateanationalsecurityriskduetoaninappropriateexposureof the PLA to any of the following twelve areas: force projection operations, nuclear operations,advancedcombinedarmsandjointcombatoperations,advancedlogistical operations, chemical and biological and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction,surveillanceandreconnaissanceoperations,jointwarfightingexperiments
21

Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 66 and Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: ObamaHuSummit:SuccessorDisappointment?,ComparativeConnections,January2010.
22

Chinese, U.S. military leaders vow to further cooperation, Xinhua, October 27, 2009 and Yang Qingchuan,Chinese,U.S.militarytiesfaceopportunityfornewdevelopment,Xinhua,October29,2009.
23

This is a reference to the annual Defense Department report to Congress on Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China. The latest edition of this publication has been retitled and toned down: Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012.

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and other activities related to transformations in warfare, military space operations, other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces, arms sales or militaryrelated technology transfers, release of classified or restricted information, and access to a DefenseDepartmentlaboratory.24 President Obama made his first official visit to China from November 1518, 2009.25 WhateverbenefitderivedfromthisvisitwaserodedtwomonthslaterinJanuary2010 whenPresidentObamanotifiedCongressofarmssalestoTaiwan.26Inresponse,China suspended highlevel militarytomilitary relations with the United States for ten months,includingthebilateralMMCA.U.S.defenseofficialsdescribedChinasactionsas continuedpoliticizationofmilitarytomilitarycontacts. President Obama dispatched two high level envoys to Beijing in March to repair the damage, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and the Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council Jeffrey Bader. They succeeded and Chinas ForeignMinistryannouncedthatPresidentHuJintaowouldattendtheNuclearSecurity SummitinWashingtoninmidApril. The2ndSE&DwasheldinBeijinginMay2010intheshadowoftheannouncementby President Obama four months earlier of a new package of arms sales to Taiwan and Chinas suspension of some military exchange in retaliation.27 U.S. military representatives included PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard and Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace Gregson. They met separately with Deputy Chief of GeneralStaff,AirForceGeneralMaXiaotianandRearAdmiralGuanYoufei.GeneralMa raisedthreeobstaclesarmssalestoTaiwan,closeinreconnaissanceinChinasEEZ, andrestrictionscontainedinFY2000NDAA.28ThePLAturneddownaU.S.offertobrief them on the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Accordingtooneanalyst:
discussions between military representatives on the margins of the formal meetings were tense Rear Adm. Guan Youfei, a vice minister at the Foreign Affairs Office of the PLA, lecturedaboutUSmishandlingoftheSinoUSrelationship,pinningtheblameontheUSfor

24 25

Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,1213.

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: ObamaHu Summit: Success of Disappointment, Comparative Connections,January2010.
26

Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip, U.S.China Relations: The Honeymoon Ends, Comparative Connections, April 2010. President Obamas meeting with the Dalai Lama on February 18 only further exacerbatedmatters.
27

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections, July 2010.
28

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections, July 2010.

14
allthebilateralproblems.GuanaccusedtheUSofbeingahegemon,schemingtoencircle Chinawithstrategicalliances,andtreatingChinaasanenemy.29

InJune2010,SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatesattendedthe9thShangriLaDialoguein Singapore.30EnroutetoSingaporeSecretaryGatestoldtheaccompanyingmediagaggle that The PLA is significantly less interested in this relationship than the political leadership of China.31 Chinas foot dragging on developing military contacts led Secretary Robert Gates to admonish the PLA for its failure to follow up on the commitment of Presidents Obama and Hu in 2009 to advance militarytomilitary ties. Afterannouncinghisacceptanceofaninvitationtoattendtheinauguralmeetingofthe ASEANDefenseMinistersMeetingPlus(ADMMPlus)inHanoi,32GatesarousedChinese irebycallingforopen,transparent,andequalaccesstotheglobalcommon,including the maritime commons, for security, for trade and commerce, and free passage. He thenpointedlydirectedhisremarkstotheSouthChinaSea:
Inthisrespect,theSouthChinaSeaisanareaofgrowingconcern.Thisseaisnotonlyvital tothosedirectlyborderingit,buttoallnationswitheconomicandsecurityinterestsinAsia. Our policy is clear: it is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhinderedeconomicdevelopmentbemaintained.Wedonottakesidesonanycompeting sovereigntyclaims,butwedoopposetheuseofforceandactionsthathinderfreedomof navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with customary international law.33

ChinaexpresseditsdispleasurebyturningdownarequestbyGatestovisitChina.34U.S. South China Sea policy has remained an irritant in bilateral U.S.China relations in generalaswellasmilitarytomilitaryrelationsinparticular.35
29

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections, July 2010.
30

TheShangriLaDialogue,formallyknownastheAsiaSecuritySummit,issponsoredbytheInternational InstituteforStrategicStudiesandhasservedasaforumforregionaldefenseministerssince2002.China first participated in 2007 but declined to send its defense minister until 2011. Secretary Gates and DefenseMinisterLiangmetonthesidelinesoftheShangriLaDialogueinJune2011.TheChinesedefense ministerdidnotattendin2012.
31

Quoted in Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections,July2010.
32 33

TheUnitedStateswasthefirstofeightinviteddialoguepartnerstoaccept.

Dr.RobertM.Gates.SecretaryofDefense,UnitedStates,StrengtheningSecurityPartnershipsinthe th AsiaPacific,presentationtotheFirstPlenarySession,The9 IISSAsianSecuritySummit,TheShangriLa Dialogue,Singapore,June5,2010.IISSisanacronymforInternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies.

34

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections, July 2010; and Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, Hopes and Plans Torpedoed; Strategies Outlined, ComparativeConnections,July2010.
35

Forbackgroundsee:CarlyleA.Thayer,TheUnitedStatesandChineseAssertivenessintheSouthChina Sea,SecurityChallenges,6(2),Winter2010,6984.

15

China quickly reversed its decision after President Obama raised this matter with PresidentHuJintaoinTorontoonthesidelinesoftheGroupof8SummitonJune6.On July1,GeneralMaXiaotian,PLADeputyChiefofStaff,publiclystatedthatChinawould welcome a visit by Secretary Gates at a time that is convenient to both sides. Ma tempered his announcement, however, by calling on the U.S. to respect Chinas core interestsandmajorconcerns.36 InSeptember2010,DeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseMichaelSchiffertravelledto Beijing to discuss militarytomilitary relations with the Director of the PLAs Foreign Affairs Office Major General Qian Lihua. General Qian informed Schiffer that regular dialogueandexchangesonmilitarysafetyatseaandotherissueswouldberesumed.37 Nonetheless, the Chinese side also raised their concerns about U.S.South Korean exercisesintheYellowSeaandU.S.policyintheSouthChinaSea. The following month Secretary Robert Gates and Defence Minister General Liang GuanglieheldafiftyminutebilateralmeetingontheeveoftheinauguralADMMPlus meeting in Hanoi on October 11, 2010.38 In a change of tune, General Liang invited Secretary Gates to visit Beijing early in 2011 thus ending the freeze on highlevel defensecontactsimposedbyChinainJanuary2010inreactiontothesaleofU.S.arms toTaiwan. SecretaryGatesvisitedBeijinginJanuary2011.Hisvisitsignaledthefullrestorationof U.S.China military relations.39 Secretary Gates proposed a sustained and reliable militarytomilitaryrelationship,astrategicdialogue,andimplementationofthe7point consensus.HealsoproposedthecreationofanewjointcivilmilitaryStrategicSecurity DialogueaspartoftheS&EDministerialmeetings.Gatesalsostressedtheimportance ofcontinuingtomeetundertheMMCAtoimproveoperationalsafety. Defense Minister Liang Guanglie agreed that a healthy and stable militarytomilitary relationship was an essential part of the positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship agreed by their two presidents to advance common interests and to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation. He agreed on the value of military to militarymechanismssuchastheDCT,DPCTandMMCA.Liang,however,onlyagreedto study the U.S. proposal for a strategic dialogue on nuclear weapons, missile defense, spaceandcybersecurityaspartoftheSE&D.
36 37

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Cooperation Faces Challenges, Comparative Connections, July 2010. Audrey McAvoy, U.S., China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii, The Jakarta Post, October 16, 2010.
38

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:FrictionandCooperationinRunuptoHus USVisit,ComparativeConnections,January2011.
39

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:PompandSubstance:HUsStateVisitto the US, Comparative Connections, May 2011. This paragraph and the three following paragraphs are drawnfromthissource.

16

Inasignificantdevelopmentthetwosidesagreedonanewworkinggrouptodevelop guidingprinciplesandanewframeworkforimprovingmilitarytomilitarycooperation. Futurehighlevelvisitswerereviewed.Thetwosidespledgedtosignanagreementat thenextDCTandagreedtoconvenetheDPCTassoonaspossibleinordertocomplete theprogramofmilitaryexchangesfor2011.Theyalsoagreedtoholdaworkinggroup meeting under the MMCA in the first half of 2011 to discuss operational safety and expanded maritime cooperation. Other proposals were discussed but not included in the formal agenda. These included: combined military, maritime search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter piracy and counter terrorism exercises. The 3rd S&ED was held in Washington from May 910, 2011.40 Assistant Secretary of StateKurtCampbellstatedthatoneinnovationwastheinclusionofaseniorPLAofficial. Chinas military was represented at the SE&D not by its most senior official but by its DeputyChiefofGeneralStaff,AirForceGeneralMaXiotian.Ma,nonetheless,wasthe first senior PLA official to attend these talks. Chinas Chief of General Staff pointedly paidavisittotheU.S.fromMay1522onlyaftertheSE&Dhadconcluded. The 3rd S&ED established two new mechanisms for dialogue, the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) and the U.S.China Consultation on the AsiaPacific both led by foreign ministry/departmentofstateseniorofficials.The1stSSDwasheldalongsidetheS&ED.41 TheU.S.sideincludedseniorrepresentativesfromStateandDefense:DeputySecretary of State James Steinberg, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and ViceChairmanoftheJCSGeneralJamesCartwright.ChinawasrepresentedbyGeneral Ma Xiaotian and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun. The SSD discussed maritime and cyberdisputes.ThefirstmeetingoftheU.S.ChinaConsultationontheAsiaPacificwas heldinHawaiionJune25,2011.42 TheupswinginU.S.ChinarelationswasreflectedinexchangevisitsbythePLAChiefof GeneralStaffGeneralChenBingdeinMayandtheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff AdmiralMikeMulleninJuly.43Theatmosphericsatthe2011ShangrilaDialoguewere morepositivethanthepreviousyear.SecretaryGatesdidnotmentiontheSouthChina Seainhispublicremarks.However,hereiteratedthewellknownpositionthattheU.S. hadanationalinterestinfreedomofnavigationHealsostressedtheimportanceof customaryinternationallawasaguidefortheappropriateuseofthemaritimedomain,
40

Bonnier Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, U.S.China Relations: Friction and Cooperation Coexist Uneasily,ComparativeConnections,September2011andAnnualReporttoCongressMilitaryandSecurity DevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2012,12.
41

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:FrictionandCooperationCoexistUneasily, Comparative Connections, September 2011 and Annual Report to Congress Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2012,12.
42

The2 U.S.ChinaConsultationontheAsiaPacificwasheldinBeijingonOctober11,2011andthe3 consultationwasheldinAnnapolisonMarch12,2012.

43

nd

rd

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:FrictionandCooperationCoexistUneasily, ComparativeConnections,September2011.

17

and rights of access to it.44 Chinas Defence Minister put on record his countrys commitmenttomaintainingpeaceandstabilityinSouthChinaSea.Henotedthat,at present,thegeneralsituationintheSouthChinaSearemainsstable.45 InSeptember2011,theObamaAdministrationconfirmeditsJanuarydecisiontosell a $5.85billionarmspackagetoTaiwan.Thisdecisionwasacarefullycalibratedone.46The U.S. chose to provide funding to upgrade Taiwans F16 fighter jets but not provide moremodernaircraft.Unlikethepreviousyear,thesearmssalesdidnotprecipitatea wholesale suspension of militarytomilitary exchanges.47 China did suspend several scheduled exchanges however, including visits by the U.S. Army Band, PACOM Commander,andamilitarymedicalexchange.AjointU.S.Chinacounterpiracyexercise wasalsocancelled. OnDecember7,2011theU.S.andChinahelddefensetalksinBeijingatdeputyminister level.Chinasrepresentative,GeneralMaXiaotian,DeputyChiefofStaff,declaredthat themeetingdemonstratedbothcountriesarebeingsincereaboutmaintainingmilitary exchanges. Hopefully both sides will make the best of this opportunity to expand commonground,keeprisksundercontrolandavoidmisjudgment.48 The4thS&EDwasheldinWashingtonfromMay34,2012.Thestrategictrackwasco chaired by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and State Councilor Dai Bingguo. The strategic track discussed how to promote military transparency to avoid misunderstanding, to build trust and maintain mutual stability.49 The strategic track agreed to establish the U.S.China Maritime Safety Dialogue between the U.S. Coast Guard and the China Maritime Safety Administration and to hold its first meeting in China later in the year.50 And it was agreed to hold the 4th bilateral AsiaPacific Consultationsinthesecondhalfof2012. The 2nd Strategic Security Dialogue was held at the same time. It was cochaired by DeputySecretaryofStateWilliamBurnsandViceForeignMinisterZhangZhijun.Acting
44 45 th

RobertM.Gates,EmergingSecurityChallengesintheAsiaPacific,The10 IISSAsianSecuritySummit theShangriLaDialogue,June4,2011. Liang Guanglie, Chinas International Security Cooperation, The 10 IISS Asian Security Summit the ShangriLaDialogue,June5,2011.
46

th

Carlyle A. Thayer, US Arms Sales to Taiwan: Impact on SinoAmerican Relations, ChinaU.S. Focus, September 29, 2011. http://www.chinausfocus.com/slider/usarmssalestotaiwanimpactonsino americanrelations2/.
47

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:USPivottoAsiaLeavesChinaoffBalance, ComparativeConnections,January2012.
48 49

AgenceFrancePresse,U.S.,ChinaHoldMilitaryTalks,December7,2011.

Phillip Kurata, U.S. and China Address Strategic, Economic Interests in Beijing, IID Digital, U.S. DepartmentofState,May3,2012.
50

Joint Statement on the U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track May 34, 2012, Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson,DepartmentofState,Washington,DC,May4,2012.

18

UnderSecretaryofDefenseJamesMillerandDeputyChiefofGeneralStaffofthePLA General Ma Xiantian also participated. According to the Joint Statement issued at the conclusionofthedialoguetheSSDdiscussedstrategicandcomprehensivesecurityof the two countries and decided to continue working together to develop the mechanism to increase mutual trust and manage differences between the two countries51 With the above overview, the following sections will review progress in the Defense Consultative Talks, Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the Defense Policy CoordinationTalkssince2009.

DefenseConsultativeTalks
The 10th DCT was held in Beijing from June 2324, 2009 after a break of eighteen months. The U.S. was represented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, China was represented by Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff. According to a U.S. diplomatic account, both sides affirmed the commitmentoftheirpresidentsinApriltoimprovemilitarytomilitaryrelations.52The agendaforthefirstsessionincludedtheTaiwanissue,guidingprinciplesformilitaryto militaryrelationsandtheprogramforhighlevelexchangesfortheremainderof2009. General Ma spent considerable time on the Taiwan arms sale issue as an obstacle to improvedmilitarytomilitarycooperation.HealsoreviewedfourprinciplesthatthePLA had previously tabled to guide the relationship: mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, and mutual benefit. When General Ma asked for a response, Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, proposed two further principles: continuous dialogue to ensure uninterrupted communication between the two militaries and mutual risk reduction based on the Defense Telephone Link and MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreementtoreducethepotentialformiscalculationor misunderstanding. The10thDCTalsoheldasmallgroupsessiontodiscusssensitiveissues.53Accordingto General Ma, these were issues that are not convenient to talk about in the full DCT session. In particular, General Ma raised three obstacles to a better military relationship: Taiwan, US. reconnaissance operations in Chinas EEZ, and the FY2000 NDAAwhichrestrictedU.S.defenseinteractionswiththePLA. On the second day of the DCT Flouroy briefed the Chinese on the Nuclear Posture Review and the QDR. The 10th DCT agreed to hold a Special Meeting of the MMCA in August to discuss disputes over maritime safety and freedom of navigation in Chinas
51

Joint Statement on the U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic and EconomicDialogueOutcomesoftheStrategicTrackMay34,2012.
52

2009 U.S.China Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Session 1: MilitarytoMilitary Relations, U.S. Embassy,Beijing,July1,2009.Thediscussioninthisparagraphistakenfromthissource.
53

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT)SmallGroupSession,U.S.Embassy,Beijing,July1, 2009.

19

EEZ. According to a report in the China Daily both sides at the DCT expressed willingnesstoavoidarecurrenceofrecentincidentsorconfrontationbetweenChinese vessels and U.S. naval ships off Chinas southern coast [and agreed to resolve such incidents]ascarefullyaspossibleshouldtheyhappentooccuragain.54 The11thDCTwasheldinWashingtoninDecember2010eighteenmonthsafterthelast meeting.55 It was hosted by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flourny. ChinawasrepresentedbyGeneralMaXiaotian,PLADeputyChiefofGeneralStaff.The meetingreaffirmedthe7pointconsensusreachedin2009.ItwasnotedthatSecretary RobertGateswasscheduledtovisitBeijingfromJanuary1014inadvanceofPresident HuJintaosvisittoWashingtonlaterthatmonth.InadditionGeneralChenBingde,Chief ofGeneralStaff,wasscheduledtovisittheU.S.during2011. The DCT reviewed discussions under the MMCA and noted continuing disagreements over maritime safety and security. The meeting touched on possible cooperation in regionalsecurity.Thetwosidesalsoexchangedbriefings.TheU.S.sidebriefedonthe NuclearPostureReview,BallisticMissileDefenseReviewandtheSpacePostureReview. The Chinese side was lobbied to pressure North Korea to end its provocations and to denuclearize.ThePLAbriefedonitsstrategyandmodernization.OnceagaintheChinese sideraisedthethreeobstacles. The 12th DCT met in Beijing in December 2011.56 The U.S. side was represented by UnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyMicheleFournoy,Chinawasrepresentedbythe newdirectorofintelligence(Department2),MajorGeneralChenYouyiandPLADeputy Chief of Staff General Ma Xiaotian. The meeting discussed regional security including U.S. force deployments in Australia, North Korea, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the South China Sea and the Middle East and North Africa. The meeting agreed to senior visitsandexercisesinhumanitarianassistanceandcounterpiracy.ThePLAprovideda briefing on its Defense White Paper and once again raised three obstacles to military cooperation: arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA and high frequency closein reconnaissancebyU.S.aircraftandshipsinChinasEEZ.Therewerenobreakthroughsin discussions.UnlikepreviousDCTsthismeetingfailedtoagreeonaprogramofbilateral exchangesfor2012

DefensePolicyCoordinationTalks
The 3rd DPCT was held in Beijing in February 2009 against the backdrop of Chinas suspensionofmilitarycontactssinceOctober2008.TheU.S.wasrepresentedbyDeputy
54

Quoted in Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Laying the Groundwork for Greater Cooperation, ComparativeConnections,July2009.
55

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:FrictionandCooperationinRunuptoHus USVisit,ComparativeConnections,January2011.
56

BonnieGlaserandBrittanyBillingsley,U.S.ChinaRelations:USPivottoAsiaLeavesChinaoffBalance, Comparative Connections, January 2012 and Annual Report to Congress Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2012,13.

20

AssistantSecretaryofDefenseDavidSedney,ChinawasrepresentedbyDeputyChiefof General Staff Ma Xiaotian. Sedney requested a resumption of military exchanges. The Chinesesideraisedthreeobstacles:armssalestoTaiwan,legalrestrictionsonmilitary contacts,andthepublicationoftheannual MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicof China. The 4th DPCT was held in Honolulu in December 2009 in the shadow of incidents involving the USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable in March and a further incident involving the USS John S. McCain in May.57 The U.S. was represented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer and Director of the PLAs Foreign Affairs Office Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua. The topics discussed included: military exchanges, regional security and nonproliferation. Both sides briefed the other. The U.S. side briefed on the QDR and the Chinese side briefed on PLA modernization. Schiffer tried to reinvigorate the MMCA process to manage problems in maritime and air safety. General Qian proposed changing the MMCA charter to alter its focus on operationalsafetytoplanningfornavalexercisesandnavytonavycontacts. The 5th DPCT was held in Beijing in April 2011.58 The U.S. side was represented by DeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseMichaelSchifferwhometwiththeDirectorofthe PLAsForeignAffairsOfficeQianLihua.OnceagaintheChinesecharacterizedtheDCTas aworklevelmeetingonly.

MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement
In August 2009, the U.S. and China held a Special Meeting of the MMCA in Beijing to review recent maritime incidents involving the USNS Victorious, USNA Impeccable and USS John S. McCain. The U.S. was represented by PACOMs Director of Strategic Planning and Policy (J5). The U.S. stressed the importance of safety and freedom of navigation in international waters while the Chinese side complained about U.S. surveillanceinChinasEEZ.59 PACOMhostedthe8thplenarymeetingundertheMMCAinHonoluluinOctober1415, 2010,thefirstsince2008.60Theresumptioninmilitarytomilitarycontactsreflectedan
57

Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Laying the Groundwork for Greater Cooperation Comparative Connections, July 2009; Eric A. McVadon, The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South ChinaSea,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,69;JiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident, China Security, 5(2), Spring 2009, 2021; and Mark Valencia, The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,2228.
58

AnnualReporttoCongressMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina 2012,12.
59

Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 66 and Bonnie Glaser, U.S.China Relations: Strategic&EconomicDialogueSetsAgendaforCooperation,ComparativeConnections,October2009.
60

Senior U.S. Defense Officials Conclude Talks with Chinese Counterparts, PACOM Public Affairs, October 15, 2010; China, U.S. maritime security talks candid: Chinese Defense Ministry, Xinhua, October 17, 2010; and Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, U.S.China Relations: Friction and

21

uptickinpoliticalrelations.ItwasannouncedatthattimeChinasPresident,HuJintao, wouldvisittheUnitedStatesinthenorthernSpring.61 TheU.S.sidewasrepresentedattheMMCAplenarysessionbyajointPACOMteam,in contrast, China limited its representation to a single service, the PLAN. The U.S. was representedbyPACOMsJ5,MajorGeneralRandolphAlles(USMC);Chinadowngraded itsrepresentationtoPLANDeputyChiefofStaff,RearAdmiralLiaoShining. TheU.S.sideraiseditsconcernsaboutseveralrecentincidentsinvolvingcloseintercepts ofU.S.militaryaircraftininternationalairspacebyPLAfightersandChineseharassment ofU.S.surveyshipsoperatinginChinasEEZ.62TheU.S.chargedthatChinesebehaviour endangered the lives of U.S. military personnel. Admiral Liao responded by repeating objections to closein reconnaissance by U.S. ships and aircraft. Admiral Liao rejected thepossibilityofaccidentsandarguedthatanyfuturecollisionwouldbethefaultofthe U.S. The two sides agreed to hold future exchanges on maritime search and rescue operations and to report their discussions to the next round of DCT scheduled for December.63 There was no plenary meeting under the MMCA in 2011. In August 2011 an MMCA working group met in Qingdao to discuss PLA complaints about U.S. reconnaissance flights.InDecember2011aworkinggroupundertheMMCA,ledbynavalcaptainson bothsides,metinQingdao.

Conclusion
This paper presented an overview of U.S.China militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialogues from 1980 to the present. This paper focused on three key mechanisms in particular Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the Special Policy Dialogue/Defense Policy Coordination Talks. The analysis in this paper demonstrates that it is very difficult to extract purely militarytomilitarycontactsfromtheirpoliticalandstrategicsetting.Thisisexemplified by the inclusion of military representatives as part of the Strategic and Economic DialogueprocessandthentheinitiationofaseparateStrategicSecurityDialoguewithin theS&ED. WhatdoesabalancesheettellusaboutU.S.Chinamilitaryrelations?Ontheplusside the following accomplishments should be noted: (1) exchange visits by highlevel defense officials (defense ministers and chiefs of defense forces); (2) regular Defense
Cooperation in Runup to Hus US Visit, Comparative Connections, January 2011. A Special MMCA meetingwasalsoconvenedinAugust2009.
61

Huang Xiaoyong, Gates to visit China, defense ties normalize, Xinhua, October 12, 2010 and CNN, ChinaconfirmspresidentsvisittotheU.S.,October22,2010.
62

Audrey McAvoy, U.S., China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii, The Jakarta Post, October 16, 2010.
63

HuangXiaoyong,GatestovisitChina,defensetiesnormalize,Xinhua,October12,2010.

22

Consultation Talks; (3) continuing working level discussions under the MMCA (4) agreementonthe7pointconsensus;(5)noseriousnavalincidentssincethe2009USNS Impeccableaffair;(6)continuingexchangevisitsbyseniorofficers(7)theinitiationofa Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the S&ED process; (8) the recent agreement to hold meetings between coast guards and (9) agreement on a new working group to draftprinciplesestablishingaframeworkformilitarytomilitarycooperation. OnthenegativesideitmustbenotedfirstthatU.S.Chinamilitarytomilitarycontacts have gone through cycles of cooperation and suspension. In 2009 a U.S. diplomatic cablereportedaseniorPLAofficialasobserving,thedefenserelationshiplagsbehind otheraspectsoftheoverallbilateralrelationshipanditisoftencaughtinaviciouscycle ofprogressandsuspension. 64TheseniorPLAofficialnotedthatwiththeexceptionof theNATObombingoftheChineseEmbassyinBelgradein1999andtheEP3incidentin April2001,allothersuspensionsinmilitarytomilitaryrelationsweretheresultofU.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Shirley Kan notes that China promotes repeated cycles of suspendingcontactsandthenleveragesthetimingoftheirresumption.65U.S.defense officialsviewthisasthepoliticizationofmilitarytomilitarycontacts. Second,sincemilitarytomilitarycontactswerefirstinitiatedin1980untilthepresent, theU.S.andChinahaveonlybeenabletoreachonemilitarytomilitaryagreement,the MMCA.Anevaluationofthehealthofthisagreementisnotgood.AseniorPLAofficial offered this evaluation, We signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA)in1998butoverthepast11yearsthemechanismfailedtoplayaneffective role.66 AreviewoftheMMCAwrittenbytheU.S.principalnegotiatorin2010,arguedthatthe MMCAwasonlya
frameworkfordialogueitisnothingmore.. Logically, the MMCA should have been the first of many and stronger foundations of U.S.PRC militaryconfidencebuilding. Of course, 13 years later, the MMCA remains the only miltomil agreement between these two nations and is of only limited effectiveness because it is held hostage by China over U.S. actions in 67 carryingoutourstatedobligationsundertheTaiwanRelationsAct.

AnotherU.S.reviewofU.S.ChinaMMCA(19972010)concluded:
TheMilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinawasa good start on confidence building but is, in its present form, an inadequate measure for

64

2009 U.S.China Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Session 1: MilitarytoMilitary Relations, U.S. Embassy,Beijing,July1,2009.
65 66

Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,4.

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT)SmallGroupSession,U.S.Embassy,Beijing,July1, 2009.
67

Bruce Lemkin, U.S.Taiwan Relations Are No Threat to China, Defense News, November 8, 2012. LemkinwasDeputyUnderSecretaryoftheU.S.AirForce(InternationalAffairs)from200310

23
managingevents.Itdoesnotcontainrelationshiptransformingelementsthatcouldmakeit far more relevant and useful. After twelve years, numerous incidents, and one death, it is timetoreevaluateitinthelightofotherexperienceworldwidesothatitbetterservesthe interestsofbothparties Adifficultsituationthatdevelopsatseaisnotimetoceasecommunicationinordertosignal displeasure.Onthecontrary,itistheverytimewhencommunicationbecomesmostvitally important; otherwise both parties risk losing control over events and having to deal with unwantedconsequences.TheexistingMilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreementisagood start,butevenifithadincludedprovisionsforrealtimecommunication,itwouldnothave helpedmuchinsubsequentrealworldincidentsandifitdoesnotworkinadversitythen itsnotworththepaperitswrittenon.68

Finally, a more recent review of U.S.China militarytomilitary contacts, prepared for theU.S.CongressinFebruary2012,concluded:
Chinasrisingpowerwithgreaterassertivenessandaggressiveness(particularlyinmaritime areas),refusaltodiscussnuclearweapons,cyberthreats,andrepeatedsuspensionsofvisits showed limitations of the results of miltomil exchanges The PLA has repeatedly suspendedmiltomilcontactswhileblamingU.Sobstacles(includingU.S.reconnaissance, arms sales to Taiwan, legislated restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagons annualreporttoCongressonPRCMilitaryPower).69

Third, there is not much evidence that militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialogue have reduced strategic mistrust and raised transparency.70 It is clear that continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas Exclusive EconomicZone,FY2000NDAArestrictionsonmilitaryinteractionwiththePLA,andU.S. South China Sea policy remain major irritants for China. Chinese officials repeatedly raisethreeobstaclesintheirdiscussionswiththeUnitedStates. Inweighinguptheplusesandnegativesinthebilateralrelationshipthebottomlineis despitethedeficitstheUnitedStatesandChinawillpersistinengagingwitheachother. Both sides understand that militarytomilitary contacts are a critical component of bilateralengagement.Withoutsuchinteractionthereisariskthatmistrustbetweenthe twomilitariescouldspilloverandhaveamajornegativeimpactonbilateralrelationsin general. Militarytomilitary relations will continue to exhibit elements of cooperation andcontentionanditislikelythatstrategicmistrustwillpersistthroughlackofgreater transparency.Whenincidentsanddisputesarisebetweenthetwomilitaries,andasthe momentum of militarytomilitary interaction slows, it is likely that two countries presidentswillintervene,astheyhaveinthepast,toresetbilateralrelations.

68 69 70

Griffiths,U.S.ChinaMaritimeConfidenceBuilding:Paradigms,PrecedentsandProspects. Kan,U.S.ChinaMilitaryContacts:IssuesforCongress,3.

SeethesoberingreviewofferedbyKennethLieberthalandWangJisi,AddressingU.S.ChinaStrategic Distrust,JohnL.ThorntonChinaCenterMonographSeriesNo.4,Washington,DC:TheJohnL.Thornton ChinaCenteratBrookings,March2012,733.