Filipinas Cia de Seguros vs Christern Facts: In October 1941, Christern, Huenefeld and Company, a German company, obtained an insurance

policy from FilipinasCompaia for the formers merchandise contained in a building located in Binondo, Manila. Filipinas Compaia is an American controlled company. During the Japanese occupation, the building housing the insured merchandise was burned. Christern filed its claim amounting to P92,650.00 but Filipinas Compaia refused to pay alleging that Christern is a corporation whose majority stockholders are Germans; that during the Japanese occupation, America declared war against Germany hence the insurance policy ceased to be effective because the insured has become an enemy. Filipinas Compaia was eventually ordered to pay Christern as ordered by the Japanese government. ISSUE: Whether or not Christern, Huenefeld and Co is entitled to receive the proceeds from the insurance claim. HELD: No. There is no question that majority of the stockholders of Christern were German subjects. This being so, Christern became an enemy corporation upon the outbreak of the war between the United States and Germany. The Philippine Insurance Law (Act No. 2427, as amended,) in Section 8, provides that anyone except a public enemy may be insured. It stands to reason that an insurance policy ceases to be allowable as soon as an insured becomes a public enemy. Christern should return the amount it was earlier paid.

The Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Ebrado [GR L-44059, 28 October 1977]

First Division, Martin (J): 5 concur Facts: On 1 September 1968, Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Policy 009929 on a whole-life plan for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death Benefits for the same amount. Buenaventura C. Ebrado designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred to her as his wife. On 21 October 1969, Buenventura C. Ebrado died as a result of an accident when he was hit by a falling branch of a tree. As the insurance policy was in force, Insular Life stands liable to pay the coverage of the policy in an amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death also in the amount of P5,882.00 and the refund of P18.00 paid for the premium due November, 1969, minus the unpaid premiums and interest thereon due for January and February, 1969, in the sum of P36.27. Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the policy as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she and the insured Buenaventura C. Ebrado were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia T. Ebrado. In doubt as to whom the insurance proceeds shall be paid, the insurer commenced an action for Interpleader before the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 29 April 1970. On 25 September 1972, the trial court rendered judgment declaring, among others, Carponia T. Ebrado disqualified from becoming beneficiary of the insured Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado and directing the payment of the insurance proceeds to the estate of the deceased insured. From this judgment, Carponia T. Ebrado appealed to the Court of Appeals, but on 11 July 1976, the Appellate Court certified the case to the Supreme Court as involving only questions of law. Issue [1]: Whether a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter. Held[1]: NO. It is quite unfortunate that the Insurance Act (RA 2327, as amended) or even the new Insurance Code (PD 612, as amended) does not contain any specific provision grossly resolutory of the prime question at hand. Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "(t)he insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name it is made" cannot be validly seized upon to hold that the same includes the beneficiary. The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the insured and not to the beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws against illicit relationships especially on property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance. Rather, the general rules of civil law should be applied to resolve this void in the Insurance Law. Article 2011 of the New Civil Code states: "The contract of insurance is governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be

regulated by this Code." When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, "any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him." Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. As pointed out, a beneficiary in a life insurance policy is no different from a donee. Both the recipients of pure beneficence. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital relationship. If legitimate relationship is circumscribed by these legal disabilities, with more reason should an illicit relationship be restricted by these disabilities.

Heirs of Maramag vs. Maramag G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009 FACTS: Petitioners in this case are the legitimate heirs of deceased Loreto The petitioners were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policiesissued by Insular and Grepalife. Petitioners claim that Eva, the concubine of Loreto and a suspect in hismurder, is disqualified from being designated of the insurance policies T h e y f u r t h e r a d d t h a t E v a s c h i l d r e n w i t h L o r e t o , b e i n g i l l e g i t i m a t e children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the share o f L o r e t o s i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n s h o u l d b e a w a r d e d t o t h e m , b e i n g t h e legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes. ISSUE: Whether or not the proceeds should be awarded to the petitioners HELD: No. The insurance contracts are governed by specials laws Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and thus, they are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. T h e I n s u l a r a n d G r e p a l i f e h a v e n o l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n t o t u r n o v e r t h e insurance proceeds to the petitioner. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive th eproceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefitof the estate of the insured