JOSE JOYA, et. al. vs. PCGG, et. al.

Posted by bestre on Thursday, September 18, 2008 (G. R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993)

FACTS: Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th Century Silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and Antique Silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" and which must be protected by the state; (c) whether such properties are of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress; (d) whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction; (e) whether the PCGG has complied wit the due process clause; (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic. ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether the instant petition involves actual case or controversy. RULING: On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. This is premised on Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. "Legal Standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest. It must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled also in the negative. There is no actual case or controversy involved nor is there an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial interpretation. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition

AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO [402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec.

Branch's

legal

office

concluded

null

and

void.

Issue:

Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held:

The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004] COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision[1] dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions[2] dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state: 1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied) On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to wit: WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices; WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions heretoforth mentioned; NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personal Services to support the implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998; Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . . .[3] (Emphasis supplied) Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office,

four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. [4] On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055[5] providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of the following positions in the Commission: Number of Positions 12 4 1 Position Title From To Attorney VI (In Director IV the Regional Field Offices) Director III Director IV Financial & Management Officer II Budget Officer III Accountant III Cashier III Information Officer V Director IV From 26 27 24 28 28 28 To P229,104.00 38,928.00 36,744.00 Salary Grade Total Salary Requirements

1 1 1 1

Budget Officer IV Chief Accountant Cashier V Director IV

18 18 18 24

24 24 24 28

51,756.00 51,756.00 51,756.00 36,744.00[6]

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions: A. Creation Number of Positions 4 Position Title 15 Salary Grade Total Salary Requirements 684,780.00

Security Officer II (Coterminous)

B. Upgrading

Number of Positions 1 2

Position Title From Attorney V Security Officer I To Director IV Security Officer II From 25 11

Salary Grade To 28 15

Total Salary Requirements P28,092.00 57,456.00 ------------------

Total 3

P 85,548.00[7]

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.[8] The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following justification: Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services. The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied. The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions. In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the Central Office. As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine Decade Plan on

Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original) Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation. Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the National Government. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.[9] (Emphases supplied) In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.[10] CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.

Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision provides: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.[11] Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that: A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8522 (THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1998) DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE ITSELF. C. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND 001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS THEREIN.[12] The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously

assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy. After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of the records in the case at bar, it is the Courts opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit. On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.[13] Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSCNational Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[14] We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR. Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus: SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.

In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.) SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The term government refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.) The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification. This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.[15] The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L. Buag,[16] this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a compensation and benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the review of the Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority of the Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the same complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of Budget and Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the

proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws. In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government. In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[18] the Court held that although the charter[19] of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned: It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied.) As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit: SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.) Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification. Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.[20] Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus: Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus: SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency. (Emphasis ours.) From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oftrepeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.[21] Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it

is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. ... The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the] Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.) Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership. We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of 1998 specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had categorically authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to wit: 1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personal

services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.) All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.[25] (Emphasis supplied.) The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.[26] Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided that any form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the Salary Standardization Law. The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of discontent of many civil servants.[27] For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our government. The DBMs exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough

evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization. The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions. This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, [28] we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government in general. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs

aiwa vs romulo
Facts: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In an original action for certiorari, they invoke their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order 185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the Unions argue

that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law was an integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice. During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending the latter law which only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. Issue: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for and in behalf of their members (more or less 50,000 workers) -- has the requisite standing. Held: NO. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the Unions have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of EO 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that EO 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can standing be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution. A taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. EO 185 does not even require for its implementation additional appropriation. All told, if the Court was to follow the strict rule on locus standi, the petition should be forthwith dismissed on that score. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. However, the issue posed in the present petition did not meet the exacting standard required for the Court to take the liberal approach and recognize the standing of the Unions. The subject matter of EO 185 is the

grant of authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby limited to the departments to which it is addressed. Considering that the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not one of those exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of powers

TAADA VS. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it

was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation

On February 27, 2012 00 09 July 2002 Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP). PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a ThaiPhilippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams). Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void. Issue: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. Held: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. 2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.

Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Doctrine of Potestas delegata non delegari potest; Exception Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994) An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator or other public service. EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so.

KMU Labor Center v Garcia G.R. No. 115381. December 23, 1994 07/05/2010 0 Comments

Facts: LTFRB Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the following memorandum
to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit: With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase. On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92587: The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public hearing. (Section V. Rate and Fare Setting) Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. PBOAP, DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience.

Issue:Whether DOTC Department Order No. 92-587: Defining the policy framework on
the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009: Promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 is violative of the Constitution, Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Whether, the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is constitutional. Held: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92009 is both violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. The twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.

Ratio: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009,
and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein: (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 is INCONSISTENT with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. The provision does not put the burden of proof to the oppositor but the applicant. In view of legal standing: The principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Court brushed aside this technicality because 'the transcendental importance to the public of these

cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. In view of DELEGATION Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service. The Authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. In view of Transcendental Importance One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's is inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing

that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.

The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
On Executive Secretary v CA 429 SCRA 781 07/06/2010 2 Comments Assumptions that have no factual bases are not acceptable. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court in light of the State's interests in regulating recruitment for employment abroad. The provisions in question did not take away the right of the accused to due process. Whether the accused is an employee of a licensed agency or a free agent the punishment should still be meted out with the strictness. The intent of the law is to prevent the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to

obtain employment abroad. What the respondent (and by association ARCO-Phil) in effect did was allow the free agents (unlicensed) and licensed recruitment agencies to continue on without regard to the interest and well being of the people who in the desire of achieving a better life choose to look for employment opportunities abroad. To extend the argument ARCO-Phil wants to say that the law should be amended to separate the penalties for licensed and unlicensed recruiting agencies. This scheme negates the intent of the law. Licensed and unlicensed recruiting agencies are capable of the violations enumerated by RA 8042. An amendment is therefore NOT NECESSARY.

KILOSBAYAN, INC., et. al. vs. GUINGONA, et. al.

Posted by bestre on Friday, September 5, 2008 G. R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994

FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as "lotto." Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews;" and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H.LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEECHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, andBARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, respondents. Facts: On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of anadditional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid,"Before us is a Petition 4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), which awarded "Phase II of theModernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);" Out of the 57 bidders, 13 the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technicalevaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology(DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained anumber of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003,promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.(2) to enjoin

the implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into by Comelec "either with Mega PacificConsortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI);" and(3) to compel Comelec to conduct a re-bidding of the project.On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter 14 to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Theyprotested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process hadbeen conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of whichhave been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.In a letter-reply dated June 6, 2003, 15 the Comelec chairman -- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant --rejected the protest and declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Issue: WON the petitioners legal standing should be recognized and upheld (despite the fact that they dont meet the rule on legalstanding) Ruling: YES Rationale: Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi , inasmuch as they are not challenging the validity or constitutionalityof RA 8436. Moreover, petitioners supposedly admitted during the Oral Argument that no law had been violated by the award of theContract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no actual and material interest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be injured orprejudiced on account of the award.On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -- respond that theissues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelecs flawed bidding andquestionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoralprocess. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith inthe democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursementof public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followedstrictly.Our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, therecan be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; 18 in otherwords, it is of "paramount public interest" 19 and "transcendental importance." 20 This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legalstanding, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." 21 Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22

or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." 24 In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers,assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the biddingwas defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly,they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus stand

Jumamil vs. Caf, et al.

Jumamil vs. Caf, et al. [GR 144570, 21 September 2005] Third Division, Corona (J): 4 concur Facts: In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution 49, series of 1989 (Resolution 49), denominated as Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et al. The construction of the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. Jumamil alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents, some of which were close friends and/or relative of the mayor and the sanggunian, who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents; that resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents may be availed of by anybody

who can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there were any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional Trial Court dismissed Jumamils petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered Jumamil to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of the 57 private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR CV 35082), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari. Issue [1]: Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief Held [1]: Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed, Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the Remark to Comment he filed in the Supreme Court did he first assert that he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall. Such claim was obviously an afterthought. Issue [2]: Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed. Held [2]: Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have

not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. But, even if the Court disregards Jumamils lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The subject resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000 for the construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to their enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market stalls to the private respondents who deposited P40,000 each and who were either friends or relatives of the mayor or members of the Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that there (was) no publication or invitation to the public that this contract (was) available to all who (were) interested to own a stall and (were) willing to deposit P40,000. Respondents, however, counter that the public respondents act of entering into this agreement was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution 180 dated 10 October 1988 and that all the people interested were invited to participate in investing their savings. Jumamil failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary Tolentino v COMELEC 420 SCRA 438, January 21, 2004 07/22/2010 0 Comments Facts: Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in

Resolution No. 01-005. Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645"); (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646"). In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections. Issues: The following are the issues presented for resolution: (1) Procedurally -(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge; (b) whether the petition is moot; and (c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate. (2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001. Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Ratio: However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.

The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate. Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. In view of petitioners standing We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001 Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term

A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. In view of COMELEC's failure The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way

require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, penned by Chief Justice Reynaldo Puno) In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, the pertinent portions of which reads: ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following: SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established. xxx SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. A.O. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order and usurps the power of Congress to legislate Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, while the President executes the laws. The Presidents administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. An administrative order refers to [a]cts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in

administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It does not simply implement the Administrative Code of 1987. This administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of the citizenry vis-a-vis the State, as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law. A.O. violates the right to privacy In striking down A.O. 308, the SC emphasized that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. The SC also emphasized that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. The right to privacy is a constitutional right, granted recognition independently of its identification with liberty. It is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution, specifically in Sections 1, 2, 3 (1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. Zones of privacy are also recognized and protected in our laws, including certain provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code, as well as in special laws (e.g., Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual Property Code). The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thefore, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The government failed to discharge this burden. A.O. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. While it is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. 308, it is not arguable that the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if implemented, will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer application designs. Biometry or biometrics is the science of the application of statistical methods to

biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data. The methods or forms of biological encoding include finger-scanning and retinal scanning, as well as the method known as the artificial nose and the thermogram. A.O. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used. Moreover, A.O. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. The Solicitor Generals claim that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the generation of population data for development planning is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. 308. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information, but there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. Executive Power Administrative Orders & The Administrative Code

On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System". The late Senator Ople averred that the said AO is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the peoples privacy and that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislatures power to legislate laws. Blas opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of the nature of a law hence it is beyond the presidents power to issue such. He filed a petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al countered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office; confers no right; affords no protection and imposes no duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the president is an encroachment of the functions of the Legislature.

HELD: As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Upon these precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. An AO is not a law. In here, AO 308 partakes the nature of a law hence it is beyond executive power. Only the legislative can enact such a law of general effect.

G.R. No. L-45685: People vs Vera Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414 Delegation of Powers

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a

violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that itcrosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. Hiscontentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Codesaying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.T h e focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the t e r m s i t u s e s . Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law usingthe facial challenge. Ruling:On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. Thepetitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand whatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free fromambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statuteto be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not bea c h i e v e d by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the a r e a o f protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statuteand to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of freespeech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfullysince the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in freespeech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be

heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly itmight

also be taken as

applying to other persons or other situations in which its applicationmight be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them downentirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than real.The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congressdecision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit Case: Umali vs. GUingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for CertiorariProhibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents. It was onOctober 27, 1993 when Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of theBureau of Internal Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received amemorandum alleging against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue lawsduring the incumbency as Regional Director. On October 6, 1994, President Ramosissued an Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing the petitioner from service withforfeiture of retirement and all benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved forreconsideration but the Office of the President denied the motion forreconsideration. December 1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial Courtof Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of Administrative OrderNo. 152.Issues:(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right tosecurity of tenure(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether thepetitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion forreconsideration of the trial court's decision(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the chargesagainst petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no. 152Ruling:(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right tosecurity of tenureNO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as hissecurity of tenure. The petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure however it isanemic of evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to providesufficient evidence on this matter.(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152 Tampengco, Michael Alerick B.11185562NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure,petitioner was not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Recordsshow that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to hisalleged violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended thehearings before the investigatory body.(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether thepetitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion forreconsideration of the trial court's decision The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion forreconsideration before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise thesaid issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the chargesagainst petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no. 152 The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before theombudsman.Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the petitioner doesnot constitute any valid legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions bythe Court of Appeals. However considering antecedent facts and circumstances, theCourt has decided to consider the dismissal and because the Commissioner of theBureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally theSolicitor General has no more basis to enact Administrative Order No. 152.Dispositive:Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events,and in the exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitionAccordingly Administrative order no 152 is considered LIFTED and petitioner can beallowed to retire with full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.

Arceta vs. Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004] Facts: The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in anInformation (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued aRegional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, anddespite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or tomake arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice. Arceta did not move to havethe charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Shereasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highlyunlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should bewithout prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trialcourt. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporaryrestraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law(MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the Information that on or about the month of January2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for thepayment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for the reasonACCOUNT CLOSED and with

intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been dishonored and had not beenpaid. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional.Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground wouldfail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicialreview to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity. Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present economic and financial crisis, elsedue to the undue burden made upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases. Held: When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court mayexercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case andcontroversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) theexercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lismota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, theCourt was unable to agree that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find theconstitutional question raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor thepresumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of Arcetaand Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed aprovision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis todeclare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it isprecisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in thefinancial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred,to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may beburdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law beingassailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.

CONGRESS LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANOMERCADO and MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National Treasurer,respondents.FACTS: Petitioners request that respondent officials be presented from implementingRepublic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts. They alleged that saidRA unconstitutional and

void because: (a) it was passed by the House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished theMembers at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved morethan three years after the return of the last census of our population; and (c) itapportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the severalprovinces. The respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under thestatute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional. Respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no personality to bring this action;that a duly certified copy of the law creates the presumption of its having beenpassed in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); that the Director of the Census submitted an official reporton the population of the Philippines in November 1960, which report became thebasis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the principle of proportionalrepresentation prescribed by the Constitution. ISSUES: WON RA 3040 violates the principle of proportional representative stipulated in theConstitution. DECISION: Republic Act No. 3040 that gave provinces with less number of inhabitants morerepresentative districts than those with bigger population is declared invalidbecause it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by theConstitution. RATIO: The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly asmay be according to the number of their respective inhabitants."After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, The Court issued aresolution, stating that RA 3040 violates the Constitution in several ways namely:(a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitantsgot four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a biggerpopulation got three only; .

Tan v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this case, however, is a bit on the technical side. - when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador

Benedicto. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: (1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite (2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3. ISSUE: W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that -"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." HELD: In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental. "Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte." The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a

doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that: "...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision." It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected. "Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners." Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. "WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation) FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941. On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory. HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note: Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district representatives - x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows: 208 x .20 = 52 .80 The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.

BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001Facts: Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream politicalparties , the none-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list electionsb.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors and organizations. Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.a . Y e s b . N o . Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-listelections . Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system . For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly statesthat a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.

The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory . It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution .

Hence, RA 7941 wasenacted

AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Issue: Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes d o m i c i l e t o w a r r a n t t h e disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. Held: The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and

acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Case Digest on Torayno v. COMELEC G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)

November 10, 2010

FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor. HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the LakasNUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held:

Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that

the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court

G.R. No. L-2821: Avelino vs Cuenco Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414 Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.

Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the

Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority. Pacete v Commission on Appointments G.R. No. L-25895. July 23, 1971 07/23/2010 0 Comments
Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been by-passed. Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received. Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.

Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the

adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965; Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner. The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional prescription. In view of confirmation In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965. In view of construction As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion." 1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered nonexistent. His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation." 2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. 3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even

legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the fundamental law ordains. As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not unduly limited

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the

Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects

person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924 07/23/2010 0 Comments
Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.

Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.

Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.

In view of the propriety of mandamus Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.

In view of effects of punishment Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.

In view of no remedy Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine

Senate take any particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

Osmena, Jr. vs. Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of

Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech

Held:

Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity

which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan

On January 4, 2012 00 Political Law Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019 On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran

counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator? In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which

he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both

legal and jurisprudential support. xxx It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed: x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. xxx Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002] DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIV.) EN BANC

Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 5 2002. G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), respondent.) The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari[1] is whether of not the Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House of Representatives for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a criminal case against a member of the House.
cralaw

Petitioners seek the annulment of: (1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division),[2] directing Speaker Jose de Venecia of the House of Representatives, to implement the preventive suspension of then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in connection with Criminal Case No. 18857 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S. Branzuela"; and
cralaw

(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997,[3] also of the Sandiganbayan, declaring Speaker de Venecia in contempt of court for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order.
cralaw

The facts are as follows: On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a "Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite." In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused.But the Speaker did not comply.Thus, on August 12, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.

[ [ [

Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116 adopted on August 13, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed Resolution[4] declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
cralaw

Hence, the instant recourse. The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan in G.R. No. 118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose.It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid Information.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court.On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members.It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity. Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court en banc, through Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019, thus: "The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. x x x. "The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. x x x. "The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary - has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch." (Emphasis ours)

We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This rendered moot and academic the instant case. WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. (Quisumbing, J., no part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business) Very truly yours, LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO Clerk of Court (Sgd.) MA. VILLARAMA Asst. Clerk of Court LUISA D.

CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez

On January 9, 2012

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. US v Pons G.R. No. 11530. August 12, 1916. 07/28/2010 1 Comment The favor of the merits of this case in the "real" sense of the word can be granted to the petitioner. His argument lie on the fact that there was still no law that punishes the act of his client. A difference of one day can spell out a difference of penalty in the sentence of his client. The Legislature apparently moved to stop the clock. This meant that the record in the Journal will not show the change in date. The oral testimony coming from the attendees of the said hearing cannot be admitted as evidence because it will set a precedent whereby the nullity of the law will be based on something that is vulnerable to infirmities. Most importantly, the validity of the law cannot be assailed as there is constitutionality of this law

U.S. V. PONS, G.R. NO. L-11530 AUGUST 12, 1916 FACTS: The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after

those of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. Affirmed the decision.
GUINGONA v. CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.) They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e., Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.) whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. 12 RULING: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same. TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE, 235 SCRA 630 First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with

amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution[8] because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994[9] and again on March 22, 1994,[10] the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] t has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause [i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval] would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution, such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in

its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.[17] If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases[20] manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G. R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, Section 26[1] which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title. The question is whether this amendment of Section 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P. D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P. D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to Section 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P. D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P. D. No. 1590 is:

Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner vs. Enriquez, respondent Facts: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

LUNG CENTER VS. QUEZON CITY GR 144104 June29, 2004 En Banc, Callejo J: Facts: The lung center is a charitable institution within the context of 1973 and 1987 constitutions. The elements considered in determining a charitable institution are: the statue creating the enterprise; its corporate purposes; constitution and by-laws, methods of administration, nature of actual work performed, character of the services rendered, indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use occupation of properties. As a gen. principle, a charitable institution doe not lose its character as such and its exemption form taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, or receives subsidies from government; and no money insures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. Issue: Whether or not the real properties of the lung center are exempt from real property taxes. Ruling. Partly No. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not

exempt from actually, direct and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. Vi of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes. an vs. Del Rosario 237 SCRA 324 Facts: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income taxation scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution. Issue: is the contention meritorious? Ruling: No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must apply equally to all members of the same class. The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present global treatment on taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

G.R. No. 157584: Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary

Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414 Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts .

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO C A R I O F O U N D A T I O N I N C . , C E N T E R F O R ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHERMRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON,D I A N E MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES C O N V E R S I O N D E V E L O P M E N T AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES, respondents.Facts: The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portionof Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John HaySpecial Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full powerto exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as itspower to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a lawgranting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, theclaimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from thelanguage of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of taxexemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution. However, theentire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced. Issue: WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition Ruling: YES Rationale: R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs outof all the base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence onthe bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the realinterests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, ispersonal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government actbeing challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely aninterest in the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in

the enforcement of ProclamationNo. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. ... Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governanceof Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether toconcur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitionersClaravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the presentpetitio

Astorga vs. Villegas

G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the

President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body

G.R. No. L-29658: Morales vs Subido, Commissioner (Civil Service) Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414 Journals vs Enrolled Bill

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.'

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made

in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

G.R. No. L-34676: Ligot vs Mathay Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414 Salaries of Representatives Retirement

Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law." HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, exCongressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would

lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly."

Ligot vs Mathay
On January 2, 2012 00 Political Law Salaries of Representatives Retirement Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to

pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, exCongressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from

having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.

Issue:
a

Whether or not the publication in question is privileged communication

Held:

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of

the

acts

in

question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Adaza vs Pacana
On September 3, 2011

Singularity of Office/Position Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost

can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor. HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . . The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could

appear as counsel before any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held:

Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock

in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal - A case digest
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Facts: This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed. Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary. Issue:

WON the SET can function without the Senator members. Ruling:

Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In

the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,

the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held: The

purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against

Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
Codilla vs. de Venecia

G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,

influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation. ISSUES:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

RULING: First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. xxx Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. xxx (a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. (b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin. xxx A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding. Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If

the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Prepared by Glenda Claudio Facts: Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction were filed before the court that the respondents be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and CA to include part-list representatives in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and 18, Art VI. Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of which are party-list representatives (PLR), the petitioners put forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted and be replaced by PLR nominees. Issues: (I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because no party-list representatives are members thereof. (II) Whether the refusal of the HRET and CA to reconstitute themselves to include party list representatives constitute a grave

abuse of discretion. Held The court dismissed the case on the following grounds: (I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because: a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members will occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and CA. And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their own nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and not the Supreme Court) in accordance with the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed to meet the requirements set forth for judicial review. The petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA and neither were they nominees to take the seat. (II) There was likewise no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by HRET and CA because under Sec 17 and 18 of Art VI, the HRET and CA are deprived of any power to reconstitute themselves. (III) The instant petitions must fail because of the new set of district and party-list reps elected in the House. It cannot be resolved based on the "present composition" of the House as presented by the petitioners.

Raul Daza vs Luis Singson

25 11 2010

1 Vote

Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on

Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Coseteng vs Mitra (G.R. No. 86649)

25 Jul Facts: Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as

members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation Issue: 1. WON the question raised is political. 2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/ Held: 1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the

Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable. Home

Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971, March 1, 1993

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP 7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC2.5; LAKAS-NUCD1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue:
VI,

Whether or not there is a violation of Art. Sec. 18

Held: The

respondents claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the

basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The

case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the

state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a

public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs

Lidasan v. Comelec
Bara Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections,21 SCRA 542

Facts: RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, took effect on June 18, 1966. It sought to create the new municipality of Dianaton within barrios in Lanao del Sur, but also included barrios located in Cotabato. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional because its Title is misleading and invoked the provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Issue: Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" satisfied the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify the public and others concerned of its substance.

Decis ion: RA4970, An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur, is deemed unconstitutional. The very title projected the impression that Lanao del Sur is the only province affected by the act. This statute apprised neither Congress nor the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato that part of Cotabatos territory is being taken to add to the adjacent Lanao del Sur.

Dissenting opinion: Fernando, J. The said provision of the Constitution must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in all courts, as opposed to the strict interpretation of the Supreme Court. Thus, the title of RA 4790 is sufficient to inform the public of its substance, namely, the creation of the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

23 11 2010

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Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la

Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Case Digest: Tobias v. Abalos

Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, constitution, digest, law

0 G.R.No. L-114785 PONENTE: BIDIN, J. FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. 08 December 1994

ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD/RULING: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Demetria v Alba G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987FACTS:Petitioners filed as

concerned citizens of this country, as members of the NationalAssembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties withgeneral interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whosevital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for. The petitionersassail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 or the BudgetReform Decree of 1977 with a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of

preliminaryinjunction.The contents of PD 1177 particularly that of the first paragraph of section 44 extends theprivilege of the president to discriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,office or agency of the Executive Department of any program, project or activity of anydepartment, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approvedafter its enactment.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi and fulfill the requisites for suing astaxpayers and concerned citizens.HELD:The petitioners comply with the legal standing both as concerned citizens and taxpayers.As concerned citizens, the petitioners bring the suit in quest of law and justice. The issuecries out to be solved as justice demands not only for the vindication of the outragedright but also for the guidance of the bench and bar, and as a restraint upon the future.Furthermore, the petitioner has standing to sue as taxpayer. In the determination of thedegree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a s t a t u t e , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t n o t o n l y p e r s o n s i n d i v i d u a l l y a f f e c t e d , b u t a l s o taxpayers. They have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneysraised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiringexpenditure of public moneys.T h e Supreme Court granted the instant petition. Paragraph 1 of S e c t i o n 4 4 o f Presidential Decree No. 1177 was also declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Guingona vs. Caraque, 196 SCRA 221 (1991) "What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is thecompleteness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of themeasure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, andwhat is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process cango forward . . . To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that thelegislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy . . . The standard may be either expressor implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act considered as whole .

Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the

construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent. Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which

provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid

Held:

The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasijudicial agencies. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.